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S.........................................................................................................viii
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L ..................................................................................................1
The Mandate ...............................................................................................................1
Getting off the Ground....................................................................................................3
Our Commitment to Public Education.................................................................................6
Meeting the Public.........................................................................................................9
The Diaspora .............................................................................................................12
Our Commitment to Public Consultation............................................................................12
Our Review of Public Offices..........................................................................................14
The Final Phase .........................................................................................................15
Our Decision-Making Process ........................................................................................16
The Preparation of Our Report .......................................................................................17
Conclusion ................................................................................................................18
SIGNATURE PAGE............................................................................................................20
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D ....................................................................................................................23
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................................32
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Pre-Independence Events .............................................................................................58
Foundations of the Legal System .............................................................................59
Constitutional Fundamentals...................................................................................61
Declassified Information on Independence..................................................................62
Post-Independence Experience ......................................................................................66
RECOGNISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SIR ARTHUR LEWIS ..................................................71
CHAPTER ONE – PRELIMINARY
Constitutional Reform and a Referendum..........................................................................77
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CHAPTER TWO – REWORDING THE PREAMBLE
Language of the Constitution..........................................................................................78
Recommendations ...............................................................................................78
Indigenous People.......................................................................................................79
Recommendation.................................................................................................80
Preserving Culture.......................................................................................................80
Recommendation.................................................................................................80
Rule of Law ...............................................................................................................80
Recommendation.................................................................................................81
The Recognition of God................................................................................................81
Recommendation.................................................................................................82
The Queen’s Chain......................................................................................................83
Recommendations ...............................................................................................84
Additional Matters Considered........................................................................................84
The Environment..................................................................................................84
Recommendations ...............................................................................................85
Separation of Powers............................................................................................85
Recommendations ...............................................................................................85
Constitutional Review............................................................................................86
Recommendation.................................................................................................86
CHAPTER THREE – STRENGTHENING OUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
The Marlborough House Agreements on Human Rights........................................................87
The Right to Life .........................................................................................................89
Recommendation.................................................................................................90
Deprivation of Property.................................................................................................90
Recommendations ...............................................................................................91
Protection of Public Property..........................................................................................92
Recommendations ...............................................................................................92
Capital Punishment .....................................................................................................93
Recommendation.................................................................................................93
Extension of Protection on the Grounds of Discrimination......................................................93
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Gender ..............................................................................................................93
Discrimination against Women.................................................................................94
Recommendation.................................................................................................94
Sexual Orientation................................................................................................95
Recommendations ...............................................................................................97
Common Law Unions...................................................................................................97
Recommendations ...............................................................................................98
Same-Sex Unions .......................................................................................................99
Recommendation.................................................................................................99
The Right to Privacy ....................................................................................................99
Recommendations .............................................................................................100
The Right to Health....................................................................................................100
Recommendations .............................................................................................101
The Right to Work .....................................................................................................101
Recommendations .............................................................................................103
Termination of Contracts of Employment.........................................................................103
Recommendation...............................................................................................104
The Right to Education ...............................................................................................104
Recommendation...............................................................................................104
Consumer Rights ......................................................................................................104
Recommendation...............................................................................................105
Public Information and State Property ............................................................................105
Recommendations .............................................................................................106
Protection of Patrimony, Cultural Heritage and National Assets.............................................107
Recommendations .............................................................................................108
Human Rights Commission .........................................................................................108
Recommendation...............................................................................................109
Youth Representation.................................................................................................109
Recommendation...............................................................................................109
Locus Standi............................................................................................................109
Recommendations .............................................................................................111
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CHAPTER FOUR – BECOMING A REPUBLIC WITH A NEW HEAD OF STATE
Monarchy or Republic – The Pre-Independence Debate .....................................................112
Becoming a Republic .................................................................................................113
New Practices in State Craft Regionally ..........................................................................114
Recommendations .............................................................................................117
The Head of State of Saint Lucia...................................................................................118
Method of Appointment........................................................................................118
Qualification......................................................................................................118
Tenure ............................................................................................................118
Removal from Office ...........................................................................................119
Procedure for Removal........................................................................................119
Recommendations .............................................................................................120
CHAPTER FIVE – REFORMING OUR PARLIAMENT
The Pre-Independence Debate.....................................................................................122
Separation of Powers.................................................................................................124
Recommendations..............................................................................................130
The Westminster Parliamentary Model ...........................................................................131
Public Concerns .......................................................................................................134
Bi-cameralism ..........................................................................................................134
The Role of Elected Representatives .............................................................................135
Creating a Hybrid System............................................................................................137
Some Effects of Hybridization.......................................................................................138
Recommendations .............................................................................................139
The Senate..............................................................................................................140
Recommendations .............................................................................................140
Choice of an Electoral System......................................................................................141
Recommendations .............................................................................................144
Right of Recall..........................................................................................................144
Recommendations .............................................................................................148
Ministers of Religion ..................................................................................................148
Recommendation...............................................................................................149
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Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commissions.........................................................149
Recommendations .............................................................................................150
CHAPTER SIX – CREATING A HYBRID EXECUTIVE
Term Limits for the Prime Minister .................................................................................152
Recommendation...............................................................................................158
Direct Election of the Prime Minister Excluded from Hybrid ..................................................158
Recommendation...............................................................................................159
Deputy Prime Minister ................................................................................................159
Recommendations .............................................................................................160
The Attorney General.................................................................................................160
Recommendations .............................................................................................161
Maintaining Stability and Efficiency Under the New Hybrid: The Cabinet, Collective
Responsibility and Parliament.......................................................................................161
The Leader of the Opposition .......................................................................................164
Recommendations .............................................................................................165
CHAPTER SEVEN – RE-ENGINEERING THE PUBLIC SERVICE
The Public Service ....................................................................................................166
The Public Service Commission....................................................................................170
Recommendations .............................................................................................171
The Police Service ....................................................................................................172
Recommendations .............................................................................................174
Scrutiny of Service Commissions ..................................................................................174
Recommendations .............................................................................................175
The Director of Audit ..................................................................................................175
Recommendations .............................................................................................176
The Director of Public Prosecutions ...............................................................................176
Recommendations .............................................................................................177
CHAPTER EIGHT – LOCAL GOVERNMENT .........................................................................178
Pre 1946.................................................................................................................178
Post 1946 to Present..................................................................................................179
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Conduct of Elections ..................................................................................................180
Role of Parliamentary Representatives ...........................................................................181
Recommendations .............................................................................................183
CHAPTER NINE – STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OF SCRUTINY AND
OVERSIGHT
The Parliamentary Commissioner..................................................................................186
Recommendations .............................................................................................188
Integrity Commission..................................................................................................189
Recommendations .............................................................................................193
The Public Accounts Committee ...................................................................................194
Recommendations .............................................................................................197
A Contractor-General for Saint Lucia..............................................................................198
Recommendations .............................................................................................200
CHAPTER TEN – THE JUDICIARY
The Magistracy.........................................................................................................202
Recommendations .............................................................................................205
The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court ..........................................................................206
Recommendation...............................................................................................207
The Caribbean Court of Justice ....................................................................................207
Recommendations .............................................................................................214
The Role of the Minister of Justice.................................................................................214
Recommendation...............................................................................................215
CHAPTER ELEVEN –CITIZENSHIP ACT AND RELATED PROVISIONS
Recommendations .............................................................................................222
CHAPTER TWELVE – RELATED MATTERS .........................................................................225
Elections and Political Party Financing............................................................................225
Recommendations .............................................................................................227
Diaspora related issues ..............................................................................................228
Financial Accountability (The Finance (Administration) Act) .................................................230
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Recommendations .............................................................................................234
Regional Integration...................................................................................................234
CHAPTER THIRTEEN – THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ITS EFFECT ON POLITICAL CULTURE ...236
CHAPTER FOURTEEN – RESERVATIONS
Commissioner Terrence Charlemagne ...........................................................................240
Commissioner Veronica Cenac.....................................................................................247
Commissioner David Cox............................................................................................251
Commissioner Flavia Cherry ........................................................................................264
APPENDICES
Appendix I: Statutory Instrument, 2004, No. 50.............................................................270
Appendix II: CRC’s Information Pamphlet. ...................................................................278
Appendix III: Secondary Schools and Tertiary Institutions Outreach Activities........................284
Appendix IV: Outreach Activities – Community Preparatory Meetings and Consultations..........285
Appendix V: Outreach Activities – Groups and Associations.............................................293
Appendix VI: Outreach Activities – Panel Discussions and Public Lectures...........................295
Appendix VII: Outreach Activities – Consultations with the Diaspora ....................................298
Appendix VIII: Outreach Activities – Media Activities.........................................................299
Appendix IX: Public Oral Presentations.......................................................................302
Appendix X: Interviews with Constitutionally Established Functionaries ..............................306
Appendix XI: Summary of Submissions Received..........................................................308
Appendix XII: Preparatory Activities of CRC..................................................................326
Appendix XIII: List of persons/organisation making written submissions................................328
Appendix XIV: CRC’s Internal Meetings and Training June 2006 – Oct. 2008.........................334
Appendix XV: CRC Prayer .......................................................................................345
INDEX...........................................................................................................................346
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CBO Community Based Organisations
CCJ Caribbean Court of Justice
CRC Constitutional Reform Commission
DBS Daher Broadcasting Service
DPM Deputy Prime Minister
ECSC Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
FPTP First Past The Post
GIS Government Information Service
HTS Helen Television Service
ILO International Labour Organisation
JLSC Judicial and Legal Services Commission
LOGB Leader of Government Business
MP Member of Parliament
NCA National Conservation Authority
NIC National Insurance Corporation
NPC National Printing Corporation
NTN National Television Network
OC Outreach Coordinator
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OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
PAC Public Accounts Committee
PC Privy Council
PM Prime Minister
PMA Piton Management Area
PR Proportional Representation
PSA Public Service Announcement
RCI Radio Caribbean International
RSL Radio Saint Lucia
SI Statutory Instrument
SIDS Small Island Developing States
SLP St. Lucia Labour Party
TOR Terms of Reference
UN United Nations
UNCRC
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UWP United Workers Party
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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Her Excellency, Dame Calliopa Pearlette Louisy, GCSL, GCMG, D.St. J., PhD, LL.D (Hon), FRSA.
Governor General.
The Honourable Dr. Hilda Rose Marie Husbands-Mathurin
Speaker of the House of Assembly
Your Excellency,
The Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC) of Saint Lucia is pleased and privileged to submit its
final report to the Parliament and to the people of Saint Lucia.
The Mandate
By unanimous resolution dated 17
th
February, 2004, the House of Assembly of Saint Lucia
authorised the establishment of a Constitutional Reform Commission (hereafter “the Commission”)
to examine Saint Lucia’s Constitution (Saint Lucia Constitution Order S.I. 1901 of 1978) (hereafter
“the Constitution”) and to report in writing, the Commission’s opinions and recommendations for
possible reform of that same Constitution (“herein after the Resolution”)
The Resolution stated that the Commission was required, through broad-based consultations with
Saint Lucians both at home and abroad, to “review and reform the Constitution of Saint Lucia in
order to encourage effective governance, to ensure that the institutions of State remain strong and
responsive and that the rights and freedoms guaranteed to all persons are respected.” It noted
further, that the major objectives of the exercise were principally to:
“(a) promote a meaningful expansion and widening of democratic participation by citizens
in Government;
(b) address possible weaknesses in the constitutional framework which political practice
had highlighted over the years;
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2
(c) re-fashion the Constitution so that it better accorded with our changing social and
political circumstances; and
(d) promote better governance and greater equity in the constitutional framework
generally”.
In the conduct of its affairs, the Commission was to be guided by a set of Terms of Reference
(TORs) specified in the Resolution, which among other things, mandated the Commission to seek
ways to;
(a) strengthen democratic institutions;
(b) encourage a wider and deeper participation by citizens in the processes of
Government;
(c) strengthen accountability of public institutions; and
(d) strengthen the fundamental and basic rights of citizens of Saint Lucia.
The Resolution established the Commission in such a manner so that it constituted persons
nominated by both Government and Opposition, as well as a wide cross section of Civil Society. It
stated that the Commission would comprise twenty-five (25) individuals, with a Chairperson and
Deputy to be appointed by the Governor General, with the former to be nominated by the Prime
Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, and the latter to be nominated by the
Leader of the Opposition after consultation with the Prime Minister. To ensure its independence,
the Commission would not comprise members of Parliament.
This Resolution was also unanimously passed in the Senate on 14
th
April 2004. Its adoption
represented the realisation of a statement of intent made just over four years prior, in Her
Excellency’s own Throne Speech delivered on 21
st
March 2000, during which the then Government
of Saint Lucia indicated its intention to cause the Constitution to be reviewed. A copy of the
Resolution is appended hereto as Appendix I.
Although the Resolution was published in the Saint Lucia Gazette on the 16
th
July 2004 as
Statutory Instrument, 2004, No. 50, it was not until Friday 18
th
November 2005, almost sixteen (16)
months later, that the Commission was able to formally launch and present its mission to the Saint
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
3
Lucian public. This was because in the intervening period between the publication of the
Resolution and the ceremony launching the Commission, various administrative matters had to be
settled before the Commission could commence its work.
The chairperson of the Commission, in the person of Madam Justice Suzie d’Auvergne (retired)
was appointed by Your Excellency, on the advice of then Prime Minister, Dr. the Honourable Kenny
D. Anthony, with the support and concurrence of then Leader of the Opposition, the Honourable
Mr. Arsene James.
On Monday, 13
th
June 2005, the Prime Minister informed the public that Mr. James had also
provided the Opposition’s final list of nominees for membership of the Commission, including its
nomination for the position of Deputy Chair, in the person of Mr. Nicholas John, Attorney-at-Law.
This paved the way for the remainder of the Commission to be formally appointed by Your
Excellency and for the Commission to be presented to the public.
At the formal ceremony, launching the Commission to the public in November 2005, the
Commission was honoured to be addressed by, among many distinguished persons, Mr. Parnel
Campbell, CVO, Q.C., who at that time served as the Chairman of the Constitutional Review
Commission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. In his remarks, he commended the Government
of Saint Lucia and the Parliamentary Opposition for their bi-partisan approach to establishing the
Commission, and reminded the Commission that bi-partisanship was essential to any eventual
success at constitutional reform. The Commission was greatly influenced by Mr. Campbell’s
exhortations and was grateful for the benefit of his experience in the Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines context, up to that time.
Getting Off the Ground
In the period immediately following its launch, accommodation was settled for the Commission at
Poinsettia Drive in Vigie, Castries, and appropriate furnishings, equipment and telephone and
related services, were obtained through the kind assistance of the Office of the Prime Minister.
Ms. Zenith James, retired former Director of Finance in the Ministry of Finance, was recruited as
Secretary to the Commission. This proved a fortunate choice since, in the course of the
Commission’s five (5) year existence, many instances arose in which her diligence and knowledge
Report – March 2011
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of the inner workings of the Ministry of Finance, probably staved off several forced interruptions in
the Commission’s work. To be sure, lack of operational funds, apparently occasioned by the
sluggishness or indifference to the work of the Commission on the part of the Public Service,
proved to be challenging. Ms. James also proved integral to guaranteeing the Commission’s
financial accountability for the resources it received.
The Commission began its work in earnest on 1
st
June 2006, nearly two years after publication of
the Statutory Instrument which established it, and nearly a year after formal appointment of its
membership by Your Excellency in 2005. By agreement, the Commission met once a week on
Wednesday afternoons for several hours at a time.
Shortly after convening its first meeting, the Commission established a Management Committee,
initially comprising the Chair, Deputy Chair, Mr. Eldon Mathurin and Mr. David Cox, and charged it
with the responsibility of, among other things, developing appropriate structures to guide the work
of the Commission over its lifespan, and a strategic plan to cover the initial stages of the
Commission’s work. In that regard, and with the concurrence of the full Commission, the following
matters were decided:
(a) that the work of reviewing the Constitution would be divided into three broad
phases;
(b) that the first phase would involve simultaneous public education programmes and
internal familiarisation programmes for members of the Commission;
(c) that the second phase would constitute a sustained, widespread community
outreach programme of public consultations at home and abroad, to permit
members of the Commission to engage the public on their views on the
Constitution; and finally
(d) that the third phase would involve examination and discussion of the various oral
and written submissions received from the public and eventual preparation of the
Commission’s report for submission to Parliament.
Thereafter, the Commission took a decision to seek advice and assistance with the task of team
building and organisational management. We regarded this as essential since the membership was
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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drawn from various backgrounds and disciplines and Commissioners were largely unknown to
each other.
Consequently, the Commission recruited Dr. Aubrey Armstrong of Aubrey Armstrong Management
Associates based in Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago, to conduct a one day workshop aimed at
strengthening the organisational capacity of the Commission and promoting internal cohesion
among our membership. Held on 30
th
September 2006, the workshop proved invaluable in shaping
the Commission into a stronger body. We are grateful to Dr. Armstrong for his invaluable
assistance which was provided gratis and are happy to report that the workshop was a resounding
success at forging the Commission into a cohesive body.
In the course of our initial discussions, it became apparent to the entire membership that, quite
apart from organisational issues, an extended immersion in Saint Lucia’s Constitution and its
history and traditions was required. Although the Commission counted several attorneys-at-law
among its membership, the Commission felt that a focused education programme aimed at getting
all Commissioners familiar with our Constitution was an essential requirement in preparation for
engagement with the general public.
In that regard, several internal workshops were executed and documents prepared, with the
purpose of training Commissioners on various aspects of the Constitution. Among other
documents, we prepared a Glossary of Legal Terms for the benefit of the non-lawyer members
amongst us. We drew upon the expertise of several Commissioners with expertise in Constitutional
Law and Political Science, all of whom provided key assistance in leading workshop sessions.
These workshops reviewed legal, socio-political, historical, cultural and occasionally, operational
matters. Not including the session led by Dr. Armstrong, a total of five (5) such workshops were
held between October 2006 and September 2007, ranging from four (4) to eight (8) hours in
duration. These workshops proved essential preparation for the Commission’s later community
outreach programmes.
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Our Commitment to Public Education
Convinced that a deeper and wider knowledge of our Constitution would enable members of the
public to better articulate their concerns with its provisions and ultimately lead to more successful
public consultations, the Commission prepared a detailed and comprehensive public education
initiative for the dual purposes of familiarising our citizens with their Constitution and sensitising
them to the Commission’s mandate. This ambitious and comprehensive initiative was designed to
promote the Commission’s agenda via print and electronic means, and drew on a wide range of
resources and expertise.
With the assistance of the Voice Publishing Co. Ltd, the Commission secured the preparation of
20,000 easy to understand pamphlets which provided information on constitutional reform. These
pamphlets were distributed in the Saturday edition of The Voice newspaper sometime in late
September/early October 2006, and generated widespread discussion in the weeks immediately
following release. See Appendix II for the content of the pamphlet.
With the support of the Office of the Prime Minister and the National Printing Corporation (NPC,)
1200 copies of the Constitution were prepared for sale by the Commission at a greatly reduced
cost to the public. Several thousand copies of the Statutory Instrument establishing the
Commission were also printed for distribution at various functions and for inclusion in copies of the
Constitution when sold or distributed. Several copies of these documents were distributed by
members of the Commission at various public functions to which the Commission was invited or
which were convened by or on the Commission’s behalf.
After much effort and considerable frustration, the Commission was eventually able to establish,
with the kind assistance of Mr. Richmond Felix, then of the Government Information Service, a
website in the final quarter of 2006, on which the Commission made available, among other things,
information relating to the Commissioners, the Statutory Instrument establishing the Commission,
and an electronic copy of the Constitution for download. Much to the dismay and regret of
Commissioners, the dedicated technical and financial assistance necessary to make the website
1
as interactive as we initially hoped, was never made available through central Government.
1
Commission’s website address: www.saintluciaconstitution.org
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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Notwithstanding, the website proved adequate for our purposes in the period immediately after the
commencement of operations.
Sometime in the final quarter of 2006, the Commission secured the services of a local playwright,
to produce an initial run of twelve (12) public service announcements (PSAs) to be broadcast on
local radio and television stations over a twelve (12) week period. These two minute PSAs, which
principally featured well known local folk actors and which were titled “Constitutionally Speaking,”
examined specific issues in Constitutional Reform, and were broadcast primarily on Radio St. Lucia
(RSL) and the National Television Network (NTN). So well received were they and of such high
quality, that the Commission ordered twelve (12) additional episodes for airing.
Unfortunately, and with much regret, the Commission was unable to broadcast on other television
stations due to prohibitive costs. The Commission nevertheless feels fortunate to have secured the
participation of all concerned in the production exercise and believes that the PSAs could be
strategically re-utilised in any eventual referendum campaign on constitutional reform.
Simultaneously with the production of the PSAs, the Commission was able with the assistance of
UNDP to produce a one hour television documentary on constitutional reform. The documentary,
which was aired in two parts, focused first on the immediate pre-independence period and the
difficulties experienced by Saint Lucia between 1979 – 82. The second episode focused on the full
range of the constitutional issues with which the Commission would be occupied in the coming
years.
In this connection, the Commission was grateful and fortunate to have secured the participation of,
among many other distinguished persons, the late Sir John Compton and Dr. the Honourable
Kenny D. Anthony, in the period immediately preceding and following general elections in 2006. To
the extent that the documentary represents an historical record, we considered it fortuitous that the
late Prime Minister was able to share his views on constitutional reform prior to his illness and
death in 2007. The participation by Dr. Anthony during a time when political responsibilities were at
their heaviest, meant that the Commission was in a privileged position of having two different Prime
Ministers, publicly endorse and underscore the importance of the Commission’s work. The
documentary was produced during the months between November 2006 and January 2007, and
Report – March 2011
8
aired on NTN, DBS and HTS in mid-April 2007, and by all accounts, received by the Saint Lucian
public with much acclaim.
Sometime in early 2007, the Commission took a decision to retain the services of a public relations
firm to prepare a programme drawing attention to the Commission’s work and also to “launch” its
public education initiative with an appropriate level of fanfare. This launching of the Constitutional
Reform Education Campaign under the theme “Secure Your Rights. Raise Your Voice,” took the
form of three (3) simultaneous exhibitions in the Castries Town Hall, the Gablewoods Mall in Vieux
Fort and the Soufriere Town Square, between 15
th
to 17
th
March 2007 inclusive. The programme
included public addresses by the Chair and fellow Commissioners, and received widespread
coverage in the local print and electronic media for several days.
Throughout much of 2007, the Commission also made diligent efforts to engage young people in
Saint Lucia through visits to a number of institutions of learning. Between 3
rd
May and 17
th
October
2007 inclusive, Commissioners visited twenty-one (21) secondary and tertiary level educational
institutions. The full list of learning institutions visited by the Commission is appended hereto as
Appendix III. To complement this activity, the Commission also launched, with sponsorship from
the 1
st
National Bank, an essay competition on the desirability and necessity of constitutional
reform, with special awards aimed at two broad categories; persons under sixteen (16) years of
age and persons above sixteen (16).
From the launch of the Commission right through to the completion of this report, members of the
Commission participated in a number of popular radio and television “call-in” programmes on
several local stations. Judging from the number of questions and calls received, these programmes
appeared to have generated remarkable interest in the constitutional debate.
These activities represent only some of the public education initiatives undertaken by the
Commission in the first phase of its work. This early sensitisation and focused public education
drive, ran from June 2006 and for much of 2007. It would also continue, in some form or other, for
nearly the full five years during which the Commission conducted its mission, and would be
complemented by other activities.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
9
While it is difficult to measure accurately how successful the Commission was in its efforts to
promote a high level of awareness of constitutional reform among the public during this period,
anecdotal evidence suggests that the measures adopted, were generally effective. We believe, for
example, that the many “call-in” programmes focused on reform, played a significant role in raising
public awareness about the functions of the Commission and in prompting widespread interest and
participation in our eventual public consultations.
We noted for example, the repeated and persistent references to the work of the Commission, by
members of the public in their daily commentary on various radio stations, even in cases of
programmes unrelated to the topic. It was also not uncommon for nearly all Commissioners to
relate stories of being approached by individuals seeking an update on the Commission’s work. We
noted too, a special interest on the part of certain radio personnel and broadcasting stations, in
keeping the discussion on constitutional reform in the forefront of the public’s mind.
In this regard, special mention must be made of the generous cooperation of Radio Caribbean
International (RCI), and in particular Mr. Timothy Poleon and Ms. Cherry-Ann Gaillard, for their
consistent efforts to keep the subject of constitutional reform current whether by inclusion of a
news item in the midday news, or through frequent invitations to members of the Commission to
discuss issues of constitutional import. The Commission is moved to wonder how much more
successful it might have been, in promoting interest in reform, if other radio and television stations
had followed this example.
Meeting the Public
In the next phase of the Commission’s strategic plan, a heavy focus was placed on community
outreach programmes and/or widespread public consultations.
Sometime in April of 2007, the Commission first considered the possibility of retaining the services
of a full time member of staff to organise community outreach activities. The position required an
individual to arrange public meetings in all constituencies and to organise targeted consultations
with groups throughout Saint Lucia. In September 2007, Mr. Amatus Edwards was recruited as an
Outreach Coordinator to perform these tasks. With Mr. Edwards’ appointment, the Commission
Report – March 2011
10
began in earnest to make arrangements to engage directly with the public on their views on
constitutional reform.
Beginning in October 2007 and extending until December 2008, the initial community outreach
activities, varying in form from panel discussions to public lectures transformed into interactive
consultations with members of the public. This was because, in some cases, the Commission felt
that, notwithstanding the public education initiatives already discussed, it was necessary to do
more intimate preparatory work with communities, to sensitise citizens on the issues before the
Commission and to better equip them to express their views on what provisions should be
changed, or what reforms should be pursued.
These sessions were generally held on evenings between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.
and were each facilitated by two (2) or three (3) Commissioners. They were audio recorded
wherever possible. The level of attendance varied, with some meetings recording the presence of
over a hundred persons while in others the numbers were in single digits. The consultations
spanned the length and breadth of the country and sought Saint Lucians out in the most remote
communities.
By early 2008, the Commission had recognised that an extension of time to complete the task
mandated by Parliament was required. Accordingly, on 13
th
May 2008, the Chair dispatched
correspondence requesting an extension of time to 31
st
December 2009 so as to complete the
Commission’s work. This extension was readily granted and as a result, the Commission was able
to continue its consultations with the public.
The final outreach meeting between the Commission and members of the public took place on 11
th
December 2008 in the community of Blanchard, Desruisseaux. The Commission held public
consultations in over one hundred and twenty-five (125) communities and villages from every
constituency in Saint Lucia and each of these was visited at least twice. The complete list of
communities visited by the Commission is appended hereto as Appendix IV.
In December 2008, intensification of the Commission’s activities placed increased pressure on the
Commission’s planning capacity and accordingly, the size of the Management Committee was
increased to include Commissioners Veronica Cenac, Dwight Lay, and Lawrence Poyotte.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
11
In the Commission’s desire to ensure that consultations with the public were as comprehensive as
possible and addressed all the myriad nuances or concerns our people expressed, the
Commission also convened special meetings with various associations and groups in Civil Society.
These meetings were carried on simultaneously with the community consultations and included a
cross-section of civil society organisations. A list of all organisations that met with the Commission
is appended hereto as Appendix V.
Of special note, was a meeting between the Commission and several members of Parliament,
including Prime Minister, Honourable Stephenson King and Leader of the Opposition, Dr. the
Honourable Kenny D. Anthony.
Throughout this period also, the Commission continued to organise and execute a number of
activities designed not only to promote discussion by members of the public on matters of reform,
but also to help prompt debate and analysis among Commissioners. In November and December
of 2008, we organised a series of panel discussions on the following issues:
(a) the relevance and importance of constitutional reform;
(b) whether Local Government should be afforded constitutional protection;
(c) whether we should retain the first past the post system or move to proportional
representation or a combination thereof;
(d) whether the Senate should be abolished; and finally,
(e) whether the Prime Minister should be directly elected.
The Commission was privileged to have been assisted in these discussions by the following
distinguished persons: Drs. Hamid Ghany and Francis Alexis, the Honourable Justice Hugh
Rawlins (now Chief Justice, of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Supreme Court), Mr.
Parnel Campbell, CVO, QC and Professor Albert Fiadjoe, among several others. A complete list of
the persons who participated in panel discussions organised by the Commission is appended
hereto as Appendix VI.
Report – March 2011
12
In an effort to provide some diversity in our approach, several public lectures on constitutional
reform were also specially arranged. The Commission was extremely grateful indeed, to have
secured, on separate dates and occasions, lectures by the distinguished personages of Drs. Hamid
Ghany, Tennyson Joseph, Honourable Ralph Gonzalves, Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines and Donatus St. Aimée, Professors Simeon McIntosh, Rose-Marie Belle Antoine and
Mr. Watson Louis.
The Diaspora
Financial constraints contributed to the Commission’s inability to send large delegations to the
Diaspora. As a consequence, a decision was taken to send small teams of two (2) Commissioners
to well known Saint Lucian communities living abroad, based on availability and willingness to
travel. In the event, the Commission undertook several overseas visits between early 2008 and
late 2009 to St. Croix, USVI, St. Thomas, USVI, Tortola and Virgin Gorda, BVI, Barbados,
Martinique, New York, Washington, Toronto and London. A list of visits and Commissioners who
attended is appended hereto as Appendix VII.
These visits proved to be highly successful and the Commission was heartened at the level of
interest displayed by Saint Lucians in the Diaspora, in matters of constitutional reform. We were
reassured of the strong ties between the Saint Lucian Diaspora and Saint Lucians at home, and of
their fervent desire to see no constitutional amendments which would weaken their ability to enjoy
the privileges of citizenship, as a result of their decision to live in other countries.
The Commission is deeply grateful to all the individuals who made a concerted effort to arrange
these meetings on our behalf.
Our Commitment to Public Consultation
As a result of the increased profile which the Commission’s activities had prompted during this
time, many Commissioners were privileged to be invited to discuss constitutional reform by
representatives of the local electronic media on a number of different programmes. Members of the
Commission made sixteen (16) appearances on the following radio and television programmes
between 2008 and 2009: RCI’s “News Spin” and “To the Point”, RSL’s “The Agenda”, and “In the
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
13
Public Interest”, DBS’ “Newsmaker Live”, and the then Helen FM 100’s “An Hól-la”, “Bring It On”,
Live 95 FM and “Straight Up”. Commissioners also participated in live radio talk shows on Hot FM,
Radio Free Iyanola and Praise FM. In some cases, Commissioners made repeated appearances at
the request of the hosts of the programmes and a wide diversity of reform related issues were
discussed. A list of media appearances by Commissioners is attached hereto as Appendix VIII
By early 2009, the majority of the Commission’s planned community meetings were completed and
the Commission readied itself to commence the enormous challenge of reviewing and debating the
many submissions for reform we received from the public. However, convinced that the legitimacy
of the entire review process depended on the quality and breadth of our public consultations, the
Commission determined that it was still necessary to take additional measures to target as many
different types of audiences as possible, before consultations could be finally concluded.
In that connection, the Commission developed a consultative plan for execution in 2009 that would
build on the previous engagements with the public. In January 2009 the Commission collaborated
with the Nobel Laureate Week Committee chaired by Your Excellency to organise three (3) public
lectures in Gros Islet with Ambassador Dr. June Soomer, in Soufriere with Mr. Hilary Charlemagne
and in Laborie with Mrs. Agatha Jn. Panel.
During the period 17
th
to 20
th
March 2009, the Commission organised public oral presentations at
the National Insurance Corporation (NIC) Conference Centre in Castries. The purpose of these
sessions was to allow members of the public to make oral presentations to the full Commission on
various proposals for constitutional reform. They would permit members of the Commission in the
course of what were essentially public “hearings,” to question presenters on the feasibility and the
philosophical underpinnings of their recommendations. In part also, the Commission hoped that
the activity would draw out those citizens who might be interested in reform, but who might not
ordinarily attend evening consultations, to make direct appeals to the Commission.
These “open days” proved to be among the most well attended and well received activities
undertaken by the Commission in its five (5) year existence. In the course of the initial hearings,
the Commission was privileged to receive presentations from twenty-one (21) presenters over
three (3) days, including representatives of interest groups and organisations and private
individuals. The complete list of presenters at this activity is appended hereto as Appendix IX.
Report – March 2011
14
The Commission arranged for live broadcast on Radio St. Lucia and re-broadcast on NTN of this
activity. The Station further assisted the Commission by airing interviews and panel discussions.
Commissioners also participated in GIS programmes: Issues and Answers, Konsit Kwéyòl and
Feedback. These programmes, which were meant to complement the public hearings, were
broadcast during the week of the Commission’s open day activities and were repeated on several
occasions through the admirable initiative of the staff of NTN.
On the basis of the resounding success of the first open day activities held in March 2009, the
Commission was moved to organise further public hearings for June of the same year. This was
because, in the intervening period since the last activity, it became apparent that a number of
persons who greatly desired to be heard by the Commission, but who were unable to attend for
various reasons, were seeking a new opportunity to participate in “interactive” sessions with the
Commission. In order to accommodate such persons and also to address a previous shortcoming
of the initial activities, namely that they had been restricted to Castries, a second set of public
hearings was arranged from 29
th
to 30
th
June 2009, at the Castries City Hall, Laborie Parish Hall,
and the St. Isidore Hall in Soufriere.
In the course of these hearings, the Commission was pleased to receive further presentations from
other individuals and organisations. The complete list of presenters at this second open event is
appended hereto as Appendix IX.
The final hearing, which took place on the 30
th
June, 2009 was held exactly three (3) years and
one (1) month after the Commission began official operations, represented the close of public
consultations.
Our Review of Public Offices
Upon the close of public consultations, Commissioners undertook targeted meetings with persons
who either previously held, or who were current holders, of various Constitutional offices.
These meetings, held between July and August 2009, proved extremely valuable, as the
Commission gleaned many practical lessons about the operations of Government which eventually
improved the quality of our final recommendations.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
15
The Commission was grateful for the opportunity to organise twenty (20) such meetings. The
complete list of persons interviewed during this series of meetings is appended hereto as
Appendix X.
Despite several attempts by the Commission, we were never able to convene meetings with any
former Attorney General or the holder of the office at the time. The last meeting with constitutional
functionaries took place on 26
th
August 2009.
By the latter half of 2009, the Commission had received a number of submissions from the public
and had amassed a great deal of information relating to constitutional thought and theory. By this
time the Commission had accumulated several hundred hours of recordings of public meetings,
approximately one hundred and thirty (130) written submissions and consulted with thousands of
Saint Lucians both at home and abroad. From these consultations and submissions, the
Commission distilled approximately two hundred and seventy (270) separate recommendations for
reform of our Constitution. This list of summarised submissions is appended hereto as Appendix
XI.
Since it was impractical to complete our review of the information in time to prepare a report to
Parliament by 31
st
December 2009, it was clear to the membership that a further extension would
have to be sought from Parliament. By letter dated 12
th
November 2009 therefore, the Commission
duly requested a further extension of time to 31
st
December 2010, to complete our deliberations
and prepare our report.
The Commission received confirmation for an extension for the year 2010 during the month of
February, 2010.
The Final Phase
In anticipation of the vast amount of information we would have amassed and conscious of the
importance of accurately recording the results of our deliberations, the Commission took a decision
in early January 2009, to obtain the services of two additional members of staff. After urgent
enquiries, the Commission retained the services of retired public servant Mr. Patrick Felix, who
joined the Commission in February 2009 to prepare detailed transcripts of the Commission’s
deliberations.
Report – March 2011
16
In May 2009, Mrs. Vanesta Moses-Felix, previously attached to the Department of Information
Services, Office of the Prime Minister, was also recruited on the basis of her qualifications and
experience in archiving and indexing information. Her principal task at the Commission was to
transcribe, index and properly cross-reference, the significant amounts of information in the
Commission’s possession, whether in the form of countless hours of recordings or in the form of
written submissions.
The decision to retain their services, proved key for the Commission’s operational success, since
by virtue of their diligence and efficiency, countless hours of the Commission’s deliberations were
faithfully and comprehensively transcribed. Many records which the Commission was keen to
safeguard and protect were duly secured, and the material on which the Commission itself would
deliberate, was made conveniently available in an easily digestible form. This greatly facilitated the
work of the Commission by enabling it to go directly into its deliberations as it entered the final
phase of its operations in November 2009.
Our Decision-Making Process
To enable the Commission to arrive at its recommendations and complete the report in a timely
manner, a decision was taken in late 2009, to hold meetings twice weekly. These “working
sessions,” which began on 16
th
November 2009, were scheduled for Monday and Wednesday
evenings between 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., and were initially held in the conference room of the
Ministry of Communications, Transport, Works, and Public Utilities but later moved to the
Commission’s office in Vigie. It was in the course of these sessions, that Commissioners debated
and scrutinised, the many submissions received from the public.
This proved a difficult and at times, contentious process, due to the size of the Commission and the
many strong and divergent views among Commissioners on some of the issues. The process was
also unavoidably time-consuming, since a concerted effort was made to ensure that all views were
heard and consensus arrived at where possible. Some Commissioners had such strong dissenting
views on some subjects that they felt compelled to express their reservations to some of the
recommendations of the Commission. These reservations are contained in Chapter Thirteen.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
17
In the course of these sessions, Commissioners examined proposals from the public as well as
from its membership. The Commission researched, examined and discussed a wide array of
material, including, but not limited to:
(a) jurisprudence about our own Constitution and those of other Commonwealth
Caribbean countries,
(b) several international treaties and conventions,
(c) several Acts of Saint Lucia’s Parliament (laws “related” to our Constitution),
(d) the Constitutions of a number of non-Commonwealth countries,
(e) news articles on constitutional matters from local, regional and international
sources, and
(f) scholarly papers on constitutional thought and theory from a range of sources.
The Commission also observed, examined, or took note of a number of significant local and
regional events which had constitutional overtones, and which had implications for its work.
The Commission closed review sessions on the 22
nd
September, 2010, after ten (10) months of
intense deliberations, and fifty-four (54) meetings totalling approximately two hundred and sixteen
(216) hours of debate.
The Preparation of Our Report
In the first quarter of 2010, Commissioners determined that it was necessary to obtain the services
of a consultant, to assist in the preparation of the instant report. This decision was premised on a
frank assessment that Commissioners, who were fully employed persons in their private capacities,
would be unable to dedicate the time required, to complete the work in time to meet the deadline of
31
st
December 2010. Commissioners were also mindful of the seriousness of the task entrusted to
them by Parliament and considered it prudent to seek expert advice in preparing an appropriate
document.
Report – March 2011
18
In May 2010 therefore, and after some deliberation, the Commission selected Dr. Hamid Ghany,
Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, St. Augustine campus, UWI, Trinidad and Tobago, to
assist us with this task. Dr. Ghany commenced work in late August of 2010 and submitted an initial
draft report in October 2010, but due to the widespread dislocation caused by Hurricane Tomàs,
which affected several members of the Commission living in various parts of Saint Lucia, we were
unable to meet to consider the draft until well into December 2010.
As a consequence, and with much regret, the Commission was forced to request an additional
extension of time to 28
th
February 2011, to permit even more frequent meetings and the dedication
of yet more feverish hours to complete the review and revision of the report. After some delay, and
in no small part due to the persistence of our Chair and the high esteem in which she is held, the
requested extension was granted. We are therefore grateful to the kind consideration of the
Honourable Speaker and the Honourable Prime Minister, in permitting us a final period of grace to
complete our task.
We are indeed, also very grateful to Dr. Ghany for his efforts to ensure that the Commission was
able to meet its vision in respect of this report. The Commission is also grateful of the efforts of
some individual commissioners who wrote some parts of the report.
Conclusion
As we survey our work over the last five years, three observations resonate.
Firstly, we are struck by the enormity of the task we undertook. Although review of a Constitution
such as we have managed represents only the beginning of a process of lasting constitutional
change, we were perhaps late to realise the tremendous amount of work and effort this review
demanded. Whether because we were initially too modest in our assessment of the efforts we
made, or whether the haze of activity blurred our focus, it seems clear with the benefit of hindsight,
that the work involved was quite extraordinary.
Perhaps the most elegant testimony of this fact is that, between preparatory meetings, working
sessions, participation in public education and media activities, the organisation and attendance of
countless public consultations, and preparation of this report, the Commission committed several
thousand intensive hours to the completion of its work. As such, it is estimated that, if all the hours
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
19
spent by each Commissioner on constitutional reform were added up, it would probably constitute
a full working year of each Commissioner’s life.
Secondly, we have noted that there have been tremendous changes in Saint Lucia and in our sub-
region since we commenced our work, not the least of which is that a different Parliament now
exists to that which established the Commission in 2004. In that same vein, the Commission has
also changed. When we began we were a group of twenty-five (25) strangers. In the years since,
we became an extended family of seventeen (17). Sadly, several Commissioners lost relatives or
loved ones in the intervening years. And whether through engagement with each other or with
members of the public, we have all been transformed, by our desire to improve our system of
governance and our consideration of other constitutionally related issues.
Thirdly, though the process has been long and involved tremendous sacrifice, Commissioners are
struck by the deep sense of gratitude and satisfaction we derived from our participation in the
process. Commissioners feel privileged to have been given the opportunity to contribute, through
this document, to the development and history of our country and in some small measure, to the
lives of all citizens. Commissioners feel ennobled not only by the commitment to the cause, but
also by association with each other.
We wish to extend our heartfelt gratitude to all persons in the various community groups
throughout Saint Lucia and overseas including developmental committees, town and village
councils, sporting organisations, persons in charge of community centres, Saint Lucia Consulates
and Missions as well as the various associations in the Diaspora. We also wish to extend our
sincere thanks to all print and electronic media houses who gave much publicity by producing,
covering, airing and/or publishing the activities of the Commission. The preparation of this report
would not have been possible without their contribution.
Above all, Commissioners were conscientious in the discharge of our mandate and are hopeful that
the report, which hereafter follows, bears testimony to this claim.
Report – March 2011
20
SIGNATURE PAGE
The following are the members of the Saint Lucia Constitutional Review Commission
Justice Suzie d’Auvergne - Chairperson
John, Nicholas (Mr.) - Deputy Chairperson
Abenaty, Francis K. (Dr.) - Member
Alexander, Rhikkie (Mr.) - Member
Alphonse, Ulric (Mr.) - Member
Barrow-Giles, Cynthia (Ms.) - Member
Biscette, Gregor (Mr.) - Member
Cenac, Veronica (Ms.) - Member
Charlemagne, Terrance (Mr.) - Member
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
21
Charles, Ferrel (Mr.) - Member
Chase, Mc. Donald (Dr.) - Member
Cherry, Flavia (Ms.) - Member
Cox, David (Mr.) - Member
George, Andie (Mr.) - Member
Jude, Gabriel (Mr.) - Member
Lay, Dwight (Mr.) - Member
Francis, Michel (Fr.) - Member
Hilaire, Ernest (Dr.) - Member
Mathurin, Eldon (Mr.) - Member
Report – March 2011
22
Mathurin, Patrick (Mr.) - Member
Poyotte, Lawrence (Mr.) - Member
Seraphin, Urban (Dr.) - Member
Vargas, Barbara (Ms.) - Member
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Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
23
F
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Although the following pages of this report faithfully reflect the specific recommendations we have
reached as a body about our Constitution and our system of Government over the last five years, it
would be wrong to assume that they contain the full sum of knowledge or of understanding that we
have acquired over that period. The process of reforming our Constitution forced us to learn a great
deal about how average Saint Lucians view our Constitution and our system of Government.
This is because the process was intense and extended. It led us to consult widely with Saint
Lucians from all walks of life. It compelled us to seek them out and engage them on their views
about how Government works; about their expectations for the future and about the changes they
believed were necessary to meet these expectations.
It took us from the traditional corners of the Diaspora to the smallest nooks and crannies of our fair
island. It required us to think more deeply and to inquire more closely into matters of governance in
Saint Lucia, than was ever necessary before. Most of all, it required us to reflect, to listen and to
question, with a singularity of purpose and a dedicated focus that was at times, challenging to
sustain.
Such a level of focus has meant that we were deeply immersed, as a body and as individuals, in
the political psyche of our nation. We emerged with a renewed respect for the uncommon wisdom
of average citizens; a genuine admiration for the remarkable Saint Lucian spirit, and the surprising
knowledge of a remarkable consensus.
This consensus is that the so called “Westminster inheritance” in the Saint Lucian context has at
worst, not worked, or at best, been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the Commission
recognised an acceptance that transplanting a version of British democracy in Saint Lucia, perhaps
contributed to a level of stability and continuity in our system of Government, which was desirable.
On the other hand, there appears to be a reasonable consensus among our people that what was
perhaps appropriate for Britain - with its large Parliament and relatively small Executive, guarded
by hundreds of backbenchers - was somewhat inadequate in a country of only seventeen (17)
Report – March 2011
24
constituencies and in which the near total domination of a small Executive over the Parliament,
was virtually guaranteed. Put another way, we recognised a general agreement that the
overwhelming concentration of power in the hands of a small Cabinet, was an unacceptable
situation which cried out for change.
In fact, the Commission observed a real hunger for constitutional change. It discerned restlessness
with the status quo, which manifests itself in a pervasive, near universal discontent with politicians
and politics alike. At the heart of this cynicism, we detected a widespread belief that our
Constitution condemns us to a situation in which, our Governments, once elected, seem beyond
our ability to restrain or to influence.
With each new community meeting, each new submission we received, or each new engagement
overseas, it became increasingly clear that Saint Lucians regarded our Constitution as placing
them in the role of window-shoppers, passively standing outside the store-front of Government,
looking in, hands pressed against the glass, but unable to influence decision-makers once an
election was won. They collectively regretted their inability, except by the most indirect or diffuse
means, to influence decision-making in “real time.” They lamented the fact that they could not hold
a Government accountable, except through the remote mechanism of an election, by which time
the damage resulting from poor decision-making, malfeasance, incompetence or outright contempt
for the electorate, might be irreparable or irreversible.
Above all, they bemoaned the lack of appropriate checks and balances on Cabinet authority, the
lack of a real separation between the Cabinet and the Parliament, and the lack of real and
measurable accountability, expected from a mature system of Government.
In sum, the Commission gradually came to accept the fact that Saint Lucians appear to be
dissatisfied with their system of Government although this concern was not always expressed in
the same way. For some, the problem was a lack of local Government. For others, it was the lack
of the ability to elect the Prime Minister directly, or the lack of a mechanism for recalling ineffective
or dishonest parliamentarians, and for still others, what was required was the creation of new and
super-powerful institutions to deal with abuses. For many, the solution was most or in some cases,
all of these.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
25
Many proposals spoke to a need to restrain Executive action. How else to explain numerous
submissions calling for: (i) fixed dates for elections, (ii) term limits, (iii) restrictions on the ability of
Government to acquire private property, or (iv) easier access to the Courts, so that ordinary
citizens might better seek redress for human rights abuses or breaches of the Constitution
generally. Other proposals focused on limiting the powers of the Prime Minister or increasing those
of the Leader of the Opposition.
While the cures proposed for our constitutional maladies varied from speaker to speaker,
submission to submission or constituency to constituency, the Commission was at least able to
take some comfort in the fact that the diagnosis was shared.
In the diversity of submissions received or speakers who presented, we also gleaned a deeper
lesson: after thirty-two (32) years of independence, Saint Lucians were desperate for real
constitutional change. What was clear was that Saint Lucians yearned to exercise more control
over their Government and wanted more opportunities for democratic participation. They regarded
Government as too powerful and not sufficiently accountable to them.
This meant that the Commission had to make meaningful proposals for altering our Constitution,
and that mere “tweaks” would not suffice. Any proposals for reform simply had to fundamentally
address these concerns or they would be meaningless. They had to prioritise the desires and
hopes of ordinary people in Saint Lucia, over those of parliamentarians or of politicians. In other
words, we had to make a real attempt at actually solving the problems they identified.
This realisation – that an incremental, too conservative, or purely evolutionary approach to
constitutional reform would not satisfy our people - infused all of the Commission’s work as it made
its way across the length and breadth of our country. It became the yardstick by which we
measured our deliberations. It liberated the Commission from being too concerned about whether
the specific recommendations we made, would meet with the immediate favour of Parliamentarians
or political parties.
While politicians, Parliaments and Governments would change, we recognised that any report we
produced would be a document for posterity. It would stand as an eternal statement of how Saint
Report – March 2011
26
Lucians viewed themselves in the early part of this century and of how they hoped to change their
Government for the better.
We simply owed it to our people to ensure that our report distilled and addressed the truth of their
concerns.
Against this background, it was perhaps unsurprising that the Commission received a number of
proposals recommending a full-scale adoption of the Presidential type system of Government
practiced in the United States of America. Given the concerns we noted, the Commission could
anticipate the attraction to this system of Government, in light of its many advantages, including a
true separation between Executive, Legislature and Judiciary, its numerous mechanisms for
promoting accountability and frequent opportunities for democratic participation by citizens, via a
multiplicity of elections.
It was however unclear to the Commission, whether those making the submissions, fully
understood or anticipated the complexities of how such a system might work in a local context. The
Commission could not be certain for example, that these citizens understood the potential for
deadlock in a system where, potentially, the directly elected President could come from a party,
different to those who formed the majority in the Legislature. What were the implications, we
wondered, of the wholesale “switching out” of the system of Government inherited from Britain, for
the one practiced in the USA, for a small country with limited financial resources and highly tribal
politics? Or put another way, how might such a system truly work, given the realities of our political
culture?
On the other hand, if our system of Government was not meeting our needs, how could we ignore
the merits of a system that at least outwardly, appeared to epitomise all the advantages we were
seeking?
In the course of considering these questions, the Commission was eventually forced to confront
and resolve one fundamental conundrum; how best to preserve the stability of strong central
Government that is a defining feature of the British model, while also adopting the requisite checks
and balances that are so attractive in the American system?
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
27
To a large extent, this report is an attempt to reconcile these two very different goals, and in
arriving at the proposal to create a hybrid system of Government that attempts to borrow some of
the best features from both models, the Commission remained conscious of one overriding thing:
the important issue was not so much what system of Government was to be preferred, but whether
we could push our Constitution, in new and novel directions, to make it more effective, and meet
our people’s needs.
In doing so, we rejected the all or nothing approach, which would have caused us to simply
substitute one foreign culture’s constitution for another, as if the process of constitution-making
was a straightforward task of swapping meat for fish. At all times throughout our process, the
Commission remained mindful that we could not divorce our Constitution from the political culture
in which it was immersed.
Our solutions therefore had to recognise the need to balance the demand for accountability,
against the realities of party politics in small island states. The status quo was unacceptable, but no
less so than imposing a totally alien system on our people.
Accordingly, this report contains our best prescriptions for achieving a balance between these two
goals.
In addition to the submissions we received on the structure or type of Government we had, the
Commission also noted several recurring themes in the course of its public consultations.
As we examined the functions of the public service, we noted for example, that there appeared to
be either unwillingness or an inability on the part of successive Governments, to ensure that public
institutions entrusted with a public charge, did the work they were mandated to do. We
acknowledged a widespread concern, both within the Commission and among the public, about the
accountability and efficiency of the public service.
We noted an overwhelming passion among average Saint Lucians, for an expansion in their basic
human, civil and political rights. We noted a concern about the potential encroachment by the State
into areas of privacy, or with respect to private property, and acknowledged a call from many
quarters, to ensure our Constitution protected vulnerable groups, like women and children, from
various kinds of discrimination.
Report – March 2011
28
The Commission recognised urgency in the calls from the public, to offer special protection to our
environment, and our cultural and historical patrimony, by restricting the ability of the state to
dispose of properties of a sensitive nature. In a process dedicated to reviewing constitutional rules,
it was perhaps surprising how many Saint Lucians felt aggrieved about the lack of access to
beaches, or the apparent willingness of Governments to sell, lease or otherwise compromise
property, which Saint Lucians regarded as sacred. In fact, the Commission discerned a strong
commitment on the part of average Saint Lucians to the principle of sustainable development, and
recognised a growing unease or even anger, about the ability of Government to permit commercial
exploitation of certain sensitive natural resources, to the detriment of future generations.
Other recurring themes were the requirements for citizenship and the possibility of regulating
political parties. In respect of the first matter, there seemed to be consensus that such
requirements should be strengthened, while at the same time be made flexible enough to
accommodate potential political unions with other countries in the region, should this happen in the
future. As regards recognition of political parties, the main preoccupation was the issue of
campaign finance reform.
A number of submissions were received from the public, regarding scrutiny of Government action.
As a result, the Commission devoted many hours to the possible creation or strengthening of
systems to scrutinise Government conduct. These proposals ran the gamut from strengthening the
Public Accounts Committee and the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner, to creating new
institutions, like the office of Contractor-General.
In part, because of an awareness of the lack of trust average citizens had in Government, and in
part because of submissions received, the Commission also reflected on the matter of the apparent
silence of our Constitution on the ethical standards required for elected officials. Over time, we
came to regard this oversight as a significant problem which required addressing.
By happy coincidence also, the Commission was very fortunate to have been operational during an
extended period in which a number of significant events, both locally and regionally, forced us to
consider many constitutional issues, from fresh perspectives. In regional terms, we noted the
results of elections in five neighbouring islands in the OECS, and the specific consequences to
which these elections, gave rise.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
29
In Antigua and Barbuda for example, we noted the High Court challenge to the results in three (3)
constituencies and the subsequent High Court and Court of Appeal judgments on the matter of the
late closing of polls. In St. Christopher and Nevis, we took note of Court challenges to proposed re-
alignments of boundaries. In the Commonwealth of Dominica, elections there, only added to an
already ongoing debate about dual citizenship on our own shores.
More recently in Grenada, we marked the potential crisis occasioned by a re-shuffling of Cabinet.
In the run-up to elections in both Grenada and also St. Christopher and Nevis, we observed
heightened local and regional discussion, on the issue of term limits for Prime Ministers.
Most importantly, in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, we observed with keen interest, the defeated
referendum on constitutional reform, and the subsequent re-election, albeit by a smaller
parliamentary margin, of the Government there. From the conduct of the referendum campaign and
the subsequent results, we could not help but draw some sobering lessons.
Closer to home, we were fortunate for example, to have been operational in December 2006, when
general elections in Saint Lucia were held. Like all Saint Lucians, we observed with sadness, the
sudden illness and subsequent passing of Sir John Compton, while in office, in 2007. We noted the
process of selecting his successor, and the temporary subsequent instability in the Cabinet
thereafter.
We acknowledged the public controversy over the issue of un-disclosed convictions for criminal
offences, of persons already elected to Parliament. Further, we could not avoid noting the
Commission of Inquiry into the “Rochamel Affair”, the NCA and the West Coast Road Project, the
judgements in the “Rochamel” Government guarantees, both judgments in the “Tuxedo Villas”
affair, the controversy surrounding the transfer of the former Commissioner of Police, the change of
the Attorney General in 2010 and the widespread public concern over the potential loss of World
Heritage Status for the Pitons, due to proposed developments in the Piton Management Area.
These events helped to deeply inform our thinking about our system of Government and about our
mission of constitutional reform. In the main, they reinforced the conclusions we reached after
meeting with the public, or prompted us to re-evaluate our views and assumptions.
Report – March 2011
30
Above all, they focused our thoughts on the recurring themes of reform; the need for greater
accountability, for the creation of ethical rules, and the need for greater checks and balances in a
responsible democracy.
All these matters and more, the Commission has diligently considered in the course of its
deliberations over the last five years, and on all these matters and more, the Commission has
offered some recommendations on the way forward.
Yet, while the Commission has conscientiously offered a recommendation on most of the pertinent
issues, either raised by the public or the Statutory Instrument that established us, it would be wrong
to conclude that the report which follows, represents a detailed instruction manual to policy makers,
Parliamentarians and public alike, on how to create the ultimate Saint Lucian utopia.
This is not the purpose of the report, nor is it the expectation or intention of the Commission, that
the recommendations contained herein, be regarded as the “right answers,” to all the profound
questions the Commission was required to resolve.
As one reads the report, two things should always be remembered. First, the Commission
represented a microcosm of the larger Saint Lucian society, with diverging views and beliefs on the
issues confronting us. As a body, the Commission comprised, among other groups or interests,
Adventists and Catholics, scientists and men of faith, lawyers and laymen, women and men, public
service and private sector functionaries, civil society and state officials, employers and union
representatives, Opposition and Government, and young and old alike.
Second, the Statutory Instrument that established the Commission imposed on us an obligation to
agree on recommendations by a two-thirds majority. This meant the Commission had to strive to
reach consensus on the issues.
As a result of both of these factors, the recommendations contained in the following pages,
represent the fruit of a painstaking, deliberative, and consensual process, aimed at arriving at the
best potential answers we could agree upon as a body. In reaching our conclusions, some
inevitable compromises had to be made. In the same vein, some matters could not be agreed and
no recommendations could be made, and rightly so. In an undertaking to review democratic
processes, it is only right that democracy should prevail.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
31
In the end however, we believe that any compromises arrived at, only served to strengthen and not
weaken our proposals, and to make them more representative of the views of the general public.
Our objective was not to make our Constitution perfect, but to make it stronger. We are confident
that these recommendations help us achieve that objective.
In sharing the knowledge we have acquired in the course of this process, we also fervently hope
that this report, will help us to learn something about ourselves, as a society and as a country. We
consign the lessons learned to the benefit of future generations.
In whatever case, no report could adequately relate all that we have learned, nor prescribe a cure
for every malady that ails the Nation, and the Commission is the first to recognise that, in a country
with many differing views and beliefs, not all of the recommendations we have made, will find
unanimous acceptance or approval. It is one task to identify a consensus on a problem, and an
altogether different task to agree on the best way to solve it.
We have nonetheless made the most genuine efforts we could to do so, and are resigned to the
knowledge that history will best judge the same.
Report – March 2011
32
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The following summarises the recommendations of the Commission. These conclusions are
informed, in large measure, by submissions from the public and arise out of intense debate
and discussions by members of the Commission.
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
CHAPTER TWO
REWORDING THE PREAMBLE
Language of the
Constitution
(1) The language of the Constitution should be simplified.
(2) The creation of a printed Kwéyòl version of the Constitution is
not recommended to be part of the current exercise, but a
future project should be the creation of an audio version in
Kwéyòl.
(3) The language of the Constitution should be gender neutral.
Indigenous People
(4) The indigenous people of Saint Lucia should not be specifically
recognised in the Preamble.
Preserving Culture
(5) A statement on the preservation of Saint Lucian culture along
the lines of paragraphs three (3) and five (5) of the Haitian
Constitution should be inserted in the Constitution.
Rule of Law
(6) Subsection (d) of the Preamble should be reworded as follows:
“Maintain that these freedoms can only be safeguarded by
the impartial enforcement of the rule of law”.
Recognition of God
(7) Subsections (a) and (b) of the Preamble should be reworded to
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
33
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
read as follows:
“… acknowledge the reality that while the majority of Saint
Lucians affirm their faith in the supremacy of Almighty God,
they also commit to the principle of respect for other spiritual
beliefs and persuasions.”
Queen’s Chain
(8) A statement on the protection of the Queen’s Chain must be
made in the Preamble to reflect the protection of the patrimony
of the people of Saint Lucia.
(9) Provisions should be included in the Constitution to protect the
rights of citizens to access the beach, coastal areas, rivers,
reclaimed land and other public places.
The Environment
(10) Our natural resources should be used in such a way that
ensures sustainability, development and safeguards our
patrimony for future generations
(11) A Natural Resource Management Act is required by ordinary
legislation to facilitate the protection of the environment.
Separation of Powers
(12) There was no need to make specific mention of the concept of
the Separation of Powers in the Preamble.
(13) There should be some statement in the Preamble that would
preserve the independence of the Judiciary.
Report – March 2011
34
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Mandatory Review of the
Constitution
(14) There should be periodic reviews but there should not be
specifying a timeline for such review.
CHAPTER THREE
STRENGTHENING OUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
The Right to Life
(15) The existing provisions on right to life should be retained.
Deprivation of Property
(16) The ability of the State to alienate the patrimony of the country
should be restricted. These restrictions should include, but not
be limited to the ability to lease, to change land use or to
promote sustainable development.
(17) Access to the patrimony of the State should be a public right.
(18) Compensation for property acquired by Government should be
based on the current value of the property and, at that time,
payment should be full and prompt.
(19) Strengthening the provisions of the Constitution to ensure (15)
above.
Protection of Public
Property
(20) The ability of the State to alienate the patrimony of the country
should be restricted. These restrictions should include, but not
be limited to the ability to lease, to change land use or to
promote sustainable development.
(21) Access to the patrimony of the State should be a public right.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
35
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
(22) The Constitution should provide for the protection of public
property especially our cultural heritage, and the State’s
natural resources.
(23) A Natural Resource Management Act should be provided for.
Capital Punishment
(24) Capital punishment should be retained.
Discrimination Against
Women
(25) The provisions of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) should be
implemented and where complementary included in the
Constitution.
Sexual Orientation
(26) Discrimination based on sexual orientation is unacceptable
and should be addressed under well-defined ordinary
legislation.
Common Law Unions
(27) Parliament should consider examining the Convention on the
Rights of the Child with a view to incorporation into domestic
law.
(28) Children born out of wedlock should receive the same
treatment under the Constitution as those born in wedlock.
(29) Parliament should enact laws to provide equal recognition and
protection to parties in common law unions.
Same Sex Union (30) Sexual intimacy in public should continue to be a criminal
offence.
(31) Marriage should continue to be between a man and a woman.
Report – March 2011
36
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
The Right to Privacy
(32) The right to privacy should be expressly included in the Bill of
Rights.
(33) Related provisions to the right to privacy should be
strengthened and extended to protect the rights and dignity of
individuals.
The Right to Health
(34) The fundamental right to health along the lines expressed in
Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
should be included in the Constitution.
The Right to Work
(35) The right to work should be included as a specific right in the
Bill of Rights in the Constitution; such right should include the
right to strike.
(36) The issue of special protection on the job is better addressed
under the anti-discrimination provisions of the Constitution.
Termination of Contracts
of Employment
(37) This matter would be more appropriately addressed through
the enactment of ordinary legislation such as the Labour
Code.
The right to Universal
Education
(38) The right to universal education up to secondary level should
be included in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution but should
be subject to available resources.
Consumer Rights
(39) Consumer rights should be addressed under ordinary
legislation.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
37
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Public Information and
State Property
(40) Ordinary legislation should clearly define what is the property
of the State and therefore public property.
(41) The details of the right to public information should be
articulated in ordinary legislation.
(42) The right to public information should be limited in the interest
of national security or other relevant grounds.
Protection of Patrimony,
Cultural Heritage and
National Assets
(43) Certain sensitive and specified national assets or patrimony
having historical or cultural significance should not be
alienated.
(44) Historic assets should be considered public property and that
the State or its agents or other duly authorised bodies should
have the authority to preserve or retrieve these public assets
and hold them on behalf of the State.
Human Rights
Commission
(45) A Human Rights Commission should be established.
Youth Representation
(46) A permanent advisory body consisting of youth organisations
to meet with an appropriate Government agency on a regular
basis to discuss issues affecting the youth of Saint Lucia
should be established.
Locus Standi
(47) The locus standi provisions in the Constitution should be
relaxed to make them less restrictive, especially as they relate
to access to the fundamental human rights and freedoms
provisions of the Constitution. In this regard the provisions of
Report – March 2011
38
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Section 38 of the enforcement provisions of the South African
constitution should be considered.
(48) The fundamental rights provisions should be enforceable
against both the State and private entities/citizens.
(49) The wording of the Constitution should be made clear in
establishing the right of a private citizen to take action against
a private citizen or entity.
CHAPTER FOUR
BECOMING A REPUBLIC WITH A NEW HEAD OF STATE
Model of Government
(50) The Saint Lucia Constitution should be repatriated.
(51) The constitutional monarchical system should be abolished
and replaced with a republican constitutional system.
(52) The personal authority of the British Monarch over Saint Lucia
should be terminated.
(53) The Head of State should be a ceremonial President.
(54) The Head of State should be indirectly elected based on a
limited selectorate.
(55) The oath of allegiance should be amended to reflect allegiance
to the State of Saint Lucia.
Head of State
(56) The Governor-General should be replaced by a ceremonial
President with similar powers and responsibilities, save and
except as otherwise recommended in this report.
(57) The ceremonial President should be elected at a joint sitting of
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
39
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Parliament by a simple majority vote after a duly submitted
recommendation by the Prime Minister in consultation with the
Minority Leader.
(58) There should be an office of Deputy President who shall be
elected in like manner at the same time as the President.
(59) The President should be a Saint Lucian by birth who has been
resident in Saint Lucia for a minimum of ten years immediately
prior to being nominated and must be between the ages of
thirty-five (35) and seventy-five (75) years and should not
have held office in a political party or stood for election as a
candidate for elective office within ten (10) years of his/her
nomination for President.
(60) The same qualifications should apply to the Deputy President
as for the President.
(61) The President should serve no more than two (2) consecutive
seven-year terms.
(62) The grounds and procedure for the removal of the President or
the Deputy President from office should follow the equivalent
provisions in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Dominica with appropriate adjustments.
(63) Neither the President nor his/her Deputy should have control of
any Ministry of Government.
Report – March 2011
40
SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
CHAPTER FIVE
REFORMING OUR PARLIAMENT
Separation of Powers
(64) There should be the creation of a mixed model of Government
with a different kind of Executive branch, to that which
currently prevails. Under that new system the only member of
the Executive branch who will belong to both the Legislature
and the Executive will be the Prime Minister. However, the
Deputy Prime Minister will serve as a member of Cabinet
without ministerial authority except when deputising for the
Prime Minister. To this end, he/she will be appointed on the
basis of his ability to command the support of a majority of
elected Members of Parliament and he/she will appoint
Ministers. If a minister is selected from Parliament, he/she
must subsequently resign as a member of Parliament, to take
up the post of Minister..
(65) The Prime Minister will remain accountable to Parliament and
can be removed by a motion of no confidence there, but his
Ministers will be vicariously accountable through a summons
that will be issued to them by parliamentary committees and
the presiding officers of both Houses to appear there as and
when their presence is desired or required.
(66) The appointment of any Minister from the House of Assembly
will require a substitute Member of Parliament to replace the
Member of Parliament for the constituency that the Minister
previously represented.
(67) In order to effect this, one option is political parties can be
required under the new constitutional arrangement to name
running mates for all constituencies that are being contested
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
in general elections or bye elections and independent
candidates will be required to name a substitute if they contest
an election.
(68) If at a future date there is the desire to appoint one of the
M.P’s as a Minister, then the running mate will be sworn into
office as the Member of Parliament for that constituency.
(69) Alternatively, a bye-election can be held to fill the vacancy
created by the appointment of an elected Member of
Parliament to the Executive branch.
(70) The retention of the constitutional and political practice of
appointing anyone including defeated electoral candidates to
the Cabinet. This will allow Prime Ministers the same
opportunities to ensure that their current availability of
ministerial talent will remain intact.
(71) The Legislative branch of Government should be given the
right to approve/ratify Prime Ministerial appointments to the
Cabinet.
(72) In establishing a Government, the Prime Minister must ensure
that apart from himself/herself, every Cabinet at a minimum
consist of the following: the Attorney General, the Minister of
National Security, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the
Minister of Finance.
Hybridization
(73) With the exception of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime
Minister, Members of the House of Assembly and the Senate
will no longer be members of the Cabinet.
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
(74) The House of Assembly should scrutinise and ratify
nominations made by the Prime Minister for persons to be
appointed as Ministers.
(75) Special Parliamentary Committees should be created as joint
select committees to oversee Government ministries,
departments, agencies and Service Commissions.
(76) Ministers will be directly accountable to Parliamentary
Committees.
(77) These Committees will summon Ministers to appear to be
questioned on matters of executive policy, proposed legislation
and administrative functions of their Ministries.
(78) Nomination of Ministers should be after Parliament has met for
the first sitting.
The Senate
(79) That the status quo in terms of the role of the Senate should
be retained.
(80) The Senate should comprise expertise among its members
that can give Bills the scrutiny that would enhance the process
of approval.
(81) An increase in the number of Senators from eleven (11) to
thirteen (13).
(82) The revised formula for the Senate should be seven (7)
Senators appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, three
(3) Senators appointed on the advice of the Minority Leader,
and three (3) Senators appointed by the President in his/her
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
own deliberate judgement.
First-Past-the-Post (83) The First-Past-the-Post plurality system of elections should be
retained.
Fixed Date for Elections (84) There should be fixed dates for Parliamentary Elections so that
these elections are held every five (5) years on the 5
th
anniversary of the previous elections.
(85) Exception to the fixed date of elections should be made by
retaining the provisions of Section 55 (4) (b) and (c) of the
Constitution which state:
“(b) If a resolution of no confidence in the Government
is passed by the House and the Prime Minister
does not within three days either resign or advise
a dissolution, the Governor-General (now
President), acting in his own deliberate judgment,
may dissolve parliament; and
(c) If the office of the Prime Minister is vacant and the
Governor-General (now President), acting in his
own deliberate judgment, considers that there is
no prospect of his being able within a reasonable
time to make an appointment to the office, the
Governor-General (President) shall dissolve
parliament.”
Right of Recall
(86) The right of recall should be provided for in a reformed
constitution.
(87) A recall should be automatically triggered if a Member of
Parliament who was elected on a party ticket crosses the floor
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
or changes his/her political allegiance.
(88) A recall should also be initiated in cases where:
there is non-performance as it relates to constituency
duties and which can only be initiated after the MP has
served at least half of his parliamentary term; or
there is a breach of any law, rule or ethical standard
established by Parliament;
(89) In either of these two (2) cases mentioned above, at least 25%
of eligible voters must sign a petition requesting a recall.
(90) In cases of recall petitions, the Electoral and Constituency
Boundaries Commission will be required to certify that the
names and signatures on the petition are bona fides.
(91) In the recall referendum, a Member of Parliament is recalled if
at least 60% of eligible voters in the relevant constituency vote
in favour of the proposition.
(92) The recalled Member has the right to contest the bye-election
Ministers of Religion
(93) With respect to ministers of religion participating in electoral
politics, the status quo should be retained.
Electoral and
Constituency Boundary
Commissions
(94) The existing Electoral Commission and Constituency
Boundaries Commission should be merged and call the
Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commission.
(95) The membership of the Electoral and Constituency Boundaries
Commission should comprise five (5) persons appointed as
follows:
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
A chairperson appointed by the President after due
consultation with the Prime Minister and the Minority
Leader;
Two (2) persons appointed by the President acting in
his own deliberate judgement;
One (1) person appointed on the nomination of the
Prime Minister; and
One (1) person appointed on the nomination of the
Minority Leader.
CHAPTER SIX
CREATING A HYBRID EXECUTIVE
Term Limits for the
Prime Minister
(96) No person should be appointed to the office of Prime Minister
for more than three (3) consecutive five (5) year terms. Where
a Prime Minister has served for three (3) consecutive terms,
he/she may return after a hiatus of five years.
Direct Election of the
Prime Minister
(97) The status quo in relation to the appointment of the Prime
Minister be maintained. There should not be direct election of
the Prime Minister.
Deputy Prime Minister (98) Provisions should be made for the office of a Deputy Prime
Minister.
(99) The Appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister from among the
elected members of the Parliament.
(100) The Deputy Prime Minister upon appointment should become
a member of Cabinet but not have ministerial responsibility
other than when he is acting for the Prime Minister.
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
(101) The necessary amendment of Section 63 (2) and (3) of the
existing constitution that empowers the Governor General
(now President) in the absence of the Prime Minister to
appoint a temporary Minister to replace a Minister who for
whatever reason, is unable to perform his functions.
Prerequisite Qualification
of the Attorney General
(102) The Commission recommends that the requisite qualification
for the Attorney General should be equivalent to that of a High
Court judge.
(103) The option of appointing a political Attorney General should
remain.
The Leader of the
Opposition
(104) The title for the office of Leader of the Opposition should be
changed to “Minority Leader”.
(105) The Minority Leader should be appointed in the same way as
exists now for the Leader of the Opposition.
(106) The Minority Leader should be consulted by the President on
a wider range of matters as specified within the body of this
report.
CHAPTER SEVEN
RE-ENGINEERING THE PUBLIC SERVICE
The Public Service
Commission
(107) The Teaching Service Commission should be merged with the
Public Service Commission.
(108) The members of the Public Service Commission after the
merger should be appointed by the President as follows:
three (3) persons acting on the advice of the Prime
Minister;
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
two (2) persons acting on the advice of the Minority
Leader; and
one (1) person acting in his/her own deliberate
judgement who shall be the chairperson.
(109) Each member shall have one vote with the exception of the
chairperson who shall have a casting vote in the event of a tie.
The Police Service
(110) There should be an independent Police Complaints
Commission.
(111) The Police Complaints Commission s
hould be capable of
suspending, disciplining and prosecuting, if necessary.
(112) The existing powers of the Police Commissioner to exercise
disciplinary control over officers should be retained.
(113) The Police Act and Police Regulations should be modernised.
Service Commissions
(114) Service Commissions should be required to submit annual
reports to Parliament.
(115) Service Commissions should be subject to scrutiny by a
Parliamentary Committee as to their administrative and
management functions with a view to examining their
efficiency and use of resources allocated.
Director of Audit
(116) The Constitution should make it clear that the Director of Audit
is answerable to Parliament.
(117) A name change from Director of Audit to Auditor General and
the new office should be strengthened accordingly.
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Director of Public
Prosecutions
(118) The person holding the office of Director of Public
Prosecutions should no longer be permitted to hold the office
of Attorney General simultaneously under any circumstances.
(119) Both the Prime Minister and the Minority Leader should be
consulted in the appointment of the Director of Public
Prosecutions.
CHAPTER EIGHT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local Government
(120) The system of elected Local Government in Saint Lucia should
be re-established.
(121) The Constitution should make provision for Local Government
to be entrenched.
(122) Community Based Organisations (CBOs) should be an
essential component of Local Government.
(123) Local Government bodies should comprise both elected and
nominated representatives with the majority being elected.
(124) Local Government should be instituted as a means of
facilitating more efficient delivery of goods and services by the
State to all communities.
(125) Local Government authorities should comprise the following:
Two (2) members nominated by the Parliamentary
Representative
Two (2) members nominated by CBOs
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Six (6) members elected in Local Government elections
(126) Public Officers, whose functions do not involve the formulation
and direct implementation of Government policies, should be
allowed to stand for election to Local Government.
(127) There should be a formal link between the Parliamentary
Representative and the Local Government Authority.
CHAPTER NINE
STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OF SCRUTINY AND OVERSIGHT
Parliamentary
Commissioner
(128) Adequate provisions should be made to guarantee the
financial independence and efficiency of the office of the
Parliamentary Commissioner.
(129) A Select Committee should be appointed by the House of
Assembly to deal with reports tabled in Parliament on behalf of
the Parliamentary Commissioner and that this Committee,
among other things, should ensure that the Parliamentary
Commissioner’s recommendations are implemented.
(130) Reports made by the Parliamentary Commissioner should be
released verbatim to the public once they have been laid in
the Parliament, except in cases where such disclosure would
not be in the interest of national security, because those
reports are the people’s business and the people have a right
to know.
(131) The Ombudsman Act of Belize 2000 should be reviewed as a
source to assist in making amendments to the Parliamentary
Commissioner Act of 1982.
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Integrity Commission
(132) The President should consult both the Prime Minister and the
Minority Leader before making appointments.
(133) Non-compliance with the provisions of the Integrity in Public
Life Act should be met with sanctions for the offending parties.
(134) All members of Parliament and the Cabinet should make a
declaration to the Commission within thirty (30) days of
assuming office.
(135) The list of persons in public life who ought to be required to
make declarations to the Integrity Commission should be
expanded to include the proposed Contractor-General, Chief
Engineer as well as certain other functionaries below the rank
of Comptroller of Customs and Excise and Comptroller of
Inland Revenue.
(136) The list of public bodies falling within the purview of the
Integrity in Public Life Act should be extended to include any
company, in which the Government or an agency of
Government holds fifty-one per centum or more shares.
Public Accounts
Committee
(137) It should be entrenched in the Constitution.
(138) Membership should be broadened to include an individual with
the necessary accounting and investigatory skills and that
person must be drawn from outside Parliament.
(139) Disciplinary action should be instituted against persons or
entities for failing to submit timely reports, documents and
information or otherwise fail to cooperate with the Committee.
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
(140) It should be established as a joint select committee of
Parliament consisting of ten members with four drawn from the
Senate, two (2) being nominated by the Minority and two (2)
nominated by the Government; four (4) drawn from the House
of Assembly, two (2) being nominated by the Government and
two (2) nominated by the Minority; an independent member
appointed by the President, who shall be a forensic
accountant and the Minority Leader who shall be the
chairperson.
(141) The independent appointee with accounting skills will serve as
a non-voting member.
(142) The first meeting must be convened before the second sitting
of the House of Assembly.
(143) The quorum shall be three (3) members.
(144) It should have the power to request an independent audit of an
entity and should have the powers of investigating the
finances of that entity whether or not an audit report has been
submitted.
(145) It should be empowered to obtain the services of a private
independent auditor to carry out an audit in cases where it is
found that there has been undue delay in the preparation and
submission of the report, or where it is found that there is a
matter to be dealt with in an expeditious manner.
(146) Adequate provisions should be made for an automatic
resolution by Parliament for the approval of expenditure
incurred by the Committee should the services of a private
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
independent auditor be utilised.
(147) Parliament must make its secretariat resources available for
use by the Committee.
Contractor-General
(148) The office of Contractor-General should be introduced into the
Saint Lucian Constitution based on an adaptation of the Belize
Contractor-General Act 2000.
(149) The public bodies that should come under the purview of the
Contractor-General include but not limited to:
All Ministries, Departments and Agencies of
Government;
Local Government Authorities;
Statutory Bodies and Authorities; or
any company in which the Government or an agency of
Government holds fifty-one per centum or more of the
shares.
CHAPTER TEN
THE JUDICIARY
The Magistracy
(150) It should be brought fully under the control and management of
the Judicial and Legal Services Commission;
(151) An appropriate mechanism should be created within the
Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court and the JLSC to monitor
and manage the day to day operations of the Magistracy in
Saint Lucia.
(152) There should be an elevation of the magistracy so that it could
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
benefit from improved training, independence, mobility and
remuneration of the “upper” judiciary.
The Eastern Caribbean
Supreme Court
(153) It was not necessary or appropriate to make any
recommendations for reform of the ECSC in the context of the
current review.
The Caribbean Court of
Justice
(154) It should replace the Privy Council as Saint Lucia’s final
appellate court;
(155) It should be entrenched in a new Constitution, so that it is
afforded similar protection as the ECSC in the domestic legal
system.
The Minister of Justice
(156) The Minister should become an advocate in Cabinet for the
Judiciary and should liaise with the leadership of the Judiciary
so as to more effectively communicate its needs at the level of
the Executive.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CITIZENSHIP ACT AND RELATED PROVISIONS
The Citizenship Act and
the Provisions Relating
to Citizenship
(157) The definition, rights and obligations of a possible “regional
citizenship” in acknowledgement of current regional integration
arrangements should be properly determined through
reciprocal treaty arrangements among the OECS or wider
Caribbean before amendment to the Constitution or the
Citizenship Act can be made to deal with the issue.
(158) There should be a Constitutional restriction on the grant of
economic citizenship.
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
(159) The Citizenship of Saint Lucia Act should be redrafted and
simplified and made more coherent by dedicating separate
sections of the Act to deal with the individual grounds of
citizenship. Therefore, the revised Act should have clear
sections dealing with citizenship by birth, citizenship by
descent, citizenship by marriage, citizenship by naturalisation
(residency requirements) and citizenship in special cases, for
example, adoptions, minors, stateless children, persons who
have given service to the country and people who would have
been entitled before 1979.
(160) The provisions relating to the entitlement to citizenship of an
applicant by descent which is now restricted to cases
where one’s parent is a Saint Lucian should extend to a
person whose grandparent is a citizen.
(161) With respect to citizenship by marriage, the current
discrimination against Saint Lucian women who marry a non-
citizen should be removed.
(162) The Act should empower the Minister to deny the grant of
citizenship in cases where a marriage is found to be a sham or
marriage of convenience. Strong sanctions should be imposed
against persons engaging in sham marriages.
(163) There should be no restriction defining a period of time after
marriage before an applicant is eligible to apply for citizenship.
(164) The power of the Minister to refuse a grant of citizenship
should apply in all cases of marriage or naturalisation. The
power to deny an application must be on clearly prescribed
grounds contained in the Act. However, the discretion of the
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Minister should be limited as much as possible as this
privilege can be abused.
(165) The procedure for the deprivation of citizenship obtained
through fraud, false representation or concealment of any
material particular should be clearly set out in the Act and refer
to the procedure for initiation of the process, the process itself
and what the Minister has to consider and find.
(166) Matters concerning the investigation of eligibility requirements
for the grant of citizenship should be removed from the
purview of the Police Force to a civilian entity.
(167) The Act should provide for the grant of temporary residence
status as a precursor to the grant of citizenship by qualified
applicants to ensure that their status is not in abeyance during
the period between the filing of the application and grant or
refusal of the grant of citizenship due the lengthy processing
period.
(168) The Head of State should be a citizen by birth or descent. In
the case of citizenship by descent the individual should have
been resident in the State for at least thirty (30) years.
(169) Eligibility for election to the House of Assembly should be
restricted to citizens by birth or descent. In the case of citizens
by descent, the individual should have been resident in the
country for a period of at least seven (7) years following the
acquisition of citizenship and seven (7) years immediately
prior to the election.
(170) The existing rule which appears to disqualify the holders of
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
dual citizenship in some cases from being eligible for election
to the House of Assembly in accordance with Section 32 (1)
(a) of the Constitution should be retained.
(171) In relation to Senators, nominations should be restricted to
Saint Lucian citizens resident in the State for at least five
years.
(172) The existing rule which appears to disqualify the holders of
dual citizenship in some cases from being eligible for
nomination to the Senate in accordance with Section 26 (1) (a)
of the Constitution should not apply.
CHAPTER TWELVE
RELATED MATTERS
Elections and Political
Party Financing
(173) Saint Lucia should embrace the current global trend of creating
a regulated environment for political parties and elections
campaign financing.
(174) Political parties should register for the purpose of elections.
(175) A Political Party and Elections Campaign Finance Act should
be enacted which would among other things provide for a
system of both private and public funding.
(176) The new Act should require full disclosure of all the financial
contributions made to political parties. Non-disclosure should
therefore be an offence.
(177) Political parties should declare their assets and liabilities.
(178) Appropriate sanctions should be placed on political parties that
violate the provisions of the Act.
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SUBTOPIC RECOMMENDATIONS
(179) All foreign government contributions for election purposes
should be banned.
(180) All financial contributions from foreign companies to political
parties should be prohibited.
(181) A limit should be placed on contributions to political parties by
companies and individuals.
(182) A ceiling should be placed on contributions that would not be
required to be declared.
(183) All sources of anonymous contributions should be prohibited.
(184) The State should provide some form of funding to political
parties. However, State funding should not supplant or
dominate private funding.
(185) There should be greater equity in terms of the access of all
parties to the State media.
(186) The Act should clearly define political parties.
Financial Accountability
(The Finance
(Administration) Act)
(187) The Act should be revised so as to clarify the respective roles
of the Director of Finance and Planning and that of the
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance.
(188) No one individual should function in the capacity of Director of
Finance and Planning and that of Permanent Secretary in the
Ministry of Finance simultaneously.
(189) The methodology for assessing or creating the Contingency
Fund should be reviewed so as to safeguard against abuse.
(190) The implementation of the recommendation of the Ramsahoye
Report in respect to the Act should continue.
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58
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Pre-Independence Events
The pre-European history of Saint Lucia is somewhat uncertain. However, it is known that in 1627,
the Earl of Carlisle received Letters Patent from King Charles I, in respect of the Government of the
West Indian islands which included Saint Lucia in the Letters Patent.
2
There appeared to be
resistance from the Caribs to any form of European settlement and in 1660, according to Roberts-
Wray, “local treaties were negotiated by French and British Governors of islands in the Caribbean,
which left the French in possession of St. Lucia; but in 1663 the Governor of Barbados (not a party
to the treaties) purchased the island from the Caribs and took it from the French.”
3
The island had the following exchange of hands between imperial powers between 1663 and 1814:
1. The English withdrew in 1666 and the island was occupied by the French.
2. There were disputes between Britain and France about occupation of the island between
1718 and 1763.
3. By the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Saint Lucia was delivered to France by Britain.
4. In 1778 the island was captured by the British.
5. In 1783, it was restored to France by the Treaty of Versailles.
6. It was recaptured by the British in 1794.
7. It was returned to France by the Treaty of Amiens in 1802.
8. It was recaptured by Britain in 1803.
9. It was permitted to remain in British occupation by the Treaty of Paris in 1814.
2
Roll, 3 Car. 1, p.31, No. 15
3
Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law. London: Stevens and Sons, 1966, p 857.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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Foundations of the Legal System
The foundations of the legal system in Saint Lucia can be traced back to the application of the
Coutume de Paris (Custom of Paris) to Saint Lucia in 1681. However, after Saint Lucia was ceded
to Britain for the final time in 1814, it is noted that British law was gradually introduced to the island.
The condition under which British law was received in a colony differed depending upon whether
the colony was conquered or ceded, on the one hand, or was settled, on the other hand. This
distinction was made in the famous case of from Grenada.
4
This case arose out of a dispute
between a servant of the Crown, William Hall, a tax collector, and the plaintiff, James Campbell,
over the payment of a certain tax on sugar in Grenada (a former French colony captured by British
forces in 1762 and ceded to Great Britain by France by the Treaty of Paris in 1763).
In delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, Lord Mansfield, said, among other things, that:
“A country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the King in the right of
his Crown; and, therefore, necessarily subject to the Legislature, the Parliament of Great
Britain.
The 2d
5
is, that the conquered inhabitants once received under the King’s protection,
become subjects, and are to be universally considered in that light, not as enemies or
aliens.
The 3d, that the articles of capitulation upon which the country is surrendered, and the
articles of peace by which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable according to their true
intent and meaning.
The 4
th
that the law and legislative Government of every dominion, equally affects all
persons and all property within the limits thereof; and is the rule of decision for all
questions which arise there. Whoever purchases, lives, or sues there, puts himself under
the law of the place. An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations,
has no privilege distinct from the natives.
4
Campbell v Hall [(1774) 1 Cowp. 204]
5
System of writing ordinal numbers of that time.
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60
The 5
th
, that the laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are altered by the
conqueror : the absurd exception as to pagans, mentioned in Calvin’s Case, shews the
universality and antiquity of the maxim. For that distinction could not exist before the
Christian era; and in all probability arose from the mad enthusiasm of the Croisades.
6
In
the present case the capitulation expressly provides and agrees, that they shall continue to
be governed by their own laws, until His Majesty’s further pleasure be known.
The 6
th
, and last proposition is, that if the King (and when I say King, I always mean the
King without the concurrence of Parliament) has a power to alter the old and to introduce
new laws in a conquered country, this legislation being subordinate, that is, subordinate to
his own authority in Parliament, he cannot make any new change contrary to fundamental
principles : he cannot exempt an inhabitant from that particular dominion, as for instance,
from the laws of trade, or from the power of Parliament, or give him privileges exclusive of
his other subjects; and so in many other instances which might be put.”
7
This argument clearly established that in conquered or ceded colonies, the existing law remained
until altered by the Crown under its prerogative or by the Legislature. This was the case with Saint
Lucia and over a period of time British law was introduced. The English language was introduced in
1842 by Proclamation, trial by jury was introduced by Ordinance in 1848, a Civil Code was
introduced by Ordinance in 1876 and came into force in 1879, a Commercial Code was detailed in
1879 and enacted in 1916, and a Criminal Code was introduced in 1920.
According to Roberts-Wray: “The Laws of St. Lucia (Reform and Revision) Ordinance, 1954,
empowered the Commissioner appointed to prepare a New Edition of the Laws to assimilate the
Codes (Civil, Civil Procedure, Criminal, Commercial, and ‘any other Code’ then in force) ‘to the law
of England where they differ, in the light of the present needs of the Colony and to prepare draft
measures suitable for enactment by the Legislative Council to give effect thereto.’ The
Commissioner explained in the Preface that law reform was effected by the enactment of some
eighteen Ordinances, the major reforms being the assimilation of the law of the Colony to the law
6
Now known as Crusades
7
Campbell v Hall [(1774) 1 Cowp. 204 at 208 – 209]
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of England relating to contracts, torts, agency and guardianship of children, and the introduction of
the English law of trusts.”
8
In 1959, all of the laws in force in Saint Lucia on 30
th
June, 1957, were published in seven volumes
under the authority of the Laws of Saint Lucia (Reform and Revision) Ordinance 1954. By this time,
British law had been substantially incorporated into the legal system of Saint Lucia. However, the
basis of the civil law may be regarded as French.
1954 to 1959 marked a period of deliberate attempts to shape the Civil Code into a British format.
The statutory steps along the way include the Saint Lucia (Reform and Revision) Ordinance 1954
9
,
the Civil Code Amendment Ordinance 1956,
10
and the publication of seven volumes of the Laws of
Saint Lucia in 1959.
It has to be noted that the reception of British law in Saint Lucia took place over a period of almost
a century and a half from final cession to Britain in 1814 to the publication of the seven volumes in
1959.
Constitutional Fundamentals
The independence constitution of Saint Lucia was pre-dated by a constitution that was introduced
in 1967 and came into effect on 1
st
March, 1967 under the authority of the West Indies Act 1967.
11
The effect of the West Indies Act 1967 was to introduce a new constitutional status for the
territories of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia, and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines by which they were to be known as Associated States. Under this
arrangement, these states were given self-determination and their legislatures provided with full
legislative competence to the extent that the applicability of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865
12
was removed. The effect of this Act was to restrict the powers of colonial legislatures to the extent
that they could not enact any laws that were repugnant to British law.
8
op. cit Roberts-Wray, p.859
9
Saint Lucia (Reform and Revision) Ordinance 1954 (No. 21/1954),
10
Civil Code Amendment Ordinance (No. 56/1956)
11
West Indies Act (U.K. Status 1967, c. 4).
12
Colonial Law Validity Act 1865, (28 & 29 Vict. c. 63)
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Self-determination was ensured by Section 10 of the West Indies Act that permitted either the
legislature of an associated state or Her Majesty to seek to terminate the association. Saint Lucia
terminated its association with Great Britain on 22
nd
February, 1979 and on that day it assumed
fully responsible status, otherwise known as independence.
Declassified Information on Independence
The final months before independence was granted to Saint Lucia under the provisions of Section
10 of the West Indies Act 1967 were filled with political challenges. These political challenges are
best captured in the Conclusions of a Meeting of the British Cabinet on Thursday 30
th
November,
1978, chaired by Prime Minister James Callaghan, at which time the issue of independence for
Saint Lucia was discussed.
According to the now-declassified Secret Cabinet Conclusions for that meeting the following entry
was made in respect of Saint Lucia:
“The Prime Minister said that the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee was
considering proposals for the grant of independence to St. Lucia. Both the Government of
St. Lucia and the Opposition were in favour of the principle of independence, but the
Opposition were arguing that the people of St. Lucia should first be consulted directly in an
election. It was not, however, expected that the Opposition would resort to violence if
independence was granted without an election, but even so, the possibility of having a
Royal Navy ship close at hand as a precautionary measure at the time was being
examined.”
13
After the consideration of the matter by the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the
Cabinet (DOP), it then went for consideration at a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party on 7
th
December, 1978. According to a report prepared by the West Indian and Atlantic Department dated
7
th
December, 1978 under the heading “Debate on the St. Lucia Termination of Association Order
1978” the following was said:
13
[CM (78) 41
st
Conclusions, p. 3]
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
63
1. “The St. Lucia Government (SLG) have asked us to terminate their status of association
with Britain and to promulgate a new independence constitution, using the same procedure
under the West Indies Act as for Grenada (1974, under the previous Government) and
Dominica (last month).
2. St. Lucia has been self governing since 1967 in all matters except foreign affairs and
defence and is well qualified to move to full independence. This is however a politically
controversial issue in the island.
3. The St. Lucia Opposition do not oppose the principle of independence but argue that the
people of St. Lucia should be consulted directly in an election, which otherwise does not
have to be held until next September. They are actively lobbying MPs here of all parties
and have recently threatened to resign their seats in the House of Assembly if
independence goes through without a prior election. We think at present that this is an
empty threat. They seem to believe they would win this and thereby steal the glory of taking
St. Lucia to independence.
4. The DOP have recently accepted that it has been shown through democratic process that
the majority of the people of St. Lucia do want independence and that a satisfactory
constitution, fully preserving human rights and the rule of law has been prepared. Any
attempt by the British Government to delay a decision on independence would be to go
against the wishes of an elected Government with universal adult suffrage and be seen
locally as support for the St. Lucia Opposition. This would cause dismay among other
Commonwealth Caribbean Governments and could have a serious effect on the progress
of the three remaining Associated States to independence. The DOP therefore agreed to
the request of the SLG to move to independence and debates on the Independence Order
in Council will take place in both Houses next week.
5. We have been assured by the Opposition Spokesman that their Members will not stand in
the way.”
14
It was apparent that the party caucus had decided to go ahead with the grant of
14
(U.K. National Archives, FCO 44/1910, Folio 434).
Report – March 2011
64
independence to Saint Lucia having considered all of the political issues surrounding the
matter following its acceptance by the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP).
The next stage would be to manage the parliamentary phase of the approval process. It is
noted that the Opposition in the British Parliament had agreed not to “stand in the way”.
In working out the parliamentary timetable, there was a desire on the part of the British
Government to have the Saint Lucia Termination of Association Order made before the Christmas
recess in 1978.
In a declassified confidential internal memorandum at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated
30
th
November, 1978, P.C. Duff of the West Indian and Atlantic Department defines the following
problem and argument:
“ST. LUCIA INDEPENDENCE
PROBLEM
1. To consider whether the St. Lucia Termination of Association Order can be made before the
Christmas recess.
ARGUMENT
2. I understand that Mr. Rowlands wishes to have the St. Lucia Termination of Association
Order made at the meeting of the Privy Council on 20 December. This may just be
possible, depending on the parliamentary timetable.
3. The DOP Paper has been approved by the Secretary of State and was delivered to the
Cabinet Office on 28 November. We said that we will assume concurrence if nothing is
heard by 4 December.
4. The weekly meeting of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments on Tuesday 12
December will therefore be the only one at which the draft Order could be scrutinised in
time for it to be debated in Parliament and made on 20 December. We must lay the draft
Order before Parliament by Thursday 7 December to get it on the agenda for the Joint
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
65
Committee meeting of 12 December. The Lords will rise for the Christmas recess on 14
December, and 13 December therefore seems the latest possible date for the debate in
that House. Since it is possible that the Commons may also rise early for Christmas, it
would be safest to assume that the debate there will have to take place on the following
day, 14 December.
5. Before the draft Order can be laid, it will be necessary to insert the date on which the
termination of Association is to take effect. The date will therefore have to be agreed very
rapidly with Mr. Compton as soon as DOP approval has been secured
15
What had become a top priority after the British Government had decided to go ahead with
independence for Saint Lucia was to get an independence date from the Premier of Saint Lucia,
John Compton. In a declassified confidential telegram dated 4
th
December, 1978 from C.G
Mortlock, Deputy British Government Representative, resident in Saint Lucia, to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office in London, the following message was sent:
“St. Lucia Independence
1. I saw Premier Compton this afternoon and delivered Mr. Rowland’s message. Compton
was delighted and asked that his appreciation and gratitude for this quick response be
conveyed to the Minister.
2. Without any hesitation he nominated Thursday 22 February as Independence Day.”
16
The
swift response from Premier Compton was crucial to the parliamentary timetable back in
London as the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ted Rowlands,
was working with a tight schedule. The announcement of the decision of the British
Government as well as the date of independence was made by way of a reply to a
Question for Written Answer in the House of Commons on 6
th
December, 1978. The
House of Commons Hansard records it as follows:
15
.” (U.K. National Archives, FCO 44 / 1910, Folio 408).
16
U.K. National Archives, FCO 44 / 1910, Folio 418.
Report – March 2011
66
“Mr. Boothroyd asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will
make a statement on the termination of the status of association between St. Lucia and the
United Kingdom.
Mr. Ted Rowlands: The Government have decided to recommend to Parliament that the
status of association be terminated by Order in Council under Section 10(2) of the West
Indies Act with effect from 22
nd
February 1979. Copies of the proposed independence
constitution are being made available in the Library of the House.”
17
(
It is to be noted that The Saint Lucia Termination of Association Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/ No. 1900)
and the Saint Lucia Constitution Order 1978 (S.I. No. 1901/1978) were both made on 20
th
December, 1978 and came into effect on 22
nd
February, 1979.
The Post-Independence Experience
In the post-independence period, Saint Lucia faced many challenges and constitutional
controversies which have caused many in the society to entertain the thought of the need for
constitutional reform. The establishment of the Constitutional Reform Commission by way of a
Statutory Instrument [S.I. No. 50/2004] in 2004 has emerged out of the many travails that the
society has had to bear from the collapse of the Government in 1982 to the two general elections
that were held in April 1987 to the death of Sir John Compton in office as Prime Minister in 2007
among other things
Through all of this, one can say that the system of Government has survived. Some may argue that
it is the independence constitution that has preserved the democratic process in Saint Lucia, while
others may argue that the political culture has been the saviour of the society to the extent that the
local political soil is fertile for democracy regardless of the type of constitutional system that is
operated.
The general election of July 1979 saw the St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) coming to power under the
leadership of Allan Louisy. However within months of capturing power, there were problems within
17
House of Commons, Hansard, Written Answers, Vol. 959, p. 709, 6
th
December, 1978).
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
67
its ranks as a split emerged between Prime Minister Louisy and George Odlum who was
subsequently dismissed from the Government.
The split in the SLP widened which lead to the collapse of the Government by 1982 resulting in
early general elections being called. At these elections, the United Workers Party (UWP) under the
leadership of John Compton returned to power with a 14 – 3 margin of victory. This margin was not
sustained at the next general election on 6th April, 1987 which the UWP narrowly won by a 9 – 8
margin.
Prime Minister Compton requested dissolution of Parliament after the formalities of opening a new
Parliament had been completed on 13
th
April, 1987. This cleared the way for another general
election on 30
th
April, 1987. The Governor-General, Sir Allen Lewis, had a choice here to refuse
the request for dissolution by Prime Minister Compton. The provisions of Section 55(4) (a) of the
Constitution state as follows:
“(a) if the Prime Minister advises a dissolution and the Governor-General, acting in his own
deliberate judgment, considers that the Government of St. Lucia can be carried on without
a dissolution and that a dissolution would not be in the best interests of St. Lucia, he may,
acting in his own deliberate judgment, refuse to dissolve Parliament;…”
However, he opted to grant the request for dissolution so soon after the previous request and the
result of the first general election was repeated. Saint Lucia is one of three countries in the
Commonwealth Caribbean that has a provision that permits the Governor-General to refuse the
request of the Prime Minister for dissolution. The other two are St. Vincent and the Grenadines and
Belize.
In the aftermath of the second general elections of 1987, Neville Cenac stepped down as leader of
the SLP and Julian Hunte became the new leader. Subsequently, a different political behaviour
arose when Cenac ‘crossed the floor’ which gave Compton and the UWP a more comfortable 10 –
7 margin by which to govern.
Needless to say, the phenomenon of crossing the floor and switching allegiances was a matter of
considerable political disquiet as anti-Government emotions expressed on the campaign trail were
converted after the election into pro-Government support. This type of phenomenon would replay
Report – March 2011
68
itself in future years in St. Lucian politics and would force many persons to ask whether this was a
creature of personal choice, political ambition or systemic failure.
The critical issue that arises here is the question of whether party politics should be the dominant
force in the system of Government and how dominant it should be. On the one hand, loyalty to the
party is the essence of the Westminster-style system of Government as it creates an adversarial
contest between two major political parties in which one will emerge victorious by virtue of
capturing a majority of seats in the elected House of Parliament and the other will earn a minority.
The majority is entitled to have its leader appointed Prime Minister, while the leader of the minority
is appointed Leader of the Opposition. However, both sides operate on the basis of parliamentary
caucuses in which the need to toe the party line is paramount.
The premise of this type of system of Government is that the minority is expected to oppose the
majority and that it is assumed that power will rotate between two major parties at future dates
when general elections are held. The fluidity that changing political allegiances brings to the
process is that Governments can be strengthened or weakened by the shifting allegiances of
elected Members of Parliament during their terms of office which can lead to the sustenance or the
collapse of a Government.
The reality is that many in the society would like to see a more independent-minded Member of
Parliament who is not simply a creature of party loyalty, but rather is willing to stand up on matters
of principle for constituents under their care. This clash between constituency needs and party
loyalty has created internal pressures for the major political parties and the current system of
Government does not adequately permit equality between the two. After all, the collapse of party
loyalty can bring about the demise of any Government.
Indeed, party loyalty is driven by the political process in which the selection of candidates, the
election of Members of Parliament and their discipline in the Parliament after their election are all
driven by party loyalty. The challenge here is to devise a system of Government in which political
parties continue to play an important role in providing candidates for elected and selected public
office, while simultaneously playing the roles of political education and political mobilisation that are
so vital to the political process.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
69
The 1992 general election saw the return of the UWP to power and John Compton continued as
Prime Minister. However, in 1996 Prime Minister Compton stepped down from office and was
replaced by Dr. Vaughan Lewis as Prime Minister. In the general election that followed in 1997, the
UWP were defeated and the SLP under the leadership of Dr. Kenny D Anthony assumed office
with a 16 – 1 majority in the House of Assembly. This was reduced to a 14 – 3 majority in the
general election of 2001.
In December 2006 Sir John Compton led the UWP to victory in the general elections. He assumed
the office of Prime Minister for a sixth time having held the office from 22
nd
February to 2
nd
July,
1979; then from 3
rd
May, 1982 to 2
nd
April, 1996; and then again from 12
th
December, 2006 until his
death in office on 7
th
September, 2007
18
after five general elections in 1982, 6
th
April 1987, 30
th
April 1987, 1992 and 2006.
Indeed, Saint Lucia has experienced a full range of political events from successful turnovers of
power from one party to another after general elections (July 1979, May 1982, May 1997 and
December 2006); to resignations of Prime Ministers (Allan Louisy – 4
th
May, 1981, Winston Cenac
– 17
th
January, 1982, Michael Pilgrim – 3
rd
May, 1982, and John Compton – 2
nd
April, 1996); to the
death of a Prime Minister in office (Sir John Compton – 7
th
September, 2007).
In spite of all of this, the country has remained a stable democracy at its foundation, but has
demonstrated a high level of political fluidity at the higher levels of Government. With seven
persons having held the office of Prime Minister from independence up to the time of writing.
19
there is no doubt that Saint Lucia has a very democratic ingredient in its political soil that bodes
well for constitutional reforms that it may need to undertake for its future development and
prosperity.
18
Mr. Compton was Chief Minister from 1964 to 1967 when the island was a Crown Colony and Premier from 1967 to
1979 when the island was an Associated State.
19
(John Compton – 22
nd
February, 1979 to 2
nd
July, 1979; Allan Louisy – 2
nd
July, 1979 to 4
th
May, 1981; Winston
Cenac – 4
th
May, 1981 to 17
th
January, 1982; Michael Pilgrim – 17
th
January, 1982 to 3
rd
May, 1982; John Compton –
3
rd
May, 1982 to 2
nd
April, 1996; Dr. Vaughan Lewis – 2
nd
April, 1996 to 24
th
May, 1997; Dr. Kenny Anthony – 24
th
May,
1997 to 11
th
December, 2006; Sir John Compton – 11
th
December, 2006 to 7
th
September, 2007; and, Stephenson
King since 7
th
September, 2007).
Report – March 2011
70
The ability of the country to endure such frequent political change at the level of the Prime Minister
and the two main political parties, the SLP and the UWP, being able to reorganise themselves after
suffering major political defeats and internal convulsions is another marker that can be used to
appreciate the extent to which a democratic tradition can be identified in the political culture.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
71
RECOGNISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SIR ARTHUR LEWIS
As Saint Lucia moves to reform its constitution, it would do well to recognise the contribution of one
of its Nobel Laureates to the development of democratic theory. Sir Arthur Lewis
20
has been hailed
as a world-renowned economist, but not many people are aware of his intrinsically valuable cross-
disciplinary contribution to the development of democratic theory. This was acknowledged by
Professor Arend Lijphart,
21
who noted the immense contribution of Lewis to the development of
what he (Lijphart) has called “consociational democracy”. In his book Thinking About Democracy,
Lijphart wrote:
“Another striking example of consociational democracy as a rationally invented model can
be found in Sir Arthur Lewis’ (1965) “Politics in West Africa”. Lewis was an economist,
born in St. Lucia in the Caribbean and of African descent. He served as an economic
adviser to several of the Governments of West Africa from 1953 to 1965, and he observed
and deplored the breakdown of democracy that was occurring in these countries. His
diagnosis of this failure was that the West African ethnically divided countries had not
adopted the right kind of democracy upon independence. What they needed, he argued,
was broad inter-ethnic coalitions, elections by PR, and ethnic group autonomy. He did not
attach a comprehensive label to these proposals, but they clearly add up to a
consociational democracy. He did not mention any empirical examples of
consociationalism either, and he appears not to have known of the Colombian, Lebanese,
Dutch, and other precedents. Hence, in contrast to political scientists like Gerhard
Lembruch and myself who discovered consociationalism a few years later, Lewis invented
it by trying to think what would be the logical solution to the problems in West Africa. This
is another example of consociationalism as a creative invention and rational choice –
20
Sir Arthur Lewis was a former Principal of the University of the West Indies and he also held Professorial Chairs in
Economics at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom and at Princeton University in the United States. He
served as an advisor to several African Governments as well as being the Federal negotiator for the Federation of the
West Indies.
21
Research Professor Emeritus in Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and a renowned scholar
on democratic theory in the field of political science.
Report – March 2011
72
especially significant because, as I already mentioned in the Introduction, Lewis was the
first modern scholar to identify the consociational model of democracy.”
22
Lewis’ famous work, Politics in West Africa
23
provided an interesting insight into the emergence of
new states in West Africa which had only recently attained their independence. Lewis did not
confine himself to English-speaking countries, but also analysed those that had emerged from
colonial rule under other imperial powers.
His economic theory on “Industrialisation by Invitation” and his anti-Marxist view of politics would
put him at loggerheads with many in the academic world. On Marxism in Politics of West Africa, he
wrote:
“The point is not that the Marxist thesis is wrong, but that whether right or wrong it does not
apply to West Africa. This fact is of tremendous importance. Most of the political
philosophy of Europe and the Americas, stretching back long before Marx, derives from
the clash between haves and have-nots; as we shall see later, when transported to West
Africa much of this philosophy is irrelevant.”
24
In relation to the political problems being faced by new states that were emerging in the post-
colonial era after gaining their independence in the 1950s and early 1960s, Lewis had this to say:
“Plurality is the principal political problem of most of the new states created in the twentieth
century. Most of them include people who differ from each other in language or tribe or
religion or race; some of these groups live side by side in a long tradition of mutual
hostility, restrained in the past only by a neutral imperial power.”
25
22
Lijphart, Arend. Thinking About Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. New York;
Routledge, 2008 pp. 278 – 279.
23
This book was published out of Series X of the Whidden Lectures that he gave in 1965 on the topic of Politics in
West Africa at Mc Master University in Canada. These lectures were established in 1954 to honour the memory of a
former Chancellor of Mc Master University, the Reverend Dr. Howard P. Whidden.
24
Lewis
,
W Arthur. Politics in West Africa. London; Allen and Unwin, 1965. pp. 18 – 19).
25
Ibid p 66
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
73
The problems that Lewis diagnosed in West Africa may not apply to Saint Lucia, but it is important
to celebrate his contribution to the emergence of democratic theory given the fact that this aspect
of his life’s work is not widely known. The importance of citing Lewis here is also to confirm that
Saint Lucia has a rich history of democratic tradition that has been sternly tested and it has
survived, unlike in some other parts of the world where political outcomes have been very different.
The Commission did not consider the writings of Sir Arthur Lewis until very late. Nonetheless, the
Commission was able to arrive at the same conclusion as Lewis about the differences between
West Africa and Saint Lucia on the subject of democratic traditions.
As a relatively young democratic state, the problems analysed by Lewis in West Africa in the 1950s
and 1960s are not akin to Saint Lucia. The Commission, therefore, wants to signal its intention to
offer recommendations that do capture the spirit of what Lewis stood for in seeking to preserve
functioning democracies for future generations as one of the keys to the enjoyment of general
prosperity.
Report – March 2011
74
CHAPTER ONE
PRELIMINARY
The Constitution of Saint Lucia belongs to a stock of constitutions that are based on a
parliamentary system that recognises the person of the Monarch of the United Kingdom as their
Monarch. To this end, Queen Elizabeth II is the Queen of Saint Lucia and the Governor-General is
Her Majesty’s personal representative in Saint Lucia. The prerogative powers of the Crown are
exercised by the Governor-General in the name of Her Majesty and these powers are primarily
exercised on the advice of Ministers, except in cases where they may be exercised on the advice
of persons or authorities other than Ministers or after consultation or in the deliberate judgment of
the Governor-General.
This is specifically detailed in Section 64 (1) of The Saint Lucia Constitution Order 1978 as follows:
“In the exercise of his functions the Governor-General shall act in accordance with the
advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet except
in cases where he is required by this Constitution or any other law to act in accordance with
the advice of, or after consultation with, any person or authority other than the Cabinet:
Provided that the foregoing provisions of this subsection shall not apply where the
Governor-General is authorised to act in his own deliberate judgment in accordance with the
following provisions of this Constitution-
a) section 57 (which relates to the Constituency Boundaries Commission and the
Electoral Commission);
b) section 60 and 63 (which relates to Ministers);
c) section 67 (which relates to the Leader of the Opposition);
d) section 86 (which relates to the appointment, etc, of public officers);
e) section 88 (which relates to the Chief Elections Officer); and
f) section 95 (which relates to the Public Service Board of Appeal).”
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
75
Saint Lucia is therefore a parliamentary monarchy whose constitution resembles the stock of
Westminster-Whitehall constitutions that are the foundation of all of the countries of the
Commonwealth Caribbean with the exception of Guyana. Any reform of its constitution will be
based on three possible options. These options are (i) the retention of the parliamentary monarchy;
(ii) a change to a parliamentary republic; and, (iii) a change to a presidential republic. The
constitutional status of Saint Lucia is a product of its political history and culture and, therefore, the
changes proposed will have to take account of this reality in respect of the alterations.
Simultaneously, the influence of the Washington model and some of its techniques cannot be
underestimated. This may present the opportunity for hybridization in some instances between
parliamentary and presidential models. Some of the more popular Washington model techniques
are confirmation hearings for the appointment of certain public officials, the ratification of Executive
appointments by the Legislature, the right of recall, term limits for certain public officials, the use of
elections for a wide range of public officials, etcetera.
The balance between the Westminster-Whitehall and Washington models will provide philosophical
challenges in advocating reform as the attractions of the latter model are, in some instances,
incompatible with the former. Some countries in the region (namely the Commonwealth of
Dominica and Trinidad and Tobago) have adopted parliamentary republics and, in doing so, have
included some Washington constitutional techniques that are reasonably compatible with the
parliamentary model, for example term limits for the President of the Commonwealth of Dominica
and an Electoral College for the election of the President in Trinidad and Tobago.
The parliamentary system is designed to function on the basis of domination of the Parliament by
the Cabinet on a natural foundation of majoritarian division (Government majority and Opposition
minority). Such a system cannot accommodate consensual techniques of divided Government that
would involve the Executive being controlled by one party and the Legislature by another with no
harm to the political system. Therefore, it is easier for Commonwealth Caribbean societies to
absorb the effect of a change from a parliamentary monarchy to a parliamentary republic as
opposed to skipping the parliamentary republic and heading directly for a presidential republic
because of the severity of the change in political culture. Nevertheless, the effect of the
Washington model on the evolutionary processes of Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions in
Report – March 2011
76
their Westminster-Whitehall attire is likely to tilt the balance in years to come as Caribbean
societies become weary of the authoritarian tendencies of the Westminster-Whitehall model in their
application in small island states with small parliaments that are just the opposite of Westminster.
While the Westminster model itself has moved with purpose over the last decade to catch up with
Commonwealth Caribbean countries whose separation of powers was far advanced to theirs, the
mother of our parliaments has done some reforms of its own; the highlights of which have been the
dismantling of the office of Lord Chancellor and the introduction of executive, parliamentary and
judicial reforms.
On 1
st
October, 2009, history was created in the United Kingdom when the long standing tradition
of having the House of Lords as the final court of appeal in that country came to an end with the
establishment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court. The Lord Chancellor is no longer the Head
of the Judiciary, but rather the Lord Chief Justice is. The Lord Chancellor is no longer the minister
responsible for the judiciary in the Cabinet, but rather the Secretary of State for Justice is. The Lord
Chancellor no longer presides over sittings of the House of Lords, but rather the Lord Speaker
plays this role.
With such far-reaching reforms, the Westminster system itself is no longer what it used to be.
Constitutional reform has been embraced in a manner that has changed many constitutional and
administrative law textbooks within the last ten years. Saint Lucia is no different in seeking to
undertake a reform of its own more than three-decade old constitution. Unlike the United Kingdom
that does not have a written constitution; Saint Lucia will have to undergo the three tenets of
entrenchment to get a new constitution into place.
These tenets are (i) a time delay procedure between first and second reading of a bill to amend the
Constitution; (ii) a three-fourths majority in the House of Assembly; and, (iii) a simple majority vote
at a referendum after the bill has been passed with the special majority in the House of Assembly
and a simple majority in the Senate. This is the most extreme situation for a complete overhaul of
the Constitution. There are other clauses that do have as strict a requirement as do amendment of
the whole constitution.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
77
In such a situation, consensus will be required to make constitutional reform a reality as both
Government and Opposition will have to come together to forge a new dawn for the people of Saint
Lucia.
Constitutional Reform and a Referendum
In attempting to ensure that the constitutional reform process should have the widest public
participation when it comes to making that final decision on a new draft constitution, there was
discussion among Commissioners on whether issues raised in this constitutional reform process
should form the basis of a referendum as well as issues to be raised at the next general election.
There was a clear recognition that it was very important to ensure that any referendum on a new
Constitution for Saint Lucia should avoid being treated as a party political issue to the extent that
there should be some distance between the holding of a referendum and the holding of a general
election. Having regard to the bipartisan approach that was adopted in the establishment of the
Commission, there is a clear expectation that the two major political parties (the SLP and the UWP)
are both committed to changing the Constitution and that neither side would want to have a reform
process culminate in controversy.
The search for consensus over whatever the Commission recommends can create a situation
whereby both major political parties can urge their supporters to vote in favour of the new
Constitution because of the way in which the entire process has been handled.
The Commission is ever mindful of the fact that its recommendations will have to be converted into
a Bill to be debated in Parliament and that, once that Bill is successfully passed by the required
majority in the Parliament, it will have to be submitted to the electorate at a referendum for their
approval.
The earnest wish of the Commission is that ultimately there should be consensus among the
parliamentarians of the political parties who are represented in the House of Assembly to enact a
new Constitution that a majority of the electorate will support at a referendum.
Report – March 2011
78
CHAPTER TWO
REWORDING THE PREAMBLE
Language of the Constitution
In seeking to reword the Preamble, the Commission was ever mindful that, on the whole, the
language in the Constitution is very legalistic and that it should be made simpler, more
contemporary and void, as far as possible, of technical legal jargon. This view comes from
recognition of the fact that the average layman has difficulty in understanding all of the niceties of
the language of constitutional drafting. This viewpoint about the language of the Constitution starts
in the Preamble and then works it way through the entire document.
There was a suggestion that the Constitution should be written in both English and Kwéyòl. This
was not supported on the ground that the very persons who would read the English version would
be the ones to read the Kwéyòl version. Owing to this situation, it was considered more practical to
consider developing an audio version in Kwéyòl as a future project.
There were concerns about the absence of any gender neutrality in the language of the
Constitution with the use of the words “he” and “his” being used to also include “she” and “her”.
There was consensus that the language of the Constitution should be gender neutral to the extent
that “he” should be replaced with “the person” and that other usage should as far as possible be
reflective of a genuine attempt to be gender neutral. These are general guidelines that the
draftspersons must consider in preparing the draft constitution.
Recommendations
With respect to the language of the Constitution, the Commission recommends the following:
(1) The language of the Constitution should be simplified.
(2) The creation of a printed Kwéyòl version of the Constitution is not recommended to be part
of the current exercise, but a future project should be the creation of an audio version in
Kwéyòl.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
79
(3) The language of the Constitution should be gender neutral.
The Preamble
The purpose of a Preamble to the Constitution is to provide a statement of prevailing beliefs and
values at the time of the introduction of the Constitution. While the Preamble is not a legally
enforceable part of the Constitution, its importance lies in the fact that it introduces the Constitution
and states quite clearly what the values of the State are and, by so doing, gives character to the
Constitution. The Commission is of the view that the Preamble is an umbrella or underlying
sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of the society.
Since 22
nd
February, 1979, there have been changes to some of the values that constitute the very
essence of the Constitution. Indeed, there have been latter-day debates about the importance of
the environment, the need to preserve the national patrimony, the broadening of human rights’
considerations that have questioned the inalienability of human rights themselves as well as
greater social diversity to include atheism, sexual orientation, and gender.
Indigenous People
The Commission considered a presentation on the rights of indigenous people, however, there was
no definition of the term “indigenous people” save that the Commission was referred to the
Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People that states: “People who inhabited a land before it
was conquered by colonial societies and who consider themselves distinct from the societies
currently governing those territories are called Indigenous Peoples”. The Commission also noted
the definition by the UN Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which states that indigenous communities, peoples and
nations are: “…those which having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of
societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples,
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.”
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The Commission took the view that the indigenous people of Saint Lucia should not be specifically
recognised in the Preamble because the Commission did not wish to give special constitutional
recognition to any one group over any other.
Recommendation
(4) With respect to indigenous people of Saint Lucia the Commission recommends that the
indigenous people of Saint Lucia should not be specifically recognised in the Preamble.
Preserving Culture
The Commission discussed the importance of Saint Lucian culture, its preservation and its being
constitutionally recognised. Paragraphs three (3) and five (5) of the Preamble of the Haitian
Constitution were instructive on this point which states: “Establish a strong and stable State,
capable of protecting the country’s values, traditions …” and “Strengthen national unity … by
accepting the community of language and culture …”
Commissioners agreed to the submission that some statement about the preservation and
protection of our culture be inserted in the Constitution, be it in the Preamble or otherwise, in order
that our way of life, both traditional and modern, can be constitutionally recognised.
Recommendation
(5) With respect to preserving our culture, the Commission recommends that statement on
the preservation of Saint Lucian culture along the lines of paragraphs three (3) and five (5)
of the Haitian Constitution should be inserted in the Constitution.
Rule of Law
The Commission supported a suggested amendment that subsection (d) of the existing Preamble
which says, “maintain that these freedoms can only be safeguarded by the rule of law”, would be
strengthened by stating that the enforcement of the rule of law was necessary in order to maintain
rights and freedoms for the individual. The Commission concluded that the revised wording should
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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read: “maintain that these freedoms can only be safeguarded by the impartial enforcement of the
rule of law”.
Recommendation
(6) With respect to the rule of law, the Commission recommends that the revised wording for
Subsection (d) of the Preamble should be reworded as follows:
“Maintain that these freedoms can only be safeguarded by the impartial
enforcement of the rule of law”. “Maintain that these freedoms can only be
safeguarded by the impartial enforcement of the rule of law”.
The Recognition of God
One of the major areas of debate in respect of the Preamble was the issue of the mention of God
and that such references did not include non-believers and atheists. While there is recognition of
the rights of atheists, the Commission felt that this cannot overcome the fact that the State is
founded on a belief in the existence of Almighty God.
To remove references to God in the Preamble would severely compromise the argument contained
in the existing Preamble that people are endowed by God with inalienable rights and dignity. The
premise of the Preamble is that rights come from God and not from Mankind which is what makes
them inalienable. Furthermore, dignity which is important for the existence of civilisation also
comes from God.
The Commission considered that as a tolerant society, Saint Lucia does not have to eliminate its
foundation as a God-fearing society in order to accommodate non-believers and atheists. Their
principles are adequately included in all of the provisions of the existing Preamble. With the belief
by some that rights are an inalienable divine gift to mankind, the non-believers and the atheists are
protected as no man or woman will ever have the right to deprive any individual (believer or non-
believer) of their natural and inalienable rights.
This is not to diminish in any way the many concerns/proposals about the Preamble in which there
were conflicting views on this matter. However, there was a recognition that the majority of people
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were in favour of keeping the references to God in the Preamble. Nevertheless, there was the
recognition of the fact that the views of the minority could be accommodated in the Preamble by an
appropriately worded statement which would provide a sense of inclusion as opposed to a feeling
of exclusion for anyone. The relevant section of the Preamble of the Independence Constitution
states:
“WHEREAS the People of Saint Lucia –
(a) affirm their faith in the supremacy of the Almighty God;
(b) believe that all persons have been endowed equally by God with
inalienable rights and dignity;”
The Commission suggests that (a) and (b) above should be replaced with the following:
(a) Acknowledge the reality that while the majority of Saint Lucians affirm
their faith in the supremacy of Almighty God, they also commit to the
principle of respect for other spiritual beliefs and persuasions.
It must also be noted that the Preamble cannot be regarded as conflicting, because it has no
function for the purpose of interpreting the later provisions in the Constitution which protect the
rights of minorities.
Recommendation
(7) With respect to the recognition of God, the Commission recommends that subsections (a)
and (b) of the Preamble should be reworded to read as follows:
“… acknowledge the reality that while the majority of Saint Lucians affirm their faith
in the supremacy of Almighty God, they also commit to the principle of respect for
other spiritual beliefs and persuasions.”
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The Queen’s Chain
In considering the Preamble to the Constitution, the Commission engaged in a debate about the
need to protect the Queen’s Chain from property and other developers in order to safeguard the
right of Saint Lucians to access their beaches.
The Queen’s Chain is the portion of land measuring One Hundred and Eighty-six Point Five (186.5)
feet from the foreshore. The foreshore is that portion of land which is alternatively covered and left
dry by the ordinary flux and reflux of the tides.
26
In other words, the Queen’s Chain is that expanse
of land running 186.5 feet inland from the high water mark, or rather, 186.5 feet from the edge of
the clear-cut land and where the flow of the sea and waves do not come.
Article 355 of the Civil Code of Saint Lucia states that the “roads and public ways maintained by
the State, the Queen’s Chain, the sea-shore, land reclaimed from the sea, ports, harbours and
roadsteads, and generally all those portions of territory which do not constitute private property, are
considered as being dependencies of the Crown domain”. Therefore, it is clear from the language
of Article 355 that the Queen’s Chain is part of the Crown’s domain, and as such belongs to the
people of Saint Lucia, for which the Government is the custodian.
As far back as the late 1600’s an area of land was reserved by the King of France, around the
Island of Saint Lucia to enable the establishment of towns, parishes, forts, entrenchments,
batteries and other public and necessary works. This was as much for their decoration as for the
defence of the Island. In areas where towns, fortresses and batteries were established, they served
for that purpose. In the rest of the island, the owners of lands above that portion which was
reserved, obtained from the Lords, Governors and Stewards of the King permission to clear the
lands which enabled them to procure facilities for the exploitation of their plantations. Permission
was granted gratuitously, without any dues to the Lords or King and with the understanding that
those lands can be reclaimed when they were needed for the service of the King or for the use of
the public.
26
Coulson & Forbes on the Law of Waters: Sea, Tidal and Inland and Land Drainage. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1952.
p 22
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84
The Commission concluded that there is a need to write into the Constitution provisions which
protect the rights of citizens with regards to access to the beach, coastal areas, reclaimed land and
other public places. As it relates to the foreshore and seabed, there should be a reserve. There
should always be some level of discussion and public participation on the disposal of public lands
which the Government holds in trust for the people.
In order to guarantee protection to the citizens on this point, the Preamble should include a clear
statement that protects the Queen’s Chain as an area that must be protected in perpetuity for the
people of Saint Lucia as part of the patrimony for future generations.
Recommendations
With respect to the Queen’s Chain, the Commission recommends the following:
(8) A statement on the protection of the Queen’s Chain must be made in the Preamble to
reflect the protection of the patrimony of the people of Saint Lucia.
(9) Provisions should be included in the Constitution to protect the rights of citizens to access
the beach, coastal areas, rivers, reclaimed land and other public places.
Additional Matters Considered
There was general agreement among Commissioners that the format and content of the remainder
of the Preamble were adequate; save for some minor additions or amendments. It was also
determined that most of the remaining submissions were already provided for in the Preamble.
However, there were some submissions that Commissioners agreed should be given due
consideration and included in the Preamble.
The Environment
There were a number of submissions that protection of the environment be among the extension of
rights. Generally, the trend is that constitutions make mention of the environment in the Preamble
and make specific provisions for it in the Bill of Rights. The sentiment that the current generation
should use our natural resources in a way that ensures sustainability, development and safeguards
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our patrimony for future generations, should be embodied in the Preamble, was endorsed by the
Commission. To this end, the Commission concluded that a Natural Resource Management Act
was required in ordinary legislation to support this thrust.
Recommendations
With respect to the environment, the Commission recommends the following:
(10) Our natural resources should be used in such a way that ensures sustainability,
development and safeguards our patrimony for future generations
(11) A Natural Resource Management Act is required by ordinary legislation to facilitate the
protection of the environment.
Separation of Powers
There was a debate about whether or not there was a need to enshrine the separation of powers in
the Preamble. Commissioners noted that there is a sufficient body of law under the existing
Constitution that is very clear on the separation of powers as a doctrine and as an accepted
principle. Commissioners felt that they would like to see the principle enshrined as an ideal, as they
felt that laws could be easily changed by a majority in Parliament. At the very least, there should be
a statement that would preserve the independence of the Judiciary.
Recommendations
With respect to separation of powers, the Commission recommends the following:
(12) There was no need to make specific mention of the concept of the Separation of Powers
in the Preamble.
(13) There should be some statement in the Preamble that would preserve the independence
of the Judiciary.
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Constitutional Review
The Commission considered the issue of a mandatory review of the Constitution after a designated
number of years. It was felt by a majority of Commissioners that such a provision would lead to an
extreme level of uncertainty which would adversely affect the supreme law of the land. The process
of constitutional reform cannot be labelled in such a way as to make it time-specific, but rather that
future generations would respond to a prevailing need to amend the Constitution in the same way
that the House of Assembly passed a resolution on 17
th
February, 2004 and the Senate did
likewise on 14
th
April, 2004, calling for the establishment of a Constitutional Reform Commission.
Recommendation
(14) With respect to the Constitution, the Commission recommends that there should be
periodic reviews but there should not be specifying a timeline for such review.
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CHAPTER THREE
STRENGTHENING OUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
The existing constitutional provisions for the fundamental human rights and freedoms currently
enjoyed by Saint Lucians emerged out of a strengthening of the provisions that were in the
previous associated state constitution.
The Marlborough House Agreements on Human Rights
At the Marlborough House Constitutional Conference where the independence constitution for St.
Lucia was discussed during the period 24
th
– 27
th
July, 1978, the declassified summary of what
was agreed between the British Government, the Saint Lucian Government and the Saint Lucian
Opposition reveals as follows:
1. “Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
The existing provisions which already contain the usual safeguards have been
further strengthened as a result of the constructive contributions by the St. Lucia
Government and Opposition delegations to the constitutional conference (see
paragraph 11 of Cmnd 7328).”
27
The modifications made to the fundamental rights and freedoms provisions contained in the
associated state constitution for the independence constitution are detailed in paragraph 11 of the
Report of the St. Lucia Constitutional Conference
28
as follows:
11. “The constitution would include provisions modelled on Chapter I of the existing
constitution with modification as follows:
1) references should be included to equality before the law, and to the protection
of personal privacy and family life in the declaratory provisions of section 1;
27
U.K. National Archives, FCO 44/1910, Folio 419, Annex A, St. Lucia Constitution.
28
Report of the St. Lucia Constitution Conference, 1978/Cmnd 7328
Report – March 2011
88
2) in section 3(2), the phrase “as soon as reasonably practicable” should be
replaced by the phrase “with reasonable promptitude”;
3) an additional subsection should be added giving an arrested person the right
to retain and instruct a legal representative promptly and to hold private
communication with him;
4) the language of section 3(5) should include an explicit prohibition of excessive
bail;
5) an additional provision should be added to section 3 giving a minor who is
arrested or detained the right to communicate with his parents or guardian;
6) section 3(6) should be amended so that, to the extent that it is so provided by
law, no compensation would be payable where the arrest or detention was
effected in pursuance of the order of a Court or magistrate or justice of the
peace;
7) section 4(3)(d) should be amended so as to replace the reference to “any other
emergency or calamity” by a reference to “any accident or natural calamity”;
8) section 6(1) should be amended so that property may only be acquired
compulsorily for a public purpose;
9) section 6(4) should be amended so as to permit the imposition of reasonable
restrictions on the remission to another country of any amount of
compensation for the deprivation of property for the purpose of controlling the
export from St. Lucia of capital raised in St. Lucia or capital raised in some
other country the Government of which has entered into arrangements with the
Government of St. Lucia for the purpose of controlling the export of such
capital;
10) section 8(2) should be amended on the lines of section 8(2) of the Dominica
Independence Constitution which refers to the circumstances in which a trial
may take place in the absence of the accused;
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11) section 9(3) which relates to the protection of freedom of conscience should be
amended on the lines of section 9(3) of the Dominica Independence
Constitution;
12) section 11(1) should be amended so as to refer explicitly to the right to form or
belong to political parties;
13) section 15(1)(a) should be amended so that a detained person is to be
informed in a language that he understands and in detail, of the grounds of
detention and also furnished with a written statement in English specifying
those grounds in detail;
14) section 17 which relates to Declarations of Emergency should be replaced with
a provision on the lines of part 3 of Chapter 1 of the constitution of the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.”
29
Armed with the knowledge of how the Bill of Rights was amended for the Independence
Constitution, the Commission felt that this should now be juxtaposed against some of the issues
raised in consultation with the population as well as those areas of debate that engaged
Commissioners in their review sessions.
The Right to Life
On the issue of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life, some Commissioners were of the view that
issues relative to respect for the integrity of the person, including freedom from arbitrary or unlawful
deprivation of life, protection of the unborn as well as when life begins, could best be afforded
protection through ordinary laws.
Other Commissioners were of the view that the present Constitution does not deal with the right to
life where it exists before birth, consequently it cannot be dealt with under ordinary legislation. It
29
Report of the St. Lucia Constitutional Conference (1978/Cmnd. 7328, pp. 2 – 3).
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90
was agued that if conception was seen as the commencement of life, then due consideration
should be given to what medical practitioners and others say in that regard.
There was the view that while the right to life is already afforded constitutional protection, there has
always been a clear restriction on abortion. The law has only recently been amended to allow it
under certain circumstances. In fact, there has always been the allowance for medical reasons but
it has been extended to include two new categories, rape and incest, albeit under stringent
conditions. Some argued that if the right to life is applied to most vulnerable groups, then, the
unborn child should fit that category and the fundamental laws should seek to protect the existence
of such a life. There is also the view that life begins after the first trimester. Ultimately the
Commission was divided as to whether life begins at conception or at birth.
There was the view that the law is not the place to determine where life begins when the medical
profession has not been unable to do so definitively. There are also widely varying views among
different religions. What has been done, and it is the correct strategy, is to provide general
protection to life in the Constitution and place restrictions in ordinary legislation as to how that can
be abrogated and where it can be protected.
Recommendation
(15) With respect to the right to life, the Commission recommends that the existing provisions
on right to life should be retained.
Deprivation of Property
The Commission noted that Section 6 (1) of the Constitution relating to protection from deprivation
of property indicates that:
“No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no
interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired,
except for a public purpose and except where provision is made by a law
applicable to that taking of possession or acquisition for the prompt payment of full
compensation.”
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Despite the fact that this section had been specifically amended by the drafters of the
independence constitution on the instructions of the Marlborough House Conference, the
Commission still hold the view that adherence to this provision was questionable.
It was felt that Section 6 (2) did not adequately address the situation where there are competing
interests. Also there were questions as to whether that should be a matter for the Courts to
determine.
Some Commissioners felt that the problem was not with the constitutional provisions but with the
provisions of the legislation thereunder. Other Commissioners were of the view that ordinary
legislation cannot take care of this situation. The Commission concluded that the problem arose
mainly due to the unwillingness of politicians to follow the law.
Restrictions should therefore be placed in the Constitution so that the legislation can better address
the situation. A case in point is the Land Acquisition Act (No. 11 of 1984) which restricts
compensation to the market value of the property at the time of the acquisition and not at the time
of payment. If these constitutional changes are applied, it would more than likely force prompt
settlement.
Recommendations
With respect to deprivation of property, the Commission recommends the following:
(16) The ability of the State to alienate the patrimony of the country should be restricted. These
restrictions should include, but not be limited to the ability to lease, to change land use or
to promote sustainable development.
(17) Access to the patrimony of the State should be a public right.
(18) Compensation for property acquired by Government should be based on the current value
of the property and, at that time, payment should be full and prompt.
(19) Strengthening the provisions of the Constitution to ensure (15) above.
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Protection of Public Property
The Commission received submissions that the Constitution should provide for the protection and
promotion of the cultural heritage of the State including historic sites, monuments, places and
objects of artistic and historic interest, language, literature, visual and performing arts to enrich the
cultural life of the citizens of the State. The Commission endorsed these submissions.
There were also submissions that the provision of a public right to access parks, beaches and
public property (i.e. patrimony) should be granted constitutional protection. There was extensive
discussion among Commissioners on the issue. Commissioners concluded that some aspects of
this issue can best be addressed by ordinary legislation.
Commissioners and the public were concerned with the protection of the patrimony not just for this
generation but also for the generations to come. The idea that benefits, such as access to
beaches, are enjoyed by non-nationals to the exclusion of most nationals was a situation that
needed to be redressed. To this end, the Commission took a firm stand on the issue of the
Queen’s Chain by agreeing to have it included in the Preamble and in the Chapter on Fundamental
Human Rights and Freedoms. It was also felt that a Natural Resource Management Act should
provide for adequate management of our environment and natural resources.
Recommendations
With respect to Protection of Public Property, the Commission recommends the following:
(20) The ability of the State to alienate the patrimony of the country should be restricted. These
restrictions should include, but not be limited to the ability to lease, to change land use or
to promote sustainable development.
(21) Access to the patrimony of the State should be a public right.
(22) The Constitution should provide for the protection of public property especially our cultural
heritage, and the State’s natural resources.
(23) A Natural Resource Management Act should be provided for.
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Capital Punishment
There were as many recommendations calling for the retention of capital punishment as there were
those calling for its abolition. The Commission was mindful that the issue has preoccupied the
Commonwealth Caribbean, ever since the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's decision in
Pratt v Morgan in 1993. In that case, the Judicial Committee overturned a previous decision,
holding that an extended delay in carrying out the sentence of death by hanging, could convert an
initially lawful sentence of death to cruel and inhuman punishment, contrary to the Constitution.
The effect of the decision is that sentences of hanging in the Commonwealth Caribbean now have
to be carried out before the expiration of five years, to be legal.
30
After considerable debate on the issue, the Commission remained sharply divided on the retention
of the death penalty, although a majority favoured retention. In the end, the Commission
recommended that the current legal position permitting the application of the death penalty in
certain cases of murder should be retained. The Commission therefore does not recommend any
changes to the law on capital punishment in Saint Lucia.
Recommendation
(24) With respect to capital punishment, the Commission recommends that capital punishment
should be retained.
EXTENSION OF PROTECTION ON THE GROUNDS OF DISCRIMINATION
Gender
In considering protection from discrimination, there was a proposal that gender should be included
among the provisions. It was the general view of Commissioners that sex was already included in
the Constitution; however, there was a strong minority view that discrimination on the basis of sex
does not mean gender. Therefore, on that basis, non-discrimination on the basis of gender should
30
Will return to this issue of hanging when dealing with the matter of the CCJ – where the repatriation of our court
system is being considered.
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94
be included in the Constitution. While Commissioners were sensitive to the issue, the majority did
not endorse that viewpoint.
Discrimination against Women
The Commission noted the definition of discrimination against women as proffered by the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), which states
that:
"...any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field."
The Commission also noted that the Convention establishes an agenda for action to put an end to
sex-based discrimination. Those countries ratifying the Convention are also required to enshrine
gender equality into their domestic legislation, repeal discriminatory provisions in their laws, and
enact new provisions to guard against discrimination against women. By accepting the Convention,
States commit themselves to undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women
in all forms, including:
(a) to establish tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective
protection of women against discrimination; and
(b) to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons,
organizations or enterprises.
The Commission noted that Saint Lucia has ratified the Convention and that countries that have
ratified or acceded to the Convention are legally bound to put its provisions into practice.
Recommendation
(25) With respect to discrimination against women, the Commission recommends that the
provisions of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
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Women (1979) should be implemented and where complementary included in the
Constitution.
Sexual Orientation
The Commission was made aware of an opinion by Justice Edwin Cameron, Judge of the South
African Supreme Court cited in the South African Law Times,
31
where it was noted that sexual
orientation was defined on the basis of erotic attraction in the case of heterosexuals to members of
the opposite sex, in the case of gays and lesbians to members of the same sex.
With respect to sexual orientation, the majority of Commissioners were not convinced that it should
be included as one of the provisions while a minority could not understand why such a significant
percentage of the population should be ostracised in a modern constitution.
It was noted that giving sexual orientation constitutional approval will have implications for certain
sexual offences such as buggery. To this end, there may have to be legislative reforms on a wider
scale if such a concession is made.
The point was made that there was a high level of violence and abuse directed against persons
who were not heterosexuals and who have other sexual orientations. Constitutional protection
would ensure that state-sponsored organisations would not discriminate against these individuals.
It was argued that persons should not be fired from their jobs or excluded from employment on the
basis of their sexual orientation. The fundamental rights and freedoms clauses of the Constitution
ought not to allow any discriminatory practices against anyone regardless of their sexual
orientation.
There were divergent views among members of the Commission. One view was that the first
paragraph of Chapter 1 on The Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms which states:
“Whereas every person in Saint Lucia is entitled to the fundamental rights and
freedoms, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political
opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of
31
South African Law Times 1993. Page 44.
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96
others and for the public interest, to each and all of the following, namely-…”
appears to be comprehensive enough to cover everybody regardless of sexual orientation. It was
further argued that this issue should be dealt with under ordinary legislation and not in the
Constitution.
A contrasting view to this was that Section 1 under the fundamental rights and freedoms provisions
is not enforceable by virtue of the exclusion of Section 1 under the provisions of Section 16 which
states:
“If any person alleges that any of the provision of Sections 2 to 15 inclusive of this
Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him (or,
in the case of a person who is detained, if any other person alleges such a
contravention in relation to the detained person), then, without prejudice to any
other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person
(or that other person) may apply to the High Court for redress.”
In order to make Section 1 enforceable, Section 16 would have to be extended to say:
“If any person alleges that any of the provision of Sections 1 to 15 inclusive of this
Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened …”
This was refuted, on the basis that the discriminatory grounds referred to in Section 13 (3) repeats
the very grounds cited in Section 1. This therefore makes these rights enforceable. The additional
ground being recommended would be better placed under Section13 (3) rather than including it in
Section 1.
Another argument for inclusion of sexual orientation as a ground for discrimination is that
Constitutions must have a built-in ability to reflect the times as they are. Race, place of origin,
political opinions, colour, creed or sex are the issues of that time when the emphasis was on
political and civil rights. Most Constitutions that have been reviewed in recent times, for example
the South African Constitution, are beginning to recognise another class of rights and have gone
the route of extending the grounds of discrimination to include social and economic rights.
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It was further argued that ordinary legislation that dealt with some of those issues, for example
issues of gender identity, sexual orientation and gender issues, are not sufficient and that they
really should be reflected in the Constitution to secure, particularly for women, equal treatment and
protection. There was also a growing acceptance of the fact that there are clear issues relating to
sexual orientation in that it is being used as a basis upon which to promulgate severe levels of
abuse.
The Commission also considered whether sexual acts between consenting adults of the same sex
in private should not be criminalised but did not make a recommendation.
Recommendations
(26) With respect to sexual orientation the Commission recommends that discrimination based
on sexual orientation is unacceptable and should be addressed under well-defined
ordinary legislation.
Common Law Unions
The Commission recognised that common law relationships are integral to Saint Lucian society. In
examining the issue the Commission recognised the need to provide protection to parties in
common law relationships and considered whether they should be granted rights to protect them
from discrimination.
The status of marriage as against common law unions was discussed by the Commission and the
debate ranged from whether this fell within the purview of the Commission because it did not
receive any recommendations on that issue, neither was it an issue discussed at the public
consultations in respect of making special provision for common law unions.
The Commission considered several questions, including what determines a common law union.
What are the consequences of such a union? What is a person entitled to on the death of a party?
How do you regulate the interest of an existing spouse and a common law spouse and the children
of the two unions? The Commission considered that these were among the issues to be decided.
The Commission took note of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Family Law
Project which dealt with the issue in some respects and noted that the intention was to draft
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legislation in that regard. Therefore, some Commissioners felt that the Commission might be
premature in addressing this topic at this stage. Further, Commissioners considered that the issue
was not so much recognition of common law unions in the Constitution as it is the consequences of
such unions. In this regard, there will be need to ensure protection for children. An examination of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child may be more relevant in terms of securing protection for
children of a common law union.
There was the view that there may not be a need to mention common law unions in the
Constitution if there is already sufficient protection on the basis of gender and for children in
keeping with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the law of trust, et cetera. These will go a
very long way in terms of securing the necessary benefits.
The Constitution is the supreme law which holds the ideals of the society. Marriage is considered in
the Constitution because it is something the society regards as ideal.
32
The dearth of submissions
in relation to common law relationships leaves the Commission guessing as to the public’s position
on the matter. However, the commission found it necessary to make the following
recommendations.
Recommendations
With respect to common law unions, the Commission recommends the following:
(27) Parliament should consider examining the Convention on the Rights of the Child with a
view to incorporation into domestic law.
(28) Children born out of wedlock should receive the same treatment under the Constitution as
those born in wedlock.
(29) Parliament should enact laws to provide equal recognition and protection to parties in
common law unions.
32
Section 13 (4) of the Constitution states that the protection from discrimination may be infringed by a law so far as
that law makes provisions with respect to marriage.
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Same-Sex Unions
No submissions were received by the Commission for or against same sex unions. However, the
Commission considered the matter and concluded that marriage should continue to be between a
man and a woman.
While the Commission agreed that this was not a constitutional issue, it considered a submission
that sexual acts between consenting adults of the same sex should be criminalised. The
Commission’s view was that any kind of sexual intimacy in public should continue to be a criminal
act.
Recommendation
With respect to same sex unions, the Commission recommends the following:
(30) Sexual intimacy in public should continue to be a criminal offence.
(31) Marriage should continue to be between a man and a woman.
The Right to Privacy
Commissioners noted that the right to privacy is mentioned in the Preamble but not dealt with
specifically within the Constitution, except for the provisions of Section 7 pertaining to protection
from arbitrary search or entry.
There were submissions that people’s rights to privacy were frequently violated by the media. This
view was also shared by some Commissioners. However, at the same time, the Commission noted
that care should be taken not to stifle the media but there was a need to find ways to ensure that
the media report with due accuracy and prudence. The Commission considered Section 14 (1) of
the Belize Constitution which provides as follows:
“A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to any unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
The private and family life, the home and the personal correspondence of every person
shall be respected.”
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Recommendations
With respect to the right to privacy, the Commission recommends the following:
(32) The right to privacy should be expressly included in the Bill of Rights.
(33) Related provisions to the right to privacy should be strengthened and extended to protect
the rights and dignity of individuals.
The Right to Health
There were submissions that the right to health should be protected under the Constitution. In the
view of the Commission, this is generally formulated as the provision of a basic standard of living
and safe environment as per Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
reads as follows:
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control.”
The Commission observed that, generally speaking, countries which have adopted the provisions
of the Right to Health have limited themselves to providing “a standard of living adequate for health
and well-being of the person and of his/her family”, and that there is usually the proviso that this is
“subject to the extent and level of resources of the State.”
The Commission further noted that the Preamble of the present Constitution speaks about these
social and economic rights in subsection (e) when it states:
“WHEREAS the People of Saint Lucia realise that human dignity requires respect
for spiritual values; for private family life and property; and the enjoyment of an
adequate standard of economic and social well-being dependent upon the
resources of the State….”
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The view was expressed that the high cost of medical care and the proliferation of disease and
chronic illnesses make the right to health or the provision of a basic standard of health care, even
more relevant today.
There was concern that when rights are subjected to broad statements such as “subject to the
extent and level of resources of the State” it becomes difficult to challenge in law as it relates to the
enforcement provisions.
On the other hand, some constitutions express these principles, not as rights, but as inspirational
targets for the society. That is to say, they are dealt with within the realms of guiding principles for
state policy.
The Commission agreed that this submission should be included and that the provisions of Article
25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should inform its drafting. It should also be
extended to include, but not limited to, access to clean drinking water. As regards drinking water,
this is a phenomenon that affects many developing countries and represents a priority area of
public policy for future attention.
Recommendation
With respect to the right to health, the Commission recommends the following:
(34) The fundamental right to health along the lines expressed in Article 25(1) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights should be included in the Constitution.
The Right to Work
The Commission considered proposals related to the right to work and took due note of the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour Organisation
(I.L.O.) Conventions as well as the Belize Constitution Act of 2000 during their deliberations on this
subject.
It was noted that Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that:
- “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and
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favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
- Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
- Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if
necessary, by other means of social protection.
- Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.”
The I.L.O Convention provides for the right to decent work which takes into account factors such as
proper standards of safety, a healthy working environment, proper services, decent remuneration
and the right to associate among others. Further, the Commission noted that Belize has leaned
towards giving its nationals the unrestricted right to apply for work for which they are qualified.
There were submissions that the right to work be included as a specific right in the Bill of Rights
and the Commission agreed to this in principle. The right to decent work as well as the right not to
be hindered in one’s ability to apply for work was suggested as the preferred phrasing. However,
further consideration should be given to the scope of that provision when the actual drafting is
undertaken.
The Commission considered submissions on the right to strike and also took into consideration the
provisions of the draft St. Vincent and the Grenadines Constitution Bill 2009 in which Sections 10
(1) and 10 (2) stated that:
(1) “Every member of the Vincentian work-force has the right to work in his chosen
field, whether his work be manual or mental or otherwise, there being dignity in all
honest labour; and he has the right to be paid fair remuneration for his work.
and
(2) In turn, every member of the Vincentian work-force has a responsibility to render a
fair day’s work, and to yield worthy production as well as proper productivity.”
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Some Commissioners were of the view that one should not have the absolute right to strike and
that there should be restrictions in the Public Sector where such action can endanger public safety,
and national security. Other Commissioners were of the view that the right to strike is associated
with freedom of expression and association which is provided for under Sections 10 and 11 of the
Constitution.
The Commission concluded that the right to strike was already a principal component of the right to
work which had already been agreed and that a more modern formulation of rights provisions are
written in positive language as opposed to negative language. The drafter should be instructed in
that regard.
The Commission also held the view that the State should guarantee special protection on the job
as it relates to health status and not restrict the protection to persons living with HIV or AIDS.
Recommendations
With respect to the right to work, the Commission recommends the following:
(35) The right to work should be included as a specific right in the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution; such right should include the right to strike.
(36) The issue of special protection on the job is better addressed under the anti-discrimination
provisions of the Constitution.
Termination of Contracts of Employment
The Commission received a submission that:
“the Constitution should ensure the principles of natural justice apply to all
contracts of employment and that Parliament shall not deprive any employee of
the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice for the
determination of his/her rights and obligations or deprive a person of the right to
such procedural provisions as are necessary for the purpose of giving effect and
protection to the right to the principles of natural justice in his/her employment
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relationship with his/her employer.”
It was noted that the submission sought to extend the protection until now reserved for public
servants to workers in the private sector. The Commission felt that the implementation of such a
provision would be too onerous on the private sector.
Recommendation
(37) This matter should be more appropriately addressed through the enactment of ordinary
legislation such as the Labour Code.
The Right to Education
Commissioners agreed with a submission that the right to education should be a fundamental right.
This was so primarily because of the importance of the development of a knowledge based
economy and the type of transformation that is possible in a society where the level of education is
linked to survival and development.
The Commission considered favourably a submission that: “Free universal education should be a
fundamental right”, and agreed that there should be free universal education up to the secondary
level subject to the limitation of resources.
Recommendation
With respect to the right to education, the Commission recommends the following:
(38) The right to universal education up to secondary level should be included in the Bill of
Rights in the Constitution but should be subject to available resources.
Consumer Rights
The Commission received submissions on consumer rights and felt that giving constitutional
protection to consumer rights was not necessary and that this could be taken care of under
ordinary legislation.
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Recommendation
With respect to consumer rights, the Commission recommends the following:
(39) Consumer rights should be addressed under ordinary legislation.
Public Information and State Property
The Commission received a submission that:
“all records created on whatever media or whatever format by any Government
official, ministry, department or parastatal agency shall be the property of the
State.”
In relation to public documents and documents of public importance in the possession of private
individuals, the Commission received a submission that:
“no person except in the normal course of their duties shall copy in whatever form
on whatever media, donate or otherwise give to any person or institution or other
entity, shred or otherwise destroy, any record without the express written
permission of the National Archives Authority.”
The Commission agreed with the submission but felt that it should be dealt with in ordinary
legislation, as well as a submission that “all non-current records of any public official, ministry,
department, public institution shall be deposited to a central depository for storage and access and
determination of their value for current and future
The Commission also received to the following submissions:
“The Constitution shall provide for the freedom of information and full disclosure of,
and prohibit unreasonable refusal or failure to provide access to, documents of
Government contracts, operations and projects and access to the individual of
personal files and information that have been compiled by Government institutions
and corporate bodies in the course of business.”
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and
“The Constitution shall provide for the privacy of information to protect the personal
information of individuals particularly in the private sector and health sector.”
These submissions captured the challenge that exists between official secrecy and the right to
information. As the modern state has developed, many democracies have moved in the direction of
relaxing the doctrine of official secrecy and replacing it to varying degrees with a right to
information or the enhancement of freedom of information laws.
Commissioners were of the view that there is always the need to indicate what constitutes State or
public documents and apply the limitation which is generally applied to the right to information.
Taken as is, the submission was considered too broad.
Commissioners agreed that the right to information on civil status records, birth status records and
other public documents, for example, should be available freely. This right should also specify what
is private information as opposed to information relative to national security and seek to give
protection to the latter. It should also specify what can and cannot be accessed as well as
mandating the press, in particular, to be accurate in what they publish and make provisions for
recourse by those aggrieved.
Recommendations
With respect to public information and State property, the Commission recommends the following:
(40) Ordinary legislation should clearly define what is property of the State and therefore public
property.
(41) The details of the right to public information should be articulated in ordinary legislation.
(42) The right to public information should be limited in the interest of national security or other
relevant grounds.
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Protection of Patrimony, Cultural Heritage and National Assets
It is the inheritance of our culture that makes us a people and gives us an identity. It is therefore
the Commission’s position that was this too important to leave to the insecurity of ordinary
legislation. With regards to the protection of our cultural heritage, the Commission received and
considered the following submissions:
1. “The constitution shall provide for the protection of the cultural heritage of the State
including historical sites, monuments, places and objects of artistic and historic interest
language, literature, visual and performing arts to enrich the cultural life of the citizens of
the State”. Commission were in agreement with this submission and also felt that
consideration should be given to the enactment of legislation making it mandatory that
researcher on areas such as Saint Lucian bio-diversity, cultural forms such as the Djab
Dèwò, the flower festivals, Listwa, Koudmen, Kòdwil, Débòt, Bèlè, Koutoumba, Lavéyé,
traditional music (such as those now owned by the Smithsonian institute) traditional herbal
treatments and cures among other things, leave copies of their research with the Saint
Lucia National Archives.
2. A statement must be made in the constitution requiring the provisions of the Draft Cultural
Policy of 1988 be implemented
3. “Patwa should be made the official language of the State”.
The majority of Commissioners were of the view that this was not a constitutional matter and that
this could be dealt with through ordinary legislation.
4. “The use of Canabis in the religious rituals of the Rastafarian Movement should be
legalised, as religion is part of the culture.”
The majority of Commissioners were of the view that this was a matter for ordinary legislation.
5. “Disposal of national assets be it by the government or otherwise, is so important to the life
of the State that it must never be done without a referendum.”
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The Commission, having understood National Assets to mean, the patrimony
33
of the State
supported the submission.
The Draft Cultural Policy of 1988 was seen by the Commission as a comprehensive document
which captures most of the relevant issues as regards the protection, promotion and preservation
of our cultural heritage and therefore advocate the adoption of the said policy in ordinary
legislation.
Recommendations
With respect to Cultural Heritage, the Commission recommends the following
(43) Certain sensitive and specified national assets or patrimony having historical or cultural
significance should not be alienated.
(44) Historic assets should be considered public property and that the State or its agents or
other duly authorised bodies should have the authority to preserve or retrieve these public
assets and hold them on behalf of the State.
Human Rights Commission
There were submissions calling for the establishment of a Human Rights Commission. Concerns
were expressed as to whether such a body should be created or whether there should be
continued reliance on the existing court structures to consider constitutional motions.
The Commission considered whether such a body would effective to ensure that people have
access in terms of enforcement of the fundamental rights and freedoms provisions.
The Commission was of the view that there should be an independent institution that can regulate
and investigate the relationship between the State and the individual which should extend to
actions by the State that compromises individuals’ rights and also ensuring that the necessary
access is available.
33
Patrimony refers to the aggregate of property over which the Crown may assert ownership on behalf of those
citizens to whom the law does not allow self-management
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The functions of the Police Complaints Commission could also be subsumed under the Human
Rights Commission as one of its tasks. This would take away the powers of investigation from the
police and alter the situation in which the police service investigates complaints against itself.
Recommendation
(45) With respect to a Human Rights Commission, the Commission recommends that a Human
Rights Commission should be established.
Youth Representation
There was a submission that there should be Youth representation in Parliament which was
expressed, in part, as follows:
“… the young people should have the right of a representative body to speak to
Parliament on their behalf for their needs.”
Commissioners supported the submission in principle and recommended that a mechanism be put
in place by ordinary legislation for the National Youth Council to meet with some regularity with a
Special Parliamentary Committee dedicated to Youth Affairs to air their views and express their
concerns.
Recommendation
(46) A permanent advisory body consisting of youth organisations to meet with an appropriate
Government agency on a regular basis to discuss issues affecting the youth of Saint Lucia
should be established.
Locus Standi
In relation to the issue of locus standi
34
, the Commission considered the provisions of the South
34
Locus standi, in law, means the right to bring an action, to be heard in court, or to address the Court on a matter
before it. To this end, it represents the ability of a person or other entity to demonstrate to the court a sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged that would support that person’s or entity’s participation in
the case.
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African Constitution which were instructive in that regard. The Commission considered that the
rules on locus standi in the Saint Lucia constitution are too restricted. There is therefore a need to
extend or redraft the provisions under Section 16 of the Saint Lucian Constitution so that it allows
for representative groups of persons or somebody acting on behalf of a group of persons to bring
an action, and not be restricted to detained persons.
The Commission recommends the adoption of Section 38 on enforcement of rights in the South
African Constitution which states:
“Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging
that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may
grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may
approach a court are—
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of
persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.”
The Commission took note of the fact that extending locus standi, would have implications for the
rights of access before the Courts, specifically it raises questions about the availability of legal aid
and the costs associated with enforcing the rights before the courts. However, the Commission
regarded it as an important first step to relax the rules on locus standi to enable citizens to more
easily access the protection of the courts.
In promulgating a Bill of Rights to provide protection for citizens, then a corollary should be to
provide access to a tribunal. If the tribunal were a court, then there should be procedures in place
to minimise the cost so that this would not be a barrier.
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Further, the Commission considered that the language of the Constitution should be made clearer
as to whom action could be brought against. Further the language ought to ensure that there is an
understanding that an action can be brought against both the state and private individuals.
Recommendations
With respect to locus standi, the Commission recommends the following:
(47) The locus standi provisions in the Constitution should be relaxed to make them less
restrictive, especially as they relate to access to the fundamental human rights and
freedoms provisions of the Constitution. In this regard the provisions of Section 38 of the
enforcement provisions of the South African constitution should be considered.
(48) The fundamental rights provisions should be enforceable against both the State and
private entities/citizens.
(49) The wording of the Constitution should be made clear in establishing the right of a private
citizen to take action against a private citizen or entity.
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CHAPTER FOUR
BECOMING A REPUBLIC WITH A NEW HEAD OF STATE
Monarchy or Republic – The Pre-Independence Debate
One of the topics that engaged the Marlborough House Conference in 1978 was the debate over
whether Saint Lucia should continue with a monarchical form of Government or become a republic.
This debate is adequately captured in paragraph 6 of the Conference Report as follows:
“6. The St. Lucia Government proposed that the new constitution should continue
the monarchical form and reported that this had been the consensus of view in St.
Lucia and was reflected in the report of the Select Committee. The delegation
representing the Opposition in St. Lucia felt unable to express a view on this matter,
saying that the people of St. Lucia had not been adequately consulted and had not
expressed a clear view on this specific issue. Since, however, no substantial body
of opinion had raised overt objection to the principle of a monarchical constitution as
proposed by the Government, the Conference proceeded on the basis that this was
the system to be incorporated in the draft constitution until a contrary view was
clearly demonstrated.”
35
The contentious nature of this discourse between the Government and the Opposition delegations
can be further identified in the Conference Report at paragraph 12 under the heading of “The
Governor-General” as follows:
“12. Subject to the reservation by the Opposition mentioned in paragraph 6, the
Conference agreed that the constitution should provide that the Governor-General
should be a citizen of St. Lucia. Opposition proposals that the Governor-General
(a) should be elected by the House of Assembly; (b) should have been ordinarily
35
1978/Cmnd. 7328, p. 1.
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resident in St. Lucia for five years before the appointment; and (c) should not be
younger than forty years old, were not agreed.”
36
It was not unusual for such a debate to be going on in July 1978 as Trinidad and Tobago had
become a republic in August 1976 and Dominica was about to become a republic in November
1978.
Becoming a Republic
According to Simeon McIntosh the post-colonial constitutions of the Anglophone Caribbean
countries are:
… Orders-in-Council of the British Imperial Parliament –amended versions of the colonial
constitution, with Bills of Rights engrafted onto them. This allowed easy transition from
colony to independent state. This continuity implied no important changes between the
colonial and independent constitution.
37
It is in that context that its continuation is regarded by its opponents as the very definition of
colonialism. Former Prime Minister of Jamaica, P. J. Patterson noted that, because the Jamaican
constitution was an order in council of Britain and therefore not a creature of the Jamaican
Parliament, the time had come for the supreme law of the land to be established as an act of the
sovereign Jamaican Parliament.
38
However in some quarters, there is the view that the
constitutional monarchical system represents a better one than the republicanism political form.
The debate on repatriation of the constitution has thrown up three modalities of selection of the
new Head of State:
ceremonial President appointed by the Prime Minister.
a publicly elected President,
a President elected by members of parliament.
36
1978/Cmnd. 7328, p. 3.
37
See Simeon C. R. McIntosh's, Caribbean Constitutional Reform, Rethinking the West Indian Policy; Caribbean Law
Publishing Company; Kingston: 2002.
38
See McIntosh, Caribbean Constitutional Reform: Rethinking the West Indian Polity. The Caribbean Law Publishing
Company: Kingston, 2002.
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114
Another element in the debate on repatriation of the constitution is to ensure that, while the change
would lead to the removal of the British sovereign, it does not facilitate the increased political
control of the political elite nor enhance the possibilities for constitutional crisis.
New Practices in State Craft Regionally
The post-independence era in the former British West Indies has witnessed the creation of three
presidencies, namely in Guyana (formerly British Guiana), Trinidad and Tobago and the
Commonwealth of Dominica. In two of these three territories, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago,
there was a change from being an independent monarchy to an independent republic which
involved the replacement of the authority of Queen Elizabeth II in person as the Queen of Guyana
and the Queen of Trinidad and Tobago respectively with presidencies in which the executive
authority of the State was then vested.
In the case of the Commonwealth of Dominica, there was a termination of associated statehood
and the creation of an independent republic in 1978 which had the effect of terminating the
personal authority of Queen Elizabeth II over the country as its Queen at the point of the
termination of association.
Guyana was an independent monarchy between 1966 and 1970 and became a republic with a
ceremonial President in 1970. In 1980 its presidency was altered in such a manner as to make it
an executive one. Trinidad and Tobago was an independent monarchy from 1962 to 1976 and then
it became an independent republic in 1976 with a quasi-ceremonial president.
Under the independent constitution of Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana the relationship between
Queen Elizabeth II as Queen of these colonies was substantially changed from a situation in which
she acted on the advice of British Ministers to a situation where she became Queen of these
independent monarchies acting on the advice of her Guyanese or Trinidad and Tobago Ministers
as the case may be.
Owing to the fact that Queen Elizabeth II is the Queen of so many countries simultaneously, it is,
therefore, necessary for her to have a personal representative in each independent country of
which she is Queen in the person of the Governor-General. The authority of the Governor-General
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of any Commonwealth country (which includes Saint Lucia) is located in the Royal Prerogative
39
of
the British Monarchy and it is those powers that are exercised by the Governor-General on behalf
of Her Majesty on the advice of local Ministers.
The reality is that the executive authority of the State is accordingly grounded in the Royal
Prerogative of the British Monarchy. In the circumstances, Ministers and certain other public
officials pledge an oath of allegiance to Queen Elizabeth II, her heirs and her successors upon
taking office.
The transfer from monarchical to republican status in Trinidad and Tobago therefore saw the
transfer of the Royal Prerogative to the new republic as the basis of their State power and the
inclusion of transitional provisions in the Act of Parliament creating the Republic and the new
republican constitution. In Guyana, provision was already made in the independence (monarchical)
constitution of 1966 for Guyana to become a republic upon the approval of a resolution to that
effect in the National Assembly by simple majority vote. There were no transitional provisions in the
Constitution, but rather replacement provisions to give effect to the transfer. In 1980, Guyana
enacted a new Constitution to become the Co-operative Republic of Guyana with an executive
presidency.
In the case of the Commonwealth of Dominica, the island had become a State in free association
with the United Kingdom (an Associated State) in 1967 under the provisions of the West Indies Act
1967. Like Saint Lucia, Dominica enjoyed full internal self-Government, while citizenship, defence
and external affairs were the responsibility of the United Kingdom. Either party (the United
Kingdom or an Associated State) could withdraw from the arrangement unilaterally under the
provisions of the Act. The independence constitution of the Commonwealth Dominica of 1978
came into force on 3rd November, 1978 together with an Order made after a resolution was
passed in the Dominica House of Assembly on 12th July, 1978 that led to the termination of
Dominica's associated statehood following discussions with the British Government. Transitional
provisions relating to the transfer from associated statehood to a sovereign democratic republic
were included in the Constitution.
39
The Royal Prerogative authority, privilege, and immunity recognised in common law as belonging to the sovereign
alone.
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Today, Saint Lucia is considering that option of becoming another republic in the Commonwealth
Caribbean. Republicanism is the dominant form of Government among the fifty-three member
states of the Commonwealth. There are sixteen monarchies of which Queen Elizabeth II is the
Head of State and the removal of Saint Lucia from this category will reduce it to fifteen.
40
The removal of monarchy and its replacement by republicanism in Trinidad and Tobago and
Guyana, and the creation of a republic at independence in Dominica required a method of election
to choose an indigenous Head of State, namely the President of the Republic. It may be argued
that this became necessary because of the fact that the succession to the British Monarchy could
no longer be applied to the appointment or election of an indigenous Head of State for a new
republic.
During the period of monarchy in Trinidad and Tobago and in Guyana, the appointment of the
Governor-General was normally based on Letters Patent from Her Majesty given on the advice of
the Prime Minister of that independent monarchy. The Governor-General in both Trinidad and
Tobago and in Guyana held office "during Her Majesty's pleasure” which allowed the Prime
Minister of the day considerable control over the actual appointment of a Governor-General as the
Queen would normally act on the advice of the Prime Minister in appointing a Governor-General.
The heir to the British Throne would become, upon succession, the new Head of State of those
independent monarchies in the Commonwealth that shared the person of the British Sovereign as
their Head of State.
In Guyana, the President is elected by direct-like election; in Trinidad and Tobago the President is
elected by an Electoral College which comprises a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament, while
in Dominica the President is elected by the House of Assembly only if the Prime Minister and the
Leader of the Opposition are unable to agree on a single nominee for the office.
These methods, therefore, vary from the direct choice of the electorate, to the indirect choice of the
Legislature and to the concurrence of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. In all
instances the President serves for a period of five years.
40
There are five indigenous monarchies namely (i) the Sultan of Brunei; (ii) the King of Lesotho; (iii) the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong (or King) of Malaysia; (iv) the King of Switzerland; and (v) the King of Tonga
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The election of any proposed President of Saint Lucia will highlight the challenge of devising a
method of election that will allow the holder of the office of President an important measure of
legitimacy without competing with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet for political dominance in the
system. The method of indirect election dominated by the elected representatives of the people of
Saint Lucia would cater to such a need.
Such a presidency may be described as being quasi-ceremonial based on the mixture of advisory
and minimal discretionary powers exercised by the President. This would not be dissimilar from
what obtains currently with the Governor-General. In these circumstances, the shift from the
Governor-General to the President is not alien to the political development of the Commonwealth
Caribbean.
There was general consensus among Commissioners that the Presidency should be a ceremonial
one and not an executive one. Accordingly, neither the President nor his/her Deputy would have
control of any Ministry. Commissioners did not therefore support the idea of an Executive
President, as it was felt that the concept was too radical a deviation from the present system and
that Saint Lucian political culture was not ready for such a recommendation.
Recommendations
With respect to the model of government, the Commission recommends the following:
(50) The Saint Lucia Constitution should be repatriated.
(51) The constitutional monarchical system should be abolished and replaced with a republican
constitutional system.
(52) The personal authority of the British Monarch over Saint Lucia should be terminated.
(53) The Head of State should be a ceremonial President.
(54) The Head of State should be indirectly elected based on a limited selectorate.
(55) The oath of allegiance should be amended to reflect allegiance to the State of Saint Lucia.
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The Head of State of Saint Lucia
The Commission considered Chapters II – The Governor General and IV – The Executive of the
Saint Lucia Constitution jointly as some of the topics were closely related. There was consensus on
a submission that the office of the Governor General should be abolished in favour of a Ceremonial
President. With this change, the monarchical system will be replaced.
Method of Appointment
The Commission supported a submission that proposed a system in which the Nation, through its
representatives in Parliament, elects the Head of State on the basis of indirect election as opposed
to direct election by the people. The Commission agreed that the ceremonial President should be
elected at a joint sitting of Parliament by a simple majority vote to replace the Governor-General
and that the Deputy President should be elected in like manner at the same time.
The Commission agreed with the submission that a non-partisan person should be appointed as
Head of State and that such an appointee should be scrutinised by both chambers of Parliament
after a duly submitted recommendation by the Prime Minister following consultation with the Leader
of the Opposition.
Qualification
There was consensus that the Head of State should be a Saint Lucian by birth who must be
between the ages of thirty-five (35) and seventy-five (75) years of age. The individual must have a
minimum residency of ten years immediately preceding his/her appointment.
The person who is elected to hold the office of President of Saint Lucia should not have held office
in a political party or should not have been a candidate for elective politics within ten (10) years of
his/her election as President.
Tenure
The Commission agreed that the President should be subjected to term limits and that no more
than two consecutive seven-year terms should be permitted under the Constitution. The
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Commission believes that the seven year term would promote continuity in the office and would
reduce the politicisation of the office. It must be noted, however, that there was a minority but vocal
view within the Commission who felt that the term of office of the President should be restricted to
five years to coincide with the parliamentary electoral cycle of five years.
Removal from Office
The Commission found the provisions of the Constitution of Dominica on the issue of the removal
of the President from office to be suitable for implementation in Saint Lucia with appropriate
adjustments.
The President and Deputy President should be removed from office where:
he/she wilfully violates any provisions of the Constitution;
he/she is found guilty of an indictable offence;
he/she behaves in such a way as to bring the office into hatred, ridicule, contempt
or disrepute;
he/she behaves in a way that endangers the security of the State;
he/she is unable to perform the functions of his/her office because of mental or
physical incapacity; or
any circumstance were to arise that, if he/she were not President, would cause
him/her to be disqualified to be elected under the provisions of the Constitution.
Procedure for Removal
The office of the President shall become vacant if-
(a) the House (acting upon a motion signed by not less than one third of all the
members of the House proposes the removal of the President from office on
grounds of complaint specified with full particulars in the resolution;
(b) a tribunal consisting of the Chief Justice and two other judges of the Supreme
Court appointed by the Chief Justice, being as far as practicable the most senior
judges, investigates the complaint and makes a report on the facts thereof to the
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House; and
(c) the House, after considering the report, by resolution supported by the votes of not
less than two-thirds of all the members of the House declares that the President
shall be removed from office.
Parliament may make provision with respect to the powers, practice and procedure of tribunals
established for the purpose of subsection 1(b) of this section and, subject as aforesaid, any such
tribunal may by regulation or otherwise regulated its own procedure.
Where a resolution is passed in accordance with subsection (1)(a) of this section, the President
shall forthwith cease to perform the functions of this office; but he may resume the performance of
those functions if, after the House has considered a report made to it under subsection (1)(b) of
this section, no such resolution as is referred to in subsection (1)(c) of this section is passed.
Recommendations
With respect to the Head of State, the Commission recommends the following:
(56) The Governor-General should be replaced by a ceremonial President with similar powers
and responsibilities, save and except as otherwise recommended in this report.
(57) The ceremonial President should be elected at a joint sitting of Parliament by a simple
majority vote after a duly submitted recommendation by the Prime Minister in consultation
with the Minority Leader .
(58) There should be an office of Deputy President who shall be elected in like manner at the
same time as the President.
(59) The President should be a Saint Lucian by birth who has been resident in Saint Lucia for a
minimum of ten years immediately prior to being nominated and must be between the
ages of thirty-five (35) and seventy-five (75) years and should not have held office in a
political party or stood for election as a candidate for elective office within ten (10) years of
his/her nominated for President.
(60) The same qualifications should apply to the Deputy President as for the President.
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(61) The President should serve no more than two (2) consecutive seven-year terms.
(62) The grounds and procedure for the removal of the President or the Deputy President from
office should follow the equivalent provisions in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Dominica with appropriate adjustments.
(63) Neither the President nor his/her Deputy should have control of any Ministry of
Government.
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CHAPTER FIVE
REFORMING OUR PARLIAMENT
The Pre-Independence Debate
The Report of the Marlborough House Conference in 1978 reveals the following discussion under
the heading “The Legislature” from paragraphs 13 to 20:
“13. Section 25(1)(b)(ii) should be amended so that a person who has resided in St. Lucia
for a period of twelve months immediately before his nomination should be qualified for
election to the House of Assembly.
14. An Opposition proposal to remove the disqualification upon a Minister of Religion for
election to the House of Assembly was not accepted by the Government.
15. Section 26(5) should be amended so that Parliament may provide that any person who
has held an office or appointment prescribed as a disqualifying office or appointment under
that section and which carries emoluments above a prescribed level, shall continue to be
disqualified for a prescribed period not exceeding three years after his relinquishment of
that office or appointment. The Opposition made it clear that they were opposed to such a
provision.
16. A provision should be added stipulating that a by-election must be held within three
months of a seat in the House of Assembly becoming vacant.
17. Provision should be made for an Electoral Commission consisting of a Chairman
appointed by the Governor-General in his own deliberate judgment and two other
members, one of whom would be appointed by the Governor-General acting on the advice
of the Prime Minister and the other would be appointed by him acting on the advice of the
Leader of the Opposition. The duties of the Commission would be similar to those of the
Electoral Commission in the Dominica Independence Constitution and there should be a
Chief Elections Officer as in that Constitution.
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18. Section 36 which relates to the alteration of the Constitution and certain other laws
should be amended on the lines of Section 42 of the Dominica Independence Constitution
so as to facilitate amendments relating to the West Indies Associated States Supreme
Court.
19. The Opposition delegation tabled a paper proposing that there should be a Senate to
act as a Review Chamber on [sic] the House of Assembly consisting of 12 persons elected
from a list of candidates recommended by community organisations covering all aspects of
the social, economic and cultural life of the island. The St. Lucia Government delegation
were [sic] not prepared to accept the Opposition proposal. They proposed instead that the
dormant provisions of the existing constitution relating to a Senate consisting of nominated
members should be activated at Independence and thus included as an operative part of
the Independence Constitution. They further proposed that of the eleven Senators only six
should be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister while the number to be appointed
on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition should be increased to three. The two
remaining Senators would be appointed by the Governor-General acting in his own
deliberate judgement, after consultation with such religious, economic or social bodies or
associations as he might think fit. The Government also proposed that a Minister of
Religion should no longer be disqualified for appointment as one of the two Senators
appointed by the Governor-General acting in his own deliberate judgement. The
Opposition contended that the disqualification upon Ministers of Religion for appointment
as Senators should be removed entirely.
20. Section 49 which relates to delimitation of constituencies should be replaced by
provision for an Electoral Constituency Boundaries Commission which should consist of
the Speaker of the House of Assembly as Chairman and four other members, two
appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister and two appointed
on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition.
41
.”
41
1978/Cmnd. 7328, pp. 3-4.
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Separation of Powers
A basic architectural premise of all modern democracies is that the main constitutional mechanism
for assuring good governance is democratic accountability primarily through elections. Indeed in
the process of drafting one of the first modern democratic constitutions (USA), founding father
James Madison argued that “dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
Government.” It is anticipated that when these primary controls work well they will produce good
Government through the selection of rulers who will govern for the common benefit of the citizenry.
In so doing it is expected that the governing elite would be primarily motivated by patriotism and
justice and that this would prevail over all other considerations.
Another architectural assumption of modern democratic constitutions is that the primary system
may fail to produce such a body of citizens resulting instead in the selection of a group of
individuals primarily motivated by local prejudice, narrow and sectoral interest or worst by sinister
designs who may ultimately betray the interests of the people on whom they are dependent. Thus
to guard against such a possibility, constitutional safeguards have been created in order to limit the
capacity of the bad or self interested rulers to do serious harm to the public good. These fail safe
constitutional systems of accountability are normally found in the separation of powers, federalism,
the protection of specific individual liberties in an entrenched Bill of Rights, a system of checks and
balances and an independent judiciary. Indeed as John Locke wisely advocated in the Social
Contract, to simultaneously check and prevent the abuse of power, power must be able to check
power, which he identified as executive, legislative and judicial. If one individual holds all powers,
that is the power to make the laws (legislative), the power to enforce the laws (executive) and the
power to judge violations, then the life of the citizen would be imperilled. This basic philosophical
idea has also found expression in Baron de Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws where he argued that
power should be enabled to check power so as to prevent tyranny. For:
“When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single
body … there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that
makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically
Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from
executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the power of life and liberty of the
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citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to
executive power, the judge would have the force of an oppressor.
All would be lost if the same man or the same body of principal men, either of nobles, or of
the people, exercised these three powers; that of making the laws, that of executing public
resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or the disputes of individuals.”
42
In like vein James Madison in the Federalists papers 47 contended that:
“The accumulation of all powers, that is legislative, executive and judiciary in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many and whether hereditary, self appointed, or
executive, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
43
The central idea therefore is that good governance can only be guaranteed in the context of the
separation of power and backed by a system of adequate checks and balances. Separation of
powers can therefore only work effectively in an environment where the political elite in a system of
governance are given adequate powers to check the potential for the accumulation of power in one
branch of Government. Such an accumulation is viewed as potentially dangerous. In effect, this
ability to check the other power would enable the system to not only resist and force a retreat but
would ultimately safeguard the integrity of the system.
In designing the American political system, the founding fathers were less concerned with the
efficiency of the institutional structures and deliberately did not seek to prevent conflict from
paralysing the smooth operation of the system. Consequently, the doctrines of the separation of
powers and checks and balances that were accepted by the framers of the constitution and which
undergird the political model were not designed to promote efficiency but rather to prevent the
exercise of tyrannical power.
The principles of the separation of powers and checks and balances have found expression under
the American constitution more so than any other modern democracy. In stark contrast to this
42
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws in Arend Lijphart (ed), Parliamentary Government Versus Presidential
Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; pp. 48-51.
43
Madison, James. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power among its Different
Parts. The Federalist No. 47. New York Packet, Wednesday January 30, 1788. p.1
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ability to constitutionally restrain and resist the amassing of power in one branch of Government,
the Westminster parliamentary form of Government while paying lip service to the constitutional
notion of the separation of power, is in fact defined more by the fusion of power than by the
separation of power. Consequently, lacking the formal separation of executive and legislative
functions, the Westminster system and its many parliamentary variations around the world tend to
depend on a system of elaborate enumerations of protected individual liberties in an entrenched
Bill of Rights and by a strong or relatively strong independent judiciary. It is anticipated that these
two architectural pillars would safeguard these rights against the possibility of intrusion and at
worst hijacking, by overzealous politicians. Parliamentary Government is therefore not as
unfettered as a cursory glance at the main institutional pillars would suggest. Indeed parliamentary
regimes are constitutionally, politically and legally constrained as they are subject to judicial review.
Saint Lucia is no exception to this model.
Throughout our consultations with the citizenry of Saint Lucia, there were persistent strong calls for
the reform of the current system that enables the political executive to completely dominate the
legislative branch of Government. Submission after submission urged the separation of the
Executive from the Legislature. Specifically, a call was made for the Constitution to make
provisions for the complete separation at the level of personnel. In a slight twist to the usual
recommendation that a complete separation of power be institutionalised, many Saint Lucians
urged the Commission, to consider not only the separation of personnel and functions, but to
create a system that would prevent the constituency representatives from exercising both
legislative and executive functions.
The Commission agreed that small island states like Saint Lucia have suffered from the total
domination of the Legislature by the Executive which can therefore lead to ‘runaway” Executives.
Nonetheless it considered that the current model was premised on the need for efficiency and that
whatever changes made should have to reconcile the demands of the people for a clear
demarcation of personnel and functions, with the need for efficiency of Government business.
Therefore, the desire of the Commission to engage in a clear demarcation of the powers of the
Executive and the Legislature, as a means of enforcing a stricter separation of powers while
attempting to maintain the main architectural design of the model that facilitated efficiency led to
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the engineering of a mixed model, with a different kind of executive branch of Government, than
that which currently prevails.
In the view of the Commission, the only member of the Executive branch who will belong to both
the Legislature and the Executive will be the Prime Minister.
44
To this end, he/she will be appointed
on the basis of his ability to command the support of a majority of M.P.s elected to the House of
Assembly and he/she will appoint Ministers who may emerge from Parliament but who must
subsequently resign their position in the Parliament..
This means that the Prime Minister is accountable to Parliament and can be removed by a motion
of no confidence there, but his Ministers will be vicariously accountable through a summons that
will be issued to them by parliamentary committees and the presiding officers of both Houses to
appear there as and when their presence is desired or required.
In order to satisfy the demands of the citizenry for change and for a clear demarcation between the
legislative and executive branches of Government without encountering the problems associated
with that architecture, the Commission considered the novel experimentation of the French Fifth
Republic of 1958 which required that any member of the legislature who was selected to the
Cabinet of Ministers must vacate his/her legislative seat and be replaced by a substitute. At face
value, a bye-election seemed a reasonable device to use to effect a replacement. Moreover, it
would be more easily accepted by the populace. However, the Commission was also motivated by
a desire to ensure that the balance of power in the Legislative branch would not be unduly impeded
should the selection of an MP to the Cabinet require a substitute. The Commission was certainly
aware that it was not uncommon for some seats to be won by small margins. Consequently, it was
politically possible that a bye-election could change the profile of the House of Assembly, with the
attendant consequence of divided government. In our view this would be untenable and
dangerous. Thus the appointment of any Minister from the House of Assembly will require a
substitute M.P. to replace the M.P. for the constituency that the Minister previously represented. In
order to effect this, political parties should be required under the new constitutional arrangement to
name running mates for all constituencies that are being contested in general elections or bye
elections and independent candidates should be required to name an alternate if they contest an
44
However, it is to be noted that the Deputy Prime Minister, who is a member of Parliament, will be a member of
Cabinet without ministerial responsibility and will exercise executive power when deputizing for the Prime Minister.
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election. If at a future date there is the desire to appoint one of the Members of Parliament as a
Minister, then the running mate can be sworn into office as the M.P. for that constituency. However
there was a strong dissenting view which advocated that the replacement of the Minister can be
effected through the agency of a bye-election, which is already part and parcel of the political
culture of the country. Further, it was felt that it may be difficult for Saint Lucians to accept the
replacement of their elected constituency representative by a substitute. Whatever the method
used however, the objective of the reform is clear. Whether through the agency of a bye election or
a substitute, the net effect would be to remove the fusion and coincidence that currently obtains
under our present constitutional design without sacrificing the efficiency of the model.
In assessing the current method of selection to the Cabinet, Commissioners noted that the
provisions of the Constitution permit the Prime Minister to select defeated candidates for
appointment to the Senate and they were also frequently appointed to the Cabinet of Ministers.
The majority of Commissioners accepted the status quo on the grounds that Saint Lucia like other
resource starved countries, suffers from a critical mass problem. Consequently the majority of
Commissioners opined that the retention of this constitutional and political practice, will allow Prime
Ministers to appoint Ministers from among defeated candidates as well as persons who did not
contest elections and are available for service. There was a strong minority view against this
recommendation, on the grounds that one of the most frequent submissions received from the
public was that this should not occur. The minority felt that the wishes of Saint Lucians should be
respected. The majority also felt that rejection at the polls did not mean the public disapproved of
possible appointment as a Minister, especially as Saint Lucians at home and abroad thought that
Ministers of Government should be separated from the legislative branch of Government. In the
majority’s view therefore, the material basis for this recommendation remains.
In any event the Commission felt that, given the proposed reform of the political model, the
Legislative branch of Government would be adequate to give the right to approve/ratify Prime
Ministerial appointments to the Cabinet. This would be sufficient to guard against abuse.
Under the proposed system the House of Assembly may also pass motions of no confidence in the
Ministers. Any motion that is successful can be reviewed by the Prime Minister for him/her to make
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a determination as to whether to dismiss that Minister from the Government. That will be a political
judgment call for the Prime Minister at the bar of public opinion.
In establishing a Government, the Prime Minister must ensure that apart from himself/herself that
the following other Ministers are included in the Cabinet, namely the Attorney General, the Minister
of National Security, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Finance. These portfolios
are considered essential to the operation of a Government at minimum.
In respect of the Attorney General, it was felt that the existing system of having a political Attorney
General should continue. However many Commissioners felt that the qualifications of the Attorney
General deserved special attention. For that reason, a group within the Commission felt that the
Attorney General should have the same qualifications of a High Court Judge. While the
Commission recognised that this would significantly reduce the pool of persons from whom the
Prime Minister can chose, the Commission felt that this recommendation was a way to address the
numerous concerns from the public about the competence of persons occupying the position.
The recommended hybrid model, while not fully embracing the American presidential political form,
recognises the need to engage in some level of separation of the important functions and
personnel of Government. We note that the presidential form is seductive with its fixed date of
elections, its functional and personnel spread, however we can agree with Walter Bagehot in The
English Constitution: The Cabinet, that:
“The American Government calls itself a Government of the supreme people; but
at a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign power is most needed, you cannot find
the supreme people. You have got a congress elected for one fixed period…which
cannot be accelerated or retarded – you have a president chosen for a fixed
period, and immovable during that period: all of the arrangements are for stated
times. There is no elastic element, everything is rigid, specified, dated. Come what
may, you can quicken nothing and retard nothing. You have bespoken your
Government in advance, and whether it suits you or not, whether it works well or
works ill, whether it is what you want or not, by law you must keep it ….
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Even in quiet times, Government by a president is … inferior to Government by a
cabinet; but the difficulty of quiet times is nothing as compared with the difficulty of
unquiet times. The comparative deficiencies of the regular, common operation of a
presidential Government are far less than the comparative deficiencies in time of
sudden trouble – the want of elasticity, the impossibility of a dictatorship, the total
absence of a revolutionary reserve.”
45
Recommendations.
With respect to the separation of powers, the Commission recommends the following:
(64) There should be the creation of a mixed model of Government with a different kind of
Executive branch, to that which currently prevails. Under that new system the only
member of the Executive branch who will belong to both the Legislature and the Executive
will be the Prime Minister. However, the Deputy Prime Minister will serve as a member of
Cabinet without ministerial authority except when deputising for the Prime Minister. To this
end, he/she will be appointed on the basis of his ability to command the support of a
majority of elected Members of Parliament and he/she will appoint Ministers. If a minister
is selected from Parliament, he/she must subsequently resign as a Member of Parliament,
to take up the post of Minister.
(65) The Prime Minister will remain accountable to Parliament and can be removed by a
motion of no confidence there, but his Ministers will be vicariously accountable through a
summons that will be issued to them by parliamentary committees and the presiding
officers of both Houses to appear there as and when their presence is desired or required.
(66) The appointment of any Minister from the House of Assembly will require a substitute
Member of Parliament to replace the Member of Parliament for the constituency that the
Minister previously represented.
(67) In order to effect this, one option is political parties can be required under the new
constitutional arrangement to name running mates for all constituencies that are being
45
Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution: The Cabinet in Arend Lijphart (ed), Parliamentary Government Versus
Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; pp.66-71.
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contested in general elections or bye elections and independent candidates will be
required to name a substitute if they contest an election.
(68) If at a future date there is the desire to appoint one of the M.P’s as a Minister, then the
running mate will be sworn into office as the Member of Parliament for that constituency.
(69) Alternatively, a bye-election can be held to fill the vacancy created by the appointment of
an elected member of Parliament to the Executive branch.
(70) The retention of the constitutional and political practice of appointing anyone including
defeated electoral candidates to the Cabinet. This will allow Prime Ministers the same
opportunities to ensure that their current availability of ministerial talent will remain intact.
(71) The Legislative branch of Government should be given the right to approve/ratify Prime
Ministerial appointments to the Cabinet.
(72) In establishing a Government, the Prime Minister must ensure that apart from
himself/herself, every Cabinet at a minimum consist of the following: the Attorney General,
the Minister of National Security, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of
Finance.
The Westminster Parliamentary Model
Independence constitution accepted the parent model of the Westminster parliamentary system. In
essence the model of Government is defined by the following criteria:
a) A dual executive (split between the Head of Government and the Head of State).
b) A Parliament which has formal or informal powers.
c) A Cabinet (Executive) which is the collective decision making body.
d) The Cabinet which is politically responsible to the parliamentary representatives.
e) A parliamentary majority which can force the Cabinet to resign through the no-
confidence motion. As such, parliamentary Governments are typically defined by
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Governments that rise and fall on the basis of the confidence of the parliament.
The Chief Executive (The Prime Minister) must therefore be supported by a
majority in the Legislative branch.
f) As Governments rise and fall on the basis of the confidence of the Parliament, the
terms of office of the Government and the parliament are not fixed. Essentially
therefore, the Cabinet is supposed to be accountable to the parliament.
g) Collective and individual responsibility of the Cabinet and the ministers to the
parliament.
h) The Prime Minister’s ability to dissolve the parliament.
i) Strong party discipline
j) Fusion of power between the executive and legislative branches of Government.
k) Typically too, in Westminster parliamentary democracies, the Head of Government
(the Prime Minister) is not popularly elected.
Simply put, parliamentary Government can be defined/viewed as a form of constitutional
democracy in which executive authority emerges from, and is responsible to, legislative authority
and is thus accountable to the parliament. In this way parliament can dismiss a Government
through an ordinary or constructive vote of no confidence.
The Parliamentary Westminster model of Government also concentrates power in the executive
branch which when supported by the majority in the legislature, enables it to carry out the wishes of
the parliamentary majority. Thus, in order to work effectively, the executive branch of Government
and its parliamentary majority must work in tandem and in close cooperation. To ensure this close
cooperation between the Cabinet and the legislative majority, strong party discipline is expected.
Further, given the fusion of power between the Legislative and Executive branches of Government,
the Westminster model ensures efficiency (swiftness) of decision making. This permits the Cabinet
to not only conduct its legislative agenda with efficiency but also to conduct its domestic and
foreign policy with the assurance that the parliamentary majority will support it against the
Opposition. Additionally, the model of Government permits the easy identification of responsibility
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for success and failure of Government policy. There is therefore little difficulty in allocating blame or
praise.
While the model has clear advantages, nonetheless it also has serious defects especially as it
functions regionally. Foremost among these defects is the excessive partisanship or adversarial
politics. Secondly, given the fusion of power and the small size of the parliament itself, the
legislative branch of Government has not been able to effectively check Cabinet to ensure that the
Executive branch does not engage in hasty policy making that is designed to achieve short-term
popularity of their policy proposals. Consequently, while the ability of the system to lend itself to
speedy decision making and to avoid the gridlock and deadlock that is evident under the
Presidential political form is advantageous, nonetheless, given the extensive concentration of
power and swiftness with which decisions can be reached, it is fraught with danger. Ultimately
therefore “There is no security for due reflection, no opportunity for second thoughts. Errors may be
irretrievable”.
46
By comparison, the Presidential or Washington political model which is built on a clear separation
of power and a system of checks and balances that is absent in the Westminster model, negates
many of the defects of the latter system. Foremost among these, is the model’s ability to ensure
that there is prudence and consensus in decision making given the imperative for both the
legislative and executive branches of Government to support any piece of legislation. However, the
institutional requirement for consultation and participation in the policy making ensures prolonged
debate, which contributes to gridlock, deadlock and filibustering. According to Giovanni Sartori, the
American presidential system is characterised more than by any other single factor, by the division
(separation) of power between president and congress.
47
The essence of the American political
system is the separation of the executive from parliamentary support, compared to the power
sharing feature of parliamentary models, whereby the executive both stands on and falls without
that support from parliament. Inevitably what has occurred as a result of the structure of
Government in the United States is a system of divided Government. Sartori contends that, in the
“last forty years, a trend of minority presidents, of presidents whose party did not have a majority in
46
Bryce, James (1921). Modern Democracies. New York: Macmillan
47
Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. 2
nd
ed. MacMillan Press. 1997
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the houses’ has emerged”.
48
This was a deliberate institutional device of the framers of the
American constitution to prevent abuse and concentration of power that prevails under the
parliamentary Westminster form.
Presidential systems such as the American prototype were therefore deliberately created to ensure
safety, and not speed. Presidential Government also solves the problem of stability by
guaranteeing that members of the executive and legislative branch serve a fixed term of years.
This lends itself to stability unlike the parliamentary system which is quite flexible given the no
confidence motion and the constitutional power of the Prime Minister to dissolve the parliament.
However, a fixed term of office is a double edged sword as it can also contribute to the crisis of
governability as the electorate has no constitutional means by which to replace a non functioning
executive or legislative branch of Government. This can be compared to the Westminster
parliamentary system that permits the parliament to remove the Government which fails to maintain
the confidence of the Legislature and in this way avoid a constitutional or Governmental crisis.
Public Concerns.
One of the most consistent themes to emerge in the consultations of the Commission was the
nature of the political system in the region. Specifically, Saint Lucians expressed strong concern
about the seeming lack of a system of checks and balances, the nature and composition of the
parliament, the overwhelming power of the Prime Minister, and the minimum time that
parliamentary representatives devoted to constituency matters. The Commission considered all of
these issues in arriving at its recommendations on reforming the parliament in Saint Lucia.
Bi-cameralism
Insofar as the political system is concerned, while the Commission seriously considered the many
submissions that the current bicameral form should be abolished and replaced with a unicameral
system, the Commission was not sufficiently persuaded by the arguments advanced. However, it
should be noted that the Commission entertained various submissions on the nature and
composition of the two houses of parliament, ranging from fully elected chambers, to partially
elected and partially nominated chambers. Many of the recommendations showed an overriding
48
Boyce, op.cit.
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concern with the subordination of the Senate to the House of Assembly and the tendency of the
Senate to rubber stamp the decisions of the Government. This, we accepted was related to the
manner in which the Senate is appointed. Thus, we considered a submission that called for the
appointment of Senators who were representatives of various interest groups in the Saint Lucian
society. Specifically, the submission called for representatives to be appointed to represent the
Trade Unions, the Business Community, the Professionals, the Churches, Sporting Bodies, and
Environmental Interests and others. It was felt that constituency of interest should be required to
appoint a representative from their ranks to sit on the Senate.
Mindful of the impact that such a reform would have on the functioning of the system, the
Commission’s position was that the current bicameral form should be maintained. However, the
Commission felt that in an effort to make the Senate a more effective institution, there should be an
increase in the numbers without undermining the Government’s majority. Specifically, the
Commission was persuaded that an increase in the number of independent Senators was
warranted. As an appointed body it was felt that the Senate should not frustrate the elected
element in parliament. While therefore the proposed minimalist reforms would not affect the
balance of power, more independent voices would be heard in the Senate. In this way the
Commission reasoned that the original intent of the Senate would be realised.
In a strong dissenting view on the composition of the Senate, it was proposed that the Senate
should comprise an equal number of persons appointed by the Head of State in his/her own
deliberate judgement, the Prime Minister and the Minority Leader. Such a reformed Senate it was
argued, would be more effective and provide a “sober, second thought” on the work done by the
Lower House. Consequently, this would promote “greater adherence to the principles of good
governance through accountability, transparency and responsibility.”
The Role of Elected Representatives
A vigorous debate ensued within the Commission on the question of the role of elected
representatives in Parliament. Commissioners felt that while submissions’ recommending the
establishment of an American type political system was not justifiable, nonetheless there was an
urgent need to effect some form of separation of powers. This was especially critical given the
fusion of power and the small size of the national parliament which made it near impossible to
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engage in any form of meaningful scrutiny of Government business. In evaluating the relative merit
of the presidential system of Government, it was accepted that the appeal of the system partly
resided in its ability to provide that critical scrutiny which was absent or minimal under the existing
model. In the main, it was accepted that one of the failings of the current system appeared to be
the absence of functioning Parliamentary Committees which is possible in larger sized parliaments.
In the view of the Commission, Parliamentary Committees have a critical role to play as the
watchdog of the Executive. Consequently, the Commission reasoned that freeing Parliamentarians
from their triple function as legislators, executives and constituency representatives and restricting
them to a dual function of legislators and constituency representatives would present the
opportunity for the committee system to be more effective.
After more than thirty years of independence, the society has been able to assess the performance
of the Parliament. Whereas the Independence discussions sought to make minor alterations to the
structure and functioning of the Parliament, the Commission has concluded that Saint Lucians
would like to see a parliamentary system where there is more scrutiny of public affairs and less
dominance of a party line on all aspects of the functioning of Parliament and so on.
The debates about reforming the Parliament of Saint Lucia have involved the expression of a
desire to give the Parliament more powers of scrutiny over the Executive branch of Government. In
doing this, it became apparent that there was strong influence from the United States Constitution
in respect of seeking to have ministerial appointments vetted by the Senate, the establishment of
fixed dates for elections, seeking to have Ministers who were appointed from among the ranks of
the Senators resign their senatorial positions and serve from outside the Parliament, et cetera.
Essentially, the strong influence of the Washington model in the reform of the Parliament would
ultimately lead to the creation of a hybrid between the Westminster and Washington models as
opposed to the retention of the Westminster-style democracy that has existed.
The major challenge to be faced here was how to create a greater separation of powers between
the Legislature and the Executive in such a way as to find a mid-point between the parliamentary
system that has existed in Saint Lucia since independence and the presidential system which is
best represented by the Washington model.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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Creating a Hybrid System
The Commission advocates the creation of a hybrid parliamentary – presidential constitution with
parliamentarism being the dominant force. This system would be unique in the Commonwealth
Caribbean.
Under this system, the Prime Minister would select Ministers who may emerge from Parliament but
who must subsequently resign their position in the Parliament. In doing so, the elected Members of
Parliament would only hold their positions as constituency representatives and as legislators. The
hope is that this would lead to the development of professional legislators who could devote time to
the scrutiny of legislation and provide oversight of the Executive through committees, while at the
same time devoting themselves to the demands of their constituencies.
The objective here will be to create a greater check and balance against the exercise of excessive
power. There will no longer be a parliament dominated by the executive since members of the
executive branch will now be prevented from being members of the legislative branch with the
exception of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister.
This will create a more level political situation in relation to the separation of powers in which the
dominance of the Cabinet over the Parliament will be diminished. Persons who seek to stand for
election as a Member of the House of Assembly or are appointed to the Senate will be doing so on
the basis that they will not also be entitled to become Ministers. These persons will be seeking to
become parliamentarians, not Ministers.
The availability of more Parliamentarians to perform legislative roles as distinct from executive
roles as Ministers can lead to more powerful committee oversight of Executive action by these
Parliamentarians. In order to ensure that committee membership is seen to be attractive, the
Standing Orders of Parliament will have to be amended to ensure a new level of functionality and
legislators will have to be regarded as full-time servants of the State.
The position of a committee chairperson will have to become reasonably attractive under the new
constitution in respect of the level of power that will be exercised so that persons who are willing to
serve will come forward to be selected as candidates for their parties. Under the current system,
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the main attraction is that if one is elected or selected to Parliament, one can become a Minister.
Under these proposed reforms, that will no longer necessarily be the case.
With the emphasis in the creation of this hybrid being placed upon creating a more rigid separation
of powers between the Executive and the Legislature, Parliament will play a renewed role as a
scrutineer of Executive action. Ministers will now be required to attend committee hearings to
discuss their portfolios under cross-examination from parliamentary committees which will not only
retain accountability to Parliament on their part, but also create a new method of accountability.
Political competition inside and outside of political parties will create a different environment for
scrutiny in which performance will have to be enhanced on the part of Ministers because of the
type of cross-examination that they will have to undergo from their own colleagues as well as those
opposed to them.
Some Effects of Hybridization
The retention of the bicameral system will ensure that there will be diversity in the different
chambers of Parliament for hearings as well as the increased use of joint select committees for
oversight with all special departmental committees consisting of members from the House of
Assembly and at least one or two Senators.
The retention of a nominated Senate will ensure that the House of Assembly will be dominant over
the Senate by virtue of the fact that the latter is elected and the former is nominated. When coupled
with the retention of the Prime Minister as a member of the House of Assembly, the effect will be to
make the House of Assembly and whoever controls an effective majority in it, the effective power
broker under the proposed constitution.
There will now be a diversity of Committees which will lead to the establishment of three types of
committees, namely (i) departmental oversight; (ii) standing committees; and, (iii) ad hoc
committees. With the creation of special departmental joint select committees for oversight of
Government Ministries and Departments and the Service Commissions, there will be the need for
the Standing Orders of Parliament to be amended once the Constitution has been changed to
recognise such committees.
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The continuation of the existing oversight committees such as the Public Accounts Committee and
other Standing Committees of both Houses and the specific committees for each House that
currently exist such as the Privileges Committee and others will give them new meaning as the
business of both Houses will be addressed by persons who are legislators only and not Ministers.
This will change the culture of the operations of both Houses of Parliament.
This new and enhanced role of scrutiny for the Parliament will provide a basis for the introduction
of some elements of the Washington model, insofar as the appointment of Ministers is concerned.
The power of the Prime Minister to appoint whomsoever the Prime Minister wishes to be a Minister
will be shared in such a way that the Prime Minister nominates Ministers and a majority of
Members of the Parliament will ratify those nominations. This will be a new role for the House of
Assembly and it will mean that the Cabinet can only be appointed after the Parliament has been
summoned and the Members of Parliament take their oaths of office
.49
Recommendations
With respect to hybridization, the Commission recommends the following:
(73) With the exception of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, Members of the
House of Assembly and the Senate will no longer be members of the Cabinet.
(74) The House of Assembly should scrutinise and ratify nominations made by the Prime
Minister for persons to be appointed as Ministers.
(75) Special Parliamentary Committees should be created as joint select committees to
oversee Government ministries, departments, agencies and Service Commissions.
(76) Ministers will be directly accountable to Parliamentary Committees.
(77) These Committees will summon Ministers to appear to be questioned on matters of
executive policy, proposed legislation and administrative functions of their Ministries.
(78) Nomination of Ministers should be after Parliament has met for the first sitting.
49
This will be the subject of further discussion in Chapter Six.
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The Senate
The Commission would like to see an increase in the size of the Senate from eleven (11) to thirteen
(13) Senators. The revised formula for the Senate will be seven (7) Senators appointed on the
advice of the Prime Minister, (3) three Senators appointed on the advice of the Minority Leader,
and three (3) Senators appointed by the President in his/her own deliberate judgement from among
such groups or organisations or from such fields of endeavour as the President thinks fit.
The Commission received a submission that the role of the Senate and the role of the President of
the Senate should be outlined in the Constitution. Further, the view was expressed that the Senate
should take on an informational role in which it actually explores issues and presents them to the
public. This role could be expressed through town hall meetings, chat rooms, public lectures, or the
Internet, before the parliamentary stage.
In an effort to separate the Legislature and the Executive, there was a submission that the number
of members of the Executive in the Senate should be restricted. A further submission proposed
that the Senate should comprise expertise that can give legislative measures the scrutiny that they
deserve in order to ensure the creation of a Senate that will function with a higher level of scrutiny
than exists under the current Constitution.
In discussion, the Commission felt that to spell out the role of the Senate may in some way create
conflict and could possibly prove to be destructive to the legislative process. Additionally, having
the Senate take on an informational role could prove controversial.
Recommendations:
With respect to the Senate, the Commission recommends the following
(79) That the status quo in terms of the role of the Senate should be retained.
(80) The Senate should comprise expertise among its members that can give Bills the scrutiny
that would enhance the process of approval.
(81) An increase in the number of Senators from eleven (11) to thirteen (13).
(82) The revised formula for the Senate should be seven (7) Senators appointed on the advice
of the Prime Minister, three (3) Senators appointed on the advice of the Minority Leader,
and three (3) Senators appointed by the President in his/her own deliberate judgement.
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Choice of an Electoral System
In keeping with the pre-independence electoral environment, the 1978 Independence Constitution
of Saint Lucia accepted the plurality First-Past-the-Post system (FPTP) as the effective electoral
system of the country. Combined, the Constitution of Saint Lucia and the Elections Act
50
make it
clear that Saint Lucia operates a single member constituency system for election purposes.
Section 30 (1) of the Constitution which speaks to the composition of the House of Assembly
clearly states that:
“The House shall consist of such number of members as corresponds with the
number of constituencies for the time being established in accordance with the
provisions of section 58 of this Constitution, who shall be elected in accordance
with the provisions of section 33 of this Constitution.”
Section 33 (1) of the Constitution states:
“Each of the constituencies established in accordance with the provision of section
58 of this Constitution shall return one member to the House who shall be directly
elected in such manner as may, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be
prescribed by or under any law.”
Further, Section 66 (7) of the Elections Act states that:
“The candidate who, on such final count of the votes, is found to have the largest
number of votes, shall then be declared elected in writing and a copy of such
declaration shall be delivered to each candidate or his or her agent, if present at
the final count of the votes, or, if any candidate is neither present nor represented
thereat, shall be transmitted to such candidate by registered post.”
In appraising the performance of the system currently in place in Saint Lucia, the Commission
acknowledged the historical tendency of the model to restrain and therefore limit the number of
50
Elections Act Cap 1.02 (Rev. Ed. 2006)
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142
political parties that have acquired seats in the elected House of Assembly. Therefore the
Commission agreed with the view that:
“The most serious and fundamental defect in the First Past The Post system is that it
regularly and repeatedly fails to create a parliament in which the image of the feelings of
the nation are truly reflected. There is the general tendency to exaggerate the
representativeness of the largest party and to reduce that of the smaller ones.”
51
The Commission also considered the possibility of this representational distortion resulting in a
situation where a party may be able to win the Government (the absolute majority of seats) while
finishing second in popular vote thereby creating an artificial majority. While the electoral history of
Saint Lucia has not yet exhibited the latter tendency, nonetheless the Commission recognised that
it was a distinct possibility and indeed was not alien to the Commonwealth Caribbean.
In its deliberations, the Commission considered different types of electoral systems. Special
attention was paid to the system of proportionality which lends itself to erasing many of the
distortions that are created under the current system. Foremost among the appeals of the
proportional representation system was its tendency to create a political space for a greater
number of political parties to participate in the decision making process of the country. Thus
proportional representation would correct the tendency of the plurality electoral system to deprive
third parties of representation.
However, the Commission was also troubled by the possibility that, given the historical closeness
in the national vote, support of the two dominant political parties in the country, its adoption as the
institutional system for Saint Lucia could lead to deadlock in the Parliament, create excessive
control by party bosses, and had the potential to create instability. Therefore the Commission
reasoned that the post election bargaining and horse trading which takes place under the
Proportional Representation system (PR) would be avoided by the retention of the status quo.
Further, the Commission recognises that proportional representation systems are prevalent in
diverse societies with groups or groupings. These types of divisions are absent in Saint Lucian
society.
51
See Peter A. Jamadar, The Mechanics of Democracy: Proportional Representation Vs First Past the Post. Port
of Spain: Inprint Ltd., 1989.
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The Commission viewed the FPTP system as a simpler system to administer than the other
electoral models. Consequently the Commission rejected other voting systems such as the Single
Transferable Vote, the Double Ballot System, the Proportional Representation system and others
which might prove not only intellectually taxing but also incur higher administrative costs for the
country. Additionally the Commission felt that the FPTP would work well with its flagship
recommendation of the right of recall for the elected members of Parliament, which would be
difficult, if not impossible, to exercise under a proportional representation system which was often
recommended by Saint Lucians.
Perhaps with the single exception of the powers of the Prime Minister, no other issue occupied the
mind of the Saint Lucian public more than the nature of the electoral system and the general
elections environment. In that respect the Commission received memoranda and heard from the
constituents during the many group discussions and public consultations that were held both at
home and abroad. In general there appeared to be much dissatisfaction with the operation and
performance of the model in the country.
Additionally the Commission received recommendations that there should be a fixed date of
elections. This was justified on the grounds that such an important democratic instrument should
not be left to the whims and fancy of the Prime Minister. This was readily supported by the
Commission who felt that this constitutional power of the Prime Minister tended to give an unfair
advantage to the ruling political party which would always select a date that was most convenient
to them. The Commission, however, was cognisant of the fact that the retention of the
parliamentary form of Government, albeit with some important changes, necessitated a
refashioning of the electoral and parliamentary systems that would continue to provide the
Parliament with the opportunity and the right to move a no confidence motion against the
Government. In that regard therefore, the Commission felt that it would be impractical to maintain
that important instrument of censure (no confidence) against the Government while instituting the
fixed date of elections. How then to resolve the dilemma of a fixed date of elections within the
confines of a parliamentary principle of the no confidence motion? In the event, the Commission
took the compromised position that the fixed date of election would substitute for the current
flexible timeline (subject to the constitutional requirement that elections be held once in every five
years), except under circumstances where a successful no confidence motion automatically
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144
triggered a dissolution of the Parliament of Saint Lucia. As such the Commission strongly
advocated the retention of the current constitutional provision which provides for the Head of State
to dissolve the Parliament if the Prime Minister fails to either resign or advise dissolution, within
three days of the passing of a resolution of no confidence in the Government.
Recommendations
With respect to choice of an electoral system, the Commission recommends the following:
(83) The First-Past-the-Post plurality system of elections should be retained.
(84) There should be fixed dates for Parliamentary Elections so that these elections are held
every five (5) years on the 5
th
anniversary of the previous elections.
(85) Exception to the fixed date of elections should be made by retaining the provisions of
Section 55 (4) (b) and (c) of the Constitution which state:
“(b) If a resolution of no confidence in the Government is passed by the House
and the Prime Minister does not within three days either resign or advise a
dissolution, the Governor-General acting in his own deliberate judgment, may
dissolve parliament; and
(c) If the office of the Prime Minister is vacant and the Governor-General acting in
his own deliberate judgment, considers that there is no prospect of his being
able within a reasonable time to make an appointment to the office, the
Governor-General shall dissolve parliament.”
Right of Recall
Against the backdrop of tremendous concern expressed by Saint Lucians about the behaviour of
elected Parliamentarians, lack of accountability between elections, and general limited contact
between parliamentary representatives and constituents, the Commission considered the
proposals to make Parliamentary representatives more responsive to the people. We have already
noted elsewhere in the report the changes that we envisaged for a reformed Parliament which in
the Commission’s opinion would create a larger space for such representation. However, the
Commission felt that this in itself was inadequate to correct the deficiencies in the current system of
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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delegated representation. Therefore we considered a number of mechanisms that have been
utilised in various jurisdictions to create a closer relationship between constituents and the elected
members of parliament. In our view the recall mechanism offered a best practice which could easily
be adopted without seriously undermining the working of the system.
Simply put, a recall mechanism is designed to trigger a recall election of an elected official who in
the view of the electorate has failed to perform or has violated a regulation. Globally, it is one of the
best means of institutionalising a form of direct democracy, in which the politically relevant citizens
are able to cut short the term of an elected representative through a public vote. There are several
modalities but as a general rule, using the recall mechanism requires the affected citizens asking
for a recall to sign a petition. Only when a sufficient number of the electorate signs the petition,
would a recall process be initiated. This involves a special election (usually a referendum) to
determine whether the official should be removed from office.
The Commission accepted that as a tool designed to effect greater accountability of elected
officials the recall mechanism has tremendous value. In addition, the Commission believes it would
deepen the democratic process in a representative democracy with little opportunity for direct
democracy. Firstly, the Commission accepts the view that sovereignty should truly rest with the
people. The Commission thus reasoned that as much power as possible should reside with the
people. While the Commission noted that the citizenry/electorate entrust power to legislators and
members of the executive, Commissioners felt that if that trust was broken or abused, there should
be a mechanism to recall from office the offending politician. In this way, the Commission reasoned
that elected officials would not only behave in a more ethical manner but would also be forced to
perform even more effectively than at present. Secondly, the Commission considered that as
elections generally focus on an entire party, the lack of a recall mechanism may allow an offending
official to escape judgement when the public was desirous of returning a party to Government. As
such, regardless of their incompetent and unethical conduct, such an official may escape
judgement. The recall mechanism in the estimation of the Commission therefore, is designed to
correct this, by isolating the official from the party and to also facilitate quicker action. Ultimately
therefore, the Commission felt that in the period between elections, elected officials facing the
prospect of a recall, would moderate their behaviour.
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In arriving at its decision the Commission weighed the potential for disruption to the system and
abuse by constituents. In evaluating the merits of the system, we accepted that a recall
mechanism offered the potential for abuse. This was potentially dangerous, especially in elections
which produced very close constituency results. Indeed marginal victories in constituencies are
typical, not only in Saint Lucia but throughout the Caribbean where candidates often lose the
constituency race by small margins. The Commission was also mindful of the fact that electorally
the two main political parties are very close in terms of national support. In the past, Governments
have been known to hold only a one seat advantage in the national Parliament. Under such
circumstances the recall mechanism would be extremely attractive to the opposition and their
supporters and powerful private interests groups adverse to the Government or the Member of
Parliament. These groups could theoretically manipulate the system in order to effect a change of
Government at any time. This, the Commission reasoned would be unfair and potentially
dangerous as it would certainly present a picture of instability which a small dependent economy
could ill afford.
To be sure, the Commission was mindful of the fact that while we were charged with offering
solutions to deepen the democratic environment, we could not allow democracy to be undermined
by the constant fear of local recall initiatives. Further, we acknowledged the vulnerability of elected
officials, and in our estimation felt that in order to prevent deliberate mischief on the part of political
opponents and highly partisan electors, the model of recall would have to have inbuilt a safeguard
against the arbitrariness or abuse. In the perspective of the Commission therefore, a recall should
only be initiated on very limited and specific grounds and should be subject to a time line. The
commission was therefore of the view that the following conditions must be satisfied:
Non-performance as it relates to constituency duties and which could only be
initiated after the MP has served at least half of his parliamentary term; or
Breach of a law, rule or ethical standard established by Parliament.
This of course is subject to our other recommendation elsewhere that an automatic recall should
commence in the case of a Member of Parliament crossing the floor which would lead to an
automatic vacating of the parliamentary seat.
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In reviewing the various modalities used globally, the Commission was intrigued by the model
which is used in Venezuela and which triggered the recall referendum of populist political leader
and President Hugo Chavez. The specific regulation in Venezuela provides for the recall of an
elected official, only if the elected official had served at least half of the term of office. Secondly, in
order to trigger the recall mechanism, at least twenty five percent (25%) of the registered voters in
the affected constituency must petition for a calling of a referendum to revoke that official’s term of
office. If voters in numbers equal to or greater than twenty-five percent (25%) of the eligible voters,
who had, in the previous elections for the official, vote for recall, the official’s mandate is revoked
and a bye-election must take place to fill the vacancy with immediate effect.
52
The Commission agreed that the twenty-five percent (25%) threshold utilised in Venezuela was
reasonable and should be adopted in Saint Lucia. Additionally, in cases of recall petitions, the
Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commission will be required to certify that the names and
signatures on the petition are bona fides.
The Commission also felt that a sufficiently high ceiling should be placed on the recall election of
sixty percent (60%) of the eligible electors in the relevant constituency. While there was general
consensus on the right of recall, a minority of Commissioners was of the view that only persons
who had voted in the previous election should have the right to participate in the recall election.
The majority disagree with this viewpoint, maintaining that this would be difficult to administer by an
Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commission starved of resources and that in any event,
every eligible voter had the legitimate right to vote in any election.
In evaluating best practices globally, the Commission also noted the need to ensure that in the
event of a successful recall, the bye-elections triggered by this action would not remove the right of
the recalled Member to contest the bye-election.
52
Venezuela enjoys a rather straightforward approach to recall which is contained under section 72 of its Constitution.
Article 72 of the Constitution of Venezuela enables the recall of any elected representative, including the President.
This provision was used in the Venezuela recall referendum of 2004, which attempted to remove President Hugo
Chavez.
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Recommendations
With respect to right of recall, the Commission recommends the following:
(86) The right of recall should be provided for in a reformed constitution.
(87) A recall should be automatically triggered if a Member of Parliament who was elected on a
party ticket crosses the floor or changes his/her political allegiance.
(88) A recall should also be initiated in cases where:
there is non-performance as it relates to constituency duties and which can
only be initiated after the MP has served at least half of his parliamentary
term; or
there is a breach of any law, rule or ethical standard established by
Parliament;
(89) In either of these two (2) cases mentioned above, at least 25% of eligible voters must sign
a petition requesting a recall.
(90) In cases of recall petitions, the Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commission will be
required to certify that the names and signatures on the petition are bona fides.
(91) In the recall referendum, a Member of Parliament is recalled if at least 60% of eligible
voters in the relevant constituency vote in favour of the proposition.
(92) The recalled Member has the right to contest the bye-election.
Ministers of Religion
The debate about the role of Ministers of Religion that formed part of the Marlborough House
discussions in 1978 continued inside the Commission insofar as they can be appointed to the
Senate. There was much debate on the question of whether Ministers of Religion should continue
to be barred from standing in elections. Commissioners were divided in their discussions on this
matter. Some argued that Saint Lucian society is a very religious one and at election time Ministers
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149
of Religion may have an unfair advantage. Others felt that the principle of the separation between
Church and State is one which has stood the test of time.
Further arguments were that the Constitution of Saint Lucia had a Westminster foundation in which
ecclesiastical representation was permitted in the House of Lords. In the Caribbean, other
territories had removed this restriction thereby permitting Ministers of Religion to participate in
electoral politics.
After much debate the Commission was unable to arrive at a consensus. The majority of the
members of the Commission agreed to maintain the status quo.
Recommendation
(93) With respect to ministers of religion participating in electoral politics, the Commission
recommends that the status quo should be retained.
Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commissions
The Commission considered the Electoral Commission and the Constituency Boundaries
Commission to determine whether the institutions should be merged or kept separate. On the one
hand, the Commission considered a submission that the method of appointment of the
Constituency Boundaries Commission left it vulnerable to undue partisan political influence, while
the Electoral Commission managed to enjoy a degree of independence. On the other hand it was
argued before the Commission that the Constituency Boundaries Commission was too important to
be politicised and could benefit significantly from the independence enjoyed by the Electoral
Commission. The question before the Commission was how to reform the Constituency
Boundaries Commission to better insulate it from partisan political interference. In making its
decision, the Commission noted that the current separation of the two commissions did not permit
achievement of the purposes for which they were designed. Accordingly, the Commission believes
that if the institutions were merged the Constituency Boundary Commission could be given the
level of independence that it did not currently enjoy, provided that the manner of appointment of its
membership followed the pattern of appointment of the current Electoral Commission. However, it
was argued that with the merging of the two institutions, the membership should comprise five (5)
persons. These persons would be appointed as follows:
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A chairperson appointed by the President after due consultation with the
Prime Minister and the Minority Leader;
53
Two (2) persons appointed by the President acting in his own deliberate
judgement;
One (1) person appointed on the nomination of the Prime Minister; and
One (1) person appointed on the nomination of the Minority Leader.
It was agreed that the Head of State should be given greater power of appointment. The
Commission was therefore of the view that the Head of State should have the power to nominate
three (3) persons to the Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commission. In their view the
enhanced role of the President in the selection of the membership of the Commissions would
afford the Commissioners a greater level of independence inasmuch as the President would now
have greater independence than that enjoyed by the office of the Governor-General under the
Independence Constitution.
Recommendations
With respect to the Electoral Commission and the Constituency Boundaries Commission, the
Commission recommends the following:
(94) The existing Electoral Commission and Constituency Boundaries Commission should be
merged and called the Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commission.
(95) The membership of the Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commission should
comprise five (5) persons appointed as follows:
A chairperson appointed by the President after due consultation with the
Prime Minister and the Minority Leader;
Two (2) persons appointed by the President acting in his own deliberate
judgement;
One (1) person appointed on the nomination of the Prime Minister; and
One (1) person appointed on the nomination of the Minority Leader.
53
Due to the sensitivity of the post of Chairman of the Electoral and Constituency Boundaries Commission, and due
also to the fact that the President would not be popularly elected, the Commission regarded a requirement for
consultation as essential.
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CHAPTER SIX
CREATING A HYBRID EXECUTIVE
The Report of the Marlborough House Conference in 1978 reveals the following discussion under
the heading “The Executive” from paragraphs 21 to 24:
“21. Opposition proposals that the Prime Minister should have to be a person born
in St. Lucia of St. Lucia parents, and that he should not serve more than 10 years
consecutively were not accepted. It was observed that as an elected member of
the House of Assembly the Prime Minister would already be a citizen of St. Lucia.
22. It should be mandatory on the Governor-General (rather than within his
discretion as at present provided) to remove the Prime Minister after a resolution
of no confidence in the Government had been passed by the House of Assembly.
23. Consequential amendments should be included on the lines of those proposed
in the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly to take account of
the possibility of there being no elected member of the Opposition, in which case
the Governor-General would be enabled to act on his own deliberate judgement in
matters where otherwise he would be required to consult the Leader of the
Opposition. The Governor-General would also have the power to decide whom to
appoint as Leader of the Opposition when there was doubt about which elected
member commanded the most support among those elected members who did not
support the Government.
24. There should be provision in the constitution for appointment of a political
Attorney General at the option of the Government.”
54
The continuation of the dialogue that was started at the Marlborough House Conference about
term limits for and the Powers of, the Prime Minister were once again considered by the
Commission in active debate.
54
Report of the Marlborough House Conference. 1978/Cmnd.7328, pp. 4 – 5
Report – March 2011
152
Submissions were received that term limits be established for the Prime Minister as Head of the
Executive. The majority of the submissions were for two (2) terms not exceeding ten (10) years.
The Commission held differing views on this matter. Some saw term limits as undemocratic, while
those who agreed with term limits felt that and that after two (2) consecutive terms there should be
a hiatus of at least one term before the individual is qualified to take up the office again.
Term Limits for the Prime Minister
The fascination with American presidential techniques, particularly in relation to term limits for the
Prime Minister and fixed dates for elections for the Parliament appear not only to be a fixation with
the Washington model, but also a fixation with trying to limit the considerable powers of the Prime
Minister in Westminster-style constitutional systems.
As far as term limits for the office of the Prime Minister is concerned, this will be more difficult to
regulate in a parliamentary system as the post-independence political history of Saint Lucia has
shown. With the appointment of eight (8) different persons as Prime Minister over a period of
twenty-eight years, there is no compelling argument for term limits other than the fact that Sir John
Compton held the office so many times after independence.
What clearly complicates the measurement of this is the fact that the term of office of a Prime
Minister of Saint Lucia is not broken if the party that he/she leads is successful at a general
election. Section 60(7) of the Saint Lucia Constitution
55
, confirms this as follows:
“If, at any time between the holding of a general election of members of the
House and the first meeting of the House thereafter, the Governor-General
considers that in consequence of changes in the membership of the House
resulting from that election the Prime Minister will not be able to command the
support of the majority of the members of the House the Governor-General may
remove the Prime Minister from office.”
Such a constitutional arrangement emphasises incumbency and only places the burden for the
removal of the Prime Minister from office if the Governor-General is satisfied that as a result of the
55
Saint Lucia Constitution (S.I. 1978/No 1901, Schedule 1).
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
153
outcome of a general election the Prime Minister would be unlikely to command the support of a
majority of the members of the House of Assembly.
It is for this reason that there was no need to appoint Honourable John Compton (later Sir John) in
1987 and in 1992. The same applied to Dr. the Honourable Kenny D. Anthony in 2001. Essentially,
Sir John really served only one term between 1982 and his resignation in 1996 owing to the
wording of the Constitution. The same can be said for Dr. the Honourable Kenny D. Anthony
between 1997 and 2006.
Additionally, the desire for fixed dates for elections has arisen out of the number of times that there
have been general elections in Saint Lucia. With eight (8) general elections in twenty-seven (27)
years, one may argue that with fixed dates for elections the arithmetic would have been very
different as forty (40) years would have had to elapse.
However, Saint Lucia has a provision in its Constitution at Section 55(4)(a) for the Governor-
General to refuse the request of a Prime Minister for a dissolution of Parliament. It appears that this
provision has not been invoked since independence and will provide a stronger basis for seeking
fixed dates for elections in any reforms that may be undertaken to give effect to such a desire.
It is the domination of the political process by the Prime Minister and the party in power that has led
many to seek ways to curb that dominance without compromising the ability of governments to
govern. At the same time, Saint Lucians are all too familiar with the instability associated with
political infighting and turmoil as we saw between 1979 and 1982 and also between 2006 and
2007.
The challenge is to provide for political stability while enhancing the institutions of scrutiny that can
make governments more accountable to the population without hampering their ability to govern.
To this end, the hope is that institutional change will bring with it altered political behaviour and the
emergence of a different political culture.
Once more we can see that this represents the importation of the presidential technique of limiting
the terms of office of the Prime Minister. The issue has been around for a while. It was directly
considered by the Constitution Review Commission under the chairmanship of the Right
Report – March 2011
154
Honourable Sir Hugh Wooding in Trinidad and Tobago during the period 1971 – 74. The Wooding
Constitution Commission took a hostile view of it in paragraph 284 of its 1974 Report as follows:
“We considered and rejected the suggestion that a limit should be placed on the
number of terms which any person may serve as Prime Minister. Essentially at any
general election voters choose the party which they wish to form the Government.
It seems to us unthinkable to impose any restrictions on the number of successive
terms which any party could win. Once that is conceded, it would seem to be
wrong in principle to place a restriction on the party’s choice of leadership. This
could have a significant effect on their chances of winning the elections.
Compelling them to change their leader may, in effect, reduce their chances of
success. We do not think that any useful purpose can be served from a study of
the experience of the United States of America and some Latin American
countries where the choice of President is essentially the choice of a person, not
of a governing party. In these systems the office of President stands by itself
separate and apart from Congress which may be controlled by a party other than
that to which the President belongs.”
56
After considering whether to retain the Parliamentary system or whether to embrace the Executive
Presidential model, the Commission was of the view that a hybrid parliamentary-presidential model
should be considered for reasons outlined above.
The parliamentary model only works when the Executive can dominate Parliament. A presidential
model can function with different parties controlling the executive branch and the legislative branch
of Government or one party may control both with the concurrence of the electorate.
The key factor here is that both the fixed dates for elections and the proposal for term limits are
features of presidential models of Government and are not features of parliamentary systems,
unless there is some kind of compromise.
For example, Canada introduced fixed dates for elections by amending its electoral laws in May
56
Report of the Constitution Commission, Trinidad and Tobago Printing and Packaging Co., 1974, para. 284).
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
155
2007; however, the amendment to the electoral law provided for an exception to the powers of the
Governor-General under the Royal Prerogative (in order to avoid having to seek a constitutional
amendment). Accordingly, the revised electoral law provided that a general election should be held
at the federal level on the third Monday in October after the previous general election had been
held. This established that the next general election ought to have been held on 19
th
October,
2009.
In September 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose Government was surviving a number
of confidence votes in the Canadian House of Commons because of opposition abstention to avoid
forcing a general election, was able to secure a dissolution of Parliament in defiance of the
electoral laws because the Governor-General, Michaelle Jean, exercised the prerogative powers of
the Crown to dissolve Parliament in 2008 one year ahead of the fixed date prescribed in electoral
law which is inferior in the face of the prerogative powers of the Crown.
The proposal for term limits for the Prime Minister is fashioned after the Twenty-Second (22
nd
)
Amendment to the United States Constitution that was ratified in 1951. The Amendment read as
follows :
“Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than
twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President,
for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected
President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this
article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this article
was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be
holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which
this article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as
President during the remainder of such term.
Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the
Congress.”
Report – March 2011
156
The amendment did not apply to the person holding office at the time of its approval, but would
apply to future holders of the office of President. This amendment came into effect while President
Harry Truman was in office but he did not seek to be elected for a third term after the New
Hampshire primary in 1952.
Setting aside the example of Canada, the Commission recognises that fixed dates for elections in
Parliamentary systems were not normal due to the problem that in the event of a crisis, (as
occurred in Saint Lucia during the 1979 – 1982 period) the life of a Government may need to be
ended prematurely. In short, the Commission recognised that one of the strengths of the
Parliamentary system was the flexibility it allowed to end the Parliament earlier where
circumstances arose which makes this desirable. Accordingly, if dates for elections were fixed a
problem could arise where a Government may need to return to the polls, due to a loss of
confidence for example, earlier than the typical five (5) year anniversary. Having considered the
issue at length, the Commission decided to address this issue with fixed dates for elections by
retaining the current provisions of Section 55 (4) (a) & (b) of the Constitution to ensure some
degree of flexibility to avert possible constitutional crises.
57
In a Parliamentary system, the appointment of the Prime Minister is not determined by the people,
but rather by the Head of State based on constitutional guidelines. In these circumstances, the
Commission has determined that it will recommend that any appointment to the office of Prime
Minister continue to be made as it is now, with the President replacing the Governor–General.
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, there are written constitutions that regulate the manner in which
the Prime Minister is to be appointed. These constitutions may be separated into different methods
57
In the exercise of his powers to dissolve Parliament, the Governor-General shall act in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister:
Provided that:
a) if the Prime Minister advises a dissolution and the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate
judgment, considers that the government of Saint Lucia can be carried on without a dissolution and
that a dissolution would not be in the interests of Saint Lucia, he may, acting in his own deliberate
judgment, refuse to dissolve Parliament;
b) if a resolution of no confidence in the Government is passed by the House and the Prime Minister
does not within three days either resign or advise a dissolution the Governor-General, acting in his
own deliberate judgment, may dissolve Parliament;
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
157
as regards the appointment, and termination of appointment, of a Prime Minister. One method
emphasises the incumbency theory by making provision for the removal of the Prime Minister only
if the changes in the membership of the elected House, after a dissolution and before the first
sitting of Parliament, are such that the Governor-General or President, as the case may be,
determines that it is necessary to remove the Prime Minister from office. Otherwise, the Prime
Minister does not have to be re-appointed if he/she continues to command the support of a majority
of elected members after a general election. Commonwealth Caribbean countries that follow this
method in their constitutions are Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
Another method emphasises the need for the termination of office regardless of incumbency after a
dissolution and before the first sitting of Parliament. In this case, the termination of office comes as
a consequence of being re-appointed as Prime Minister so that one term of office ends and another
begins for every incumbent. The appointment of someone else as Prime Minister will naturally end
the term of the incumbent. However, effect is given to this termination merely by way of the
Governor- General or President, as the case may be, informing the incumbent Prime Minister that
he/she is to be re-appointed or someone else is to be appointed Prime Minister. Commonwealth
Caribbean countries that follow this method are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica,
The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The incumbency method recognises that there is no need to re-appoint the Prime Minister if the
alterations in the elected membership of Parliament after a general election do not warrant any
change. The termination method makes it mandatory that the Prime Minister vacate office every
time after a general election whether the reason is re-appointment or the appointment of someone
else.
In Saint Lucia, the Parliaments that assembled after the general elections of 6
th
April, 1987 and 30
th
April, 1987 would have created some controversy as Saint Lucia had adopted the incumbency rule
where re-appointment of the Prime Minister is not required as opposed to the case of Trinidad and
Tobago where the termination method exists. Each term of Parliament in Saint Lucia is not
matched by a re-appointment of the Prime Minister thereby negating a term limit rule. In Trinidad
Report – March 2011
158
and Tobago, a victorious outcome for the incumbent Prime Minister still requires a re-appointment
in order to end one term and to start another.
Notwithstanding the above, a majority of the Commission voted in favour of term limits for the
Prime Minister of three consecutive five-year terms. A minority however, viewed term limits as
being somewhat undemocratic as it fails to take into consideration the wishes of the people if their
desire is for a particular person to remain in office.
Recommendation
With respect to term limits for the Prime Minister, the Commission recommends the following:
(96) No person should be appointed to the office of Prime Minister for more than three (3)
consecutive five (5) year terms. Where a Prime Minister has served for three (3)
consecutive terms, he/she may return after a hiatus of five years.
Direct Election of the Prime Minister Excluded from Hybrid
The Commission considered and rejected the submission that the Prime Minister should be elected
in direct elections. However, it must be noted that this submission was among those with the
highest frequency among the submissions that the Commission received.
The Commission was of the view that the recommendation of the direct election of the Prime
Minister will lead to the creation of an Executive Presidential system along the lines of the United
States. Commissioners did not support the idea of an Executive President, as it was felt that the
concept was too radical a deviation from the present system and our political culture may not be
ready for such a recommendation.
The prospect of having the Prime Minister being directly elected and the constituencies electing
their representatives could create a situation in which the Prime Minister could emerge from a party
that won a minority of seats in the House, but capture the premiership in national (and not
constituency) elections. This would therefore make it difficult for the Prime Minister to implement
the policies of the party to which he/she belonged because the majority in the House of Assembly
may be controlled by another party. In a small island developing state like Saint Lucia, this may
make governing untenable.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
159
Recommendation
With respect to the election of the Prime Minister, the Commission recommends the following:
(97) The status quo in relation to the appointment of the Prime Minister be maintained. There
should not be direct election of the Prime Minister.
Deputy Prime Minister
The Commission received and considered many submissions calling for the direct election of the
Prime Minister and a Deputy Prime Minister. The Commission did not support the idea of a directly
elected Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for the reasons canvassed above. While the
Commission therefore rejected the submission, nonetheless in considering the new arrangements
for the political executive in Saint Lucia, the Commission felt that it was necessary to give
constitutional effect to the office of a deputy to the Prime Minister.
During its deliberations, the Commission concluded that in the interest of succession and decisive
action, it would be preferable that a Parliamentarian be appointed to the post of Deputy Prime
Minister. Accordingly, it was argued, that in the absence of the Prime Minister from the State, or
under circumstances where the Prime Minister was unable to perform the functions of the chief
executive as a result of illness, the Deputy Prime Minister would automatically fulfil the functions of
the Prime Minister. Further, the Commission held the view that Section 63 (2) and (3) of the current
Constitution which speaks to the appointment of a temporary Minister to replace a Minister who is
unable to perform his ministerial responsibilities, should be amended to remove the discretion of
the Governor General (now President) in respect of the position of Prime Minister..
58
Essentially
58
Section 63
(2) Whenever a Minister other than the Prime Minister is absent from Saint Lucia or is within Saint Lucia but by leave
of the Governor-General is not performing the functions of his office or by reason of illness is unable to perform
those functions, the Governor-General may authorize some other Minister to perform those functions or may
appoint a Senator or a member of the House to be a temporary Minister in order to perform those functions; and
that Minister may perform those functions until his authority or, as the case may be, his appointment is revoked by
the Governor-General or he vacates office as a Minister under subsection (8) or (9) of section 60 of this
Constitution.
(3) The power of the Governor-General under his section shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of
the Prime Minister;
Report – March 2011
160
therefore, under the new arrangement where the Minister in question under Section 63 (2) is the
Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister will automatically assume the duties of the Prime
Minister. The Deputy Prime Minister shall be the one empowered under the Constitution to advise
the President.
In order to facilitate the Deputy Prime Minister in the discharge of his functions when deputising for
the Prime Minister, he would have to become a member of Cabinet upon his appointment but such
appointment would not make him a Minister nor would such appointment require him to resign as a
Member of Parliament. As a result of this, there would be two (2) elected members in the Cabinet,
but the only time the Deputy Prime Minister would exercise Executive functions is when he is
deputising for the Prime Minister.
Recommendations
With respect to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister under the new Constitution, the
Commission recommends the following:
(98) Provisions should be made for the office of a Deputy Prime Minister.
(99) The Appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister from among the elected members of the
Parliament.
(100) The Deputy Prime Minister upon appointment should become a member of Cabinet but
not have ministerial responsibility other than when he is acting for the Prime Minister.
(101) The necessary amendment of Section 63 (2) and (3) of the existing constitution that
empowers the Governor General (now President) in the absence of the Prime Minister to
appoint a temporary Minister to replace a Minister who for whatever reason, is unable to
perform his functions.
The Attorney General
In respect of the Attorney General, it was felt that the existing system of having a political
appointee as Attorney General should be retained. However, whichever way the Prime Minister
Provided that if the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment considers that it is impracticable to
obtain the advice of the Prime Minister owing to his absence or illness he may exercise those powers without that
advice and in his own deliberate judgment.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
161
decides, the requisite qualification for the Attorney General should be equivalent to that of a High
Court judge. While the Commission recognises that this recommendation may reduce the pool of
persons from which the Prime Minister can choose, the Commission felt that this recommendation
was a way of addressing the numerous concerns expressed by the public about the competence of
the persons occupying this position.
Recommendations
With respect to the Attorney General, the Commission recommends the following:
(102) The requisite qualification for the Attorney General should be equivalent to that of a High
Court judge.
(103) The option of appointing a political Attorney General should remain.
Maintaining Stability and Efficiency Under the New Hybrid: The Cabinet,
Collective Responsibility and Parliament
.
Undoubtedly the conceived political system envisaged under the proposed changes to the
Constitution will have implications for the conduct of both parliamentary and executive behaviour.
Having previously established that the anticipated system will maintain the parliamentary political
form, while simultaneously engineering a near complete separation between the executive and the
legislative branches of government, the burning question that the Commission needed to answer
was, how would the system maintain its efficiency and stability in a context of a separation of these
two important powers? Indeed, under the existing political form, one of the critical ex-post
mechanisms used to maintain efficiency and stability is the doctrine of collective responsibility.
Simply put, the doctrine of collective responsibility refers to the conduct of Ministers of government
in relation to government policy. By convention it is expected that Ministers are bound to publicly
support the decisions of the Cabinet and should therefore not show public disagreement with those
decisions. In so doing, the expectation is that there will be the appearance of Cabinet unity and
party discipline and support with respect to governmental policy. Parliamentary government with a
strong Prime Minister and Cabinet, which is the norm in the Commonwealth Caribbean, means that
every member of the Cabinet, must accept and if, and when necessary, defend Cabinet decisions
Report – March 2011
162
even if he/she is opposed to and or dislikes them, unless he/she chooses to resign. While political
developments in Saint Lucia have showed that collective responsibility has not always worked in
the way that it is expected, and Ministers have chosen instead to violate the doctrine,
59
nevertheless it is primarily because of this conventional practice that governments have tended to
remain efficacious and stable. Thus the doctrine of collective responsibility provides an effective
constraint on the behaviour of Cabinet members as they are expected to be bound by the collective
decision making process and outcome, even when they disagree with the decisions made.
Ministers will therefore inevitably find themselves in a position where arising out of the convention,
they must publicly (that is in Parliament) not only support but defend the policy even while
personally finding the policy an abomination.
Samuel H. Beer et al therefore contended that under the doctrine of collective responsibility:
“Not only are members of the Cabinet bound in vote and speech to defend the
authoritative decisions of the cabinet system, but so also are all members of the
Government and, though not so tightly, their parliamentary private secretaries.
Moreover the decisions to which they are bound are not only those of the full
Cabinet. The decisions of the cabinet Committees now have the same validity as
decisions of the cabinet proper.”
60
Another critical component of the convention is the need for secrecy about disagreements in
Cabinet. It is argued that any revelation of Cabinet disagreements would mean that Ministers were
not presenting a united front which is the core principle of the doctrine of collective responsibility.
Consequently, the constitutional doctrine of collective responsibility as it applies in Parliamentary
systems has three main rules, which are:
(i) the confidence rule, which dictates that government will only stay in power in so far
as it continues to maintain the confidence of the Parliament, in this case the House
59
Sarah Flood-Beaubrun violated the convention of collective responsibility when she publicly broke rank with her
Cabinet colleagues over the abortion provisions of the Criminal Code of Saint Lucia.
60
See Samuel H. Beer et al. Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe. Random House: New
York, 1973, p. 148.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
163
of Assembly. The confidence of the Parliament is therefore always assumed
unless there is a successful no confidence motion against the government.
(ii) the unanimity rule, which requires that all members of the government speak and
vote together in the Parliament unless an exception is made; and
(iii) confidentiality rule, which provides for all discussions in the Cabinet to be
confidential and private if open and frank discussions are to take place. This latter
dimension of the doctrine of collective responsibility is the sine qua non of the
doctrine, without which Cabinet government and governmental stability would be
endangered.
61
However, the Commission notes a recent decision of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court where
the confidentiality rule appears to be eroded when the Court made an order for Cabinet minutes to
be disclosed.
62
Under this proposed hybrid, all of these rules will have to be upheld in order to prevent Cabinet
disruption. However, the Cabinet will have to depend upon the Leader of Government Business in
the House of Assembly to uphold the confidence rule so that the Government will not collapse in
the face of any no confidence votes. As regards the confidence rule in both Houses, the Leaders
of Government Business in both chambers will have to try and ensure that Government policy is
supported as no Ministers will have a right to vote in either House.
However, the Parliamentary caucuses of the party forming the Government will have to effect any
compromises to policy and legislation given their control over party discipline in the Houses of
Parliament.
In Parliamentary systems, legislators who support the majority usually toe the party line so as to
avoid disrupting power arrangements for the Cabinet that depends upon the continued confidence
of a majority of elected legislators. Under the hybrid which promotes a greater separation of
powers (by removing the Ministers from Parliament), we eliminate the possibility where, as has
happened in Saint Lucia, a member of Cabinet who has been part of a Cabinet decision, can vote
against that same decision in Parliament.
61
See Stephen Buckley: The Prime Minister and Cabinet. Edinburgh University Press: 2006 for more details.
62
Attorney General v Kenny D. Anthony HCVAP 2009/031
Report – March 2011
164
In practical terms, discipline in the House should be the responsibility of the Leader of Government
Business, acting on behalf of the Prime Minister, while discipline in Cabinet, should be the sole
responsibility of the Prime Minister. However, political problems may arise in the cases of Ministers
who are dismissed from, or who may resign, their ministerial portfolios as they may earn the
support of others in the House of Assembly who may not toe the party line. The Prime Minister may
be able to avert a political crisis by offering ministerial portfolios to any disgruntled M.P. thereby
removing him/her from the membership of the House in exchange for ministerial office.
With the hybrid, the Cabinet will not collapse (as would be the case under the doctrine of collective
responsibility under the present Constitution). All that would happen is that the Parliament would
continue and Cabinet would be forced to engage in constructive dialogue and compromise, in order
to effect policy and legislative changes. The Prime Minister will not be able to dissolve Parliament.
Instead he/she would be able to rearrange the membership of the Cabinet and that of the House of
Assembly and the Senate, through judicious use of his/her enhanced powers of appointment,
subject to ratification. However, this can be curbed if a majority of the new substitute Members of
Parliament and the existing Members of Parliament do not support the Prime Minister.
The Leader of the Opposition
The Leader of the Opposition will be appointed in the same way as exists now on the basis of
being the Member of Parliament who can command the support of the largest number of Members
of Parliament who do not support the Government. This would be measured by the fact that these
Members of Parliament do not support the Prime Minister. However, the Commission recommends
that the title of the office be changed to “Minority Leader” to capture the fact that the office is not
about perpetual opposition to the Government.
The value of this office can be measured by the fact that the Opposition, in Westminster-style
democracies, is considered the alternative Government. In the independence Constitution of Saint
Lucia, provision has been made for the Leader of the Opposition to be consulted by the Governor-
General before certain appointments are made in accordance with the Constitution. These include:
the appointment of a tribunal to investigate the removal of the members of the
Electoral Commission (other than the Chairman) (Section 57);
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
165
the Parliamentary Commissioner (Section 110); and,
the Deputy Parliamentary Commissioner (Section 111).
Recommendations
With respect to the position Leader of the Opposition, the Commission recommends the following:
(104) The title for the office of Leader of the Opposition should be changed to “Minority Leader”.
(105) The Minority Leader should be appointed in the same way as exists now for the Leader of
the Opposition.
(106) The Minority Leader should be consulted by the President on a wider range of matters as
specified within the body of this report.
Report – March 2011
166
CHAPTER SEVEN
RE-ENGINEERING THE PUBLIC SERVICE
The Public Service
In every truly democratic society a public servant holds a unique status in many respects. As the
servant or agent of the State, he/she enjoys special advantages and protections and
correspondingly submits to certain restrictions. The public servant’s distinctive position is
recognised in the existence of a special chapter, Chapter VI, in the existing Constitution containing
provisions relating to them and also to the express provisions in sections 10 and 11 authorising
restrictions on their freedom of expression and of association and assembly, respectively.
The Public Service of Saint Lucia is part of the executive branch of Government and was originally
established as part of the machinery of the colonial administration. Today, after thirty-two years of
independence the ethos and regulations of the service remain substantially patterned upon that of
Britain. As a result, and following the British tradition, the Public Service is characterised more or
less by permanence, confidentiality, anonymity and political neutrality. The permanence of public
servants ensures that the public service does not change with the Government. As a result, public
servants should acquire a sense of duty to the country since they do not work for the goals of the
political party in power - instead they work towards administering the country. Confidentiality
ensures that all the advice that public servants give to Ministers remain secret so as to enable
public servants to be totally frank with such advice without fear of reprisal. Through anonymity, the
public remains unaware of the intricate details of the actual work done by individual public
servants. The Minister (as distinct from the public servants) remains the one who is accountable to
both the electorate and the Parliament. And finally, political neutrality should ensure that public
servants do not bring their political views into their work. They are expected to be non-partisan. To
make this possible the current Constitution insulates members of the Public Service and the police
service from any political influence that may be exercised directly on them by the government of
the day. The mechanism adopted for doing so is to vest in autonomous commissions, to the
exclusion of any other person or authority, power to make appointments, to remove and to exercise
disciplinary control over members of the public service.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
167
Underlying these characteristics is the legitimate concern that the Public Service and its servants
should be seen to serve the public in the administration and implementation of Government
policies and programmes, in an impartial and effective manner. The preservation of the impartiality
and neutrality of public servants has long been recognised in democratic societies as of critical
importance in the preservation of public confidence in the conduct of public affairs. The point is
made by Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrative Law
63
that:-
“… the public interest demands the maintenance of political impartiality in the Public
Service and confidence in that impartiality as an essential part of the structure of
government in this country.”
A major challenge facing the Public Service in the post-independence era is that of making a
paradigm shift from administration to management. The classical Weberian philosophy of an ideal-
type bureaucracy whereby the existence of a hierarchy was the foundation for building a career in
the public service on the basis of seniority and promotion until retirement and using the tools of
administration of public policy as opposed to management of public policy has since been
challenged. In addition, the realitiy that face modern human resource practice is the need, given
the ever-increasing rate of change in the modern environment, for organisations to cultivate the
practice of self-renewal. The hallmarks which may have characterised a “good” employee of
yesteryear are no longer valid in today’s extremely competitive world, and given the ever escalating
cost of the Public Service, the taxpayer deserves the best that can be provided, both in terms of
service and productivity.
The issue of the “permanence” of public servants has been placed under examination by both the
disappearance of the loyalty that once existed in the psyche in the public servant, and factors such
as the growing tendency to recruit “contract” officers. In the face of the rapidly increasing pace of
change, there will always be the need to inject specialist expertise into a dynamic public service.
The injection of such expertise, however, must be carefully done; it cannot be assumed that the
most brilliant technician is not the worst possible manager. The institutionalisation of appointments
by contract throughout the Public Service may provide a solution to this issue. In this regard, the
63
5
th
edition (1973) at page 299
Report – March 2011
168
approach could be to define specific posts within the Public Service where such appointments
could be made.
The hallmark of the good manager is to become thoroughly acquainted with the culture of his/her
new organisation, and to try and bend that culture gradually in the direction of excellence. The
“inertia” which is often complained about is however, a necessary “check and balance” which
enables careful study of new policy – the good public servant is very familiar with the attention and
action required in an emergency. The inexperienced one may not necessarily know which buttons
to press.
The public’s perception of the public service seems to suggest that the political protection offered
by Chapter VI in the Constitution is being abused. This stems from the usually inordinate delay in
the hearing of disciplinary offences coupled with what appears as no serious culture within the
Service to tackle these problems. There is also a feeling that corruption within the Service is
astronomical and occurs at senior levels.
The Report of the Marlborough House Conference in 1978 reveals the following discussion under
the heading “The Public Service” from paragraphs 26 to 28:
“26. A proposal by the Leader of the Opposition that the Prime Minister should consult the
Leader of the Opposition before advising the Governor-General on the appointment and
removal of the Chairman and members of the Public Service Commission and certain
other public service officers was agreed.
27. The Conference agreed that the Teaching Service Commission should be among the
public bodies given specific recognition in the constitution.
28. The Conference agreed that the Public Service Board of Appeal should consist of a
Chairman, a member appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, and two members
appointed by the Governor-General after consultation with the various appropriate bodies
representing the public service associations.”
64
64
Report of the Marlborough House Conference 1978/Cmnd. 7328, p. 5
.
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Some of the submissions for reform of the Public Service that were received by the Commission
may be summarised as follows: -
(a) That the concept of a neutral, non-political public service be retained;
(b) The jurisdiction of the Service Commissions should be extended to members of
Statutory Corporations and members of Statutory Boards; it is therefore recommended
also that a special Commission be introduced for statutory bodies, and a common
professional resource service all of the Commissions’ requirements under the aegis of
the Public Service Ministry.
(c) That Public Officers below a certain grade or rank should be given a constitutional
right to sign public petitions, take part in the management of newspapers, furnish the
press with letters or articles which are of a “political or administrative nature”, give
broadcast talks and participate in discussions of a political or administrative nature;
(d) That members of the Service Commissions should be appointed by the Head of State
(President) in the following manner (a) the Chairman, acting in accordance with the
advice of the Prime Minister (b) one member, acting in accordance with the advice of
the Prime Minister after consultation with the relevant employees’ representative e.g.
Saint Lucia Civil Service Association; and (c) up to three members on the advice of the
Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition;
(e) That members of the Service Commissions should enjoy tenure as well as protection
of conditions of service;
(f) That there should be a quarantine period during which retiring members of the
Commissions may not hold public office;
(g) Removal of members of the Commissions should only be for cause; and
(h) That there should be a Tribunal hearing before dismissal of members of Service
Commissions. Such Tribunal should be appointed by the Head of State and chosen
from persons who hold or have held or are eligible to hold high judicial office.
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(i) The issue of corruption should be addressed by creating internal mechanisms of
accountability in respect of lower level public officials but a more inquisitorial
mechanism for senior officials such as the politicians, permanent secretaries and
heads of departments by which they could be investigated without prejudice or favour
and if found guilty suffer the consequences like any other ordinary person.
(j) The institutionalisation of appointments by contract for specific post within the Public
Service which should exclude posts of Permanent Secretary and Head of Department.
(k) There is need for a Procedures Manual or and Operations Manual for the Public
Service.
If the nature of the concerns which were expressed by both members of the public and by public
servants themselves, are examined carefully, it will be noticed that they point to a realisation that
the management of the human resource, the most important asset of any organisation, and
certainly the most expensive commodity of the Public Service, does not appear to have kept pace
with the developments which have occurred since independence. The role of the Service
Commissions therefore, is paramount, and their leadership is crucial. The staffing resources with
which they are equipped need also to be carefully chosen and thoroughly trained.
The Public Service Commission
The mechanism of the Public Service Commission, as in other Constitutions of this ilk, has been
used as a means of protecting the public officer from any form of direct political pressure, to give
effect to the concept of meritocracy in advancement, and impartiality in the application of
disciplinary action. Increasing demands to ensure the fulfilment of these functions have made the
resources allocated to the servicing of these requirements inadequate.
There was a submission that the Leader of the Opposition should have a greater role to play in the
determination of the composition of the Public Service Commission. It submitted further, that the
Public Service Commission should therefore comprise:
three (3) persons nominated by the Prime Minister;
two (2) persons nominated by the Leader of the Opposition (who will be
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renamed “Minority Leader”); and
one (1) person nominated by the President acting in his or her own deliberate
judgment; this nominee should be the Chairperson.
The Commission accepted this submission noting that this represented an extension of the
proposal at the Marlborough House Conference in 1978. In the Commission’s view, such reform
would introduce a greater level of balance in the appointment of members of the Public Service
Commission which it regards as a desirable goal.
There was also a submission that the Teaching Service Commission should be subsumed under
the Public Service Commission for purposes of greater efficiency. This proposal represents a
reversal of one of the reforms adopted at the Marlborough House Conference in 1978. The
Commission agreed with this proposal for change on the grounds that separate service
commissions was an unnecessary duplication and that, in practical terms, both commissions share
the same personnel and resources.
Recommendations
With respect to the Public Service Commission and the Teaching Service Commission, the
Commission recommends the following:
(107) The Teaching Service Commission should be merged with the Public Service
Commission.
(108) The members of the Public Service Commission after the merger should be appointed by
the President as follows:
three (3) persons acting on the advice of the Prime Minister;
two (2) persons acting on the advice of the Minority Leader; and
one (1) person acting in his/her own deliberate judgement who shall be the
chairperson.
(109) Each member shall have one vote with the exception of the chairperson who shall have a
casting vote in the event of a tie.
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The Police Service
In 1965 the Police Act
65
and the Police Regulations
66
became law in Saint Lucia. These two pieces
of legislation were to provide for the organization, administration, duties and discipline of the Police
Force.
The Commissioner of Police is empowered to deal with the hearing and determination of charges
or complaints against members of the Police Force, below the rank of Inspector. He is also
empowered to delegate these powers to other senior officers. In summary the Police was given
power to hear and determine complaints against their colleagues. Needless to say as the years
went by, the people of Saint Lucia became very frustrated with the situation and started to voice
their frustration.
In order to curb the spate of discontent from the public against the members of the Police Force,
the Police Complaints Act No 6 of 2003 was passed. The Act provided for the receipt, investigation
and determination of complaints by the public against the police. It made provision for the
establishment of a Complaints Unit within the Police Force and for the establishment and
organization of a Police Complaints Commission.
Subsequently, in August 2004, the Complaints Unit and the Complaints Commission were
established.
The primary functions of the Complaints Unit are as follows:
“Investigate complaints made by members of the public against police officers and referred
to it by the Commission.”
Resolve the said complaints in accordance with the Act.
Finally to submit on a quarterly basis a progress report on the work done and eventually a
final report on all investigations carried out by the Commission and the Commissioner of
Police.”
65
Police Act 30 of 1965
66
Statutory Instrument 22 of 1965
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The Complaints Commission on the other hand, had to receive complaints on the conduct of any
police officer; monitor the investigation of a complaint by the Police Complaints Unit so as to
ensure that the investigation is conducted impartially; report to the responsible Minister (for Home
Affairs and Internal Security) from time to time or at his request; and to review reports from the
Police Complaints Unit and may in such a case conduct an investigation of its own accord.
A perusal of the Police Complaints Act reveals that the Complaints Commission only plays an
advisory role. It has no authority to either discipline police officers or establish departmental
policies within the Police Force. The Commission is also unable to provide complainants with the
results of disciplinary action recommended.
Notwithstanding and not surprising, the public continues to complain about the work of the Unit and
the Complaints Commission. It is regarded as a waste of time for, in the final analysis, it is the
same policemen who are investigating their colleagues. However, there appears to be some
breakthrough, a little light through the tunnel. By Cabinet Conclusion No. 1243 of 2008, Cabinet
approved the appointment of two independent adjudicators one for the North and the other for the
South of the island.
The Commission received and considered a submission suggesting that there should be an
independent police complaints authority because what currently exist underminds public
confidence as investigations are carried out by police officers appointed by the Police
Commissioner. In the Commission’s view this practice represented a fundamental weakness in the
current system.
Commissioners supported, in principle, the submission that there should be an independent police
complaints office. If Saint Lucia is to re-engineer its police service, it has to ensure that an
independent capacity exists with constitutional protection, for the conduct of investigations against
errant officers whose treatment of civilians can have the capacity to damage the confidence and
reputation of the police service in the eyes of the public.
In the view of the Commission, a modern police service is one in which the police will have
confidence to protect and serve their communities and the nation. In order to instill that trust and
confidence, the police service must have the capacity to withstand independent scrutiny. It should
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have the power to suspend, discipline and prosecute if necessary, officers found to be in breach of
their oath to uphold and preserve the law. To this end, an independent Police Complaints
Commission is an absolute necessity. The powers being recommended for the police Complaints
Commission are in addition to that which are already vested in the Commision of Police.
Recommendations
With respect to the Police Service, the Commission recommends the following:
(110) There should be an independent Police Complaints Commission.
(111) The Police Complaints Commission should be capable of suspending, disciplining and
prosecuting, if necessary.
(112) The existing powers of the Police Commissioner to exercise disciplinary control over
officers should be retained.
(113) The Police Act and Police Regulations should be modernised.
Scrutiny of Service Commissions
There was a submission that there should be a Parliamentary Committee to oversee the
performance of Service Commissions and that the Opposition should be given the chairmanship of
this committee with no political majority on the committee.
The Commission had mixed views on this submission. It was noted that the Service Commissions
were established to insulate public servants from political influence. Some Commissioners argued
that this would have the net effect of challenging the integrity of an independent Service
Commission to guarantee oversight and maintain that independence. A counter view was that a
Parliamentary Committee would serve to guarantee and maintain that independence. Yet another
view was that it was unreasonable for public bodies like the PSC to remain untouchable.
Some Commissioners felt that the problem of non-performance within the Public Service is a
problem of management within the Public Service and not an indictment of the Commissions.
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As part of the process of re-engineering the Public Service, the question of some kind of scrutiny of
service commissions may be required if their performance is to move the public service forward.
The ethos of the service commissions in the Commonwealth Caribbean is one in which their
independence is designed to protect the public servants from the politicians.
The challenge here is to determine how well the service commissions have worked. The tradition
has been to treat service commissions as the “sacred cows” of the Constitution and to place them
above the level of scrutiny. However, as bodies charged with making strategic decisions about
public bureaucracies, there have been questions asked about their efficiency. Scrutiny would be
designed to probe their efficiency and effectiveness as opposed to their independence.
The Commission was persuaded by this latter view and therefore supported the submission calling
for the creation of a Parliamentary Committee to oversee the administration of service
commissions. In the Commission’s view, it is important that the Parliamentary Committee’s role be
restricted to the proper and efficient functioning of the service commissions but not scrutiny of its
decisions. Some Commissioners nevertheless expressed their concern that this would compromise
the independence of the service commissions by exposing them to the risk of political interference.
Recommendations
With respect to scrutiny of Service Commissions, the Commission recommends the following:
(114) Service Commissions should be required to submit annual reports to Parliament.
(115) Service Commissions should be subject to scrutiny by a Parliamentary Committee as to
their administrative and management functions with a view to examining their efficiency
and use of resources allocated.
The Director of Audit
The Commission reviewed the section in the Constitution relating to the Director of Audit. The
Commission felt that the powers of the Director of Audit were clearly spelt out under Section 90.
Notwithstanding that, the Commission felt that this office should be strengthened in relation to
existing duties and responsibilities. Additionally, in the Commission’s view, the Director of Audit
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should be answerable to Parliament. This would introduce a measure of accountability that would
contribute to the overall thrust by the Commission to re-engineer the public service through the use
of parliamentary scrutiny as a new device to promote greater efficiency and delivery of service.
One submission was that there should be a title change from Director of Audit to Auditor General.
The Commission was referred to other jurisdictions where such a change had been effected. The
argument advanced is that there is a perception that the office of Director of Audit was a
department of a broader office not realising that it had overriding jurisdiction over all Government
offices. A further argument was that many departments were headed by a Director and the
perception was that the Director of Audit was just another such Director and not seen as a senior
constitutional position, which it is. The Commission felt that the arguments advanced for a name
change were sufficiently compelling.
Recommendations
With respect to the Director of Audit, the Commission recommends the following:
(116) The Constitution should make it clear that the Director of Audit is answerable to
Parliament.
(117) A name change from Director of Audit to Auditor General and the new office should be
strengthened accordingly.
The Director of Public Prosecutions
The Commission considered the provisions of Section 72(3) of the Constitution that permits the
Attorney General (if the person holding the office is a public officer) to also hold the office of
Director of Public Prosecutions. Commissioners felt that it was important to make a separation
between the functions of the Attorney General and those of the Director of Public Prosecutions in
order to remove the taint of the political directorate upon prosecutions being handled by the State.
There was a submission that the provision which requires that the Judicial and Legal Services
Commission to consult with the Prime Minister in the appointment of a Director of Public
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Prosecutions
67
should be removed.
Commissioners did not support that submission because it was felt that consultation with the Head
of Government on such an important appointment was reasonable. However, the Commission was
of the view that the Minority Leader should also be consulted.
Recommendations
With respect to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commission recommends the following:
(118) The person holding the office of Director of Public Prosecutions should no longer be
permitted to hold the office of Attorney General simultaneously under any circumstances.
(119) Both the Prime Minister and the Minority Leader should be consulted in the appointment of
the Director of Public Prosecutions.
67
The Saint Lucia Constitution Order 1978, Section (89) (1, 2, 3)
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CHAPTER EIGHT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Pre 1946
Local Government was introduced in Saint Lucia by an Ordinance No. 6 of 1850 entitled “The
Mayor and Town of Castries”. Although the short title was specific to the town of Castries,
provisions were also made for the town of Soufriere and the other rural districts to incorporate their
own Local Government councils.
The procedure for the incorporation of any town or district council was the submission of a petition
to the Lieutenant- Governor signed by two thirds of the male inhabitants of full age who were
owners of three acres of real or free hold property, or lessees of six acres of land, or was in
possession of real or personal property with a clear value of £300, in the town or rural district.
The first petition requesting the incorporation of a Local Government Council consisted of one
hundred and twenty- six (126) names of the burgesses of Castries and it was published in the
Gazette of January 2, 1851. By a Proclamation dated February 18, 1851 the Lieutenant- Governor
announced that elections will be held on February 27, 1851 and that the elections will be
conducted by a “Barrister, Attorney or Notary as the Lieutenant- Governor may appoint for that
purpose”. Elections were for nine (9) Councillors and two (2) Auditors. There were no provisions,
however, which prevented Government officials, or employees of the Crown from being elected,
but clergymen were not allowed to run for any of these offices.
Elections were held every three (3) years until 1872 when an Ordinance entitled “Castries Town
Board” was passed by the Legislative Council at the instance of, and proclaimed by, the
Administrator G. William Des Voeux on May 4 of that year. This Ordinance disbanded the elected
council and replaced it with a Castries Town Board of three (3) members nominated by the
Administrator who also served as Chairman.
Elected Local Government was reintroduced by an amended Castries Town Board Ordinance of
1889, which provided for the town of Castries to be governed, by a Corporate Body with perpetual
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succession and a Common Seal. The number of councillors was reduced to eight (8) and the first
election under this Ordinance was held in December 1889.
Post 1946 to Present
After a period of suspension, local government was reintroduced in Saint Lucia with the passage of
the Local Authorities Ordinance of 1947. For much of the period between the 1950s to the late
1970s, Local Government operated at the very heart of community life, offering a range of services.
In 1979, Local Government elections were again suspended and Interim Councils comprising
nominated members were appointed to conduct the affairs of Towns and Village Councils.
In 1997, a Local Government Reform Task Force was established by Central Government, to,
among other roles, “examine and advise on the appropriate legislative, fiscal, institutional and
administrative measures required to strengthen the operations of Local Government.”
68
A Green Paper was published by the said Task Force as a Discussion Draft, after much
consultations and discussions at a series of consultative meetings. Unfortunately, this document
was not circulated for review, nor put up for any further discussion or public consultation.
However, this Commission noted some salient recommendations of the Task Force, which the
Commission felt were worthy of consideration in making recommendations for the entrenchment of
Local Government in the Constitution. In particular two issues were highlighted by the Commission,
namely:
(i) roles and functions of a Local Government Authority; and
(ii) a new structure for Local Government.
One of the goals of Local Government is that it should be established at the heart of communities,
providing a broad range of services. Further, Local Government should have the power to provide
any service they consider necessary that will redound to the benefits of the people that they serve,
in addition to those other functions and services that are assigned exclusively to Central
Government.
68
Green Paper on Local Government (Discussion Draft) Undated.
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It is being recommended that a two-stage approach to service provision be adopted as follows:
(i) in the short term the focus should be on ‘Standard Services’, meaning those
services which are exclusive and local in nature which might more efficiently be
provided at a local level. For example: maintenance and repairs of roads,
cemeteries, squares, sporting facilities, parks, beaches and open spaces, public
buildings; granting of permits and licenses, operation of libraries etcetera; and
(ii) Long Term Services – the focus might be on those services which might be
provided at a later date as the Local Government Authority develops the requisite
capacity; including but not limited to, advisory to Central Government, provision of
housing for the poor, destitute and disabled, provision of primary health care,
management of pre-schools, land use planning, operation and maintenance of
select educational facilities such as libraries and schools.
Conduct of Elections
Prior to the suspension of Town and Village Councils, elections were conducted in accordance with
Regulations in the Local Authorities Ordinance of 1947. Each prospective candidate would apply
for nomination papers, which would be endorsed by signatures of six eligible voters and returned to
the Presiding Officer appointed for such election in the said community. On the prescribed Election
Day, eligible voters of the said community would cast their votes accordingly for the number of
members required since the term of office of all members would not expire at the same time. There
would be on the Council, three nominated members appointed by Central Government to represent
their views and seven elected members. The Council would comprise ten members of which one
elected member would be the Chairperson and one of the three nominated members would be
elected as the Deputy Chairperson. The Chair and his Deputy would be elected by the entire
Council at the first sitting of the Council.
The Commission noted that at the public community consultations conducted by the Task Force of
Local Government Reform, the feedback clearly indicated that persons did not wish to see
elections contested on the basis of party politics. The view was that party politics was divisive and
would not encourage the growth of “community spirit and action”, which it is believed to be the
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bedrock of Local Government. The Commission endorses this view of the Task Force as this
assertion is consistent with the findings of the Commission during its community outreach activities.
The Commission is mindful of the importance of keeping the election process simple, so as to
increase the potential for effective participation. However, it would be unfair to exclude the views of
the Parliamentary Representative from the discussions of the Local Government Authority when
deciding on improvement and developmental plans of the community.
Role of Parliamentary Representatives
.
The role of the Parliamentary Representative in Local Government is of paramount importance.
The Parliamentary Representative, as the name implies, represents all the people in his/her
constituency in Parliament regardless of their party affiliation. Following the recommendation of the
Commission that Parliamentary Representatives should no longer be Ministers of Government, the
primary function of the Parliamentary Representative would be the welfare of his/her constituents in
conjunction with the Local Government Authority. Besides nominating persons for membership in
the Local Government, the Parliamentary Representative should be a liaison between the local
authority, Central Government and in particular the Ministry or ministries responsible for Local
Government and community development.
There must be a link between the Parliamentary Representative and the Local Government at all
times. These two parties must treat each other with mutual respect. Local Government will function
effectively if appropriate communication linkages are established between the Parliamentary
Representative, the Local Government and the Ministry responsible for Local Government. The
relationship should be a collaborative and consultative one. To cultivate this, it is imperative that a
programme of education and awareness be planned to sensitise both the Parliamentary
Representative and the Local Government in team building and conflict resolution.
In seeking to re-engineer the public services of Saint Lucia, the emphasis has to be placed upon
delivery of goods and services to the population. The most effective manner in which to accomplish
this will be to re-introduce the system of elected Local Government on such a basis that the
implementation of Government policy can reach all corners of Saint Lucia.
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Since its suspension in 1979, there have not been any Local Government elections and the
Commission would like this to be the first step towards a renaissance movement to carry
Government to the very basic levels of society.
There is no other way that the citizens of Saint Lucia will enjoy the benefits of public policy
decisions on an equal basis unless the State is prepared to employ a philosophy of
decentralisation in which the Local Government network can serve as the vehicle of delivery.
The ravages of Hurricane Tomàs in October 2010 only served to highlight the need for
fundamental reform of the public services and their ability to reach all communities. As Saint Lucia
rises out of the trauma of that event, the lessons to be learnt may now be squarely addressed in
reforming the Local Government system as part of the overall exercise of re-engineering public
service delivery.
The Commission recognised that Local Government was too important an issue to be left to
ordinary legislation. Therefore, in seeking to make improvements, the Commission recommends
that Local Government be entrenched within the Constitution so that it receives the appropriate
protection and permanence that it deserves.
The Commission recommends that there should be a place for Community Based Organizations
(CBOs) in the new arrangements for Local Government on a non-partisan basis.
The Commission agrees that Local Government is an important step forward in making systemic
change. To that end, it recommends the adoption of a system of nominated and elected members
with the elected representatives constituting the majority.
In its examination of the issue of Local Government, the Commission reviewed the aforementioned
Green Paper on Local Government. The Commission noted that this document contained many
good recommendations which could serve as a basis for the reintroduction of an effective system
of Local Government.
Among the objectives outlined in Statutory Instrument No. 50, 2004, the Commission was
mandated “to promote better governance and greater equity in the constitutional framework
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generally”. There could be no better way to accomplish this objective than to restart the Local
Government system on an ideally non-partisan basis.
Recommendations
With respect to Local Government, the Commission recommends the following:
(120) The system of elected Local Government in Saint Lucia should be re-established.
(121) The Constitution should make provision for Local Government to be entrenched.
(122) Community Based Organisations (CBOs) should be an essential component of Local
Government.
(123) Local Government bodies should comprise both elected and nominated representatives
with the majority being elected.
(124) Local Government should be instituted as a means of facilitating more efficient delivery of
goods and services by the State to all communities.
(125) Local Government authorities should comprise the following:
Two (2) members nominated by the Parliamentary Representative
Two (2) members nominated by CBO’s
Six (6) members elected in Local Government elections
(126) Public Officers, whose functions do not involve the formulation and direct implementation
of Government policies, should be allowed to stand for election to Local Government.
(127) There should be a formal link between the Parliamentary Representative and the Local
Government Authority.
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CHAPTER NINE
STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OF SCRUTINY AND
OVERSIGHT
The Report of the Marlborough House Conference in 1978 reveals the following discussion under
the headings “Parliamentary Commissioner”, “Integrity Commission” and “Salaries Review
Commission” from paragraphs 30 to 32 :
“Parliamentary Commissioner - 30. Provision should be included in the constitution
for such an office on the lines of Chapter VIII of the Dominica Independence
Constitution.”
“Integrity Commission – 31. Provision should be included in the constitution for an
Integrity Commission, similar to that of Trinidad.”
“Salaries Review Commission – 32. An Opposition proposal to provide in the
constitution for a Salaries Commission as in the Trinidad constitution was not
agreed.”
69
These three proposals came from the Opposition delegation to the Conference, but only two of the
three were agreed. The declassified summary on what was agreed for the Parliamentary
Commissioner and the Integrity Commission reveals as follows :
“10. Parliamentary Commissioner – At the suggestion of the Opposition delegation
at the constitutional conference provision has been made in the new constitution
for a Parliamentary Commissioner to investigate complaints of maladministration
along the lines of the Parliamentary Commissioner in the United Kingdom.
69
Report of the Marlborough House Conference(1978/Cmnd. 7328, p. 7).
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11. Integrity Commission – At the suggestion of the Opposition delegation at the
constitutional conference provision has been made in the new constitution for an
Integrity Commission. Its functions are to receive declarations as to the financial
interests of Senators, Representatives and certain officials.”
70
In 1978 it would have been considered progressive to advance such institutions of scrutiny as the
discipline of public administration and the study of the administrative sciences were moving in the
direction of transparency, scrutiny and monitoring of the personal performance and wealth of
individuals in public life.
The fact that the proposals made by the Opposition delegation to the Conference were all to be
borrowed from elsewhere is testimony to the fact that no attempt was made to reinvent the wheel.
The reality is that many constitutional proposals are transportable anywhere and they can be
adjusted to suit local realities. And so it was with the Parliamentary Commissioner and the Integrity
Commission in Saint Lucia.
The intention of both the Parliamentary Commissioner and the Integrity Commission are clearly
stated in the declassified summary above. However, the Commission did have some views on how
to strengthen them.
One of the shortcomings of the Westminster-style model in the Commonwealth Caribbean has
been the slow development of a culture of scrutiny of public officials by dedicated institutions that
are expected to play an enquiring role in the affairs of State. This has tended to be exacerbated in
small states where the concentration of power in majoritarian democracies has only been undone
by the will of the electorate or internal political struggles between persons who belong to the same
political parties and who are seeking power for themselves.
The creation of a culture of scrutiny can only come through a fundamental systemic alteration that
will not undermine the ability to govern, but will curb the excesses of the zero sum game (winner
takes all) that emerges after victory in a general election. The perception of the State as an agent
of victimisation against persons of a different political persuasion has to be tempered against the
70
U.K. National Archives, FCO 44/1910, Folio 419, Annex A, St. Lucia Constitution.
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need for a new Government to exercise its right to dispense political patronage. At the same time
this ought to be accomplished without doing injury to the ability of the State to function effectively,
as well as not jeopardising the contribution of persons of unquestioned talent already holding
certain positions.
The Parliamentary Commissioner
The Commission examined the provisions relating to Parliamentary Commissioner. It regarded the
position as an important institution of scrutiny and oversight. It noted that notwithstanding the
provisions there was a general perception that the office was ineffective and required
strengthening.
The Commission received the following submissions relating to the Parliamentary Commissioner:
Reports made by the Parliamentary Commissioner should be released
verbatim to the public once they have been laid in the Parliament, except in
cases such as in the interest of national security, because these reports are
the people’s business and the people have a right to know.
The Parliamentary Commissioner’s Annual Reports should be released to the
public after review by Parliament.
The Parliamentary Commissioner should be retained, but the process, when it
comes to investigating certain matters, is in need of change because the
existing system is ineffective.
The Parliamentary Commissioner’s main budget to be approved by an
independent board as a local grant.
In the Commission’s view, there is need for the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner to be
strengthened since Commissioners felt that the Office was not taken seriously enough by
Parliament and the general public. The Commission noted the lack of any specific action taken on
the reports of Parliamentary Commissioners and the general lack of awareness of the Office and
its functions by the public. Commissioners supported in principle the submission that the
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Parliamentary Commissioner’s reports should be released verbatim to the public, except in those
cases such as in the interest of national security.
While the Commission was unclear as to how a local grant would be administered within the
context of the Finance Laws and Regulations,
71
the Commission was of the view that the office of
the Parliamentary Commissioner was in need of greater financial independence. Therefore,
adequate provisions should be made to guarantee the financial independence and to promote
greater efficiency of the office.
The introduction of a hybrid system whereby parliamentarians will be expected to perform as full-
time legislators will create the environment for a functioning committee system. In these
circumstances a forum will be available for detailed examination of the reports submitted by the
Parliamentary Commissioner. A properly functioning committee system in Parliament can be an
effective watchdog for the public and, in the process, strengthen this institution of scrutiny over the
public service.
Commissioners felt that if every report produced by the Parliamentary Commissioner could get
devoted committee time in Parliament, then the problems encountered by average citizens in their
daily lives as reported by the Parliamentary Commissioner would get attention. The Commission
believes that this would make a difference to people who feel that their issues matter to somebody
and that real action to redress maladministration will be taken. Currently, the Parliamentary
Commissioner has to rely on moral suasion to a large extent to get redress for many aggrieved
persons. The institutionalisation of parliamentary committee hearings on these reports will change
this dynamic. After all, the Parliamentary Commissioner and the Deputy Parliamentary
Commissioner are officers of Parliament and the use of committees to facilitate and highlight their
work will make their offices more efficient and effective.
During the Commission’s discussions on the Parliamentary Commissioner, the Commission
considered and compared the Ombudsman Act of Belize 2000
72
and the Parliamentary
71
Finance (Administration) Act. Cap 15.01 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia
72
Ombudsman Act, Chapter 5, of the revised laws of Belize 2001.
Report – March 2011
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Commission Act of Saint Lucia 1982
73
along with an article titled “Essential Characteristics of a
Classical Ombudsman by Dean M. Gottehrer and Michael Hostina.
74
It was noted by the Commission that the Belize Act was developed along the guidelines advocated
by Gottehrer and Hostina. This act is comprehensive and written in clear and simple language. The
Commission suggested that these documents should be reviewed as a source to assist in making
amendments to the Parliamentary Commission Act 1982.
Consideration was given to a number of sections of the Belize Act, in particular, Section 16 which
speaks to the extent of exercise of powers; Section 17, the procedure in respect of investigation;
Section 18 evidence; Section 20, power to enter premises and retain documents; Section 21,
procedure after investigation; Section 22, disciplinary action against officers and procedure for
criminal offences; Section 26, performance of functions of Ombudsman by members of his staff;
Section 27, funding and accounts; Section 34, power of Ombudsman in relation to Contractor-
General; and Section 35, regulations.
Recommendations
With respect to the Parliamentary Commissioner, the Commission recommends the following:
(128) Adequate provisions should be made to guarantee the financial independence and
efficiency of the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner.
(129) A Select Committee should be appointed by the House of Assembly to deal with reports
tabled in Parliament on behalf of the Parliamentary Commissioner and that this
Committee, among other things, should ensure that the Parliamentary Commissioner’s
recommendations are implemented.
(130) Reports made by the Parliamentary Commissioner should be released verbatim to the
public once they have been laid in the Parliament, except in cases where such disclosure
73
Parliamentary Commissioner Act Cap 1.13 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia.2008
74
Dean M. Gottehrer and Michael Hostin
a.
Essential Characteristics of a Classical Ombudsman
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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would not be in the interest of national security, because these reports are the people’s
business and the people have a right to know.
(131) The Ombudsman Act of Belize 2000 should be reviewed as a source to assist in making
amendments to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act of 1982.
Integrity Commission
.
The matter of proper standards in public life by politicians and public officers in Saint Lucia has
been the subject of comment at political meetings, at private parties, debates in Parliament, on
radio and television talk shows and in calypsos. It has also been the subject of comment in the
course of Commissions of Inquiry and judicial pronouncements. Indeed, it was a concern raised at
several of the outreach sessions convened by this Commission. All this implies that the issue of
good governance and the elimination of corruption in public life should be given adequate attention
in constitutional reform.
The Commission notes that, with the enactment of integrity legislation, provisions have been put in
place to ensure checks on the assets and liabilities of politicians, senior public servants and
persons managing statutory corporations.
In that regard the Integrity in Public Life Act,
75
calls for the appointment of an independent
Commission, the functions of which are to:
(a) “receive, examine and retain all declarations filed with it under this Act;
(b) make such enquiries as it considers necessary in order to verify or determine the
accuracy of the declaration filed under this Act;
(c) receive and investigate complaints regarding non-compliance with or breach of
this Act; and
(d) perform such other functions it is required by this Act to perform.”
75
No.6 of 2004, in force 1 January 2006 (S.I.169/2005)
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Parliament has determined that the Integrity Commission shall be an independent statutory
authority in the exercise of its functions. Under the Act, the Commission is not subject to the control
or direction of any person or authority. This provision, in its terms, vests the Integrity Commission
with the similar autonomy as is afforded independent authorities under the Constitution. These
include the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director of Audit and the constitutionally mandated
Commissions. Once appointed, members of the Integrity Commission have security of tenure for
three years and can only be removed from office by the Governor General for inability to discharge
the functions of their offices or for misbehaviour and only on the recommendation of an
independent high level tribunal, after proper inquiry. However, this does not mean that the
Commission can do whatever it likes as it is subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts.
By being in receipt of public moneys from the Consolidated Fund under Section 39 of the Act, the
management of the funds of the Integrity Commission falls within the ambit of the Finance
(Administration) Act and related regulations. The accounts of the Commission are to be audited by
the Director of Audit, and the Commission is required to submit an annual report of its activities for
tabling in the House of Assembly.
The Integrity Commission is appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime
Minister who shall consult with the Leader of the Opposition before providing this advice. The
Integrity Commission shall have at least a chairperson and not less than two nor more than four
other members, of which one must be a chartered or certified accountant and one must be an
attorney-at-law. The members, by reason of their expertise, are expected to be capable of
collectively assessing submissions to ensure their accuracy and compliance with the provisions of
the Act.
The Act includes provisions for behaviour defined as “corruption”. According to the Act, a person in
public life commits an act of corruption if:
(a) “he or she solicits or accepts, whether directly or indirectly, any article or money or
other benefit, being a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or
another person for doing any act or omitting to do any act in the performance of
his or her official functions or causing any other person to do so or omit to do
anything;
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(b) he or she in the performance of his or her public functions does any act or omits to
do any act for the purpose of obtaining any illicit benefit for himself or herself or
any other person;
(c) he or she fraudulently uses or conceals any property or other benefit derived from
any such act or omission to act under paragraph (a) or (b);
(d) he or she offers or grants, directly or indirectly, to a public servant any article,
money or other benefit being a gift, favour, promise or advantage to the public
servant or another person, for doing any act or omitting to do any act in the
performance of the public servant’s public functions;”
There are several other provisions in the Act which speak to the issue of corruption. These include
improper use of Government property for the benefit of an individual and the use of official
influence to support any scheme or contract in which the individual has an interest. The penalties
are severe and, in extreme cases, individuals can be fined and confined.
It must be noted that the Act is not aimed solely at politicians. The provisions which define
corruption are also aimed at citizens, companies and others who attempt to bribe decision makers
in Government to obtain decisions in their favour.
As with many other laws in this country, the success of implementation and enforcement relies on
the active participation of members of the public. Accordingly, the Act allows members of the public
to report acts of corruption.
In recent times, the Integrity Commission has had to report several instances of non-compliance by
parliamentarians, Government Ministers, senior public servants and heads of public corporations
and statutory boards. As currently exists, the Integrity Commission can only report breaches to the
Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney General for further action. The Commission regards
this as unsatisfactory and is of the view that the Integrity Commission needs to be empowered to
deal with defaulters more directly.
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According to a former Chair of the Integrity Commission,
“Increasingly fewer and fewer people comply as delinquents are not prosecuted as
provided by the law. In ten years not one person has been called to account. There is an
urgent need for enforcement as well as strengthening the law in this regard. Further,
persons whether from within the Public Service or otherwise before being appointed to a
post that would make them a Person in Public Life, should be informed by the PSC or the
relevant ministry, of their obligation to file a declaration in accordance with the Act on behalf
of themselves and their spouse.
At the moment, there is a contemptuous disregard for the Integrity in Public Life Act and by
extension the Commission; this should be addressed as a matter of urgency. He also
thought that the dragnet of the Commission should be wider.”
76
The Parliament of Saint Lucia, by enacting integrity legislation, deemed it necessary to subject a
class of persons
77
to a special regime of disclosure of their financial affairs. This was done for the
express purpose of establishing probity, integrity and accountability in public life in Saint Lucia.
Hence, under the Act, they are required to disclose their income, how much they owe and to
whom, their investments if any, their properties and even the life insurances that they carry.
The Commission recognises the important role of the Integrity Commission and considered some
other key positions deserving of such scrutiny. Additionally, the Commission is of the view that
defaulters should face sanctions for non-compliance.
76
Evelyn, Randolph. In Saint Lucia Constitutional Reform Commission. Report on Meetings with Constitutionally
Established Functionaries/Bodies. Castries Saint Lucia, 11 – 15 May, 2009 pp 60-61
77
These persons in public life, within the meaning of the relevant Act are: Members of the Senate and of the House of
Assembly; Ministers of Governments; Parliamentary Secretaries; Chief Technical Officers in Government Ministries
and Heads of Department; Speaker of the House of Assembly; President of the Senate; Secretary to the Cabinet;
Attorney-General; Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Permanent Secretaries; Parliamentary Commissioner; Heads of
Diplomatic Missions of Saint Lucia accredited to any country or any international organisation; Commissioner of Police,
Superintendent of Prisons, Chief Fire Officer and their Deputies; Managing Directors and Managers of banks in which
the State has a controlling interest; Chairperson, Managing Director, General Manager, Chief Executive Officer and
departmental head of a public corporation, company or public institution in which the State has a controlling interest;
Director of Audit; and Director of Public Prosecutions.
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The Commission received a submission that the Prime Minister should not be the only person
involved in the appointment of the Integrity Commission. The Minority Leader should also be
involved. The President should consult both the Prime Minister and Minority Leader before making
appointments to the Integrity Commission.
Commissioners were concerned with non-compliance with the provisions of the Integrity in Public
Life Act. Therefore, the Commission strongly suggests that such non-compliance should be met
with sanctions for the offending parties. Further, the Commission also agreed that all members of
Parliament and the Cabinet should make a declaration to the Commission within 30 days of
assuming office.
The list of persons in public life who ought to be required to make declarations to the Commission
should be expanded to include the Chief Engineer as well as other key functionaries below the
rank of Comptroller of Customs and Excise, Comptroller of Inland Revenue and the proposed
Contractor-General.
The list of public bodies falling within the purview of the Act should be extended to include any
company or corporate body, in which the Government or an agency of Government holds fifty-one
per cent or more of the shares.
Recommendations
With respect to the Integrity Commission, the Commission recommends the following:
(132) The President should consult both the Prime Minister and the Minority Leader before
making appointments.
(133) Non-compliance with the provisions of the Integrity in Public Life Act should be met with
sanctions for the offending parties.
(134) All members of Parliament and the Cabinet should make a declaration to the Commission
within thirty (30) days of assuming office.
(135) The list of persons in public life who ought to be required to make declarations to the
Integrity Commission should be expanded to include the proposed Contractor-General,
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Chief Engineer as well as certain other functionaries below the rank of Comptroller of
Customs and Excise and Comptroller of Inland Revenue.
(136) The list of public bodies falling within the purview of the Integrity in Public Life Act should
be extended to include any company, in which the Government or an agency of
Government holds fifty-one per centum or more shares.
The Public Accounts Committee
Public Accounts Committees are one of the instruments that Parliaments can use to check
Governments’ activities. They can be institutionalised by:
a country’s Constitution as in Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago;
Standing Order of the Legislature as in Jamaica, Guyana and Saint Lucia; or
an Act of Parliament as in Australia and the United Kingdom.
In Saint Lucia, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is a bipartisan select committee of Members
of Parliament established by Standing Order 67 of the Standing Orders of the House of Assembly.
The PAC, has the duty to examine:-
the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by the Legislature
to meet public expenditure;
such other accounts as may be referred to the PAC by the House or under
any law; and
the report of the Director of Audit on any such accounts.
Hence as a select committee of Parliament, the PAC is a mechanism for overseeing Government
revenue and expenditure to ensure that they are effective and honest and to ensure transparency
and accountability in the financial operations of Government.
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The Leader of the Opposition serves as the Chairman of the PAC which consists of five members
- three Government and two Opposition representatives. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst propose that
the fact that the chairmanship of the PAC is given to the Opposition performs two basic functions.
Firstly, it re-equilibrates the balance of power between the Government and the Opposition, and
secondly, it performs a symbolic function in that it indicates the willingness of both the majority and
the minority to operate, within the PAC, “in a perfectly bipartisan manner”.
78
The PAC is empowered to hold hearings on the contents of the report of the Director of Audit, and
call before it public servants from the audited organisation and the staff of the Audit Office. After
the hearings, the Committee reports to the House of Assembly, commenting on the Audit findings
and recommending possible action to eliminate any problems identified by the Director of Audit.
Parliament is therefore able to call to account those who are entrusted with the physical, human
and financial resources provided by taxpayers. The work of the PAC, therefore, completes the
cycle of accountability. It is then up to Government to respond to the Committee’s
recommendations.
In a submission made to the Commission, it was indicated that the Committee rarely ever met, as
some members were frustrating the convening of meetings by ensuring that a quorum could not be
obtained. In addition, the report of the Director of Audit, for various reasons, was not always
available in a timely manner to facilitate such meetings.
The Commission considers the PAC vital to the process of good governance and is of the view that
the membership of the Committee and quorum requirements need to be reviewed. Additionally, the
powers of the Committee need to be augmented in an attempt to make it more effective and to
curtail any deliberate attempts to hinder its work. The Commission has therefore made appropriate
recommendations in that regard.
78
Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, Public Accounts Committees, SMU Social Sciences& Humanities, Working Paper Series
2006, Paper No.01-2006, Singapore Management University.
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The Commission felt that it was necessary to enact constitutional provisions mandating the
entrenchment of the PAC. These provisions would give the Committee a status beyond what it
currently has under the Standing Orders of Parliament.
The Commission identified a number of issues hindering the proper functioning of the PAC:
The PAC cannot meet if the accounts of Government Ministries, Departments and
Agencies are not tabled.
The membership is too small.
Not all of the members of the Committee have the requisite skills for the task.
Therefore, the Commission proposes a broadening of the membership to include persons with the
necessary accounting and investigatory skills and these may be drawn from outside of Parliament
as special advisors to the Committee.
The PAC should be established as a joint select committee of Parliament consisting of ten
members with four drawn from the Senate, two (2) being nominated by the Minority and two (2)
nominated by the Government; and four (4) drawn from the House of Assembly, two (2) being
nominated by the Government and two (2) nominated by the Minority; an independent member
appointed by the President who shall be a forensic accountant and the Minority Leader who shall
be the chair. The Commission took into account the possibility of there being no elected member of
the Opposition and in such a case, the Commission felt that the President acting in his/her own
deliberate judgment, should be empowered to appoint representatives from the extra-parliamentary
wing of the minority party (party coming second) to fill such posts. With the new hybrid
arrangements for Parliament, there will be no Ministers eligible to sit on the PAC. The PAC should
be convened at the second sitting of the House of Assembly.
At any meeting of the PAC the quorum shall be three members. It is expected that this would
address the issue of infrequent meetings due to lack of a quorum.
The PAC should have the power to request an independent audit of an entity and should have the
powers of investigating the finances of such entity whether or not an audit report has been
submitted. This should allow for greater efficiency and make delinquency a thing of the past.
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Further, the Commission is of the view that where it is found that there has been undue delay in the
preparation and submission of the report, or where it is found that there is a matter to be dealt with
in an expeditious manner, the PAC should be empowered to obtain the services of a private
independent auditor.
The Commission believes that adequate provisions should be made for an automatic resolution by
Parliament for the approval of expenditure incurred by the PAC, should the services of a private
independent auditor be required. Further, there must be the provision that Parliament makes its
secretariat resources available for use by the PAC.
Recommendations
With respect to the Public Accounts Committee, the Commission recommends the following:
(137) It should be entrenched in the Constitution.
(138) Membership should be broadened to include an individual with the necessary accounting
and investigatory skills and that person must be drawn from outside Parliament.
(139) Disciplinary action should be instituted against persons or entities for failing to submit
timely reports, documents and information or otherwise fail to cooperate with the
Committee.
(140) It should be established as a joint select committee of Parliament consisting of ten
members with four drawn from the Senate, two (2) being nominated by the Minority and
two (2) nominated by the Government; four (4) drawn from the House of Assembly, two
(2) being nominated by the Government and two (2) nominated by the Minority; an
independent member appointed by the President, who shall be a forensic accountant and
the Minority Leader who shall be the chairperson.
(141) The independent appointee with accounting skills will serve as a non-voting member.
(142) The first meeting must be convened before the second sitting of the House of Assembly.
(143) The quorum shall be three (3) members.
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(144) It should have the power to request an independent audit of an entity and should have the
powers of investigating the finances of that entity whether or not an audit report has been
submitted.
(145) It should be empowered to obtain the services of a private independent auditor to carry
out an audit in cases where it is found that there has been undue delay in the preparation
and submission of the report, or where it is found that there is a matter to be dealt with in
an expeditious manner.
(146) Adequate provisions should be made for an automatic resolution by Parliament for the
approval of expenditure incurred by the Committee should the services of a private
independent auditor be utilised.
(147) Parliament must make its secretariat resources available for use by the Committee.
A Contractor-General for Saint Lucia
Against the backdrop of increased public discussion and concern about public procurement of
goods and services, the Commission considered the position of Contractor-General in other
jurisdictions with a view to possible adoption.
Further, the controversies that have erupted in many Commonwealth Caribbean countries over the
award of State contracts have led to calls for greater monitoring and scrutiny of the processes by
which awards are made as well as any subsequent variations to original awards of contracts.
The allocation and supervision of Government contracts is a critical area of State activity that must
be adequately scrutinised to ensure proper segregation of duties, transparency of process,
exposure of bid rigging, prevention of collusion and conspiracy to defraud the State, exposure of
insider informants and declaration of conflicts of interest.
The Commission considered the Jamaican Contractor-General Act 1999 and the Belize Contractor-
General Act 2000 on their respective Contractors-General and concluded that such an office
should be introduced into the Saint Lucia Constitution. Additionally, the Commission expressed a
preference for the adaptation of the Belize provisions.
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99
The Belize Act makes provisions for the establishment of the office of the Contractor-General,
appointment and removal of a Contractor-General, and spells out provisions to ensure the
independence of the office, among other things. According to the Act, the Contractor-General’s
functions are:
“(a) to monitor the award and the implementation of public contracts with a view to
ensuring that-
such contracts are awarded impartially and on merit;
the circumstances in which each contract is awarded or, as the case may be,
terminated, do not involve any impropriety or irregularity;
without prejudice to the functions of any public body in relation to any
contract, the implementation of each such contract conforms to the terms
thereof;
there is no fraud, corruption, mismanagement, waste or abuse in the
awarding of contracts by a public body;
(b) to investigate any such fraud, mismanagement, waste or abuse;
(c) to develop policy guidelines, evaluate programme performance and monitor
actions taken by a public body with respect to the award, execution and
termination of contracts; and
(d) to monitor the grant, issue, suspension or revocation of any prescribed licence,
with a view to ensuring that the circumstances of such grant, issue, suspension or
revocation do not involve impropriety or irregularity and, where appropriate, to
examine whether such licence is used in accordance with the terms and conditions
thereof.”
The public bodies that should come under the purview of the Contractor-General include:
a Ministry, Department or Agency of Government;
Local Government Authorities;
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a Statutory Body or Authority; or
any company in which the Government or an agency of Government holds fifty-
one per centum or more of the shares.
The reports by the Contractor-General would also inform the work of the parliamentary committees
contemplated under the new hybrid system for Parliament that has been proposed by the
Commission.
Recommendations
With respect to the Contractor-General, the Commission recommends the following:
(148) The office of Contractor-General should be introduced into the Saint Lucian Constitution
based on an adaptation of the Belize Contractor-General Act 2000.
(149) The public bodies that should come under the purview of the Contractor-General include
but not limited to:
All Ministries, Departments and Agencies of Government;
Local Government Authorities;
Statutory Bodies and Authorities; or
any company in which the Government or an agency of Government holds fifty-
one per centum or more of the shares.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE JUDICIARY
In the aftermath of the Marlborough House Conference in 1978, the declassified summary on what
was agreed for the Judicial Provisions reveals as follows:
“9. Judicial Provisions – Like the other former Associated States which have
become independent, St. Lucia will retain its connection with the West Indies
Associated States Supreme Court. In St. Lucia the court will be known as the
Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. The Court consists of a Court of Appeal and a
High Court. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council remains the final court of
appeal.”
79
These arrangements have remained in place since independence.
As directed by the Statutory Instrument (S.I). that established it, the Commission inquired into
potential reforms aimed at “maintaining and strengthening the independence of the Judiciary at all
levels.”
80
The Commission considered the various Constitutional provisions relating to the
Judiciary. It took note of Section 91 of the Constitution which governed the appointment of
Magistrates and Legal Officers of the State. It reviewed the provisions relating to the High Court
and Court of Appeal of Saint Lucia, and of the provisions specially preserving appeals to the Privy
Council as Saint Lucia’s final court of appeal,
81
among others. The Commission also considered
and reviewed the Supreme Court Order,
82
which established the Eastern Caribbean Supreme
Court, of which Saint Lucia is a part.
Based on an examination of these provisions, and of the Constitution as a whole, the Commission
took note of the special position of the Judiciary as the third arm of government. It noted, for
example, that the various rules governing the appointment and discipline of judges, as well as the
79
U.K. National Archives, FCO 44/1910, Folio 419, Annex A, St. Lucia Constitution.
80
S.I. No. 50, 2004.
81
Sections 105 – 109 of the Constitution.
82
The ECSC was established in 1967 by the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order No. 223 of 1967.
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structure of the Court, were all aimed at creating an independent institution, capable of serving as a
bulwark against the erosion of rights enjoyed by citizens. The Commission was especially
cognisant of a number of decisions by the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, which pronounced
upon Executive action in Saint Lucia. It noted that in a number of instances, the Court was required
to and did issue decisions, which declared laws passed by Parliament unconstitutional, or
decisions taken by Cabinet, illegal. The Commission therefore recognised that the Judiciary played
a key role in serving as a check and balance against both governmental and parliamentary over-
reach, and that its role required it to be in occasional divergence with both institutions. It
acknowledged that by dint of this fact, the Judiciary occupied a special and privileged position in
the Constitutional framework.
The Commission considered the various issues surrounding potential reform of the Judiciary. It
determined that any reforms proposed should only strengthen and not weaken the special position
enjoyed by the Judiciary. In that regard, the Commission understood the direction contained in the
S.I. to require an examination of the Judiciary at three levels, namely; the Magistracy, the Eastern
Caribbean Supreme Court, and the Privy Council. It concluded that the issues related to each level
were distinct and required separate consideration.
The Magistracy
The Commission considered a number of submissions that suggested there was a crisis in the
Magistracy. It noted that persons commenting on the Magistracy emphasized the critical role
played by the Magistracy in dispensing justice in Saint Lucia. The Commission’s attention was
drawn to the fact that a very high percentage of all criminal cases were heard and dispensed with
in the Magistrates’ Courts, as well as a significant number of civil matters. For some persons,
corruption or incompetence in the Magistracy contributed significantly to the inefficiencies and
ineffectiveness of the existing criminal justice system.
In the view of those making the submissions, the problem with the Magistracy was located in our
Constitution. It was argued before the Commission that the fundamental problem was an issue of
accountability. The Commission’s attention was drawn to the fact that, while responsibility for
discipline and removal of Magistrates vested solely in the Judicial and Legal Services Commission,
(JLSC,) actual day to day management of the operations of Magistrates fell under the purview of
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the Minister of Justice. In other words, it was suggested that the Constitution was unclear as to
which authority was ultimately responsible for management of the lower Judiciary. It was also
argued that our Constitution did not sufficiently clarify the roles and functions of the lower Judiciary.
At the same time, it was noted that the public held the government responsible for the performance
or apparent lack thereof, of the Magistracy. It was also suggested that, by virtue of the itinerant
nature of the JLSC, and the lack of dedicated human and other resources to monitor performance,
that body was ill-equipped to assume the role of monitoring and managing the performance of
Magistrates in Saint Lucia.
Accordingly, the suggestion before the Commission was that the Constitution should be amended
to permit responsibility for management of the Magistracy to vest solely with the elected
government of the day and to permit the appropriate Minister of Justice to have authority to appoint
and discipline non-performing, ineffective, or corrupt Magistrates.
The Commission considered the submissions with respect to the Magistracy at length. It conceded
that there was a widespread perception that the Magistracy was in crisis. It acknowledged that
there was an apparent ambiguity in the operational accountability of the Magistracy and agreed
with the proposition that the Magistracy was critical to an effective criminal justice system and that
the vast majority of criminal matters came before and were dispensed with, in Magistrates’ courts.
It recognized a potential weakness in terms of how the JLSC was currently set up to manage the
lower Judiciary. It therefore agreed that the Magistracy was an area requiring urgent Constitutional
reform.
Notwithstanding, the Commission did not agree that the responsibility for appointment and
discipline of the Magistracy should rest solely with a Minister of Justice or Cabinet. The
Commission regarded this proposal as likely to undermine the effectiveness and independence of
the lower judiciary, rather than to strengthen it. It recalled the critical role played by the Judiciary in
protecting the rights of citizens. It considered the privileged position of the higher courts, and noted
the relative high effectiveness of judges at High Court and Court of Appeal levels. The Commission
regarded this effectiveness as a function of two major factors:- firstly the independence and
security of tenure afforded to judges at those levels, and secondly the adequacy of the financial
resources dedicated to the operations of those institutions.
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The Commission was concerned that, without the security of tenure of the “upper” judiciary, and
without the dedicated resources required to properly discharge their functions, Magistrates might
become a hostage of a corrupt government, seeking to influence criminal cases based on narrow,
political considerations. By handing responsibility for the Magistracy over to the Cabinet, the
Commission believed a door would be opened for a dangerous encroachment of the Executive into
the Judicial arena. Accordingly, rather than improving the effectiveness and accountability of the
Magistracy as some submissions contended, the Commission was fearful that political
considerations might influence the dispensation of justice in Magistrates’ courts, should the
Magistracy be removed from the control of the JLSC.
The Commission also considered regional trends and took notice of the regional discussions on the
Magistracy in the last few years. It noted that the general trend in the region in terms of potential
reform of the Magistracy, appeared to advocate the assumption of responsibility for the Magistracy
by the Chief Justice and the “upper” Judiciary. It noted that several regional academics and
statements by a number of regional governments, strongly advocated for the creation of a “regional
Magistracy,” drawn from across the sub-region, in order to help promote and increase its
effectiveness.
For that reason also, the removal of the Magistracy from the control of the JLSC, ran counter to
recent regional trends and developments in terms of the reform of the Magistracy. The Commission
therefore firmly rejected the submissions in this regard.
However, the Commission felt it was necessary to urge some reforms of the Magistracy, since it
regarded the status quo as unsatisfactory. Contrary to the suggestion by some who made
submissions before it, the Commission believed that further strengthening the capacity of the JLSC
to monitor and manage the day-to-day operations of the Magistracy, was the most appropriate
method of improving the quality of justice dispensed in the lower Courts. The Commission
regarded the problems with the Magistracy as essentially a management issue, and believed that
adequate allocation of resources, coupled with the creation of appropriate institutions within the
JLSC, should significantly strengthen the performance and accountability of the Magistracy in Saint
Lucia.
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Further, the Commission also believed that, in light of the need to strengthen the Magistracy and to
afford it the independence enjoyed by judges at High Court and Court of Appeal levels, it was
necessary to bring the Magistracy fully under the purview of the Chief Justice. In that regard, the
Commission was of the view that the Magistracy should be made a full part of the Judiciary, and
that the current constitutional arrangement, in which responsibility for management and supervision
of the Magistracy is shared between the JLSC and the Minister responsible for Justice, should be
terminated. In the Commission’s view, what was required to improve the quality of service
dispensed in the lower courts, was an elevation of the Magistracy, so that it could benefit from the
improved training, independence, mobility and remuneration of the “upper” Judiciary. In short, the
Commission determined that the privileges enjoyed by judges of the High Court and Court of
Appeal should be extended to the Magistracy in full.
The Commission was therefore convinced that, by firmly clarifying the responsibility for the
management and supervision of the Magistracy in the Constitution and by bringing the Magistracy
exclusively under the purview of the JLSC and Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, the concerns
expressed by citizens about the effectiveness and integrity of the Magistracy, would be reduced
over time.
Recommendations
With respect to the Magistracy, the Commission recommends the following:
(150) It should be brought fully under the control and management of the Judicial and Legal
Services Commission.
(151) An appropriate mechanism should be created within the Eastern Caribbean Supreme
Court and the JLSC to monitor and manage the day to day operations of the Magistracy in
Saint Lucia.
(152) There should be an elevation of the magistracy so that it could benefit from improved
training, independence, mobility and remuneration of the “upper” judiciary.
Report – March 2011
206
The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
The Commission considered the position of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. It noted that
the Court was a shared institution, of which Saint Lucia was only one part. It also noted that the
Court was constituted in common for the members of the OECS and that any recommendations for
reform of the Court may be hampered by or could have implications for, Saint Lucia’s membership
of the Court.
The Commission took notice of the manner of appointment of judges of the High Court and Court
of Appeal. It perused the Supreme Court Order which established the Court in Saint Lucia and
noted that judges of the Court enjoyed security of tenure and that the Court, as an institution,
enjoyed special protection in Saint Lucia’s Constitution.
83
The Commission was privileged to count among its membership, a retired former member of the
Court, in the person of our Chairperson, Madam Justice Suzie d’Auvergne, (retired,) and the
current President of Saint Lucia’s Bar Association, Mr. Andie George, as well as a number of
practicing attorneys in Saint Lucia. These members drew the Commission’s attention to a number
of occasions in the past on which the Court issued decisions against successive Saint Lucian
governments. The Commission noted that the Court issued similar decisions in a number of OECS
jurisdictions and that by and large, judges of the ECSC enjoyed a high degree of respect and
admiration among the general public, regional academics and other courts in the Caribbean. The
Commission took special note of the fact that a number of retired judges who served on the ECSC,
were called upon to provide additional judicial service in other countries in the region. The
Commission’s attention was also drawn to the fact that in a very high number of cases, decisions of
the Court of Appeal were expressly approved of by the London based Privy Council.
The Commission considered the position of the ECSC, and determined that the Court already
evidenced the high level of independence and integrity contemplated by the S.I. Consequently, the
Commission did not regard reform of the ECSC as necessary in the context of the review.
Moreover, the Commission believed that even if some recommendations for reform were
appropriate, which was in any event not the case; it would be imprudent to offer them, given the
regional nature of the Court.
83
See e.g. section 41 of the Constitution dealing with “alteration of the Constitution.”
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
207
Recommendation
(153) With respect to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, the Commission concludes that it
was not necessary or appropriate to make any recommendations for reform of the ECSC
in the context of the current review.
The Caribbean Court of Justice
In addition to the direction contained in the S.I. that the Commission should inquire into the means
of “maintaining and strengthening the independence of the Judiciary at all levels,” the Commission
also took note of the commands that it should “advise and make recommendations concerning the
appropriateness or otherwise of maintaining Saint Lucia’s links with the British Crown,” and “advise
and make recommendations concerning the patriation of the Constitution.”
84
In the Commission’s
view, the S.I. that established the Commission essentially directed it to consider the need to
complete Saint Lucia’s independence by breaking ties with the British Crown at various levels, and
this included Saint Lucia’s judicial ties to Britain.
In that regard, the Commission examined the judicial provisions contained in the Constitution and
in particular, considered the position of the London based Privy Council (PC) as Saint Lucia’s final
court of appeal. It noted that during the period since independence, there were two major
developments which were likely to impact upon the continued existence of the PC as Saint Lucia’s
court of last resort. One was the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) in April
2005 and the other was the establishment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in October 2009.
As regards the latter development, the judicial provisions that came into effect in the United
Kingdom in October 2009 were part of a suite of reforms that started in January 2004, with the
announcement of a Concordat between the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor. This
Concordat proved a precursor to the enactment of the United Kingdom Constitutional Reform Act
2005.
The effect of this Act was to make provision for the ultimate creation of a Ministry of Justice which
would be led by a Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor. It was the first time that the
84
Op. cit S.I.
Report – March 2011
208
office of Lord Chancellor would be held by someone who was not a member of the House of Lords.
The office was joined with the Secretary of State for Justice who became the Minister responsible
to Parliament for the Judiciary. Such a responsibility had previously been held by the Lord
Chancellor before these reforms which removed the right to preside over the House of Lords from
the Lord Chancellor. Next to go was the removal of the office’s ministerial responsibility for the
Judiciary with the creation of a Ministry of Justice.
The final act of dismantling the office of Lord Chancellor, which had a unique position in the British
Constitution of belonging to all three branches of government, came in October 2009 with the
establishment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court. This Court is led by the Lord Chief Justice
and all members of that court ceased to hold their previous positions as Law Lords.
However, the title “Lord Chancellor” still exists as there are many statutes that make reference to
this office. Insofar as the Lord Chancellor (who is also the Secretary of State for Justice) and the
Lord Chief Justice are concerned, both offices have a Concordat to govern their relations.
The significance of this development is arguably two-fold. In the first case, by undertaking these
reforms, the United Kingdom has actually moved closer to the direction of its former colonies in the
Commonwealth Caribbean, by establishing a Supreme Court in a similar style and vein to what has
obtained in the region, in many respects. At the very least, the establishment by Britain of
institutions similar to those already established and operated in the region, implies a high level of
confidence, in the types of institutions themselves, and suggests a need for greater confidence in
the region’s own ability to operate them.
In the second case, the willingness of the British Parliament to undertake such reforms, certainly
raises questions about whether the privileged position of the PC as the final appellate court for the
region, can be indefinitely guaranteed. The reforms by the British Government signal a desire on its
part to modernise its judicial system and to create an independent, robust court, capable of
meeting the demands of the twenty-first century. The dismantling of the constitutional oddity of the
office of Lord Chancellor perhaps best embodies this strong commitment to modernisation and
common-sense reforms.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
209
In the wake of this Constitutional revolution however, a number of law lords and senior British
judicial officials have expressed doubts about the continued reliance by countries in the
Commonwealth Caribbean, on the Judicial Committee as their final court of appeal. Indeed, some
officials have even suggested that the situation places an undue burden on British judicial
resources. Accordingly, these circumstances raise the spectre that the region may be “pushed”
before it is ready to leave.
On the other hand, on 14
th
February, 2001, the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of
Justice was signed among CARICOM member states. That Agreement came into force on 23
rd
July, 2003 and the Court was inaugurated on 16
th
April, 2005. The headquarters for the Court is in
Trinidad and Tobago.
The countries that have acceded to its appellate jurisdiction (as opposed to its original jurisdiction
in relation to the Caribbean Single Market) and have thereby replaced the Judicial Committee of
the PC as their final Court of Appeal are Barbados, Belize and Guyana. Jamaica attempted to do
so in 2004 but the legislation that gave effect to the replacement was held to be unconstitutional by
the Privy Council itself in the matter of the Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998)
Ltd. v. The Hon. Syringa Marshall-Burnett and the Attorney General of Jamaica
85
in a judgment
handed down on 3
rd
February, 2005.
In any event, the Commission noted that these two developments (the creation of the CCJ and the
creation of the United Kingdom Supreme Court) placed the Commonwealth Caribbean at the
crossroads of history as regards the replacement of the Judicial Committee of the PC with the CCJ.
In that regard, the Commission received and considered a number of submissions that the PC
should be replaced with the CCJ. The Commission noted that there appeared to be some general
consensus among the Saint Lucian public that the process of completing Saint Lucia’s
independence was important and that the abolition of appeals to the PC was an integral and
important step in that direction.
The Commission nevertheless considered some of the major arguments in favour of retention of
appeals to the PC and against adoption of the CCJ as Saint Lucia’s final court of appeal. The
85
Privy Council Appeal No. 41 of 2004
Report – March 2011
210
Commission noted that one of the traditional arguments in favour of retention of the PC was that
the judiciary of the region had not sufficiently matured to discharge the role of such a final appellate
court. The Commission considered suggestions that there was a greater likelihood of political
interference in the operations of the CCJ which was not a danger if the PC was retained. It noted
further too, that other considerations were that there as yet did not appear to be a widespread
consensus among the political elites and body-publics of the region, on the CCJ.
In that connection, the Commission took note of the fact that in late 2010, Prime Minister Bruce
Golding of Jamaica proposed that the country establish its own final appellate court. Golding
revealed during debate on the Charter of Rights in Parliament on Tuesday December 21, 2010,
that the Government was hoping to establish a local final court of appeal to replace the Privy
Council. The Commission noted though, that the main opposition party, the People's National
Party, was in favour of the CCJ, which was yet to be established in the Constitution of Jamaica in
its appellate jurisdiction.
The Commission was also referred to and considered the Jamaican case of Independent Jamaica
Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd. v. The Hon. Syringa Marshall-Burnett and the Attorney
General of Jamaica (see above.) It noted the PC’s judgment to the effect that the attempted
replacement of the PC by the CCJ, without entrenching the CCJ in Jamaica’s domestic law, had
the effect of weakening the level of protection afforded to the Judiciary by the Jamaican
Constitution.
However, after having reviewed the facts pertinent to the CCJ, the Commission was unable to
agree that the PC should be retained as Saint Lucia’s final appellate court. The Commission noted
that, while support for the CCJ as a replacement for the PC varied throughout the region, some
jurisdictions, including Belize, Barbados and Guyana, were highly in favour of the Court and had
already taken steps to make the CCJ their final appellate court.
More importantly however, the issue was not whether there was widespread support in the region
for the Court, but whether support for the CCJ in Saint Lucia was sufficiently robust. As such, the
Commission noted that in Saint Lucia, support for the CCJ among the general public was relatively
high, in light of the popularity of the various submissions received to the effect that it should replace
the PC. Moreover, the Commission recognised for example, the statements in support of the Court
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
211
from the late Prime Minister, Sir John Compton. It noted further, that the current Prime Minister of
Saint Lucia, Honourable Stephenson King, and the current Leader of the Opposition, Honourable
Dr. Kenny D. Anthony, had on separate occasions, expressed disappointment in the position of the
Jamaica Government as regards its stated plans for having its own final court. In the Commission’s
view, these facts suggested a strong commitment on the part of both the Government and the
Opposition in Saint Lucia for the CCJ.
The Commission recalled its previous discussions on the judiciary in Saint Lucia and its
examination of the relative success of the ECSC. It noted that to a large extent, the CCJ was a
court very similar in design and structure to the ECSC. The Commission recognised for example
that, like the ECSC, the CCJ was a regional court, constituted in common for several states at
once. It recognised that the system of appointment of judges to the CCJ were identical in most
respects to the system of appointment of judges to the ECSC. The Commission noted that, with the
exception of the selection of the Chief Justice of the CCJ, governments of the region played no role
whatsoever in the appointment and selection of judges to that court. The Commission
acknowledged that this was peculiar to the court and unique in the world.
The Commission also recalled the high level of independence and the demonstrated intellectual
capacity of the judges on the ECSC over the years. It recognised the competence of the persons
appointed to the court, and recalled that a very high number of decisions by the Court of Appeal
were approved by the PC. The Commission acknowledged that in Saint Lucia’s case alone, it had
produced several distinguished and eminent jurists who had served on the ECSC. The
Commission specifically recalled the example of the late, Rt. Honourable Sir Vincent Floissac Q.C.,
among others, and took notice of the fact that Sir Vincent had been called upon to serve on the PC
at points in his illustrious legal career; that in fact Sir Vincent had written lead judgments for the
Judicial Committee on occasions.
The Commission therefore believed that the argument that the region did not produce jurists of
sufficient intellectual, moral and legal capacity to perform the functions of a judge on a final
appellate court like the CCJ, was easily dispensed with and could be rejected outright.
As regards the decision of the PC itself in the Jamaican case, (see above,) the Commission here
too, rejected the arguments advanced for several reasons. Firstly, the Commission took
Report – March 2011
212
cognisance of the fact that the PC was not entrenched in the Jamaican Constitution.
86
Accordingly,
the suggestion by their Lordships that a court created to replace the PC had to be strongly
entrenched in the Jamaican Constitution was illogical.
87
Put in other terms, the Commission
recognised an incongruity in the PC’s suggestion that, while it was not entrenched in the Jamaican
Constitution, any court created to replace it had to be entrenched. While the Commission agreed
that entrenchment was probably very desirable, it could not understand the suggestion by the PC
that only a court entrenched in the Jamaican Constitution could provide the same quality of justice
previously supplied by the un-entrenched PC..
Secondly, the PC argued that the CCJ needed to be entrenched due to the apparently small risk
(described as “fanciful” by their Lordships,) that the governments signing the agreement
establishing the Court, could amend the agreement and thereby weaken the protection afforded to
the judges who sat on the court. The Commission was unable to regard this as a material concern,
as the Commission took special note of the fact that amendments to the agreement establishing
the Court, required unanimous approval of all the governments that were signatories to the
agreement. In the Commission’s view, this fact converted any risk of possible amendments to the
Treaty establishing the Court from “fanciful” to near impossible, as the Commission was unable to
anticipate what circumstances could arise which could possibly prompt twelve sovereign
governments to unanimously agree to undermine the independence of the CCJ.
In any event, the Commission recognised that the Jamaican case turned on the question, not of the
desirability of the CCJ as a replacement for the PC, but the method and means by which the
Jamaican Government had attempted to replace the PC with the court. In other words, the
Commission acknowledged that the important lesson of the Jamaican decision was that it was
critically important for the correct procedure, outlined in Saint Lucia’s Constitution for the abolition
of appeals to the PC, to be followed. In the case of Jamaica, the government attempted to abolish
appeals to the PC and replace it with the CCJ, but did not take any special measures to entrench
the court in the domestic legal system. It also attempted to achieve this without a referendum on
the issue.
86
In the Jamaican context, appeals to the PC could be abolished by a simple majority vote in Parliament.
87
See e.g. the Jamaica Observer, Editorial, March 7
th
2005.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
213
In the case of Saint Lucia, it is unclear whether a referendum would be required to abolish appeals
to the PC and replace that court with the CCJ. The Commission’s attention was drawn to a body of
thought which took the view that no referendum might be required in the case where Saint Lucia
seeks to establish a regional court in common with other states in the OECS, to replace the PC. If
correct, the implication is that it might be possible for Saint Lucia to accede to the appellate
jurisdiction of the CCJ without the need to deeply entrench the CCJ in Saint Lucia’s domestic legal
system.
Notwithstanding, the Commission believes that, irrespective of the actual procedure contained in
our Constitution for abolishing appeals to the PC, the CCJ should be afforded appropriate
protection in a new Constitution and should be entrenched in order to promote confidence in the
court and to ensure that the CCJ is afforded no less protection than the ECSC.
However, perhaps the most important reason for the Commission’s support of the court, is that the
Commission regards breaking ties with the PC as an important last step in completing Saint Lucia’s
journey of independence. The Commission considered the mandate entrusted to it by the
Parliament of Saint Lucia, and agreed that Saint Lucia had reached a stage in its development,
where it could take full ownership and responsibility for its judicial policy and affairs. While the
Commission took notice of the critical role played by the PC in the past in the development of Saint
Lucian and regional law, the Commission was convinced that, in the context of the current review,
a commitment needed to be made to complete Saint Lucia’s growth as a civilization in its own right,
and that the umbilical ties to the former colonial motherland needed to be broken. The Commission
regarded it as incompatible with the status of independence that the interpretation of Saint Lucia’s
laws should be done for it by a foreign power, on foreign soil. The Commission believed that Saint
Lucia, in tandem with other OECS states, had demonstrated its judicial maturity and integrity since
it gained independence, and could sever ties with Britain with confidence.
As such, for all reasons discussed above, the Commission recommends the replacement of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with the CCJ as Saint Lucia’s final court of appeal and the
entrenchment of the CCJ in the domestic legal system.
Report – March 2011
214
Recommendations
With respect to the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Commission recommends the following:
(154) It should replace the Privy Council as Saint Lucia’s final appellate court;
(155) It should be entrenched in a new Constitution, so that it is afforded similar protection as
the ECSC in the domestic legal system.
The Role of the Minister of Justice
In light of the Commission’s proposals for reform of the lower judiciary, and mindful of the
requirement to make recommendations designed to “maintain and strengthen the independence of
the judiciary,” the Commission considered the potential role for the Minister of Justice in a revised
Constitution.
The Commission took special notice of the Edinburgh Plan of Action for the Commonwealth that
was prepared at the end of the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Colloquium held on 6th and 7th
July, 2008 at the Scottish Parliament and presented to the Commonwealth Law Ministers meeting
in Edinburgh in July 2008. In that connection, Commonwealth Law Ministers broadly agreed that
adequate resources should be allocated to the judiciary to enable it to properly discharge its
functions, judges should be accountable to the Constitution and should submit regular reviews to
Parliaments on the financing and administration of the courts, and the Minister of Justice had an
important role to play in Cabinet, as an advocate for judicial independence.
Accordingly, in the Law Ministers view, Ministers of Justice played an important institutional and
political role in defending the independence of the judiciary. Via means of functional cooperation
between the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice, the Law Ministers envisaged opportunities to
build public confidence in the administration of justice. Ministers were expected to facilitate an
important dialogue between the Executive and the Judiciary on the one hand, and the Judiciary
and the public on the other. Above all, a Minister of Justice was required to be a champion on
behalf of the judiciary for the allocation of sufficient resources to secure its independence.
The Commission considered the recommendations coming out of the Colloquium and agreed in
principle that a Minister of Justice should be a powerful advocate on behalf of the Judiciary in
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
215
Cabinet. The Commission agreed that the independence of the judiciary was closely related to its
receipt of adequate resources to discharge its functions, and that some mechanism should be
institutionalised to enable the Chief Justice to liaise with an appropriate functionary of the
Executive, to make direct representations with respect to the same.
Recommendation
(156) With respect to the Minister of Justice the Commission recommends that the Minister
should become an advocate in Cabinet for the Judiciary and should liaise with the
leadership of the Judiciary so as to more effectively communicate its needs at the level of
the Executive.
Report – March 2011
216
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CITIZENSHIP ACT AND RELATED PROVISIONS
Although closely associated with nationality, citizenship is an independent concept with the nation
being only one possible community within which citizenship is exercised. Citizenship as opposed to
nationality is defined as belonging to a community or groupings of persons who recognise that they
have something in common, either based on the acceptance of the legitimacy of the state in which
they live, shared history, ethnicity, religion or common purpose. This means that nationals and non-
nationals can exercise citizenship by their participation in the economic, social and political life of
their community. Nationality generally connotes membership of a nation or sovereign state which
affords the state jurisdiction over the person and affords the person the protection of the state.
Notions of citizenship in constitutional theory reflect a nexus between one’s national identity and
sense of belonging to the state which confers certain rights and obligations as defined in domestic
law, principally, a constitution. Citizenship in this regard is therefore restricted to concepts of
allegiance, entitlement and obligations. A constitution should therefore define and guarantee the
position of the citizen. This relationship is defined as ‘constitutional reconstruction’
88
in the sense
that the citizen should play an active role in the respect for and advancement of the constitution
and, the constitution should in turn protect and foster citizenship.
Recent world trends towards the establishment of multi-country political and economic unions have
introduced the concepts of “regional citizenship” or “international citizenship”. For example, the
Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union gave recognition to the concept of “citizenship
of the European Union”
89
with citizens having some minimal rights including the right of non-
discrimination within the scope of the Treaty, a limited right to free movement and residence in
Member States as well as certain political rights
90
.
88
Starkey, H Democratic Citizenship, Languages, Diversity and Human Rights, The Open University, Milton Keynes,
2002
89
Article 17 (1) of the amended EC Treaty states:
“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a member state shall
be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.”
90
See Articles 18-21 and 225 of the Treaty
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
217
The Commonwealth of Nations to which Saint Lucia belongs also prescribes the notion of a
“Commonwealth citizen” being one who is a citizen of a Commonwealth member state. This form of
citizenship offers certain privileges within some Commonwealth countries including the waiver of
visa restrictions to enter and remain in the state, the ability to participate in the political life of the
country including, in the case of Saint Lucia, nomination to the Senate (Upper House)
91
. There are
many pieces of ordinary legislation in Saint Lucia which confer a ‘privileged position’ to
Commonwealth nationals as opposed to other nationals generally described in law as ‘aliens’. For
example, the period of residency and fees required to apply for citizenship of Saint Lucia is less
onerous for a Commonwealth citizen than for a non-Commonwealth citizen.
The current regional movements toward OECS Economic Union and the CARICOM Single Market
and Economy (CSME) required that the Commission explore the issue of regional integration and
the impact of a possible “regional citizenship”. The Commission considered the two arrangements
and submissions, to allow for this new class of citizenship in the future. It was noted that Section
103 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to make law regarding the acquisition of citizenship
by persons who are not eligible under the existing provisions of the Constitution. Therefore it is
possible that the Citizenship Act can be amended to include a class of “regional citizens” without
falling foul of the Constitution. The Commission was therefore of the view that there was no need to
make a clear recommendation on this, given the provisions of Section 103. Further the
Commission felt that the matter should be properly determined through reciprocal treaty
arrangements among the OECS or wider Caribbean before any amendment to the Constitution or
related legislation
92
as the case may be.
The Commission also considered the grant of citizenship on economic grounds. It was argued that
this can generate significant revenue for developing states like Saint Lucia and encourage
investment. The Commission was wary however, of the potential negative impact of these
schemes and the perception that the country was “for sale”. The submission was very unpopular
among members of the public who participated in the consultations and there were suggestions
that this should be specifically banned in the Constitution. The Commission was not persuaded
that the advantages of economic citizenship were sufficient to sacrifice the ideals of national
91
See Section 25 (a) of the Saint Lucia Constitution
92
The Citizenship of Saint Lucia Act Cap 1.04 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia 2001
Report – March 2011
218
identity and citizenship. The Commission by a majority therefore agreed that economic citizenship
should be excluded and specifically banned in the Constitution.
In its review of the constitutional provisions relating to the acquisition, retention and deprivation of
citizenship contained in Sections 99 to 104 of the Constitution, the Commission was also required
to review the provisions of the Citizenship of Saint Lucia Act
93
and regulations made pursuant to
the Act. The Commission was of the view that the Act is incoherent in its organisation. Further, the
Commission felt that the Act was imprecise and as such open to wide interpretation and leading to
weak enforcement. More over, both the Act and the Constitution contained discriminatory
provisions in relation to women with respect to the conferment of benefits on a non-St. Lucian
spouse.
In accordance with the Constitution and the Citizenship Act, an individual may become a citizen of
Saint Lucia on the following grounds: jus soli
94
(right of soil), that is by virtue of being born in the
country, jus sanguinis
95
(right of blood) by virtue of the citizenship of at least one parent, jure
matrimonii
96
, through marriage to a person holding citizenship and through naturalisation
97
, having
satisfied periods of residency within the country.
With respect to citizens by birth or jus soli it was noted that children born in Saint Lucia to non-
nationals whose father possesses diplomatic immunity or whose father is a citizen of a country with
which Saint Lucia is at war, shall not become a citizen. It is therefore possible to be born in Saint
Lucia and not be entitled to citizenship. There were many complaints made by persons in the
Diaspora who felt that they were treated as second class citizens by immigration officers on entry
into Saint Lucia with a foreign passport, notwithstanding that the passport would have a notification
to the effect that the holder was “born in Saint Lucia”. While the Commission took cognisance of
93
Cap 1.04 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia 2001 which came into effect on 5 June 1979(Act No. 7 of 1979)
94
See Section 100 of the Constitution and Section 4 of the Citizenship of Saint Lucia Act Cap 1.04
95
See Section 101 of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Citizenship of Saint Lucia Act Cap 1.04.
96
See Sections 102 (1) (a) and 102 (2) (a) of the Constitution and Sections 6 (1) (a) and 6 (2) (a) of the Citizenship of
Saint Lucia Act Cap 1.04
97
See Sections 102 (1) (b) and 102 (2) (b) of the Constitution relating to Commonwealth citizens and Sections 6 (1)
(b), 6 (2) (b) of the Citizenship of Saint Lucia Act Cap 1.04 relating to Commonwealth citizens. See also Section 8 of
the Citizenship of Saint Lucia Act Cap 1.04 extending to other “aliens” as provided for by Section 103 of the
Constitution.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
219
the affirmation of allegiance by members of the Diaspora and the strong ties they feel towards
Saint Lucia, the Commission was constrained to accept submissions that they should be treated as
holders of Saint Lucian passports for the following reasons. As described in the scenario above,
the status of being born in the State does not necessarily confer citizenship and secondly the
Commission took cognisance of the fact that in some cases there would have been a renunciation
of the Saint Lucian citizenship to facilitate the acquisition of the other.
With respect to citizens by descent or jus sanguinis, the law restricts the entitlement to a person
whose parent is a citizen. Therefore, an individual is not entitled if a grandparent and not the parent
is a citizen of Saint Lucia. The Commission agreed with the submissions that this provision was too
restrictive and that entitlement to citizenship should extend to a person whose grandparent is a
citizen.
With respect to citizenship through marriage or jure matrimonii the Constitution and the Act allow
the appropriate Minister, on specified grounds, to deny the application for the grant of citizenship to
a man married to a Saint Lucian woman. In contrast, the appropriate Minister must grant
citizenship to a woman married to a Saint Lucian man once the applicant fulfils the requirements.
The Commission supported submissions that this distinction, although rooted in the principle under
old law, that a woman assumed the domicile of her husband was discriminatory and unacceptable.
The Commission was therefore of the view that this right (citizenship) should extend to both male
and female applicants.
However, the Commission considered the provisions on marriage to be very weak, in that, there
are no provisions dealing with sham marriages which the Commission defined as a marriage
solemnised solely for the purpose of presenting an application for citizenship. The Commission
agreed that the Act should be redrafted to contain a separate section or sections dealing with
marriage including the power to deny an application or revoke a grant where the marriage is found
to be a sham.
With respect to submissions that there should be a period of time after the marriage before one
would be entitled to apply for citizenship, the Commission noted that there were many “real”
marriages which did not survive the first or second anniversary. Imposing this restriction would only
ensure that the sham is perpetuated for the requisite period.
Report – March 2011
220
With respect to applications on the basis of marriage and in cases of naturalisation or residency
requirement (seven (7) years for Commonwealth citizens and eight (8) years for all other
nationalities), the Commission received many complaints relating to the length of time for
processing the application. The Commission was informed that in some cases this may take up to
two years. The main reason cited for the long delays was that these applications were vetted by
the Police who investigated each application. However, due to the limited human resources within
the Police Force, applications would languish for years or months before being investigated. The
Commission was persuaded by submissions that this function should reside in a civilian entity
dedicated to this task.
Submissions were made that the Act should provide for the granting of permanent residence status
as a precursor to the grant of citizenship in eligible cases. In the absence of such a provision, the
residency status of the applicant must be renewed on a monthly basis. The legislation does not
categorise these applicants as residents and consequently they are forced to keep paying for
extensions of stay and work permits in addition to paying the fee for the grant of citizenship. The
Commission agreed that the Act should make clear provisions regulating the status of an individual
during the period between the filing of the application and grant or refusal of the grant of
citizenship.
The Commission was equally consumed with submissions on the issue of dual citizenship in
relation to Members of Parliament, including the Head of State, Prime Minister, Parliamentary
Representatives and Senators. There were strong sentiments that persons in such high offices
entrusted with the peace, order and good government of the country ought to demonstrate a clear
and unequivocal allegiance to the State and that therefore they should not have dual nationality. In
considering these submissions the Commission reviewed the current requirements relevant to the
various offices.
With respect to the Office of Governor General, Section 19 of the Constitution only requires that the
individual be a “citizen”. There is no distinction as to the source of citizenship, that is, whether by
birth, descent or naturalisation. The Commission was of the view that in keeping with the
recommendations of the changes in that office to “President”, eligibility for appointment should be
citizenship by birth or descent. It was further agreed that in the case of citizenship by descent the
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individual must have been resident in the State for the least thirty (30) years. This would assist in
guaranteeing that the Head of State is someone who is “Saint Lucian in heart and identity” and in
whom the confidence of all Saint Lucians would repose.
In relation to elected members of the House of Assembly, the Commission considered Section 31
of the Constitution which sets out the grounds of qualification for election to the House. In particular
Sections 31 (a) and (b) which provide:
“31. Subject to the provisions of Section 32 of this Constitution, a person shall be qualified
to be elected as a member of the House if, and shall not be so qualified unless, he –
(a) is a citizen of the age of twenty-one years or upward;
(b) was born in Saint Lucia and is domiciled and resident there at the date of his
nomination or, having been born elsewhere, has resided there for a period of
twelve months immediately before that date; and …….”
Section 32 (1) (a) goes on to disqualify a member of the House who: “by virtue of his own act, is
under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state.”
The provision appears to require a positive act of allegiance to a foreign power or state, for
example, swearing an oath of allegiance or pursuing an application for citizenship of another
country. The question of allegiance and knowledge of local circumstances was viewed as critical
prerequisites of persons charged with the responsibility of making laws affecting the day to day
living of Saint Lucians by many persons participating in the consultations of the Commission. It
appears therefore, that with respect to Members of Parliament, dual citizenship is not allowed
where there has been any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign
power or State. The Commission noted and agreed with the status quo in relation to the restriction
on dual citizenship of members of the House of Assembly. There was consensus that eligibility for
election to the House of Assembly should be restricted to citizens by birth or descent. In the case
of citizenship by descent the individual should have been resident in the country for a period of at
least seven (7) years prior to the acquisition of citizenship and seven (7) years immediately prior
to the election.
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With respect to members of the Senate, the Commission considered Section 25 of the Constitution
which provides for qualification of Senators. Section 25 (a) and (b) provide:
“Section 25: Subject to the provisions of Section 26 of this Constitution, a person
shall be qualified to be appointed as a Senator if, and shall not be so qualified
unless, he –
(a) Is a Commonwealth citizen who has attained the age of twenty-one years;
(b) Has been ordinarily resident in Saint Lucia for a period of five years
immediately before the date of his appointment; and....”
There is therefore, no requirement that a Senator under the Constitution be a citizen of Saint Lucia.
It is therefore very curious that one of the grounds of disqualification contained in Section 26 is the
same disqualification as for a member of the House, which is “by virtue of his own act, is under any
acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state”.
98
The
Commission agreed that eligible nominees should be citizens and resident in the State for at least
five years prior to their appointment, but the dual citizenship rule should not apply.
There was a minority view that the same restrictions placed on membership to the House of
Assembly should be extended to membership of the Senate given that elected members have
greater legitimacy than nominated members.
Recommendations
With respect to the provisions relating to citizenship and the Citizen of Saint Lucia Act, the
Commission recommends the following:
(157) The definition, rights and obligations of a possible “regional citizenship” in
acknowledgement of current regional integration arrangements should be properly
determined through reciprocal treaty arrangements among the OECS or wider Caribbean
before amendment to the Constitution or the Citizenship Act can be made to deal with this
issue.
(158) There should be a Constitutional restriction on the grant of economic citizenship.
98
Section 26 (1) (a)
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(159) The Citizenship of Saint Lucia Act should be redrafted and simplified and made more
coherent by dedicating separate sections of the Act to deal with the individual grounds of
citizenship. Therefore, the revised Act should have clear sections dealing with citizenship
by birth, citizenship by descent, citizenship by marriage, citizenship by naturalisation
(residency requirements) and citizenship in special cases, for example, adoptions, minors,
stateless children, persons who have given service to the country and people who would
have been entitled before 1979.
(160) The provisions relating to the entitlement to citizenship of an applicant by descent
which is now restricted to cases where one’s parent is a Saint Lucian should extend to
a person whose grandparent is a citizen.
(161) With respect to citizenship by marriage, the current discrimination against Saint Lucian
women who marry a non-citizen should be removed.
(162) The Act should empower the Minister to deny the grant of citizenship in cases where a
marriage is found to be a sham or marriage of convenience. Strong sanctions should be
imposed against persons engaging in sham marriages.
(163) There should be no restriction defining a period of time after marriage before an applicant
is eligible to apply for citizenship.
(164) The power of the Minister to refuse a grant of citizenship should apply in all cases of
marriage or naturalisation. The power to deny an application must be on clearly
prescribed grounds contained in the Act. However, the discretion of the Minister should be
limited as much as possible as this privilege can be abused.
(165) The procedure for the deprivation of citizenship obtained through fraud, false
representation or concealment of any material particular should be clearly set out in the
Act and refer to the procedure for initiation of the process, the process itself and what the
Minister has to consider and find.
(166) Matters concerning the investigation of eligibility requirements for the grant of citizenship
should be removed from the purview of the Police Force to a civilian entity.
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(167) The Act should provide for the grant of temporary residence status as a precursor to the
grant of citizenship by qualified applicants to ensure that their status is not in abeyance
during the period between the filing of the application and grant or refusal of the grant of
citizenship due the lengthy processing period.
(168) The Head of State should be a citizen by birth or descent. In the case of citizenship by
descent the individual should have been resident in the State for at least thirty (30) years.
(169) Eligibility for election to the House of Assembly should be restricted to citizens by birth or
descent. In the case of citizens by descent, the individual should have been resident in the
country for a period of at least seven (7) years following the acquisition of citizenship and
seven (7) years immediately prior to the election.
(170) The existing rule which appears to disqualify the holders of dual citizenship in some cases
from being eligible for election to the House of Assembly in accordance with Section 32
(1) (a) of the Constitution should be retained.
(171) In relation to Senators, nominations should be restricted to Saint Lucian citizens resident
in the State for at least five years.
(172) The existing rule which appears to disqualify the holders of dual citizenship in some cases
from being eligible for nomination to the Senate in accordance with Section 26 (1) (a) of
the Constitution should not apply.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
RELATED MATTERS
Elections and Political Party Financing
The Commission considered proposals for the regulation of elections and political party financing
against a backdrop of increasing cost of elections and interference in national elections by foreign
Governments. Noting that global best practice requires some form of regulation for political parties,
the Commission acknowledged that the Caribbean is one of the last refuge for parties in the
Western Hemisphere where the regime of elections and political party financing is virtually
unregulated. Thus the Caribbean remains one of the few regions that have yet to pass strong and
effective legislation to govern its political parties and elections campaign financing. The
Commission therefore strongly felt that the continuing absence of such legislation and regulation
would not only facilitate the possibility of state capture by criminal, international and or commercial
interest but would also jeopardise the Caribbean’s relationship with its international partners.
Mindful of the difficulties that small size and a political culture that has increasingly become marked
by patronage, victimisation and dependency would have on devising a system, the Commission
reasoned that this should limit the ambitions of any proposed legislation. Thus, as a Commission
we grappled with the issues of enforcement of a full declaration of contributions, the impositions of
ceilings, exclusions from contributions, sanctions for violations of regulations of a reformed system,
state financing of elections and political parties, abuse, transparency and oversight. Ultimately the
Commission anticipated that the reformed system which aimed to limit the influence of money on
elections would lead to the development of a democratic system premised on fair electoral
competition and political equity.
With the ever increasing demands for goods and services on the part of the Saint Lucian voting
public, the price for party loyalty has become more expensive. This has therefore led political
parties both new and old to search for more lucrative sources of financing, particularly from the
external private sector sources in exchange for investment opportunities as well as leverage on the
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226
international scene.
99
Worst, is the entanglement and possibility of entanglement of parties and
agents of parties with the international, domestic and regional criminal community.
As a Commission we accepted that any proposal for the establishment of a new regime would be
meaningless without wider systemic changes. We certainly felt that our targeted efforts at retooling
the procurement system, the recommendation to create an office of the Contractor-General among
others, would certainly limit office holders especially those in Government from dispensing favours.
We were consoled by the fact that combined with our many recommendations on limiting abuse,
improving transparency; limiting political discretion and cultivating an environment build on greater
accountability that this would ultimately lead to democratic consolidation in Saint Lucia. However
unpalatable, our final recommendations on the issue would therefore be to some circles, we were
compelled by the end game and the realisation that failure to act propitiously and meaningfully
would lead to the continuing erosion and corrosion of democracy and the long held democratic
values in the country.
Emerging out of our discussions was a concern about the use of state resources for election
purposes. While we acknowledged the difficulty of acquiring such evidence there is a general
feeling among the populace that incumbency has a clear electoral advantage not only with respect
to the use of Government’s physical resources but also with respect to the media. The media we
agreed, is one of the most expensive election expenditure items.
The Commission’s overriding concern with the potential impact of the failure to seize the
opportunity presented to it amidst growing concerns of “presidential style” elections campaigns,
with its glossy billboards, huge rallies and concerts, t-shirts, glossy magazines, public relations
experts, pollsters and other elections paraphernalia was sufficient to mobilise the members into
making strong recommendations. At a minimum level, the Commission felt that the Elections Act
should be amended to include provisions relating to elections and political party financing. For
sure, we reasoned that such tightening of the regime would have a positive impact on the public’s
growing disenchantment with politics, which was especially acute among the youth of the region.
Secondly, we anticipated that there would be a positive correlation between such regime change
and the de-escalation of the erosion of the credibility of elections and the political parties that
99
View expressed by Dr. Vaughn Lewis. Former Prime Minister of Saint Lucia at a Regional Consultation on Political
Parties and Elections which was held in Jamaica in September 2010.
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compete in them. Finally, we strongly felt that a comprehensive Act which would also allow for the
monitoring of the acquisition of financial resources by political parties, would arrest the possibility of
criminal elements affecting the outcomes of elections, through their campaign contributions, and or
intimidation of voters.
In its deliberations however, the Commission considered that the constraints of small size often
circumscribed the ability of political parties to raise money and would expose its contributors to
public scrutiny and consequently adversely impact the capacity of political parties to survive. We
considered that this would be counterproductive as it would endanger the very system we were
hoping would flourish. Thus, the Commission surmised that a proposal for full disclosure of
contributions must also be balanced by a counter proposal for state funding. This would also
simultaneously create greater equity for all parties and limit the influence of private special interest
groups. The net effect would be to reduce the possibilities of political corruption and influence
peddling.
Further, the Commission accepted that political parties were crucial for the survival of democracy
and while there was heated debate on what some considered to be the dismal failings of parties,
the adversarial nature of the political organisations, and their contribution to the growing political
tribalism that characterises the society, nonetheless Commissioners felt that there was need to
give due formal recognition to political parties whether constitutionally or legally. In that way too,
the Commission was of the view that it would lend itself to the ability of the oversight body to
monitor and evaluate the performance and behaviour of the institutions.
Recommendations
With respect to Elections and Political Party Financing, the Commission therefore recommends the
following:
(173) Saint Lucia should embrace the current global trend of creating a regulated environment
for political parties and elections campaign financing.
(174) Political parties should register for the purpose of elections.
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228
(175) A Political Party and Elections Campaign Finance Act should be enacted which would
among other things provide for a system of both private and public funding.
(176) The new Act should require full disclosure of all the financial contributions made to political
parties. Non-disclosure should therefore be an offence.
(177) Political parties should declare their assets and liabilities.
(178) Appropriate sanctions should be placed on political parties that violate the provisions of
the Act.
(179) All foreign government contributions for election purposes should be banned.
(180) All financial contributions from foreign companies to political parties should be prohibited.
(181) A limit should be placed on contributions to political parties by companies and individuals.
(182) A ceiling should be placed on contributions that would not be required to be declared.
(183) All sources of anonymous contributions should be prohibited.
(184) The State should provide some form of funding to political parties. However, State funding
should not supplant or dominate private funding.
(185) There should be greater equity in terms of the access of all parties to the State media.
(186) The Act should clearly define political parties.
Diaspora
Related Issues
In keeping with its mandate, the Commission consulted with Saint Lucians residing in Barbados,
Martinique, St. Croix and St. Thomas (USVI), Virgin Gorda and Tortola (BVI) New York and
Washington (USA), London, Manchester and Liverpool (UK), Toronto and Ontario (Canada)
seeking their views on constitutional reform in Saint Lucia.
Whilst the people of the Diaspora shared many of the views and concerns expressed by Saint
Lucians residing in Saint Lucia on the Governor General, the Prime Minister, the Civil Service,
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politicians, Parliament and the like, there were a number of issues raised which were specific and
of special interest to them.
There was the general desire to play a more meaningful and participatory role in the development
and governance of their country. In particular, they wanted to participate in the democratic process
of electing the Government of the country. At every meeting they submitted that due consideration
should be given to establishing a mechanism whereby Saint Lucians living overseas could vote at
elections. The Commission engaged them in debate on the costs and logistical problems
associated with this proposal. Consideration needed to be given to the extent of the expansion of
the number of countries which now constitute the Diaspora. These include Taiwan, China, Japan,
India, Australia, among others.
After due consideration of the submission and an examination of the process involved in the
arrangement of overseas voting, the Commission concluded that the submission could not be
recommended.
In addition, members of the Diaspora were keenly interested in the issue of citizenship, in
particular, the right to citizenship of persons who are of Saint Lucian descent and who are born
overseas, any prohibition on dual citizenship, the current discrimination in respect of a woman
marrying a man with Saint Lucian citizenship, any changes in the citizenship laws that would affect
their or their children’s rights to participate in the democratic process or public life.
In its deliberation of, and recommendations in respect to, the provisions of the Constitution dealing
with citizenship and of the Citizenship Act, the Commission has taken into account the views and
submissions coming from the Diaspora.
There were some issues, not necessarily constitutional in nature, which seem to be common
concerns of members of the Diaspora. These include, the problems encountered in securing official
documents such as passports and birth certificates, restrictions on their right to stay in Saint Lucia
for those not holding a current Saint Lucian passport, securing their property whilst living overseas
and the lack of consultation with them by consecutive Governments on important issues in or
concerning Saint Lucia.
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Financial Accountability
(The Finance (Administration) Act)
In addition to the Constitution, the Commission was mandated to examine, study and make
recommendations for amendments, reforms and changes to related laws, as are in the opinion of
the Commission necessary and desirable for promoting good government in Saint Lucia, and in
particular for strengthening the relevant Government machinery in order to ensure maximum
transparency and strict accountability in the management of public funds, including appropriate
sanctions for corruption. The Commission therefore felt it relevant and appropriate to examine the
Finance (Administration) Act, (the Act).
100
The Commission noted that certain provisions of the Act had in recent times been the subject
matter of litigation, judicial pronouncements and a Commission of Inquiry, all arising out of what
has become commonly known as the “Rochamel Affair”. During its consultations the Commission
heard a number of concerns and received a number of submissions on the subject of the
management of public funds and holding those responsible for mismanagement accountable for
their actions. The provisions of the Act also came up for discussion when submissions were made
regarding the powers of the Prime Minister.
The Act deals with, inter alia, the control and management of public finance, payments into and
from the Consolidated Fund, accounting for public monies, the authorisation of expenditure and
public debt. The Act also provides for financial regulations and procurement and stores regulations
to be made pursuant to the Act.
It is the responsibility of the Minister of Finance, (the Minister), to supervise the finances of the
Government in order to ensure that a full account is made to the Parliament and for that purpose to
have full responsibility for the management of the Consolidated Fund. The Minister is further
mandated to give such directions and instructions as appear to him or her to be necessary or
expedient for the advantage, economy and safety of public monies and public property.
The Act places on “the Director of Finance and Planning” (the Director), the responsibility to take all
proper steps to ensure that any directions and instructions given by the Minister pursuant to the
Act, the Rules or Regulations are brought to the notice of all persons directly affected thereby and
100
Op. cit
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are complied with. The Director must certify all withdrawals made or authorised from the
Consolidated Fund.
The Commission noted that there is currently no position referred to as Director of Finance and
Planning. The Act states that this title refers to the public officer duly appointed by the Public
Service Commission to hold the office of Director of Finance and Planning and who is directly
responsible to the Minister for the Administration of the Ministry of Finance.
The Chief Accounting Officer is the Accountant General who is charged with performing a
supervisory function with respect to the collection, expenditure and accounting for, public funds.
Permanent Secretaries and public officers who are heads of department or who perform the duties
of a head of department, are Accounting Officers who are answerable to the Public Accounts
Committee of Parliament for the efficient management of and accounting for public funds entrusted
to them as accounting officers.
Further, there were concerns that there is currently a Director of Finance and not a Director of
Finance and Planning. More importantly, concern was expressed that the person holding the
position of Director of Finance, and therefore charged with responsibility to see that the directions
of the Minister are complied with, also holds the position of Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
Finance, and therefore is an Accounting Officer in that capacity, answerable to the Public Accounts
Committee of Parliament for the efficient management of and accounting for public funds entrusted
to him or her. There is a view that one person should not function in both capacities and the Act
should be amended to make this clear. The Commission observed that there is some overlap in the
functions of the Director of Finance and Planning as prescribed by the Act and that of the
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance as prescribed by the Constitution and that the
relevant provisions of the Act should be revisited.
The Act provides that, subject to the Constitution and except as otherwise provided therein, all
revenues and other monies raised or received for the purposes of the Government, not being
revenue or other monies which are payable by or under any enactment into some other fund
established for a specific purpose, shall be paid into and form part of the Consolidated Fund. In this
regard, the Commission has noted some public concern suggesting that this provision of the Act
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has not been complied with in recent times. However, the Commission was not able to determine
the veracity of these suggestions or submissions.
The Accountant General is charged with preparing, certifying and submitting to the Director of Audit
the accounts of Saint Lucia for the financial year showing the financial position of Saint Lucia on
the last day of such financial year. These accounts are to be presented within three (3) months of
the close of each financial year, unless the Minister grants an extension of time. Where an
extension of time is so granted, the authorisation or direction is to be laid before Parliament at its
next sitting.
The Act mandates the Director of Audit to submit to the Minister, not later than three (3) months
from the date of receipt of certified copies of the financial statements from the Accountant General,
those statements with his or her opinion on them. Section 84 of the Constitution outlines in greater
detail the responsibilities of the Director of Audit and this we have discussed elsewhere in this
Report. The Minister is mandated by the Act to lay a copy of every document submitted to him by
the Director of Audit before Parliament at its next sitting following the date on which that document
was received.
One of the greatest concerns of Saint Lucians as expressed in submissions, is the apparent power
of the Minister to borrow or otherwise commit the resources of the State without prior approval from
Parliament. The Act provides that the Minister may, by resolution of Parliament, borrow money
from a bank or other financial institution by means of advances to an amount not exceeding in the
aggregate the sum specified for that purpose in the resolution, to meet current requirements, and
such resolution shall not have effect for any period exceeding 6 months. Additionally, the Minister
may, by resolution of Parliament, borrow from any bank or other financial institution for any of the
following:
the capital or recurrent expenditure of Government;
the purchase of securities issued by any Government or government agency;
on-lending to any statutory body or public corporation; or
making advances or payments to public officers as authorised by any enactment.
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The Act further provides in Section 41 that a guarantee involving any financial liability is not binding
upon Government unless that guarantee is given in accordance with an enactment or unless
approved by resolution of Parliament. The interpretation and application of this section has been
the subject of much public debate in recent times, especially when it became apparent from judicial
pronouncements that it was possible for the Prime Minister to enter into a guarantee, and thereby
commit the Country to financial obligations, without the prior approval of Parliament.
The Commission reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Ramsahoye Report as to the
adequacy of Sections 38, 39 and 41 of the Act and also considered the numerous submissions to
the Commission on this matter. After due consideration, the Commission concluded that the
recommendations of the Ramsahoye Commission of Inquiry with regards to the Act and financial
accountability in general, should be adopted and implemented. In particular, the Commission
concluded that every guarantee given by the Government of Saint Lucia, if not given under an
enactment, be put before Parliament for prior approval by resolution with full details of the amount
to be guaranteed and the object and reasons for giving of the guarantee.
The Commission is cognisant of the fact that Parliament has recently enacted legislation to
implement some of the recommendations of the Ramsahoye Report and welcomes this move.
The Commission received a submission that there should be a review of the Contingency Fund
provision which allows the Minister to make advances from the Fund and then lay a supplementary
estimate before the House after the fact, when he or she is satisfied that there has arisen an urgent
and unforeseen need for expenditure. Whilst acknowledging the need for flexibility in these
situations it was felt that there was a need to look at the methodology for assessing or creating the
Fund as well as to safeguard against abuse of the provision. The Commission agreed with this
submission.
There was a submission that the Act should contain provisions for the laying before Parliament of
budgeted actuals as a methodology for accounting for expenditure incurred in the previous year.
The Commission was of the view that such a practice would result in greater transparency and
accountability regarding how the resources of the state are utilised.
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Recommendations
With respect to Financial Accountability, the Commission recommends the following:
(187) The Act should be revised so as to clarify the respective roles of the Director of Finance
and Planning and that of the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance.
(188) No one individual should function in the capacity of Director of Finance and Planning and
that of Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance simultaneously.
(189) The methodology for assessing or creating the Contingency Fund should be reviewed be
reviewed so as to safeguard against abuse.
(190) The implementation of the recommendation of the Ramsahoye Report in respect to the
Act should continue.
Regional Integration
The need for economic sustainability among Small Island Developing States (SIDS), particularly
the reality of survival in an unfair competitive global environment, has placed the issue of
regionalism at the very core of the Caribbean development agenda.
The integration movement has been on a forward march as early as 1948 when the common
services of the University of the West Indies (UWI) was established and continued into the short
lived Federation of the 1950's. This was followed by the Caribbean Meteorological Service in 1963,
the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) in 1965, which evolved into the Caribbean Community
and Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973.
The regional integration initiative helped to meet some key objectives through a collaborative and
unified approach in many areas of functional cooperation. Some of these areas include
strengthening of trade and such related issues in the region, the creation of an appropriate
enabling environment for private sector development, the development of infrastructure
programmes in support of economic growth and regional integration, the development of strong
public sector institutions and good governance.
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Another important area of regional integration is the OECS Economic Union Treaty which focuses
on economic union for the purposes of providing one economic space (at this time) among member
states. It allows participating states to retain their sovereignty and make decisions in a manner that
does not require constitutional change. The Government of Saint Lucia has recently (1st February
2011) introduced legislation to give effect to the treaty.
In view of this the Commission noted the implications of regional integration in several areas
including the free movement of labour, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), citizenship and
harmonized legislation. These developments will from time to time have implications for our
constitutional development.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ITS EFECT ON POLITICAL CULTURE
With the introduction of a new constitution for Saint Lucia, the major paradigm shift is one that
moves away from the parliamentary model towards the presidential model but stops mid-way
between the two. This represents a fundamental departure from the approach that was adopted at
Marlborough House in 1978.
At Marlborough House, the approach was one of making piecemeal changes to the 1967
Constitution so that there was a continuation of a particular type of evolution along a continuum
that would end at the parliamentary model.
The enactment of Statutory Instrument No. 50, 2004 gave a different mandate to the Constitutional
Reform Commission of Saint Lucia. The Commission was asked to:
1) “promote a meaningful expansion and widening of democratic participation by
citizens in Government;
2) address possible weaknesses in the Constitutional framework which political
practice has highlighted over the years;
3) re-fashion the Constitution so that it better accords with our changing social and
political circumstances; and
4) promote better governance and greater equity in the constitutional framework
generally.”
It is hoped that the recommendations that the Commission have made will ultimately achieve those
objectives. However, the change that will overcome the political culture of Saint Lucia if these
constitutional proposals are accepted must be understood.
The creation of a parliamentary-presidential hybrid represents a further evolutionary step along the
road of development. The political experiences of the post-independence period have left many
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Saint Lucians wondering about the functioning of their Constitution and the implications for their
democracy.
The political turmoil of the 1979-82 period, the political uncertainties associated with two general
elections in April 1987, the political succession
101
and retirement of John Compton in 1996 and his
return to power in 2006 and his death in 2007 constitute what politics is all about. The reality is that
Saint Lucia needs to enjoy prolonged political stability with a new political culture that will transform
the zero-sum game of the Westminster-style model into a culture of scrutiny, transparency and
oversight.
The challenges of hybridization present an opportunity to make real political changes that will
require political parties to change the way they operate and force their nominees to observe
standards of ethics and probity that the current system takes for granted.
The enhanced political responsibility that will be placed in the hands of the parliamentarians as
committee members in a new parliament will force the system to accept different standards of
political behaviour that are higher than those which currently exist.
There are too many people who complain about the process, but when faced with the real prospect
of change, shy away to the safe corner of the parliamentary system with which they are familiar.
Who will dare to change the way that political business is done and embrace it for all it is worth?
Further, the forces of regionalism are not as strong as they should be. The Caribbean Court of
Justice is the living proof of that. What is it that some politicians and some people fear the most
about the Caribbean Court of Justice? This is where the debate needs to go as only Barbados,
Belize and Guyana have made the step to embrace the Court as the replacement for the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.
The way to handle this is to try to understand the fear and not to get angry. There is a kind of
unease among some politicians and people that needs to be explained and allayed. If this does not
happen, the possibility of a counter-movement against the Court could emerge. Since 2005 there
101
John Compton was succeeded by Dr. Vaughn Lewis as Political Leader of the UWP and subsequently Prime
Minister.
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have only been three countries who have taken that step. St. Vincent and the Grenadines tried in
2009 but their bid failed at the referendum on the Constitution.
Saint Lucia has come through the ravages of Hurricane Tomàs which has exposed many
weaknesses of Government systems, but none of human spirit. The resolve of the Saint Lucian
people will always shine through, but their political will to make these changes and to demand them
of their leaders will now be tested.
The media have an important role to play in making this quantum leap from a parliamentary system
to the proposed hybrid. Linear thinking will not advance this cause very much. The challenge here
is to engage these reforms on the basis of critical thinking so that the frequent criticisms of the
existing system are not converted into defence mechanisms on how to keep the status quo or to
analyse what is being proposed here by reference to the way that political business has been
transacted for more than thirty years. A new framework of thought and analysis is required.
If accepted, Saint Lucia will face a new dawn of political responsibility and accountability for which
it has yearned. The maturity of the politicians will be tested in their own consideration of this
document which is the product of almost five years of hard work and widespread consultation both
at home and in the Diaspora.
It is anticipated that a new political culture will emerge out of these proposed reforms. The
excesses of the Westminster-style system that concentrates power in the hands of the Prime
Minister is expected to be a thing of the past. So many people have been influenced by the
Washington model that their sensitivity and yearning for reform has naturally taken them to that
model.
This phenomenon can only be explained by the fact that people have been observing political
events and theorising in their minds about how such a system could work in Saint Lucia. This has
been prompted by many events, including but not limited to, the “crossing of the floor” by Neville
Cenac in 1987, the succession of Dr. Vaughn Lewis as Prime Minister in 1996; the dismissal of
Sarah Flood-Beaubrun in 2005, the death of Sir John Compton in 2007 as well as the election of
Barack Obama as President of the United States of America in 2008 whose election has electrified
the political interest of many average citizens in the workings of our system of Government. The
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fact that so many persons proposed reforms along those lines is revealing in its own right. As a
Commission, we listened and we debated. The end product is now before you for your
consideration.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
RESERVATIONS
Commissioner Terrence Charlemagne
SENATE COMPOSITION REFORM, AN EFFECTIVE MEDIUM TO CHANGING A
STAGNANT CULTURE AND PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE
It is my view that the recommendation of the Commission, though commendable, does not address
the critical role of promoting good governance, accountability and transparency in government.
Based on that premise, I submit this reservation.
As expressed in our web site, the Constitution … is the most supreme law of the land which
defines in a social and political contract between the citizen and state, the procedure and scope
for, and limits of lawful governance as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.
Veritably, such a law would have to be the foundation on which every other law pursuant to the
governance of the State would be coded.
Over the recent past, the populace has witnessed the rapid deterioration of standards, ethics and
disregard for the democratic principles that underpin our fundamental rights and freedom. Such an
experience must therefore be a pivotal consideration as we engage in meaningful discourse in the
process to reform our constitution.
Town hall meetings: During the various sessions, it was clear that people wanted a fundamental
change to the Senate to effect review based on the “good of the people” rather than conscience of
a political party.
While Commissioners concur with the sentiment that Saint Lucia requires an effective Senate, we
were divided between the culture of “party political system”, in which the party in power enjoys the
majority, and an authentic, effective and distributive Senate.
In our endeavour to reform our engine of good governance, we must engage our thinking to our
mission to “deepen the process of democracy; enable the participation of all citizens wherever they
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may reside, in the development of the country, as well as protect, defend and safeguard the
interest and welfare of all Saint Lucians”.
Critical to this mission is to revisit the structure and function of the Senate as an integral
component of governance in the authentic expression of a democratic state. The Senate must
therefore, be a powerful house that is rife with impartiality that safeguards checks and balances,
and promotes “good for country” as against good of individual and party. The Senate must not be
viewed as a vestigial apparatus as seen presently.
The present structure of the Senate is skewed towards the governing party. That aspect can hardly
give rise to an effective Senate where a high level of independence is required and conscience
voting is promoted. As presently exists, foremost in the orientation and delivery of nominees, is the
promotion of interest of the party as against the good of the country.
In the present situation, experience has shown that dissent has led to automatic dismissal,
irrespective of the value that the individual brings in promoting the interest of the country and
upholding the democratic principles that forms the fabric of our parliamentary system of
Government.
Proposal by the Commission
The Commission, in its deliberations and recommendations proposed an increase in the number of
Senators but maintained the majority in favour of the governing party. That orientation can hardly
be regarded as an effective change that would safeguard the principles of good governance,
accountability and transparency. What if the Senate is made of both elected and nominated or all
elected members? Would a model that would guarantee a controlling majority by the governing
party be dictated, if it was denied through the democratic process?
Increasing the number of Senators to 13 as proposed by a majority of Commissioners, with seven
(7) appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, three (3) on the advice of the Minority Leader
and three (3) by the President in his own deliberate judgment, cannot ensure a balance and an
effectively functional Senate. Any proposal that does not change the structure to give new meaning
to that important organ of government, and hoping that there will be a change in mindset for
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political acculturation, is an exercise in futility or what we term in our kwéyòl palance “èspwa mal
papay”.
A New Dispensation
We must therefore adopt a deliberate posture to create real change, to give effect to that required
culture of good governance through an effective Senate. Without reforming the Senate that would
provide a functional change to effect an integral part of governance, the institutions of government
cannot work better and will not do better than they do at present.
Further, the Senate should comprise expertise that can give Bills the scrutiny that they deserve,
thereby, creating a functioning Senate” Since Senators are not subject to the vagaries of elections,
they can track issues over a longer period of time than Members of Parliament.
Senators must also contribute to in-depth studies by Senate committees on public issues. The
reports from these investigations can lead to changes in Government public policy and legislation.
Senators should provide a detailed review of all legislation, and the government of the day should
always be conscious that a bill must get through the Senate where the "party line" is more flexible
than in the House. It must be noted that this cannot be achieved with a rubber stamped Senate
where the governing party has the majority votes.
During Senate question period, Senators must purposefully question and challenge the Leader of
the Government Business in the Senate on government policies and activities.
In our parliamentary democracy we are to have two houses but not two houses of party rubber
stamps. The senate therefore, must be a powerful house that is rife with impartiality that
safeguards checks and balances and promotes “good for country” as against good of individual
and party. Therefore, the notion that the majority party must control both houses of parliament is a
fallacy and is tacit endorsement of elective dictatorship.
This model proposed as the reservation is based on a distributed majority rather than a party
majority thus allowing independents to provide the equilibrium. The purpose of the Senate is not to
provide the platform for voting in blocks but one to cultivate and demonstrate good governance
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through open and intelligent discourse. The Senate must therefore guard its role as a 'stabilizing'
influence on the expression of parliament.
Party majority is designed for a situation where Senators are elected and the expression of the
democratic principle through the simple majority prevails. “Office by appointment”, where
nomination is the “over-riding factor” is fundamentally different. Practice has shown that the” rigidity
of the party system has weakened the effectiveness of the Senate”. The party system also impact
son responsible government. The endorsement of the party based majority in the Senate is a
functional alienation of Independents and minority in the Senate.
Passage of Bills
The constitutional text denies the Senate the power to originate or amend appropriation bills,
thereby not being able to hold government to ransom in its use of funds for its development
agenda. However, the Senate is still left with the power to reject other bills or defer their passage
The notion that not allowing the governing party a Senate majority will create gridlock in
government is providing an excuse for political dictatorship. If bills that were denied in the first
instance are re-introduced, and again fail to pass the Senate, the President may agree to a joint-
sitting of the two Houses in an attempt to pass the bills. That is a new aspect for consideration.
Therefore, the model that represents both a change in structure and numbers as proposed should:
• Reduce rubber stamping.
• Provide greater accountability.
• Allow for greater debate and discussion.
• Ensure that the Senate incorporates more political diversity than the Lower House, which
is basically a two party body.
• Demonstrates that the composition and structure of the Senate is different to that of the
House of Assembly, contributing to its function as a house of review.
• Have the Upper House acting as a 'stabilizer’ having a strengthening influence on the
expression of popular democracy.
• Encourage conscience votes and debates and
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• Take a more active legislative role.
Greater scrutiny of government activities by (non-government) Senators provides the opportunity
for all Senators to ask questions of Ministers and public officials. This may occasionally include
government senators examining activities of independent publicly funded bodies, or pursuing
issues arising from previous governments' terms of office.
A functioning Senate, either directly or/and indirectly through its committees, is to scrutinize
government’s activities. The vigour of this scrutiny will be fuelled by the party in government not
having the majority in the Senate. Whereas in the House of Assembly the government's majority
has sometimes limited that chamber's capacity to implement executive and legislative scrutiny, the
opposition and minor parties will be able to use their Senate numbers as a basis for conducting
inquiries into government operations.
The existence of equality of ‘parties’ in holding the balance of power in the Senate will make
decision making more important and occasionally more dramatic than in the House of Assembly.
Recommendation
A powerful Senate should therefore be an equal and effective. That is, the Senate should comprise
of an equal number of Senators appointed by the Prime Minister, Minority Leader and the
President. In that vein I wish to propose five (5) Senators from each of the contending parties.
This proposal is designed to establish an effective Senate that promotes greater adherence to the
principles of good governance through accountability, transparency and responsibility. It will
ultimately institute a critical role of Senators providing "sober, second thought" on the work done by
the Lower House.
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The Definition of Marriage
Making it a Constitutional Provision
This reservation is submitted over the non-inclusion of the definition of marriage as a constitutional
provision.
The Preamble of the constitution is the fundamental principle and philosophy that guide the tenet of the
social, political, economic, cultural and spiritual sustenance of the Saint Lucian society. The spiritual pillar of
our society is clearly annunciated in the Preamble of the constitution which clearly states that we … the
People of Saint Lucia:
“ a) affirm their faith in the supremacy of the Almighty God;
b) believe that all persons have been endowed equally by God with inalienable rights and dignity”;
In recognition of its relevance, the Commission duly considered such fundamentals and made it even more
inclusive to represent the majority of individuals in our society by rewording the section to read; “…
acknowledge the reality that the majority of Saint Lucians affirm their faith in the supremacy of Almighty
God, they also commit to the principle of respect for other spiritual belief and persuasions”, thus upholding
the values inscribed in the provision.
Marriage is universally accepted as a moral fabric of our society. Marriage is not what we want it to be. It is
defined as “a union between a man and a woman”. That therefore, provides a premise for it to be given
absolute expression in the constitution. Further, inclusion of the definition, in no way infringes on the
fundamental rights of individuals. Rather, it epitomizes our norms and values and resonates in the principles
of procreation.
It was observed, that the consideration given to gender and sexual orientation by the Commission, though
commendable, prejudices the bias against the inclusion of the definition of marriage (a union between a
man and a woman) in the constitution and therefore engineered the potential abortion of this moral
imperative. To a certain extent, behavioural trends are generally subsumed within the social proclivity of
gender and sexual orientation and can possibly propagate the environment for a level of acculturation
conducive for the decadence of the very norms and values we seek to uphold and which are intrinsically
foreign to the St. Lucian society. Further, the associated behaviours are of no positive value to the social,
economic, cultural and spiritual advancement of our country.
Our belief in the Creator or spiritual persuasions by others, strongly upholds and protects the fundamentals
of procreation for the sustenance of the human race. By design, the male was never made to be a partner to
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a man or a female to a woman. Not inscribing the definition of marriage in our constitution, is subjects it to
be changed by the whims and fancies of agents if placed in ordinary legislation, and represents a tacit
endorsement of, or an accommodating valve to the act of same sex marriage. The abortion of the fabric of
our norms, values and procreation, is the denial and death of any society. To devoid ourselves of such truth
is ultimately therefore, an abortion of our spiritual existence.
I therefore strongly recommend that the definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman be
given expression in the revised constitution.
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RESERVATION
Commissioner Veronica Cenac
INCLUSION OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A GROUND OF DISCRIMINATION
Human Dignity as the Basis for Human Rights
The Preamble to the Constitution of Saint Lucia adopts the belief that all persons are endowed
equally by God with inalienable rights and dignity. It further observes that human dignity requires
respect for spiritual values; for private family life and property; and the enjoyment of an adequate
standard of economic and social well-being dependent upon the resources of the State. Human
rights are premised on the inherent dignity of the human person. There is a positive duty on the
State to take reasonable measures to protect the human rights of its citizens. This was clearly
stated by Barrow J in Francis v Attorney-General of Saint Lucia
102
where the court recognized the
duty of the State to ensure that there was adequate protection against domestic violence.
Vulnerable populations to HIV and those already living with HIV face widespread discrimination in
Saint Lucia. Although the Constitution protects against discrimination, this protection is limited to
specified grounds; none of which include health status, disability or sexual orientation. It was
recommended that:(a) the anti-discrimination provision be open-ended rather than closed so that
protection against discrimination is not restricted to the grounds listed; one means of achieving this
is the insertion of the phrase “other status” in the provision. and (b) the protection provided for in
the anti-discrimination provision be extended to include discrimination on the basis of health status,
disability and sexual orientation. While the Commission agreed to the extension of the grounds to
health status and disability, there was no consensus on the basis of sexual orientation.
Protection from discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation
Protection from discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is inherently tied to fundamental
principles of equality, privacy and respect for human dignity. In Saint Lucia it is commonplace for
102
LC 2001 HC 16 (24 May 2001)
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persons to openly display acts of hostility towards and discriminate against perceived and actual
homosexuals, lesbians and transgendered persons. There is the perception that men who have
sex with men are infected with HIV and the often misguided conclusion that men who are infected
with HIV are homosexuals. The stigma attached to being homosexual deters many individuals
from getting tested. Discrimination should not be condoned by the State. Sexual orientation should
be included as a ground of discrimination in the anti-discrimination section.
In the Landmark decision of the Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others
delivered by the High Court of Delhi on 2nd July 2009, the Court held that Section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC), insofar it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private, is violative of
Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution. In 2001, the Naz Foundation had filed a public interest
litigation (PIL) petition with the Delhi High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of Section
377 under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution on equality, Article 15 on equality on the basis of
sex, Article 19 on freedom of speech and expression, and Article 21 on the right to privacy and
health.
S.MURALIDHAR, J Chief Justice in his written decision on behalf of the Court found, after
reviewing extensive material placed on the record in the form of affidavits, authoritative reports by
well-known agencies and judgments including affidavits filed by the Ministry of Health, that the
criminalization of same-sex conduct has a negative impact on the lives of gay men and women
who are reduced to “un-apprehended felons”, thus entrenching stigma and encouraging
discrimination in different spheres of life. Apart from misery and fear, a few of the more obvious
consequences are:
harassment,
blackmail,
extortion, and
discrimination.
He stated:
“The criminalization of homosexuality condemns in perpetuity a sizable section of society and
forces them to live their lives in the shadow of harassment, exploitation, and humiliation, cruel and
degrading treatment at the hands of the law enforcement machinery. The vast majority (borrowing
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the language of the South African Constitutional Court) are denied “moral full citizenship”. Section
377 IPC grossly violates their right to privacy and liberty embodied in Article 21 insofar as it
criminalises consensual sexual acts between adults in private. S.MURALIDHAR, J Page 43
The link between buggery laws and how they impede HIV prevention efforts was one of the
compelling arguments by the Applicants in the Naz Foundation judgment which resonated with the
Court and upon which the decision rests.
Justice Michael Kirby, a distinguished former Judge of Australian High Court, expressing in similar
vein said that criminalization of private, consensual homosexual acts is a legacy of one of three
very similar criminal codes (of Macaulay, Stephen and Griffith), imposed on colonial people by the
imperial rules of the British Crown. Such laws are wrong:
Wrong in legal principle because they exceed the proper ambit and function of the
criminal law in a modern society;
Wrong because they oppress a minority in the community and target them for an
attribute of their nature that they do not choose and cannot change. In this respect
they are like other laws of colonial times that disadvantages people on the ground
of their race or sex;
Wrong because they fly in the face of modern scientific knowledge about the
incidence and variety of human sexuality; and
Wrong because they put a cohort of citizens into a position of stigma and shame
that makes it hard to reach them with vital messages about safe sexual conduct,
essential in the age of HIV/AIDS.
Enforceability of the opening section to the Bill of Rights
The opening section to the Bill of Rights in Caribbean Constitutions is generally not viewed as
giving rise to enforceable rights. In Saint Lucia, the opening section is not included in the redress
clause. The High Court in Girard and the St. Lucia Teachers Union v AG
103
concluded that rights in
the opening section were not amenable to redress. This section was said to be merely declaratory,
providing a forerunner of things to come which are worthy of protection. The position is different in
103
LC 1986 HC 24 (17 December 1986) unreported
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Antigua and Barbuda and Belize, where the opening sections are specifically included in the
redress clause. This approach should be adopted by Saint Lucia.
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RESERVATION
Commissioner David Cox
Although I am in general agreement with many of the recommendations made in this report, there
are some matters on which I must respectfully express my disagreement with the majority of my
colleagues on the Commission (“the majority.”)
The Proposals on Prime Ministerial Power
The majority on the Commission recommends that the office of the PM (PM) be stripped of several
of the powers currently enjoyed by the office. (See Chapters Five and Six of the report, for
examples.) These reductions in the all-encompassing powers of the PM are appropriate and
laudable. They also represent significant changes to the current constitutional framework which, if
implemented, would bring about material changes in the way Government works.
Curiously, while the majority has stripped the office of many of its powers, they have also opted to
retain the current rule which permits a parliamentary majority to essentially “fire” or change a PM,
by withdrawing their support and replacing him with another House member of their choosing. (See
Chapters Five and Six.) They have also gone further, by recommending the removal of the PM’s
power to dissolve the House should this occur. Together, the result of these recommendations is
that it is certainly conceivable that several PMs could be appointed during the term of any one
Parliament.
By going this route, the majority has succeeded in radically and severely weakening the office of
the PM. In the current system, every PM enjoys a degree of leverage over his Parliamentary
colleagues, primarily through his ability to determine who becomes a Minister. This leverage
operates in several ways. It allows him a reasonable discretion to “hand out” rewards for political
success. It also enables him to establish the hierarchy of his Cabinet, by giving more senior posts
to more seasoned or loyal colleagues and less high profile appointments to more junior or
inexperienced members. Most importantly, it provides him an opportunity to exercise discipline
over Cabinet through the threat of dismissal of any Minister.
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This is an important element of the current system. The discretion to appoint and remove Ministers
represents both a carrot and a stick. It ensures that the PM and his Cabinet exist in a state of
dynamic tension – he is dependent on their support for his position as PM, while they are
dependant on him as Party Leader to get elected, and for political rewards. This situation promotes
a degree of stability in Government, although, as history has only recently shown in Saint Lucia, it
is open to abuse.
Under the new dispensation however, a PM would essentially be unable to appoint his
Parliamentary colleagues as Cabinet Ministers, without their having to resign their seats in
Parliament first. While they could always resign their seats to serve in Cabinet, they would run the
risk that the PM could dismiss them at his whim at some later point, with the effect that those very
members would essentially be excluded from Government altogether. This is because, unlike in the
current system, they would no longer be able to simply go back to being an ordinary backbencher.
Once dismissed from Cabinet, they would be out of power, for the duration of that Parliament. Put
another way, there would be very little incentive indeed for a member of the House to resign his
seat in Parliament to serve in the PM’s Cabinet.
Coupled with his inability to dissolve the House if his colleagues should withdraw their support, the
consequence of these new proposals would be to decisively remove, any leverage a PM would
enjoy over his Parliamentary colleagues. A PM would have nothing to incentivise loyalty, nor the
ability to discipline or punish disloyalty. In fact, his only option to exercise discipline would be to
have members fired from the party, but in doing so, he or she would potentially expose him or
herself to losing his or her parliamentary majority.
Consequently, the proposals, if adopted, would result in an immediate and considerable shift in the
balance of power between the PM and the rest of the members of his party, who were elected to
the House. They would ensure that actual power would move dramatically away from the PM,
toward those members of the House, who made up the majority party in Government.
With the greatest respect to my colleagues, the cumulative effect of the changes proposed by the
majority in this regard goes beyond mere emasculation of the office of PM. With these proposals,
the Commission has succeeded in pulling the pants down around the waist of the office; they have
castrated it, tied a bag of hardened cement around its ankles and thrown it into the Castries
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Harbour. By some as yet undiscovered constitutional magic, the majority on the Commission
appear to expect the office to float, unscathed and alive, to the surface.
Nothing in my study of constitutional law or hard politics permits me to share this remarkable
optimism. In the circumstances contemplated by the majority, PMs would be removed at the
slightest whims and fancies of aggrieved, over-ambitious or unscrupulous elected members and
frequent changes of PM would actually become an even greater risk than what exists under the
current system. In fact, the Commission’s proposals, if adopted, would probably guarantee several
changes of PM in the life of any given Government.
In my view, the proposals would simply lead to an intolerable situation where there would be no
continuity in government, and where Parliamentary discipline would be non-existent. Without an
incentive to promote the success of the PM and his policies, elected members would essentially be
left to a “free for all/every man for himself” scenario, in which the immediate needs of a particular
constituency or member could never be prioritised over those of any other. Every PM would
essentially become the hostage of every single member of the majority in Parliament and the office
itself would be relegated to a game of musical chairs, as each member of the parliamentary
majority vied to take his turn at the helm.
In addition to the foregoing, the recommendation also gives rise to broader, systemic concerns
which are troubling. The task of reforming a Constitution is a delicate undertaking. It invariably
involves redistributing power to make Government more accountable and responsive to voters, by
addressing instances of over-concentration of authority in any one branch of Government. In other
words, constitutional reform must involve redistributing power away from Government and toward
the people, if it is to be meaningful.
In the current system, the overwhelming concentration of authority in the Cabinet is an
unacceptable, intolerable state of affairs that is actually inimical to the development of a strong
democratic ethos in Saint Lucia. The less empowered people are to exercise control over their
Government, the more likely the case that Government can run roughshod over the people or the
more likely that Government can simply run amok. The more frequently Government does this, the
greater the public disenchantment with the institutions of Government and with the idea of
democratic participation generally.
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This concentration of authority in the hands of a PM and a Cabinet, is the defining feature of the so
called Westminster model. Without appropriate checks and balances, this concentrated authority
routinely gets out of control. It is for this reason that I fully support the majority of Commissioners in
their view that the persons who constitute Cabinet and the House should be separated to the
extent that this is possible.
Yet with the proposals to fundamentally strip the powers of the PM down to their barest minimum,
without a corresponding restraint on the power of the parliamentary majority to remove him or her
at their whim, the majority on the Commission has essentially exchanged one type of constitutional
tyrant for another. They have not proposed to redistribute power in our system of Government to
make all three branches of Government more equal, but instead have merely shifted the
concentration of authority away from the Cabinet, toward the majority in the House. Instead of an
almost tyrannical, super-powerful PM, looming large over the constitutional framework, we would
be left with a situation where every member of a parliamentary majority was king, able to insist on
the building of a major road or a school in every constituency, irrespective of the state of the
treasury or the country’s finances. Since the PM would know he could simply be removed if he did
not comply with every request, no matter how unreasonable, how could he refuse?
In effect therefore, the Commission’s proposals would simply exchange one type of constitutional
monster for another. Instead of abuses caused by a powerful, reckless Cabinet, carrying out bad
policy due to hasty decision-making, we would be left with a dysfunctional Parliament which could
simply bully the Executive to the point where the very act of governing was impossible. Instead of a
strong Executive overseen by a weak Legislature, we would have a weak Executive dominated by
a capricious Legislature. Government would simply become the incapacitated hostage of the
privileged majority.
In other words therefore, the majority hasn’t solved the inherent problem of the over-centralisation
of power; they have merely proposed to shift its locus. Consequently, while I can agree with the
majority’s recommendations that, for the sake of creating proper checks and balances on Cabinet
authority, the Cabinet and Parliament should be largely separated, I can not support the
recommendation that the majority of elected members should have the power to change PMs,
without the imposition of a related rule requiring an automatic dissolution of Parliament.
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In my view, if the PM’s powers are to be so considerably diminished, then the ability of his
colleagues to replace him should be similarly restricted. Since he is unable to discipline them
without endangering his own position in Parliament, they should not be able to discipline him
without also putting themselves at risk. Accordingly, if the majority of elected members should
withdraw their support or vote against the PM in a vote of no confidence, my recommendation is
that he should be entitled to dissolve Parliament and permit them all to face the electorate. While I
recognise of course that such a situation would be novel in the context of our parliamentary
systems, it is no less radical an innovation that what the majority on the Commission have
proposed in respect of separating the Cabinet and Parliament, fixing dates for elections or
appointing persons to Ministerial posts, after vetting and approval by Parliament.
At the very least, by requiring elections whenever the PM was changed, the Commission would
ensure that the office, even with reduced authority, would continue to function as the “first among
equals” and the “keystone of the Cabinet arch,” it was always designed to be. It would ensure that
the survival of the parliamentary majority would depend on the enforcement of parliamentary
discipline, and would permit any person appointed as PM, sufficient leverage to actually fulfill the
mandate he or she was elected, however indirectly, to fulfill. It would promote a reasonable degree
of continuity in Government and ensure that the PM would not lose support, merely due to the
irrepressible ambition of one or more of his elected colleagues. On the contrary, his or her support
would be virtually guaranteed, except on the genuine grounds that he or she was truly
incompetent, corrupt, or largely out of favor with the public. After all, which elected member would
participate in a rebellion against a PM, when his or her position was at stake, unless that rebellion
was founded on some genuine difference of principle?
Most importantly, tying the fate of the majority in Parliament to that of the PM in this manner, would
also preserve the dynamic tension of the current arrangements, to the extent that the potential for
re-election of the majority in Parliament would depend on the performance of the PM and his
selected, largely technical Cabinet. Put in other terms, the success of the majority of elected
members in the House would depend on the success of the policies of the PM and Cabinet and
vice versa.
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There is one further but actually equally important reason I am moved to disagree with the rest of
the Commission on this issue.
As we went about the length and breadth of the country, it was not uncommon for many ordinary
Saint Lucians, to complain that they were tired and disgruntled that “their” PM could be changed,
by a group of people in a party, or by a rebellion in a Cabinet. It was clear that the status quo
angered many Saint Lucians and that they felt deeply aggrieved by the fact, that the person to
whom they believed they were handing over authority for managing the affairs of the country, could
be changed without their consent or even consultation. They were suspicious and resentful of the
“back door” machinations they believed were invariably involved, in cases where a sitting PM was
to be replaced by one of his colleagues in Government.
What is obvious but nonetheless amazing from the frequency of this complaint, is that although
Saint Lucians do not elect a PM directly in our current system, the public nevertheless regards the
individual, as having been essentially elected by them. In fact, the frequency with which this
concern was raised, confirms that elections in our system are largely decided on the basis of the
charisma and electability of the political leader of the party seeking office. It also probably explains
the frequency of the submission by the public that the PM should be directly elected; a submission
that, like the majority on the Commission, I do not support.
Notwithstanding that many members of the public were intense in their views that the situation
cries out for change however, the majority on the Commission has elected to maintain the status
quo. They have chosen to do so, on the basis of what I consider to be overly legalistic, technical
grounds, which do not address the substance of the public’s concerns.
This is very unfortunate. Given the intensity of the public’s feelings where this matter is concerned,
the prevailing state of our political discourse and the highly tribal nature of our politics, I feel that it
is frankly, only a matter of time before the change of a popular Saint Lucian PM, as a result of the
unwitting stupidity or rampant ambition of an unscrupulous Cabinet majority, leads to widespread
bloodshed in the streets of Saint Lucia.
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Term Limits
The majority on the Commission has proposed in Chapter Six that term limits should be imposed
on PMs, but only to prevent persons from serving more than three (3) consecutive terms at a time.
Based on the recommendation, a PM who had served three (3) consecutive terms could be re-
appointed to the office of PM, after one (1) term had elapsed since his or her last consecutive term.
With the greatest respect to my colleagues, the recommendation amounts in my view to a non-
recommendation. This is because it would not deal with the mischief the public asked the
Commission to address in the first place. If the majority’s recommendations on term limits were
adopted in their respective countries, they would not prevent, for example; an Owen Arthur, Keith
Mitchell, Denzil Douglas, Roosevelt Skerrit, or Ralph Gonzalves from being elected to the office of
PM six (6) times or more. Indeed, nothing in the majority’s recommendations would have prevented
the late Sir John Compton from being re-elected to however many terms he was able to win. And
yet, whether right or wrong, the public was fairly vociferous in their calls for placing limits on the
number of times a person could be re-offered to the electorate as PM and by their own reasoning,
the Commission concedes that the arguments in favour of imposing term limits are more
compelling than those against. What then is the Commission’s true position on the desirability of
term limits?
Put simply, the majority on the Commission has adopted a recommendation which does not
achieve any purpose. But in trying to have its proverbial cake and eat it, the majority is also
sending a mixed or confused message to policy makers and the public alike. The Commission
should either recommend: (i) adopting term limits, or (ii) avoiding them completely.
This aside, my view is that the issue of term limits requires a principled decision. There will always
be strong views in favour or against anything with significant consequences, and neither side will
ever convince the other of the correctness of their views. However, if I ever harboured any doubts
that term limits were an absolute necessity for any Government, recent events in Egypt have
eradicated them to the point where I can no longer recall what they were. Of course, non-
supporters of term limits will be quick to point out that the system of Government in Egypt was not
democratic, and therefore, there was never an opportunity to vote Mubarak out. In truly democratic
systems they would argue, Mubarak’s presidency would have been ended by the people.
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This would completely miss the point. The system in Egypt lasted as long as it did because it was
tolerated or embraced by the people of Egypt, and before Mubarak became the reviled figure he is
today, he was revered as a national hero and generally admired internationally. Ironically, this is
also true of every popularly elected figure in democracies the world over. In support of this claim,
one has only to ask a citizen of Zimbabwe. Long before Robert Mugabe became the hated figure
he is, he was a popularly elected figure and very admired. In a democratic system without term
limits therefore, Mubarak would probably have been re-elected as many times as Mugabe, before
eventually being thrown out. The lesson here is that, just because you can elect someone to five
(5) or six (6) terms, doesn’t mean you should, and the best constitutional rules are sometimes
designed to help protect people, from themselves. Term limits are just such a type of rule that at
least, also has the benefit of avoiding the necessity of mass demonstrations and civil unrest to
terminate a politician’s time in office.
In sum, I believe term limits are an absolute necessity in any modern, responsible democracy and
its absence in our system of Government is an evil we inflict upon ourselves.
Appointment of Rejected Candidates to Cabinet Posts
The majority have agreed that the PM should have the power to nominate as Ministers, persons
who were defeated as candidates for general elections. They have taken this view on the
somewhat dubious grounds that rejection at the polls does not mean that the public thereby also
intends to express an opinion on whether that person should be made a Minister.
The logic of the majority on this matter, escapes me. Put bluntly, the majority is saying they did not
adopt the recommendation because they did not believe it is what the public wanted, except that
this was precisely what the public said they wanted, on almost every occasion we spoke with them.
Indeed, the submission was among some of the most popular we received. Accordingly, how can
we reject a recommendation on the basis that the public does not intend something to happen,
when they were clear and unequivocal in saying over and over again, that the situation should be
changed?
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The majority have also suggested that the discretion of the PM should not be unduly hamstrung by
placing a restriction on the PM’s ability to select defeated candidates. This is not an unreasonable
argument. However, it conveniently ignores the fact that, even if PMs are prevented from
nominating defeated candidates to Ministerial office, the available pool of persons from which he or
she would be able to draw will be wider than ever, in the context of the hybrid system the
Commission proposes for adoption.
Perhaps more importantly however, I believe there is a deeper message, hidden in the popularity
of the submission that the majority on the Commission may be ignoring. In my view, there is
growing public contempt for the notion that executive positions should be an automatic entitlement
for political success. Increasingly, the public is concerned about the quality of representation they
receive from elected officials in the current system. They are resentful of their local concerns being
relegated to once-a-week visits by members of Parliament, in favour of Ministerial duties. They
abhor a culture in which the opportunity to serve as a Minister, sit in a Cabinet and thereby obtain a
higher salary, or represent Saint Lucia overseas, is actually an inducement for entering into politics.
On the other hand, it is also reasonably clear that the public is deeply contemptuous of the practice
by various administrations, of appointing either defeated or prospective candidates to ministerial
positions, in order to utilize state resources to advance their chances at the next elections. In other
words, there is a widespread desire to elevate the position of district representative, promote a
higher quality of representation and reduce or eliminate the opportunity for defeated or prospective
candidates to utilize state resources to indirectly fund campaigns.
Taking all these matters into account, the message from the public seems to be that constitutional
reform should help promote a culture, in which persons offering themselves for political office
should be prepared to make the necessary sacrifices in the course of pursuing that objective. If
their intention is to represent people in parliamentary politics, they should be focused solely on
that, and moreover, political choices should have certain consequences. If a person wants to run
for office, they should do so in the full knowledge of that fact that they are barred from becoming a
Minister for the duration of the next Parliament. In other words, the public appears to want
politicians to be forced to make a choice.
The majority’s recommendations on this issue appear to miss this point."
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The Use of Running Mates to Replace MPs Who Resign from the House to
Take Up Cabinet Posts
The Commission has proposed in Chapter Five that political parties should be required to field
“running mates” with every candidate for every constituency. They have made this
recommendation on the basis that, where an elected candidate resigns from the House to take up
a Cabinet position, it would potentially jeopardise the Government’s majority if a by-election were
held and a candidate from a different party won the seat. Consequently, the Commission has
proposed that the majority group in Parliament should simply be able to appoint the party’s
“running mate,” so that a resignation will not have any effect on the number of seats on the
Government’s or Opposition’s benches.
I am unable to support the majority’s recommendation on this matter. The idea of “running mates”
for constituency elections is alien to Saint Lucia’s political culture. It will impose a serious burden
on political parties to essentially field an additional candidate for every constituency. It will do this in
circumstances where it is already difficult for political parties to find one quality candidate willing to
run. It will also lead to a greater level of complexity in our electoral process that will be difficult for
the majority of Saint Lucians to understand or manage.
Most importantly, the majority recommends making a major change in the way we conduct our
politics, to deal with what will only be a very rare or occasional occurrence. This is because the
majority ignores the probability that under the new system proposed, elected members will be able
to enjoy fixed terms while Ministers can be dismissed at pleasure. Accordingly, which elected
member would willingly give up the guaranteed tenure of a fixed parliamentary term, to expose him
or herself to dismissal at the PM’s whim? So while resignation to take up a Cabinet post will
certainly happen, the probability is that it will be quite rare indeed. Yet the majority proposes a
major overhaul of our electoral system to deal with it.
Rather than going the route proposed by the majority, my recommendation would be that a by-
election should be held when an elected member resigns for any reason. If the consequence of
resignation could be a by-election which could endanger the Government’s majority, this should be
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a matter for the political judgment of both the PM and elected member, who should make a
calculated decision about whether the appointment to Cabinet, is really necessary. Further, if as a
consequence of this alternative approach, appointments to Cabinet from among members of the
House would be less likely, it is arguable, (for reasons explained in the preceding section,) that
such a situation would probably be preferable in any event.
Proposals on the Right of Recall
The Commission has proposed that in order to secure the recall of a parliamentarian, a petition
containing the signatures of at least 25% of voters registered to vote in the respective constituency
should first be obtained or produced. Once produced, a recall referendum would be held, in which
at least 60% of electors voting in that referendum must vote in favour of recalling the specific
district representative to be successful. At that point, the member would be recalled and a by-
election would then be held to determine who should replace the recalled member. In short
therefore, the Commission has proposed that to recall an elected parliamentarian, there should be
two elections, namely; an election to determine whether an elected member should be recalled
(“the recall vote”) followed by another election to choose his or her successor (“the replacement
vote”.)
This represents an awfully convoluted and expensive procedure that would probably have the likely
effect of ensuring that no parliamentarian in Saint Lucia was ever recalled. In my view, the
procedure governing recall of governors in the state of California in the United States, provides a
good template for possible adoption or adaptation in Saint Lucia. In that system, the recall vote is
simultaneous with the replacement vote, so that in addition to the question of whether the
candidate should be recalled, voters are required in one sitting to choose his or her successor. In
this case, recalling an elected official represents a seamless, fluid transaction which has the added
benefit of being easier and less expensive to implement.
Alternatively, the threshold for the recall petition should be set at an appropriately high level and
once reached, a by-election should be triggered in which electors are given the opportunity to re-
elect the existing candidate or another contender.
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Proposals on the Human Rights Commission, the Contractor-General, the
Parliamentary Commissioner and the Integrity Commission
The Commission has made several recommendations to establish a number of bodies to scrutinise
executive conduct and to promote accountability and good governance. They have proposed the
creation of a new Human Rights Commission (“HRC”), called for the establishment of a Contractor-
General, and recommended significant reforms of both the office of the Parliamentary
Commissioner and the Integrity Commission. My concern is that the majority has not given
adequate consideration to the implications of their recommendations.
If adopted, the effect of the majority’s proposals would be to exponentially increase the size of
government and to place an even greater burden on the country’s finances, and by extension, tax-
payers. Further, throughout the report, the Commission as a whole bemoans the fact that sufficient
resources are not usually allocated to important constitutional offices like the office of the DPP, the
Parliamentary Commissioner and the Integrity Commission. It therefore makes little logical sense
that the majority should recommend the creation of new or additional offices that will have the
inevitable consequence of increasing the demand on already limited public resources.
Some of the recommendations are also unnecessary or inappropriate in our specific political and
historical context. HRCs are normally institutions established in countries with a history of
widespread and persistent human rights abuses, against a backdrop of the collapse of legal and
other state institutions. They are also often commonly established in countries with diverse ethnic
populations, where internal strife has resulted in widespread discrimination and or persecution of
an identifiable ethnic minority. In Saint Lucia, where none of these factors are present, where the
legal system is obviously functioning and has demonstrated its independence from the Executive,
and where citizens can and do routinely approach the Courts to hear their grievances against the
state, the establishment of an HRC would arguably be an expensive constitutional extravagance.
This is not to suggest that there will not and have not been abuses of fundamental rights of citizens
by state organs in Saint Lucia. However, there are existing mechanisms to address those abuses
and it would be preferable to ensure that such systems are made more effective, rather than to
create new burdens on taxpayers.
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Since the recommendations to establish these multiple bodies, are all concerned with monitoring
executive performance, it would appear to make more sense to simply establish one institution
which would have multiple functions. My recommendation would be to simply establish one
institution charged with the Constitutional responsibility to: (i) prosecute breaches of integrity rules
established by Parliament, (ii) monitor the award and performance of contracts involving the state,
(iii) investigate claims by the public against public officers or inefficiency of the public service, and
if necessary, advise dismissal of defaulting parties, and (iv) defend on behalf of deserving citizens,
breaches of fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
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Reservations
Commissioner Flavia Cherry
In a young democratic state like St. Lucia with a painful history of bigotry and exclusion from
slavery, any attempt at constitution reform will be fraught with expectations of moving towards the
principles of unrestricted and inalienable fundamental rights to all of its citizens. With this in mind, I
sought always, as a member of the Commission for Constitutional Reform, to consciously and
consistently refrain from allowing any personal beliefs and prejudices from clouding this vision for
ideals of inclusion and fundamental respect for the human person and equality for all. It is for this
reason, that I feel duty bound to pen my reservations and objections to the firm view of the majority
of Commissioners (despite my many objections), that the prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of gender and individual preference as well as the right for gender equality is not necessary for
inclusion in a reformed constitution.
I will explain the basis of my objections and will advance counter proposals for consideration (in
some areas where I think relevant), but this does not in any way suggest that I am distancing
myself to the general report of the Commission. My disagreement is limited mainly to the areas
that I have chosen to focus on and is not meant in any way to give the impression that I do not
appreciate, subscribe to and respect the hard work and long hours which went into the process of
constitutional reform. In fact, I support (despite the targeted objections) many of the relevant and
important recommendations in the report and humbly appeal for consideration of my comments
and recommendations, for the benefit of all St. Lucians, no matter what their status, gender or
personal/individual preferences. And I do so with the full understanding and experience (although
it gravely disturbs me) of the tendency to demonize those who stand up for the rights of the
minority and disadvantaged persons among us.
It is my firm conviction that in order to protect the right of every citizen, the recommendations to
reform of a new Constitution for St. Lucia cannot deliberately exclude those important proposals
relating to gender equality and prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender and even more
so, on the basis of individual preferences. However, every time the discussion on including gender
equality was held, the issue was always put down by the majority as irrelevant and in many cases,
there was an insistence that since sex is included, there was no need to include discrimination on
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the basis of gender. Most Commissioners held onto that view because they felt that sex and
gender was one and the same, despite my frequent, repeated and documented attempts to explain
otherwise.
Democracy is about the rule of the majority but I believe that that very democracy will be
compromised if the majority use their power to deny the rights of the minority. A democratic
constitution must therefore incorporate various fundamental rights in order for it to be democratic.
These fundamental rights are not determined by majority opinion (and in our case, the firmly held
personal beliefs of Commissioners), but are regarded as inalienable and inherent. These rights
have been integrated into all international human rights treaties, because it is generally accepted
that man, by his very nature is self-serving and discriminatory. St. Lucia has ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and has thus undertaken to respect the rights of
equality and respect for the dignity of all.
The right to equality implies respect for difference, so no person should be deprived of opportunity
solely on the basis of an irrelevant personal characteristic. Such a deprivation constitutes unfair
discrimination. For example, to deny a job simply on the basis of a person’s gender, when the fact
is unrelated to the ability to perform the required work, is an affront to the person’s dignity. Identity
of treatment may also result in substantive inequality. To equally deny maternity leave to women as
well as men results in equality through a failure to acknowledge a difference in circumstances and
sex. Unfair discrimination thus results from the unequal treatment of equals and the equal
treatment of unequals.
It is important to note that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1966 (ICCPR)
broadly referred to the inherent right to life and liberty and the right against arbitrary deprivation of
those rights and its various aspects (Articles 6 to 14); privacy, family, etc. (Article 17); freedom of
conscience and religion (Article 18); freedom of expression and information (Article 19); Right of
peaceful assembly (Article 21); freedom of association (Article 22); rights of minorities (Article 27);
etc. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR) broadly
referred to the “right to work” and its various aspects (Articles 6 and 7); right to form trade unions
for promotion of economic or social interests and the right to strike (Article 8); right to social
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security and social insurance (Article 9); family, marriage, children and mothers’ rights (Article 10);
adequate standard of living, right to food, clothing and housing, freedom from hunger (Article 11);
physical and mental health (Article 12); education (Article 13); compulsory primary education
(Article 14) and culture (Article 15). The treaty obligations under the covenant enjoined the State
Parties to ensure these rights without discrimination and “to take steps” to promote them “to the
maximum of its available resources”, with a view to achieving “progressively” the full realization of
these rights. The Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution are indeed the
precursor to economic, social and cultural rights specified in the ICESCR.
Following are my further comments and recommendations:
• The suggested inclusion of ‘of identity’ in the wording (c) of the preamble (before Chapter
1) after ‘of thought’
• The principle of equality of men and women is a basic requirement for the enjoyment of
rights so the following should be included in the preamble: gender equality, non-
discrimination, unity and tolerance for diversity, inclusiveness, justice and peace as
basic principles.
• Under Fundamental Rights and Freedoms a provision specifying that 'women and men
have equal rights and duties' should be included. It should also state that 'the State
may adopt specific measures to guarantee de facto equality in the exercise of rights
and duties.'
•
In Chapter 1 (under section 13 – 3) the word gender needs to be added into this paragraph
in order to recognize that gender should not be grounds for discrimination. If it is not
amended, it contradicts the Constitutional Article which provides that all persons are equal
before the law.
•
Sex is biologically determined and refers to the physical composition of males and
females. Gender refers to the socially constructed notion of man and woman (e.g. men as
strong and women as weak; men as leaders and women as followers; men as breadwinner
and women as homemakers). Both terms have to be included into the Constitution
because women and men can be discriminated against on the basis of their sex AND
gender. Put differently, because discrimination is about a different power relationship
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between men and women and not just based on the physical make up of men and women
(i.e. sex), it is necessary to include gender together with sex in this amendment. By using
the word gender, it also helps to situate and understand the relationship between men and
women and the fact that their relationship is based on different treatment which can result
in either of them being disadvantaged in varying circumstances. For example, a man
cannot be denied the right to nurture and raise his child on the basis of traditional and
cultural practices which suggest that this is the role of women.
•
Prohibition of discrimination is not enough as the state has to respect, protect and fulfill
rights. There is therefore need for an amendment which will enable the fulfilment of rights.
Women as compared to men, face many obstacles sanctioned by culture, religious
practice, by entrenched male interests in key institutions such as political parties, trade
unions, religious institutions, the courts, etc. There is a need to put in place enabling
conditions or preferential rules to benefit women, even when discrimination has been
prohibited, and thus facilitate their access to opportunities and accelerate de facto equality.
•
I must also add that variations of historic or past discrimination requires the concept of
corrective measures to overcome the effect of past discrimination that leaves women
handicapped vis a vis the men. For example, if a development initiative is offered to
women on the same footing as the men, according to the principle of equal rights or equal
opportunity, it might still turn out that men benefit more than women, because men
generally (and based on cultural practices) do not share the burden of nurturing children
and caring for other relatives. Women may also be disadvantaged by issues of confidence
or simply because the environment is male dominated and is more conducive to male
participation. This is the effect of past discrimination. The constitutional amendment must
also include provisions for positive action (through law or other measures) in favour of
women (or other disadvantaged groups). This will pave the way for measures through
which affirmative action and women centered development policy and budgeting measures
can be legitimized to ensure de facto equality for women. This has been done in other
countries such as India and South Africa.
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•
Some important rights are not provided and should be included, for example, the right to
decide regarding procreation, personal body integrity, to both maternity and
paternity leave, to equality of the mother and the father in parenting and nurturing of
their children.
•
Currently the constitutional provision for equality addresses the actions of the state via
laws and policies. Much of the discrimination against women takes place through the
actions of private actors (e.g. private enterprises, organizations or individuals). In the
context of privatization, we therefore need to ensure that the private sector in the fields
of education, employment, health etc. also are bound by the constitutional guarantee
of equality.
For example, the South African Constitution makes provisions for this.
" No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds
in terms of subsection 3"
Finally, as a general recommendation and in keeping with the spirit of respect for rights and
inclusion, I would like to call for the national anthem to be revised to make it gender neutral.
Distinguished fellow commissioners, all, there is no better time but the process of Constitution
Reform, for all of us to act like the humans God intended us to be -- one people, under God, with
liberty, respect and justice for all. And may God grant us wisdom to collectively reach that level of
consciousness and understanding. My sincere wish is that we keep maturing until as a plural
society of equals, we truly appreciate and accept that a Constitution for the people means all the
people, with no limitations or biases.
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APPENDICES
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Appendix I:
Statutory Instrument, 2004, No. 50
SAINT LUCIA
STATUTORY INSTRUMENT, 2004, No. 50
[16th July, 2004]
WHEREAS The Constitution of Saint Lucia (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") is a
schedule to the Saint Lucia Independence Order (S.I. 1978 No. 1901), made by Her Majesty-In-
Council, pursuant to the West Indies Act 1967(a) and received into Saint Lucia pursuant to a
resolution passed in the House of Assembly on the 24th of October 1978 and came into operation
on the 22nd of February, 1979;
WHEREAS the Saint Lucia Constitution is now approaching twenty-five (25) years old and
there is a need to take stock and to examine what changes, if any, should be made in order to
widen and to deepen democracy in Saint Lucia;
AND WHEREAS this review of the Constitution is in part a fulfilment of an undertaking by the
present Government to engage in Constitutional Reform since its assumption of office in 1997;
AND WHEREAS in the Throne Speech of Her Excellency on March 21, 2000, Her Excellency
announced that the Government intended to establish a Constitution Reform Commission to
review and reform the Constitution of Saint Lucia in order to encourage effective governance, to
ensure that the institutions of State remain strong and responsive and that the rights and freedoms
guaranteed to all persons are respected;
NOTING THAT the objectives of the reform exercise are principally:
(1) to promote a meaningful expansion and widening of democratic participation by citizens in
Government;
(2) to address possible weaknesses in the Constitutional framework which political practice
has highlighted over the years;
(3) to re-fashion the Constitution so that it better accords with our changing social and political
circumstances; and
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(4) to promote better governance and greater equity in the constitutional framework generally;
AND NOTING THAT to ensure popular legitimacy, the process of reform will necessarily have to be
bi-partisan and accommodate broad based participation by citizens of Saint Lucia, at home and
abroad;
BE IT RESOLVED that the House of Assembly and the Senate do approve the establishment
of a Constitutional Reform Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission"):
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED:
1. That the Commission be guided by the following Terms of Reference:
(a) to examine, consider and enquire into strengthening Saint Lucia's democratic
institutions and other related laws and matters. After due examination and study, to
report in writing giving its opinions, making recommendations, and providing for
consideration of any amendments, reforms and changes in the Constitution and related
laws as are in the opinion of the Commissioners necessary and desirable for
promoting the peace, order and good Government of Saint Lucia, and in particular for:
(i) strengthening democratic institutions, and ensuring that parliamentary and
multi-party democracy is given such constitutional protection as may be
necessary and desirable;
(ii) encouraging a wider and deeper participation by the citizens of Saint
Lucia in the democratic processes of Government, both at the parliamentary
and other levels;
(iii) strengthening the accountability of parliamentary representatives to their
respective constituents;
(iv) the retention or abolition of a second Chamber of the Legislature; the
method and means of increasing the representativeness of Parliament, not
excluding such changes in the manner of electing representatives as may
lead to a more equitable distribution of seats among political parties on the
basis of votes received at general elections;
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(v) strengthening the fundamental and basic rights, liberties and freedoms of the
individual and ensuring that there is no discrimination in the national life of the
State;
(vi) maintaining and strengthening the independence of the judiciary at all
levels;
(vii) strengthening the relevant Government machinery in order to ensure
maximum transparency and strict accountability in the management of
public funds, including appropriate sanctions for corruption;
(viii) reviewing the independence and impartiality of the Public Service, having
particular regard to the need for the efficient and responsive administration
of Government business;
(b) Additionally, the Commission shall:
(i) advise and make recommendations concerning the appropriateness or
otherwise of maintaining Saint Lucia's links with the British Crown;
(ii) advise and make recommendations concerning a structure for the executive
authority of Saint Lucia that is best suited to protect the independence and
authority of Parliament and the fundamental rights and freedoms of its
citizens;
(iii) advise and make recommendations concerning the patriation of the
Constitution so as to ensure that it draws its authority and validity from an
Act of the Parliament of Saint Lucia;
(iv) protect parliamentary democracy, the fundamental rights and freedoms of
the citizens of Saint Lucia and to achieve effective and efficient Government
so as to position Saint Lucia to meet the challenges of the twenty-first
century and beyond;
(v) prepare and include in the written report, if the Commissioners so
determine, draft legislation to effect any amendments, reforms or changes
to the Constitution and related laws.
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2. That the Commission be constituted as follows:
(a) a Chairperson to be appointed by the Governor General, acting on the advice of the
Prime Minister who shall consult with the Leader of the Opposition before tendering
his advice to the Governor General;
(b) a Deputy Chairperson appointed by the Governor General, acting on the advice of
the Leader of the Opposition who shall consult with the Prime Minister before
tendering his advice to the Governor General;
(c) five persons appointed by the Governor General acting in accordance with the
advice of the Prime Minister;
(d) two persons appointed by the Governor General acting in accordance with the
advice of the Leader of the Opposition;
(e) one person from each of the following organizations, appointed by the Governor
General, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister who shall consult with each
organization:
(i) the Saint Lucia Christian Council;
(ii) the Saint Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture;
(iii) the Saint Lucia Medical and Dental Association;
(iv) the Civil Service Association;
(v) the Saint Lucia Bar Association;
(vi) a representative of Women's Organisations;
(vii) the National Youth Council of Saint Lucia;
(viii) the Saint Lucia Teachers Union;
(ix) a representative from Farmers' Organisations;
(x) a representative from the Credit Union League;
(xi) a representative from Sporting Organisations;
(xii) the National Workers Union;
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(xiii) the Saint Lucia Seamen and Waterfront Workers Union;
(xiv) a representative from Cultural Organisations;
(xv) up to two other representatives from non-Governmental organizations
including those from overseas.
3. That in the performance of its functions, the Commission shall govern itself as follows:
(a) no member or officer of the House of Assembly shall not [sic] be eligible for
membership of the Commission;
(b) a member of the Commission may at any time resign his or her office by notice in
writing to the Chairperson who shall notify the Governor General;
(c) if at any time any member of the Commission is for any reason unable to exercise
the functions of his or her office, the Governor General shall in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 2 hereunder appoint a person to replace such member;
(d) the appointment of members of the Commission and the termination of office of any
member shall be notified promptly in the Gazette;
(e) the Commission shall regulate its own procedure subject to the following:
(i) the Chairperson, or in his or her absence the Deputy Chairperson, shall
preside at all meetings of the Commission;
(ii) the quorum shall be thirteen persons including either the Chairperson or the
Deputy Chairperson;
(iii) the decisions of the Commission may be by consensus, but where
consensus cannot be achieved the decisions shall be the votes of two-thirds
of all the members present;
(iv) all documents and all decisions made by the Commission shall be signed by
the Chairperson, or in his or her absence the Deputy Chairperson and the
Secretary or in his or her absence, the Assistant Secretary of the
Commission;
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(f) the Commission shall meet at such times and places as may be necessary or
expedient for the transaction of its business, and such meetings may be held in
public or in private as the Commission itself may determine;
(g) the Commission may delegate to any sub-committee or subcommittees the authority
to carry out on its behalf such duties within the mandate of the Commission as may
be appropriate;
(h) no personal liability shall attach to a member or staff of the Commission in respect of
anything done or suffered in good faith in the execution of his or her duties with the
Commission;
(i) the Commission shall be served by a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary both
appointed to the Commission by the Governor General upon the advice of the Prime
Minister;
(j) the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Chairperson, may assign any
Consultant or Technical Advisor to the Commission to assist in the carrying out of its
functions or mandate;
(k) such sum or sums of money as the House of Assembly may deem appropriate for
the performance of the duties of the Commission shall be a charge on the
Consolidated Fund;
(l) the members and staff of the Commission shall be paid such stipends for services
and reimbursement of expenses as the Government on the recommendation of the
Commission may determine;
(m) the Commission may from time to time make representations to the Government for
the payment of allowances and expenses for such persons who have assisted the
Commission in the performance of its duties as may be deemed / appropriate;
(n) it shall be the responsibility of the Chairperson to account to the Government for all
monies in accordance with the provisions of the Financial Regulations;
(o) the Commission shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Assembly such Interim
Reports as the Commission may determine on a quarterly basis and shall further
Report – March 2011
276
submit its Final Report to the Speaker of the House of Assembly no later than twenty-
four months after the date of its first appointment;
(p) upon receipt of any Interim Report or of the Final Report from the Commission, the
Speaker shall forthwith cause copies thereof to be prepared and shall circulate such
copies to all Members of the House of Assembly for consideration at the next
meeting of the House of Assembly following such circulation;
(q) the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition may give
appropriate operational directions to the Commission on its functioning, including the
time lines, but not as to its recommendations on constitutional reform.
4. That in pursuing its Terms of Reference the Commission is also mandated to:
(a) consult widely with the citizens and organizations of Saint Lucia whether in Saint
Lucia or abroad, by such manner and procedure as the Commission determines;
(b) receive and examine proposals from the general public;
(c) prepare and disseminate such material as might be relevant so as to widen public
knowledge and appreciation of the Constitution;
(d) generate public interest in the subject matter by means of public meetings throughout
the island, radio "callin" programmes, other public discussions, pamphlets and
information kits, or any other methods of communication which the Commission
deems appropriate in both English and Kweyol;
(e) facilitate the arrangements for advertisements by the Government Information
Service and other private media; and to plan and organize media briefings, seminars
and other outreach programmes and activities;
(f) interface with the Organisation of American States, United Nations Development
Programme, University of the West Indies, OECS, CARICOM, Commonwealth
Secretariat and other collaborators to the Constitutional Review Process;
(g) set up sub-committees to :
(i) to assist with the organization and management of the public consultations;
(ii) to advise on the preparation of ad hoc documentation for keeping the
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
277
general public and specific interest groups appraised of the Constitutional
Reform activities, and overseeing the production of the same;
(h) manage the overall budget and authorize payments as needed;
(i) maintain the financial integrity of the Constitutional Review Process by
reporting timely on all financial issues to the Government and the Speaker
of the House of Assembly.
Passed in the House of Assembly this 17th day of February, 2004.
BADEN J. ALLAIN,
Speaker of the House of Assembly.
Passed in the Senate this 14th day of April, 2004.
HILFORD DETERVILLE,
President of the Senate.
Report – March 2011
278
Appendix II
CRC’s Information Pamphlet.
Constitutional Review
St. Lucia
Constitutional Review Commission (CRC)
The Commission was set up by Statutory Instrument, No: 50 of 2004 dated 16
th
July,
2004.
The two main political parties, the St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) and the United Workers
Party (UWP), in Parliament took the decision to set up the CRC. It is an independent,
nonpolitical body responsible to the Parliament of St. Lucia.
The Commission comprises twenty-five (25) Commissioners drawn from a wide cross-
section of St. Lucian society, and includes nominees from various organizations
representing civil society.
Extracts from the terms of reference of the CRC.
1. To do everything necessary to review the existing Constitution of St.
Lucia and to submit recommendations to the House of Assembly.
2. To organize and manage public consultations, arrange meetings at home and
abroad.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
279
3. To generate public interest in the work of the Commission by
implementing public education and information programmes;
4. To facilitate the arrangements for advertisements by the Government
Information Service (GIS) and other private media; to plan and organize
media briefings, seminars and other outreach programmes and activities;
5. To prepare and submit to the Speaker of the House of Assembly periodical
reports on the work of the Commission.
What is a Constitution?
It is a body of fundamental principles governing a state or nation which may be written or
unwritten. It is the Supreme Law of the nation and comprises a set of rules which regulates
the relationship between the state and the citizens, as well as between citizen and citizen.
Our present Constitution
The Constitution consists of ten (10) chapters, which are in turn divided into one hundred
and twenty (120) sections. The chapters are:
Chapter 1- Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
Chapter 2 - Governor General
Chapter 3 - Parliament
Chapter 4 - The Executive
Chapter 5 - Finance
Chapter 6 - The Public Service
Chapter 7 - Citizenship
Report – March 2011
280
Chapter 8 - Judicial Provisions.
Chapter 9 - Parliamentary Commissioner
Chapter 10 - Miscellaneous.
For purposes of electing a Government, the country is divided into constituencies.
Candidates are nominated for each constituency and the candidate attaining the highest number
of votes is declared the representative for that constituency. This is known as the "First Past
The Post" system, and every citizen of the age of eighteen (18) and over is entitled to cast
a vote.
Some Institutions and Organs established by the Constitution
The Constitution provides for a Governor General who is Saint Lucia's Head of State and
represents Her Majesty the Queen. As such, the Governor General sits at the head of each
branch of Government. The Constitution also establishes the Government, which is divided
into:
• The Executive
• The Legislature
• The Judiciary
The Executive consists of the Cabinet of Ministers led by the Prime Minister.
The Legislature consists of the House of Assembly and the Senate.
The Judiciary consists of the Privy Council, Court of Appeal, the High Court and the
Magistracy.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
281
Why review our Constitution
Saint Lucia became independent in 1979 and since then the world has changed dramatically.
Further, the people of Saint Lucia have never, as a nation, had the opportunity to comment on
the content of the Constitution.
Additionally, the Saint Lucia Constitution, like that of most of the former British colonies, is a
document of the British Parliament so that its source is therefore not the Legislature of our
country.
Within our own region several significant events have taken place, such as the ongoing
evolution of a Single Market and Economy and a Caribbean Court of Justice.
The environment and circumstances within which Saint Lucia today operates, are
considerably different from those which obtained thirty years ago.
Some people have also expressed the following views:
(i) There was insufficient public participation in the preparation of the present
Constitution.
(ii) Too much power resides in the position of Prime Minister.
(iii) The present Constitution tends to hinder the proper governance of the
country.
Report – March 2011
282
Objectives of a revised Constitution
A revised Constitution must:
(a) emerge from the expressed wishes of the people and must reflect their aspirations and
expectations;
(b) enable all citizens to guard and enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms;
(c) make it easier for the people of our country to unite with others within the OECS and
CARICOM;
(d) be simple to read, understand and apply; and
(e) deepen the process of democracy; enable the participation of all citizens, wherever they
may reside, in the development of the country, as well as protect, defend and
safeguard the interest and welfare of all St. Lucians.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
283
How to Contact the Commission:
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMISSION
POINSETTIA ROAD
VIGIE, CASTRIES
SAINT LUCIA
P.O.BOX CP – 6446
TELEPHONE: 758 453 2662
FAX: 758 452 7450
EMAIL: conreform@candw.lc
Report – March 2011
284
Appendix III
Secondary Schools and Tertiary Institutions Outreach Activities
DATE SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS PRESENT
5
th
March 2007 Babonneau Secondary Fr. Michel, Alexander, Poyotte
5
th
March 2007 Sir Ira Simmons Secondary Lay, George, Vargas
6
th
March 2007 St. Mary’s College Lay, Chase, Charles
8
th
March 2007
U.W.I. School of Continuing
Education.
Barrow-Giles, E. Mathurin, George,
Biscette
8
th
March 2007 Choiseul Secondary
Justice d’Auvergne, Cenac,
Alphonse, Seraphin.
12
th
March 2007 Anse Ger Secondary
Lay, Charlemagne, Alphonse.
12
th
March 2007 Micoud Secondary Seraphin, Biscette.
13
th
March 2007
Grande Riviere Secondary(Dennery) Abenaty, Biscette, Charles,
Seraphin
13
th
March 2007 Gros Islet Secondary Lay, E. Mathurin.
19
th
March 2007
Sir Arthur Lewis Community College E. Mathurin, Poyotte, Lay.
19
th
March 2007
Corinth Secondary Justice d’Auvergne, E. Mathurin,
20
th
March 2007
Vieux Fort Comprehensive Campus Fr. Michel, Alexander, Lay.
20
th
March 2007
Castries Comprehensive School George, Chase, Vargas.
21
st
March 2007
Seventh Day Adventist Academy Justice d’Auvergne, E. Mathurin,
28
th
March 2007
Bocage Secondary Lay, Poyotte, Chase.
28
st
Mar
ch 2007
Entrepot Secondary Seraphin, Mathurin, Biscette.
29
th
March 2007
St. Joseph’s Convent Justice d’Auvergne, Lay, Vargas.
30
th
March 2007
George Charles Secondary John, Poyotte, Lay.
30
th
March 2007
Vide Boutielle Secondary Justice d’Auvergne, Chase.
9
th
October 2007
Soufriere Comprehensive Secondary
Lay, Outreach Coordinator (OC)
10
th
October 2007
Vieux Fort Technical Institute Lay, Alexander, Biscette, OC
17
th
October 2007
Piaye Secondary Justice d’Auvergne, OC
17
th
October 2007
Clendon Mason Secondary Alphonse, Charlemagne, George
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
285
Appendix IV:
Outreach Activities – Community Preparatory Meetings and Consultations
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
20
th
Feb., 2007 Overseas Outreach
Saint Lucians Living in St.
Croix
Alphonse, Charlemagne
14
th
May, 2008 Preparatory Meeting Piaye Community Seraphin, Lay
21
st
May, 2008 Preparatory Meeting Saltibus Community Cox, Jude
May 28, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Delcer Community
(Choiseul)
Charlemagne, Lay
29
th
May, 2008 Preparatory Meeting Banse La Grace Seraphin, Charlemagne
29
th
May, 2008 Preparatory Meeing La Fargue Seraphin, Charlemagne
4
th
June, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Mongouge Community
(Choiseul)
Charlemagne, Lay
30
th
June, 2008 Preparatory Meeting All of Micoud North Biscette, Seraphin
3
rd
July, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Babonneau & Cabiche
Community
George, E. Mathurin
3
rd
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Praslin Alexander, Lay
7
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Des Barras Vargas, P. Mathurin
7
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Mon Repos, Lumbard Lay, Biscette
Report – March 2011
286
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
8
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Boguis, Savanne En Haut,
Desablon
P. Mathurin
8
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Patience, La Pointe,
Malgretoute
Lay, Biscette
10
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
La Guerre, Americ,
(Babonneau)
Abenaty, George
10
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Micoud Village Cenac, Poyotte
14
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Plateau (Babonneau) Vargas, E. Mathurin
16
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Paix Bouche, La Croix
(Babonneau)
Chase, Cox
16
th
July, 2008 Consultation Mongouge (Choiseul)) Jude, Charlemagne
16
th
July, 2008 Consultation Praslin, Mamiku Seraphin, Biscette
17
th
July, 2008 Consultation Rodney Bay
Justice d’Auvergne, E.
Mathurin
17
th
July, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Fond Assau, Chassin,
Talvan (Babonneau)
Vargas, Abenaty
17
th
July, 2008 Consultation
Mon Repos, Lumbard
(Micoud North)
Biscette, Alexander
24
th
July, 2008 Consultation
Patience, La Pointe,
Malgretoute, Escap,
(Micoud North)
Biscette, Lay
24
th
July, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Cacoa, Girard, Morne
Monzie, Hill 20
(Babonneau)
Cenac, Poyotte
28
th
July, 2008 Consultation Micoud Village Biscette, Seraphin
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
287
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
28
th
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Garrand (Babonneau) E. Mathurin, P. Mathurin
31
st
July, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Balata,Ti Morne,Morne
du Don
George, P. Mathurin
4
th
Aug, 2008 Public Lecture
Faux
-
A
-
Chaux,
Bananes, La Toc,
Hospital Road
(Castries Sout
h)
Vargas, P. Mathurin
4
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Cabiche, Tete Chemin
(Babonneau)
Cherry, Abenaty
4
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation La Fargue Lay, Ulric
4
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation Praslin Lay, Biscette
4
th
Aug, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Reduit, Cap Estate,
Massade, Rodney
Heights, Bonne Terre
Justice d'Auvergne,
E. Mathurin,
5
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation Des Barras P. Mathurin, Abenaty
5
th
Aug, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Grande Riviere, Piat,
Monier, Marisule,
Sugar City, Bois
d’Orange (Gros Islet)
John, E. Mathurin
5
th
Aug, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Ciceron, Lower Morne Vargas, Poyotte
7
th
Aug, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Coubaril, Upper
Ciceron (Castries
South)
George, Poyotte
7
th
Aug, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Ri
viere Mitant,
Desrameaux, La
Borne, Monchy (Gros
Islet)
Justice d'Auvergne, E.
Mathurin
7
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Boguis, Savanne En
Haut, Desablon
(Babonneau)
Chase, Cox
Report – March 2011
288
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
11
th
Aug, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Marigot, La Croix,
(Castries South) Caye
Mangé
Cenac, Vargas
11
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
La Guerre, Americ
(Babonneau)
E. Mathurin, P. Mathurin
11
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation Plateau (Babonneau) Chase, Cox
12
th
Aug, 2008 Preparatory Meeting
Ti Colon,Goodlands,
Cul De Sac
George, Poyotte
14
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Paix Bouche, La Croix
(Babonneau)
Chase, Cox
14
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Banane
s
, La Toc,
Hospital Road
(Castries South)
Vargas, P. Mathurin
18
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Fond Assau, Chassin,
Talvan (Babonneau)
Cherry, Abenaty
18
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Ciceron, Lower Morne
Road (Castries South)
Vargas, P. Mathurin
19
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Cacoa, Girard, Morne
Monzie, Hill 20
(Babonneau)
Cox, Chase
19
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Coubaril, Upper
Ciceron (Castries
South)
Cenac, Alexander
21
st
Aug, 2008 Consultation Delcer Jude, Lay
21
st
Aug, 2008 Consultation Garrand, (Babonneau)
E. Mathurin, George
21
st
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Marigot, La Croix, Caye
Mange (Castries
South)
Poyotte, Cherry
26
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Balata, Ti Morne,
Morne Du Don
John, Abenaty
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
289
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
26
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation
Cul-de-Sac, Ti Colon,
Goodlands
P. Mathurin, Cenac
27
th
Aug, 2008 Consultation Faux-A-Chaux
. 1
st
Sept, 2008 Preparatory
Ti Rocher, Dugard
(Micoud South)
Lay, Alphonse.
1
st
Sept, 2008
Consultation
Belvedere
, Anse La
Verdure (Anse La
Raye/ Canaries)
George, Alexander
1
st
Sept, 2008
Consultation
Massade, Beausejour
(Gros Islet)
Cox, E. Mathurin
11
th
Sept, 2008
Consultation
Bouton Jude, Lay
24
th
Sept, 2008
Consultation
Millet
7
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation
Corinth, Marisule, Top
of the World, Bois
d’Orange
Poyotte, E. Mathurin
8
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation
Monchy, Desrameaux,
Riviere Mitant, La
Borne
Abenaty, Poyotte
16
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation
Desruisseaux, Anse
Ger
Lay, Seraphin
16
h
Oct, 2008 Consultation
Fond St. Jacques, Bois
D’Inde
Alphonse, Jude
16
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation
CDC, Lower Morne
Road, Sans Souci and
environs (Castries)
Vargas, Abenaty
17
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation Central Castries
Abenaty, Barrow-Giles,
George. OC
Report – March 2011
290
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
21
st
Oct, 2008
Consultation
Ti Rocher, La Cour
Ville, Moreau (Micoud)
Lay, Seraphin
21
st
Oct, 2008
Consultation
Blanchard Lay, Seraphin
21
st
Oct, 2008
Consultation
La
Bayee
, Sarrot and
environs
George, P. Mathurin
21
st
Oct, 2008
Consultation
Morne Fortune,
Goodlands, Derriere
Fort
Cox, Poyotte
21
st
Oct, 2008 Consultation Etangs Alphonse, Jude
22
nd
Oct, 2008 Consultation Millet George, P. Mathurin
22
nd
Oct, 2008 Consultation Bouton Jude, Poyotte
22
nd
Oct, 2008 Consultation Entrepot Cenac, Chase
23
rd
Oct, 2008
Consultation
Dennery Village and
environs
George, Seraphin
23
rd
Oct, 2008
Consultation
Bexon, Odsan and
environs
Cenac, P. Mathurin
23
rd
Oct, 2008 Consultation Monchy Poyotte, Abenaty
23
rd
Oct, 2008 Consultation Jacmel John, Lay, Cenac, OC
23
rd
Oct, 2008 Consultation Soufriere Town Alphonse, Jude
23
rd
Oct, 2008 Consultation
Ti Rocher, La Cour
Ville, Moreau (Micoud)
Lay, Biscette
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
291
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
28
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation Desruisseaux Lay, Biscette
28
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation Dennery South George, Seraphin
29
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation
CDC, Lower Morne
Road, Sans Souci and
environs (Castries)
Cox, Abenaty
29
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation Entrepot Chase, Cenac
30
th
Oct, 2008
Consultation
La
Bayee
, Sarrot and
environs
P. Mathurin, Cherry
30
th
Oct, 2008
Consultation
Morne Fortune George, Poyotte
30
th
Oct, 2008 Consultation Blanchard Lay, Biscette
5
th
Nov, 2008 Consultation Parliament All Commissioners
5
th
Nov, 2008 Consultation
Entrepot, Marchand,
Cedars
Lay, Chase
6
th
Nov
, 2008
Consultation
La Ressource
George, Seraphin
6
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
Castries
Vargas, Abe
naty
6
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
Bexon
John
11
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
La Bayee, Sarrot and
environs
George
11
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
Laborie Village
Lay, Charlemagne
11
th
Nov, 2008 Consultation Dennery Village Seraphin, Poyotte
13
th
Nov, 2008 Consultation Blanchard Lay, Biscette
13
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
Morne Fortune
Vargas, Poyotte
13
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
Banse
Charlemagne, Seraphin
Report – March 2011
292
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
18
th
Nov, 2008 Consultation Bexon P. Mathurin
25
th
Nov, 2008 Consultation Banse Lay, Alphonse
26
th
Nov, 2
008
Consultation
Grace
John, Charlemagne
26
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
Vieux Fort Town
Lay, Alphonse
26
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
Vigier
Seraphin, Bicette
27
th
Nov, 2008
Consultation
Pierrot
John, Alphonse
27
th
Nov, 2008 Consultation Laborie Village Lay, Charlemagne
2
nd
Dec, 2008 Consultation Vieux Fort Town Lay, Alphonse
2
nd
Dec, 2008
Consultation
Augier
Seraphin, Biscette
2
nd
Dec, 2008
Consultation
La Ressource VF
Charlemagne, John
4
th
Dec
, 2008
Consultation
Belle
Vue
Biscette, Seraphin
4
th
Dec, 20
08
Consultation
Grace
John, Alphonse
4
th
Dec, 2008
Consultation
Pierrot
Charlemagne, Lay
9
th
Dec, 2008 Consultation Augier Biscette, John
9
th
Dec, 2008 Consultation Vigier Charlemagne, Seraphin
11
th
Dec, 2008 Consultation
La Ressource (Vieux
Fort)
John, Alphonse
11
th
Dec, 2008 Consultation Belle Vue Seraphin, Charlemagne
11
th
Dec, 2008 Consultation Blanchard Lay, Biscette
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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Appendix V:
Outreach Activities – Groups and Associations
DATE EVENT TARGET GROUP/COMMUNITY
23
rd
Oct, 2007 Consultation
I
yanola Council for Rastafarian
23
rd
Oct, 2007
Consultation
Muslim Community
30
th
Oct, 2007 Consultation National Mini Bus Association
30
th
Oct, 2007
Consultation
Taxi As
sociation
31
st
Oct
, 2007
Consultation
Kiwanis Club
31
st
Oct, 2007
Consultation
Lions Club Castries
1
st
Nov., 2007 Consultation Saint Lucia Hotel & Tourism Association
1
st
Nov., 2007 Consultation Saint Lucia Chamber of Commerce et cetera.
10
th
Nov., 2007 Consultation Saint Lucia Blind Welfare Association
10
th
Nov., 2007 Consultation Fellowship of Gospel Preaching Churches
4
th
Dec, 2007
Consultation
United Workers Party
Executive and members of the United Workers Party
6
th
Dec., 2007
Consultation
Saint Lucia Labour
Party
Executive and members of the Saint Lucia Labour Party
. 29
th
Feb., 2008
Consultation
Members of the Rotary Club of Saint Lucia
14
th
April, 2008 Preparatory Meeting Castries North Community Leaders
16
th
April, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Choiseul
Public Forum
19
th
April, 2008 Discussion St. Lucia International Association
21
st
April, 2008 Preparatory Meeting Castries South Community Leaders
28
th
April
, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Anse La Raye Basin Leaders
30
th
April
, 2008
Preparatory Meeting
Canaries and Environs Leaders
30
th
April, 2008 Preparatory Meeting Micoud South Community Leaders
9
th
July, 2008 Consultation United Workers Party Executive, Delegates, Candidates
Report – March 2011
294
DATE EVENT TARGET GROUP/COMMUNITY
Consultation
Sai
n
t Lucia
Fire Service
Consultation Royal Saint Lucia Police Force
Consultation
VBCC
Consultation
Shamrock Sports Club
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
295
Appendix VI:
Panel Discussions and Public Lectures
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
RESOURCE PERSONS
8
th
Nov., 2007 Panel Discussion
Topic:
The Relevance and
Importance of
Constitutional Reform
Castries and its
environs
See footnote
104
Dr. Hamid Ghany
Dr. Francis Alexis
Justice Hugh Rawlins
Parnel Campbell
Prof. Albert Fiadjoe
Moderator: Commissioner
John
14
th
Nov, 2007 Panel Discussion
Topic:
Should Local Government
be Entrenched?
Soufriere and its
environs
Hilary Charlemagne
Jimmy Haynes
Jackie Francis
Eusebia Jn. Baptiste
Moderator: Commissioner
Alexander
18
th
Nov., 2007 Public Lecture
Castries and its
environs
Dr. Hamid Ghany
104
Dr. Ghany - Dean of the (UWI), St. Augustine Campus, Faculty of Social Sciences; Dr. Alexis - former Attorney-
General of Grenada, and a former UWI Senior Lecturer in Law; Justice Rawlins - Court of Appeal
Judge with the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court now Chief Justice of the of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court;
Parnel R. Campbell, Q.C - Chairman of the Constitutional Review Committee, St. Vincent & the Grenadines; Prof.
Fiadjoe - Professor of Public Law at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill campus in Barbados.
Report – March 2011
296
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
RESOURCE PERSONS
21
st
Nov., 2007 Panel Discussion
Topic:
Should elections continue
to be under the first past
the post system, or
should there be some
form of proportional
representation or a
combination of the two?
Island wide.
Broadcast live on
NTN, DBS & HTS
Sarah Flood-Beaubrun
Dr. Robert Lewis
Matthew Hunte
Cybelle Cenac-Maragh
Moderator: Commissioner
Seraphin
28
th
Nov., 2007 Panel Discussion
Should the Senate be
abolished, be revamped
or should a unicameral
system be adopted?
Gros Islet and its
environs
Armstrong Alexis
Stanley French
Trudy Glasgow
Petra Mendes-Nelson
Moderator: Commissioner
Poyotte
10
th
Dec., 2007 Panel Discussion
Topic:
Should the PM be directly
e
lected? Should there be a
fixed date for General
Elections?
Mon Repos and its
environs.
Patrick Augustin
Flora Joseph
Henry Mangal
Denis James
Moderator:
Commissioner Seraphin
Jan. 2008
Panel Discussion hosted
by Labowi Promotions
Laborie Boys’ Primary
School
Agatha Jn. Panel
Watson Louis
Dr. Donatus St. Aimée
Commissioners Present
Justice d’Auvergne, E.
Mathurin,Lay,Charlemagne,
Alphonse.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
297
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/COMMUNITY
RESOURCE PERSONS
6
th
March, 2008 Public Lecture
Topic: West Indian
Constitutional Reform:
Some Philosophical
Rreflections
NIC Conference Room
Castries and environs
Presenter:
Prof. S.C.R. Mc.Intosh –Dean
Faculty of Law UWI
.
16
th
March., 2009
Public Lecture
Topic:
The OECS
Economic Union and
Some Constitutional
Implications
Island wide Presenter:
Dr. The Hon. Ralph Gonsalves
– P.M St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
3
rd
April, 2008
Overseas Outreach
(Panel Discussion)
Saint Lucian students
of the Cave Hill
campus of UWI
Dr. Tennyson Joseph
Dr. Eddy Ventose
Dr. Don Marshall
Dr. Rosemarie Antoine
Barrow-Giles, Seraphin
represented CRC
Report – March 2011
298
Appendix VII
Consultation with the Diaspora
Date City/Country Venue Commissioners
4
th
Feb., 2008 Jamaica Mona Campus UWI
20
th
– 25
th
Feb., 2008
St Croix, USVI
The Drive
-
in
Frederickstead
Ulric Alphonse & Terrance
Charlemagne
2
nd
– 4
th
April, 2008 Barbados
Cave Hill Campus
UWI
Cynthia Barrow-Giles &
Urban Seraphin
12
th
April, 2008 St. Thomas Justice Suzie d’Auvergne
16
th
April, 2008 Virgin Gorda (BVI)
Justice Suzie d’Auvergne,
David Cox
17
th
April, 2008 Tortola (BVI)
Justice Suzie d’Auvergne,
David Cox
1
st
– 2
nd
April, 2009 Martinique Lamentin
Gregor Biscette & Dr.
Urban Seraphin
17
th
Sept., 2009 New York
Saint Lucia Mission
to the UN
Eldon Mathurin &
Lawrence Poyotte
18
th
Sept., 2009 Washington DC
Saint Lucian
Embassy at OECS
House
Eldon Mathurin &
Lawrence Poyotte
27
th
Sept., 2009 Toronto
Our Lady of Good
Council,
867 College Street,
Toronto
Veronica Cenac &
Nicholas John
11
th
Nov., 2009 London (UK)
West Ham Town
Hall
Justice d’Auvergne &
David Cox
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
299
Appendix VIII:
Outreach Activities – Media Activities
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/
COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
November 2007 News Maker Live
Live Radio Talk Show –
Radio Caribbean hosted by
Timothy Poleon
Island wide Justice d’Auvergne & Cenac
. 1
st
Feb, 2008 TTP Talk Show
Live Radio Talk Show –
Radio Caribbean - Timothy
Poleon hosted the show.
Island wide Lawrence Poyotte & David Cox;
20
th
Feb, 2008 News Maker Live
Live Radio Talk Show –
Radio Caribbean hosted by
Timothy Poleon show.
Island wide Lawrence Poyotte & David Cox.
.
March2008 News Maker Live
Live Radio Talk Show –
Radio Caribbean hosted by
Timothy Poleon
Theme: Capital Punishment
Island wide David Cox & Veronica Cenac
31
st
March, 2008
In the Public Interest (IPI)
Live Radio Talk Show –
RSL
Island wide
Lawrence
Poyotte & Andie
George.
3
rd
June, 2008 Bring it On
Live Radio Talk Show –
Radio 100. Hosted by
Russell Lake
Island wide David Cox
4
th
June, 2008
News Spin
Radio Talk Show – Radio
Caribbean.
Poyotte & Cox.
Report – March 2011
300
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/
COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
2
nd
Oct., 2008 Juke Bois Talk Show Island wide Seraphin & Biscette.
18
th
Feb, 2009 The Agenda
Live Radio Talk Show on
RSL – Hosted by David
Samuel.
Island wide Biscette & Seraphin..
22
nd
Feb, 2009 The Agenda
Live Radio Talk Show on
RSL – Hosted by David
Samuel.
Island wide E. Mathurin & Cenac..
10
th
March, 2009 The Agenda
Live Radio Talk Show –
RSL
Hosted by David Samuel
Island wide
Abenaty & Seraphin represented
CRC.
11
th
March, 2009 News Spin
Live Radio Talk Show –
RCI
Island wide Cox & George.
12
th
March, 2009
Live Radio Talk Show –
HOT FM
Hosted by Lisa Joseph
Island wide Cenac & Barrow-Giles.
13
th
March, 2009 Bring-it-on
Live Radio Talk Show –
Helen FM Hosted by Russell
Lake
Island wide Hilaire
13
th
March, 2009 Interview on Radio
PRAISE FM
Island wide Seraphin
18
th
March, 2009
Interviews on Radio Free
Iyanola
105
Soufriere and
its environs
Seraphin and Jude
105
Two Interviews were conducted by Commissioner Seraphin on that date 8: a.m. to 8:15 a.m. and the other from
1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Commissioner Jude joined Commissioner Seraphin on the latter interview.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
301
DATE EVENT
TARGET
GROUP/
COMMUNITY
COMMISSIONERS
March 2009
Straight Up
Live Radio Talk Show –
Hosted by Claudius Francis
Island wide Justice d”Auvergne
March 2009
Talk
Live interview on HTS;
Hosted by Rick Wayne
Island wide Cenac and George
9
th
April, 2009
Live Interview on Voice of
Barbados
Island wide Barrow-Giles and Seraphin
. 10
th
Feb, 2011
Talk
Live interview on HTS;
Hosted by Rick Wayne
Island wide Cox
16
th
- 20
th
March,
2009
During that week
Commissioners recorded
programmes at GIS for
broadcast on Radio and TV
at future dates
15 minute interview. One
guest and a moderator
Issues & Answers;
Three 30 minutes
programmes
Konsit Kwéyòl; (two 30
minutes programme)
Island wide .
John and George.
John & Abenaty
Vargas, E. Mathurin &
Chase
Barrow-Giles & Lay
Jude & Biscette
Seraphin & Biscette
Report – March 2011
302
Appendix IX
Public Oral Presentations
The Commission held four public oral presentations between March 2009 and July 2010. The two
in Castries were daylong activities while those in Soufriere and Laborie were held from 5:30 p.m. to
9:00 p.m. These were intended to allow members of the public to present on various aspects of the
Constitution and to recommend changes to same.
DATE ACTIVITY COMMISSIONERS PRESENT
17
th
March, 2009 Day One – First Public Oral Presentations
106
Venue: NIC Conference Centre
Presenters:
• Justice Suzie d’Auvergne
• Commissioner Nicholas John
• Commissioner Ernest Hilaire
• Henry Mangal – Concerned Citizen
• McHale Andrew – SLHTA and Concerned citizen
• Joan Didier – AIDS Action Foundation
• Armelle Mathurin – Help-Age Saint Lucia
• Juliette Braithwaite – Corner Stone Humanitarian
Society
• Pamela Devaux – Animal Protection Society
• Claude Guillaume – Concerned Citizen
• Orjan Lindberg – Movement Exploring New
Democracy
All Commissioners
106
These presentations, though written versions were submitted, were presented orally at the symposium.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
303
DATE ACTIVITY COMMISSIONERS PRESENT
19
th
March, 2009 Day Two – First Public Oral Presentations
Venue: NIC Conference Centre
Presenters:
• Andrew George – NEMO
• Bishnu Tulsie – Saint Lucia National Trust
• Akim Larcher – Concerned Citizen
• Kenita Placid – United & Strong Inc.
• Gertrude George – UWP
• Wilkie Larcher – Concerned Citizen
• David Hughes – Concerned Citizen
• Lucia Lee – Concerned Citizen
• Gerald Saltibus – Concerned Citizen
Nation wide
All Commissioners
Report – March 2011
304
DATE ACTIVITY COMMISSIONERS PRESENT
20
th
March, 2009 Day Three – First Public Oral Presentations
Venue: NIC Conference Centre
Presenters:
• Kevin Lorde – Concerned Citizen
• Modestus Louis – Concerned Citizen
• Dr. Stephen King – Concerned Citizen
• Imran Jean – Concerned Citizen from a faith
based organization
• Geoffrey Devaux – Concerned Citizen
Nation wide
All Commissioners
29
th
June, 2009 Public Oral Presentation
Venue: Castries City Hall
Main Presenters
107
:
• Claudius Francis – Concerned Citizen
• Margot Thomas – National Archives Authority of
Saint Lucia.
• George Goddard – National Workers Union
• Mary Francis – Human Rights Advocate.
• Urban Dolor – Concerned Citizen
• Msgr. Patrick Anthony - Faith Based Community
(Roman Catholic)
• Amatus Edward – Concerned Citizen
Castries and its environs
Justice d’Auvergne –
Chairperson CRC and
Chair of this activity
John – Deputy
Chairperson of CRC
Alphonse
Biscette
Seraphin
Charles
Cenac
Poyotte
Vargas
Alexander
Lay
Chase
P. Mathurin
107
Peter Josie was unable to make his scheduled presentation but presented to the Commission
on June 23, 2009 at the Commission’s Secretariat.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
305
DATE ACTIVITY COMMISSIONERS PRESENT
30
th
June, 2009 Public Oral Presentation
Venue: St. Isidore Hall, Soufriere
Main Presenters:
• Anthony Robinson – Soufriere Youth Council
• Katalin Allain & Jannallia Lamontagne –
Soufriere CYO
• Gabriel Jude – Soufriere Action Theatre
• Marvin Edgar – National Youth Council
• Sonia Cazaubon – Soufriere Marine
Management Area
• Licia Jn. Paul and Eusebia Jn. Baptiste
Yaticka Youth Group
Soufriere and its environs
Commissioners present
Jude –
Chairperson at
this activity
Justice d’Auvergne
John
E. Mathurin
Lay
Cenac
Alphonse
1
st
July, 2009 Public Oral Presentation
Venue: Laborie Parish Hall
Main Presenters:
• Watson Louis – Concerned Citizen
• Twain Edwards – Country Strikers
• Augustin Barthelmy – Labowi Promotions
Laborie and its environs.
John – Chai
rperson at
this activity
Justice d’Auvergne
Alphonse
Biscette
Charles
Cherry
Cox
E. Mathurin
George
Lay
Seraphin
Report – March 2011
306
Appendix X
Interviews with Constitutionally Established Functionaries (Past and Present)
Date Functionary
25
th
March 2009 Governor General – Dame Pearlette Louisy
11
th
May 2009 Speaker of the House of Assembly (Dr. Rose Marie Husbands-Mathurin)
11
th
May 2009 Leader of the Opposition (Dr. Kenny D. Anthony)
11
th
May 2009 Deputy President of the Senate (Everistus Jn. Marie)
11
th
May 2009 Former President of the Senate (Hilford Deterville Q.C.)
12
th
May 2009 Parliamentary Commissioner (Madison Stanislaus)
12
th
May 2009 Former Cabinet Secretary & Acting Governor General (Victor Girard)
12
th
May 2009 Acting Governor General & former PS (Cornelius Lubin)
12
th
May 2009 Chief Elections Officer (Carson Raggie)
13
th
May 2009 Former Chairperson Integrity Commission (Canon Randolph Evelyn)
13
th
May 2009 Chairperson Public and Teaching Service Commissions (Frank Myers)
13
th
May 2009 Former Speaker of the House of Assembly (Matthew Roberts)
14
th
May 2009 Clerk of Parliament (Kurt Thomas)
14
th
May 2009 Director of Audit (Avril James-Bonnette)
14
th
May 2009 Chairperson Public Service Board of Appeal (Vern Gill)
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
307
Date Functionary
14
th
May 2009 Former Prime Minister (Lewis, Vaughn )
24
th
June 2009 Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria Charles-Clarke)
22
nd
July 2009 President of the Senate (Gail Phillips)
22
nd
July 2009 Former Prime Minister (Dr. Michael Pilgrim)
26
th
Aug 2009 Chair Electoral Commission (Kenneth Monplasir Q.C.)
Report – March 2011
308
Appendix XI
Summary of Submissions Received
1. The Constitution should make provisions for separate people to be appointed to the
Executive, the Legislature and as Constituency Representatives.
2. Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to be elected in direct elections by the entire
country.
3. The elected Prime Minister would select his/her Executive (Cabinet) from professional
individuals outside the Legislature.
4. Senators should be elected.
5. Senators be individuals with a sufficient educational, intellectual and expert capacity to
independently analyse, review and refine proposals of the House or Lower Chamber and
the Executive
6. The Senate should also have the right to propose and pass its own laws independent of
the Executive.
7. Senators should possess minimum qualification of a University Degree or some
professional expertise in specific areas.
8. Senators should be proficient in oral and written English and Kwéyòl.
9. There should be a Senate Majority Leader and Deputy Leader as well as a Minority Leader
and Deputy Leader.
10. Constituency Representatives should continue to be elected directly by the people.
11. The House should continue to approve laws recommended by the Executive and should
have the power to propose its own laws for debate in the House and approval by the
Senate.
12. There should be a minimum qualification of an Associate Degree or an “A” Level Education
for Parliamentarians.
13. Parliamentarians should be proficient in oral and written English and Kwéyòl.
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14. A Constituency Representative when elected should become the Chairperson or Mayor of
the constituency.
15. A Constituency Representative when elected should be in charge of Local Government.
16. A Prime Minister, Senate Majority Leader, The House Majority Leader must not serve more
than two consecutive terms.
17. There should be elections on a fixed day or date for General Elections, this should be held
every 5th year.
18. Recall provisions be enshrined in our revised constitution to allow recall proceedings to be
instituted against any elected official.
19. The subject areas for Ministries should be fixed.
20. There should be a fixed number of Ministries.
21. Direct elections or confirmation hearings to be instituted for members of the judiciary.
22. The Constitution should make specific provisions to insulate our Governor General from
undue party political influence in his/her decision making.
23. The revised constitution must replace the Privy Council with the Caribbean Court of Justice
as our final appellate court.
24. The Executive President along with a Vice President elected directly by the people of Saint
Lucia in national elections.
25. There should be a unicameral legislature.
26. Local Government in a country of 238 square miles and 171,000 people is preposterous
27. Saint Lucia should include in its Constitution the right to health as an enforceable right.
28. The right to work should be included as a specific right in the Bill of Rights.
29. Included in the Bill of Rights should be a specific Right to Information.
30. The Constitution should include the right to education as an enforceable right in the Bill of
Rights.
Report – March 2011
310
31. The right to privacy should be specifically included in the detailed section of the Bill of
Rights.
32. Health status should be specifically included in the anti-discrimination section.
33. The anti-discrimination provision should specifically include disability as a prohibited
ground of discrimination.
34. Sexual orientation should be included as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the anti-
discrimination section
35. Saint Lucia should establish within its Constitution a Human Rights Commission.
36. The Constitution makes it mandatory and enforceable that children care for and cater to the
needs of their aging parents relative to their needs and circumstances.
37. There should be free legal aid for older persons who need to seek redress in cases of abuse,
violence, discrimination or exploitation.
38. The language of the Constitution should step away from “legalese” and become more
easily understood, easier to apply, less ambiguous, clear and irrefutable.
39. The basic tenets of the UNCRC must be enshrined in the Saint Lucia Constitution.
40. A much larger House of Representatives, which eliminates the need for a second sub-tier of Local
Government should be established.
41. Members of the House of Representative will be drawn from professional organizations.
42. Private land ownership should not be absolute, but should come with a social
responsibility and
mortgage.
43. Historic assets should be designated public property.
44. Position of Deputy Prime Minister be a constitutional position
45. A Line of Succession should be enshrined in Constitution to ensure continuity of
Government in emergency or disaster situations.
46. The Executive shall consist of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers who
will be nominated by the Prime Minister.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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47. A Minister shall be nominated by the Prime Minister but must be confirmed by the majority
of members of both the Senate and the House at hearings held solely for this purpose.
48. A Ministry and its full designation shall be proposed by the Prime Minister but must be
approved by the majority of both the House and the Senate at hearings called for this sole
purpose.
49. There may be need for some Core Ministries to be named in the Constitution.
50. That the Parliament shall consist of the Senate and the House of District Representatives.
51. The President of the Senate shall be a Public Officer appointed by the Public service
Commission to conduct the business of the Senate.
52. The Deputy President of the Senate shall be the elected member of the Senate who received the
most votes in preceding national elections.
53. The District Representative shall also be the highest officer of Local Government and shall
serve his Constituency daily on-site.
54. The Speaker of the House shall be a Public Officer and be appointed by the Public Service
Commission.
55. The Deputy Speaker shall be elected from amongst the elected members of the House.
56. If for any reason the office of the Prime Minister should become vacant his place shall be
taken over by the Deputy Prime Minister who then becomes the new Prime Minister.
57. Whenever the office of the Deputy Prime Minister becomes vacant, this shall be filled by
the Deputy President of the Senate.
58. An Alternate Senator shall be elected by direct vote to replace a senator who has been
elevated to the office of Deputy Prime Minister.
59. The ballots should bear only the candidate name and photo.
60. Voting should be done by finger print (finger dipped in ink) and not by X.
61. Abolition of the Office of Governor General.
62. Abolition of the Office of the Leader of The Opposition.
63. Abolition of Office of Parliamentary Secretary.
Report – March 2011
312
64. The Senate shall comprise of elected members chosen by the citizens during an election.
65. A District Representative shall not be (cannot be) a Minister.
66. Election for the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to be held every 6 years.
67. The two independent senators appointed by the Governor General should not hold office
as President or deputy President of the Senate.
68. There should be an age limit for Parliamentarians; not younger than 21 years and not older
than 70 years old.
69. Ministers of religion should not be barred from standing in elections.
70. A member of the House who no longer wishes to represent the party under which he/she
was elected to the house and is desirous of joining another party shall vacate the seat and
a by election called.
71. A Member of Parliament who resigns his/her seat other than to change party allegiance
should not be allowed to contest the seat that he/she has just vacated.
72. The Prime Minister of Saint Lucia shall be a citizen of Saint Lucia of Saint Lucian parents
by birth not naturalisation or registration.
73. The term of office of the Prime Minister should be not more than three consecutive terms.
74. Any person married to a Saint Lucia citizen should not automatically become a Saint Lucian
citizen.
75. Categories protected under the current Constitution should be expanded to include
protection on the grounds of race, gender identity, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth.
76. The Constitution must provide security, justice and equality for all St. Lucians including
those who have different health status, religious beliefs, cultural practices, sexual
orientations and gender expressions.
77. The constitution should ensure that all Saint Lucians have equal rights under the law.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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78. Any laws criminalising consensual same-sex intimacy should be repealed under the
Criminal Code.
79. All provisions which criminalise sexual activity between consenting same sex adults should
be repealed.
80. The right of all persons to equality before the law without discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity should be provided for.
81. An equal age of consent should apply to both same-sex and different-sex sexual activity.
82. Provisions in the Constitution should be expanded to include the civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights of ALL Saint Lucians.
83. That the State should not criminalise sexual acts between adults of the same sex and take
all necessary actions to protect homosexuals from harassment, discrimination and
violence.
84. Sexual orientation and gender identity form part of a new reformed constitution.
85. Provision be made in the Constitution to reprimand elected members who mislead or lie to
the nation.
86. There should be a chapter dealing with the need to protect the organs and the symbols
and emblems of the state.
87. That Saint Lucia favours retention of the monarchical form of Government with the
Governor General as Head of State.
88. That there should be a Parliament of Saint Lucia which should consist of Her Majesty, a
Senate and a House of Assembly.
89. There should be constitutional provision for Parliament to pass rules for the peace, order
and good conduct of Parliament.
90. The Constitution should provide for the removal of an elected Member of Parliament
should that need arise.
91. The process by which any section of the constitution can be amended should be stated
clearly in the constitution.
Report – March 2011
314
92. In Parliament, the District representative will have oversight, through various
Parliamentary committees, of the performance of the Cabinet of Ministers, besides the
normal legislative functions.
93. In the event an elected representative is selected as a Minister, his Parliamentary seat
would automatically become vacant necessitating a bye-election.
94. There be term limits for all elected officials.
95. A recall mechanism for all elected officials for clearly defined reasons of which non-
performance must be one should be provided for.
96. There must be integrity legislation covering all aspects of public service life.
97. The Governor-General position should be replaced by the President.
98. Ministries and Ministers should be limited to allow synergy between departments and
reduce administrative costs.
99. The Senate is not necessary and should be removed.
100. The Public Services Board of Appeal should be kept but should function as a board that
hears appeals from any citizen or national institution that has an issue with the
functioning or decisions of Government.
101. The Public Service Commission and The Teaching Service Commission should be
abolished. The HR function of the Ministries should be handled by the respective
Ministries.
102. The Constitution must be explicit about zero-tolerance for violence.
103. Capital punishment should be abolished.
104. A clause on the protection of the unborn needs to be inserted.
105. Section 8 (1) Provisions to secure protection of law. There is need to define the time.
106. Section 8 (2) (d) should change to legal counsel should be provided by a person or if the
person is not able then one is provided by the state.
107. The Permanent Secretaries should have power to hire, discipline and dismiss.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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108. No one with a criminal record whether in St. Lucia or overseas should be allowed to vie for
public office.
109. The Senate should be given the responsibility for the appointment of the Chief Justice and
not the Prime Minister.
110. The first past the post system should be retained
111. All persons appointed to hold positions in Cabinet must receive the approval of the Senate.
112. Subsection 24 (2) of the Constitution be revoked or deleted;
113. All references to “appointed” or “appointment” pertaining to the position of Senator, except
those appearing in subsection 24 (1) and Section 28, be changed to read “elected” or
“election”;
114. Subsection 27 (e) be revoked or deleted;
115. Subsection 28 (4) be revoked or deleted.
116. Domesticated animals should have protection against cruelty, ill treatment and
neglect.
117. No person shall cause harm to another through his/her actions, whether illegal or
legal, or by his/her inaction.
118. A system of proxy voting be established to accommodate nationals living abroad
during general elections.
119. Supports the Privy Council as the final court of appeal.
120. If a person is elected to the House of Assembly as a candidate of a registered political
party or as an independent and changes the political affiliation through which he was
elected to the House, his seat should be declared vacant and a by-election held for its
representation.
121. An election candidate should be required to submit his credentials for consideration by the
electorate
122. A system of elected Local Government should be established.
123. Senators should be appointed for a fixed term.
Report – March 2011
316
124. The Governor General should be elected and not selected by the Prime Minister
125. There should be a fixed tenure of office for the Governor General.
126. Prime Ministers should not be able to call election at will.
127. A Member of Parliament who is elected on the ticket of one party should not be able to
cross the floor.
128. A recall of any Member of Parliament who brings the office into disrepute, crosses the
floor, not happy with their performance or any other reasons the drafters of the Constitution
deem necessary should be enforced.
129. There should be a ceremonial President instead of a Governor General.
130. If a Party cannot raise the necessary funds then the State should provide support.
131. There should be limits/ceiling on spending.
132. There is need for disclosure of the source of funding.
133. People are forced to work on their Sabbath day and this infringe on people’s right to
freedom of worship. Constitution should ensure that this does not happen.
134. No one should be allowed to hold dual citizenship.
135. Unless the Senate can fulfil its function of providing checks and balances on the Lower
House, it must be gotten rid of.
136. Parties should be required to declare their sources of finance as per the Constitution. This
declaration should be prior to elections.
137. There should be a review of finances after the elections
138. There should be limits as to level of individual contributions.
139. There should be laws compelling Parliamentary representatives to consult with their
constituents.
140. At the risk of turning Saint Lucia into an elitist state, there should be set academic
qualifications for persons wanting to become Parliamentary Representatives.
141. Right to life of an unborn child should be protected under the Constitution.
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142. Ruling Party should not have the majority in the Senate.
143. Governor General should be able to nominate more independent members.
144. Eleven Senators are insufficient.
145. Rejected Ministers should not be reappointed.
146. Provisions should be made in the Constitution to facilitate a public servant to run for
parliamentary office.
147. Constitution should address accountability on the part of Members of Parliament.
148. Provisions for membership in regional and international organisations should be made.
149. Parliamentary Commissioner should have a legal background.
150. Making the Governor General a deputy Prime Minister would make the Office more
effective.
151. Constitution should ensure greater participation at the local level.
152. Whether through the construction or the Education Act, it should be mandatory that all
children of age 15 and below attend school; parents of offenders should be made liable;
should be made an offence to contrive same.
153. Rights of children to social services and education should be enshrined in the Constitution
as a means of protecting our future generation from emotional and sexual abuse.
154. A procedure for the selection of candidates to contest for Parliamentary office should be
enshrined.
155. Powers of the Prime Minister should remain in order to be able to rule effectively.
156. If the Court makes it compulsory for parents to maintain their children financially or
otherwise, it should be compulsory that children take care of their elderly & disabled
parents if they are financially capable.
157. State should appoint a lawyer for persons who cannot afford one.
158. A line of succession for the leadership of Saint Lucia.
Report – March 2011
318
159. Instrument of appointment of the President must be signed by the Prime Minister, the
Leader of the Opposition, leaders of other parties or Independents in the House and the
Senate as evidence of collaboration in the selection.
160. President shall be appointed to serve for ten(10) years equivalent to two parliamentary
terms. President will not be required to read a Throne Speech at the annual opening of
Parliament but will instead obtain the appropriate information and address Parliament and
the nation on matters relevant to the progress and direction of the country.
161. Persons who lost as candidates at the preceding general election should not be made
Senators for the Parliamentary term following that election.
162. As regards births, marriage and divorce, death and rights of inheritance, Islamic tenets of
Faith must be guaranteed under the Constitution.
163. Implementation of a National Land Use Plan with accompanying zoning regulations,
164. The ‘first past the post system’ should be re-examined and restructured in innovative, not
necessarily replicated, ways to suit our uniqueness as Saint Lucians.
165. A clause giving recognition to the established institution of the Fire and Emergency
Services under the authority of the Chief Fire Officer as detailed in the Fire Service Act and
the Fire Service Regulations and Orders of 1976
166. The Fire and Emergency Services be recognised as an essential service
167. Local Government should be given constitutional protection; Appointment to Local
Government should be by election by community.
168. Local Government should be given executive authority.
169. Capital punishment should be retained.
170. Marriage should be defined as a union between a man and a woman.
171. The Language of the preamble does not affect us as citizens of Saint Lucia and should
therefore be simplified to meet the understanding of the lay person.
172. The Prime Minister or any Minister should be required to appear before the Court of Law
for any wrongdoings they are accused of.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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173. A candidate should state his background to the people he wishes to represent before
going to the polls.
174. Calculation of time for holding persons beyond the prescribed time without charge
pursuant to an order of the Court should exclude weekends, Sundays and public holidays.
175. Persons who have prior criminal records should be debarred from applying for citizenship
176. Stop and search powers of Police should be wide enough to allow police to place barriers
on roads and highways for the purpose of search without first having to have reasonable
suspicion to justify research.
177. Public Service Commission should be accountable to Parliament
178. There should be mandatory delegation of disciplinary powers by PSC to Commissioner of
Police, Fire, Chief and Director of Prisons.
179. Police Commissioners should be career public officers as distinct to contract officers.
180. Duties of Parliamentary Commissioner should be clearly stated so as to avoid an overlap
with Police.
181. Name of Royal Saint Lucia Police Force should be retained.
182. Members of the Executive Branch of Government should have basic academic and other
qualification that would justify their appointment as Minister for Ministry.
183. Doctrine of Collective Responsibility should be limited so as to facilitate debate in
Parliament
184. The Preamble of the Constitution should continue to affirm the belief in and the supremacy
of God.
185. An allied services commission with a full time chairman with the mandate to attend to the
recruitment, appointment and discipline of Fire, Police & Prison Officers.
186. Establishment of a National Security Commission that deals with (a) Discipline (b)
Promotion (c) Dismissal (d) Admission throughout the RSLPF, the Fire Service and the
Prison Service.
187. Law against obscene language should be expanded and strictly enforced.
Report – March 2011
320
188. Law against truancy should be strictly enforced.
189. Specific provision should be placed in the Constitution to ensure protection from
deprivation of property.
190. A Republican System of Government should be established.
191. The elections for the President should not be based on party lines.
192. The President should be responsible for the appointment of all the independent
commissions and boards.
193. The President should be given term limits up to maximum of two consecutive terms, each
of a five year duration.
194. Constitution should secure Government’s responsibility for enacting additional and
enforcing environmental laws that protect the natural environment
195. Constitution should secure Government’s responsibility/obligation to protect and, if
necessary, develop biologically diverse parks/ecological enclaves and corridors (common
public properties) for present and future generations.
196. Constitution should secure Government’s responsibility to use natural resources, or allow
them to be used, in a sustainable manner.
197. Local elections should be held separately from national elections.
198. Plurality voting (first-past-the-post) should be provided for central Government, and a
proportional representative system for local Government.
199. Prime Minister should not have any portfolios.
200. Kwéyòl (patwa) should be officially instated/recognised as the National Language of Saint
Lucia.
201. Government should introduce antidiscrimination legislation to protect women.
202. The role of the Senate and the President of the Senate should be outlined in the
Constitution
203. In an effort to separate the Legislature and the Executive one should restrict the number of
Executive members in the Senate
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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204. Because the GG is the Head of Parliament, it follows that her Deputy should emerge out of
Parliament rather than outside of Parliament.
205. The Senate should comprise expertise that can give bills the scrutiny that they deserve.
206. The Deputy Speaker should have power to convene a sitting of the House under certain
circumstances.
207. The rights, privileges, immunities, speaking powers of Parliamentarians should be
addressed in the Constitution.
208. Parliamentary Assistant should be employed to assist Parliamentarians who are Ministers
with duties in various constituencies.
209. Replace the GG with a President elected by the House by Electoral College.
210. A unicameral system where the Senators are appointed to the elected House based on a
proportional system should be established.
211. Anyone with a criminal record should be compelled to disclose same before seeking to
become a Member of Parliament.
212. All persons who have agreed to be candidates for election to Parliament should make a
declaration of their liabilities and assets prior to elections.
213. The magistracy should belong exclusively to the Judicial and Legal Services Commission.
214. Parliament should have total control over the appointment of the Director of Audit.
215. The Chairman of the Electoral Commission should be appointed by a two-thirds majority in
the House or that the GG should consult with the Leader of the Opposition and the
Government on such appointments.
216. The Constituency Boundary Commission and the Electoral Commission should be
amalgamated.
217. The Cabinet should be no larger than 10 members; 5 elected and 5 selected.
218. The sitting of Parliament should be regular.
219. The Queens’ Chain be elevated to the status of a constitutional prohibition.
220. No Bill should go through all three readings at one sitting of the House.
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221. The Crown should always have the right of appeal against sentences handed down by a
judge.
222. The Constitution should make provisions to broaden the remit of the Ombudsman by
placing Police oversight under his jurisdiction
223. The office of Parliamentary Secretary provided for in the Constitution be abolished.
224. Permanent Secretaries should not be contracted personnel.
225. The Senate should have the power to amend all Bills including Money Bulls.
226. The same provisions for the appointment of the Electoral Commission should apply for the
Boundaries Commission.
227. The title of the Officer in Chief be changed from Director of Audit to Auditor General.
228. That the specific age of retirement should not be prescribed in the Constitution.
229. The Constitution should make it clear that the Director of Audit is answerable to
Parliament.
230. The budget of the office of the Director of Audit should be decided directly by Parliament.
231. The Attorney General should be a Civil Servant.
232. The Senate should be elected based on proportional representation by list.
233. The provision which requires consultation with the PM in the appointment of a DPP should
be removed.
234. The office of the DPP should have the authority to sanction the police for failing to present
evidence requested by that Office.
235. The Director of Public Prosecutions should be directly responsible for the expenditure of
funds voted to her department by Parliament.
236. There should be a provision to allow the Director of Public Prosecutions to impose
sanctions for non-compliance of officers re directives issued by the office of the DPP.
237. No one should be given a lifetime appointment such as a judgeship without hearings prior
to confirmation.
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238. That Cabinet Ministers should face hearings prior to appointment
239. A Prime Minister should not be allowed to utilise members of the House as members of his
Cabinet.
240. The House should also serve as an oversight committee regarding the appointment of
judges, cabinet ministers, Public Service Commission and the like.
241. A reformed Constitution should address Prime Ministers succession.
242. Elected members ought not to be given the power to elect a Prime Minister from among
them.
243. There should be constitutional provisions to allow for impeachment of elected members.
244. That the nationally elected Prime Minister should be allowed to nominate – not appoint –
persons to serve in his Cabinet.
245. The Speaker would come from within the elected members of the House.
246. There should be more frequent meetings of the House and that such meetings should not
be at the behest of the Executive but instead completely controlled by the Legislature.
247. The Electoral Commission should not be controlled by the central Government;
248. No Government should be able to influence the work of independent commissions via the
budgetary provision.
249. A minimum set number of voters should constitute a constituency.
250. The provision which mandates that the head of a tribunal should be a lawyer should be
revoked.
251. The Constitution should expressly forbid the Legislature from enacting retroactive laws.
252. All records created on whatever media or whatever format by any Government official,
ministry, department or parastatal should be the property of the State.
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324
253. The Constitution should provide for the privacy of information to protect the personal
information of individuals particularly in the private sector and health sector.
254. Provision should be made in the Constitution to ensure that workers are guaranteed Trade
Union representation without fear of reprisals.
255. There should be a State sponsored Legal Aid Programme in Saint Lucia.
256. The Prime Minister should have veto rights on any money, national security or foreign
affairs bill.
257. The office of Parliamentary Commissioner should be given more teeth.
258. Provision should be made in the Constitution to ensure the participation of youth in
national decision making.
259. Some statement about the preservation and protection of our culture be inserted in our
Constitution
260. Disposal of national assets be it by the Government or otherwise, is so important to the life
of the State that it must never be done without a referendum.
261. There should be a specific distance from which hotels should be built from beach fronts.
262. The age of consent should return to eighteen.
263. Members of the Teaching and Public Services should be allowed the freedom of
association and participation in political activity without fear of victimisation.
264. The Teaching Service Commission should be subsumed under the Public Service
Commission.
265. The Queen’s Chain should include a buffer zone for the rivers.
266. A statement must be made requiring the provisions of the draft cultural policy of 1988 be
implemented.
267. The use of cannabis in the religious rituals of the Rastafarian movement should be
legalised.
268. Utilities such as WASCO and LUCELEC should be State owned.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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269. Areas of lands such as the sea bed, Queen’s Chain, river bed, reclaimed lands should
form part of the patrimony.
270. Citizenship should be granted on economic grounds.
Report – March 2011
326
Appendix XII:
Preparatory Activities of CRC
(List of Internal Training Activities Undertaken by the Constitutional Reform Commission November
2006 – November 2009)
By Statutory Instrument No. 50, 2004, (See Appendix I) the Government of Saint Lucia
established a Commission to review and reform the Constitution of Saint Lucia. Pursuant to this,
the Commission undertook the following preliminary activities:
Conducted training workshops for Commissioners to familiarise them with the process;
Hosted a series of public lectures by prominent regional personalities on the topic of
constitution and constitutional reform aimed at sensitizing the public on the issue;
Undertook a series of Community based education meetings to explain briefly, for the
benefit of the citizenry, certain provisions of the existing Constitution, in the hope that, in
doing so, their understanding of the document and of the central issues involved in
constitutional review would be enhanced; ultimately redounding to their effective
participation in the review process.
The Commission consulted widely with the citizens and organizations of Saint Lucia, at home and
abroad, in its quest to maximise submissions from all interested parties.
There were regular weekly meetings of Commissioners at the Commission’s secretariat; these
were held on Wednesdays from 1:30 p.m.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
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27
Workshops for Commissioners
The following are lists of activities undertaken by CRC in order to prepare Commissioners for the
task at hand.
DATE ACTIVITY
30
th
Sept., 2006 Team building retreat for Commissioners facilitated by Dr. Aubrey Armstrong
– Management Consultant
6
th
Nov., 2006 Introductory workshop for Commissioners
21
st
Nov., 2006 Orientation workshop for Commissioners
28
th
Nov., 2006 Preparatory workshop for Commissioners
29
th
Jan., 2007 Workshop for Commissioners
6
th
Feb., 2007 Workshop for Commissioners
24
th
Nov., 2009 Workshop for Commissioners
Report – March 2011
328
Appendix XIII
List of persons/organisation making written submissions
Individual/ Organization
01
Clement Prospere, Men’s Christian Fellowship Methodist Church in Saint
Lucia
02 Henry Mangal
03 McHale S.C. Andrew
04
Joan Didier, AIDS Action Foundation/Caribbean Vulnerable Communities
Coalition
05
Armelle Mathurin, Help-Age St.Lucia (HASL) National Council of and for
Older Persons
06 Juliet Brathwaite, Cornerstone Humanitarian Society
07 Pamela Devaux, St.Lucia Animal Protection Society
08 Claude Guillaume
09 Orjan Lindberg - MEND
10 Bishnu Tulsi, St.Lucia National Trust
11 Andrew George, NEMO
12 Gerard Saltibus
13 Lucia Lee
14 Akim Larcher
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Individual/ Organization
15 Kentia Placide/United & Strong, Inc.
16 Wilkie Larcher
17 David Hughes
18 Gertrude George, United Workers Party
19 Kevin Lord
20 Modestus Louis
21 Stephen King, Dr.
22 Imran Jean
23 Geoffrey Devaux
24 Sylvanus Fontenard
25 Andrew Antoine
26 St. Lucia Solid Waste Management Authority
27 Mike Topp
28 Cyril Mangal
29 Bernice Clery, St.Lucia International Association
30 Maurice Laurencin, Jomo Primus
31 Stanley French
32 Maurus Faucher
33 Dawn French
Report – March 2011
330
Individual/ Organization
34 Delrita Joseph
35 P. Watson Louis
36 Islamic Association of Saint Lucia
37 Ayodele Hippolyte
38 Paula Didier
39 Georgina Anthony
40 Ministry of Health and Labour Relations
41 Muriel Gill
42 Rainer Verhoeven
43 Titus Samuel
44 Lionel James
45 Robert Devaux
46 Knights of Columbus
47A
47 B
ALDET Centre
ALDET Centre
48 Paula Fitz
49 Anthony Henry
50 Matthew St. Paul
51 St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
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Individual/ Organization
52 Crispin d’Auvergne, Min. of Physical Development
53 St. Lucia Fire & Emergency Services
54 Regis, Edmund. National Printing Corporation(NPC)
55 Marcia Lesmond
56 E. George
57 Vigier Community
58 Royal Saint Lucia Police Force
59 St. Lucia Civil Service Association
60 St. Lucia Fire & Emergency Services
61 Dona Emmanuel
62 Velon John
63 Daniel [DelightThe[email protected]]
64 Dr. B. M. Pilgrim
65 Peter Josie
66 Lydia Charlemagne
67 Rosanne Martyr
68 Folk Research Centre. Kwéyòl Language Committee
69 Flavia Cherry
70 Madison Stanislaus – Parliamentary Commissioner
Report – March 2011
332
Individual/ Organization
71 Carson Raggie – Chief Elections Officer
72 Claudius Francis
73
Margot Thomas
National Archives Authority of Saint Lucia
74 George Goddard
75 Urban Dolor
76 Amatus Edwards
77
Anthony Robinson,
(Soufriere Youth Council)
78
K. Arlain, J. Lamontagne
Soufriere CYO
79
Gabriel Jude,
Soufriere Action Theatre
80
Eusebia Jn Baptiste/Lucia Jn. Paul
Yaticka Youth Group
81
Marvin Edgar
National Youth Council
82
Sonia Cazaubon
Soufriere Marine Management Area
83 Watson Louis
84
Twain Edward
Country Strikers
85
Augustin Barthelmy
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Individual/ Organization
(Labowi Promotions)
86 St. Lucia International Association 2
87 Iyanola Council for the Advancement of Rastafari (ICAR)
88 Sarah Flood-Beaubrun
89 Rudy Lubin
90 St. Lucia Ottawa Association
91 CRC Delegation to UK
92 Dr. James St. Catherine
93 Vanesta Moses-Felix
Report – March 2011
334
Appendix XIV
CRC’s Internal Meetings and Training June 2006 – October 2008
Date Type of Activity Comments
5
th
July, 2006 Internal Meeting A sub Committee was formed comprising; the Chair and
Deputy, David Cox and Eldon Mathurin to work on a Draft
Work Program/Operational Plan for the next three
months.
5
th
July, 2006 Internal Meeting General Meeting
10
th
July, 2006 Internal Meeting Special Committee Meeting -
Operational Planning:
(1) Press Conference
(2) Lecture Series –Commissioners/public
(3) Documentary
(4) Internal training program
(5) Series of Retreats/Workshops
(6) Printing & distributing the following document:-
-A layman’s Guide to the Constitution
19
th
July,2006 Internal Meeting General Meeting
31
st
July, 2006 Internal Meeting Special Committee Meeting - Financing of Operational
Plan
2
nd
Aug., 2006 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Reporting by Management Committee
16
th
Aug., 2006 Internal Meeting Special Committee Meeting - Planning for Aubrey
Workshop, Pamphlets et cetera.
30
th
Aug., 2006 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Pamphlets,
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335
Date Type of Activity Comments
Documentary, Radio Programs, Website.
6
th
Sept., 2006 Internal Meeting General Meeting - 1200 copies of the Constitution were
received; 20000 pamphlets to be produced by the Voice
Pub. Co.Ltd; Proposed lectures by the Bar; quotation from
David Desborough; Quotation from Aubrey Armstrong for
Commissioners' workshop; documentary; radio
programmes; website.
30
th
Sept., 2006 Workshop for
Commissioners
Led by Dr. Aubrey Armstrong from Aubrey Armstrong and
Associates; Commissioners were placed into three teams
for the purpose.
4
th
Oct., 2006 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Glossary of Constitutional Terms;
Report on Sept 30 2006 workshop; Outreach Programme;
Membership; Radio Programmes; Logo and Letterhead.
11
th
Oct., 2006 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Pamphlets,
Documentary Radio Programs, Website (updates).
25
th
Oct., 2006 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Logo, Chair's London visit; Proposed
Work Programme; Workshop for Commissioners.
1
st
Nov., 2006 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - More Workshops
Planned; Website and Radio Programme Updates.
6
th
Nov., 2006 Workshop Led by David Cox and Dwight Lay.
15
th
Nov., 2006 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Public Launch; Kendall's Proposal;
Glossary of Terms; Recent and next workshops.
Report – March 2011
336
Date Type of Activity Comments
21
st
Nov., 2006 Workshop Led by Dwight Lay and Andie George: Constitutional Law
- Separation of Powers, organs of the State, Conventions
of the Constitution.
22
nd
Nov., 2006 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Documentary (Mr.
Hippolyte), Ask visiting lecturers to assist the
Commission.
28
th
Nov., 2006 Workshop or
Commissioners
Led by Ernest Hilaire: Political/sociological approach to
Constitutional Reform.
4
th
Dec., 2006 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Observer Team for
the General Elections; Hippolyte's Proposal; Lecturers'
assistance; Documentary.
6
th
Dec., 2006 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Workshops Review; Work Plan;
Glossary of Terms; Meeting with Leader of Opposition;
Report from Management Committee on recent meetings.
20
th
Dec., 2006 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Public Launch;
Hippolyte (Episodes1+2); Visiting Lecturers;
Documentary.
10
th
Jan., 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Draft Work Plan for
07/08; Hippolyte (Episodes 3,4); Budget Work Plan;
Documentary; Website.
17
th
Jan., 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Report on recent Management
Meetings.
24
th
Jan., 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Barbara Jacobs and
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337
Date Type of Activity Comments
Public Launch; TV Episodes; Documentary.
29
th
Jan., 2007 Workshop for
Commissioners
Bay Gardens on the CRC: Structure; Work Programme;
Julian Johnson's Booklet; Furnishing and staffing of the
Secretariat; Terms of Reference Review by sub
Committees (Groups A1,A2,B1,B2).
31
st
Jan., 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Outreach Sub Committee Appointed
(Biscette, Charlemagne, Seraphin); Group A1 and A2
Discussions on the Terms of Reference of the
Commission.
5
th
Feb., 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Discussion of Barbara
Jacobs (Right Angle Imaging) Proposal for the Public
Launch.
7
th
Feb., 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Public Launch; Documentary, Work
Programme; Report from Group A.
12
th
Feb., /2007 Internal Meeting Special Committee Meeting - Group A1,A2,B1: Revision
of Roster Prepared by Dwight Lay; reassignment of some
activities.
13
th
Feb., 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Discussion of Barbara
Jacobs (Right Angle Imaging) Proposal for the Public
Launch; Documentation; Calendar of Activities.
16
th
Feb., 2007 Internal Meeting Special Committee Meeting - Group A1,A2,B1: Revision
of roster prepared by Dwight Lay; reassignment of some
activities.
Report – March 2011
338
Date Type of Activity Comments
19
th
Feb., 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Report by Group A1 et al; Right Angle
Presenting Plans for Public Launch; Documentary.
26
th
Feb., 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Essay Competition;
Richmond Felix and the Website; Right Angle Imaging
and Public Launch; Draft of Outreach Meetings.
4
th
March, 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Media Launch; Documentary complete
2 DVDs in hand; Legal aspects of the Essay Competition
(Proprietary Rights); Draft Format for Outreach Meetings -
21 schools visited to date, Guide Document for
Commissioners on Outreach and Radio Programmes,
BOSL, SLASPA,NIC,PSA Targeted for Outreach
Meetings.
7
th
March, 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Report of last Management Meeting;
Constitutionally Speaking Episodes; Outreach Meetings
Draft Roster.
27
th
March, 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Public Lecture (Hunter
Francois); Purchase of a Copier, Public Launch; Website
Payment; Computer Infrastructure Proposal.
16
th
April, 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Outreach Meetings
with schools and communities; Meeting Planned with
Lions Club for April 16 2007; Advertisement of the
Position of an Outreach Coordinator; Proposal for an
Outreach Sub Committee; Discontent with Website;
Public Lecture possibly with Kenny D. Anthony.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
339
Date Type of Activity Comments
2
nd
May, 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - TV Episodes, Documentary and
UNDP, Outreach Meetings.
9
th
May, 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Topic for Essay
Competition adopted; Outreach Meetings temporarily
suspended; Applications for Outreach Coordinator (OC)
Job received.
13
th
May, 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Essay Competition, TV Episodes, OC
selection, Documentary.
30
th
May, /2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Review of applications
for OC. Four people were short listed for the Job.
28
th
June, 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - OC Selection;
Request for the secondment of Lucius Doxerie;
Community Development Officers (CDO) to be contacted;
Proposal from Amatus Edwards; Purchase of Camcorder
and Audio Recorder for Outreach Meetings.
4
th
July, 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Glossary of Terms; OC, Documentary.
3
rd
August, 2007 Internal Meeting Special Committee Meeting - CDOs and OC on Planning
for Community Outreach.
23
rd
August, 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Presentation of Draft
new Website by OC; Documentary, OC Constitutionally
Speaking; Outreach Meetings
29
th
August, 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Website, Essay
Report – March 2011
340
Date Type of Activity Comments
Competition, OC - Should Amatus Edwards be brought in
on a temporary basis; Outreach Meetings - Get green
light with Social Transformation for engagement of CDOs.
3
rd
Sept., 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Update on CDOs collaboration, Panel
Discussions, visits to schools; Plan for Lectures;
Workshops for Commissioners.
5
th
Sept., 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - OC; Public Lectures, Documentary,
Website (OC gave an intro to the New Website;
Workshop for Commissioners.
7
th
Sept. 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Website; Appointment
of Amatus Edwards as interim OC, Essay Competition;
Plan for a Public Lecture with Dr. Hamid Ghany, Francis
Alexis et al.
24
th
Sept. 2007 Workshop for
Commissioners
The Way Forward for the CRC'; Short Comings of the OC
were highlighted; Commissioners were unanimous about
the slow pace of outreach activities citing that the people
need to be fired up about the Commission's work; Calls
for more TV and other media appearances. There was
need for forging of alliances of NGOs such as the
Mothers and Fathers' Groups and the US Peace Corps.
24
th
Oct., 2007 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Essay Competition;
Website; Ocs new approach to the Outreach Programme;
Collaboration with the CDOs; Consultations;
Constitutionally Speaking TV Programmes.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
341
Date Type of Activity Comments
7
th
Nov., 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - OC Report on Outreach Programme;
Possible OAS Financial Assistance; Commission's Public
Image.
5
th
Dec., 2007 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Overseas meeting Planning (NY and
St. Croix); OC meeting with Outreach Committee.
19
th
Dec., 2007 Internal Meeting Special Committee Meeting - (General Membership) To
review and discuss the objectives of the consultations;
Plans for the format of the Community Consultations that
should start in January 2008.
9
th
Jan., 2008 Internal Meeting General Meeting - OC Outreach Report; Overseas
Meeting in St. Croix; Demonstration of the Consultations
Cataloguing System by OC.
23
rd
Jan., 2008 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Appointment of
Amatus Edwards as Outreach Coordinator (OC); attitude
of the Populace to the CR exercise; Meeting with Julian
Johnson; Essay Competition; collaboration with the
CDOs; Sources of Finance for the Commission.
13
th
Feb., 2008 Internal Meeting
General Meeting - OC Report on Outreach Meetings for
the month; St. Croix Overseas Meeting; McIntosh Lecture
Plans.
5
th
March, 2008 Internal Meeting General Meeting - OC's Report; Report on St. Croix visit;
Recording Equipment; Consultation Cataloguing System.
10
th
March, 2008 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - OC Appointment
Report – March 2011
342
Date Type of Activity Comments
Acceptance; Kennedy Samuel's proposal for TV Ad;
Meetings with CDOs by OC; Report on Rotary Club
Meeting; Attitude of Populace to Constitutional Reform;
Julian Johnson; Sources of Finance for the Commission;
Overseas Outreach Meetings.
11
th
June, 2008 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Misplaced recordings from GIS;
reactivation of Committees; meeting with students in
Jamaica; Youth Month Programming and the CRC; OC
Report; Format for reporting Community meetings.
17
th
July, 2008 Report Committee (Eldon Mathurin, Dwight Lay Veronica Cenac, Urban
Seraphin).
18
th
July, 2008 Internal Meeting Special Committee Meeting - (Parliament's Office),
Consultation with Parliament on their recommendations
and also to share with them the status of the CRC's work.
Agreed; two presentations to Parliament before the
consultation (August and October).
6
th
August, 2008 Internal Meeting General Meeting - Julian Johnson document; Essay
competition; meeting with Saint Lucians in Barbados;
document on Constitutional Reform in Jamaica; meeting
with Rodney Bay Residents association.
7
th
August, 2008 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - To consider the
invoice submitted by the developer of the Consultations
Cataloguing system; OC Contract renewal; Independent
assessment of the Cataloguing Software by Mr. Samuel
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
343
Date Type of Activity Comments
of the NIC.
18
th
Sept., 2008 Internal Meeting Management Committee Meeting - Meeting with
Parliamentarians; Mrs. Giles Requests; Questionnaire;
Invitation to the GG and other Key Public Servants to
address the Commission; November Retreat.
5
th
Nov., 2008 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Barrow-Giles led a session on the topic:
Models of Political Systems: Constitutional Governance
and Engineering.
15
th
April, 2009 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Barrow-Giles led a session on the topic:
Electoral Engineering: Issues of Efficiency,
Representation and Good Governance.
30
th
Sept., 2009 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Cherry led a session on the topic: The
New Constitution and Gender Equality.
12
th
Oct., 2009 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Barrow-Giles led a session on the topic:
Provisions Related to Head of State: Consideration for
Saint Lucia
Constitution
.
21/7/2010 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Cox led a session on the topic: Altering the
Constitution of Saint Lucia.
29
th
July, 2010 Internal Commissioner Charlemagne led a session on the Senate
8
th
August, 2010 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Barrow-Giles led a session on the topic:
Recall as a Mechanism for Ensuring Accountability of
Public Officers.
11
th
August, 2010 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Barrow-Giles led a session on the topic:
Legal Framework for Political Party and Elections
Financing for Saint Lucia: Issues under Consideration.
Report – March 2011
344
Date Type of Activity Comments
6
th
August, 2010 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Barrow-Giles led a session on the topic:
Modalities of Second Chambers
.
25
th
August, 2010 Internal
Lecture/Discussion
Commissioner Cox led a session on the topic: Reform of
the Magistracy.
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
345
Appendix XV
CRC Prayer
In an effort to evoke the support of God in the deliberation of the Commissions’ task at hand,
Commissioner Dr Urban Seraphin was asked to pen a prayer which would become the standard by
which the work of the commission would commence. Commissioner Seraphin officially with the
support of other members became the Chaplin to the Commission.
The following, therefore is the Constitutional Reform Commission’s prayer as author by Dr Urban
Seraphin:
Father God, we come to you in humble supplication;
create in us a pure and noble heart, confirm in us the mission
entrusted to the Commission, by thy grace.
Heavenly Father, provide the Commission and Commissioners
the strength to carry out our task.
Let peace and truth dwell in our deliberations at all times through
the aid of thy holy spirit.
Gracious Father, grant us always the will and desire which is most
acceptable to your cause and let your will be ours.
Merciful God, as we dispense the work of the Commission, guide our efforts
and provide in us, thoughts that would enlighten our minds with a spirit of piety
for the edification of others.
WE beseech you Father in the name of your beloved Son, our Lord and Saviour the only true God
world without end.
Amen
Report – March 2011
346
INDEX
Alexis, Francis Dr., 11, 297, 342
Anthony, Kenny D. Dr., 3, 7, 11, 70, 154, 164,
212, 308, 340
Antigua and Barbuda, 29, 62, 158, 195
Antoine, Rose Mary Belle Prof., 12
Armstrong, Aubrey Dr., 5, 329, 337
Attorney General, 15, 29, 40, 46, 130, 132, 152,
161, 162, 177, 192, 324
Barbados, 5, 12, 59, 158, 229, 238, 297, 300
Belize, 52, 68, 100, 102, 103, 158, 199, 200, 201,
238
Bill of Rights, 36, 85, 90, 101, 103, 104, 105,
111, 125, 127, 311, 312
bye-election, 43, 128, 148, 149, 316
Campbell, Parnel CVO, QC, 3, 11, 297
Cenac, Neville, 68
Central Government, 180, 181, 182
Citizenship Act, 53, 218, 219, 223, 230
Commission, 135
Compton, John Sir, 7, 29, 66, 67, 68, 70, 153,
154, 212, 238, 239, 258
Constituency Boundaries Commission, 43, 44,
75, 124, 148, 149, 150, 151
Constitutional Reform Commission, 1, 67, 87,
193, 237, 273, 328
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 35, 99
Coutume de Paris, 60
Diaspora, 12, 23, 229, 230, 239
Dominica, 29, 38, 62, 64, 76, 89, 90, 114, 115,
116, 117, 120, 122, 123, 124, 158, 185
Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, viii, 52, 202,
203, 206, 207, 297
Elections Act, 142, 227
Electoral Commission, 44, 75, 123, 150, 151,
165, 309, 323, 324, 325
Executive, 23, 25, 26, 40, 76, 118, 119, 127, 128,
131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 141, 152,
153, 155, 159, 193, 310, 311, 312, 321, 322,
325
Fiadjoe, Albert Prof., 11, 297
fixed dates for elections, 25, 137, 153, 154, 155,
157
Floissac, Vincent Sir, 212
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 66
Ghany, Hamid Dr., 11, 12, 18, 297, 342
Gonzalves, Ralph Dr., 12
Governor-General, 38, 43, 68, 75, 113, 115, 117,
118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 145, 151, 152, 153,
154, 156, 158, 165, 316
Grenada, 29, 60, 62, 64, 158, 297
Guyana, 76, 115, 116, 117, 195, 238
House of Assembly, 1, 40, 41, 49, 50, 64, 70, 77,
78, 87, 113, 116, 117, 123, 124, 128, 129,
131, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 152, 154,
159, 164, 165, 189, 191, 193, 195, 196, 197,
198, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 279, 308, 315,
317
House of Lords, 77, 150
Constitutional Reform Commission – Saint Lucia
347
House of Parliament, 40, 69, 128, 131
Hunte, Julian Dr., 68
hybrid, 27, 130, 137, 138, 139, 155, 164, 165,
188, 197, 201, 237, 239
I.L.O, 102, 103
Jamaica, 114, 158, 195, 210, 211, 212, 213, 227,
344
Jamaican, 213
Judicial and Legal Services Commission, 177,
203, 323
King, Stephenson, 11, 70
Kwéyòl, 14, 32, 79, 310, 322
Land Acquisition Act, 92
Leader of the Opposition, 2, 3, 11, 25, 46, 69, 75,
117, 119, 123, 124, 152, 165, 166, 171, 191,
196, 275, 278, 308, 320, 323
Legislature, 26, 40, 60, 61, 76, 117, 123, 127,
128, 131, 135, 137, 139, 141, 195, 273, 310,
322, 325
Lewis, Allen Sir, 68
Lewis, Vaughn Dr., 70, 227, 238, 239
Lijphart, Arend, 72, 126, 131
Local Authorities Ordinance of 1947, 180, 181
Lord Chancellor, 77, 208, 209
Louis, Watson, 12
Louisy, Allan Sir, 67, 70
Marlborough House, 88, 92, 113, 123, 149, 152,
172, 185, 202, 237
Marlborough House Conference, 92, 113, 123,
152, 169, 172, 185
Martinique, 12, 229, 300
McIntosh, Simeon, 114
McIntosh, Simeon Prof., 12
Minister of Finance, 40, 130, 132
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 40, 130, 132
Minister of National Security, 40, 130, 132
Ministers of Religion, 124, 149, 150
Minority Leader, 38, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 121, 136,
141, 151, 165, 166, 172, 178, 194, 197, 198,
242, 245, 310
Natural Resource Management Act, 33, 86
New York, 12, 73, 134, 229, 300
Odlum, George, 68
OECS, ix, 28, 98, 278
Ordinary legislation, 92
Parliament, 140
Parliamentary Committee, 110, 175, 176
Parliamentary Representative, 48, 182, 184
Patterson, P. J., 114
Politics of West Africa, 73
pre-European history of Saint Lucia, 59
Presidential systems, 135
Privy Council, ix, 53, 60, 65, 94, 202, 203, 207,
208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 238, 311, 317
Public Service, ix, 4, 46, 75, 171, 172, 175, 193,
274, 308, 313, 316, 321, 325, 326
Public Service Commission, 171
Rawlins, Hugh, 11, 297
Report – March 2011
348
Rowlands, Ted, 66, 67
Saint Lucia, ix, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19,
20, 23, 25, 29, 32, 33, 37, 38, 48, 52, 53, 56,
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 74,
75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 94, 95, 96,
101, 108, 110, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
127, 135, 137, 142, 143,쀀145, 147, 148, 150,
153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 164, 165, 173, 174,
179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 186, 188, 190, 193,
195, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210,
211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 222,
223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 237, 238, 239,
241, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 295, 296,
300, 304, 305, 306, 311, 312, 314, 315, 318,
319, 320, 321, 322, 326, 328, 330, 332, 333,
334, 345
Saint Lucia Gazette, 2
Sartori, Giovanni, 134
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, 67
St. Aimée, Donatus Dr., 12
St. Christopher and Nevis, 29, 158
St. Croix, 12
St. Lucia Labour Party, ix, 67
St. Thomas, 12, 229, 300
St. Vincent, 29, 62, 68, 103, 158, 239, 297, 299
Standing Orders of Parliament, 138, 139, 197
Teaching Service Commission, 46, 172, 316, 326
The Bahamas, 158
Toronto, 12, 229, 300
Tortola, 300
Trade Union, 136, 326
Treaty of Paris, 59, 60
Trinidad and Tobago, 76
U.K. National Archives, 64, 66, 88, 186
UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 95
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 35, 96
unicameral system, 135, 298, 323
United Kingdom, 67, 72, 75, 77, 116, 185, 195
United States, 26, 72, 134, 137, 155, 156, 159,
239
United Workers Party, ix, 68, 295, 331
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 101
USVI, 12, 229
Virgin Gorda, 12, 229, 300
Washington, 12, 76, 134, 137, 140, 153, 229,
239, 300
West Indian and Atlantic Department, 63
West Indies Act 1967, 63
Westminster, 23, 69, 76, 77, 127, 132, 133, 134,
135, 137, 150, 153, 165, 186, 238, 239
Wooding, Hugh Sir, 155
