Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets: Issues and Challenges

Atlantic Marketing Journal Atlantic Marketing Journal

Volume 5 Number 3 Article 4

February 2017

Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets: Issues and Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets: Issues and

Challenges Challenges

John T. Drea

Illinois College

, [email protected]

Andrew Nahlik

Illinois College

, andrew[email protected]

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Atlantic Marketing Journal

Vol. 5, No. 3 (Fall 2016)

Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball

Tickets: Issues and Challenges

John T. Drea, Illinois College

Andrew Nahlik, Illinois College

John.drea@mail.ic.edu

Abstract – With its origins in the airline industry, dynamic pricing has recently been

extended to the area of Major League Baseball tickets in both the primary and

secondary markets. The present study examines similarities in the application of

dynamic pricing in the airline and MLB industries, as well as the key differences,

which include the interactive effects of competitors in the airline industries and the

presence of a secondary ticket market for MLB tickets. The “zone of reasonableness”

concept used in freight pricing provides a useful framework for understanding the

self-imposed upper and lower price limits for MLB primary market ticket pricing in

primary markets.

Keywords – Sports marketing, dynamic pricing, baseball, airlines

Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers, and/or Practitioners –The

goal of dynamic pricing is to maximize the revenue from a product/service by

adjusting prices in accordance with demand and available inventory. In both the

airline and MLB industries, dynamic pricing increases ticket revenue by raising

prices as inventory decreases and demand increases. For marketing educators

teaching pricing concepts, the paper compares how dynamic pricing is applied in MLB

and airline ticket sales and allows readers to see the effects that competitors,

capacity, and secondary markets can have on prices.

Introduction

A rapidly growing trend in the business of professional sports is the use of dynamic

pricing as a tool for maximizing revenue generation. Dynamic pricing (DP) is defined

as a system in which prices respond to supply and demand pressures in a real time

(or nearly real time) manner (Sahay, 2007). American Airlines is credited with the

first widespread use of DP as a pricing tool to handle the mismatches in supply and

A previous version was presented/published in the Proceedings of the 2015 AtMa Conference.

60 | Atlantic Marketing Journal

Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets

demand for certain flights (McAfee and te Velde, 2006). DP has spread to numerous

other industries, including entertainment, hotels, manufacturing to order, and lately,

to Major League Baseball.

Conceptually, dynamic pricing can be understood as on a per unit basis as:

Price = Transaction Cost + Marginal Cost + Markup

where the markup is assigned according to what the market will bear, with the lowest

acceptable price being the sum of a transaction cost plus the marginal cost of

generating a unit for sale.

The goal of a DP model is typically one of profit maximization; however, the

implementation of a profit maximization strategy is complex. In the airline industry,

maximizing the revenue for a single flight by filling every seat through discounting

likely means that later flights to the same destination will be difficult to maximize.

In addition, competing carriers in the same segment will likely react to price changes

with their own pricing changes, creating a very dynamic marketplace.

DP is typically most effective when two product characteristics are present

(McAfee and te Velde, 2006).

1. The product/service has a specific expiration date, at which point the value

for the product service becomes zero, such as a hotel room, an airline flight,

an event ticket, or a time-dated (“sell before”) product. This creates a

pressure on the seller to liquidate inventory as the expiration date

approaches, which potentially creates a downward pressure on prices. This

is particularly true when supply exceeds demand.

2. Second, the capacity for the product/service is fixed and can only be

increased at a relatively high marginal cost. This characteristic creates the

opposite effect of upward pressure on pricing, especially when demand

exceeds supply.

Rascher et al (2007) posited that MLB teams were failing to capture millions of

dollars of revenue by not using dynamic pricing, thereby allowing the secondary

market to exploit the demand for certain high demand games. Three years later, the

San Francisco Giants were credited with implementing the first dynamic pricing

system in Major League Baseball (Young, 2010). Since this introduction in 2010, it

is estimated

that twenty-eight of thirty MLB teams (primary market) are

dynamically pricing some tickets for the 2015 season. The secondary market for MLB

tickets is largely dominated by StubHub, which enables buyers (both individual ticket

holders and ticket brokers who purchase blocks of tickets for re-sale) who wish to sell

Private discussion with a MLB team official, April 2015.

Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets

Atlantic Marketing Journal | 61

tickets to price their tickets dynamically. This rapid adoption of DP in the MLB

primary market is based upon the belief that the use of DP generates increased

revenues.

DP has spread rapidly across Major League Baseball, and one of the questions

that remains unanswered in the existing literature is how DP in Major League

Baseball is different from DP as it was originally developed in the airline industry.

The goal of this paper is to examine these similarities and differences and to examine

the issues surrounding the use of dynamic pricing within Major League Baseball.

Price Dispersion, Product Expiration, and Capacity

Models of dynamic pricing suggest that prices should rise after tickets initially go on

sale, then fall as the event approaches in order to maximize revenue. McAfee and te

Velde (2006) found this to be partially correct in their study of DP in the airline

industry – ticket prices rose an average of $28.20 two weeks before take-off, and then

rose another $50 in the week before takeoff. Rather than decline immediately before

departure, airline ticket prices actually rose another $16 the night before take-off.

This data was effectively confirmed in a 2011 study by Airlines Reporting

Corporation, which found that prices are 40% above average if purchased the day of

travel but were 6% below average if purchased six weeks prior to departure

(Sakraida, 2012). Escobari (2012) also found that airline prices for a 100 passenger

aircraft increase an average of $1.53 for each less seat that remains available, and

that price increases accelerate during the final two weeks due to a combination of

reduced capacity and price inelasticity among business travelers.

One of the reasons airline ticket prices generally do not fall as the event horizon

approaches is the desire for airlines to price discriminate between different types of

customers. In effect, an airline using DP can charge more to customers that are

willing to pay more for a last minute ticket (Sweeting, 2012). The lack of a drop in

pricing at the end to maximize revenues is likely a function of not having a pool of

travelers waiting for a potential price reduction (people need a reason to travel), and

an airline not wanting to inadvertently reward travelers who wait until the last

minute to book a ticket.

StubHub and Ebay are examples of a platform for dynamic pricing in the

entertainment industry, where prices can fall as an event becomes closer and event

supply exceeds demand. These declines accelerate as the event comes closer and

frequently range in the 30-60% discount from the original ticket price (Sweeting,

2012).

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Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets

Consumer Decision Making and Dynamic Pricing

Consumer decision making processes are an important consideration in creating a

DP model. Many DP models are based upon deterministic decision models; that is,

there is little uncertainty in demand and purchase decisions are predominantly a

function of pricing decisions. (An options market for a commodity would be an

example.) Such classic approaches to DP assume that consumers make purchase

decisions when the price of the item to be purchased drops below the value assigned

to it (for example, when an airline ticket that is valued at $300 drops below $300 in

price, the consumer purchases the ticket.) This viewpoint has correctly been

described as myopic (Levin, McGill, and Nediak, 2010). The reality for MLB tickets,

airline tickets, hotel reservations, etc. is that such product markets are

fundamentally stochastic and influenced by a combination of deliberate actions

(pricing, promotion, etc.), random events, and events beyond the control of the seller

(winning percentage, weather conditions, etc.). As an example, regression modeling

of minor league baseball games has shown that even with the independent variables

of winning percentage, weather, day of the week, and presence/absence of promotions,

nearly half of all variation in ticket sales remained unaccounted (Drea, 1991).

In reality, consumers are likely to be strategic in their behavior by learning how

certain perishable items are priced in a DP environment (Talluri and van Ryzin,

2004). As the level of involvement with a dynamically priced item increases, it

becomes increasingly likely that consumers move away from a deterministic DP

model (purchase occurs when value exceeds price) and become more strategic.

Consumers are likely to communicate with other consumers regarding high

involvement purchases, becoming more sophisticated and strategic in their decision

making to find a price position that maximizes their return (the difference between

price and value assigned). This implies that to maximize revenue from consumers,

the process by which dynamic prices are set should not be completely transparent to

consumers. The pricing systems within most major airlines are “remarkably opaque

to the consumer, which is not surprising given one estimate that American Airlines

changes half a million prices per day” (McAfee and te Velde, 2006). If the time of the

lowest price point can be readily estimated by a consumer and if the consumer is

effectively rewarded for waiting with a lower price, the marginal revenue from each

ticket will decrease as consumers optimize their return by timing their purchases.

Dynamic pricing has its criticisms, which focus on two issues: negative influences

on consumer search behavior, and issues of price fairness. DP complicates search

processes for consumers, who must weigh whether to purchase a ticket early or to

delay a purchase to see if prices fall without knowing how the dynamic model works

(Furtwengler, 2011). Consumer perceptions of the “fairness” of dynamically set prices

is a function of the magnitude of the price increase, the extent to which the customer

is loyal, and the temporal proximity of the price difference (Dai, 2010). Consumers

are likely to describe dynamically set prices as unfair when the difference is to their

disadvantage (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba, 2003). Loyal customers were found to have

Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets

Atlantic Marketing Journal | 63

reduced perceptions of price unfairness (than non-loyal customers) when a price

change was small or temporally distant; however, when the price change was large

and/or recent the perceptions of price unfairness were greater (Dai, 2010).

Dynamic Pricing in the Airline and MLB Industries

Extending DP from the airline industry to MLB tickets requires an understanding of

how the two industries are similar and different as it applies to pricing. Clearly, some

similarities exist:

1. Both airline and MLB tickets are sold in advance, and unsold tickets expire

at departure/game time (perishable).

2. Capacity is set in advance and can only be modified at a significant

marginal cost.

3. There is considerable uncertainty about aggregate demand than cannot be

resolved solely through pricing.

4. Consumers operate with imperfect information, but improve their decision

making over time in response to learning (primary vs. secondary markets,

purchase timing.)

There are numerous differences between the airline industry and MLB regarding

the influences for dynamic pricing, as shown in Table 1. Airline ticket pricing

features several factors which contribute to highly complex DP models. These include

the presence of direct competitors within the airline industry and the interactive

effect that changes in process have on competitor prices (and vice versa). While MLB

teams have direct competitors, a consumer is less likely to purchase a ticket for a

game from a competing team in order to obtain a lower price.

One of the key differences between the use of DP in the airline industry and MLB

ticketing surrounds the potential for negative repercussions for perceived price

unfairness. Because airline ticket prices tend to move and down collectively as an

industry, individual airlines are unlikely to be perceived as exhibiting price

unfairness for fluctuating prices since ticket prices for competitors are likely to be

fluctuating as well. (The exception would be tickets purchased within hours of

departure when only one competitor has available capacity.)

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Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets

Table 1: Dynamic Pricing Influences: Differences between Airline Tickets

and MLB Tickets

Airlines

Major League Baseball

Competitors

Multiple direct competitors

in geographic proximity are

a direct influence on prices.

Direct competitors have

limited influence on prices,

and are seldom in

geographic proximity.

Generic or total budget

competitors are a greater

influence.

Secondary

Markets

No secondary market

Active secondary market

(StubHub)

Product

Differentiation

Low. Product is viewed to

some extent as a

commodity, differentiated

on price, services, and

convenience

High. Since there are few

direct competitors, MLB

tickets compete against

generic budget competitors

for discretionary spending

Categories of

tickets

Few. Typically coach and

first class, with some

variations.

Many, depending on

location and amenities.

Risk for

perceptions of

price

unfairness

Low. Prices tend to move as

an industry, so perceptions

of unfairness by individual

competitors is rare.

High, if a competitor allows

prices to rise unrestrained

for high demand games.

Impulse

purchase

Low. Buyers often make

purchase decisions several

weeks prior to departure.

Impulse purchases are

infrequent.

Varied. Some purchases

are made weeks/months in

advance, but many tickets

are sold based on an

impulse basis on the day of

game.

A second key distinction between the airline and MLB industries is that MLB

ticket buyers are both consumers and fans. A fan has a monetary value that is in

addition to the ability to purchase single game tickets, including pre-sold

(season/package) tickets, media viewership, parking concessions, and the purchase of

licensed merchandise. Perceptions of price unfairness among the fans of a particular

MLB team potentially impacts these additional revenue streams. MLB teams are

advised to avoid maximizing the ticket revenue stream for exceptionally high demand

tickets at the risk of triggering perceptions of price unfairness, which would lower

behavioral intention to re-purchase and lower overall lifetime revenue.

Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets

Atlantic Marketing Journal | 65

The Zone of Reasonableness and MLB Ticket Pricing

Another key distinction between airline and MLB ticket pricing is the effect of the

secondary market (StubHub) on primary market ticket sales. Unlike the primary

market, the MLB secondary market operates on a more market driven basis for ticket

pricing with less of a concern for perceptions of price unfairness or the potential

negative effects of having ticket prices fall below the prices paid by season ticket

holders. If a ticket with an initial value of $100 is sold later on StubHub for $300,

the perceptions of price unfairness are focused on the secondary market provider

(StubHub) and not the MLB team that no longer controls the ticket price. The

secondary market is also unconcerned with any effects of price unfairness when

individual game tickets fall below the per game ticket price paid by a season ticket

holder. This frequently results in a broader range of potential ticket prices found in

the secondary market, compared to the restricted range of prices in the primary

market.

Figure 1: The Zone of Reasonableness for MLB Ticket Pricing

Variable

cost

Variable cost plus

transaction costs

Ticket Value to Consumer

Season Ticket Holder Price

Minimum

ticket

price,

primary

market

Maximum

ticket

price,

primary

market

Value/Price

Maximum

ticket

price,

secondary

market

Transaction

cost

Minimum

ticket

price,

secondary

market

Zone of

reasonableness,

primary

market

Zone of reasonableness, secondary market

Possible

perceptions

of price

unfairness

66 | Atlantic Marketing Journal

Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets

One way of understanding the differences of DP in the primary and secondary

markets is through the application of the “zone of reasonableness” pricing concept to

the field of dynamic pricing. The zone of reasonableness is a concept used in both

energy pricing (Fox-Penner and Wharton, 2007) and freight pricing (Drea and Hanna,

2006) to determine the floor and ceiling prices for a particular item. In the MLB

primary market ticket pricing, the range of available ticket price positions is bounded

on the lower end by the price per game paid by season ticket holders, and on the upper

end by a price above which perceptions of price unfairness would likely develop. In

the MLB ticket secondary market, the range of potential ticket prices is considerably

broader, since the secondary market in unencumbered by perceived lower price limit

imposed by season ticket holders or concerns of price unfairness as an upper limit.

Not pricing below the per game price paid by a season ticket holder is believed to be

an important mechanism to guarantee season ticket holders that they are receiving

the best price per game for their tickets and that they would not benefit by purchasing

tickets individually in the primary market. In 2013, MLB entered into an agreement

with StubHub to establish a minimum ticket price of $6, which includes all

transaction fees (Fisher, 2012), and this price establishes the lower price limit for the

secondary market.

There is support that some professional sports teams use a “zone of

reasonableness” concept when implementing DP. For example, a high demand MLB

ticket would be the San Francisco Giants vs. Oakland Athletics at AT&T Park in San

Francisco on Friday, July 24, 2015. A ticket purchased through the team in the lower

box area was priced at $122.50 from primary market (SF Giants) vs. an average price

of $162.15 in the secondary market (StubHub prices for this area ranged from $102.95

to $219.95). By comparison, a low demand ticket in a lower box area for the June 29,

2015 game between the Cincinnati Reds and the Minnesota Twins at Great American

Ball Park in Cincinnati was priced at $37 in the primary market (Cincinnati Reds)

vs. an average price of $24.85 in the secondary market (StubHub prices for this area

ranged from $16.83 to $33.01). In each of these two examples, the MLB teams appear

to have constrained the range of prices in the primary market in order to protect the

interests of season ticket holders and fans.

Teams that routinely approach stadium capacity have the flexibility of pursuing

additional pricing objectives beyond profit maximization. The St. Louis Cardinals,

which use DP and routinely sell out, had 79% of home games in the 2014 season with

some tickets priced at $10 or less and 36% of home games had some tickets priced for

$5. (St. Louis Cardinals, 2015). This is done by making some areas unavailable for

season ticket sales, such as high in the top deck of the stadium, and in some areas of

the bleachers. These sentiments were echoed by Joe Strohm, VP for Ticket Sales from

the Cardinals. “The biggest challenge was communicating the new pricing structure

to our fans and overcoming the concern of season ticket holders that we would be

undercutting their price. We have guaranteed season holders that we will never sell

individual tickets below the game value of their ticket” (Rishe, 2012).

Dynamic Pricing in Major League Baseball Tickets

Atlantic Marketing Journal | 67

Carr and Lovejoy (2000) previously considered this goal of pricing in order to

sellout as a poor strategy in industries such as airlines and hotels, but it may have

value in professional sports ticket markets where the presence of a sellout has

benefits for enhancing the attractiveness of a ticket and emphasizing the scarcity.

Discussion/Conclusions

For the majority of entities using DP, the primary pricing objective is profit

maximization. While both airlines and MLB teams use DP and embrace profit

maximization, the implementation of DP in each industry is substantially different.

Some of these discrepancies are related to different market structures, with a) more

direct competition and less brand differentiation in the airline industry and b) the

presence of an active secondary market for MLB tickets. At the same time, it is worth

noting that airlines have customers and MLB teams have fans, some of whom are

ticket buying customers and all of whom contribute to the revenue stream for the

MLB team. As a result, the implementation of DP in MLB ticket sales is different

from the implementation of DP within the airline industry.

MLB tickets priced using DP are constrained at the upper and lower levels by

the “fan as a customer” duality faced by team ticket staffs. The lower level of

acceptable ticket prices is constrained by per game prices paid by season ticket

holders, while the upper level of acceptable prices is constrained by issues of price

fairness, which is more difficult to quantify. Secondary MLB ticket markets do not

have these same constraints, which results in a greater level of price dispersion on

the secondary market. These differences are represented by the zone of

reasonableness pricing model.

As a tool for maximizing MLB ticket revenue, DP is most effective when the

demand for tickets exceeds the perceived supply. This scenario allows an MLB team

to extract more value from the transaction by setting a dynamically priced ticket

higher than the price paid by a season ticket holder, yet below a price point that

triggers perceptions of price unfairness. In a scenario where the demand for tickets

does not exceed the supply, DP provides a basis for price discrimination by charging

a higher price to buyers who purchase tickets within the last day before game time

have the ability to pay a price premium for such decisions.

One of the issues for future research in this area is to quantify the costs incurred

by MLB teams for the constraints that prevent teams from fully maximizing revenues

(as occurs in the secondary market), and to determine what actions, if any, can be

undertaken that would allow dynamically set process to fluctuate more fully in

accordance with market demands.

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Author Information

Dr. John Drea earned his D.B.A in Marketing from Southern Illinois University. He

is a Professor and Chair of the Management and Organizational Leadership Program

at Illinois College, as well as Emeritus Professor of Marketing at Western Illinois

University. His research has appeared in the Journal of Personal Selling and Sales

Management, Transportation Journal, Journal of Services Marketing, Journal of

Transportation Management, and numerous other outlets.

Mr. Andrew Nahlik earned his M.A in Economics from the University of Florida. He

is an instructor in the Economics, Accounting, and Finance department at Illinois

College. His previous research has been used in technical reports for various

government agencies such as the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife and the

New Mexico Department of Game and Fish and other interested parties.