INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
REPORT
NO.
3703
THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND
SANTA
FE
RAILWAY
COMPANY
IN
RE ACCIDENT
AT
ROBINSON, N. MEX., ON
SEPTEMBER
5, 1956
Report
No. 3703
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2 -
Date:
Railroad:
Location:
Kind
of accident;
Trains
Involved:
Train
numbers:
Locomotive
numbers:
Consl
B
ts:
Estimated speeds:
Operation.
Track:
Weather:
Time:
Casualties:
Cause:
September 5, 1956
Atchison,
Topek§
and
Santa
Fe
Robinson,
N. Mex.
Head-end
collision
Passenger : Passenger
6 • 19
Diesel-electri
c
units
41, 41A,
41B,
and 41C
15
cars
Standing
Dlesel-electrlc
units
30C, 30B,
30A,
and 30
14
cars
63 m. p. h.
Timetable,
train
orders, and automatic
bio
ck-
s
1
gnal sy s tem
Single;
tangent; 1.08 percent descend-
ing
grade eastward
Clear
3:01 a. m.
20
killed;
4 Injured
Fireman of
train
on a siding stationing
himself
near
main track switch in
violation
of rule and
then
becoming
confused and opening the switch imme-
diately
in front of approaching
train
SUMMARY
-
3 -
INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
COMMISSION
REPORT
NO.
3703
IN
THE
MATTER
OF
MAKING
ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
REPORTS
UNDER
THE
ACCIDENT
REPORTS
ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
THE
ATCHISON,
TOPEKA
AND
SANTA
FE
RAILWAY
COMPANY
October
2, 1956
Accident
at Robinson, N. Mex., on September 5, 1956, caused
by
the fireman of a
train
on a siding stationing Mil-
self
near
a main
track
switch in violation of rule and
then
becoming confused and opening the switch immedi-
ately in front of an approaching
train.
REPORT
OF THE
C0MMI3SI0N-
1
-
CLARKE,
Commissioner:
On
September 5, 1956,
there
was a head-end collision
between a mail and express
train
and a passenger
train
on
the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa
Fe
Railway
at Robinson,
N.
Mex., which resulted In the
death
of 15 dining car and
lounge car employees and 5 train-service employees, and
the Injury of 1 passenger, 2 dining-car employees, and 1
train-service employee. This accident was investigated in
conjunction with a representative of the
State
Corporation
Commission
of New
Mexico.
1
Under
authority
of section 17 (2) of the
Interstate
Commerce
Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred
by
the Commission to Commissioner Clarke for consideration
and disposition.
- 4 -
I
I
i
r
i
1.40
2.40 3.71 1.20
mi*
nd, mi, mi, z
I i i
I 1
+4-
1,343
ft.
Tangent
Robinson
L__i__
26 ft.
Sig.
7041
•P.S.
*
accident
H
CO
'
Raton,
N.
Hex.
39.6 mi.
Springer
6.1 mi.
Robinson
(Point
of
accident)
20.0 im.
tfagon
Mound
44.1
mi.
Las
Vegas,
N.
Mex.
4
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° "£
CO
O
T*
53
s
Q3
O
C
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n
•H
u
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CO
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3703
Location
of Accident and Method of Operation
This
accident occurred on
that
part
of the New
Mexico
Division
extending between Las
Vegas*
and Raton, N. Mex.,
109.8 miles, a single-track line,
over
which
trains
are
operated by timetable,
train
orders, and an automatic block-
signal system. At Robinson, 64.1 miles
east
of Las
Vegas,
a siding 2,994 feet in length parallels the main
track
on
the
south.
The
east
siding-switch is
1,-343
feet
east
of
the station sign. The accident occurred on the siding at
a point 431 feet west of the
east
switch. From the ^ast on
the main
track
there aro, in succession, a tangent in excess
of
2.00 miles in length, a l'-30
!
curve to the
left
1,133 feet,
and a tangent 1.20 miles to the
east
siding-switch and a
considerable distance westward. The grade is 1.08 percent
ascending westward at the point of accident.
There
is a No. 14
turnout
at the
east
end of the siding
at Robinson. The switch
stand
Is of the horizontal-throw
intermediate-stand type and Is located about 7 feet
north
of
the
north
rail of the main
track.
It is provided with a cir-
cular red target 18 inches in diameter and
TT
ith reflector
lenses at the top of the spindle. When the switch is
l
1
n*»d
for
movement on the main
track
the
banner
is parallel to
the
track
and green reflector lenses are displayed In the
direction of approaching
trains.
When the switch is lined
for
entry to the siding the
banner
is at
ri^ht
angles to
the
track
and red reflector lenses are displayed in the
direction of approaching
trains.
The switch is provided
with
a switch-point lock which
must
be released by means of
a treadle
near
the base of the switch
stand
before the switch
can be opened. Botn the operating
lever
and the treadle are
locked
with
standard
switch
loo^s.
Automatic
signals 7011, 7021, 7031, and 7041, governing
west-bound movements on the main
track,
are located, respec-
tively,
5.71 miles, 2
P
40 miles, 1.40 miles, and 26 feet
east
of
the
east
siding-swi r,ch at Robinson. These signals are of
the semaphore type and are approach lighted. The control-
ling
circuits are arranged on the overlap principle with
double approach signals. When the ea^t siding-switch at
Robinson
is lined for entry to the siding, signals 7011 and
7021 each indicate Proceed-preparing-to-stop-at-next-signal,
and signals 7031 and 7041 each indicate Stop-then-proceed.
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3703
No.
8 was moved westward a distance of about 40 feet
by
the force of the Impact. The first and second Dlesel-
electrlc units and the front truck of the third unit were
derailed. Separations occurred between the first and second
Dlesel-electrlc unite and between the eighth and ninth cars.
The first unit was turned end for end and stopped upright on
the south side of the track with the front end opposite the
rear end of the second unit. It vas demolished. The other
units stopped upright and in line with the track. The main
frame of the second unit was broken, and the unit was badly
damaged. The third and fourth units, and the eighth, ninth,
eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth cars were somewhat damaged.
The four Dlesel-electrlc units, the first six cars, and
the front truck of the seventh car of No. 1? were derailed.
Separations occurred between each of the Dlesel-electrlc
units and at each end of each of the first five cars. The
first unit was turned end for end and stopped at an angle
of about 45 degrees to the track. The rear end was against
the rear end of the first unit of No. 8, and the front end
was toward the southeast. It was demolished. The second
and third unite stopped in diagonal positions across the
track structure of the siding. The fourth unit stopped across
the siding and at right angles to It, *i.th the rear~ end on the
track structure of the main track. These units were badly
damaged. The first car stopped on its left side. The front
end was against the side of the fourth Diesel-electric unit,
and the rear end was toward the southeast. The second car
stopped on its side. The top of the second car was crushed
against the underside of the first car throughout the length
of the car. None of the other cars overturned. The third
car stopped with the north end several feet north of the main
track, and the aide against the underside of the second car.
The fourth car stopped with the front end against the south
end of the underside of the second car, and the rear end on
the track structure of the main track. The fifth car stopped
with the front end against the rear end of the fourth car, and
the rear end on the track structure of the siding. The other
derailed cars stopped approximately in line with the siding.
The first two cars were destroyed, the third and fourth cars
were badly damaged, and the fifth and sixth cars were con-
siderably damaged.
The engineer of No. 8, the engineer, the fireman, and
the conductor of No. 19, and one employee not on duty who
was on No. 19 were killed. The front brakeman of No. 19
was Injured.
The weather was clear and It was very dark at the time
of the accident, which occurred at 3:01 a, ID.
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3703
Dlscusslon
The crews of both trains held copies of train order
No.
508, which established Robinson as the meeting point
between these trains and provided that No. 8, the superior
train by direction, take siding at the meeting point. The
surviving members of the crews of both trains so understood.
When No. 8 stopped at the west siding-switch at Robinson
the enginemen were on the locomotive, the train porter, who
would ordinarily operate the siding switch, was in the tenth
car,
and the conductor and the flagman were in the thirteenth
car.
The fireman alighted and opened the switch. After the
train entered the siding the flagman closed and locked the
switch. The train then proceeded to the east end of the
siding and stopped with the front of the locomotive 431 feet
west of the east switch. The fireman said that the engineer
had instructed him that he was to operate the switch. After
the train stopped, the engineer extinguished the headlight.
The fireman then proceeded to the switch and unlocked the
padlock which secures the treadle of the switch-point lock.
He said he then crossed the track and took a position oppo-
site the switch stand and about 25 feet south of the track.
After crossing the track he extinguished his light. He said
that as No. 19 was approaching he was looking toward that
train and that when No. 19 reached a point which he thought
was about l/4 mile east of the switch he heard the engineer
of No. 8 sound the pneumatic horn several times. He said
that prior to this time he had been positive that No. 8 was
on the siding and that the switch was properly lined for
the movement of No. 19 on the main track. When he heard
the pneumatic horn he became confused and thought that the
engineer intended the sounds as a signal to him to line the
switch for entry to the siding. At this time No. 19 was
closely approaching. The fireman crossed the track and
unlocked and opened the switch. The locomotive of No. 19
passed immediately afterward. When No. 8 stopped on the
siding at Robinson the members of the train crew alighted
on the north side of the train. These employees said that
as No. 19 was approaching they heard a short blast on the
pneumatic horn on the locomotive of No. 8, and several sec-
onds later they heard another short blast. The conductor
and the train porter said that the engineer of No. 8 then
lighted the headlight, and the conductor said that after
being lighted the headlight was extinguished. The flagman
said that he glanced toward the front of the train as No. 19
was entering the siding and that the headlight of No. 8 was
lighted at that time. Both the conductor and the flagman
said that the sound of the exhaust from the locomotive of
No.
19 indicated that the Diesel engines were shut down
when the locomotive was in the vicinity of the east siding-
switch. The flagman said that he could see that the brakes
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3703
of No. 19 were applied as- the front of that train entered
the aiding. None of these employees saw the fireman operate
the switch. After the accident occurred the switch was found
to be lined and locked for entry to the siding. The engineer
of No. 8 was killed in the accident, and his reason for sound-
ing the horn as No. 19 was approaching Is not known. It is
probable that he was attempting to call the fireman's atten-
tion to the fact that he should not remain In the immediate
vicinity of the switch.
As No. 19 was approaching Robinson the enginemen were
on the locomotive, the conductor and the front brakeman were
in the vestibules at the rear of the second car and the front
of the third car, and the flagman was in the rear car. The
headlight was lighted brightly. The front brakeman said that
the engineer sounded the station-approach whistle signal as
the train approached Robinson. The conductor then sounded
the meeting-point signal on the communicating signal system,
and this signal was acknowledged by the engineer. The brake-
man said that a short time later the conductor, who was look-
ing out the vestibule door, called a warning and that at
approximately the same time the brakes became applied. The
collision occurred several seconds later. The flagman said
that there was no brake application until a few seconds be-
fore the collision occurred. He said that at that time the
brakes became applied in emergency.
The dining car and lounge car employees who were killed
were in AT&SF 1382, the second car of No. 19. The side and
roof of this car were demolished. Apparently the first car
of the train was the first to overturn, and after the two
cars were turned at an angle to the track the side and top
of the second car were forced ageinst the underside of the
first car and crushed as the second car overturned.
AT&SF 1382, which was of lightweight construction, was
built in 1937. At the time It was built it met or exceeded
the strength requirements of the Post Office Department for
railway mail care. Subsequently the current specifications
of the Association of American Railroads were formulated and
adopted for new passenger cars, and these specifications
provided for certain strength requirements in excess of
those covered by the specificatlone of the Post Office Depart-
ment at the time the car was built. The car was shopped in
1950,
and at that time the underframe, end frame, and colli-
sion posts were reinforced to bring the car into conformity
with the current specifications of the Association of American
Railroads.
When the first Diesel-electric unit of No. 19 was in-
spected after the accident occurred it was found that the
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3703
handle of the autometlc brake valve "was broken off. The
stem, which was bent, was In emergency position. The throt-
tle was In "stop" position. The tape of the speed-recording
device Indicated that at a point about 0.6 mile east of the
point of accident the speed of No. 19 was 65 miles per hour.
The portion of the tape indicating the speed between this
point and the point of accident was destroyed. A represen-
tative of the carrier estimated that on the ascending grade
east of Robinson the speed of No. 19 would have been reduced
to about 63 miles per hour at the time the locomotive reached
the east sidlng^ewitch.
The signal apparatus in the vicinity of the point of
accident was inspected and tested after the accident occurred.
It was found that the involved signals functioned properly.
The rules of this carrier provide that at meeting points
the employee attending the switch must not station himself
nearer to main track switch than the clearance point until
the expected train has been met. The manner in which this
accident occurred indicates the Importance of this reoulre-
ment. The clearance point at the east end of the siding
at Robinson is approximately 295 feet west of the switch.
An Interval of time would elapse before an employee at this
distance from the switch could reach the switch, and If he
should become confused momentarily it would be impossible
for him to operate the switch on Impulse. The fireman of
No.
8 said that when operating switches at meeting points
he ordinarily complied with this rule. He said that on this
occasion he first went to the switch to unlock the padlock
which secures the treadle of the switch-point lock, and that
he could not explain his failure to return to the clearance
point before the arrival of No. 19. The fireman was employed
in this capacity on the New Mexico Division in 1942 and was
promoted to the position of engineer in 1947.
Cause
The accident was caused by the fireman of a train on
a siding stationing himself near a main track switch in
violation of rule and then becoming confused and opening
the switch immediately In front of an approaching train.
Dated at Washington, D. C, this second day
of October, 1956.
By the Commission, Commissioner Clarke.
(SEAL) HAROLD D. McCOY,
Secretary