Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 2015)

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516

Matter of L-A-C-, Applicant

Decided March 19, 2015

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) Where an Immigration Judge finds that an applicant for asylum or withholding of

removal has not provided reasonably available corroborating evidence to establish

his claim, the Immigration Judge should first consider the applicant’s explanations

for the absence of such evidence and, if a continuance is requested, determine

whether there is good cause to continue the proceedings for the applicant to obtain the

evidence.

(2) Although an Immigration Judge should consider an applicant’s explanation for the

absence of corroborating evidence, section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012), does not require the Immigration

Judge to identify the specific evidence necessary to meet the applicant’s burden of

proof and to provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain that

evidence.

FOR RESPONDENT: Rebekah B. Rodriguez, Esquire, Houston, Texas

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Alex D. Perez, Assistant

Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, MULLANE, and CREPPY, Board Members.

MALPHRUS, Board Member:

In a decision dated October 28, 2013, an Immigration Judge denied the

applicant’s applications for withholding of removal pursuant to

section 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012), and protection under the Convention Against

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N.

GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into

force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention

Against Torture”). The applicant has appealed from that decision. The

applicant has also submitted additional evidence on appeal, which we

construe as a motion to remand. The appeal will be dismissed and the

motion will be denied.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The applicant is a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the

United States without authorization in 2004. On February 19, 2008, an

Immigration Judge ordered the applicant removed to Guatemala. The

applicant reentered the United States in 2008, and in 2012, he was removed

upon reinstatement of the original removal order. He returned to the United

States again shortly thereafter. In 2013, the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) initiated these withholding-only proceedings against the

applicant.

Before the Immigration Judge, the applicant filed an application for

withholding of removal pursuant to section 241(b)(3)(A) of the Act and

protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that he was

persecuted in Guatemala on account of his political opinion. The

Immigration Judge denied both applications, finding that the applicant was

not credible. She further found that, even assuming he was credible, the

applicant’s testimony was insufficient to meet his burden of proof and that

he did not provide sufficient corroborating evidence to establish his

eligibility for the requested relief.

On appeal, the applicant argues that the Immigration Judge’s adverse

credibility finding is clearly erroneous and that she erred in denying his

applications. Citing Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011), he

contends that section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012), requires an Immigration Judge to inform an

applicant for asylum or withholding of removal during a merits hearing

what specific corroborating evidence is required to meet his burden of proof

and to grant a continuance to obtain such evidence. The applicant also

asserts that he presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate his eligibility

for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against

Torture.

II. ISSUE

The primary issue in this case is whether an Immigration Judge is

required to identify the specific corroborating evidence necessary to meet

an applicant’s burden to establish a claim for asylum or withholding of

removal and to provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain

the evidence for presentation at a future hearing.

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Burden of Proof and Corroboration

Pursuant to section 208(b)(1)(B)(i) of the Act, the burden of proof is on

an applicant for asylum to establish that he or she is a refugee within the

meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)

(2012). Section 241(b)(3)(C) of the Act provides that an applicant for

withholding of removal bears the burden of establishing that his life or

freedom would be threatened in the country of removal on account of his

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion. With both applications, “[t]he testimony of the applicant

may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration,

but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s

testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to

demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.” Section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the

Act (incorporated by reference in section 241(b)(3)(C)). However,

“[w]here the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide

evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence

must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and

cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id.

“Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the

language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the

particular dispute in the case.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,

340 (1997). Issues regarding whether the language is plain and

unambiguous are “determined by reference to the language itself, the

specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of

the statute as a whole.” Id. at 341. Where the statutory language is unclear,

we consider legislative history to help discern congressional intent.

See, e.g., Matter of Avila-Perez, 24 I&N Dec. 78, 83 (BIA 2007).

Although section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act clearly states that an

Immigration Judge may require the submission of corroborating evidence

even where an applicant’s testimony is credible, it is ambiguous with

regard to what steps must be taken when the applicant has not provided

such evidence. Because the statutory language regarding the procedural

requirements for submitting corroborating evidence is not plain, we look to

the context of the statute as a whole and the legislative history for guidance.

Section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act was enacted by section 101(a)(3) of

the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302,

303 (“REAL ID Act”). The legislative history of the REAL ID Act makes

clear that section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) was enacted in an effort to “bring

clarity and consistency to evidentiary determinations by codifying

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standards for . . . determining when corroborating evidence may be

required.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 165 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted

in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 290−91, 2005 WL 1848528 at *165. It

specifically states that the standards concerning corroboration that Congress

intended to codify were those set forth by the Board in Matter of S-M-J-,

21 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 1997). Id. at 166 (“Congress anticipates that the

standards in Matter of S-M-J-, including the [Board’s] conclusions on

situations where corroborating evidence is or is not required, will guide the

[Board] and the courts in interpreting this clause.”).

In Matter of S-M-J-, we held that an applicant has the burden to

establish his claim, even when credible, and that where it is reasonable to

expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the

specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should be presented.

1

Where credible testimony alone is determined to be insufficient, an

applicant for asylum or withholding of removal bears the burden to provide

reasonably available supporting evidence for material facts that are central

to his claim and are easily subject to verification. Matter of S-M-J-,

21 I&N Dec. at 725. If the evidence is unavailable, the Immigration Judge

must afford the applicant an opportunity to explain its unavailability and

ensure that the explanation is included in the record. Id. at 724. We

cautioned that the absence of corroborating evidence could lead to a finding

that the applicant did not meet his burden of proof. Id. at 725−26. In other

words, regardless of whether an applicant is deemed credible, he has the

burden to corroborate the material elements of the claim where the evidence

is reasonably obtainable, without advance notice from the Immigration

Judge.

The REAL ID Act codified the requirements outlined in Matter of

S-M-J-, making it clear that an applicant who seeks asylum or

withholding of removal has the burden of demonstrating eligibility for such

relief, which may require the submission of corroborative evidence.

Sections 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 241(b)(3)(C) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(a),

1208.16(b) (2014); see also Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th

Cir. 2008) (“[T]he REAL ID Act clearly states that corroborative evidence

may be required, placing immigrants on notice of the consequences for

1

This approach was initially rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, which held that an applicant who testifies credibly in support of his

application may not be required to provide independent corroborating evidence. Ladha

v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2000). The passage of the REAL ID Act and its

amendments later abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s case law in this regard. See Shrestha

v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010); Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1049

(9th Cir. 2009).

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failing to provide corroborative evidence.”). See generally Aden v. Holder,

589 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “Congress has

installed a bias toward corroboration in the statute to provide greater

reliability” and in doing so “made asylum litigation a little more like other

litigation”). Moreover, the instructions for the Application for Asylum and

Withholding of Removal (Form I-589) provide additional notice to an

applicant that he “must submit reasonably available corroborative

evidence” relating to both general country conditions and the specific facts

upon which the claim is based. The instructions further warn the applicant

that he must provide an explanation if such evidence is not reasonably

available or he is not providing corroborating evidence in support of his

application.

2

The framework set forth in Matter of S-M-J- did not require the

Immigration Judge to identify the specific corroborating evidence at the

merits hearing that would be considered persuasive under the facts of the

case to meet the applicant’s burden of proof. Nor did it require the

Immigration Judge to grant an automatic continuance for the applicant to

present that corroborating evidence at yet another future merits hearing.

There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended

to impose such requirements. The overall purpose of enacting section

208(b)(1)(B) of the Act was to allow Immigration Judges to follow

commonsense standards in assessing asylum claims without undue

restrictions. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 165−67. The intent was not to create

additional procedural requirements relating to the submission and

evaluation of corroborating evidence.

Requiring advance notice of the need for specific corroborating

evidence and an automatic continuance would be inconsistent with the

normal procedures for conducting immigration court proceedings, which

2

Moreover, pursuant to section 240(c)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B)

(2012), an applicant for any form of relief or protection from removal (including asylum

or withholding of removal) “must comply with the applicable requirements to submit

information or documentation in support of the applicant’s application for relief or

protection as provided by law or by regulation or in the instructions for the application

form.” Congress enacted this provision to extend the credibility and corroboration

requirements for asylum and withholding applications to all applications for relief and

protection in removal proceedings. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 169. Although this

case involves withholding-only proceedings rather than removal proceedings, the

standards for credibility and corroboration in section 240(c)(4)(B) are equally applicable

and further support our view that Congress intended to place applicants for asylum and

withholding of removal on notice of their obligation to provide corroborating evidence

without specific prompting from an Immigration Judge. See 8 C.F.R § 1208.2(c)(3)(i)

(2014) (stating that the rules of procedure for removal proceedings are applicable in

withholding-only proceedings).

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are separated into master calendar and merits hearings. Generally, in

master calendar hearings, pleadings are taken, legal and factual issues in

dispute are identified and narrowed, and continuances may be granted for

good cause, such as to secure counsel or obtain evidence in preparation for

the hearing on the merits of any application for relief from removal. See

generally Matter of Cordova, 22 I&N Dec. 966, 968 (BIA 1999)

(discussing the nature and purpose of master calendar hearings).

3

Also, the

parties are given advisals and warnings, including deadlines for submitting

evidence, and the hearing on the merits is scheduled. Then, during the

merits hearing, witness testimony and other evidence is presented, the

Immigration Judge makes factual findings and legal conclusions, and any

applications for relief are resolved.

At the merits hearing, in circumstances where the Immigration Judge

determines that specific corroborating evidence should have been

submitted, the applicant should be given an opportunity to explain why he

could not reasonably obtain such evidence. See, e.g., Chukwu v. Att’y Gen.

of U.S., 484 F.3d 185, 192−93 (3d Cir. 2007).

4

The Immigration Judge

must also ensure that the applicant’s explanation is included in the record

3

At the master calendar hearing, the Immigration Judge should, as a matter of good

practice, remind an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal of his burden to

establish his claim and to provide corroborating evidence where it is reasonable to do so.

This reminder is particularly important for an applicant who is not represented by

counsel. Section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act and the instructions for the Form I-589

clearly provide such notice. Nevertheless, it is beneficial for the Immigration Judge to

remind the applicant at the master calendar hearing of the general type of evidence

needed to corroborate a claim. This is far different from requiring the Immigration Judge

to identify at the merits hearing the specific evidence that he or she would find persuasive

to meet the applicant’s burden of proof under the facts particular to that case and to then

grant the applicant an automatic continuance to obtain it for presentation at a later hearing.

It is the applicant’s duty to present evidence to meet his burden of proof prior to, rather

than after, the hearing on the merits.

4

Permitting the applicant to state the reasons why the corroborating evidence could

not be obtained is consistent with both the language of the REAL ID Act and the

Board’s longstanding practice of allowing aliens to explain discrepancies in the record.

See sections 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 241(b)(3)(C) of the Act; see also Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N

Dec. at 725 (“If the applicant does not provide [corroborating evidence], an explanation

should be given as to why such information was not presented.”). We need not address

whether there are circumstances in which the absence of corroborating evidence may be

so glaring that no explicit opportunity to explain its absence needs to be given. Cf.

Matter of B-Y-, 25 I&N Dec. 236, 242 (BIA 2010) (“If an inconsistency is obvious or

glaring or has been brought to the attention of the respondent during the course of the

hearing, . . . there is no requirement that a separate opportunity for explanation be

provided prior to making the adverse credibility determination.”).

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and should clearly state for the record whether the explanation is sufficient.

Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. at 724.

Further, if requested, the Immigration Judge should decide whether to

grant a continuance for the applicant to obtain additional corroboration.

The decision to grant or deny a continuance, either at a master calendar or

merits hearing, has long been one for the Immigration Judge to make in the

exercise of discretion based on whether good cause is shown in the

individual circumstances of the case. See Matter of Perez-Andrade,

19 I&N Dec. 433 (BIA 1987); Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. 354, 355−57

(BIA 1983); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1240.6 (2014). This decision is

a matter that is within the Immigration Judge’s statutory and regulatory

authority to manage immigration hearings. See Matter of Interiano-Rosa,

25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010).

There are circumstances in which it is appropriate to continue the

proceedings to another merits hearing for an applicant to present additional

corroboration. For example, a continuance would typically be warranted

where the Immigration Judge determines that that the applicant was not

aware of a unique piece of evidence that is essential to meeting the burden

of proof.

Moreover, in deciding whether an applicant has met his burden of proof,

an Immigration Judge must not place undue weight on the absence of a

particular piece of corroborating evidence while overlooking other evidence

in the record that corroborates the claim. See generally Mukamusoni

v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 122−25 (1st Cir. 2004) (reversing the denial of

an asylum application where the absence of certain corroborating

documents was overstated and other corroborating evidence was ignored).

Rather, the Immigration Judge should weigh all of the evidence provided

and consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the

applicant has met his burden.

5

The applicant argues that the Immigration Judge erred because she did

not automatically continue the hearing for him to obtain corroborating

evidence. In support of his argument, the applicant relies largely on Ren

v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, in which the United States Court of Appeals for

5

In immigration proceedings, much like other court litigation, the corroborating

evidence that an Immigration Judge finds persuasive or necessary in a particular case will

vary depending on the type of claim presented and the facts as developed during the

merits hearing. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d at 1045. Corroboration may include

identity evidence, such as proof of the applicant’s name and place of birth; evidence of

relevant events in the country of nationality, such as media accounts of large

demonstrations; and evidence supporting the specific details of the claim, such as

documentation of medical treatment and of the applicant’s political participation. See

Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. at 725.

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the Ninth Circuit discussed corroboration and continuances in the context

of the Act. In Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2014), the

court later held that the Immigration Judge did not comply with Ren

because she did not give the applicant notice that “he was required to

present the corroborative evidence she referred to in her decision” and did

not schedule a subsequent merits hearing for him to provide this specific

evidence. We are not bound by the decisions of the Ninth Circuit in these

proceedings, which arise in the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit. See Matter

of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31 (BIA 1989). In any event, we disagree

with these cases to the extent that they hold that section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of

the Act entitles an applicant to advance notice from the Immigration Judge

of the specific evidence necessary to establish the claim and an automatic

continuance to obtain such evidence.

Our approach is consistent with that taken by the Second and Seventh

Circuits. In Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second

Circuit held that the Immigration Judge properly resolved the applicant’s

claim without granting a continuance for another hearing, stating that

although the Immigration Judge must specify the points of testimony that

require corroboration, this need not be done prior to the disposition of the

alien’s claim. The court explained its conclusion as follows:

After all, a factfinder may not be able to decide sufficiency of evidence until all the

evidence has been presented; insufficiency cannot be determined while there is

evidence to be introduced. Likewise, it is not easy to know when an explanation

would be required for a lack of corroboration, because an [Immigration Judge] may

not determine that corroboration is necessary until all the evidence is in, and the

[Immigration Judge] has had an opportunity to weigh the evidence and prepare an

opinion—steps that may not occur until days after the hearing. Accordingly, while

we have sometimes remanded a case if the [Immigration Judge] failed to explain

his reliance on a lack of corroborating evidence, the alien bears the ultimate burden

of introducing such evidence without prompting from the [Immigration Judge].

Id.

In Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d at 530, the Seventh Circuit stated that

“[t]o hold that a petitioner must receive additional notice from the

[Immigration Judge] and then an additional opportunity to provide

corroborative evidence before an adverse ruling, would necessitate two

hearings—the first to decide whether such evidence is required and then

another hearing after a recess to allow the alien more time to collect such

corroborating evidence.” The court noted that “such an approach would

seem imprudent where the law clearly notifies aliens of the importance of

corroborative evidence.” Id.

We agree with the analysis of the Second and Seventh Circuits.

Applicants have the burden to establish their claim without prompting from

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the Immigration Judge. Section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act was intended to

codify Matter of S-M-J- and not to impose additional rigid requirements for

the consideration of corroboration. It does not require an Immigration

Judge to give an applicant additional advance notice of the specific

corroborating evidence necessary to meet the applicant’s burden of proof

and to provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain such

evidence. Consistent with established procedure, it is within the discretion

of the Immigration Judge to decide whether there is good cause to continue

the proceedings in a particular case for additional corroboration or for any

other reason.

B. Applicant’s Claim

The applicant asserts that he was persecuted in Guatemala on account of

his political opinion. He testified that he was an active member of the

Democratic Christian Union political party, saying that he distributed flyers

and used his skills as a teacher to explain the party’s positions to voters.

The applicant claims that he was threatened in writing by the mayor of his

hometown in 2004 on account of his political activities and that he was

persecuted by agents of a different mayor in 2012 for providing financial

support for his father’s political activities.

The Immigration Judge made an adverse credibility finding because she

found certain aspects of the applicant’s account to be implausible. We need

not determine whether the Immigration Judge’s concerns, without more, are

sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding. Even assuming that the

applicant testified credibly, he has not provided sufficient corroborating

evidence regarding key elements of his claim to meet his burden of proof to

establish eligibility for relief.

The applicant provided some evidence of general country conditions but

did not submit any corroborative evidence relating to the specific facts

underlying his claim. The only evidence the applicant offered to

corroborate his testimony consists of a written statement regarding his

experiences in Guatemala in his application and a copy of the 2012

State Department country report on Guatemala.

6

Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Guatemala Country Reports

on Human Rights Practices for 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rlshrrpt

/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204454. Although the

country report indicates that political corruption and human rights abuses

6

The applicant also provided birth certificates for his four United States citizen children

and a letter from a licensed clinical social worker describing the impact of the applicant’s

detention on one of his daughters.

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exist in Guatemala, it does not corroborate the applicant’s specific claims of

mistreatment.

The applicant has not provided any evidence to corroborate his claims

that he was politically active, that he was a member of the Democratic

Christian Union, that he was a teacher in Guatemala, or that he sent money

to his father. He has also not submitted any letters or written statements

from his parents or others in Guatemala who are familiar with the details of

his claim. Considering all of the evidence submitted, we agree with the

Immigration Judge that the applicant has not met his burden of

demonstrating that he suffered past persecution or that it is more likely than

not that his life or freedom will be threatened in Guatemala on account of

his political opinion or any other protected ground.

The Immigration Judge gave the applicant an opportunity to explain the

absence of the corroborating evidence, but the applicant did not provide a

convincing explanation. When asked why he did not submit any evidence

of his political activities, the applicant testified only that he was not able to

have his uncle send the relevant documentation. When asked why he did

not submit any evidence to corroborate his claim that he was a teacher in

Guatemala, the applicant stated that he did not realize such evidence would

help his claim. The applicant testified that he has evidence that he sent

money to his father, but he did not submit such evidence or explain why he

did not do so. Finally, the applicant has not sufficiently explained the

absence of written statements from his parents or anyone else in Guatemala

who is familiar with the facts of his claim. His testimony that his partner is

in contact with his mother, who updates him on the situation in Guatemala,

undermines his assertion that he could not obtain such evidence because it

was expensive to call Guatemala while he was in detention.

We disagree with the applicant that the Immigration Judge erred by not

continuing proceedings to allow him a further opportunity to corroborate

his claim. The applicant did not show good cause to warrant further

delaying the resolution of the proceedings where he was represented by

counsel and had the burden of proof, and it was reasonable to expect him to

provide corroborating evidence regarding key aspects of his claim. See

sections 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 241(b)(3)(C) of the Act; Matter of S-M-J-,

21 I&N Dec. at 724−26. We agree with the Immigration Judge that the

applicant has not demonstrated that the evidence in question could not have

been reasonably obtained in advance and presented at his merits hearing,

and we conclude that she did not err in declining to provide a continuance.

See Rui Yang v. Holder, 664 F.3d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the

applicant’s argument that letters from his family in China were unavailable

when his explanation was that he speaks to them regularly on the

telephone); Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2011)

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(affirming an Immigration Judge’s determination that the applicant’s

“explanation for the lack of corroborating evidence was insufficient”);

Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 455 (BIA 2011) (stating that an

Immigration Judge is not required to accept an alien’s explanations as

persuasive where there are other permissible views of the evidence).

7

C. Additional Issues

We also agree with the Immigration Judge that the applicant has not

demonstrated his eligibility for protection under the Convention Against

Torture. The applicant has not established that he was tortured in

Guatemala. Nor has he shown that it is more likely than not that he would

be tortured there, either by or with the acquiescence (including the concept

of willful blindness) of a public official or other person acting in an official

capacity. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17−.18 (2014); see also Hongyok

v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2007).

The applicant has submitted additional evidence on appeal consisting of

an article from the online encyclopedia, Wikipedia, about the National

Unity of Hope political party in Guatemala, which we construe as a motion

to remand. A motion to remand for the purpose of presenting additional

evidence must conform to the same standards as a motion to reopen and

will only be granted if the evidence was previously unavailable and would

likely change the result in the case. Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464,

471−72 (BIA 1992).

The applicant has not shown that the evidence was previously

unavailable. Additionally, although the evidence corroborates the

applicant’s testimony concerning the existence of the National Unity of

Hope party, it does not contain any information relating to the applicant’s

own political activities in Guatemala or otherwise corroborate his claim that

he was or will be harmed in that country. Moreover, we note that

Wikipedia articles lack indicia of reliability and warrant very limited

probative weight in immigration proceedings. See Badasa v. Mukasey, 540

F.3d 909, 910 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that an article from the online

encyclopedia Wikipedia is not a reliable source for evidence in immigration

7

The Immigration Judge also denied the application on the alternative grounds that the

applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that he had not been convicted

of a disqualifying criminal offense. We need not reach the applicant’s arguments

regarding his conviction because he has not otherwise met his burden of proof with

respect to his application for withholding of removal. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S.

24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings

on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

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proceedings). Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that a

remand is warranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act does not impose a requirement that

the Immigration Judge give an applicant advance notice of the specific

corroborating evidence necessary to establish the applicant’s claim based

on the facts of the case. And it does not require that the Immigration Judge

provide the applicant an automatic continuance to obtain such

corroboration. However, where corroborating evidence has not been

presented, the Immigration Judge should consider the applicant’s

explanations for its absence and, if a continuance is requested, decide

whether there is good cause to continue the proceedings for the applicant to

obtain the evidence.

We conclude that the Immigration Judge did not err in denying the

applicant’s application for withholding of removal based on a lack of

reasonably available corroborative evidence. We are also unpersuaded that

the applicant demonstrated that he is eligible for protection under the

Convention Against Torture or that a remand is warranted. Accordingly,

his appeal will be dismissed and the motion to remand will be denied.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

FURTHER ORDER: The motion to remand is denied.