Order 2024-1-18
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Issued by the Department of Transportation
on the 26
th
day of January, 2024
Served: January 26, 2024
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Summary
By this order, the U.S. Department of Transportation (the Department) tentatively allocates to
American Airlines, Inc. (American) one U.S.-Haneda slot pair for daily service between New
York’s JFK Airport and Tokyo’s Haneda Airport.
Background
The 2010 U.S.-Japan Memorandum of Understanding, as amended (the Agreement), provides for
17 daytime slot pairs and one nighttime/early morning slot pair for U.S.-carrier operations at
Tokyo International Airport (Haneda).
1
Since the Agreement’s entry into force and the 2010
return of U.S.-carrier operations at Haneda, the Department has conducted a number of
proceedings to allocate the opportunities among interested U.S. carriers and cities. As a result of
the proceedings, American; Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Delta); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Hawaiian);
and United Airlines, Inc. (United) have been allocated the Haneda slot pairs as summarized in
the chart below:
1
The Agreement establishes daytime hours as between 0600 and 2255 hours (local time) and
nighttime/early morning hours as between 2200 and 0655 hours (local time).
Applications of
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
in the matter of 2019 U.S.-Haneda Combination
Services Allocation Proceeding
Docket DOT-OST-2019-0014
2
Carrier
U.S. Gateway
Order # /
Notice
Carrier
U.S. Gateway
Order # /
Notice
American
Los Angeles
2016-9-1
Hawaiian
Kona / Honolulu
2016
Notice
2
Dallas/Fort Worth
2019-8-6
Honolulu
2016-9-1
Los Angeles
2019-8-6
Honolulu
2019-8-6
Delta
Los Angeles
2016-9-1
United
San Francisco
2016-9-1
Minneapolis/St. Paul
2016-9-1
Newark
2019-8-6
Seattle
2019-8-6
Chicago O’Hare
2019-8-6
Detroit
2019-8-6
Washington-Dulles
2019-8-6
Atlanta
2019-8-6
Los Angeles
2019-8-6
Portland
2019-8-6
Honolulu
2019-8-6
On September 22, 2023, Delta filed a letter with the Department stating that it would not launch
Portland-Haneda flights by the October 29, 2023, deadline specified in the Department’s most
recent order extending startup and dormancy waivers,
3
and that it returns to the Department the
daily Portland-Haneda slot pair allocated to Delta by Order 2019-8-6.
United and American each filed applications for the available slot pair. In light of the competing
applications, by Order 2023-11-5, issued November 3, 2023, the Department instituted this
proceeding to allocate the available slot pair. The Order set forth a procedural schedule and
evidentiary requirements for the establishment of a record for the Department to make a decision
in this case. Pursuant to the procedural schedule, applications, amendments to applications, or
supplements to applications were due November 9, 2023; answers were due November 16, 2023;
and replies were due November 21, 2023.
4
American and United each filed supplements to their
applications, answers, and replies. The City of Houston also filed an answer and reply in the
record. The proposals and positions of the parties are summarized below.
5
2
See Notice of Action Taken dated May 13, 2016, in Docket DOT-OST-2016-0048.
3
By Order 2020-3-9, issued March 27, 2020, the Department found it to be in the public interest to grant
all U.S. air carriers temporary blanket relief from startup and dormancy conditions applicable to limited-
entry route authority through October 24, 2020. The Department subsequently extended the blanket relief
for certain markets, most recently by Order 2023-2-15. Under the terms of that order, the startup and
dormancy waivers for Haneda slot pair allocations expired on October 28, 2023. Furthermore, Order
2023-2-15 required carriers granted waivers to file a notice no later than October 1, 2023, in Docket
DOT-OST-2020-0035 listing each limited-entry market in which it would not resume service beginning
October 29, 2023.
4
On January 26, 2024, Hawaiian notified the Department that effective April 2, 2024, it would return the
sole nighttime slot pair available under the agreement that had been allocated to Hawaiian for service
between Haneda and Kona, Hawaii (three times per week) and Honolulu (four times per week). We
tentatively do not view that development as consequential to the outcome of this proceeding whereby the
Department is considering competing proposals for allocation of the available daytime slot pair. Parties
are, of course, free to comment on this tentative view in any pleadings submitted in response to this order.
5
Will Horton also filed and served comments on the parties to the proceeding. Mr. Horton raises several
issues relating to the scope of the proceeding and Department awards of authority, the Department’s
selection criteria, and matters relating to the U.S.-China air services agreement. We believe these issues
are more appropriate for other fora and therefore will not address them here.
3
Summary of Proposals
American proposes daily service from New York (JFK) beginning on March 31, 2024, using
Boeing 777-200 aircraft. United proposes daily service from Houston beginning within 60 days
of the final order using Boeing 777-200 aircraft. The applicant proposals are briefly summarized
in the table below.
Applicant
Proposed Routing
Aircraft Type
Capacity
American
New York (JFK)-
Haneda
B777-200
273 Total Seats:
37 Business Class /
24 Premium Economy /
66 Main Cabin Extra /
146 Main Cabin
United
Houston, Texas-
Haneda
B777-200
276 Total Seats:
50 Polaris /
24 Premium Plus /
202 Economy
Positions of the Parties
American states that its New York-Haneda proposal will enhance inter-carrier and inter-alliance
competition while adding 199,290 passenger seats annually between the United States and
Tokyo.
6
American notes that it would be the only U.S. carrier to offer direct service between
JFK and Tokyo, providing competition to the JFK-Haneda services offered by Japan Airlines
Co., Ltd. (JAL) and All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. (ANA), as well as inter-gateway competition
to United’s daily Newark-Haneda route.
American contends that awarding the slot pair for its proposed JFK-Haneda service would
support competitive balance among U.S. carriers in the U.S.-Tokyo market. In this regard
American states that it currently holds the fewest U.S.-Haneda slot pairs of itself, United, and
Delta, and that it has the fewest U.S. gateways to Haneda.
7
American notes that ANA is an
antitrust-immunized Star Alliance partner of United, and that JAL is an antitrust-immunized
oneworld alliance partner of American. Combined with its partner, JAL, American states they
operate far fewer U.S.-Haneda slots than United and its partner, ANA.
8
American asserts that an
award to American of this slot pair would mean the Star Alliance and the oneworld Alliance
would each have three JFK-Tokyo flights, thereby enhancing inter-alliance competition.
9
American asserts that its proposed service would increase time-of-day coverage for JFK-Haneda
service by staggering its departure between the two daily JAL-operated JFK-Haneda flights.
10
Additionally, American asserts that its proposed service would offer a significant time savings
over its current one-stop options between New York and Haneda that connect through Dallas/Ft.
Worth.
11
6
Supplement to Application of American, at 1-2.
7
Id., at 4.
8
Id., at 9.
9
Id., at 7.
10
Id., at 7.
11
Id., at 8.
4
American also asserts that its proposed service has been timed to optimize connections at
Haneda, utilizing the domestic route network of its partner, JAL.
12
As a result, American states
that passengers will have enhanced service options to more than 30 Japanese cities and four other
Asian cities.
13
Additionally, American states that its proposal would provide three large U.S.
cities with additional one-stop roundtrip connections to Haneda.
14
American also asserts that New York and Tokyo have substantial communities of interest that
merit the only nonstop JFK-Haneda service by a U.S. carrier. American states that New York is
the largest city in the United States, is the nation’s commercial and financial center, and that
Tokyo is the largest metropolitan area and financial center in Japan.
15
American states that New
York is home to the second largest community of Japanese-born persons in the mainland United
States, as well as the U.S. headquarters of approximately 140 Japanese companies.
16
American
argues that the strength, depth, and breadth of these communities of interest between New York
City and Tokyo are demonstrated by the fact that the New York City metropolitan area has the
greatest demand for service to Haneda and to Tokyo compared to any other metropolitan area in
the eastern or central United States.
17
In response, United asserts that American’s proposed service reflects an “apparent strategy to
cherry-pick a seemingly ‘easy’ Haneda gateway” without demonstrating how a duplicative sixth
Haneda flight from the New York metropolitan area would be beneficial to the travelling
public.
18
United argues that American has not substantiated its proposal with consumer and
community benefits, but instead thinks of itself and the opportunity to increase American’s
Haneda slot holdings for the sake of rectifying a deficiency resulting from American’s
commercial strategies and American’s proposals in earlier Haneda proceedings.
19
United argues
that its Houston-Haneda proposal, on the other hand, reflects prioritization of consumer choice,
economic growth, and United’s experience at Haneda and in the overall Asia/Pacific region.
United argues that Houston is more deserving of the Haneda slot pair than New York (JFK),
noting that Houston has the largest population base in the Southern United States without U.S.
airline service to Haneda. United also argues that Houston’s catchment area is larger than New
York’s catchment area, and that United’s proposal far exceeds American’s proposal with 18
times more connecting cities and nine times more annual Tokyo bookings.
20
United notes that
New York already has five daily flights to Haneda, including four from JFK.
21
Meanwhile,
12
Id., at 10.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id., at 5.
16
Id., at 6.
17
Id.
18
Answer of United, at 2.
19
Id., at 2.
20
Id., at 11-12, and Exhibit UA-A101.
21
Answer of United, at 13.
5
United states that Houston only has one daily flight to Haneda, while other top metropolitan
areas have two or more.
22
United also argues that the history of New York JFK-Tokyo service is marked by a series of
attempts and subsequent withdrawals, noting that four U.S. carriers have previously served JFK-
Tokyo and all withdrew from the route. United notes that American operated to Narita between
April 2002 and May 2012 before switching to Haneda, only to cease operations in November
2013.
23
United asserts that due to American’s minimal hub structure at JFK, American would
essentially operate the service as a point-to-point route, and that the Department should not
gamble on the future long-term success of American on this route.
24
United asserts that the Department set a clear precedent in denying American’s 2019 Las Vegas-
Haneda proposal, that “connectivity is king.”
25
United asserts that the Department declined to
select the Las Vegas proposal due to limited connectivity to other U.S. points, and that this
precedent clearly establishes that the Department prioritizes proposals that offer broader network
connections, i.e., United’s Houston-Haneda proposal, over limited point-to-point services.
In its reply, American asserts that its proposed service is overwhelmingly additive and does not
entail replacing American’s nonstop Dallas/Ft. Worth-Narita service or pulling down any other
service. American argues that United would use the available slot pair to provide Houston-
Haneda service and shut down its Houston-Narita service, leaving Houston with two daily
nonstop flights to Tokyo, just as it has today.
26
American also asserts that United misrepresents
Houston as having greater demand than New York, and argues that New York is underserved
compared to Houston. American argues that New York has one Tokyo flight for every 59,620
Origin and Destination (O&D) passengers, compared to Houston’s one flight for every 28,757
O&D passengers.
27
American further argues that even if the Department were to select
American’s proposed JFK-Haneda service, New York would remain underserved compared to
Houston.
28
American also maintains that its proposal would reduce the existing imbalance in the number of
Haneda gateways among mainland U.S. carriers and a geographic disparity whereby American
lacks an eastern U.S. Tokyo Haneda gateway, which American argues will significantly benefit
travelers and the overall competitive environment.
In response to United’s assertions about the viability of American’s proposed JFK-Haneda
service, American asserts that its prior history is not instructive here and notes that the market
has evolved since American last operated the route in 2013. Additionally, American points out
that its previous service suffered because of restrictions that, unlike now, limited service to
22
Id., at 11.
23
Id., at 15-16.
24
Id., at 16-17.
25
Id., at 18.
26
Reply of American, at 5.
27
Id., at 7-8.
28
Id., at 11.
6
unfavorable early morning and late night times.
29
American also counters that United’s
reference to abandoned JFK-Narita service by other U.S. carriers should not be held against
American, arguing that it is not proper to judge American’s application by the decisions of other
airlines that flew from JFK in a different era to a different Tokyo airport.
30
United states that its proposal will create numerous consumer benefits that will maximize the
Haneda slot pair’s public benefits, from time savings to providing greater access at a major hub
with strong U.S.-Japan demand. United asserts that its dedication to the Asia/Pacific region and
robust network makes it best positioned to optimize and sustain service, and that it has shown a
far greater commitment to restoring capacity to Tokyo after the COVID-19 pandemic.
31
United states that its selection of Houston as its next Haneda gateway prioritizes consumer
choice, economic growth, and its own experience in the Asia/Pacific region. United asserts that
Houston is a global nexus that will allow increased connectivity to Haneda for consumers in 18
Southern states. United states that its service proposal will provide for connections to 63 U.S.
communities behind/beyond Houston.
32
United further states that consumers will see additional
benefits with 35 Japanese destinations behind/beyond Haneda representing 150,000 annual
bookings, and which are served by ANA at Haneda but not at Narita.
33
United also asserts that Houston has strong demand for Tokyo, while other routes are still
struggling to recover to pre-Covid-19 levels.
34
United further asserts that Houston stands as the
largest population base in the Southern United States without U.S. carrier service to Haneda.
United contends that as a faster growing city than New York, Houston should have a second
Haneda flight before New York gets a sixth.
35
Additionally, United asserts that there are over
240 Japanese affiliated businesses in Houston and that Japanese businesses employ over 74,000
people in the state of Texas.
36
United notes that if selected in this proceeding it will no longer provide service to Tokyo-Narita
from Houston, but it will still serve Narita via other gateways in the east coast (New
York/Newark), central United States (Denver) and west coast (San Francisco and Los
Angeles).
37
United contends that no other U.S. airline has placed value in executing a dual-
airport Tokyo operation like United has.
38
United asserts that its proposed Houston-Haneda service will offer significant time savings to
consumers connecting in Haneda to numerous Japanese cities, citing examples of consumers that
would be able to experience noticeably shorter travel times by connecting in Haneda instead of
29
Id., at 20.
30
Id., at 21.
31
Supplement to Application of United, at 3.
32
Id., at 8.
33
Id.
34
Id., at 8-9.
35
Id., at 9.
36
Id.
37
Id., at 10.
38
Id.
7
Narita.
39
United also asserts that it purposefully scheduled its flights between Houston and
Haneda at different times than the existing ANA-operated Houston-Haneda flight, to allow for
enhanced time-of-day coverage and to allow 10 U.S. destinations to gain same day connectivity
with Haneda that is not achievable with the ANA flight.
40
United asserts that the Department should consider United’s longstanding commitment to service
in Tokyo and the Asia/Pacific region as a decisional factor in favor of allocating the slot pair to
United. United states that 594,000 annual passengers flew through Tokyo Haneda or Tokyo
Narita to destinations beyond in the Asia/Pacific region on United flights.
41
Additionally, 30%
of passengers connecting at Haneda or Narita fly to/from a destination served nonstop from the
United States by United, demonstrating the benefits of United’s Asia/Pacific network and
benefiting consumers with a wealth of options in terms of flights, fares, and schedules.
42
United also notes that its proposal has received broad public support, including from the City of
Houston, members of Congress and other elected officials, local chambers of commerce, U.S.
airports that would gain connecting service through United’s proposal, and various other civic
parties.
In its answer, American argues that United’s service proposal is not additive, as United would
replace its current Houston-Narita service with Houston-Haneda service. American states that if
selected, Houston will be in the same position just as today with two daily nonstop services to
Tokyo. American argues, in contrast, that its proposed JFK-Haneda service is overwhelmingly
additive, providing significant public benefits and enhancing inter-carrier, inter-alliance, and
inter-gateway competition.
43
American asserts that the New York City metropolitan area has the most O&D Tokyo demand of
any city in the eastern and central United States, and notes that United’s Newark-Haneda flight is
the only nonstop U.S. air carrier service from the New York City metropolitan area.
44
American
argues that awarding the slot pair for JFK-Haneda service would break United’s “stranglehold on
U.S. air carrier service to Haneda from New York City,” and help reduce a disparity in the
number of Haneda flights between United and American.
45
American also asserts that the
central United States has more Haneda gateways than the eastern United States, despite having
less O&D demand, and argues that awarding an additional gateway to the central region would
further the existing disproportionality of awards.
46
American also argues that United significantly overstates the scope and benefits of its proposed
connectivity over Houston. American claims in this regard that 39 of United’s proposed
connections beyond/behind Houston have shorter and/or less circuitous one-stop connections via
39
Id., at 12-13.
40
Id., at 14.
41
Id., at 19.
42
Id., at 19-20.
43
Answer of American, at 3-4.
44
Id., at 5.
45
Id., at 5-6.
46
Id., at 8-9.
8
other United hubs.
47
American further asserts that during the summer, all of United’s claimed
beyond/behind Houston connections have existing roundtrip service to Tokyo on United’s
Houston-Narita service (in the winter all but three communities have roundtrip service).
48
American also argues that United uses unreasonable parameters to identify the catchment area of
behind/beyond U.S. communities for its proposed service by including connections that require
an overnight stay, and by using a higher circuity factor than American used when identifying
potential connections for its JFK-Haneda service.
49
American asserts that United would lose
nine connections representing 49,318 Haneda passengers if United used the same circuity factor
as American did.
50
American further states that if it used United’s parameters, then American’s
beyond/behind-JFK connectivity would increase significantly to include 14 U.S. cities.
51
In its reply, United argues that its proposal outshines American’s proposal in all respects, and
that American has failed to explain, illustrate, and substantiate the benefits of its JFK-Haneda
proposal. United asserts that it has provided exhibits, case studies, and exhaustive narratives
detailing how traveling consumers would benefit from its proposed Houston-Haneda service,
which would provide consumers in the southern region of the United States with an additional
choice between Delta at Atlanta and American at Dallas/Ft. Worth.
52
United also maintains that
its service is additive, because its proposal connects two airports that the airline currently does
not fly between.
53
United also maintains that award of this slot pair would allow United’s
customers to travel from Houston to the more attractive Haneda airport, as well as the possible
connections behind/beyond Haneda.
54
United argues that American’s lack of a Haneda gateway in the eastern United States is a direct
result of American’s own decisions, noting that American did not submit an application to serve
the region in previous proceedings, and instead chose to propose Las Vegas-Haneda service in
2019.
55
United also counters American’s claim that United can adequately serve Haneda through its
other U.S. hubs. United asserts that its proposed service would open up a southern hub to
provide more choice and flexibility for consumers choosing where to connect. United argues
that there are a multitude of reasons why a consumer would want another hub to connect to
Haneda, including departure time, the type of aircraft and seat class available, or even to avoid a
potential weather-related challenge.
56
United also argues that its connection parameters are
reasonable, noting that American itself sells flights from JFK to Haneda via Dallas/Ft. Worth or
47
Id., at 15.
48
Id., at 16.
49
Id., at 17.
50
Id., at 17-18.
51
Id., at 19.
52
Reply of United, at 9-10.
53
Id., at 12.
54
Id., at 13.
55
Id., at 14-16.
56
Id., at 16.
9
Los Angeles which involve a circuity factor greater than the 1.15 factor that American used in its
application.
57
The City of Houston, through its Department of Aviation (Houston), submitted an answer and
reply in the proceeding in strong support of United’s application. Houston asserts that it is home
to an economic powerhouse, and that international air travel is an essential component to
Houston’s success and ongoing growth.
58
Houston states that Japan is Houston’s fifth largest
trading partner by dollar value (fourth largest by volume) and the city has had a nonstop service
to Tokyo since 1998.
59
Houston asserts that George Bush Intercontinental Airport is a world class facility, a leading
international hub, and is currently undergoing a $1.43 billion redevelopment to redefine the
passenger experience and elevate the airport’s status as a key international gateway.
60
Houston
argues that the geographic and connecting benefits, namely to the South-Central United States,
from United’s Haneda service would be far greater than those offered by American’s proposal at
New York.
61
The City of Houston also argues that American prioritizes its own self-interest, and that its
record of seeking Haneda service and its application in this proceeding are deficient.
62
Houston
also asserts that American has not addressed whether its partner, JAL, could and/or would
withdraw one of its New York-Haneda flights, if American is awarded the slot pair.
63
Tentative Decision
After carefully considering the record in this case, we have tentatively decided to select
American’s proposal for daily service between New York (JFK) and Haneda. In reaching this
decision we note that both carriers present attractive proposals that would introduce significant
public benefits for the traveling and shipping public. The nature of the benefits that each
proposal would offer differ, however, and we tentatively find, on balance, that selection of
American’s proposal at New York (JFK) would enhance competition and better achieve our
principal objective of maximizing public benefits.
The record shows that New York City is the second largest mainland U.S.-Tokyo O&D market,
second only to Los Angeles, and the largest such market proposed in this proceeding. Selection
of American would add the only U.S. carrier-operated Haneda service from JFK, and offer an
additional competitive option for travelers between the largest cities and commercial/financial
hubs of the United States and Japan, respectively. American’s proposal also adds nearly 200,000
annual passenger seats between the United States and Tokyo.
57
Id., at 20.
58
Answer of the City of Houston, at 3.
59
Id., at 7-8.
60
Id., at 11-12.
61
Id., at 13.
62
Reply of the City of Houston, at 6-7.
63
Id., at 8.
10
Selection of American’s New York (JFK) proposal would also be consistent with an objective
important to the Department in past Haneda proceedings; namely, enhancing competition
between U.S. carriers serving Haneda, as well as promoting inter-alliance competition. Selection
of American/JFK would result in American holding four daytime U.S.-Haneda slot pairs,
compared to five daytime slot pairs for United, six daytime slot pairs for Delta, and two daytime
slot pairs for Hawaiian. Selection would also establish an east coast Haneda gateway for
American. We tentatively find that selection of American considering these potential
competitive benefits would best serve the public interest in the circumstances presented.
We have considered United’s and the City of Houston’s arguments that the New York
City/Newark area is overserved with Haneda service as JFK currently enjoys four daily flights to
Haneda, and Newark-Haneda is served once daily. American’s proposal also provides for round-
trip connections to only three U.S. cities, meaning it would need to primarily rely on the local
New York traffic base to support the service. We tentatively find persuasive American’s
arguments that traffic demand in the New York-Tokyo market justifies additional Haneda
service, and that New York would still be underserved relative to Houston if the Department
awards the slot pair to JFK. Viewed together with the potential competitive benefits to be
achieved through selection of American, we tentatively find that additional service at New York
(JFK) would offer the greater combination of public benefits.
The Department recognizes the strength of Houston’s economy, its extensive international trade
and ties to Japan, and Houston’s importance as an international gateway for communities across
the south and central United States. We also appreciate the strong support on the record from the
City of Houston, local civic parties, and other U.S. airports. The record of this proceeding
shows, however, that traffic demand for Houston-Tokyo service is far smaller than the demand
for New York-Tokyo service. We also note that Houston currently enjoys two daily Tokyo
flights and would continue to have just two daily Tokyo flights if we were to select United’s
proposal, as United has stated it would shift its daily Houston-Tokyo Narita flight to Tokyo
Haneda.
We are also mindful that United’s proposal offers connecting opportunities over Houston to 64
U.S. cities across 18 states. We note, however, that many of these proposed connecting cities are
already served by United over its other U.S.-Haneda gateways; many, as American argues, with
shorter travel times than would be achieved through Houston. We find merit in United’s
assertions that consumers consider a variety of factors in choosing a connecting itinerary, and
United’s proposal would provide travelers with a meaningful additional option in that regard.
We tentatively find, however, that selection of United would not promote inter-carrier and inter-
alliance competition in the nonstop U.S.-Haneda market or promote parity among U.S. carrier
nonstop access to Haneda to the same degree as would selection of American. We tentatively
find those factors most dispositive in this proceeding, thereby giving American’s proposal an
advantage in maximizing public benefits.
Against that background, we tentatively conclude that the overall combination of potential
service and competitive benefits that could be achieved through selection of American at New
York (JFK) outweigh the benefits that would result in selection of United at Houston.
11
Terms, Conditions, and Limitations
The Department has tentatively decided to impose a startup condition for this award. If our
tentative decision is made final, we will require American to institute its proposed services
within 90 days of American’s proposed March 31, 2024, startup date.
In addition, consistent with the Department’s standard practice, the slot pair allocation tentatively
made here will be subject to the Department’s standard 90-day dormancy condition, wherein any
slot pair not utilized for a period of 90 days (once inaugurated) would be deemed dormant and
the allocation as to that slot pair would expire automatically and the slot pair would revert to the
Department for reallocation.
Finally, the slot pair allocation tentatively granted here will also be subject to the Department’s
standard condition that the Department may amend, modify, or revoke the authority at any time
and without hearing, at its discretion.
ACCORDINGLY,
1. The Department tentatively allocates to American Airlines, Inc. one daytime slot pair for its
proposed New York (JFK)-Haneda service;
2. The slot pair tentatively allocated by ordering paragraph 1 above would be effective
immediately and would not expire, provided that the holder continues to hold the necessary
underlying authority to serve the markets authorized; that the holder begins service with the
allocated slot pair within 90 days after March 31, 2024; and also provided further that any slot
pair will become dormant and will revert automatically to the Department if not used for a period
of 90 days (once inaugurated);
3. The slot pair tentatively allocated by ordering paragraph 1 above would be subject to the
Department’s standard condition that the Department may amend, modify or revoke the
allocation at any time and without hearing, at its discretion;
4. To the extent not tentatively granted, the Department tentatively denies the remaining
requests in this proceeding;
5. The Department directs any interested parties having objections to the tentative findings and
conclusions set forth in this order and in ordering paragraphs 1 through 4 above, to file their
objections in the above-captioned docket, with the Department’s Docket Section, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C., 20590, no later than 14 calendar
days from the date of service of this order; answers thereto shall be filed no later than seven (7)
calendar days thereafter;
64
64
The original filing should be on 8½" x 11" white paper using dark ink and be unbound without tabs,
which will expedite use of the Department’s docket imaging system. In the alternative, filers are
encouraged to use the electronic filing submission capability available through the Dockets/FDMS
Internet site (http://www.regulations.gov
) by following the instructions at the web site.
12
6. If timely and properly supported objections are filed, the Department will afford full
consideration to the matters or issues raised by the objections, and any answers thereto, before
taking further action; if no objections are filed, the Department will deem all further procedural
steps to be waived and will proceed to enter a final order awarding the authority proposed in this
Order; and
7. The Department will serve this order on the parties to the proceeding; the U.S. Department of
State (Office of Aviation Negotiations); the Federal Aviation Administration; and the
Ambassador of Japan in Washington, D.C.
By:
Carol A. (Annie) Petsonk
Assistant Secretary for
Aviation and International Affairs
(SEAL)
An electronic version of this document is available on the World Wide Web at
http://www.regulations.gov
