PACIFIC PEOPLES AND
CLIMATE-RELATED (IM)MOBILITY:
______________________________________________
A Synthesis Report on Scale, Paern and Impact,
Now and in the Future
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Report prepared by:
Mr Bruce Burson
Dr Evelyn Marsters
Emeritus Professor Richard Bedford and
Professor Sandy Morrison
30 June 2024
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................... 2
PREFACE ...................................................................................................................... 6
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................... 8
ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................. 9
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... 9
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... 10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 11
HAZARDS, SETTLEMENTS AND GEOGRAPHY ........................................................................... 11
THE DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT: PACIFIC PEOPLES AS POPULATIONS .............................................. 11
IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND ...................................................................................................... 11
THE REGIONAL POPULATION ....................................................................................................... 12
THE DIVERSE PACIFIC IN FIVE (IM)MOBILITY-RELEVANT CLUSTERS ....................................................... 13
RELATIONALITY AND TRANSNATIONALISM AS KEY POLICY FRAMES ................................................ 18
RELATIONALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF PACIFIC (IM)MOBILITY ................................................................. 18
TRANSNATIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF PACIFIC (IM)MOBILITY .......................................................... 20
THE DRIVER OF (IM)MOBILITY, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE ........................................................... 21
THE DRIVER AND (IM)MOBILITY DECISION-MAKING .......................................................................... 21
SCALE, PATTERN AND IMPACTS OF CLIMATE (IM)MOBILITY, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE........................ 23
STAYING IN PLACE .................................................................................................................... 24
DISPLACEMENT ....................................................................................................................... 24
MIGRATION ............................................................................................................................. 25
RELOCATION ........................................................................................................................... 26
SUMMARY CONCLUSION ON FUTURE SCALE AND PATTERN OF (IM)MOBILITY .......................................... 26
IMPACTS ................................................................................................................................. 27
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY ................................................................................................ 27
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 29
THE 2018 PACIFIC CLIMATE CHANGE-RELATED DISPLACEMENT AND MIGRATION: A NEW ZEALAND ACTION PLAN 29
THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES ................................................................................... 30
PACIFIC CLIMATE MOBILITY THROUGH THE LENS OF TE AO MĀORI AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER TE TIRITI O
WAITANGI/THE TREATY OF WAITANGI ........................................................................... 31
THE POLICY CONTEXT ....................................................................................................... 31
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS.................................................................................................... 32
THE MĀORI EXPERIENCE OF MOBILITY ................................................................................... 33
MĀORI AND PACIFIC RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CONTEXT OF MOBILITY ............................................... 34
EXAMPLES OF MĀORI AND PACIFIC RELATIONSHIPS .......................................................................... 35
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THREE CRITICAL FOCUS AREAS RAISED BY MĀORI LEADERS ......................................................... 37
THE APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING IS CRITICAL ........................................................................... 37
LAND, AND FUTURE LAND ACCESS: GENEROSITY WILL BE NEEDED ....................................................... 38
MĀORI AND PACIFIC SHARED VALUES AND RELATIONALITY AS A CRITICAL BASE ....................................... 39
CURRENT MOBILITY TRENDS AND EARLY THOUGHTS ON IMPLICATIONS FOR MĀORI ............................ 39
MOVING AS A FAMILY, COMMUNAL LIVING ...................................................................................... 39
SETTLERS, INCUMBENTS AND CONFLICT ........................................................................................ 40
IMPERMANENT, DUAL-MOBILITY OR CYCLICAL MOBILITY..................................................................... 40
YOUNG MOVERS ...................................................................................................................... 40
POPULATION GROWTH FROM THE WESTERN PACIFIC ........................................................................ 40
SETTING THE (IM)MOBILITY SCENE ............................................................................... 41
PACIFIC PEOPLES AS POPULATIONS ............................................................................ 41
IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND ............................................................................................. 41
THE REGIONAL POPULATION ............................................................................................... 42
THE EXCEPTION OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA ....................................................................................... 44
PACIFIC-BORN POPULATIONS OVERSEAS ....................................................................................... 45
SETTLEMENTS ............................................................................................................. 46
SETTLEMENTS AS SITES OF EXPOSURE OF POPULATION .............................................................. 46
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND SETTLEMENT ......................................................................... 47
SETTLEMENTS AND TENURE ................................................................................................ 48
LAND AND MARINE TENURE ......................................................................................................... 48
THE HAZARD-SCAPE ................................................................................................... 49
IMPACTS NOT HAZARDS PER SE AS THE FOCUS ......................................................................... 49
DIFFERENT HAZARDS, SAME COMMUNITY .............................................................................. 51
HAZARDS AND DATA GAPS ................................................................................................. 52
REGIONAL POLICY ANCHORS ...................................................................................... 53
TE MOANA NUI A KIWA ..................................................................................................... 53
THE PACIFIC REGIONAL FRAMEWORK ON CLIMATE MOBILITY/2050 STRATEGY FOR THE BLUE PACIFIC CONTINENT 53
THE PACIFIC DECLARATION ON THE CONTINUITY OF STATEHOOD AND THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN THE FACE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE-RELATED SEA-LEVEL RISE ......................................................................... 54
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ..................................................... 56
LOSS AND DAMAGE ......................................................................................................... 57
THE DIVERSE PACIFIC ................................................................................................. 58
THE REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC MOBILITY ........................................... 59
DIVERSE PACIFIC POPULATIONS .......................................................................................... 61
THE WESTERN PACIFIC CLUSTER .................................................................................................. 63
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC CLUSTER ................................................................................................... 65
THE EASTERN PACIFIC CLUSTER ................................................................................................... 68
THE NORTHERN PACIFIC CLUSTER ................................................................................................ 71
THE FRENCH TERRITORIES CLUSTER .............................................................................................. 73
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A DIVERSE BUT CONNECTED PACIFIC .................................................................................... 75
THE CONNECTED PACIFIC ........................................................................................... 76
PEOPLE, PLACE AND TRADITIONAL VALUES AND PRACTICES ......................................................... 77
FAITH AND SPIRITUALITY ................................................................................................... 78
EXTENDED FAMILIES AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY ........................................................... 79
EVERYDAY LIFE, EVERYDAY ACTIVITY AND RESILIENCE ................................................................ 80
CONNECTED, COLLECTIVE, AND COMMUNAL DECISION-MAKING .................................................. 82
DECISION-MAKING AND STAYING IN PLACE/IMMOBILITY ............................................................. 84
DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS ................................................... 85
TRANSNATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONALLY DISTRIBUTED FAMILIES ............................................. 86
SUPPORT ACROSS ‘PLACE’ ......................................................................................................... 86
TRANSNATIONALLY DISTRIBUTED PACIFIC FAMILIES........................................................................... 88
LIVING TRANSNATIONALLY .......................................................................................................... 89
WOMEN AND (IM)MOBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ....................................... 92
WOMEN, EVERYDAY LIFE AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE .......................................................................... 92
WOMEN AS WEALTH CREATORS ...................................................................................................... 93
WOMEN IN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSES, AND RECOVERY ............................................................. 93
SPECIFIC CHALLENGES AND VULNERABILITIES FACED BY WOMEN ................................................................ 94
ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND OPPORTUNITIES .......................................................................................... 96
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ................................................................................................................... 97
WOMEN AND MOBILITY ............................................................................................................... 98
LAND AND MARINE RESOURCES ...................................................................................................... 99
OTHER GENDER CONTEXTS: MEN AND THE RAINBOW COMMUNITY ................................................... 100
DIFFERENTIAL EXPERIENCES OF MEN ............................................................................................... 100
GENDER DIVERSITY ................................................................................................................... 100
THE DRIVER OF CURRENT AND FUTURE CLIMATE-RELATED (IM)MOBILITY ..................... 101
LOCALISED POPULATION PRESSURE ................................................................................... 102
LAND AND MARINE TENURE .............................................................................................. 103
CLIMATE CHANGE AND FOOD AND WATER (IN)SECURITY ........................................................... 106
CURRENT SCALE, PATTERN AND IMPACTS .................................................................. 109
(IM)MOBILITY AS A CONTINUUM ................................................................................................. 109
THE MULTIFACETED NATURE OF ‘PLACE’ FOR PACIFIC PEOPLES ......................................................... 110
FOR PACIFIC PEOPLES, RELATIONSHIP TO ‘PLACE’ HAS BEEN, IS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE, DYNAMIC ...... 112
STAYING IN ‘PLACE’ ....................................................................................................... 114
DISPLACEMENT ............................................................................................................ 115
THE PACIFIC RESPONSE TO DISASTER DISPLACEMENT (PRDD) (2019-2022) ..................................... 115
URBAN DISPLACEMENT ........................................................................................................... 116
DISPLACEMENT AND DATA GAPS ................................................................................................ 117
MIGRATION ................................................................................................................. 118
MIGRATION AS SHORT- AND LONG-TERM CIRCULATION ................................................................... 118
TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION SCHEMES .................................................................................. 119
COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF IMPACTS ....................................................................................... 122
INTRA-PACIFIC MIGRATION ....................................................................................................... 123
MIGRATION AS A RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE .......................................................................... 126
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RELOCATION ............................................................................................................... 127
STATE-LED RELOCATION ........................................................................................................... 127
COMMUNITY-LED RELOCATION .................................................................................................. 128
IMPACTS ..................................................................................................................... 130
CONFLICT AND TENSION .......................................................................................................... 130
NON-ECONOMIC LOSS AND DAMAGE .......................................................................................... 132
PSYCHOSOCIAL HARM ............................................................................................................. 135
FUTURE SCALE, PATTERN AND IMPACTS ..................................................................... 136
PAINTING THE PICTURE ................................................................................................... 136
STAYING IN PLACE ......................................................................................................... 139
DISPLACEMENT ............................................................................................................ 140
MIGRATION ................................................................................................................. 142
NET MIGRATION RATES – A REVIEW .............................................................................................. 143
CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY ............................................................................................. 144
THE CASE OF AMERICAN SAMOA ................................................................................................ 146
ESTIMATES AND SCENARIOS FOR TONGA AND SAMOA ..................................................................... 147
FUTURE SCENARIO BUILDING AS A TOOL HIGHLIGHTING POTENTIAL PATTERN ....................................... 149
RELOCATION ............................................................................................................... 150
PACIFIC YOUTH AS A WINDOW OF FUTURE (IM)MOBILITY ........................................................... 151
GROWTH IN YOUTHFUL POPULATIONS IN THE 21
ST
CENTURY: A CLUSTER-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE ................... 152
YOUTH PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE (IM)MOBILITY ............................................................................ 153
POLICY IMPLICATIONS .............................................................................................. 156
CLIMATE CHANGE-RELATED (IM)MOBILITY IS ALREADY A FEATURE OF THE REGIONAL LANDSCAPE ......... 156
ADDRESSING THE DRIVER OF (IM)MOBILITY .......................................................................... 158
A NEW MODEL IS NEEDED TO DEVELOP MORE (IM)MOBILITY-SENSITIVE POLICY ............................... 159
POPULATION TRAJECTORIES MATTER ................................................................................... 159
NAVIGATING RELATIONALITY AS A KEY POLICY FRAMING ........................................................... 161
RECOGNISING AND OPERATIONALISING RELATIONALITY WITH MĀORI .......................................... 162
RELATIONALITY EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO MĀORI AS IT IS FOR PACIFIC COMMUNITIES. .............................. 162
HOW DECISION-MAKING IS DONE IS CRITICAL. .............................................................................. 162
LAND IS A CENTRAL DIMENSION TO ADDRESS. .............................................................................. 163
LEARNING FROM MĀORI CLIMATE MOBILITY WITHIN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND. .................................... 163
MĀORI IN PARTNERSHIP WITH PACIFIC PEOPLES SHOWS PROMISE. ................................................... 163
DIFFERENTIATED SCALE AND ENGAGEMENT WITH MĀORI. ................................................................ 163
EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES ........................................................................................... 164
LOCALISED POLICY INTERVENTION ............................................................................................. 164
EMPOWERING AND SUPPORTING WOMEN .................................................................................... 165
LOSS AND DAMAGE ....................................................................................................... 165
SUPPORTING AND ENGAGING PACIFIC TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND ......... 166
CONCEPTUAL IMPLICATIONS ..................................................................................................... 166
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS .................................................................................................... 167
SECTORAL IMPLICATIONS ......................................................................................................... 167
RETHINKING FUNDING ................................................................................................... 170
ADDRESSING DATA ISSUES ............................................................................................... 171
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 173
RESEARCH TEAMS’ REPORTS AND STUDIES ........................................................................... 173
UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND THEMATIC PAPERS AND COMMUNITY STUDIES ............................................ 173
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UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND POPULATION STUDIES .......................................................................... 174
UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO SYNTHESIS REPORT AND THEMATIC PAPERS.................................................. 175
MANA PACIFIC CONSULTANTS SYNTHESIS REPORTS AND FAMILY STUDIES ............................................ 175
OTHER SOURCES .......................................................................................................... 176
Young children walking in the newly-established village of ‘Atataa Si’i, Tongatapu, for those relocated
from ‘Atataa following the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai erupon, 2023 (University of Waikato).
Cover image: Kwai, located 3km off the coast of East Kwara’ae, Malaita, Solomon Islands (Mana Pacific
Consultants).
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PREFACE
This report synthesises the work of the three Pacific-led research teams:
The University of Auckland, led by Professor Yvonne Underhill-Sem, Dr Tina Newport and Dr Roannie
Ng Shiu
The University of Waikato, led by Lora Vaiole, Professor Sandy Morrison and Dr Timote Vaiole
Mana Pacific Consultants, led by Dr Tracie Mafile’o.
The teams have produced reports drawing along differing scales of inquiry:
1
Family (Intergeneraonal)
Community
Naonal
Internaonal
Regional
The reports draw on in-country fieldwork in Aotearoa New Zealand and nine Pacific Island countries and
territories (PICTs): Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Kiriba, Tuvalu, Tonga, Samoa, Niue, the Cook
Islands and Tokelau. Virtual interviews have been conducted with persons in Australia and the United States
of America. This has been supplemented by addional research on out-of-scope countries to drive a regional
perspecve.
The research has been synthesised into this report by Mr Bruce Burson, Dr Evelyn Marsters and Emeritus
Professor Richard Bedford. Professor Sandy Morrison has contributed the secon on Pacific climate mobility
through the lens of Te Ao Māori and obligaons under Te Tiri o Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi, in her
capacity as Pou for kaupapa Māori within the research programme.
2
This report, and the broader research programme, was commissioned by the New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), funded by New Zealand’s climate finance through the Internaonal
Development Cooperaon (IDC) Programme. These are independent reports – the views expressed here are
the authors’ alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand government.
1
A full list of the research outputs, some with hyperlinks, forms Part 1 of the bibliography. Where teams have attributed
specific authorship to outputs this is indicated here.
2
The sythesis team wishes to thank the research teams at the University of Auckland, University of Waikato and Mana
Pacific Consulting for their helpful comments on drafts of this report; to MFAT, and in particular, Sarah MacCana and
Michelle Sheri, for their support thoughout prepartion of the report; to Max Oulton for his design of the maps and
diagrams which appear in this report; and to Hilary Tolley for her support with copy editing.
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GLOSSARY
Average Annual Displacement (AAD)
The average number of people displaced per year due to various hazards.
Climate
Change
-
Related Displacement
and Migration
Refers to the movement of people in the context of climate change,
including extreme weather events and long-term changes in climate
patterns.
Diaspora communit
y
Diaspora community refers to a group of
people who have le their
original homeland to various other places around the world. These
communies maintain a connecon to their place of origin through
cultural, social, and economic es.
Hazard
-
scapes
A dynamic scape, which reflects the
physical susceptibility of a place and
vulnerability of human life and assets to various hazards in a given human
ecological system.
IDMC
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, an international organ
isa
tion
that monitors and reports on internal displacement worldwide.
Indigenous Methodologies
Research approaches that respect and incorporate the values, cultures,
and traditions of indigenous peoples.
Informal Settlements
Residential areas
where 1)
inhabitants have no security of tenure
vis
-
à
-
vis
the land or dwellings they inhabit, 2) the neighbourhoods
usually lack, or are cut off from, basic services and city infrastructure and
3) the housing may not comply with current planning and building
regulations, and is often situated in geographically and environmentally
hazardous areas
Internal Circulation
The movement of people within their own country, often from rural to
urban areas or between regions.
Maroro
A specific cultural or research methodology is mentioned in the context of
indigenous approaches in Kiribati (specific cultural significance not
detailed in the document).
Methodological Approaches
The specific strategies or techniques used to conduct research and gather
data in the study of climate-related displacement and migration.
Net Migration Rates
The difference between the number of immigrants and the number of
emigrants throughout the year, per 1,000 inhabitants.
Pacific Climate Mobility
The movement of people within and from the Pacific Islands region in
response to climate variability and change.
Probable Maximum Displacement
An estimate of the maximum number of people who could be displaced
by specific disasters or hazards.
Relocation
The process of moving people or communities to a new location due to
environmental risks or other pressures.
Rohe
Region
Talanoa
A traditional Pacific Island method of open dialogue, used to share stories
and build relationships.
Te Ao Māori
The Māori world view, encompassing Māori culture, philosophy, and
practices.
Te Moana nui a Kiwa
A poetic name for the Pacific Ocean
Te Tiriti o Waitangi/The Treaty of
Waitangi
A foundational document in New Zealand, originally signed between the
British Crown and Māori chiefs, outlining the principles of partnership,
participation, and protection.
Tok
Stori
A method of storytelling and discussion used in some Pacific cultures to
share knowledge and solve problems.
Transnational
Extending or going beyond national boundaries
.
Urbanisation
The increase in the
proportion of people living in urban areas compared
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ACRONYMS
AAD
Average Annual Displacement
CHE
Cataloguing Hazardous Event
CNMI
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
CNZM
Companion of New Zealand Order of Merit
COP
Conference of the Parties
FRDP
Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific
FSM
Federated States of Micronesia
GDP
Gross domestic product
IDMC
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IPCC
Inter
-
governmental Panel on Climate Change
L&DC
Loss and Damage Collaboration
MFAT
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
NIWA
National Institute of Weather and Atmospheric Research
NRC
National Response Corporation
PACER Plus
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
PALM
Pacific Australia Labour Mobility
PDD
Platform on Disaster Displacement
PICTS
Pacific Island
Countries and Territories
PNG
Papua New Guinea
RSE
Recognised Seasonal Employment Scheme
SPC
The Pacific Community (SPC) is the principal scientific and technical organisation in
the Pacific region
UN
United Nations
UNDESA
United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNDRR
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNFCCC
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA
UN General Assembly
UNOCHA
United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UoA
University of Auckland
UoW
University of Waikato
WMO
World Meteorological Organization
WW2
World War Two
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Comparave populaons, Pacific countries, Aotearoa New Zealand, and Auckland: 2024 and 1950
Figure 2: Populaons of the Pacific and Aotearoa New Zealand: 1950, 2024 and 2100
Figure 3: Percentages living in rural and urban areas, 2022
to rural areas.
Walk the Land
An indigenous research approach involving physical engagement with the
environment to gain a deeper understanding and connection.
Whakatauki
M
ā
ori Proverb
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Figure 4: In-country and overseas-resident populaons born in the PICTs, 2019
Figure 5: Climate and environmental challenges by selement type
Figure 6: Proporons of Pacific populaons living within 1, 5 and 10 km of the coast
Figure 7: Established populaon mobility clusters and hubs in the Pacific
Figure 8: Populaon change in the five clusters using index numbers, 2000-2100 (2000=100)
Figure 9: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, western Pacific cluster 1970-2100
Figure 10: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, central Pacific cluster 1970-2100
Figure 11: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, eastern Pacific cluster 1970-2100
Figure 12: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, northern Pacific cluster 1970-2100
Figure 13: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, French territories cluster 1970-2100
Figure 14: Annual arrivals of RSE, SWP and PLS workers, 1 July 2007-30 June 2023
Figure 15: Sources of RSE, SWP and PLS workers, 2022/23
Figure 16: Populaon change in American Samoa since 1950: SPC and UNDESA esmates and projecons
Figure 17: Change in the populaons aged 0-14 years in the five clusters, 2000-2100, using index numbers:
2000=100
Figure 18: Change in the populaons aged 15-29 years in the five clusters, 2000-2100, using index numbers:
2000=100
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Populaon change in the Pacific, 2000-2100
Table 2: Probable maximum displacement for selected Pacific countries
Table 3: Average Annual Displacement (AAD) per hazard(s) in selected Pacific countries
Table 4: Projected net migraon rates for 2020 and 2050 by cluster
Table 5: Overview of findings from fieldwork in Samoa and Tonga: similaries and differences
Table 6: Mobility assumpons by future scenarios: a summary
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“even though they do not specifically say or directly fault climate change, their stories of natural and
environmental changes are like a deposion of climate change.”
3
Hazards, Selements and Geography
Pacific populaons are distributed across different geographies in villages, towns and cies in different raos.
Recognising geographic variability of selements at the naonal, sub-naonal and, in parcular, the
community-level is necessary to develop sound policy intervenons. This is because it is at the intersecon
of local geography and hazards that the exposure of selements lies, and where the intergeneraonally
transmied knowledge and skills of the community of people inhabing them has been forged.
Climate-related hazards will increase. The IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report is very clear that there is a greater
than 50% likelihood that global warming will reach or exceed 1.5°C by 2040, even for the very low greenhouse
gas emissions scenario.
4
That there is now more than a 50% chance that this temperature threshold will be
consistently exceeded within the next decade or two is a significant development in the Pacific hazard-scape.
Although this report has been prepared under an Acon Plan centred on concern – rightly given the IPCC ‘s
assessment – with the impacts of climate change, the Pacific hazard-scape comprises weather, climate-
related and geophysical hazards. While climate-related hazards are a context shaping current and future
(im)mobility, a broader approach to hazards and (im)mobility is therefore warranted. Climate-related hazards
can intersect with geophysical hazards and shape long-term paerns of exposure of a community. Increasing
variability in the weather is affecng tradional gardening and fishing pracces in some communies long
aer they were relocated because of the impacts of geophysical hazards.
It is therefore imperave that any gaps in hazard mapping relaon to hazard type, country and/or scale, are
addressed.
The Demographic Context: Pacific Peoples as Populaons
In Aotearoa New Zealand
The combined populaons of Māori and Pacific peoples, both with ancestral connecons to places in Te
Moana Nui a Kiwa, accounted for at least 25% of Aotearoa New Zealand’s total populaon of 5 million in
2023 and over 40% of the country’s children under 15 years of age. These shares of the country’s total
populaon will go on increasing during the 21st century because of a mix of momentum-led growth (higher
than average birth rates) and migraon-led growth (more people coming into the country to stay for lengthy
periods than leaving for overseas desnaons).
As eminent Samoan historian, Toeolesulusulu Professor Damon Salesa, has observed that since the 1960s in
Aotearoa New Zealand, “there developed a kind of Pacific archipelago - an archipelago made up of ‘islands’
( neighbourhoods, instuons and in some cases suburbs) where Pacific islanders spent much of their lives.
3
Dr Sione Nailasikau Halatuituia, Study Kāinga, Mango Tonga (Mana Pacific Consultants) p6
4
Portner, H.-O., et al. (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptaon and Vulnerability, IPCC
Sixth Assessment Report. 8. hps://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/
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By sheer force of who they were, and with an exuberant connecon to their idenes and cultures, Pacific
peoples made these locaons into unabashedly Pacific places.”
5
Populaon movement between island groups in the eastern and central Pacific, especially over the past
60 years, has spurred the development of an increasing number of transnaonally distributed family
groups. Family situated across naonal borders play an important role in shaping current paerns of
(im)mobility within the region. These transnaonal links will play a major role in a future in which the
impacts of climate change will likely feature as an important contributor to the movement of people into
and out of Aotearoa New Zealand during the next 30-50 years.
To beer understand future climate migraon trends and their social and economic impacts on Aotearoa
New Zealand and Pacific Island countries it is appropriate to set the scene with some brief comments about
the scale of Pacific peoples in their island homes and in their transnaonal communies in other countries.
The Regional Populaon
Any discussion of populaon change at the regional level in the Pacific needs to acknowledge the
disncve and dominant contribuon made by Papua New Guinea’s populaon. In 1950 the esmated
populaon of Papua New Guinea (1.6 million) was slightly smaller than Aotearoa New Zealand’s 1.9 million.
Papua New Guinea accounted for 64% of the region’s total populaon of 2.5 million in 1950.
By 2000, Papua New Guinea’s populaon had increased to 5.5 million, accounng for just over two-thirds of
the region’s populaon. Aotearoa new Zealand’s 3.7 million in 2000 was two-thirds the size of the populaon
of Papua New Guinea. Of the Pacific’s projected 19.8 million people in 2050 over three-quarters (at least 15
million) are likely to be living in Papua New Guinea – almost 2.5 mes more than the 6.3 million people that
could be living in Aotearoa New Zealand by mid-century.
In 2024, around 80% of Papua New Guinea’s populaon was resident in rural communies. This situaon
has not changed much over the past 70 years, and is not likely to change much over the next 30 years,
despite a connuous stream of people moving from rural areas into Papua New Guinea’s inland and
coastal towns.
In the context of climate change, assistance with programmes addressing crical rural development,
health and wellbeing issues and the maintenance of resilient and sustainable village-based livelihoods will
connue to be essenal in this part of the region.
Opportunies for Papua New Guineans to parcipate in labour migraon schemes in Australia and Aotearoa
have increased significantly in recent years, but these are not going to lead to growth of overseas-resident
populaon of Papua New Guineans that is numbered in the millions. At best, Australia’s populaon of Papua
New Guineans might number as many as 250,000 in 2050 (more than 10 mes the number present in 2021).
This would be equivalent to just 1.6% of Papua New Guinea’s projected populaon of 15 million in 2050.
The policy implicaons of populaon change in the other 20 Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs)
are very different. Many of them have much higher shares of their peoples living in towns and cies.
However, their demographic histories, contemporary populaon structures, and levels of urbanisaon vary
considerably, and they should not be treated as a single populaon for policy purposes. To accommodate
this diversity, the region’s populaons are reviewed in the next secon with reference to five clusters.
5
Salesa. D. (2017) Island Time: New Zealand’s Pacific Futures. Bridget Williams Books, p. 10.
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Most of these PICTs also have sizeable transnaonal communies living in urban places in one or more of
Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and the USA – communies which provide extensive support to their
island-based kin at mes of crisis such as aer very destrucve cyclones or tsunami, or during the recent
COVID-19 pandemic. Remiances from overseas have long played a major role in the development of island-
based communies and are already making significant contribuons to planned relocaon schemes in
countries like Fiji.
In 2021, there were at least 1.2 million people idenfying with Pacific heritages linked with these 20 PICTs
in the three Pacific rim desnaons. This was equivalent to 35% of the 3.4 million people living in the
Pacific, excluding PNG, in 2021. Nearly all these countries have variable levels of access to labour migraon
schemes and residence opportunies in Pacific rim countries. If these opportunies increase because of
changes in immigraon policy linked with adaptaon strategies in the face of climate change, then we might
see over 3.5 million people with Pacific heritages linked with these countries resident offshore in 2050. This
Pacific transnaonal populaon would be equivalent to 78% of the projected populaon of 4.5 million living
in the 20 countries in 2050.
Notwithstanding this growth in Pacific transnaonal populaons in countries on the Pacific rim, populaon
momentum rather than internaonal migraon is likely to remain the dominant demographic process
driving change in the Pacific’s populaon at the regional scale for most of the next 30 years at least. This is
because of the very significant contribuon to regional populaon growth that is made by Papua New Guinea
and its two western Pacific neighbours, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
The Diverse Pacific in Five (Im)mobility-relevant Clusters
The 21 PICTs (including Papua New Guinea) have been grouped into five clusters based on several dimensions
of their recent and future demographic development, including the access that their populaons have to
temporary and long-term residence in countries within as well as outside the region – access that is crically
important in the context of climate (im)mobility.
The five major “clusters” in the Pacific and their associated “hubs” in the Pacific as well as overseas owe their
origins to developments during the colonial and post-colonial eras. A key outcome of this legacy is that
cizens of parcular groups of countries (clusters) have privileged access to temporary visas for work or study
as well as to long-term residence visas either in a parcular country (hub) in the cluster, or a hub outside the
region.
The five clusters are:
1. The western Pacific cluster (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu)
2. The central Pacific cluster (Fiji, Kiriba, Nauru, Tuvalu)
3. The eastern Pacific cluster (American Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau and Tonga)
4. The northern Pacific cluster (Guam, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Northern
Mariana Islands, Palau)
5. The French territories cluster (French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna)
These clusters have variable paerns of populaon growth and urbanisaon, differences in populaon
structure, variaons in ferlity and mortality levels, and differenal access to work and residence
opportunies in countries on the Pacific rim.
Three quite disncve paerns are evident in the trajectories for their populaon growth during the 21
st
century. The first is the trajectory for the western Pacific cluster where the populaon is projected to treble
14 | P a g e
in size from 6.1 million in 2000 to 21.5 million by 2100. Most of the growth in the Pacific’s total populaon
will occur in this cluster because of a combinaon of high levels of natural increase and comparavely low
per levels of net migraon loss to overseas desnaons. The net migraon losses will increase, but they will
be numerically small by comparison with the addions to the populaon because of natural increase.
The second trajectory is much more modest populaon growth in clusters that include the two most
advanced industrial economies in the region – Fiji in the central Pacific cluster, and New Caledonia in the
French territories cluster. Both these countries are hubs for migrants from other parts of the region,
especially countries in their clusters. They have much lower rates of natural increase than are found in the
western Pacific because of declining fertility and variable histories of net migration losses to countries
outside the Pacific region.
The remaining two clusters – eastern and northern Pacific – have the lowest projected population growth
due to a combination of net migration losses, especially to countries on the Pacific rim, and variable histories
of fertility decline. The populations in these clusters, as well as in the central Pacific and French territories
clusters, are projected to be experiencing absolute population decline before the end of the century. This is
in contrast to the western Pacific’s population which will still be growing in 2100.
Some key points relating to the five clusters are summarised below.
Western Pacific cluster
The populaons in the western Pacific cluster all have youthful age-sex structures which are the product of
sustained high ferlity rates over the past 50 years. Ferlity is declining but this does not mean that absolute
numbers of children are falling. Between 2020 and 2050 the number of children aged 0-14 years in the
western Pacific is projected to increase by around 600,000 (16%) from 3.8 million to 4.4 million. Over the
same period the younger workforce (15-29 years) in the western Pacific is projected to increase by just over
1 million (38%) even though its percentage share in the total populaon will decline from 28% to 25%.
These numbers relang to the scale and paern of populaon change in the younger populaon are
significant in the context of climate (im)mobility because the children, obviously, are the future labour force,
and those in the younger working age groups are the most “mobility willing” according to surveys carried out
amongst Samoans and Tongans.
6
If the younger adult populaon is amongst the most mobile component of a populaon, the older populaon
(65 years and over) tends to be the least mobile – the “steadfast stayers”. This was reinforced in findings from
the surveys, community and family studies, and their share of the total populaons in all clusters is
increasing. In the western Pacific they comprised only 3% of the total populaon in 2020, but by 2050 this
share will have more than doubled to over 7%, and 50 years the older populaon will almost equal the young
adult’s share in the populaon.
This is an important finding because, at the same me that communies and policy makers are coping with
the mobility of increasing numbers of young adults, they will be simultaneously addressing issues
associated with preferences for staying in place amongst the older populaon.
Coping with climate change will be managed in rural sengs rather than towns for the great majority of
people in the western Pacific. This is despite the esmate that over two-thirds of the 5.8 million people
projected to be living in towns in 2050 in all of the Pacific countries are likely to be living in urban places in
6
See Vaioleti L. et al (2023b) and Vaioleti T. et al. (2024).
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the western Pacific. Only 25% of the western Pacific’s total populaon in 2050 is projected to be living in
towns.
The disncve features of the western Pacific’s youthful populaon structure and predominantly rural
distribuon are given further policy relevance by the fact there has been lile opportunity for people from
this cluster to move overseas either on visas for temporary work or study, or long-term residence in other
countries. Less than 1% of the combined in-country and overseas-resident populaons born in the western
Pacific around 2019 were living overseas.
In the absence of extended families that include overseas residents, opons for mobility to countries on
the Pacific rim, as a response to impacts of climate change, are much more limited for residents in the
western Pacific cluster than for those who have transnaonal kin networks.
Internaonal migraon outlets for cizens of countries in the western Pacific are increasing, especially in
Australia. But the recently announced Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) will have limited impact on responses
to climate change at the naonal level given the sizes of the populaons in these countries and their ongoing
high rates of natural increase. Mobility decisions taken in response to impacts of climate change will, by
necessity, have to connue to favour consideraon of desnaons within these countries, at least through
to 2050.
Central Pacific cluster
The reason for grouping Fiji, Kiriba, Nauru and Tuvalu as a cluster is because they have some disncve links
associated with their colonial heritages that have the potenal to be very significant in the context of climate
(im)mobility. There are some similaries in the trajectories of populaon change in the four countries. All
populaons have been experiencing declining ferlity, partly in response to government-sponsored family
planning programmes that date back to the 1970s, parcularly in the cases of Fiji and the former Gilbert and
Ellice Islands Colony (now Kiriba and Tuvalu). In addion, internaonal migraon has played a much more
significant role in shaping the age structures for the central Pacific cluster than has been the case in the
western Pacific.
Fiji is an increasingly important hub in the Pacific – it is the major desnaon for intra-Pacific migrants
seeking employment, educaon and residence in the region and is a prominent source of skilled migrants
to other Pacific states. Its airline, Fiji Airways, is also the largest provider of internaonal air services linking
countries in the region and on the Pacific rim. Fiji Airways and, at mes, Air Nauru, are the only airlines that
provide regular services to Kiriba and Tuvalu.
These four countries are linked by another legacy of colonialism in the central Pacific – phosphate mining on
Nauru and Banaba (Ocean Island) in Kiriba by the Brish Phosphate Commission. The phosphate industry
on Nauru and Banaba provided employment for thousands of I-Kiriba and Tuvaluans for several decades,
cemenng long-standing connecons and relaonships between the three coral countries.
To enable expansion of mining into village sites on Banaba, Banabans were reseled on Rabi Island in Fiji the
late 1940s. The relocaon of the Banabans was followed by the purchase of a neighbouring island, Kioa, in
Fiji by community leaders from Vaitupu in Tuvalu in the late 1940s to provide a safety valve in the event of
populaon pressure on the limited land resources of their atoll.
Fiji thus has long-established I-Kiriba and Tuvaluan communies, and has been a very significant source
of educaon, health and internaonal air transport services to the populaons of these two countries
especially since they became independent states in the late 1970s. These relaonships have been
strengthened further during the past 15 years through the purchase of land on Vanua Levu in Fiji by the
16 | P a g e
Kiriba government as part of a long-term strategy to secure homes for I-Kiriba who may have to leave their
islands because of damage caused by climate change. A commitment has also been made by Fiji’s former
Prime Minister to provide support with reselement if required in the future.
In addion to these strong historical and contemporary links, the countries in the cluster all have at least 50%
of their populaons living in towns and they all have sizeable transnaonal dimensions to their populaons.
In contrast to the countries in the western Pacific cluster, populaons in the central Pacific have had some
access to work and residence opportunies overseas for many years.
In this context, they have more opons regarding movement overseas as a strategy for coping with climate
change. They also have significant flows of remiances, goods and informaon from overseas kin. But their
transnaonal populaons are small in proporonal terms by comparison with those that are found in the
eastern Pacific – the cluster where the overseas components of their populaons are all much bigger than
the island-resident components.
Eastern Pacific cluster
Five of the six countries in the eastern Pacific cluster have long-standing links with Aotearoa New Zealand
that have facilitated considerable temporary as well as residenal migraon, especially since the 1960s. The
remaining one, American Samoa, is an Unincorporated Territory of the United States of America. The laer
has been included in the eastern Pacific cluster rather than with the other US-aligned PICTs north of the
equator because of indigenous cultural connecons with Samoa.
As a result of these connecons, Samoans especially, but also many Tongans, have taken advantage of
employment opportunies in American Samoa and on the west coast of the United States more generally.
The very large Samoan and Tongan transnaonal populaons in the United States owe their origin, in part,
to connecons established via American Samoa.
Migraon to countries on the Pacific rim, especially Aotearoa New Zealand and the United States, has had
a major impact on populaon growth through net losses of people in the working and reproducve age
groups. The loss of young men and women to long-term work and residence overseas represents a transfer
of their potenal contribuon to reproducon to the populaons of their host countries. This has had a
parcularly significant impact on the populaon structures of the Realm countries, which all experienced
major net losses in populaon during the 1960s and 1970s.
While the eastern Pacific cluster is projected to connue to experience populaon growth between 2020 and
2050, the overall increase will be small. Over the 30 years the SPC projects the eastern Pacific cluster’s
populaon will only increase by 23,000 or 6% to reach around 380,000 in 2050. The UN’s projecons are
more opmisc, especially for Samoa and Tonga, giving the cluster an overall increase of 120,000 or 23% to
reach a populaon of just over 500,000 in 2050. The SPC’s projecons are likely to be more reliable in this
case, especially for Samoa and Tonga. Ongoing declines in ferlity, and the likelihood of accelerated net out-
migraon as a response to climate change, favour the more conservave esmates of populaon growth for
these PICTs.
Surveys of recent and planned migraon amongst Samoans and Tongans provided evidence that climate
change is already influencing decisions to relocate elsewhere internally as well as to overseas desnaons.
These surveys, as well as community and family studies in the eastern, central and western Pacific, provided
clear evidence that climate change would become an increasingly important driver of residenal mobility.
Within countries in the cluster, migraon from rural to urban areas is expected to increase.
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While around two-thirds of the total populaon in the eastern Pacific was living in communies classified as
rural around 2019, this gives a rather misleading indicaon of the level of urbanisaon of people in this
cluster. The long-standing, albeit variable, access members of these populaons have had to overseas
desnaons since the 1970s means that all the countries in the cluster have significant transnaonal
populaons that are heavily concentrated in towns and cies in Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and the
USA.
When the overseas components of Pacific transnaonal populaons are taken into consideraon, it is clear
that Polynesians from the eastern Pacific have a much higher level of urbanisaon than assessments of
populaon distribuon within the island countries suggest. The strong connecons between the island-
based and overseas-based components of Pacific transnaonal populaons have been one of the defining
features of their social and economic transformaon, especially since the 1970s. A transnaonal rather
than a naonal frame of reference is required when considering the impacts of climate change on
populaons in the eastern Pacific cluster.
Northern Pacific cluster
The five PICTs north of the equator comprise a long-established cluster with strong connecons to the United
States. There is also extensive in-migraon of labour from countries in Asia to parts of this cluster to
compensate for the net losses of the indigenous populaons to the United States. This migraon-led “churn”
in the populaon has affected ferlity rates as well as the shares in the working age and older populaon
groups.
The PICTs in the northern Pacific have all experienced significant declines in ferlity since the 1950s and all
were expected to reach sub-replacement ferlity before 2050. They all have much higher percentages in the
older age groups than are found in the western, central and eastern clusters and this also reflects lower infant
mortality rates and higher life expectancies at birth especially in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands
where there are large immigrant populaons.
Populaons in the northern Pacific have much higher levels of urbanisaon than those found in the clusters
south of the equator. In 2018 only 28% of the northern Pacific’s populaon was rural-resident and by 2050
the UN expects this share to have dropped to 23% -- the reverse of the situaon in the western Pacific cluster.
Like the situaon in the eastern Pacific, there are large overseas-resident Micronesian populaons in the
United States, and these are mainly concentrated in urban areas.
Looking ahead, the populaons in the northern Pacific are likely to connue to have a preference for
residence overseas in the United States of America rather than in countries on the southern rim of the
Pacific. There are also strong economic and historical es between several of these countries and countries
in northeast and southeast Asia. There are no transnaonal populaons from this part of the Pacific of any
size in Australia or Aotearoa New Zealand at this stage.
In this context, it is interesng to note that the Australian Government has recently granted small PEV quotas
(50 each) to Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, with an offer on the table for the Marshall Islands.
This is the first me a country on the southern Pacific rim has included countries in the northern Pacific
cluster in an immigraon policy that targets specific countries or regions.
French territories cluster
These three Pacific territories have been grouped as a cluster because of their disncve, ongoing, status as
collecvies of France. Indigenous populaons in these widely distributed island groups have French
cizenship by right and, theorecally at least, can live in France if they choose to leave their island homes in
the Pacific.
18 | P a g e
The structure for the total populaon of this cluster is quite different from that for the other clusters, with
much higher shares in the 65+ age group. This is due to the presence of large non-indigenous populaons in
New Caledonia and French Polynesia which have older age structures and lower ferlity than the indigenous
populaons. In the French territories the youthful working age populaon aged 15-29 is projected to decline
by just under 10% during this period while the 65+ populaon increases by 87%.
The percentage of the populaon living in urban areas in the French territories ranged from around 71% in
New Caledonia to 0% in Wallis and Futuna in 2018. There has been considerable migraon between the
French territories and there are sizeable communies of Polynesians from Wallis and Futuna in New
Caledonia and French Polynesia. It is very difficult to get data on the Pacific-born populaons living in France
so it is not possible to say how extensive the transnaonal populaons of the collecvies are.
There were small populaons born in New Caledonia (310), French Polynesia (470) and Wallis and Futuna
(10) in Aotearoa New Zealand at the me of the 2018 Census of Populaon and Dwellings. These are the
smallest Pacific-born populaons from countries in Melanesia and Polynesia in Aotearoa New Zealand. While
the three territories remain colonies of France, it is unlikely that their locally-born populaons living in
countries on the Pacific rim will grow rapidly, although climate change in the region may lead to more
Polynesians especially seeking access to work and residence in Aotearoa New Zealand.
There are strong ancestral and contemporary connecons between island groups in French Polynesia and
the Cook Islands, and it was Polynesian navigators from this part of the eastern Pacific that brought the
ancestors of Aotearoa’s indigenous Māori populaon to this country. A Tahian navigator, Tupaia, also played
a major role is helping Captain Cook “discover” Aotearoa in 1769.
The cluster and hub approach, which is used to define the five sub-regional clusters, ensures that the
transnaonal dimension of Pacific populaons is always acknowledged in the analysis. This is something
which all of the research teams have given careful aenon to in their studies of families, communies,
and populaons of parcular countries and the overseas components of transnaonal populaons.
Relaonality and Transnaonalism as Key Policy Frames
Relaonality and transnaonalism are essenal concepts for understanding and addressing (im)mobility in
the context of climate change in the Pacific. These interconnected concepts, and the relaonships and
cultural pracces which they reflect, provide the most appropriate framework for developing effecve
policies that ensure that Pacific communies are beer equipped to navigate the challenges posed by climate
change. Honouring these values and integrang them into policy-making is crical.
Relaonality in the Context of Pacific (Im)mobility
Relaonality refers to the interconnectedness of individuals and communies to people and to ‘place’, and
how these relaonships shape idenes and social dynamics. It encompasses cultural, familial, and
community connecons, characterised by a deep connecon to family and land, waters, ecosystems,
tradional values and pracces. Understanding and supporng these relaonal dynamics are crucial for
developing effecve policies to address climate-related mobility in the Pacific region. Relaonality in the
Pacific will connue to be a dynamic and evolving concept, deeply influenced by climate change and mobility
paerns. The interconnectedness of people, land, and culture will remain central, with policies needing to
respect and preserve these relaonships. As Pacific peoples adapt to new environments, their relaonal es
will evolve but remain a fundamental aspect of their identy and resilience.
19 | P a g e
It is not possible to separate people from ‘place’ in the Pacific context: people are place. Nor is place simply
land.
‘Place’ for Pacific peoples is mulfaceted. Place is at once: an expression of belonging – what the ‘being’ in
‘human being’ means for Pacific peoples; a site of connecon to the tangible – to land (including people, past
and present), ocean and sky, to flora and fauna, and to language and culture – as well as the intangible – to
values, faith and protocol; the site of everyday life and acvity where tradional knowledge and pracce
drives resilience; and a source of spiritual and emoonal sustenance and wellbeing. Understanding the
mulfaceted nature of place is important as it explains why ‘staying in place’ features prominently in current
paern and will connue to do so in the future. It makes very clear just how profound loss and damage to
place is and why a place-based approach to assessing loss and damage is called for.
‘Place’ is also dynamic. Pacific peoples have long moved from ‘place’ to ‘place’, the oral tradions of whom
tell of movement to form new selements in new places stretching back centuries. Pacific peoples do not
separate from their land and kin of origin when they migrate. Instead, they aim to grow 'family' in new
contexts, creang another home while maintaining connecons with their original homes. This dynamic
formaon of addional or new ‘place’ connues. This dynamism includes Aotearoa New Zealand. Although
the movement of Pacific peoples to Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere on the Pacific rim at scale is a
relavely recent phenomenon, this means transnaonally distributed family/kin groups have relaonships
with more than one ‘place’ and along some or all of these dimensions.
In the specific context of Aotearoa New Zealand, the relaonship with Māori becomes significant. Māori
also are a place-based people. Marae or meeng spaces within tribal boundaries stand as testament to
these physical and spiritual connecons to place. In a climate mobility context, marae could play a crical
supporng role in the inial and ongoing response as well as possible longer term integraon support.
Relaonality to both people and place in Pacific communies means an intergeneraonal or
mulgeneraonal framework for examining climate-related (im)mobility in is necessary. This requires
recognising the family and community as basic units of analysis, as well as the naon, and facilitates
incorporaon of the variable me-scales; i.e., the me over which populaon processes and climate
processes play out, intersect and have impact on communies, families and households in ways which
influence decisions to stay/and or move.
Policies need to integrate climate (im)mobility with other forms of mobility, considering local condions,
cultures, and contexts. This integraon will help maintain relaonality by ensuring that policies are sensive
to the interconnectedness of Pacific peoples with their place and each other. In this regard, stories play a
crucial role in capturing the cultural connectedness between land, sea, and people. They highlight Pacific
resilience and the evolving tradional pracces adapng to climate change. This storytelling will connue to
be vital in policy-making, ensuring that relaonality is respected and preserved in new policies.
Relaonality means movement elsewhere is collecve in nature, relaonally connected to allowing more
people in the form of other family members (oen the elderly and the very young at a minimum) to stay
in place. Another important dimension of ‘move-to-stay’ mobility, characterised by what has been described
as a process of dual-mobility, is that movement abroad, even for an extended period of me (10-15 years),
can be part of a deliberate strategy to fund longer-term internal relocaon in home islands. These various
processes of ‘move-to-stay’ underscore how, in the Pacific socio-cultural context, (im) mobility-related policy
is best developed from a family/community-oriented perspecve.
Mobility in response to climate change is unlikely to involve complete abandonment of localies. Circular
mobility paerns, where people move but maintain connecons to their original homes, will keep cultural
es alive. This paern will ensure that relaonality remains a core aspect of Pacific life, even as people move
20 | P a g e
for extended periods of me through migraon or relocaon. This will mean that policy intervenons in one
country will impact in some way on family members in other countries.
Transnaonalism in the Context of Pacific (Im)mobility
Transnaonalism refers to the dynamic and interconnected relaonships that Pacific peoples maintain across
naonal borders. Transnaonalism in the Pacific is driven by both tradional values and characterised by
strong family and kinship networks, circular mobility paerns, economic and material support, and cultural
and tradional pracces. These elements collecvely ensure that Pacific peoples maintain their connecons
across borders, supporng each other in the face of climate change and other challenges.
There is a greater need for policies that facilitate integraon and support connecons, across naonal
jurisdicons, giving emphasis to circular mobility paerns where individuals maintain homes and
connecons in mulple locaons. Enhanced bi-lateral, regional and internaonal policy coordinaon is
essenal.
Key aspects of transnaonalism include:
Family and Kinship Networks: the research highlights the importance of family and kinship networks in
mobility decisions. Families oen move as units, and those who migrate maintain strong es with those who
stay behind. Pacific transnaonal networks play a pivotal role in shaping decisions about whether to move
in response to climate challenges or to stay and adapt. These networks, woven through families and
communies that span across borders, are not just social constructs but pathways that influence economic
opportunies, cultural preservaon, and personal choices in profound ways. The transmission of informaon
includes the somemes harsh realies of internaonal migraon as well as the impacts of climate change in
the other places where transnaonal kin reside. Building awareness of what internaonal migraon involves
on the part of those moving and those hosng is an important element of transnaonal relaonships.
Obligaon and Reciprocity: Pan-Pacific concepts emphasise the obligaon to support family members both
locally and abroad. They illustrate the reciprocal flow of value and obligaons within families and
communies. This flow of value is central to ways of life in the region, and also influences mobility decisions.
Economic and Material Support: substanal proporons of the diaspora send money, building materials, and
household appliances to family members in their home countries. This economic support is crucial for both
immediate needs and long-term resilience against climate impacts. They also host family who move.
Transnaonalism in the future will be characterised by increased climate-related mobility. As
environmental and ecosystem changes connue to impact the Pacific region, decisions at the individual,
family, household, and community levels will increasingly factor in climate change. This will likely lead to
more frequent and complex paerns of transnaonal movement which change the transnaonal distribuon
of family group members.
Tradional values and pracces will connue to play a significant role in shaping transnaonalism. Values
which emphasise obligaons to family and community will influence how people move and sele across
borders in the future, as well as the scale and forms of support. Future transnaonalism will connue to
involve maintaining strong es to both the home country and the host country, facilitated by these cultural
values.
As transnaonalism becomes more prevalent in the context climate change and other factors, there will
be a greater need for policies that facilitate the integraon of migrants while also supporng their
connecons to their home countries. This could include financial support, legal frameworks, and community
21 | P a g e
programmes that recognise the dual nature of transnaonal lives. Policy responses to climate change-related
mobility need to be integrated and coordinated with other mobility policy contexts. This implies that future
transnaonalism will require more robust regional and internaonal cooperaon to address the mul-causal
but interconnected nature of future migraon paerns.
The Driver of (Im)mobility, Now and In the Future
It is the intersecon of localised populaon pressure, tenure (land and marine), and food/water insecurity
which has shaped the scale and paern of past and current (im)mobility, and will shape the scale and
paern of future (im)mobility arising in the context of climate change.
These factors not only intersect but are highly interdependent. It is tenure which determines access to the
food and water resources necessary for sustenance. The size and age-sex structure of localised populaons
at any given me will place a parcular demand on systems of tenure and governance. This demand is
amplified when localised populaon trends outpace the capacity of local tenure systems, and the access
to water and food resources they govern, to cope. Such coping capacity will be undermined by future
changes in the environment – including degradaon and biodiversity loss and whether linked to climate
change or not – and by this means affect the scale and paern of future mobility by shaping decisions at
the household and family levels around whether to connue to stay in place, or whether to move.
The Driver and (Im)mobility Decision-Making
The research demonstrates that at household and community scales, concern about the current and
ancipated impacts of climate change are beginning to influence decisions at the individual, family,
household, and community levels about whether, who, when, and where to move away from their ‘place’.
In other words, climate change-related (im)mobility is already a present reality, making it a current policy
issue rather than a future one.
While climate change is not the sole context for many migraon decisions, it is becoming an increasingly
important factor alongside more typical consideraons of socio-economic beerment. The clear implicaon
of the research is that as Pacific peoples connue to experience environmental degradaon and
biodiversity loss in a warming world, their lived experiences will increasingly factor climate change into
household and community decision-making processes. Increased climate-related mobility is leading to more
frequent and complex paerns of transnaonal movement, resulng in dynamic and interconnected forms
of migraon and selement.
That the interconnected driver will influence (im)mobility is predictable. Quite what this means in terms of
future scale and paern is less predictable. Nevertheless it is reasonable to expect that, should the localised
impacts of such climate change undermine food and water security at the household and community levels,
these impacts will increasingly feature in decision-making, including a decision to move some or all family
members to another locaon.
The following will be important to have in mind.
1. The localised experience of naonal-level populaon trajectories is important, parcularly the
burgeoning youth and aged populaons. In communies in which the populaon is or will become skewed
towards older cohorts, this will likely impact how much staying in place features. For those skewed towards
the youth, the trajectory brings into focus the capacity of land and marine tenure arrangements to peacefully
absorb current and future growth in demand for resources.
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The research has idenfied five mobility relevant sub-regional groupings, as opposed to the more tradional
grouping of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. Within and between these groupings both the quantum
and distribuon of youth in the Pacific will be different in the future. Yet, like their parents, grandparents and
ancestors before them, the current and future Pacific youth populaon will be confronted, to a greater or
lesser extent depending on their community, with the same interdependent factors which have shaped
(im)mobility.
Exisng pracce will be adapted, and new pracce may well emerge to meet future environmental challenges
and become tomorrow’s ‘tradional’ knowledge and pracce. Yet, given the current trajectory of carbon
emissions, impacts of climate change-related hazards will, alongside other hazards, increasingly intrude on
(im)mobility decision-making.
What this means is that, in the western Pacific, many more young people will be trying to live on their own
land in inland villages under increased climate change condions. Increasing opportunies in towns, freeing
up agricultural land, and increasing pathways to travel abroad, must therefore be important policy
objecves.
The challenge for policy in the western Pacific cluster is how to support rural communies to simultaneously
cope with demand for access to land for farming, as well as for mobility opons, from increasing numbers of
young adults, while addressing issues associated with preferences for staying in place amongst the older
populaon.
In other clusters the populaon-related challenges are more likely to be linked with increasing urbanisaon
of populaons both internally and overseas. Young adults are seeking livelihoods based on cash earnings
rather than subsistence producon and increasing numbers are seeking opportunies for work in towns.
Where there are large overseas-based components to the cluster’s populaon, internaonal mobility has
become part of the way of life in Pacific transnaonal families.
It is also important to recognise the importance of ‘stay-to-move’ mobility. Today’s 0-4 year olds are
tomorrow’s students, workers and, potenally, migrants – whether internal or internaonal. The willingness,
and ability, of a youthful populaon to move elsewhere for study, for work, for marriage will shape not just
their own contribuon to future scale and paern, but also the contribuon of others, for whom their
movement enables connued stay.
2. Everyday acon of households and communies will connue to provide resilience. Communies
will innovate indigenous knowledge and adapt tradional pracce to meet changing environmental
condions impacng their site or sites of selement, as they have done in the past. These condions will be
shaped, depending on the geography of their selement, by exposure to weather, climate and/or geophysical
hazards.
The degree to which this every day resilience is maintained and enhanced – including though external
support as required – will have a direct bearing on the scale and paern of future (im)mobility by
dampening the effect that climate change would otherwise have on food and water insecurity and thereby
easing the impact of a local populaon pressure. This means more people will be able to choose to remain
in place for longer.
The maximum scale of staying in place will connue to be delineated by the populaon-absorpve capacity
of land and marine tenure arrangements.
23 | P a g e
3. Future scale and paern will be influenced by informaon around ancipated climate change
impacts across different ‘places’. While decision-making is likely to remain at the household or family level
(including family members living beyond naonal borders), it will connue to be influenced by discussions
that are occurring at the community level. The extent to which informaon around future climate change
flows into community level governance structures, and is transmied to households in village meengs in
digesble form will, alongside the lived experience of environmental change, shape percepons of risk and
influence – at least for some – the decision around whether some or all of a family unit connue to stay in
place. This means invesng me in understanding and supporng tradional governance structures and
leadership.
4. Reflecng both relaonality and transnaonalism as defining characteriscs of Pacific peoples,
families will connue to be first responders and the primary support mechanism in cases of future
(im)mobility. The extent to which families are supported by well-designed policy to fulfil these funcons will
influence how these forms of movement impact not just those moving, but also the wider family unit.
5. Changes in immigraon policy in the main desnaon countries within the region as well as on the
Pacific rim will have an impact on the scale and paern of populaon movement. Fiji and Australia have
merged as Pacific migraon ‘hubs’, alongside the established hubs of Aotearoa New Zealand, the United
States of America and France. This development is important as it has increased the volume of migraon
policy nodes around which internaonal migraon in the context of disasters and climate change might occur.
There is now a more variegated landscape for immigraon policy. The future scale and paern of (im)mobility
will thus be shaped by the degree to which the migraon policy sengs of the various hubs reach into one
of more of the five sub-regional clusters and the extent to which any parcular PICT is represented in more
than one policy seng.
Scale, Paern and Impacts of Climate (Im)Mobility, Now and in The Future
The language of (im)mobility, as it commonly appears in policy debates and academic discourse, is not of the
Pacific. Terms such as ‘trapped populaons’ or even ‘involuntary immobility’ do not reflect a Pacific
understanding of relaonality to place. Further the decision to stay in place will oen result from a weighing
of factors, which may not neatly fit into a voluntary-involuntary binary.
In late 2023, Pacific Island Forum Leaders adopted the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility,
signalling unequivocal recognion that (im)mobility in context of disasters and climate change is an issue of
regional significance. The Framework idenfies various forms of (im)mobility: staying in place, displacement,
migraon and relocaon. While these descripons serve an important purpose in signalling the trajectories
for future regional cooperaon in relaon to different archetypes of movement, the research reminds that,
from the perspecve of relaonality, both current and future scale and paern of (im)mobility exists as a
connuum.
In other words, all forms of (im)mobility referenced in the Framework – staying in place, displacement,
migraon and relocaon – are present at any me, albeit at different scales. While separated in this report
in order to align with the architecture of the Framework, and to capture a sense of scale, paern and any
movement-specific issues, these are best regarded as exisng along a connuum of experience and are
intrinsically connected.
By this we mean that some, but far from all Pacific people, experience these different forms throughout their
life cycles. Scaling up, all forms exist side-by-side within families and communies. Again, this is not to say
all families and all communies experience all forms. At the local scale, there is variaon. But, once we
telescope out to the naonal and regional level all forms are present to some degree. However, the extent
24 | P a g e
to which internaonal migraon features along the connuum of experience is the most variable given
differenal access to overseas desnaons at naonal and sub-regional (cluster) levels.
Staying in Place
The mulfaceted nature of place means not moving is unarguably the most common element of current
paern. Despite environmental challenges linked to climate-related hazards, many communies show a
steadfast commitment to their ancestral territories, preferring to stay. This will be no different in the future.
Where staying in place is of an involuntary nature – for example through a lack of financial or of social capital
in the form of having family networks elsewhere – the future scale of staying in place will depend on the
extent to which these barriers are reduced though policy. Where staying in place is predominantly voluntary,
the key policy challenge will be how to best support family to stay, parcularly should food and water
insecurity ramp up over coming decades because the impacts of climate change outpace the ability of
communies to cope through innovang tradional pracces.
Staying in place will continue to exert a powerful influence on future scale and pattern because it is the site
where everyday resilience is practiced. This may become even more true, given the understanding that other
places to where movement might occur will also be exposed to hazards.
Community-tension, arising from the intersecon of land tenure and localised populaon pressure (density
and increases), exists already and can have an intergeneraonal element. Land and marine boundary issues
are the most common sources of conflict, arising regardless of the selement type. More geography-specific
sources of conflict are also present. These concern access to foreshore and the sea for coastal high island
selements, and the pressure of increasing populaon on some atolls, and in coastal and highland
selements.
It will be essenal that community-level conflict resoluon mechanisms are supported.
Displacement
Obtaining a true sense of the scale of displacement is difficult in the Pacific. Many survival displacement
events occur far from administrave centres, are localised (such as from landslides) and of relavely small
scale. Nevertheless, the adverse impacts of these micro-displacements can be substanal for the affected
populaon. Disaster displacement in PICTs tends to be underreported because of a lack of dedicated and
skilled capacity, insufficient data and poor informaon governance. Addressing data issues will be important
minimising displacement and its associated impacts.
Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that displacement does occur at scale, albeit with variability. Urban
displacement is a feature of current paern. Poor urban planning and poor housing exacerbates climate risk
and increases the scale of displacement. Repeat displacement can feature, although urban displacement
tends to be highly localised and typically of short duraon. Consistent with relaonality, family (and friends)
were typically the primary source of support, including providing accommodaon.
Displacement will connue to feature and will likely increase. The scale of increase is uncertain, in part
because of a lack of accurate baseline data of current levels of displacement. The report summarises some
recent country level projecons of future scale of displacement prepared by IDMC. These projecons are
expressed in terms of a ‘probable maximum displacement’ over different return periods and an ‘average
annual displacement’.
25 | P a g e
Apart from giving an indicave sense of the scale of future displacement in certain PICTs, the projecons
demonstrate the uneven nature of hazard mapping within countries. Volcanic erupons and landslides do
not feature as specific hazards for which modelling was undertaken, despite each driving oen substanal
and protracted displacement. The projecons are also notable for capturing the many areas where
insufficient data has been available for modelling to occur.
A lack of relevant data was menoned by both Kiriba and Tuvalu in their reports to the recent mid-term
review of the implementaon of the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reducon 2015-2030. For both
countries, this has acted as a constraint on progress towards reducing the numbers of persons affected by
disasters – including through displacement – one of the targets of the Sendai Framework. Addressing such
data challenges will be central to developing displacement-sensive policy and driving down disaster risk
more generally.
Migraon
The research which underpin this report, led by Pacific and Māori researchers using methodologies anchored
in indigenous ways of understanding relaonships between people and place, has made it very clear that
when populaon movement is viewed through an intergeneraonal or a mulgeneraonal lens, circulaon
between places, rather than migraon from one locaon to another, remains the dominant form of
movement. The daily circulaon of people away from and back to the place of residence associated with
their everyday lives in villages and towns within Pacific countries, as well as in places of residence in other
countries, is the most obvious form of voluntary circular mobility. Closely linked with this everyday movement
are less frequent circuits, oen associated with parcular types of economic and social acvity, most
commonly within countries, but also to other places that are separated by the invisible boundaries between
countries in the Pacific that are a legacy of colonialism in the region.
Intra-Pacific migraon is more extensive than oen appreciated. Key groups that can be idenfied in the
flows into Pacific countries from other Pacific countries include people born in hospitals in other Pacific
countries and flows of labour into major industries in selected countries. It should be noted, however, that
the country with the largest extracve industry base in the region, Papua New Guinea, had very small in-
migrant flows from other Pacific countries. Another key group in the intra-Pacific flows is skilled labour from
Fiji, especially teachers, medical personnel, security personnel, retailers, seamen and a wide range of people
with specialist trade skills. The other important group of overseas-born in-migrants in selected Pacific
countries includes members of reseled communies from Kiriba and Tuvalu in Fiji, Solomon Islands and
Niue.
Tracking the circulaon of labour between Pacific countries is being compromised by a trend towards
publishing less informaon on the birthplaces of the populaons enumerated in censuses. This data gap
hampers delivery of effecve policy to support those moving, as well as support for the desnaon countries
where they move to.
The research as a whole cautions against over-generalisation of migration responses to climate change.
Policy responses to climate change require approaches that are very sensitive to local conditions, cultures
and contexts. They also require appreciation of the continuing importance of circulation of people between
places where they have resources, family members, and opportunities to achieve important economic and
wellbeing goals.
Migration in response to climate change is unlikely to involve complete abandonment of particular
localities for most movers. Circular mobility patterns will keep “the fires burning” for future generations in
places that have cultural significance for the movers and their multigenerational families. Even should
abandonment be necessitated by catastrophic changes in the local environment, return by smaller groups
26 | P a g e
of people to reconnect with such places to draw spiritual and emotional sustenance will likely feature at
some scale in the future.
While internal or internaonal migraon will remain circular in character, the scale, periodicity and
duraon of circulaon will vary over me depending on the locaon of selement in the PICT, the parcular
circumstances of the family unit (including its age-sex structure) and, in the case of internaonal migraon,
the immigraon and social policy sengs of the country which is also home to transnaonally distributed
family groups.
Relocaon
Community-led relocaon due to environmental changes has been part of Pacific everyday acon for
generaons. The research would suggest that scale of household and community-led relocaon is
underesmated.
There is momentum towards more State-led process of planned relocaon. The programme being
undertaken by the Government of Fiji is well documented. As early as 2014, the Government of Fiji had
indicated that 676 coastal communies needed relocaon based on projected climate impacts, of which 42
were expected to require relocaon “in this decade, with 17 currently considered as priorised for relocaon
as soon as possible”. While the process is underway, the planned scale of relocaon has not yet been
achieved. Naonal-level response in Fiji is characterised by the development of a dense and integrated legal,
policy, operaonal and financial framework.
Relocaon will, at the regional scale, remain predominantly internal in nature. Household and community-
led relocaons will connue as they have done for centuries. Future scale will depend in part on the extent
to which other counes follow Fiji’s lead and develop an organised programme of State-led relocaons.
Self-reselement – a form of circulaon in the relocaon context – is an established feature of current
paern.
Summary Conclusion on Future Scale and Paern of (Im)mobility
Given the strong aachment to place, including the naon as a ‘place’ at a larger scale, the research does
not support a finding that there will be a desire to relocate internaonally at large scale. However, given
residual uncertaines in the climate system, and looking out over longer me frames towards beyond 2050,
the need may arise in some naonal sengs. In such circumstances, the scale will depend on the size of the
affected populaons. Changes now in migraon policy sengs may contribute to populaon decline in
countries with low populaon growth rates over such me horizons and thus influence potenal scale under
such a scenario.
What the research suggests, however, is that from the perspecve of Pacific peoples: (a) the ‘mass’ in a
‘mass arrival’ is at the family or community scale; and (b) will most commonly happen at an individual or
household level over an extended period of me in the coming two or three decades rather than all at
once at a community or island scale (although the laer cannot enrely be ruled out at parcular
thresholds of future climate change over longer me horizons). Circulaon – in all its various forms and
scales – will dominate ‘mobility’. Even should whole communies need to relocate, circulaon back in
smaller numbers for short periods to reinvigorate aachment to original ‘place’ is likely to be a strong desire
and should be supported by policy to become an element of future paern.
The ‘mass arrival’ in Aotearoa New Zealand of an increasing number of Pacific people in the context of
climate change requires the specific aenon of policy at the family and community scale both in New
27 | P a g e
Zealand and in the home island. This because of the impact such ‘mass arrival’ will have on other members
of the transnaonally distributed family – both those who may remain in the home island as well as those
already present in Aotearoa New Zealand or in another Pacific desnaon country. While this does not
obviate the need to think about what arrival at larger scales over longer me frames might mean, it is crical
that policy does not lose sight of the family and community scales which are likely to connue to dominate
scale and paern in the coming two to three decades. This is made more crical given the indicaon in the
research of Aotearoa New Zealand being a preferred overseas desnaon for some Pacific populaons.
7
Impacts
Whether staying in place or moving in some way, climate change-related (im)mobility is impacng Pacific
communies in various ways and will connue to do so. Community-level tensions, oen linked to the factors
which the research indicates drive decision-making around whether to stay or move, are documented in the
research. These include land and marine boundary issues – a common source of conflict – as well as access
to foreshore and the sea for populaons of coastal, high island selements.
In some places, the ‘staying in place’ of more people has contributed to a rise in pey crime including the
from gardens, the killing of other people’s animals for meat, and starng bushfires that destroy coffee plots
and gardens. These behaviours undermine community cohesion and trust and pose significant threats to
food security, livelihoods and overall safety. Such tensions can be ancipated to endure – if not increase – in
countries where momentum led populaon growth if forecast in the coming decades. This potenal for
conflict makes clear the importance of understanding and supporng tradional governance systems for
resolving community-level conflict.
While Pacific communies, rightly, have a sense of pride in their resilience and adaptaon to changing
condions, increased stress, mental health issues, and domesc violence also feature in the research, which
underscores the importance of factoring wellbeing consideraons into policy concerning both mobility and
staying in place. These impacts include increased anxiety due to unpredictable weather, stress and trauma
from displacement and relocaon – both past and ancipated – and cultural disconnecons due to the loss
of tradional lands. The laer can diminish cultural and spiritual es, illustrang the lasng impact of climate
change on the mental health and social cohesion of Pacific communies.
Looking to the future, alongside supporng connued everyday resilience, it is vital that policy recognise
mental health and psychosocial harm as a key concern.
Implicaons for Policy
The implicaons for policy arising from the research are detailed in the last secon of the report and a short
summary only is outlined here.
Perhaps the key implicaon for policy which emerges is that climate change-related (im)mobility is already
here. It is an issue which requires the aenon of policy now, not in the future. Fundamentally, populaon
movement is circular in nature, albeit with significant variability at the household level. This will likely
remain the case in the future.
7
See, for example, Vaioleti, L., et al (2023b,4) who note in relation to the survey data generated “New Zealand is the clear
destination of choice for those in Tonga and Samoa, for those planning overseas mobility in the coming five years, as well
as in response to questions on hypothetical overseas mobility given the need and opportunity.”
28 | P a g e
Beyond recognising this reality, it is vital
that Pacific climate change-related
(im)mobility, like other forms of
(im)mobility in the region, is
approached not at as an individualised
phenomenon, but rather as collecve,
communal and relaonally connected to
people and place. A mul-generaonal,
family and place-based approach to
policy development and
implementaon across policy sectors
will best ensure (im)mobility-sensive
policy development and delivery of the
best outcomes for Pacific peoples,
wherever they may be in the warming
Pacific region, as well as for the wider
community in which they live. This
includes recognising that the
transnaonal distribuon of many
Pacific families – the scale of which is
likely to increase in the future – is core
structural feature of Pacific (im)mobility
and requires policy coherence across
naonal jurisdicons.
While, inevitably, the impacts of climate
change in the region are going to
increase pressure on Aotearoa New
Zealand (and other ‘hub’ States) to free
up opportunies for short-term and
long-term circulaon of Pacific peoples
as well as possibilies for residence for
families in the overseas part of Pacific
transnaonal sociees, such
developments must be matched by
policy which allows for other families, or
family members, to remain in place or
choose other desnaons within the
home island. Taking account of the
differing populaon trajectories in the
five mobility-relevant sub-regions will
be a crical part of this exercise.
Finally by way of summary, in the specific context of Aotearoa New Zealand, relaonship to people and
place means both early and deepening engagement with Māori as tangata whenua and recognising marae
as a crical expression of place. Understanding what differing scales of mobility – for both Māori and
Pacific migrants to Aotearoa New Zealand – may mean for engagement with mana whenua is fundamental
to delivering a meaningful process of engagement.
Lord Howe Selement, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 2023
(Auckland University).
29 | P a g e
INTRODUCTION
The 2018 Pacific climate change-related displacement and migraon: A New
Zealand Acon Plan
As Jonathan Boston notes:
8
“...good public governance must be future-oriented. It must be ancipatory.”
He observes that to do this well, governments “need good intelligence, robust evidence and sound advice”
9
.
In keeping with this approach to governance, in 2018, the New Zealand government released the Cabinet
paper Pacific climate change-related displacement and migraon: a New Zealand acon plan (‘the 2018
Acon Plan’).
There, Cabinet tasked officials to “commission robust research to beer understand future
climate migraon trends and the social and economic impacts on New Zealand and Pacific Island countries”.
This report responds to that Cabinet direcon.
Boston reminds
10
that policy development now must confront the uncertainty which inheres to a greater or
lesser extent in relaon to any consideraon of the future; in this instance, future populaon movement.
This report presents robust evidence across areas such as decision-making and regional populaon dynamics
to reduce some of the uncertainty surrounding the scale and paern of future populaon movement in a
warming Pacific. More broadly, the core aim of this research has been to produce aconable knowledge to
inform current and future policy development, and thereby contribute to ancipatory governance in
Aotearoa New Zealand and in Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs).
The research programme mandated by the 2018 Acon Plan is the fih of five early acons on climate-related
human mobility in the Pacific. It sits alongside and informs other idenfied Early Acons in the 2018 Acon
Plan, in parcular, Early Acon II – the facilitaon of regional dialogue and exploring a regional approach –
and Early Acon IV – championing the progressive development in internaonal law. These Early Acons
have generated regional policy anchors to which this research on (im)mobility relates.
The 2018 Acon Plan recognised that New Zealand’s acon on climate migraon should be underpinned by
Pacific-led values that honour the desire of Pacific peoples to connue to live in their own countries, where
possible, and respect the Pacific’s sovereignty and the right to self-determinaon. It was also recognised that
any soluon be led by those countries most significantly impacted and, in the regional context, advocate for
a Pacific-led response through the Pacific Islands Forum.
It also recognised that Aotearoa New Zealand’s unique Treaty of Waitangi obligaons and arrangements
between Māori and the Crown require that policy development and policy responses must involve iwi, hapū
and Māori in recognion of their Treaty partnership as well as their own status and acknowledge the
whakapapa links Māori have with Pacific people and Te Moana nui a Kiwa. For this report, Professor Sandy
Morrison supported the inclusion of Te Ao Māori and understanding of obligaons under Te Tiri.
8
Boston, J. (2017) Safeguarding the Future: Governing in an Uncertain World. Bridget Williams Books. 23
9
Idem. 11.
10
Idem. 12.
30 | P a g e
The methodological approaches
The three research programmes employed mulple methods to generate aconable knowledge on Pacific
mobility and immobility to inform policy. Priority was given to research methodologies that enabled Māori
and Pacific values and approaches to be used to access indigenous, tradional and sacred knowledge to
address policy-relevant quesons relang to climate (im)mobility across the region. This demanded the
engagement of Māori and Pacific researchers and the use of research methodologies grounded in Māori and
Pacific epistemologies. Relevant methods and approaches used in the field included Kaupapa Māori, talanoa,
tok stori, maroro, and ‘walk the land’ (Bishop, 1996a and 1996b; Smith, 2012; Vaiole, 2006 and 2016; Sanga
and Reynolds, 2020). Oen, the researchers researched with their own families and communies.
The research brief for the programme also included the generation of policy-relevant information and advice
using secondary data analysis, desk-based research on people and places in the region, surveys,
visualisations and scenario planning processes. These methods are all rooted in epistemologies underpinning
deductive and inductive scientific inquiries. All teams extensively used desk-based research on peoples and
places; two teams made widespread use of secondary data analysis, and one team used surveys, visualisation
and scenario planning processes.
Community and family-based studies
The three programmes used community and family as basic units of analysis, generang over 35 community
and family-based studies, spanning generaons, geographies and borders. As Underhill-Sem et al. (2024a)
observe:
By acknowledging the strengths and limitaons of individual-centric migraon studies, researchers
and policymakers can work towards developing more comprehensive frameworks that account for
both individuals and groupings of individuals who move, but also include the analysis of relaonships
between those who stay or are ‘le behind’ .... in the context of climate-induced migraon and
relocaon in the Pacific.
11
Stories
Central to the methodology of all teams has been the use of stories. Mafile’o et al. (2024b) explain why
capturing stories is so important for policy. They note that stories:
embrace cultural connectedness between land, sea and people; draw on the oral tradion strengths
of Pacific-Indigenous cultures; highlight Pacific resilience; identify intangible and non-economic
factors associated with Pacific climate mobilities, particularly as to health and well-being; reveal
knowledge of evolving traditional and local practices adapting to climate change and new
mobilities.
12
Viewed collecvely, these important aributes of storytelling belie the too-oen encountered narrave of
Pacific peoples as vicms. While they unquesonably bear no responsibly for the changing climate and
weather paerns which shape their world, the stories captured in this research powerfully make clear their
individual and collecve agency.
11
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C. Ng Shiu, R., Burnett, R. Galokale, K. (2024a) Community-Level Decision Making Dealing
with Mobility. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland. 5.
12
Mafile’o, T, Taylor, D and Sanga, E. (2024b) Why stories count in Pacific climate mobility research: A literature review.
Mana Pacific Consultants.
31 | P a g e
Surveys and scenarios
In addion to community case studies, surveys were used to collect quantave informaon from 305
Tongans and 290 Samoans on their beliefs and percepons regarding climate change and future mobility
(and/or staying in place).
13
These, together with another internet-based survey of 111 members of the
Tongan and Samoan diaspora in Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and the United States of America,
14
were
used to collect data on their strength of connecon to Tonga/Samoa and their current and future roles in
climate adaptaon and mobility, including financial contribuons and input into decision-making.
Visualisaons and scenario development processes were employed to generate beer understandings of
how Tongans and Samoans perceived their futures under different scenarios of climate change. Regarding
these methods, Vaiole, L. et al. (2023d) observe:
Crically, this process taps into the imaginaon of parcipants, and within that, reveals knowledge
and assumpons that might otherwise remain unaccessed. The imaginaon of parcipants, paired
with other informaon like personal experience or second-hand knowledge also supported thinking
on second and third order impacts of possible future changes. By smulang the imaginaon of
parcipants, scenario planning has the potenal to be an even more powerful tool.
15
PACIFIC CLIMATE MOBILITY THROUGH THE LENS OF TE AO
MĀORI AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER TE TIRITI O
WAITANGI/THE TREATY OF WAITANGI
The policy context
Future climate mobility from Pacific naons to Aoteroa New Zealand will not happen in a vacuum. While this
report speaks to a Pacific-led research project, discourses on climate change in Aoteroa New Zealand must
acknowledge and consider the polical, social, and cultural context, especially as it relates to Māori. This was
affirmed in the 2018 Cabinet background paper to this research which stated:
Aotearoa New Zealand’s unique Treaty of Waitangi obligaons and arrangements between Māori and
the Crown require that policy development and policy responses must also involve iwi, hapū and
Māori in recognion of their Treaty partnership as well as their own status, and acknowledge the
whakapapa links Māori have with Pacific people and Te Moana-nui-ā-Kiwa.
Addionally, the Terms of Reference for this research required the scope to be grounded in, and informed
by, Tikanga Māori, the values of whanaungatanga (family), kaiakitanga (guardianship) and manaakitanga
(protecon, wellbeing). These values are expressed in different ways in Pacific cultures and they served as a
starng point for decision-making in the scope of work.
13
Vaioleti, L., Vaioleti T. and Morrison, S. (2023b) The mobility-willing and the steadfast-stayers. A survey on mobility
willingness and recent and planned mobility in Tonga and Samoa in the context of climate change. University of Waikato.
14
Vaioleti, T., Vaioleti, L. and Morrison, S. (2024a) The diaspora. University of Waikato.
15
Vaioleti, L., Vaioleti, T. and Morrison, S. (2023d) Moving futures. The scenarios. University of Waikato. 11.
32 | P a g e
The intenon of the New Zealand Government was to demonstrate their commitment as a meaningful Treaty
of Waitangi partner to Māori while ensuring that they show leadership to build a resilient Pacific region
through the commissioning of the research on which this report draws.
Partnership under the Treaty of Waitangi was also illustrated by the Ministry of Pacific Peoples who
introduced their Te Tiri o Waitangi statement by being clear about their posion as a Treaty partner in
relaon to Māori:
Māori/ Tangata Whenua and Pacific peoples/ Tangata Moana, share ancient whakapapa linkages that have
existed for millennia before the signing of Te Tiri o Waitangi. Māori graciously acknowledge Pacific
peoples as ‘tuakana’ or the elder siblings in this ancient relaonship and themselves as ‘teina/ taina’ the
younger siblings. However, in the context of the Treaty, Pacific peoples are part of ‘Tangata Tiri’ as the
presence of Pacific peoples in Aotearoa in recent history, is due to the signing of Te Tiri o Waitangi/ the
Treaty. In the context of Aotearoa New Zealand,
Māori are ‘Tangata Whenua’ or ‘tuakana’ and Pacific peoples are ‘teina’ or ‘Tangata Tiri’.
16
The Ministry of Pacific Peoples also commit to upholding the principles of the Treaty in terms of partnership,
protecon, and parcipaon.
17
This means that they work together with tangata whenua, hapū, Māori
organisaons and mana whenua in ensuring that Māori contribute to decisions that could impact them in
the course of the Ministry’s work. It also means acknowledging the growing populaon of Pacific peoples
who have whakapapa Māori and ulising Te Reo, kawa, kanga, taonga and Te Ao Māori knowledge and
resources.
18
Examining the impact of Pacific climate change-related mobility on Te Tiri o Waitangi and Tikanga Māori is
significant, especially given the legal and moral rights that Māori/iwi/hapū assert and connue to assert as
tangata whenua of Aotearoa.
There are four issues addressed in this secon:
1. Historic and recent experiences of Māori with mobility;
2. Māori and Pacific relaonships in the context of mobility;
3. Crical focus areas raised by Māori leaders (decision-making, land, values-based relaonality); and
4. Current mobility trends noted in the research and early thoughts on implicaons for Māori.
The implicaons for policy are discussed alongside other policy implicaons emerging from the research in
the final secon of the report.
Data collecon and methods
This chapter draws predominantly on research undertaken by the University of Waikato parcularly ‘Six
Kōrero’ report.
19
It also draws a community case study from Tokelau by the University of Auckland. Other
exisng literature, including relevant government reports from New Zealand, is also referenced.
16
Ministry of Pacific Peoples, Te Manatū mō ngā iwi o Te Moana-nui-ā-Kīwa (2022b). Yavu the foundations of Pacific
engagement. The policy project. Wellington: Ministry of Pacific Peoples. 3
17
These are the most wellknown set of principles of many but there is no final list. Rather they are determined on a case by
case basis.
18
Idem. 3-4.
19
Morrison, S., Vaioleti, T. and Vaioleti, L. (2023) Six kōrero. Ka mate kainga tahi, kia ora kainga rua, ka mate kainga rua, ka
ora kainga toru. University of Waikato.
33 | P a g e
The Māori experience of mobility
From a Te Ao Māori perspecve, whānau, hapū and iwi tradionally were mobile within their territories, with
kainga established for seasonal living and seasonal harvesng. Incorporang principles of kanga, and
through acvang the rituals that include karakia, mauri, tapu, noa, rāhui, mahinga kai, maramataka,
Matariki, kaiakitanga, Māori had considerable adapve resilience to climate cycles and its impacts.
Mobilies were supported by these principles and rituals, balance and harmony were upheld by whakapapa
relaonships with Papatūānuku and Ranginui, a belief system that connues to exist today.
Though resilient, Māori were not invulnerable. Disasters such as floods, tsunamis, and volcanic erupons led
to forced relocaon (for example, see Bailey-Winiata 2021;
20
King, 2018
21
). During these mes, spiritual
encounters, pūrākau and taniwha, guided and explained the locaon of new kainga, or selements, allowing
Māori to be mobile and responsive to the rhythms of the ecosystems to which they were deeply connected.
Thus, aachment to whenua, to place, to spiritual kaiaki became central to Māori pracces and rituals as
communies became well-embedded over many generaons.
Like other Indigenous peoples and peoples of the Pacific, the spiritual and physical relaonship of Māori to
land cannot be underesmated. Land provides sustenance for the living and for life itself and is fundamental
to identy. The taking of ancestral lands through colonisaon remains a significant issue for Māori and the
Waitangi Tribunal and the Courts connue to hear grievances on and decide on appropriate redress.
There are historical examples of Māori communies who have experienced mobility. In the late 19
th
century
Waikari marae in Matapihi, Tauranga was moved to higher ground by their hapū of Ngā Tapu due to coastal
flooding and erosion (Tauranga Moana District Māori Council, 1989, cited in Bailey-Akuhata et al, 2022, 43);
Waipapa marae in Taranaki was relocated in 1940 because of flooding, and it was moved again in 2009 aer
flooding in 2006, (Waipapa Marae Trust, 2022 as cited in Bailey-Akuhata et al, 2022, 43). While for the most
part, these relocaons involved shis within their tribal boundaries, not all hapū will have the privilege of
relocang within their tribal rohe given their colonising histories. Relocaon also means consideraon for
mobility must be given to wāhi tapu, urupā, mahinga kai and homes, all of which underpin livelihood and
identy.
During the floods of 2005 in Matatā, it was apparent that the city leaders had built with lile regard for Māori
knowledge and disregarded Mātauranga Māori. Some Māori declared that the flood was punishment for the
city leaders who had breached their lore and disrespected their ancestors, most notably by the building of
the township of Matatā on top of wāhi tapu and urupā. The mana whenua of Matatā had their lands taken
in 1865. A local pūrākau tells of the tale of the taniwha with a flicking tail; the taniwha would flick its tail
around reflecng how rapid and radical the Waitepuru river altered course. This pūrākau guided the Māori
community in their acons and engagement and non-engagement with the river. The four Marae were
undamaged in the flood as they were built clear of the flicking tail of the taniwha.
22
Fast forward to more recent mes, with the progression of climate events, many Māori marae communies
are having crical discussions about retreat, while aempng to balance and uphold their enduring and
sacred relaonship to their lands within their tribal territories. Bailey-Akuhata and others (2022, p.42) say
20
Bailey-Winiata, A. P. S. (2021). Understanding the potential exposure of coastal marae and urupā in Aotearoa New
Zealand to sea level rise (Thesis, Master of Science (Research) (MSc, Research). The University of Waikato, Hamilton, New
Zealand. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10289/14567
21
King, D.N. (2018). Māori histories, geological archives and tsunamis in Aotearoa-New Zealand. PhD Thesis. Geology.
School of Biological, Earth and Environmental Sciences. New South Wales. 2
22
Hikuroa, 2017, as cited in Yumagulova,L., et al. (2023): Indigenous perspectives on climate mobility justice and
displacement-mobility/immobility continuum, Climate and Development. 10
34 | P a g e
while Marae were oen built in safe spaces that considered Mātauranga Māori, the increasing intensity of
climate change now make them hazard exposed. About 80 percent of the naon’s some 800 marae and their
communies are built on low-lying coastal land or flood prone rivers, with 191/800 located within 1 km of
the coastline.
23
The vulnerable locaons of many marae expose Māori to climate risk which is exacerbated
with sudden disaster events. For example, Cyclone Gabrielle in early 2023 acutely affected many
communies, including Māori, and caused long-term social, cultural, economic, and environmental impacts.
Given that Māori are already experiencing climate change resulng in climate mobility, then adding another
layer of mobility from Pacific naons may stretch resources available. There is also the point that the
development of a policy for adaptaon and planned relocaon will need to recognise the present challenges
for Māori created by historical displacement, while respecng the mana of iwi, hapū and Māori communies
who are exercising their rangaratanga within their rohe or takiwā. It will also need to accommodate the fact
that tribal rohe and takiwā boundaries are not the same as district or regional planning boundaries.
24
Māori and Pacific relaonships in the context of mobility
Māori and Pacific peoples share an ancient genealogical relaonship which is anchored in shared gods,
sharing storying, shared ancestry, and developed into shared values. They both have roamed and voyaged Te
Moana nui a Kiwa for centuries (Pacific peoples for far longer) and connue to do so. These shared values in
which both Māori and Pacific peoples can find common purpose include valuing family, collecvism,
consensus in decision-making, reciprocity, respect, and love. These values form the holisc nature of life and
the centrality of good relaonships: the connecvity of the past, present, and future; of people, land, sea,
and sky and the spirituality that binds them together.
25
From a polical perspecve, the relaonship between Māori and Pacific peoples in New Zealand has largely
been under the direcon and policies of the New Zealand Government within which Māori and several Pacific
communies are rather ghtly bound (Somerville, 2012). There has both been a long history of cooperaon
and equally a long history of compeon. From the late 1950s and 1960s, there was a high influx of Pacific
migrants to New Zealand. This was brought about by the need for more unskilled labour to meet New
Zealand’s economic growth in the manufacturing sector, as well as the ongoing primary producon for Britain
which found Māori and Pacific peoples working cooperavely in similar posions.
26
The 1970’s gave rise to polical acvism with the Polynesian Panthers challenging the hegemony of the State
to improve the working and living condions for Pacific peoples (Anae, 2006). These cooperave endeavours
did not dispel some resentment from Māori to the arrival of Pacific migrants to New Zealand as they were
seen as causing “incursions on finite local and naonal resources” (Teaiwa and Mallon 2005, 211). Sefita
Hao’uli wrote that “Pacific Island people did not come here to hongi with Māori” an indicaon that they were
coming to New Zealand for jobs and opportunies on a palangi agenda.
27
Dr Timote Vaiole, of the University of Waikato, referenced a talanoa with pre-eminent Tongan philosopher
‘Epeli Hau’ofa in 2004, where Hau’ofa said “ko e kakai pe e fonua tenau lave e fakangofua e kakai kehe ken
au nofo fonua” meaning, only tangata whenua can make others part of their whenua. His view that a shared
spirituality demanded that those entering new lands must secure the goodwill of tangata whenua and the
23
Expert Working Group on Managed Retreat (2023). Report of the Expert Working Group on Managed Retreat: A Proposed System for Te
Hekenga Rauora/Planned Relocation. Wellington: Expert Working Group on Managed Retreat. 142.
24
Idem. 77.
25
Taufe'ulungaki, A. M. (2003, 5 December). What is Pacific research?: A methodological question. Paper presented at the Health
Research Council (HRC) Pacific Health Fono, Auckland, New Zealand.
26
Spoonley, P. & Bedford, R. (2012). Welcome to our world? Immigration and the reshaping of New Zealand. Auckland: Dunmore Ltd.;
Liu, McCreanor, McIntosh & Teaiwa, 2005.
27
Hao’uli, S. (1996). We did not come to hongi with Maori, Mana, 11: 38-39. 38
35 | P a g e
right to connue to live on another people’s whenua must be respecul and include consultaons with
tangata whenua. Involving Māori to give their blessing is the right thing to do spiritually and even more so
when discussing Pacific mobility.
28
Examples of Māori and Pacific relaonships
Recognised Seasonal Employment (RSE) scheme
For the ten-year review of the RSE scheme, Vaiole, Morrison & Vaiole (2019)
29
highlighted an example of
how Māori and Pacific social values were successfully referenced between a Māori iwi business Wakatu/Kono
Ltd and a kainga of RSE workers from Tonga - as a guiding framework for RSE worker engagement – from
worker selecon in Tonga, to day-to-day pracces and behaviour expectaons when working in New Zealand.
The values-based framework also became the principal underpinning that supported transion and
relaonships in a new land and adapng to new values and systems. It included an intenonal commitment
to maintain relaonships with families in Tonga as part of the pastoral care model. The applicaon of these
values was regarded as vital for producvity, quality work outcomes, and maximisaon of the workers’
income each year. Programmes based on values from the country of origin have a greater chance of success
than those programmes which for the large part have profits as the movator rather than the care of the
workers (Vaiole, Morrison & Vaiole, 2019).
Community relaonships
A case study undertaken by the University of Auckland in Porirua speaks to a posive working relaonship
between leaders from Ngā Toa who hold mana whenua and leaders from the atoll of Atafu in Tokelau.
30
Leaders were sensive to their shared history in the 1950s, following World War II. The land in Porirua East
was taken from Ngā Toa under the Public Works Act and used for the new selement as part of geng the
country back on its feet. One of the leaders recalled being raised at that me when many Pacific migrants
seled in Porirua. There were tensions between communies with senments of Māori feeling being
imposed upon and “almost like displacement on your own whenua” as land was taken and given to others
by the Government. Through integraon and intermarriage, relaonships have deepened posively, and the
importance of care and support highlighted.
About 15 years ago, Ngā Toa had a powhiri for the Pacific community. It was a huge affair as each
community came with their flags and colours as they walked towards the marae…
… there’s appete in the Runanga to partner out so that no one will be le out in our communies.
Manaaki is taken seriously but whether that’s the percepon from everybody else, that’s the intenon
of the Runanga.
31
The Runanga also provide social, health and educaon services which are accessed by Pacific peoples as part
of its client base. Housing super lots is also an iniave being undertaken by Ngā Toa, repurposing old state
housing, and bringing them up to code to make available for whānau. This includes seng aside homes for
Pacific families to own their own homes.
28
Talanoa, Timote Vaioleti, 27 April 2024.
29
Vaioleti, T., Morrison, S. & Vaioleti, L. (2019). A fanau/whānau-centric recruitment model developed for NZ Recognised
Seasonal Employer scheme (RSE). Unpublished report prepared IMPAECT*, Indigenous Māori and Pacific Adult Education
Charitable Trust.
30
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024e).
31
Idid.10.
36 | P a g e
Overall, these discussions demonstrate a leadership and polical willingness to support the Tokelau
community.
“it’s really up to the Tokelau people to determine where they want to go and to have the conversaon
with us to see how we can support them”.
32
These examples are a mere indicator of thriving social and community partnerships between Māori and
Pacific peoples and create a model on how to plan for social inclusion and cooperaon for the benefit of the
broader community. The Bluff Māori community provided similar commitments to those from Ngā Toa:
My personal experience of mobility is through a whānau-to-whānau approach where whānau in the
Samoan diaspora returned to Samoa to bring their elders to Aotearoa following the 2009 tsunami.
This acon and selecon of family was intenonal - to help family that were struggling to re-establish
themselves in Samoa following the disaster, and to benefit from the healthcare systems here. From
what I see, I think that these elders are sll tentave about claiming their space in their new locaon.
Maybe it is a generaonal issue. Aimee Kaio
33
Through intermarriage into the whānau, there is a growing leadership of people who share Māori and
Pacific heritage and who are growing into community leaders in their own right within their
reconstuted community groups. Aimee Kaio
While some iwi have explicitly commied to the care of all who reside on their land, approaches could be
tested first at a whānau or hapū level. To quote Aimee Kaio, "Ngāi Tahu whānui, are very clear that we’re
commied to supporng the wellbeing of all whānau who reside in our takiwā".
Several examples were shared of successful exisng partnerships, including between Māori and Pacific
funding networks, social services organisaons, regional conservaon efforts, and business ventures.
Hinemoana Halo which means the cloak of protecon for the ocean upholds Indigenous custodianship across
the Pacific to protect and revitalise coastal and marine biodiversity, with parcular reference to whales.
Several leaders including the Māori King have signed He Whakaputanga Moana (Declaraon for the Ocean)
as part of the Hinemoana Halo iniave which also includes a more holisc approach to whale conservaon.
While this declaraon is not binding on Governments, it provides an entry point for discussions with
respecve Governments across the Pacific on not only upscaling conservaon efforts but also on finding
direct benefits to Māori and Pacific communies from jobs to infrastructure and promong inter-indigenous
economic relaons and trade across Aotearoa New Zealand and the Pacific.
34
There are also organisaons who have a mandate to support Māori and/or Pacific partnerships in business
and in social enterprise within Aotearoa New Zealand e.g., Amotai NZ, and the Southern Iniave. Both
groups which or, supported by local and central government, build leadership especially for Māori and/or
Pacific entrepreneurship to connect and go global while also addressing inequitable outcomes.
35
The examples provided above illustrate how Māori and Pacific peoples’ relaonships, some of which may
have started because of Government policy are now emerging on their own terms and as part of their own
creave and dynamic energy founded on shared cultural strengths and cultural wealth.
32
Idem. 11.
33
Morrison, S. et al. (2023).
34
Conservation International (n.d).Hinemoana halo. https://www.conservation.org/aotearoa/hinemoana-halo
35
Amotai,n.d. Amotai NZ https://amotai.nz/. and Auckland Council, (n.d.). https://www.tsi.nz/
37 | P a g e
We need to establish a framework based on common whakapapa and common values and caring for
one another in me of need. Jason Mika
Three crical focus areas raised by Māori leaders
This secon covers three maers that were consistently spotlighted by Māori leaders in this research
engagement, in the context of future Pacific climate mobility and Māori. The first was the process taken for
any future discussions and decisions on Pacific climate mobility, the second was the unavoidability of land
maers in parcular future climate mobility scenarios and the need to be brave, and generous. The third was
around shared values. These discussion points are summarised in the final secon of this chapter, with some
high-level thinking on related policy implicaons.
The approach to decision-making is crical
Mana whenua and tangata whenua Māori have been and will connue to advocate for partnership in
decision-making processes, where it impacts them, their taonga and their wellbeing to uphold their
rangaratanga and leadership obligaons. In addion, the principle of partnership under the Treaty of
Waitangi upholds their right to be consulted, including in relaon to climate change and climate mobility.
Will the government talk to us if they decide to bring Pacific people here [at scale] because they
should… that’s what partnership means – to include us so we can decide, and help (Rore Stafford)
36
Principles of partnership in the Treaty would necessitate the Crown and Māori working together to figure out
what opons there are, to involve Māori in decision-making and to ensure that Māori are best posioned to
support people in the Pacific; the leaders engaged for this research were firm in that the Crown cannot simply
come to Māori with proposals on acons in this space.
Māori leaders believed that Pacific peoples and Māori need space to genuinely kōrero, without input from
the Crown – listening with an open heart to each other’s needs, priories and aspiraons. The soluon or
sets of soluons will need to be co-developed between Māori, the Crown, and Pacific peoples. Discussions,
planning, and acons should also be values-led, parcularly as Māori and Pacific share many common values.
In recognising that Pacific perspecves and priories cannot be assumed or generalised, Rore Stafford
emphasised that there will also be a natural diversity of views within and between Māori, parcularly on
complex maers like climate mobility that will have land-related dimensions; engagement must recognise
these differences in views. He suggested that, pragmacally, there may need to be different levels of
engagement – at a naonal, iwi and even hapu level, and that progress with discussions, and trialling
soluons, may be more effecve at a hapū level.
Finally, Professor Linda Smith shared her belief that early discussions need to be bold and ‘push the
boundaries’ of thinking – on risks, opportunies and what is possible “in order to know where we can
ulmately ‘be’, comfortably”.
Co-development of soluons should be proacve, and implemented through a strengths-based lens, with
goals that include economic independence, and mutual benefit.
36
Ibid.
38 | P a g e
Land, and future land access: generosity will be needed
Several leaders in Samoa and Tonga believed that future climate mobility may mean seeking alternate land
overseas, assuming that there may be instances of large scale (sudden or not) mobility that requires
concerted planning efforts. One government leader in Tonga shared:
Where will we put people? Will we build up? Or will we need to start negoaons with New Zealand
and Australia for land? We will need to go as useful members of society (Taniela Fusimalohi, MP for
‘Eua, Tonga)
37
This connecon between land and moving with a plan and pathways was mirrored in statements by Māori
leader, Ngahiwi Tomoana:
We must support them into pathways for economic development. We must support them into housing, even
being their advocates to buy land … (Ngahiwi Tomoana)
38
Land maers however are already central for Māori and confronng regional and Pacific climate mobility
scenarios in the context of land will be contenous.
There is a land provision element to the preservaon of culture but that is a very difficult one to consider.
We as Māori and Iwi will have to be generous.
39
(Linda Smith)
The issue for me is then is how do Pacific peoples live in New Zealand in relaon to Māori, but also have
their cultural idenes supported and protected. And for me, for that to happen they need place. They
actually need land.
40
(Linda Smith)
All leaders, and those parcipants who raised maers around land access and acquision in places like
Aotearoa New Zealand, recognised that while necessary, entering into discussions on land in the context of
climate mobility will be very difficult, especially as land maers remain unresolved between Māori and the
Crown.
Exisng challenges in land governance and land management including ownership structures and
administraon may come to the fore in scenarios of climate-related land negoaons. Complexies would
increase where land has mulple owners or where land tles do not have any management structure in
place. Further, Māori have and connue to face barriers to the use and development of their own land. The
Report of the Controller and Auditor-General, Tumuaki o te Mana Arotake (2004) notes the historic legacy of
land legislaon and policies that prevented Māori from developing their own land and in many circumstances
resulted in Māori land being alienated. Barriers like compliance costs for Māori in accessing their whenua
may impact land availability and opons for future climate relocaon. While improvements to the Te Ture
Whenua Māori Act were made in 2021, the substanve issues sll largely remain.
A leader from the Ngā Toa community in Porirua made the following remark on land:
“The biggest challenge all Māori have is land. So where do you go to? What our tūpuna tradionally
had is control, mana and whenua. So, if there was some problem living there, they had the mana to
go up the hill. We don’t have that now. We don’t have the mana to just say oh well just take that land.
37
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).112.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
39 | P a g e
So, the biggest barrier I think to managed retreat is not so much having the will to move, it’s the place
to move to.”
41
Finally, Māori, who had in-built adapve capacity to climate change through seasonal movement, had their
seasonal movement ceased soon aer the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi; effecvely becoming fixed to
place, and remaining fixed to the land that they managed to keep. In talanoa (August, 2023), a land expert in
Samoa - Tofā Ta’ioa Dr Matavai Tautunu (Director of the Centre for Samoan Studies, NUS) - reflected on a
similar history with land in Samoa in that following colonisaon, Samoans became relavely fixed in place
with the introducon of other land tenure types (previously, of course, all land had been customary land and
managed flexibly as such).
42
This common or shared experience could provide a helpful plaorm for Māori-
Pacific discussions on land in the context of regional climate mobility.
Māori and Pacific shared values and relaonality as a crical base
Many engaged in this research highlighted shared values and shared whakapapa between Māori and Pacific
peoples. Many saw it as the necessary plaorm, or starng point, for successful discussions on future climate
mobility to Aotearoa.
“We need to establish a framework based on common whakapapa and common values and caring for one
another in me of need -Jason Mika”
A few pointed to the need to decolonise the minds of some who have ‘amnesia’ about their shared Pacific
histories, and a number of Māori leaders also shared a belief that those from some naons of the Pacific –
namely Polynesia - have a unique right to resele in Aotearoa should they wish. Rore Stafford shared his
deep sense of empathy, and aroha, towards those Pacific peoples in the future who may lose their land due
to climate impacts, reflecng on how crical it is to his well-being to be able to walk on his own whenua daily.
Rore described the need for Māori to fall back to their values in Pacific mobility futures, to manaaki those in
the Pacific who will be suffering.
Current mobility trends and early thoughts on implicaons for Māori
The overall research programme turned out a broad range of new and rich insights around the future scale,
paern and impacts of Pacific climate mobility, as well as exisng mobility trends. A number of these trends
may have parcular implicaons for Māori. This secon aims to touch on a few insights of note however it
does not aim to be an exhausve analysis. Early reflecons through a Māori lens are offered for the purpose
of providing an entry to further conversaons and tesng, and under some topics, further quesons are
raised. The insights from this short analysis feed into the policy implicaons in the final secon of this report.
Moving as a family, communal living
Climate mobility is expected to happen predominantly at a family level, and findings from the research
support this assumpon. Supporng families locally could have implicaons for e.g., Māori health and social
service providers being expected to extend manaaki to those who reside in their rohe - as illustrated by Ngā
Toa and Ngai Tahu.
43
These services with their exisng networks and capacies could also provide a helpful
means of oversight of Pacific family level mobility outcomes, and the effecveness of support intervenons.
41
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024e).
42
Talanoa, Tofā Ta’ioa Dr Matavai Tautunu, Director of the Centre for Samoan Studies, NUS, August 2023.
43
Morrison, S. et al. (2023).
40 | P a g e
For some Pacific populaons there would connue to be a strong drive for family communal living, including
on relocang to a place like Aotearoa. Some Iwi or hapu-based living models that have proved successful in
Aotearoa could be valuable to share. For scenarios of more state-led or large-scale or sudden mobility events,
notwithstanding the previous discussion on inclusive decision-making, Māori community organisaons and
exisng structures, including marae, could play a crical supporng role in the inial and ongoing response
as well as possible longer term integraon support.
Selers, incumbents and conflict
Closely connected to the previous discussion on land, Māori and Pacific climate mobility, there will be
implicaons for Māori in any discussions and decisions on land (as well as other resource access, like water,
sea or marine resources). Beyond this, tensions are already high in a range of Pacific naons around land
access, with many giving examples of conflict between those who are incumbents or landowners and those
considered ‘selers’. This power dynamic will need to be navigated in the case of Māori, and Pacific peoples
who may ‘resele’ in Aotearoa in future, potenally navigang through a conscious effort to consider shared
whakapapa, shared experiences of land loss, and through the applicaon of shared value systems.
Impermanent, dual-mobility or cyclical mobility
The research found that there are a range of mobility paerns likely already in-play in response to climate
pressures in the Pacific. For those undertaking overseas mobility, some reported that the plan was to seek
out work for a number of years in places like Aotearoa, in order to fund internal relocaon of the family home
back in the Pacific (a ‘dual-mobility’ focus). Others intend to connue undertaking other forms of cyclical-
type mobility. Some families may have been living between mulple ‘homes’ in the Pacific (e.g., coastal and
inland) due to progressive climate impacts prior to relocang overseas. Based on mobility histories, Māori
may be well-placed to appreciate this dynamism and support discussions, thinking and planning through
these varied (and perhaps shared) lenses. Further, Māori involvement in businesses ed to recent cyclical
mobility (e.g., Iwi involved in the RSE) places them in an influenal posion in terms of supporng posive
social and economic resilience outcomes.
Young movers
The Pacific populaon is relavely young. From data analysis, surveys, as well as findings from interviews, it
was suggested that those more likely to be mobile under climate stress may also be youth. Māori are also a
young populaon. Engagement with some Pacific diaspora youth in Aotearoa suggested that there may be
both social benefits and drawbacks to the coming together of Pacific and Māori youth, with one family
sharing that while local Māori youth can provide a helpful integraon point to parts of the community, they
felt that there were also some unhealthy habits that the Pacific youth took on because of those connecons.
Youth engagement by all research teams noted a strong focus and desire to get a good job to be able to
support one’s family. Many were overt in their desire to get a job in places like Aotearoa and Australia. There
could be opportunies for Māori iwi, enterprise and business to support Pacific youth into meaningful work
pathways. A number of youth also expressed concerns around social and cultural changes and the risk of
losing their culture in the future. There could be opportunies for Māori and Pacific youth to share
experiences and combine efforts where appropriate for e.g., language preservaon and cultural diversity
protecon.
Populaon growth from the Western Pacific
Tradionally, New Zealand including Māori have had a close and beneficial relaonship with the Eastern part
of the Pacific, this being the Realm countries and Samoa and Tonga. While each Pacific naon has its own
disncve histories and values, Māori share much more in common with the Eastern Pacific given their
41 | P a g e
Polynesian heritage. With significant relave growth from the Western Pacific expected, a range of crical
quesons arise for discussion - what will relaonships look like with Māori if Aotearoa New Zealand is a
desnaon of choice for those from the Western Pacific? Will a shared Pacific identy emerge given that
there is no shared whakapapa? How will commitments and support for each other play out?
Having now addressed Te Ao Māori and obligaons under Te Tiri o Waitangi as a specific and necessary
policy context in any discussion around Pacific climate-related (im)mobility to Aoteroa New Zealand, we now
turn to more general topics. We need to set the scene in which im(mobility) of Pacific peoples arises. It is to
this we now turn.
SETTING THE (IM)MOBILITY SCENE
In order the understand (im)mobility in the context of climate change and set the scene for policy
development, it is necessary to describe several significant overlapping elements. How these intersect will
determine scale, paern and impacts of (im)mobility in the Pacific now and into the future.
In the spirit of the well-known Māori whakatauki, He aha te mea nui o te ao? He tangata, he tangata he
tangata! (What is the most important thing in the world? It is people, it is people, it is people!), this secon
begins with some introductory comments about the populaons of Te Moana Nui a Kiwa (the Pacific) and
their Southern most homeland, Aotearoa New Zealand. This is followed by secons introducing selements,
the hazard-scape and regional policy anchors. This is essenal contextual informaon for the substanve
secons synthesising the findings from the three research teams that have parcular relevance for the policy
makers, addressing issues relang to climate (im)mobility.
PACIFIC PEOPLES AS POPULATIONS
The previous secon has traversed the socio-polical context of Pacific peoples in Aotearoa New Zealand. It
has detailed both ancestral connecons as well as the more contemporary polical, mobility-related and
community connecons between Māori and Pacific peoples living here and foreshadowed some of the ‘big
picture’ policy issues which emerge by reason of these overlapping connecons.
We turn now to the demography of Pacific peoples and what this means for policy.
In Aotearoa New Zealand
The inial release of data from the 2023 Census of Populaon and Dwellings on 29 May 2024 recorded
887,493 people, who are usually resident in Aotearoa New Zealand, idenfying as Māori, an increase of
111,657 (14%) on the 2018 Census Māori populaon.
44
The comparable Census populaon idenfying with
cultural heritages and ancestral roots in the islands of Te Moana Nui a Kiwa – the Pacific peoples – is 442,632,
an increase of 60,990 (16%) on the 2018 Census populaon of Pacific peoples.
As noted earlier, there is significant overlap between these ethnic populaons because of inter-ethnic
relaonships and a long history of intermarriage. The combined populaons of Māori and Pacific peoples,
with ancestral connecons to places in Te Moana Nui a Kiwa, accounted for at least 25% of Aotearoa New
44
Stats NZ (2024) 2023 Census population counts (by ethnic group, age, and Māori descent) and dwelling counts. 29 May.
Accessible at: https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/2023-census-population-counts-by-ethnic-group-age-
and-maori-descent-and-dwelling-counts/
42 | P a g e
Zealand’s total populaon in 2023 and over 40% of the country’s children under 15 years of age. These are
significant shares of the country’s total populaon that will go on increasing during the 21st century
because of a mix of momentum-led growth (higher than average birth rates) and migraon-led growth
(more people coming into the country to stay for lengthy periods than leaving for overseas desnaons).
For good reason, then, Damon Salesa (2017, 7) is right to observe in the first sentence of his monograph
‘Island me; New Zealand’s Pacific Futures’ that,
as you read, Auckland and New Zealand are becoming more Pacific by the hour. This is not a change
visible at the airport, or at the docks, as it was when we the Pacific populaon grew through
migraon. … These days, the chief ports of entry for Pacific peoples are the country’ s maternity
wards.
45
Salesa also observes that while, as a populaon, Pacific peoples are unevenly distributed across Aoteraoa
New Zealand, the substanal growth in the Pacific populaon since the 1970s has led to fundamental change:
By 1976, the populaon had reached nearly 66,000. From this point on, New Zealand was becoming
demonstrably ‘Pacific’, but unevenly so. Effecvely, within New Zealand, there developed a kind of
Pacific archipelago - an archipelago made up of ‘islands’ (neighbourhoods, instuons and in some
cases suburbs) where Pacific islanders spent much of their lives. By sheer force of who they were, and
with an exuberant connecon to their idenes and cultures, Pacific people made these locaons
into unabashedly Pacific places.”
46
The emergence of – at least inially – mobility-driven Pacific places in Aotearoa New Zealand is important.
It has spurred the development of an increasing number of transnaonally distributed family groups. As
the report will go onto discuss, family now situated across naonal borders play an important role in
shaping current paerns of (im)mobility within the region and will do in a future in which the impacts of
climate change will likely increasingly feature as an important contributor to the movement of people into
and out of Aotearoa New Zealand during the next 30-50 years.
The research commissioned by MFAT to beer understand future climate migraon trends and the social and
economic impacts on New Zealand and Pacific Island countries the subject of this report, included a
substanal inquiry into populaon dynamics in the Pacific. It is therefore appropriate to set the scene with
some brief comments about the region’s populaon to get a sense of the scale of Pacific peoples in their
island homes and in their transnaonal communies in other countries.
The regional populaon
By 1 July 2024, the populaon of the 21 PICTs is projected to exceed 13 million for the first me, according
to the Pacific Community’s (SPC) Stascs Development Unit
47
. Just under 9.7 million (73%) of the region’s
13.2 million are esmated to be living in Papua New Guinea in 2024. The remaining 3.5 million (27%) are
distributed unevenly across the other 20 PICTs. Almost half of this total (48%; ~1.6m) is in two countries: Fiji
(907,400) and Solomon Islands (778,500) (Figure 1).
45
Salesa. D. (2017) Island Time: New Zealand’s Pacific Futures. Bridget Williams Books.
46
Idem. 10.
47
An estimated total population of 13,210,000. SPC (2024). Population. Statistics for Development Division. Website.
https://sdd.spc.int/topic/population.
43 | P a g e
Figure 1: Comparave populaons, Pacific countries, Aotearoa New Zealand, and Auckland: 2024 and 1950
The remaining 18 PICTs (none of which has a populaon over 350,000) share a populaon of 1.85 million
between them – only 150,000 more than the esmated total populaon of Auckland in 2024 (1.7m)
48
. To
put it another way, in July 2024 the combined populaons of the nine countries in Polynesia, the seven
countries of Micronesia and the two remaining Melanesian countries of New Caledonia and Vanuatu is not
much larger than Auckland’s current populaon (Figure 1).
Aotearoa New Zealand’s esmated populaon of 5.18 million in 2024
49
is equivalent to 59% of the 9.7 million
people SPC has projected for Papua New Guinea in 2024. Just under 75 years ago, in 1950, the total
populaons of Aotearoa New Zealand and Papua New Guinea were very similar (Figure 1). Papua New
Guinea’s esmated total in that year was 1.68 million - around 300,000 fewer than Aotearoa New Zealand’s
populaon of 1.92 in 1950 (Figure 1).
The total populaon of the 21 PICTs in 1950 (2.56 million) was around 33% larger that Aotearoa New
Zealand’s 1.92 million in that year. By 2024 the Pacific’s populaon (13.2 million) was more than double the
5.18 million in Aotearoa New Zealand, and by 2100 the United Naons Populaon Division’s medium variant
projecons have the Pacific’s total populaon (24.6 million) being four mes their projected total for
Aotearoa New Zealand (6.2 million) in that year (see Figure 2).
Projecons are rarely accurate predicons of actual populaons, especially over long periods, but the bars
in Figures 1 and 2 give useful indicaons of scale in the Pacific regional populaon and the populaon of
Aotearoa New Zealand between 1950 and 2100.
48
See World Population Review. World Population by Country 2024. Website. (live).
https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/auckland-population
49
See National population projections, by age and sex, 2022(base)-2073. Website.
https://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/wbos/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLECODE8610
44 | P a g e
Figure 2: Populaons of the Pacific and Aotearoa New Zealand:1950, 2024 and 2100
The excepon of Papua New Guinea
The reports on populaon dynamics in the Pacific place a lot of emphasis on the fact that summary stascs
of the region are very much determined by the parcular characteriscs of Papua New Guinea’s populaon.
This is demonstrated with regard to growth of the region’s populaon over the past 70 years and into the
future, to the key demographic processes that drive populaon growth (ferlity, mortality and migraon), to
the structure of populaons in terms of key age groups, and on the distribuon of the populaon in rural
selements and urban places.
When examining changes in the region’s populaon it is important to keep the overwhelming demographic
dominance of Papua New Guinea in mind.
50
To this end, the research has analysed populaon change with
reference to five clusters of countries. These are introduced in the secon on The Diverse Pacific. In these
clusters, Papua New Guinea is included with two neighbouring countries (Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) with
similar paerns of populaon growth and distribuon and comprises the western Pacific cluster. The other
18 PICTs are grouped into the four other clusters.
A disncve feature of the demography of countries in the western Pacific is the high percentage of peoples
living in rural selements (Figure 3). Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu all had 80% or more
of their naonal populaons living in rural selements in 2022 – effecvely the reverse of the situaon in
Aotearoa New Zealand where 87% of the populaon live in urban selements.
51
50
Bedford, R.D., Friesen, W. and Underhill-Sem, Y. (2023) Regional population dynamics and mobility trends in the Pacific.
See p13-16 for further comments on the impact of Papua New Guinea’s population on regional population change, 1950-
2050.
51
Unless otherwise stated, the data on characteristics of Pacific populations in this section and in the section on the
Diverse Pacific come from either the Pacific Community’s (SPC) Pacific Data Hub which can be accessed at:
https://pacificdata.org/data/dataset/population-projections-df-pop-proj, or population estimates and projections
produced for the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aairs (UNDESA) which can be accessed at:
https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/MostUsed/. Some of the strengths and limitations of these data
sources are discussed in Bedford, R.D., Burnett, R., Friesen, W., Newport, T., Ng Shiu, R. and Underhill-Sem, Y. (2023b)
Pacific population dynamics in the context of climate change. Momentum-led and migration-led population change in the
Pacific, 1950-2050: implications for Aotearoa in the context of climate change. Policy Brief 1. 4-10.
45 | P a g e
Figure 3: Percentages living in rural and urban areas, 2022
There is quite a different rural-urban distribuon of people in the other 18 PICTs with just over half of their
combined populaon living in local towns and cies. The 20% of the Pacific’s regional populaon living in
towns shown in Figure 3 thus gives a very unrepresentave picture of the level of urbanisaon in most of the
Pacific countries. They suggest a much higher dominance of rural populaons than is the case in the majority
of countries in the region.
Pacific-born populaons overseas
Pacific peoples have well-established tradions of mobility both within the islands that comprise the present
naon states and territories (all legacies of European colonisaon from the mid-eighteenth century) as well
as between PICTs and selected countries bordering the Pacific Ocean. The project’s research on the scale and
paerns of populaon movement are reviewed in later secons, but an overseas dimension to Pacific
populaons needs to be acknowledged in this scene-seng secon.
The Pacific populaons living in countries other than their country of birth, in and beyond the region,
comprised around 6% of all Pacific-born peoples around 2019, according to the databases compiled by the
United Naons Populaon Division and the World Bank.
52
While this sounds like a very small share, it is above
the global average for overseas-resident birthplace populaons (around 3.5%). The overseas dimension to
populaons in the region is both a crical dimension of many Pacific sociees and economies, as well as an
essenal component of the architecture of contemporary and future climate (im)mobility.
There are major variaons across the Pacific in their overseas populaons. These variaons reflect some
very different histories of colonisaon and decolonisaon in the region. For example, countries like Papua
New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in the western Pacific, where the great majority of Pacific peoples
live, had less than 1% of their total birthplace populaons living overseas around 2019. This compares with
just under 30% of the populaons born in countries in other parts of the region (Figure 4).
52
Unless otherwise stated, the data on populations born in the Pacific come from a database developed for the migration
analysis contained in Burson, B., Bedford, R.D. and Bedford, C.E. (2021) In the Same Canoe: Building the Case for a
Regional Harmonisation of Approaches to Humanitarian Entry and Stay in ‘Our Sea of Islands’. Geneva: Platform on
Disaster Displacement. See Appendix 2 in that report for details of the sources of the data.
46 | P a g e
Figure 4: In-country and overseas-resident populaons born in the PICTs, 2019
These differences, amongst others, are unpacked further with reference to five sub-regional clusters of PICTs,
one of which is the western Pacific cluster in Figure 4. Before moving to that analysis, three more scene-
seng topics need to be introduced: selements, hazard-scapes, and key policy anchors.
SETTLEMENTS
Selements as sites of exposure of populaon
At the naonal, and in some sengs, sub-naonal level, Pacific populaons are distributed across different
geographies in villages, towns and cies in different raos. Recognising geographic variability of selements
at the naonal, sub-naonal and, in parcular, the community-level is crical. It is at the intersecon of local
geography and hazards that the exposure of selements lies, and where the intergeneraonally
transmied knowledge and skills of the community of people inhabing them has been forged. This
relaonship is somemes expressed in terms of so called ‘hotspots’ (e.g., Campbell & Warrick, 2014).
In order the drive a more nuanced understanding of how changes in the local environment are being
experienced by communies and how this, in turn, may influence decisions around (im)mobility, the
University of Auckland’s report ‘Navigang vulnerability, connuing resilience’ helpfully groups the
community studies by their underlying geography and charts what the community indicated as the
environmental challenges faced (Figure 5).
47 | P a g e
Figure 5: Climate and environmental challenges by selement type
53
The geographic variability of selements mediates how hazards impact communies by influencing
experiences of land and/or marine food insecurity and biodiversity loss. The research indicates that, while
atolls and coastal communies face issues regarding marine-based protein sources, agriculture and livestock
are also impacted in large western Pacific countries. Further, while communies in selements on small atolls
rely heavily on fresh rainwater, in other selement types in other geographies rivers and wells are important
water sources.
54
Populaon distribuon and selement
Populaon distribuon is clearly relevant in the context of climate (im)mobility. Except for Papua New Guinea
the great majority of the Pacific’s rural and urban populaons live close to the coast. This is clearly reflected
in Figure 6. Other countries in the western Pacific, as well as Fiji, Samoa and Niue, have small shares of their
populaons living in inland locaons, unlike Papua New Guinea where the majority of the populaon live
more than 10 km from the coast. But when Papua New Guinea’s populaon is removed from the regional
total, the SPC’s database on locaons of selements indicates that 90% of the populaon in the other 20
PICTs live within 5 km of the coast and 14 of these countries have 100% in this category.
55
Figure 6: Proporons of Pacific populaons living within 1, 5 and 10 km of the coast
Source: Andrew et al. (2019, 7).
However, as the research clearly demonstrates, adjusng to changes in environments by populaons in rural
and urban locaons, whether near the coast or inland, has been part of daily life in Pacific communies for
centuries.
53
Adapted from Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024).
54
Ng Shiu, R., Newport, C., & Underhill-Sem, Y. (2024b). Pacific human security: Health, wellbeing and resilience. Waipapa Taumata
Rau, University of Auckland. 6 - citing Campbell and Warwick 2014 and Paeniu et al. 2016.
55
SPC’s data on coastal populations 1, 5 and 10 km from the coast can be accessed at: SPC (2021) Coastal Population in
Relative Frequency. Pacific Data Hub. Website.
https://stats.pacificdata.org/vis?lc=en&df[ds]=SPC2&df[id]=DF_POP_COAST&df[ag]=SPC&df[vs]=2.0&dq=..COASTALPOP
RF..&pd=2021%2C2021&ly[rw]=GEO_PICT&ly[cl]=RANGE&to[TIME_PERIOD]=false
48 | P a g e
Regionally, rates of urbanisaon differ by country and by cluster, and most urban centres in the region are on
or near the coast. These have experienced significant growth in recent decades, with the expectaon of
further increases by 2050 (Campbell 2022b). This is explored in more detail in secon ‘The Diverse Pacific’.
At the general level, understanding historical and projected trends in urbanisaon provides a window on a
parcular characterisc of internal migraon. More specifically, understanding urbanisaon is crical in the
context of climate change and disaster-related (im)mobility for three reasons.
First, the urban environment in all PICTs, except for the inland towns in Papua New Guinea, is a site of
exposure to specific coastal hazards, such as sea-level rise, storm surges and tsunamis.
Second, urban centres are oen one of the few places where non-customary land tenure arrangements and
governance structures exist to any significant degree.
This is not to say that alienated rural land (usually, to the government or the church) does not exist, nor that
customary land tenure is not a feature in Pacific urban environments. Typically, the two will coexist in differing
raos depending on the naonal and/or sub-naonal seng, with customary ownership of peri-urban land
being structural feature of Pacific naonal-scale land tenure arrangements.
56
Third, urban and peri-urban areas tend to be sites of informal selement which influences how hazards are
experienced by the inhabing communies/families and magnifies the impacts of disasters. Oen (but not
always as the community study of Lord Howe selement demonstrates)
57
informal selements become
situated on marginal land because this is where unseled public land is located.
Selements and tenure
Land and marine tenure
That land tenure and governance arrangements in the Pacific is a context in which climate change-related
(im)mobility is well reflected in the literature. As Fitzgerald observes, “land tenure systems determine who
can use what resources, for how long, and under what condions.”
58
Land tenure is not to be confused with
security of tenure. While oen overlapping, persons without formal tenure over the land where they reside
may nevertheless have some degree of security of tenure, of which a formal lease is the paradigm example.
So too with persons living in informal selements. A degree of perceived security of tenure may exist for a
number of reasons including, “community governance mechanisms that underpin access to land through
family/lineage and other connecons”
59
.
That said, there are significant issues relang to access to land for alternave places of residence in the face
of damage to environments caused by climate change in all countries. Talanoa conducted in Tonga and Samoa
revealed many points relang to customary land tenure systems in the two countries and the opons these
offer for families to move, with land availability being raised as a parcularly pressing issue in Tonga. The
talanoa also revealed some important innovave steps such as land swaps being undertaken in Tonga to
reduce such barriers to mobility.
60
56
Fitzpatrick D. (2022). Research Brief on Land Tenure and Climate Mobility in the Pacific Region, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
57
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., & Galokale, K. (2024h). Lord Howe Settlement: A community case study from The
Solomon Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
58
Fitzpatrick D. (2022). 2
59
Idem. 9 citing Orcherton et al. (2017).
60
, Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 17; Morrison, S. et al. (2024b). 16
49 | P a g e
The research underpinning this report builds on these understandings. Significantly, the research makes clear
it is not only important to consider land tenure; marine tenure is important too.
When it comes to marine resource, the reefs is like our second garden and it is a shared resource
among nearby communies. (Ambu, Solomon Islands)
61
Both Land and Sea are very important for us. Land is mostly important for us, where we can build
our homes and used for household gardening. It gives us home as well as the surrounding
environment keeps us stable and, contributes to our survival. For the sea, this is where we fish for
our food and some of us for income. The sea provides its resources to us to ulise in a way that we
can all benefit from it. (St. John (Beo) Kiriba)
62
Only land has boundary, and everyone knows boundary. So far, we are glad that there have been no
conflict over fishing grounds. (Takaeang, Aranuka, Kiriba)
63
Those residing in places where they enjoy no tenure over the land where they live will connue to enjoy
community-derived tenure over marine resources which allows them to remain in place (voluntarily
immobile) and engage in everyday acvies generang income. This is reflected by one research parcipant:
“We don’t have land here, but we do have the sea. And when we are here we can get money every
day.” (Pa’atangata selement, Tonga)
64
Marine tenure influences the current scale and paerns of (im)mobility. The research emphasises how the
shared and secure tenure of the marine territory provides addional food security allowing
households/communies to choose to stay in place. As the University of Auckland observe:
The diverse tenure, use, and governance systems in Pacific communies are a blend of
tradional/indigenous approaches, state-imposed structures, and in-situ community pracces.
Understanding these systems and pracces are crucial to gauge the scale and paerns of climate-
induced mobility for diverse Pacific communies. For example, decisions to move away from coastal
areas or remain in place involves considering how to maintain stewardship of resources, fulfil
obligaons to prevent overfishing or over harvesng, and protect burial grounds, ground water
sources and marine resources.
65
THE HAZARD-SCAPE
Impacts not hazards per se as the focus
Reviewing the literature, Bryar and Westbury (2023) draw parcular aenon to the shortcomings of
approaches which make expansive claims about limits on opportunies for adaptaon based on predicted
ecological or physical loss drawn from climate modelling. They note that the dynamic nature of the climate
61
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., Galokale, K. & Futaiasi, D. (2024e). Ambu, Malaita Province: A community case study from
The Solomon Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland
62
Ng Shiu, R., Newport, C., Underhill-Sem, Y. & Burnett, R., (2024c). St. John, Betio: A community case study from Kiribati. Waipapa
Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
63
Ng Shiu, R., Newport, C., Underhill-Sem, Y. & Burnett, R. (2024d). Takaeang, Aranuka: A community case study from Kiribati. Waipapa
Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
64
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b).
65
Newport, C., Underhill-Sem, Y., & Ng Shiu, R. (2024b) Community land and marine tenure. Waipapa Taumata Rau,
University of Auckland.
50 | P a g e
system cloaks adaptaon with an inherent uncertainty. An over-emphasis on scienfically predicted
ecological limits tends to undervalue the adapve capacies of individuals and communies. This, they
argue, shapes the framing of discussions around mobility (citaons omied):
Such claims about the inevitable impacts of ecological limits raise a crical point of contenon in
the context of limits to adaptaon in the Pacific. For example, based on scienfically predicted
ecological limits, the predominant internaonal policy and media discourse on the low lying states is
that they will inevitably be submerged due to sea level rise ... . Within this discourse, relocaon and
migraon appear as the most, if not only, plausible adapon response, rather than as a failure of
adaptaon.
66
They champion an alternave framing to adaptaon, namely one “that draws aenon to social limits to
adaptaon based on the socially determined nature of limits that emerge at points where adaptaon fails to
protect the things that stakeholders value most.”
67
While the research challenges the noon that migraon and relocaon at the household level is best
characterised as a ‘failure’ of adaptaon in all circumstances, the cauon sounded as regards the need to
properly weigh the capacity within communies to innovate and update tradional pracce – to adapt to
protect the things they value most – is important when considering (im)mobility in the context of climate
change. It is not the underlying hazard or physical change in the environment which shapes, and will shape,
the scale and paern of (im)mobility but rather the impacts of those changes on the lives and livelihoods of
individuals, households and communies. It is how these impacts shape percepons of risk and loss, and
opportunity, that will influence decisions to stay in place or, if both willing and able, to move elsewhere
temporarily or on more long-term basis. For this reason, this report, and the research on which it draws, is
not focussed on hazards per se but more the impacts of hazards on the land and marine environment and
ecosystems from which Pacific peoples derive their identy and intrinsic sense of human ‘being’ and
livelihoods.
Nevertheless, the research makes it abundantly clear that hazards are a context shaping current and future
(im)mobility. The force exerted by ancipated future impacts of climate change-related hazards on people in
Samoa and Tonga, and how this may shape (im)mobility, is vividly explored in the University of Waikato’s
‘visions’ and scenario building exercise.
68
We address these aspects of the research in the secons dealing
with current and future (im)mobility.
Although this report has been prepared under an Acon Plan centred on concern with the impacts of climate
change, the Pacific hazard-scape comprises weather, climate-related and geophysical hazards. The laer,
popularly characterised as the Pacific Ring of Fire, are not simply volcanic in nature, but include land and sub-
marine earthquakes. Sub-marine earthquakes and island volcanic erupons can also produce devastang
tsunamis, such as occurred in Samoa in 2009 and Tonga in 2022. The research demonstrates how each event
has had significant effect on mobility in these countries, as well as influencing percepons of future risk.
Interesngly, a survey undertaken by the University of Waikato revealed that 38% of the 305 survey
parcipants believed that climate change impacts tsunami and volcanic erupon frequency. The important
66
Bryar, T. and Westbury T. (2023). The Limits to Adaptation in the Context of Climate Security in the Pacific. International Organization
for Migration (IOM), Republic of the Marshall Islands. 35pp. p.11. At hps://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/documents/2023-
06/limits-to-adaptaiton-in-the-context-of-the-pacific-2023.pdf
67
Ibid.
68
Vaioleti, L., Vaioleti, T. and Morrison, S. (2023c) The visions. Eight visions of the future. University of Waikato, and Vaioleti, L., et al.
(2023d).
51 | P a g e
point here is not the misconcepon itself, but how such misconcepon shapes a percepon of future risk
and plans for future mobility.
69
This broader approach to hazards and (im)mobility is thus warranted and sets the research approach apart
from other assessments of future (im)mobility in the Pacific which oen focus on climate- and weather-
related hazards. For example, the World Bank’s 2021 report Groundswell Part II. Acng on Internal Climate
migraon features a chapter on SIDS
70
, but there are no projecons of ‘internal climate migraon’. This is
because the modelling employed used 14-kilometre grid cells, which “are not easily applicable to small
islands.”
71
This limitaon aside, the report does go on to discuss the Pacific and other SIDS. While the report
references displacement in Samoa following the 2009 tsunami and in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea
following volcanic erupons there in 2009 and 2004, respecvely,
72
the focus of the report is overwhelmingly
on the impacts of climate change only.
None of this is to say that climate change is not an important factor shaping the scale and paern of current
and future (im)mobility in the region. The contribuons by Working Groups I and II to the IPCC’s Sixth
Assessment Report is very clear that there is a greater than 50% likelihood that global warming will reach or
exceed 1.5°C by 2040, even for the very low greenhouse gas emissions scenario.
73
That there is now more
than a 50% chance that this temperature threshold will be consistently exceeded within the next decade or
two is a significant development in the Pacific hazard-scape , especially for the PICTs comprised enrely of
coral atolls and reef islands.
As for impacts, in a diagram summarising the observed impacts of climate change on ecosystems and human
systems, the IPCC report that the global group Small Islands score “high or very high levels of confidence in
aribuon of changes to climate change” in all of the ecosystem and species range categories listed.
74
In the
case of human systems, Small Islands is one of the few clusters of countries to score “high or medium levels
of confidence in increasing adverse impacts of climate change” on most of the categories relang to water
security, food producon, health and wellbeing and disrupon to cies, selements and infrastructure.
As will be discussed, the impacts of climate change on water and food insecurity at the community and
household level is one of three interdependent factors that will shape the future scale and paern of
(im)mobility in the region.
Different hazards, same community
It is now recognised that there is a relaonship between sudden-onset weather-related hazards, such as
cyclones and storm surges, and more slow-onset hazards/processes such as, sea-surface temperature
increase and sea-level rise. However, in the specific context of Pacific (im)mobility, it is also important to
understand that climate-related hazards intersect with geophysical hazards and do so in different ways. For
example, land subsidence in Western Samoa linked to the rebounding of the earth’s crust following an
earthquake and tsunami in 2009 is accelerang the impacts of sea-level rise, which is rising four mes faster
69
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b). 12
70
Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
71
Clement, V., Rigaud, K. K., de Sherbinin, A. et al. (2021). Groundswell Part 2: Acting on Internal Climate Migration. World Bank,
Washington, DC. 217.
72
Idem. 230.
73
Portner, H.-O., et al. (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptaon and Vulnerability, IPCC Sixth Assessment
Report. 8. hps://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/
74
Idem. 10.
52 | P a g e
than the global average.
75
This demonstrates how different hazards may intersect and shape long-term
paerns of exposure of a community.
By way of contrast, the studies on communies relocated following geophysical hazards highlight how this
may magnify impacts. In Papua New Guinea, in the aermath of a volcanic erupon in 1994, which displaced
approximately 80,000 people, many people living in Matupit Island at the me were reseled on upland
government lands 50 kilometres away. The community indicated that climate change has brought notable
increases in sea and land temperatures and increased the already elevated level of soil acidity arising from
the erupon. This, the community reports, has resulted in low food crop producon, reduced fish supplies,
and fewer food staples.
76
Similarly, the community in Aruligo, which is inhabited by the descendants of persons relocated by the
Solomon Islands government in 1977 aer an earthquake stuck the coastal villages, reported challenges due
to unpredictable weather paerns. Previously able to predict the weather and plan their gardening and
fishing acvies accordingly, today members of this community no longer see specific seasons for rain or
drought.
These examples indicate clearly that increasing variability in the weather is affecng tradional gardening
and fishing pracces in some communies long aer they were relocated because of the impacts of
geophysical hazards.
77
Hazards and data gaps
Another MFAT funded project, led by NIWA, aims to provide a naonal and sub-naonal overview to guide
communies and officials as to existence, or not, of different types, of climate-related hazards and the level
of detail, and relevant data sets typically used in assessing risk/vulnerability to these climate-related hazards.
The climate hazards include: drought, extreme winds, river (fluvial) flooding, rainfall (pluvial) flooding, coastal
inundaon, shoreline and delta change, heatwaves, landslide, soil erosion and ocean temperature and
acidificaon.
78
At the date of this report, the analysis by NIWA is not available. Given much hazard data understandably sits
at Ministry level, we do not know the nature and extent of data gaps. However, perhaps signalling a bias
towards certain types of hazard data in the public-facing mapping is useful. What tends to be most referenced
in Pacific-focussed mobility-studies is how many people live in certain distance of the coast, and thus are
more differenally exposed to sea-level rise, storm surges and coastal erosion, rather than those who live
along riverbank who are exposed to fluvial flooding, or those who live within a likely pyroclasc flow path.
The focus on a broader range of hazards is a posive development given exposure to hazards other than
those affecng coastal selement populaons is a factor influencing both current and future scales and
paerns of mobility. To the extent that this analysis reveals gaps in mapping in relaon to hazard type,
country and/or scale, it is imperave that such data gaps are addressed. This means that technical agencies
such as NIWA ought to connue to collaborate in partnership with Pacific countries, as well as regional
organisaons, such as SPC, to generate baseline data (where needed) and updang data on more hazards
and with greater granularity.
75
Cartier, K. M.S. (2024) “American Samoa’s sinking land speeds up sea level rise”. Samoa News (4 February 2024). At
https://www.samoanews.com/local-news/american-samoas-sinking-land-speeds-sea-level-rise Accessed 11 April 2024.
76
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., Galokale, K., & Litau, J. (2024d). Matupit: A community case study from Papua New
Guinea. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland. 5-6.
77
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., Galokale, K. & Futaiasi, D. (2024f). Aruligo: A community case study from The Solomon
Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland..
78
See NIWA (n.d).Pacific Risk Tool for Resilience, Phase 2. Website. https://niwa.co.nz/pacific/pacific-risk-tool-resilience-phase-2-
partner-2#approach. Accessed 30 April 2024
53 | P a g e
This, in turn, needs to be made accessible to communies. This should include specific efforts to improve
understandability and relevance to specific communies/island groups.
REGIONAL POLICY ANCHORS
Te Moana nui a Kiwa
The most fundamental policy anchor is the Pacific itself – Te Moana nui a Kiwa. What Epeli Hau’ofa’s (1993;
8) famous descripon of the Pacific as a ‘sea of islands’ signifies for (im)mobility-related policy is the noon
of an ever-present ebb and flow, of circulaon, like the sea itself in the ancestral past, the present and into
the future. It also speaks to the ocean as a connector of peoples, a pathway by which vibrant and dynamic
relaonships to peoples, to places, have been developed and maintained.
79
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that a report interrogang the policy implicaons of current and future
(im)mobility in the very modern context of climate change should come to centre on noons of circulaon
and relaonality as expressed through relaonships to people and place including to new places across the
Pacific ocean – the “single common heritage” of all Pacific peoples (Hau’ofa 1997; 54).
The Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility/2050 Strategy for the Blue
Pacific Connent
The endorsement by Pacific Island Forum Leaders in late 2023 of the of Pacific Regional Framework on
Climate Mobility,
80
– the development of which was supported by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade – signals unequivocal recognion by Pacific leaders that (im)mobility in context of disasters
and climate change is an issue of regional significance.
81
At the naonal level, the extent to which climate change -related mobility has been integrated into
development planning and sectoral policies in PICTs is variable. Some aspects such as the need to relocate
vulnerable communies or migraon as an adaptaon strategy are acknowledged, but unevenly so (Voight-
Graff, 2022).
In the Framework, Pacific Islands Forum Leaders specify a range of commitments in relaon to staying in
place and the various forms of mobility. These commitments relate to many of the themes which have
emerged from the research, including recognion of the importance of preserving biodiversity and the land
and marine environment to enable Pacific communies to remain in place;
82
the need to strengthen
79
The centrality of the ocean to Pacific peoples’ identity is explored in depth the Pacific Oceans Climate Change
Assessment (forthcoming 2024). University of Canterbury and University of the South Pacific.
80
Forum Secretariat (n.d.) Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility.
81
This development sits within an emerging trend towards regionalisation at the global level. It sits alongside other regional
processes reflecting increased recognition that (im)mobility requires an integrated response involving dialogue and
cooperation between States. In July 2022, 15 African Member States signed the Kampala Ministerial Declaration on
Migration, Environment and Climate Change (UNCC, 2022). In November the First Regional Conference on Human
Mobility and Climate Change in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) Ministerial Declaration was also agreed in 2023 by seven governments (IOM, 2023).
82
Para 22.2.
54 | P a g e
collaboraon in relaon cross-border movement undertaken as adaptaon to climate change;
83
and the
need to engage with diaspora communies.
84
Importantly, this Framework sits alongside and supports the strategic pathway in the 2050 Strategy for the
Blue Pacific Connent to “[e]nsure the protecon and pracce of the rights, cultural values and heritage and
tradional knowledge of Pacific peoples in global and regional protocols for climate and disaster risk
reducon, and mobility including relocaon, migraon, and displacement”.
85
This strategic pathway
recognises that understanding both current and future (im)mobility is important across a range of policy
contexts. These contexts include the issues around statehood and the protecon of persons, disaster risk
reducon and sustainable development and loss and damage. There are important policy anchors for each.
The Pacific Declaraon on the Connuity of Statehood and the Protecon of
Persons in the face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise
In 2023, the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders expressed a regional posion on statehood and protecon of
persons in the context of sea-level rise when they adopted the Pacific Declaraon on the Connuity of
Statehood and the Protecon of Persons in the face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise.
86
The issue of sovereignty has emerged in the research. In the future scenario workshops in Tonga and Samoa,
in some of the engagements with Māori leaders, as well as through the outcomes of future visualisaons run
in Tonga and Samoa, future sovereignty-related risks – to legal sovereignty, economic control and identy
were raised. Disnguished Professor, Linda Tuhiwai Smith CNZM remarked:
What does it mean for the Pacific when they move their existence elsewhere? If they vacate the
Pacific, some other people or state will fill the space… How will they keep their … sovereignty if their
islands are no longer above sea level?
87
As we have noted in the ‘Pacific Peoples’ secon, a significant characterisc of populaons in the Pacific
context is the existence of transnaonally distributed populaons. Mobility and immobility have and will
coexist. Understanding the scale and paern of such distribuon, as well as the impacts, is crical for
discussions around both statehood and the protecon of persons.
As to statehood, discussions oen centre on loss of territory and habitability. That populaon is also a
commonly recognised criterion of statehood tends to be overlooked. This means that (im)mobility as a factor
shaping populaon over the long-term is not understood and factored into policy. It is clear that having
transnaonally distributed populaons is not of itself problemac for ongoing statehood. Over me,
migraon has caused fundamental shis in the distribuon of the populaon. Yet, even when this has
resulted in a decline in the resident populaon of a country of origin compared to what would have otherwise
existed had people not moved and give birth abroad, this has not counted against the country connuing to
exist as a State.
Take, for example, PICTs with relavely high rates of out-migraon, such as Tonga and Samoa. The University
of Waikato’s report Recent shis, future signals notes
83
Para 32.1.
84
Para 42.2.
85
Pacific Islands Forum (2022). 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent Available at.
86
Available https://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2024-
02/2023%20PIF%20Declaration%20on%20Statehood%20and%20Protections%20of%20Persons.pdf accessed 15 April 2024.
87
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 59.
55 | P a g e
that, according to the Samoa Bureau of Stascs, in the 2021 Census, Samoa counted 205,557 people, an
increase of 9,578 persons from the 2016 census.
88
According to Stascs New Zealand, the 2018 New Zealand
census counted 182,721 people who idenfied as being Samoan, a significant increase from the 131,103
recorded in the 2006 census.
89
As of 2018, approximately 45% had lived in New Zealand for 20 years or more.
90
Similarly, the 2018 New
Zealand census counted 82,389 people who idenfied as Tongan, an increase from 50,478 in the 2006 census.
91
As with the Samoan populaon in New Zealand, approximately 45% had lived in New Zealand for 20 years
or more, with an increasing proporon of those born in New Zealand, compared to the 2006 census. What
is important for present purposes is that, but for migraon, a large part of this New Zealand populaon would
form part of the populaons of Samoa and Tonga. The emergence over me of a distributed populaon
outside the territory of Samoa and Tonga as an ongoing expression of a mobility-oriented Pacific idenfy has
not, however, called into queson the existence of Samoa or Tonga as States in their own right.
92
This demonstrates that the populaon criterion for statehood under internaonal law is neutral not to just
populaon size (Crawford 2012, 478), but also distribuon. Supporng transnaonally distributed
populaons to circulate between ‘place’ throughout their lives and over the long-term will support the
connued presence of a populaon on a PICT and bolster claims to connuing statehood regardless of
change in the rao of land territory to marine area due to sea-level rise. This is not new; New Zealand has
been supporng and/or facilitang the circulaon of persons from Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau for
some me.
As regards the protecon of persons, there is an increasingly recognised link between climate change impacts
and the protecon of human rights. Regionally, this is oen expressed in terms of the economic, social,
cultural wellbeing of Pacific peoples to which human rights undoubtedly relate.
93
Indeed, the concept of
‘protecon’ – a core human rights obligaon – features as ‘priority acon’ under Goal 1 of the Framework
for Resilient Development in the Pacific.
94
The point to bear in mind here is that (im)mobility will determine which State has the primary responsibility
to ‘protect’ enjoyment of rights through policy. This is because it is the decision to stay or go will bring an
individual or a family under the jurisdicon of one or another country. The scale and paern of current and
88
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023a) and Samoa Bureau of Statistics (2023). Census. Website. https://www.sbs.gov.ws/census/ Accessed 25 April
2024
89
Statistics New Zealand 2018 Census: Samoan ethnic group. Website. https://www.stats.govt.nz/tools/2018-census-ethnic-group-
summaries/samoan Accessed 25 April 2024
90
Ibid.
91
Statistics New Zealand 2018 Census: Tongan ethnic group at: https://www.stats.govt.nz/tools/2018-census-ethnic-group-
summaries/tongan accessed 25 April 2024.
92
So too with New Zealand, which has for decades experienced significant levels of out-migration to Australia.
93
See, the Niue Declaration on Climate Change (2008) https://forumsec.org/publications/niue-declaration-climate-change ;Suva
Declaration on Climate Change (2015) at para. 7 https://pidf.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Suva-declaration-on-climate-change.pdf
; the Funafuti Declaration on Climate Change (2016)
https://www.mfed.gov.ki/sites/default/files/Funafuti%20Declaration%20Signed%208%20Oct%202016.pdf; Boe Declaration on
Regional Security (2018) at para. 7.1; Leaders’ Commitment iv in PIF (2022) 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.10:
“To secure the wellbeing of our people, we will work together to strengthen national and regional eorts to ensure all Pacific peoples
benefit from enhanced provision of education, health and other services. To achieve this, we will place emphasis on learning
from each other, drawing on scientifically-based research and traditional knowledge as well as promoting human rights,
gender equality and the empowerment of all people.” https://pacificsecurity.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Boe-
Declaration-on-Regional-Security.pdf
94
FRDP, Goal 1 refers to ‘Strengthened Integrated Adaptation and Risk Reduction to Enhance Resilience to Climate Change and
Disasters’ and Priority action i(p) references the need to:
Integrate human mobility aspects, where appropriate, including strengthening the capacity of governments and administrations to
protect individuals and communities that are vulnerable to climate change and disaster displacement and migration ...
https://www.resilientpacific.org/en/framework-resilient-development-pacific
56 | P a g e
future (im)mobility will give rise to an amalgam of co-exisng obligaons of one or more PICTs to protect
the safety and wellbeing of Pacific peoples affected by climate change, and place a premium of cooperaon
between PICTs (Burson, Kälin and McAdam 2021; Internaonal law Associaon 2024).
Disaster risk reducon and sustainable development
The effecve implementaon of the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reducon 2015-2030 (“the Sendai
Framework’) is fundamental to the realisaon of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development since
sustainable development cannot be accomplished as long as disasters connue to undermine economic
growth and social progress (UNDRR, 2016).
Human mobility is core concern of the Sendai Framework. Target B sets a goal of substanally reducing the
number of persons affected globally by disasters by 2030. Included in the definion of persons affected are
those who are “displaced, evacuated or relocated.” While it may be necessary to temporarily flee from home
to be safe from a hazard, displacement can have significant adverse humanitarian impacts and the individual,
household and community levels, parcularly if it becomes protracted. Well-designed an implemented
disaster risk reducon acvies are therefore crical to averng or minimising displacement and associated
adverse impacts (UNDRR, PDD NRC, 2019).
2023 was the midpoint in the implementaon of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris
Climate Agreement, and the Sendai Framework. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) held a midterm review
of the Implementaon of the Sendai Framework. The resulng report notes “significant progress “ at the
regional level towards integraon between climate adaptaon and DRR policy and in the development of
policies and plans in Pacific countries. However, the report notes two areas where more work is needed.
First, to translate policy into pracce and enhance the implementaon of DRR-relevant policies at the local
level. Second, to increase and simplify access to finance to implement DRR policy which “connues to remain
a lengthy and complex challenge for most Pacific countries.”
95
The research findings highlight the importance both. It is at the local level where everyday resilience is
pracced and where decisions are made for some or all family members to stay/and or to move. While
remiances remain the most proximate form of climate adaptaon and DRR financing at the household level,
this must be supported by scaled-up financing from climate adaptaon funding mechanisms including
funding for supporng migraon and relocaon as forms of climate change adaptaon.
The report also highlights capacity constraints. While a substanal number of instuons supported the
review process through consultaons, interviews, surveys, and focus group discussions, only Tuvalu and
Kiriba provided voluntary naonal reports.
96
Kiriba’s report records the significant steps being taken at the naonal level to reduce disaster risk, but also
the challenges it faces, including in relaon to data gathering. The linkage between mobility and tension also
emerges from the report which recognises displacement as factor affecng social stability.
97
Similarly,
Tuvalu’s report notes both the great strides taken to address disaster risk, but also the challenges it faces.
Urbanisaon and overcrowding due to rural-urban migraon are specifically noted by Tuvalu as contextual
factors shaping disaster risk in the period 2015-2022. As with Kiriba, that data gaps has prevented
95
UNDRR (2023a), Midterm Review of Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: 2015-2030 Pacific Regional Synthesis Report. 9.
96
New Zealand and Australia also provided reports. See New Zealand: Voluntary National Report of the MTR SF
https://sendaiframework-mtr.undrr.org/publication/new-zealand-voluntary-national-report-mtr-sf and ; Australia: Voluntary National
Report of the MTR SF; https://sendaiframework-mtr.undrr.org/2023/mtr-sf-submissions-and-reports#voluntary (29 February 2024)
97
UNDRR (2023c), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: Midterm Review Report by the Republic of Kiribati, p26.
https://sendaiframework-mtr.undrr.org/publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-midterm-review-report-republic-kiribati
57 | P a g e
substanal analysis is expressly recognised as factor liming Tuvalu’s progress towards Sendai Framework
Target B.
98
That addressing displacement cannot be divorced from sustainable development is one of the key messages
emerging from the February 2021 Pacific regional consultaon meeng which fed into the work of the United
Naons Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement. Fourteen PICTs parcipated. Ten
delivered country statements highlighng best pracces to avert, address and resolve internal displacement
in the context of climate change and disasters. The meeng also highlighted the need for physical, emoonal
and psychological support to assist in the movement of communies or individuals, the need for informed
local actors and increased training to provide this support.
99
The economic and social consequences of protracted displacement compromise a country’s ability to achieve
its overall development goals.
100
Avoiding situaons of protracted displacement as part of a wider disaster
risk management strategy which reduces risk and supports both individuals and communies to quickly and
effecvely recover from disasters, produces a range of ‘resilience dividends’. In the short-term it avoids losses,
during the medium-term it smulates economic acvity due to decreased disaster risk, while over the long-
term disaster management investments can produce development co-benefits which, like the medium-term
gains, can materialise even in the absence of a disaster.
101
Such long-term planning is evident from the research. The research noted ongoing efforts in Samoa for a
Cross Island Road. This is seen as possible ‘climate infrastructure’ as, on compleon, it will provide beer
connecons inland and across the island, potenally allowing for easier retreat and relocaon inland. Also
noted in Samoa was an upstream dam project to manage flood risks with associated development gains
including for renewable energy generaon.
102
Loss and Damage
The relaonship between forms of human mobility and loss and damage is gaining much aenon at the
global level, in terms of instuonal arrangements and research.
At the instuonal level, the internaonal community agreed at COP 28 in 2023 to not only operaonalise
the UNFCCC Loss and Damage Fund but also to include within its scope “displacement, migraon and
relocaon”.
103
At the technical and research level, in 2023, the State-led Plaorm on Disaster Displacement
in collaboraon with the Loss and Damage Collaboraon (L&DC) jointly developed a submission to contribute
to the work of the Expert Group on Non-Economic Losses of the Execuve Commiee of the Warsaw
98
UNDRR (2023d), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: Midterm Review Report by the Government of Tuvalu.
https://sendaiframework-mtr.undrr.org/publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-midterm-review-report-government-
tuvalu
99
See Executive Summary, Pacific Regional Consultation on Internal Displacement:
Pacific perspectives and practices on climate change and disaster displacement At https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-
panel/sites/www.un.org.internal-displacement-
panel/files/record_of_discussions_hlp_internal_displacement_pacific_consultation_final.pdf < accessed 17 March 2024).
100
UNDRR (2018) Disaster Displacement: How To Reduce Risk, Address Impacts And Strengthen Resilience ,Words Into Action, p21. At:
https://www.preventionweb.net/files/58821_wiadisasterdisplacement190511webeng.pdf
101
ODI, GFDRR and the World Bank (2015) The Triple Dividend of Resilience Realising Development Goals Through the Multiple Benefits
of Disaster Risk Management, p14. Available At:
https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/The_Triple_Dividend_of_Resilience.pdf Accessed 15 April 2024.
102
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 78, 89.
103
Decision -/CP.28 -/CMA.5 Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage
referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4 , Annex 1 Part II, paragraphs 6 and 9, Available at
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma5_auv_10g_LnDfunding.pdf Accessed 15 April 2024.
58 | P a g e
Internaonal Mechanism (PDD 2023).
104
The submission draws from a variety of sources and background
material and emphasises a number of key policy and operaonal issues including the need to address
persisng data and knowledge gaps, the need to avoid a strict dichotomy and see the interconnecons
between economic and non-economic losses, the need to look at and address specific condions of
vulnerability, and the need for integrated policy and operaonal approaches.
The Pacific Regional Climate Mobility Framework recognises that “movement away from home can result
from, be a form of, and cause loss and damage of an economic and non-economic nature”. It also recognises
that loss and damage can occur even when staying in place, as climate change impacts “may threaten our
customary pracces and tradions”.
105
This is reflected in the research.
106
For example, in the Cook Islands, a research parcipant shared the
following concern:
We will lose the essence of every pracce that we have that is based on the oile (village) - tawa,
yolonga, wua and pule. With the loss of everything that is related to our identy and who we are,
we will be lost. (Pukapuka, Cook Islands)
107
The research also demonstrates that understanding loss and damage is crical to understanding not just
the impacts of disasters and climate change but also the scale and paern of (im)mobility as it is
percepons of risk and loss – loss of relaonships to people, to place (in its broader sense) – which will
inform decision-making around whether, when and where to move.
For example, research parcipants in Tonga and Samoa shared the following:
108
The land is geng smaller and smaller… I’m fearful when I’m here – the sea is on both sides, I see
erosion on both sides… the fear has been there since before the tsunami, there’s nowhere to escape,
nowhere to run… I’m geng too old to run!” (Ha’apai, Tonga)
Forgive me, I feel I need to explain my responses. Though I’ve said I have not moved and do not plan
to move, it is because I cannot move, not because I don’t realise the risk of living [in Pa’atangata]. I
do not have the [financial] means to move, but I am also the eldest in the family. I need to stay to
look aer my parents, as well as my younger siblings who are not married. (Pa’atangata, Tonga)
There is just me and mum but everyone else is away... my siblings, I hope they come back and stay
at the house and look aer the land… that’s the hope but they are doing well and they are well
established [overseas]. ( Lelata, Samoa)
THE DIVERSE PACIFIC
In the previous secon the disncve place that Papua New Guinea has in any assessment of the region’s
populaon history and development was given prominence. In this secon the diversity in Pacific populaons
104
The submission is available at https://www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/publication/pdd-and-l-dcsubmission-toinform-the-
unfcccs-non-economic-losses-nels-technical-paper-2023-human-mobility-and-non-economic-loss-and-damage Acceed 15 April
2024.
105
See Climate Mobility Framework, at paragraphs 4 and 18.
106
We will deal with the evidence gahtered by the research teams in terms of loss and damage in the section on current
(im)mobility.
107
Newport, C. et al. (2024d).
108
Vaioleti, L et al. (2024).
59 | P a g e
is given priority, drawing on various reports addressing aspects of populaon change at the regional and
naonal scales.
109
The regional assessment of Pacific populaons grouped the 21 PICTs (including Papua New Guinea) into five
clusters based on several dimensions of their recent and future demographic development, including the
access that their populaons have to temporary and long-term residence in countries within as well as
outside the region – access that is crically important in the context of climate (im)mobility. Also informing
the discussion of internaonal migraon in the Pacific in this secon are two earlier reports which have direct
relevance for the assessment of climate (im)mobility.
110
These reports are introduced briefly before outlining
some key characteriscs of the populaons in the five clusters that have relevance for contemporary as well
as future climate (im)mobility.
The regional architecture of contemporary Pacific mobility
It has already been noted that there are two dimensions to Pacific populaons: the in-country populaons
and their populaons that are living overseas. The relave importance of these populaons in the different
PICTs varies significantly. This variaon is due, in large measure, to a legacy of colonialism: the imposion of
a system of boundaries (invisible lines) between countries and territories and the emergence of naonal
policies to regulate flows of people across these boundaries. A key outcome of this legacy has been some
major differences in both the scale and paern of internaonal migraon and its impact on the development
of transnaonal Pacific populaons.
First, Burson and Bedford (2013) demonstrate how cizens of parcular groups of countries (clusters) have
privileged access to temporary visas for work or study as well as to long-term residence visas either in a
parcular country (hub) in the cluster, or in the various countries that comprise the cluster. Figure 7 shows
the distribuon of three major “clusters” and “hubs” in the Pacific that owe their origins to a century or more
of European colonisaon of the region.
In Figure 7, the Pacific countries north of the equator plus American Samoa (the cluster) have privileged
access to work and residence in the USA (the hub). In the Pacific colonies of France (French Polynesia, New
Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna) the indigenous populaons have privileged access to French cizenship.
The countries in the largest cluster encompass the current and former members of the Realm of Aotearoa
New Zealand in Polynesia (Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau) as well as Fiji, Kiriba, Papua New Guinea,
Nauru, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. All have a range of access arrangements regarding entry
to New Zealand, either on the basis of cizenship, or through specific visa categories for residence (Pacific
Access Category) or temporary work (the RSE scheme).
109
The relevant reports are:
Bedford, R.D. et al. (2023a); Bedford, R.D. et al. (2023b); Friesen, W. Bedford, R.D and Underhill-Sem, Y. (2023) Country
reports on population dynamics in the Pacific, 1950-2020. University of Auckland.; Vaioleti, L., Vaioleti, T. and Morrison, S.
(2023a) Recent shifts, future signals. Painting a picture of Tonga/ns and Samoa/ns 2050. University of Waikato.; Vaioleti, L.
et al. (2024); and Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024)
110
The relevant reports are:
Burson, B. and Bedford, R.D. (2013) Clusters and Hubs: Toward a Regional Architecture for Voluntary Adaptive Migration in the Pacific.
Geneva: The Nansen Initiative: Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement.
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274254810_Clusters_and_Hubs_Towards_a_Regional_Architecture_for_Voluntary_Adaptive
_Migration_in_the_Pacific?ev=prf_pub); and Burson, B. et al. (2021).
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Figure 7: Established populaon mobility clusters and hubs in the Pacific
Source: Burson and Bedford (2013). 27.
Second, in Burson et al. (2021) the cluster-hub model is explored further in reference to flows of people who
were born in Pacific countries and move to other countries in the region (intra-Pacific mobility), to countries
on the Pacific rim, and to other parts of the world. The architecture for voluntary adapve migraon in the
Pacific is not stac and in this report Fiji is idenfied as an important hub for a cluster of countries in the
region. Another recent innovaon is the revoluon in Australia’s immigraon policy relang to the temporary
and long-term entry of cizens of many PICTs since 2009. Australia now merits hub status in the Pacific’s
regional architecture for voluntary migraon.
111
The database compiled for the analysis of clusters and hubs in these two reports has been used to inform
the discussion of internaonal migraon in the five sub-regional clusters of PICTs that form the substance of
the review of diverse Pacific populaons below.
111
See Bedford, R.D. (2023b) Recent developments in the immigration policy context for the project on “Climate mobility in
the Pacific: regional population dynamics and impacts of mobility”. Report to the University of Auckland team, May 2023
(revised June 2023). 30pp.
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Diverse Pacific populaons
Several key findings from the research on populaon dynamics are presented with reference to five sub-
regional clusters of countries. These clusters provide useful groupings of PICTs for reviewing developments
in populaon movement in the region, including likely future trajectories for internal and internaonal
climate (im)mobility.
The clusters, which are discussed in turn, are:
6. The western Pacific cluster (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu)
7. The central Pacific cluster (Fiji, Kiriba, Nauru, Tuvalu)
8. The eastern Pacific cluster (American Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau and Tonga)
9. The northern Pacific cluster (Guam, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Northern
Mariana Islands, Palau)
10. The French territories cluster (French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna)
Before examining characteriscs of the populaons in each of the five clusters comparave perspecves on
their growth trajectories are provided in Table 1 and Figure 8.
Table 1: Population change in the Pacific, 2000-2100
Cluster 2000 2020 2050 2100
Western Pacific 6,130,350 10,752,510 16,714,340 21,570,930
Central Pacific 941,350 1,070,270 1,310,650 1,313,420
Eastern Pacific 353,350 360,610 377,290 384,180
Northern Pacific 426,180 392310 449,080 405,000
French Territories 487,190 599980 711,470 658,290
Total Pacific 8,338,420 13,175,680 19,562,830 24,331,820
% in Western Pacific 73.5 81.6 85.4 88.7
Data sources: UNDESA and SPC
Drawing on esmates and projecons of populaons prepared by the United Naons Populaon Division in
the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the Stascs for Development Division of the
Pacific Community (SPC) the region’s populaon is projected to treble during the 21st century, increasing
from around 8.3 million in 2000 to around 24.3 million by 2100 (Table 1).
112
As already noted in Figure 3, just
over 80% of Pacific peoples were living in the western Pacific cluster in 2020 and this share of the region’s
total is projected to increase to 89% by the end of the century.
There are three disncve trajectories of populaon change that can be idenfied in the UNDESA and SPC
data for the five clusters. These trajectories are summarised in Figure 8 using index numbers with the
112
The UNDESA’s 2022 estinates and medium variant projections for country populations in the region are the primary
source for the data in Table 1 relating to the western Pacific, central Pacific, northern Pacific and French Territories. The
SPC’s 2022 estimates and medium variant projections for Pacific ountry populations are the primary source of data
relating to the eastern Pacific. Some of the strengths and weaknesses of the population data from these two sources are
discussed in Bedford et. al (2023b). 12-15.
62 | P a g e
populaon for 2000 in each cluster based at 100. Subsequent growth (or decline) in each cluster’s populaon
is shown in the graph relave to the populaon in 2000.
Figure 8: Populaon change in the five clusters using index numbers, 2000-2100 (2000=100)
The trajectory for the populaon of the western Pacific is completely different from the trajectories for the
other four clusters. Most of the growth in the Pacific’s populaon during the 21st century will occur in this
cluster because of a combinaon of high levels of natural increase and comparavely low levels of net
migraon loss to overseas desnaons. The net migraon losses will increase but will be small by comparison
with the addions to the populaon through natural increase (the balance of births over deaths).
Two different trajectories are evident in the projecons of the populaons for the other four clusters. The
two clusters with modest growth include the countries with the most advanced industrial economies in the
region – Fiji (central Pacific) and New Caledonia (French territories). Both these countries are hubs for
migrants from other parts of the region, especially countries in their clusters. They are also clusters with
much lower rates of natural increase than is found in the western Pacific because of declining fertility and
variable histories of net migration losses to countries outside the Pacific region.
The remaining two clusters – eastern and northern Pacific – have the lowest projected population growth
due to a combination of net migration losses, especially to countries on the Pacific rim, and variable histories
of fertility decline. The populations in these clusters, as well as in the central Pacific and French territories
clusters, are projected to be experiencing absolute population decline before the end of the century. This is
in contrast to the trajectory for the western Pacific’s population which will still be growing by 2100.
63 | P a g e
In the context of these different trajectories for population growth, the structures and spatial distributions
of the populations in the five clusters are now examined in turn.
The western Pacific cluster
The populaons of the three countries in the western Pacific cluster all have youthful age-sex structures
which are the product of sustained high ferlity rates over the past 50 years.
113
Populaon growth in the
western Pacific is being led by natural increase (the balance of births over deaths). Such populaon growth
is referred to as being momentum-led because it is a product of natural increase in the resident populaon.
A good indicator of a populaon with high growth potenal is its age-sex structure. The age-sex pyramids
for the combined populaon of the three western Pacific countries in 1970, 2020 and 2050, shown in Figure
9, are excellent examples of a populaon with high growth potenal.
Figure 9: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, western Pacific cluster 1970-2100
The age group at the base of the pyramid for the populaon in 2020 in Figure 9 remains wider than any of
the age groups above it, indicang that at least as many children are being born each year as were born in
preceding years. Ferlity is falling, however, because the percentages of the males and females that are in
113
See Friesen, W. et al. (2023) for national demographic profiles for Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
57-76
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the 0-4 age group have been shrinking since 1970, and by 2050 are likely to be slightly smaller than the
percentages aged 5-9 years in the UN’s projected populaon for that year (Figure 9).
The burgeoning youthful and older populaons
While the percentage shares of young children in the populaon of the western Pacific have been falling
since the early 1970s, this does not mean that absolute numbers are falling. Between 2020 and 2050, the
number of children aged 0-14 years in the western Pacific is projected by the UN to increase by around
600,000 (16%) from 3.8 million to 4.4 million. This increase in the western Pacific’s child populaon is
equivalent to 200,000 more people than the UN’s projected total populaon of around 380,000 for the six
countries comprising the eastern Pacific cluster in 2050.
These numbers relang to the scale and paern of populaon change are significant in the context of climate
(im)mobility because over 80% of the region’s populaon who are faced with adapng to climate change are
living in the western Pacific. In 2020, just over 3 million (83%) of the region’s 3.6 million people in the younger
working age populaon (15-29 years) were resident in the western Pacific cluster. This is the populaon that
was found to be the most “mobility willing” in the survey of Samoans living in-country and overseas – a
finding that was also reported in some of the community and mu-generaonal family studies.
114
As can be seen in the line graph in Figure 8, which shows changes in the percentages of the cluster’s total
populaon aged 15-29 and 65+ between 2020 and 2100, just under 30% of the western Pacific’s residents in
2020 were 15-29 year-olds. This is the highest share of the populaon in this age group in 2020 in all of the
five clusters. While the percentage of the western Pacific’s total populaon in the 15-29 year group is
projected to decline from 28% in 2020 to 25% by 2050 (Figure 9), the actual number of youthful workers in
the cluster will increase over this period by 1.1 million (37%). Because of the greater propensity of this group
to move in any populaon, the research teams all made a point of seeking informaon on the mobility
experiences and plans of youth in their interviews and surveys. These findings are discussed further in a later
secon.
If the younger adult populaon is amongst the most mobile component of a populaon, the older
populaon (65 years and over) tends to be the least mobile or the least inclined to be mobile. This was
reinforced in the findings from the surveys, community and family studies carried out by the three teams.
These are what have been termed the “steadfast stayers” and their share of the populaon is increasing in
all clusters. In the western Pacific they comprised only 3% of the total populaon in 2020, but by 2050 this
share will have more than doubled to over 7%, and 50 years later it will almost equal the young adult’s share
in the populaon. As the line graph in Figure 9 shows, the percentages of the populaon aged 15-29 and 65+
in the western Pacific will gradually converge during the 21
st
century.
This is an important finding because at the same me that communies and policy makers are coping with
the mobility of increasing numbers of young adults, they will be simultaneously addressing issues
associated with preferences for staying in place amongst the older populaon.
114
The University of Waikato team dierentiated between what they termed the “mobility-willing” and the “steadfast-stayers” on the
basis of their findings from surveys of around 600 Tongans and Samoans living in Tonga and Samoa. Amongst other things, these surveys
sought information on the impact climate change was already having, or might have, on mobility decisions in the next five years. See
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b) and Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024a). In Samoa the younger working age population (18-24 years) was found to be more
likely to move to live somewhere else in the country or overseas than those in the older age groups (45-54 years). In the Tonga survey,
those in an older working age group (35-44 years) were classified as being the “mobility-willing” with those aged 45 years and older being
in the “steadfast-stayers” group (Vaioleti, L., (2023). 5). Findings relating to the mobility decision-making process in the various national,
community and family contexts explored by the three teams are discussed in greater detail later in this report.
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Populaon distribuon in-country and overseas
It has already been shown that staying in place in 2020 means staying in rural communies for the great
majority of residents in the western Pacific (see Figure 3). While the urban populaon in this cluster is
projected by the UN to almost double between 2018 and 2050, increasing from 1.3 million to 3.9 million,
there will sll only be 25% of people living in urban areas in the western Pacific by 2050 (see the bar graph
in Figure 9).
115
For the great majority of people living in this cluster, coping with climate change will be
managed in rural sengs, not in towns, even though just over two-thirds of the 5.8 million people projected
to be living in Pacific towns by 2050 will be in urban places in the western Pacific.
The disncve features of the western Pacific’s youthful populaon structure and predominantly rural
distribuon are given further policy relevance by the fact there has been lile opportunity for people from
this cluster to move overseas either on visas for temporary work or study, or long-term residence in other
countries. As shown earlier in Figure 4, only 55,000 people born in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and
Vanuatu were living overseas around 2019, according to UN and World Bank esmates cited in Burson et al.
(2021, 41). This was equivalent to less than 1% of the combined in-country and overseas-resident populaons
born in the western Pacific.
There are no sizeable transnaonal populaons of Papua New Guineans, Solomon Islanders and ni-Vanuatu
in 2020 that come close to comparing with those found in the central, eastern and northern Pacific clusters.
In the absence of extended families that include overseas residents, opons for mobility to countries on
the Pacific rim, as a response to impacts of climate change, are much more limited for residents in the
western Pacific cluster than for those who have transnaonal kin networks.
The importance of these transnaonal networks, which have intergeneraonal dimensions that extend well
beyond the original migrants who were born in parcular Pacific countries, was demonstrated clearly in the
climate mobility surveys carried out as part of the research, and in responses to quesons about climate
change in the community studies and in the mulgeneraonal family studies.
Internaonal migraon outlets for cizens of the countries in the western Pacific are increasing, especially in
Australia. The recently announced quotas for the 3,000 residence visas that will be balloted annually under
Australia’s new Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV - 1,350 for PNG, 150 for Solomon Islands and 150 for
Vanuatu
116
) will contribute to building transnaonal communies from these countries over me, in the
same way that New Zealand’s Samoan Quota and Pacific Access Category visa provisions have contributed to
building transnaonal communies of cizens of Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Kiriba and Tuvalu. But the PEV will have
limited impact on responses to climate change at the naonal level given the sizes of the populaons in these
countries and their ongoing high rates of natural increase. Mobility decisions taken in response to impacts of
climate change will, by necessity, have to connue to favour consideraon of desnaons within these
countries, at least through to 2050.
117
The central Pacific cluster
The countries that are in the central Pacific cluster include Fiji with the second largest populaon in the region
(900,000 million in 2024 according to the SPC’s 2022 projecons) and three much smaller populaons in
Kiriba (126,000), Nauru (12,000) and Tuvalu (11,500) (Figure 10).
115
The UN’s data relating to urban populations in the Pacific in 2018 and 2050 come from Table 1 in Campbell, J.R. (2019). Climate
change and urbanisation in Pacific Island countries, Policy Brief no. 49, Toda Peace Institute, Tokyo. 3.
116
See Howes, S. (2024) PEV quotas: winners and losers. DevPolicy Blog, Development Policy Centre, Australian National University, 1
May 2024. Accessible at: https://devpolicy.org/pev-winners-losers-20240501/
117
For further discussion of mobility options in response to climate change, see Bedford et al. (2023b) and Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).
66 | P a g e
Figure 10: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, central Pacific cluster 1970-2100
A feature that this cluster has in common with the western Pacific is the complete dominaon of cluster’s
demographic characteriscs by one populaon. The age-sex pyramids and graphs in Figure 10 show changes
in the structure and distribuon of populaon in the central Pacific for various periods between 1970 and
2100, and reflect paerns that are parcularly relevant for Fiji’s populaon.
118
The reason for grouping them
is because they have some disncve links associated with their colonial heritages that have the potenal to
be very significant in the context of climate (im)mobility.
Some common trajectories, linkages and legacies
There are some similaries in the trajectories of populaon change in the four countries. All populaons
have been experiencing declining ferlity, partly in response to government-sponsored family planning
programmes that date back to the 1970s, parcularly in the cases of Fiji and the former Gilbert and Ellice
Islands Colony (now Kiriba and Tuvalu). The impact of declining ferlity can be seen in the narrowing base
of the populaon pyramids in Figure 10 between 1970 and 2020 and the similar percentages in the age
groups between 0-4 years and 25-29 years in the pyramid for 2050. The laer paern is not present in the
pyramid for 2050 in the western Pacific. This is due, in part, to the much more significant role that
internaonal migraon has been having on shaping the populaon pyramids for the central Pacific cluster
than has been the case in the western Pacific.
118
Demographic profiles for Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu can be found in Friesen et al. (2023). 34-56. Nauru was not an in-scope country for
this project but comparative information on aspects of its fertility, mortality and migration between 1950 and 2100 can be found in
Bedford et al. (2023a). 28-31.
67 | P a g e
Fiji is an increasingly important hub in the Pacific. It is the headquarters for several regional offices for the
UN and other agencies operang in the Pacific, the base for the region’s largest university (the University of
the South Pacific) and one of its main technical training instuons (Fiji Naonal University). Its airline, Fiji
Airways, is also the largest provider of internaonal air services linking countries in the region and on the
Pacific rim. It is the major desnaon for intra-Pacific migrants seeking employment, educaon and residence
in the region and is a prominent source of skilled migrants to other Pacific states.
119
Fiji Airways and, at mes, Air Nauru, are the only airlines that provide regular services to Kiriba and Tuvalu.
These four countries are linked by another legacy of colonialism in the central Pacific – phosphate mining on
Nauru and Banaba (Ocean Island, in Kiriba) by the Brish Phosphate Commission, a consorum of
Australian, Aotearoa New Zealand and Brish commercial interests. The phosphate industry on Nauru and
Banaba provided employment for thousands of I-Kiriba and Tuvaluans for several decades, cemenng long-
standing connecons and relaonships between the three coral countries.
To enable expansion of mining into village sites on Banaba, Banabans were reseled on Rabi Island in Fiji the
late 1940s. The relocaon of the Banabans was followed by the purchase of a neighbouring island, Kioa, in
Fiji by community leaders from Vaitupu in Tuvalu in the late 1940s to provide a safety valve in the event of
populaon pressure on the limited land resources of their atoll.
Fiji thus has long-established I-Kiriba and Tuvaluan communies, and has been a very significant source of
educaon, health and internaonal air transport services to the populaons of these two countries especially
since they became independent states in the late 1970s. These relaonships have been strengthened further
during the past 15 years through the purchase of land on Vanua Levu in Fiji by the Kiriba government as
part of a long-term strategy to secure homes for I-Kiriba who may have to leave their islands because of
damage caused by climate change. A commitment has also been made by Fiji’s former Prime Minister to
provide support with reselement if required in the future.
120
Populaon distribuon in-country and overseas
In addion to these strong historical and contemporary links, the countries in the cluster share some similar
populaon distribuon characteriscs. As the bar graph in Figure 10 indicates, they all have at least half of
their populaons living in urban places which are all located on or close to the coast. By 2050 at least 75% of
the cluster’s populaon will be urban-resident, the opposite of the situaon in the western Pacific.
Communies in both rural and urban areas in Kiriba and Tuvalu are grappling with challenges of marine
erosion and saltwater intrusion into the freshwater lenses that are essenal for life of plants, animals and
people on atolls. Community and family studies on Abaiang, Maiana, Nonou and South Tarawa in Kiriba
and Nanumanga, Niutao and Funafu in Tuvalu provide graphic evidence of the challenges posed by climate
change. Coping strategies by residents, as well as family members living in other places, including overseas,
facing these challenges are discussed in later secons of this report.
The four Central Pacific countries have transnaonal dimensions to their populaons: Fiji in Aotearoa New
Zealand, Australia, the USA and the United Kingdom; Kiriba in Fiji, Solomon Islands, Aotearoa New Zealand,
Australia, and the USA; Tuvalu in Fiji, Niue, Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia; and Nauru in Australia and
119
See Burson and Bedford (2021) for further information on Fiji’s role as destination for migrants born in other Pacific countries and as a
source of skilled migrants in the region.
120
When opening a flood evacuation centre in the village of Welagi early in 2015, the Prime Minister of Fiji stated that: “in 50 years or so
[places like Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands] may no longer exist. And we may have to give some of these people homes in Fiji …
[b]ecause we will never turn our backs on our island neighbours”. Cited in Campbell, J.R. and Bedford, R.D. (2023) Climate change and
migration: lessons from Oceania, in A. Triandafyllidou (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Immigration and Refugee Studies (2nd Edn), Oxford,
Routledge. 379
68 | P a g e
Aotearoa New Zealand. The overseas components of these transnaonal populaons tend to be relavely
small by comparison with the populaons living in the islands, although Tuvalu’s transnaonal community in
Aotearoa (around 4,600 in 2018) is the equivalent of 44% of the SPC’s esmated populaon of 10,400 for
Tuvalu in that year.
In 2024 cizens of the four countries are eligible to parcipate in the seasonal work schemes that have been
operang in Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia since the late 2000s, as well as in Australia’s longer-term
PALM visa programme. Three of the countries have annual residence quotas in Aotearoa New Zealand’s
Pacific Access Category (Fiji 250, Kiriba 75, and Tuvalu 75) and three of them have recently been granted
annual residence quotas for Australia’s PEV (Fiji 300, Nauru 100 and Tuvalu 100).
121
In contrast to the
countries in the western Pacific cluster, populaons in the central Pacific have had some access to work and
residence opportunies overseas for many years.
In this context, they have more opons regarding movement overseas as a strategy for coping with climate
change. They also have significant flows of remiances, goods and informaon from overseas kin. But their
transnaonal populaons are small in proporonal terms by comparison with those that are found in the
eastern Pacific – the cluster where the overseas components of their populaons are all much bigger than
the island-resident components.
The eastern Pacific cluster
The six PICTs in the eastern Pacific cluster includes the Realm countries of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau,
whose indigenous populaons have New Zealand cizenship, Samoa, Tonga, and American Samoa. Samoa
and Tonga have had very strong links with New Zealand for over a century, have annual quotas for residence
visas in New Zealand, and are part of the RSE and PALM labour mobility schemes in New Zealand and
Australia. American Samoa is an Unincorporated Territory of the United States of America (Figure 11).
The laer has been included in the eastern Pacific cluster rather than with the other US-aligned PICTs north
of the equator because of indigenous cultural connecons with Samoa. Through these connecons, Samoans
especially, but also many Tongans, have taken advantage of employment opportunies in American Samoa
and on the west coast of the United States more generally. The very large Samoan and Tongan transnaonal
populaons in the United States owe their origin, in part, to connecons established via American Samoa.
Diverse age structures and migraon-led populaon growth
There is considerable diversity in the demographic profiles for the six PICTs and the age-sex structure for their
aggregated populaon, shown in Figure 11, is heavily influenced by the distribuons for Samoa’s, and to a
lesser extent Tonga’s, populaon structures.
122
Samoa (203,160) accounted for 54% of the SPC’s projected
total populaon of 377,700 in 2024 with Tonga’s populaon (98,780) accounng for a further 26%. The three
Realm countries all have populaons under 20,000 and two of them (Niue and Tokelau) have around 1,500
residents each. The SPC’s projected populaon for 57,230 for American Samoa in 2024 is well above the UN’s
43,500 and the laer is likely to be more reliable in this case.
121
Kiribati’s government has yet to confirm that it wants to be part of the Pacific Engagement Visa process.
122
Demographic profiles for the Realm countries can be found in Friesen et al. (2023). 3-33. A review of characteristics of the
contemporary and future populations of Tonga and Samoa, including some statistics on their populations in Aotearoa New Zealand, is in
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023a). 7-21.
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Figure 11: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, eastern Pacific cluster 1970-2100
Two common features of the populaon structures for PICTs in this cluster are evidence of declining ferlity
in the narrowing bases of the pyramids between 1970 and 2020 (a trend that is projected to connue over
the next 30 years) and increasing shares of the populaon in the older age groups (also see line graph in
Figure 11). Migraon to countries on the Pacific rim, especially New Zealand and the United States, has had
a major impact on populaon growth through net losses of people in the working and reproducve age
groups. The loss of young men and women to long-term work and residence overseas represents a transfer
of their potenal contribuon to reproducon to the populaons of their host countries. This has had a
parcularly significant impact on the populaon structures of the Realm countries, which all experienced
major net losses in populaon during the 1960s and 1970s.
While the eastern Pacific cluster is projected to connue to experience populaon growth between 2020 and
2050, the overall increase will be small. Over the 30 years the eastern Pacific cluster’s populaon is likely to
increase by 23,000 or 6% to reach around 380,000 in 2050 according to SPC projecons for Samoa, Tonga
and the Realm countries and the UN’s projecon for American Samoa
123
. The UN’s projecons are more
opmisc than the SPC’s, especially for Samoa and Tonga, giving an overall increase of 120,000 or 23% to
reach a populaon of just over 500,000 in 2050. The SPC’s projecons are likely to be more reliable in this
case, especially for Samoa (231,400 in 2050 rather than the UN’s 320,000) and Tonga (93,300 in 2050 rather
than the UN’s 131,000). Ongoing declines in ferlity and the likelihood of accelerated net out-migraon as a
123
The UN’s projection for American Samoa is discussed later in the report. It is based on much higher assumptions of net migration loss
between 2022 and 2100 than the UN’s projections for the other PICTs in the eastern Pacific.
70 | P a g e
response to climate change favour the more conservave esmates of populaon growth for these PICTs. In
addion, Tonga has recently been included in Australia’s PEV programme with an inial allocaon of 150
balloted residence visas.
124
Several reports address current and potenal future mobility in Tonga and Samoa where climate change is
one of the forces influencing internal or internaonal migraon.
125
Analysis of responses to two different
surveys including a total of 360 Tongans and 346 Samoans within and outside the two countries, provides a
wide range of informaon about general mobility “willingness”, beliefs around future climate mobility,
internal and overseas desnaon preferences, recent and planned direcon of movement, and insights from
those based overseas on the diaspora’s unique contribuon, influence and potenal in a climate mobile
future.
126
The visualisaon sessions and scenario workshops subsequently conducted in the two countries
defined and explored different futures for Tonga and Samoa under a range of hypothecal climate change
scenarios. Insights gained from these inquiries are reviewed in later secons of this report.
Urbanisaon of populaons in the eastern Pacific
Populaons living in countries in the eastern Pacific cluster remain predominantly rural-resident. The bar
graph in Figure 11 shows that around 65% of the cluster’s total populaon in 2018 were living in communies
classified as rural. The UN’s projecons of urbanisaon suggest there will sll be under 40% of this cluster’s
populaon living in local towns and cies in 2050 – a major difference with the countries in the central and
northern Pacific clusters where over 70% of their populaons are projected to be urban-resident by 2050
(Figures 9 and 12).
In the case of the eastern Pacific cluster, the percentages living in rural and urban areas within the different
countries give a misleading indicaon of the level of urbanisaon of their populaons. The long-standing,
albeit variable, access members of these populaons have had to overseas desnaons since the 1970s
means that all the countries in the cluster have significant transnaonal populaons. The overseas
components of these transnaonal populaons are heavily concentrated in towns and cies in Aotearoa New
Zealand, Australia and the USA.
The research into regional populaon dynamics established that around 43% of the total populaon living in
the islands and in countries on the Pacific rim that idenfied with Polynesian ethnic groups (1.57 million in
2021, excluding New Zealand Māori and Hawai’i Maoli), were esmated to be resident in the eastern
Pacific.
127
Almost 60% of Polynesians were living in Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and the USA. This
compares with less than 2% of the total populaon that idenfied with Melanesian ethnic groups (11.47
million, including Fiji’s indigenous i-Taukei populaon) living overseas in 2021.
When the overseas components of Pacific transnaonal populaons are taken into consideraon, it is clear
that Polynesians from the eastern Pacific have a much higher level of urbanisaon than assessments of
populaon distribuon within the island countries suggest. The strong connecons between the island-based
and overseas-based components of Pacific transnaonal populaons have been one of the defining features
of their social and economic transformaon, especially since the 1970s.
124
Howes (2024). 2. Samoan Government has not taken up an invitation to be part of this scheme at this stage. It is currently reviewing
Samoan involvement in labour mobility schemes in Australia and New Zealand in the light of increasing shortages of labour to support
industries in the domestic economy.
125
See Vaioleti, L. et al.. (2023b, 2023c, 2023d), Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024).
126
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).
127
Bedford et al. (2023a). 71.
71 | P a g e
As the surveys of Tongans and Samoans living overseas
128
and the studies of the Pukapuka and Tokelau
communies in Aotearoa New Zealand
129
suggest, a transnaonal rather than a naonal frame of reference
is required when considering the impacts of climate change on populaons in the eastern Pacific cluster. The
implicaons of this approach for climate (im)mobility are explored in the wider context of intergeneraonal
framings of populaon movement in the secon on the Connected Pacific.
The northern Pacific cluster
The five PICTs north of the equator comprise a long-established cluster with strong connecons to the United
States. The populaons of Guam, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Northern
Mariana Islands and Palau have been profoundly affected by migraon to and from the United States and
this is reflected clearly in the age-sex pyramids for their combined populaon (around 400,000 in 2024
according to SPC and UN projecons) (Figure 12). The large American military presence in the cluster,
especially on Guam, means that the populaon structure is affected by in-migraon from the “hub” as well
as out-migraon to the mainland United States.
There is also extensive in-migraon of labour from countries in Asia to parts of this cluster to compensate for
the net losses of the indigenous populaons to the United States. The Northern Mariana Islands
(manufacturing industries) and Palau (the tourism industry) have been parcularly affected by a complex mix
of flows of labour into and out of the country. This migraon-led “churn” in the populaon has affected
ferlity rates as well as the shares in the working age and older populaon groups.
128
Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024a).
129
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, T. and Ng Shiu, R. (2024b) Mobilities over time: Ancestral, historical, future. Waipapa Taumata Rau,
University of Auckland.
72 | P a g e
Figure 12: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, northern Pacific cluster 1970-2100
Populaon structure
The age-sex pyramids and line graph showing changes in the percentages of the 15-29 and 65+ populaons
in Figure 11 are very different from those shown in the maps for the western, central and eastern Pacific
(Figures 9-11). As the assessment of populaon dynamics in the region shows, the PICTs in the northern
Pacific have all experienced significant declines in ferlity since the 1950s and all were expected to reach
sub-replacement ferlity before 2050.
130
The much higher percentages in the older age groups than are found in the populaons in the three clusters
covered earlier also reflect lower infant mortality rates and higher life expectancies at birth in those parts of
the cluster that have large immigrant populaons especially Guam (US military personnel) and the Northern
Mariana Islands (Filipino and other Asian migrants employed in manufacturing and service industries). This
has contributed to the much higher percentages of men and women in the 80+ age group in the projected
populaon structure for 2050 (Figure 12).
Populaon distribuon
Populaons in the northern Pacific have much higher levels of urbanisaon than those found in the clusters
south of the equator (Figure 12). In 2018 only 28% of the northern Pacific’s populaon was rural-resident
130
Bedford, et al. (2023a). 28.
73 | P a g e
and by 2050 the UN expects this share to have dropped to 23%. Like the situaon in the eastern Pacific, there
are large overseas-resident Micronesian populaons in the United States, and these are mainly concentrated
in urban areas. That said, the share of the total populaon living in the cluster and overseas in 2021 that was
in the northern Pacific (75%) is much higher than is the case in the eastern Pacific (43%) according to the
University of Auckland team’s analysis of the transnaonal component of Pacific populaons.
131
Part of the reason for the smaller shares of northern Pacific populaons living in the United States is the cost
of air travel. Traversing the long distances from countries in the northern cluster to the desnaons in the
United States costs much more than geng from countries in the eastern Pacific to Aotearoa New Zealand
and Australia. Indeed, Gibson and Nero (2008) showed that it was cheaper to fly from Palau, Guam and the
Northern Mariana Islands to Australia in the mid-2000s than it was to fly to North America.
132
In this context,
it is interesng to note that the Australian Government has recently granted small residence visa quotas (50
each) to Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, with an offer on the table for the Marshall Islands.
133
This is the first me a country on the southern Pacific rim has included countries in the northern Pacific
cluster in an immigraon policy that targets specific countries or regions.
Looking ahead, the populaons in the northern Pacific are likely to connue to have a preference for
residence overseas in the United States of America rather than in countries on the southern rim of the Pacific.
There are also strong economic and historical es between several of these countries and countries in
northeast and southeast Asia. The one country in the northern Pacific that may develop stronger links with
Aotearoa New Zealand in the future is the Marshall Islands, the group of atolls and reef islands to the north
of Kiriba. There are cultural links between the I-Kiriba and other Micronesian peoples and the I-Kiriba
transnaonal populaon in the United States owes its origins, in part to connecons with the Marshall
Islands. Aotearoa New Zealand’s 2018 Census of Populaon and Dwellings recorded very small numbers of
people born in the northern Pacific cluster.
134
There are no transnaonal populaons from this part of the
Pacific of any size in Australia or Aotearoa New Zealand at this stage.
The French territories cluster
The three Pacific territories (French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna) have been grouped as
a cluster because of their disncve, ongoing, status as collecvies of France (Figure 13). Indigenous
populaons in these widely distributed island groups have French cizenship by right and, theorecally at
least, can live in France if they choose to leave their island homes in the Pacific. It is very difficult to get data
on the birthplaces of France’s populaon and the UN database that has been used to provide data on Pacific-
born populaons living overseas does not contain data on people resident in France who were born in the
three collecvies.
131
Bedford, et al. (2023a). 68-75.
132
Gibson, J. and Nero. K. (2008) Why don’t Pacific economies grow faster? in A. Bisley (ed.) Pacific interacons: Pasifika in New Zealand – New
Zealand in Pasifika. Wellington: Instute of Policy Studies, pp. 191-244
133
Howes (2024). 2.
134
According to unpublished data provided by Stats NZ, the following populations born in countries in the northern Pacific cluster were
resident in New Zealand in 2018: Guam 51, Marshall Islands 21, Federated Dtates of Micronesia 18, Northern Mariana Islands 24, Palau
12.
74 | P a g e
Figure 13: Changes in populaon structure and rural-urban distribuon, French territories cluster 1970-2100
Populaon structure and growth
The two large populaons in the cluster in 2024 (French Polynesia 282,700 and New Caledonia 276,700, SPC
projecons) have sizeable non-indigenous populaons, mainly from France, which have lower ferlity than
the indigenous populaon and much older age structures. The more youthful, small populaon of
Polynesians in Wallis and Futuna (11,200 in 2024) has lile impact on the age-sex pyramids shown in Figure
13 for the combined populaon of the cluster.
The structure for the total populaon of this cluster is quite different from that for the other clusters, with
much higher shares in the 65+ age group. The line graph showing changes in the percentages of the
populaon aged 15-29 and 65+ has the percentage for the laer exceeding the former before 2040 – well in
advance of any other cluster. In the cases of the western, central and eastern Pacific clusters, UN projecons
for these two age groups does not result in the two lines meeng unl well aer 2050 and, in the case of the
western Pacific cluster, not unl aer 2100.
Populaon growth between 2020 and 2050 will be slow in the French territories cluster according to SPC and
UN projecons. The total populaon of 600,000 in 2020 is projected to increase by 112,000 (19%) according
to the UN’s medium variant projecon. This compares with percentage increases over the 30 years of 23%
in the central Pacific, 30% in the eastern Pacific and 59% in the western Pacific. Only the northern Pacific
cluster is projected to have a lower percentage increase in populaon between 2020 and 2050 (15%). In the
75 | P a g e
French territories the youthful working age populaon aged 15-29 is projected to decline by just under 10%
during this period while the 65+ populaon increases by 87%.
Populaon distribuon and intra-Pacific migraon
The percentage of the populaon living in urban areas in the French territories ranged from around 71% in
New Caledonia to 0% in Wallis and Futuna in 2018.
135
In French Polynesia 62% were urban-resident. There
has been considerable migraon between the French territories and there are sizeable communies of
Polynesians from Wallis and Futuna in New Caledonia and French Polynesia. In the absence of data on
numbers from the cluster living in France, the overseas populaons born in this cluster are heavily
concentrated within the Pacific in the other French collecvies.
There were small populaons born in New Caledonia (310), French Polynesia (470) and Wallis and Futuna
(10) in Aotearoa New Zealand at the me of the 2018 Census of populaon and Dwellings. These are the
smallest Pacific-born populaons from countries in Melanesia and Polynesia in Aotearoa New Zealand. While
the three territories remain colonies of France, it is unlikely that their locally-born populaons living in
countries on the Pacific rim will grow rapidly, although climate change in the region may lead to more
Polynesians especially seeking access to work and residence in Aotearoa New Zealand. There are strong
ancestral and contemporary connecons between island groups in French Polynesia and the Cook Islands,
and it was Polynesian navigators from this part of the eastern Pacific that brought the ancestors of Aotearoa’s
indigenous Māori populaon to this country. A Tahian navigator, Tupaia, also played a major role is helping
Captain Cook “discover” Aotearoa in 1769.
136
A diverse but connected Pacific
An outcome from research into populaon dynamics at the sub-regional level between 1950 and 2100 is the
suggested grouping of PICTs into five clusters based on aspects of their contemporary and historical
demographics and colonial and post-colonial connecons. It is argued that these clusters provide a more
relevant sub-regional grouping of countries for the analysis of the impacts of climate change on mobility than
the convenonal three regions of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.
At the core of the proposed five groups in this secon is the cluster and hub approach to the regional
architecture of Pacific mobility developed by Burson and Bedford (2013) and used as a framework for building
the case for a regional harmonisaon of approaches to humanitarian entry and stay in the region (Burson et
al., 2021). The cluster and hub approach ensures that the transnaonal dimension of Pacific populaons is
always acknowledged in the analysis – something which all of the research teams have given careful aenon
to in their studies of families, communies, populaons of parcular countries and the overseas components
of transnaonal populaons.
Recognion of diversity in contemporary and future trajectories for populaon change at the regional and
naonal levels in the research is accompanied by very clear acknowledgement of the connecons that people
in the islands have with many kin and others in different parts of their country of residence as well as in other
Pacific countries and beyond, especially on the Pacific rim. It is the nature of these connecons, and their
significance in the context of lives that are being increasingly impacted by climate change, that this synthesis
of findings from research carried out by the three teams now turns.
135
Campbell (2019). 3.
136
Salmond, A. (2012) Visitors: Tupaia, the navigator priest, pp. 57-76 in S. Mallon et al. Tangata o le Moana. New Zealand and the People
of the Pacific. Wellington: Te Papa Press.
76 | P a g e
THE CONNECTED PACIFIC
This section explores the concept of relationality to describe research participants’ lived experiences of
responding to climate change and relationships between peoples, places, and traditions. Examples are used
to illustrate that the preservation of cultural heritage, respect for traditional decision-making processes, and
support for community cohesion are essential in supporting the resilience of Pacific peoples against the
backdrop of increasing climate change. Across the Pacific region, “land and identity are inextricably linked.”
137
In the Pacific region, the connection between people and place can be understood as strong cultural,
traditional and spiritual bonds that shape people’s and communities’ identities and social structures. The
connection between people and place is deeply rooted, with ancestral land holding profound significance.
As a collective body of knowledge, the research and reports illustrate that the relationship between people
and place, is crucial for addressing the challenges posed by climate change and supporting future climate-
induced mobility. The close relationship between Pacific communities, whether living in the Pacific or abroad,
to their land, is presented across the research as an additional layer of complexity to their response to climate
change. Furthermore, the research demonstrates that community cohesion
138
and support systems further
reinforce ties to place, providing networks of mutual aid and solidarity. Even in the face of climate-related
hazards and disruptions, communities remain deeply connected to their traditional lands, drawing strength
from ancestral stories and spiritual beliefs.
The concept of ‘connectedness’ was one of the key framings for Mana Pacific Consulting which emerged from
their synthesis of the family studies.
139
Within a family study from East Malatia (Solomon Islands), is a vivid
example of the strong connection between people and place. The people-place connection is sustained via
traditional knowledge, stories, and skills being passed down from elders to younger generations to ensure
the preservation of cultural heritage and foster a strong sense of belonging
140
. According to this family study,
the Gwailao tribe function as a signpost, just as the other tribes that makeup the Gualala indigenous peoples
do also. The voices of the youth and elders resonate the importance of taking into consideration how we
negotiate the politics of change as proportional to our material and spiritual environments.
141
The community studies emphasise that ancestral lands hold cultural significance imbued with spiritual ties
that are central to the continuity of important rituals and practices. Ancestral lands in the Pacific are
represented in this research as more than physical spaces; they are also the final resting place for family
members
142
, and a sacred site for burial rituals, such as the burial of umbilical cords
143
for children and
grandchildren. For example, in the Vaimaanga community case study from the Cook Islands, spiritual ties
with the environment are noted as being maintained through Akapapaanaga relationships and the research
highlights an intergenerational and sacred connection to ancestral land.
144
In another community case study,
the significance of traditional practices connecting people to place was also highlighted in Pukapuka
145
,
where the research teams noted that ecological knowledge and communal management of resources is
137
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d).
138
Newport C. et al. (2024g).
139
Mafile’o, T., Alofa, P., Kauongo, T., Saguba, L., Steven, H., Tulano, T., Toloa, L, Nailasikau Halauitui, S. and Peneta Hauma, T. (2024a)
Pacific climate mobility multigenerational family story study: A synthesis. Mana Pacific Consultants Ltd.
140
Sanga, F. (2024).
141
Ibid.
142
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., Galokale, K. & Futaiasi, D. (2024f). Aruligo: A community case study from The Solomon
Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
143
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024e).
144
Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., Underhill-Sem, Y., & Damm, L.M., & Moeka’a R. (2024e). Vaima’anga: A community case study from the
Cook Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
145
Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., Underhill-Sem, Y., Damm, L. M., & Wright-Koteka, E. (2024d). Pukapuka – Te Ulu o Te Watu: A community
case study from the Cook Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
77 | P a g e
passed down through the generations, illustrating a commitment to preserving cultural traditions and
peoples’ connection between their identity and the land.
146
The Moving Futures report also highlights the profound connection between land and identity. This notes
that elderly individuals in Tonga face unique barriers to mobility due to their deep ties to their land of origin;
thus, they find it difficult to leave and endure the emotional and spiritual toll of separation from their land
and history.
147
Similarly, in Samoa, older participants reflected on the tight bonds between land and identity,
and in both contexts, decisions to move either internally or overseas were made more challenging if
ancestors were buried on their land.
148
People, place and tradional values and pracces
There are multiple dimensions to the connection between people and place and the centrality of cultural
heritage and traditional values and practices in sustaining these connections. Across the research, traditional
values and practices support and strengthen attachments to place within Pacific communities. This is
evidenced by the stories of intergenerational sharing of cultural knowledge and values across the research.
For example, the story of a family originally from Maiana Island in Kiribati documents a concerted effort to
teach genealogy at family reunions via a quiz, remarking that “stories are not for entertainment only, but for
empowering youth to learn values and skills passed down from our forefathers.”
149
Beyond its physical boundaries, the land and ocean embodies a profound link to heritage, tradition, and
community, strengthening the legacy of cultural identities, values, and traditions. The research with the
Tongan and Samoan diaspora
150
confirms this emotional and spiritual connection to people and place. This
is expressed as commitment to ‘ofa (love in Tongan) and alofa (love in Samoan) of both the people and the
land in their ancestral lands, despite being physically distanced from it. In the Moving Futures report,
151
the
connection between cultural heritage and land in Tonga and Samoa is highlighted, emphasising how
traditional practices strengthen attachments to place. According to these researchers, in both Tonga and
Samoa, the land is not just a place of residence but a repository of heritage, culture, and ancestral resting
places and the potential dislocation from their land represents not only physical distance, but also dislocation
from their ancestors and their traditional practices.
The process of participants in Samoa and Tonga developing and exploring four possible futures set in the year
in 2050 elucidates the significance of traditional practices and traditional values now, and in the future.
Among the Samoan participants, it was identified that one positive action that could be undertaken now to
support the future would be to “explore ways to revitalise interest in, and the practice of Samoan values to
help restore the family unit and build social resilience to upcoming change/s.”
152
The participants in the
Tongan future scenario workshops also highlighted the centrality of traditional values. In one workshop the
participants imagined that:
after years of social and cultural deterioration, by 2025 Tonga’s leadership from (government to
Church and other community leaders) have come together to initiate a significant programme of work
to reinvigorate Tonga’s traditional values. Values like faka'apa'apa'aki (mutual or two-way respect),
146
Other examples from the University of Auckland were noted in Vaiea and Bareho where communities collaborate to
adapt and mitigate challenges together.
147
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d). 6.
148
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d). 8.
149
Alofa, P. (2024). 7.
150
Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024a).
151
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d).
152
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d). 37.
78 | P a g e
feveitoka'iaki (fulfilling one's or one's group's unique obligations), tauhi vaha'a (the outcome of
fulfilling one's unique obligations and living one's values), loloto (humility and generosity) and
vahevahe mai (sharing) are revisited and adapted for application in their new reality.
153
Across the research, there are many examples of how stories are shared across generations to reinforce the
intricate web of familial connections to the land. These narratives serve as more than accounts of history;
they serve to strengthen identity and belonging and create a strong connection between people and place.
Beyond its physical boundaries, the land and ocean embody a profound link to heritage, tradition, and
communal unity, perpetuating the enduring legacy of cultural identity and values.
Within the community case studies, research participants in Managalas (Papua New Guinea), Vaiea (Nuie),
and Niutao (Tuvalu) reflected on the how the bond between genealogical lineages, ancestral connections,
and the land are deeply entrenched within the cultural and spiritual fabric of these communities. Research
with transnational populations from the Cook Islands
154
and Tuvalu
155
further substantiate the relationships
between people’s connection to place as important to the preservation of community cohesion.
These practices demonstrate resilience and adaptability, showcasing how Pacific communities leverage their
cultural heritage to navigate contemporary challenges. Within the community case studies, traditional life
and traditional practices are also illustrated as contributing to resilience. For example, in Vaiea, Niue,
156
and
Bareho, Solomon Islands,
157
communities collaborate to adapt and mitigate challenges together. Moreover,
in Pukapuka, Cook Islands,
158
the passing down of ecological knowledge and communal management of
resources reflects a commitment to preserving cultural traditions and identity. Furthermore, the Vaiea
159
,
and Niutao
160
community studies illustrate how practices such as weaving and traditional crafts contribute
to economic stability and livelihoods within Pacific communities and also ensure that cultural traditions are
passed down through generations.
Faith and spirituality
In the Pacific, faith and spirituality also play a role in connecting people to place through scared sites,
traditional practices, rituals, community and church activities, environmental stewardship. The blending of
indigenous traditions with Christian faith are part of everyday life in the Pacific and reinforce cultural identity,
community cohesion and connection to place.
The research highlights the integral role of faith and spirituality as pillars of resilience in Pacific communities.
Research participants in Samoa and Tonga expressed how mobility influences their spiritual connection with
the land, ancestors, and sea. Moreover, the report on these countries emphasises the significance of the
Christian faith and the church in maintaining peace and wellbeing within these communities, illustrating how
Christian values intertwine with indigenous beliefs.
The Christian religion is dominant in Tonga and church participation and fulfilling one’s church duties is
central to life there. Heads of churches are considered powerful, and in the public sphere, they can be more
153
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d). 17.
154
Newport, C. et al. (2024d).
155
Newport, C. et al. (2024f).
156
Ibid.
157
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., & Galokale, K. (2024g). Bareho Village, Nono Lagoon: A community case study in the
Western Province, The Solomon Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.)
158
Newport, C. et al. (2024d).
159
Newport, C. et al. (2024f).
160
Ng Shiu, R., Newport, C., Underhill-Sem, Y., Burnett, R., Amosa-Baniani, C. & Nia, B. (2024g). Niutao: A community case study from
Tuvalu. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
79 | P a g e
influential than some of the nobles (estate holders). Further, their geographical reach is extending every year
as Tongans leave for overseas destinations at pace (‘Epeli Hau’ofa, talanoa, May, 2004). Religion provides a
second home (fale-‘alua) and a support platform for those within Tonga, including in terms of disaster
response and recovery, and those overseas, including to help accommodate settlers and to connect people
in with income and work opportunities.
161
The community case studies and multigenerational family studies further illustrate the intertwining of faith
and resilience in Pacific communities, evidencing how faith and spirituality provide strength during climate
and environmental challenges. For example, for families in Papua New Guinea
162
and Kiribati,
163
spiritual
practices such as prayer, attending church, storytelling, and traditional ceremonies serve as sources of
emotional and psychological support, reinforcing community bonds and cultural identity. These practices
provide a sense of purpose and strength, enabling communities to cope with challenges posed by climate
change and other adversities.
So, also, in communities in Vaimaanga, Cook Islands, and Ambu, Solomon Islands. These studies evidence
how individuals draw upon their unwavering trust in God during difficult times, considering it an essential
aspect of their resilience. Moreover, in Niutao and Matupit, differing belief systems coexist, with some relying
on scientific research while others place their faith in divine protection, showcasing the diverse ways in which
faith and spirituality intersect with resilience strategies.
164
In short, faith and spirituality are core elements of the everyday life, everyday action which characterises
resilience in the Pacific and must be seen as such.
Extended families and intergeneraonal mobility
The various community and family-based studies all contain reference to the importance of extended families
in the everyday lives of the region’s diverse peoples, including their ways of adjusting to changes in their
residential and work environments. The research and reports all place very heavy emphasis on relationships
within families that often extend beyond national boundaries, when assessing Pacific strategies for navigating
challenging times in their lives, including the multifaceted stresses linked with coping with climate change.
Reflecting on how transnationally distributed family relationships are simultaneously differentially and
commonly anchored in ‘place’, the University of Auckland observe:
transnational communities can be distinguished as being of place in relation to their homeland
communities as staying in place (Telban, 2019). As Indigenous communities this can be
distinguished further as being from place. While they are not physically located with their origin
communities, their sense of belonging to place and community exists as an intangible
interconnected dimension of their ancestral spiritual ties to the physical and human dimension of
their environment and generations.
165
Reflecting on intergenerational mobility, they point out that,
161
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).
162
Steven, H. (2024).
163
Alofa, P. (2024).
164
Ng Shiu, R. Underhill-Sem, Y. and Newport, C. (2024). Perspectives from communities across the Pacific: Navigating vulnerability,
continuing resilience. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
165
Newport, C., Underhill-Sem, Y., & Ng Shiu, R. (2024a). Relationships - Shifting climate (im)mobility. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University
of Auckland.
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moving around the Pacific is a long-standing intergenerational process infused with relationships
born of intimate connections to people and place. This includes opportunities to advance education
or employment, changing circumstances and environmental stresses. Often this leads to
establishing a household in another community in another country; sometimes people are quick to
return home.
166
They highlight the importance of understanding climate mobility through an intergenerational lens. They
also emphasise that moving around the Pacific is a long-standing process deeply rooted in intimate
relationships with people and places. This mobility provides opportunities to advance education, secure
employment, and adapt to changing circumstances and environmental stresses. Often, it involves
establishing households in new communities or countries, although some individuals quickly return home.
Recognising this intergenerational mobility is crucial for climate-related mobility, as it underscores the
importance of relational ties and the need for policies that support sustainable and culturally sensitive
mobility options in the face of climate change.
When it comes to accessing opportunities to cope with climate-related stress in the Pacific, the research in
both Tonga and Samoa has revealed a strong belief in the very different options available to families with
close family members, including spouses, in overseas countries and those with no overseas-based family.
Families with members abroad can access support for voluntary mobility options, providing them with
resources and alternatives to cope with climate stress. In contrast, island-based families without overseas
connections lack these opportunities, highlighting a possible gap in support systems that needs addressing
to ensure equitable resilience strategies for all affected communities.
167
This framing of mobility in terms of generations rather than arbitrary time periods (short-term, long-term,
temporary, permanent) or with reference to spatial contexts or binaries (local mobility, rural-urban, internal,
international, origin-destination) is at the heart of the research into population movement. Indeed, the title
to Mana Pacific Consultants’ synthesis of the ten detailed family stories of mobility conducted across six
countries refers to “multigenerational family stories”.
168
An intergenerational or multigenerational framework for examining climate-related (im)mobility in the
region facilitates incorporation of the variable time-scales; i.e., the time over which population processes
and climate processes play out, intersect and have impact on communities, families and households.
The wide range of grounded family and community case studies the teams have provided cover a range of
settlement types in Pacific countries with different demographic histories and different experiences of, and
vulnerabilities to, climate change. Together they make a major original contribution to our understanding of
voluntary, and in some cases, involuntary migration in the region.
Everyday life, everyday acvity and resilience
As Dr Sione Nailasikau Halatuituia, writing on the experiences of the kāinga Mango, Tonga for Mana Pacific
Consulting, eloquently captures this fundamental truth:
even though they do not specifically say or directly fault climate change, their stories of natural and
environmental changes are like a deposition of climate change.
169
166
Underhill-Sem, Y, et al. (2024b). 3.
167
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d).
168
Mafile’o, T et al. (2024a).
169
Nailasikau Halauitui, D. (2024a). 6.
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That Pacific people have for generations used indigenous knowledge and traditional practices to achieve
what has come to be described and viewed through a non-indigenous lens as ‘resilience’ is reflected in the
following observation by a participant in that study:
Tupu hake pe i Fakakai feunga moe to Matangi he 61 mahalo kii tau 5 ai anga e feliliuaki he to koe
matangi naamau tu’u pe mei he mui kolo koe sio ki he muikolo koe ‘auha koe, ka naam au nofo pe
homau kii fale tonga nae tukuhifo pe kii fale ka mau hao ki ai. Pea koe anga ia feliuliuaki mau hau
ko eni ki Mango, lahi ngaahi Matangi nae mau ka naa mau hao pe homau kii api. Pea koe fiha e
sunami hoko ‘i motu ko ‘emau lele pe he ‘oku ai pe mo’unga ‘i Mango. Ko ene talaange pe oku mau
osi katoa ki ai.
[I was 5 when I experienced the 1961 cyclone devastation in Fakakai. The whole Fakakai settlement
was destroyed. We put down the roof of our Tongan house and took shelter in it. We have
experienced various cyclones and sea surges here in Mango. We always run to the hill in Mango.
When we get the warning, we go to the hill]. (Mother)
This observation – one of many across the research as a whole – reflects the reality that, in their everyday
lives, Pacific peoples residing in the many thousands of villages scattered across the many hundreds of
islands in region, maintain relationships to both place and to people – past present and future – and take
communal and community-level action which reduces the impacts of environmental hazards of all kinds,
including those linked to climate change.
Strong family and community ties provide essential support systems in Pacific communities, particularly
during times of crisis such as natural disasters or economic instability. Talanoa workshops in Tonga revealed
that through a Tongan lens, family was a key form of resilience (both as a motivator and as an enabler to
channel or broaden one’s options). As one participant noted “a person is born into a family, the boundaries
are international.”
170
In Tonga, kāinga (extended family) and the role of the ‘ulumotu’a (family head) are
central to social resilience, and families are seen as a primary support network, providing emotional and
practical support during times of hardship.
Nevertheless, number of participants in the future scenarios session suggested financial and other pressures
associated with worsening climate impacts may lead to a narrowing of perceptions of the family unit from
extended family to immediate family leading, potentially, to reduced openness of extended family to share
land, offer accommodation to those needing to relocate, and affect remittances from overseas to help fund
adaptation efforts of extended family members.
171
The study of Ambu
172
illustrates how strong relationships and cooperation between different tribes support
economic resilience and sustainability within local communities. This sentiment is captured by one
participant from Benabena
173
in Papua New Guinea:
Where we are now, we have called it our homeland, so we stay here. It is going to be bad if we leave
our home and go somewhere else. We can’t leave our gardens, our houses, our things and go
elsewhere. Our house will smell bad and stale. It is going to be bad. It is better to live in our own
village. That is why I stay put here.
170
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).
171
Idem. 51.
172
Underhill, Y. et al. (2024e).
173
Steven, H. (2024).
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Mana Pacific Consulting make the point that connection between current, past and future family/kin, as
expressed through storytelling, are a facet of everyday life and this a key driver of ‘resilience’ in that “stories
of survival, hard work and resilience of past generations serve as inspiration and guidance for dealing with
current challenges.”
174
A member of the Nagamito people in Papua New Guinea reflected,
Ol papa mama save tokim mipla olsem, bifo tumbuna blo ol stap ay, ol save wok lo stick. Ol mekim
bikpla, bikpla garden. Displa taim spade ino kam yet. Bifo taim, wokmak blo wanpla man em kain
olsem wokman blo tupla man lo taim blo mipla nau.....Lo ol lain bifo, gardening ya em bikpla
samting. Man igatim bikpla garden em leader lo hauslain ya. Man igatim bikpla garden na planti
garden ya, em leader. Ol save wok olsem bikos em ol lukim disla em wanpla profession blo ol.
[Our parents tell us that their ancestors used to work with digging stick. They made huge gardens.
During those days, they never had spades. The amount of work (in the garden) that was done by one
person in those days is equal to the amount of work that two people do today. ....Gardening was an
important part of our ancestors. A person(man) who had a huge garden is a leader in the village. A
person (man) who has a huge and plenty garden is a leader. Our ancestors dug bigger and plenty of
gardens because they regarded gardening as their profession.] (Saftty Auso, 2023)
175
Connected, collecve, and communal decision-making
The research has revealed that (im)mobility-related decision-making involves many actors, reflects wider
traditional social and governance structures, and occurs at different levels, ranging from the individual to the
family, village and government. Decision-making is grounded in relationships at the household, family/
community/village levels and in relationships with key external actors, such as the church and the
government. In some contexts, relationships with host communities also influence decision-making.
Summarising their ten intergenerational family studies, Mana Pacific Consulting emphasises the “collective
and communal ways of being” as a core element of everyday life which enhances resilience. Their family
studies demonstrate how such collectivism is deeply rooted indigenous Pacific cultures and expressed
through the sharing of crops, fish and housing among family. To highlight the point, the family study of the
Kāinga Nukunukumotu, in Tonga highlight the words of a member:
Kei fai pe me’a he taimi koee fekau’aki mo e ngaahi naunau ‘o tahi...kāinga
he motu ni; ikai fai ha fesiosiofaki.... kei fevahevahe’aki pe, koloa pe ke tatau
pe tama ko e emo e tama ko ee
[We still do what our people did in the olden
days regarding the ocean, as a kāinga there is no selfishness, we share
equally]
176
These structural features of decision-making in the Pacific in the context of disasters and climate change
feature in the research in relation to both Samoa and Tonga. At the village level in Samoa, the team note
many participants pointed to the Sa’o (title-holding Matai) as the final decision-maker in village-level matters,
including in mobility decisions. Others reportedly involved in village-level decision-making processes include
Tagata Matutua/Matua Tausi (elders) of the aiga, parents and family overseas. Talanoa with a Paramount
Chief in Samata-i-Tai, Savai’i revealed monthly village meetings take place where speeches are made
174
Mafile’o, T., et al. (2024a). 24.
175
Cited in Steven, H., (2024).10.
176
Nailasikau Halauitui, D. (2024b).11.
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regarding keeping the peace, and in which they ‘talk about the future’. Every January, a plan is made for the
year for the village, including setting expectations around land use, production expectations.
177
One research participant suggested some sub-national variation in the strength and importance of traditional
village structures and processes, including decision-making. This participant reflected that this may now be
stronger in Savai’i compared with Upolu, due to overseas or western influences in Upolu more so than
Savai’i.
178
In the communities in the seven countries where the University of Auckland research team conducted
fieldwork, there were formal committees responsible for dealing with significant community concerns and
committed to ensuring community wellbeing. These “were primarily consultative and mostly comprised
elders, church leaders, traditional leaders and where they existed, representatives of government”
179
They
note that one community mentioned a series of community meetings following a significant flooding event,
in which families were encouraged to relocate to government land further inland. They report that,
ultimately, the final decision rested with the families, with some stating that the relocation site was “was too
far away from ‘home’ and from the sea.” Those who relocated still returned to visit and were happy to have
moved.
Different decision-making processes may exist at the community-level within the same country. In Pukapuka,
for example, moving off the island entirely because of concerns about climate change has featured at the
community-level. As one interviewee pointed out:
Some years back, with the previous Council, we spoke about where we could possibly move to.
Maybe to our other higher islands, like Rarotonga, Ngaputoru [southern Island grouping of Atiu,
Mauke, Mitiaro and Takutea] or Mangaia, where it is higher ground. This was just a bit of
brainstorming just in case the sea level rises and our land will be covered by the sea, we will request
to Rarotonga, Ngaputoru or Mangaia to take us. At that time, we didn’t think of New Zealand, but I
think New Zealand would be better for us, our people are there, and everything is there.
180
This case study describes a ‘unique’ collective decision-making approach where village and church authorities
play important roles in planning and implementing projects.
However, echoing the research in Samoa and Tonga about the need to be attuned to sub-national, island-
specific nuances regarding the strength of traditional decision-making structures, one interviewee on
Pukapuka indicated that the degree to which the Aronga Mana (customary leaders group) influences what
happens on Pukapuka might be unusual. This is because on other islands the mana of the Aronga has been
assumed by the Member of Parliament or the Island Council.
181
Other important features of decision-making are noted by the research.
First, although influenced by community-level discussion, final mobility-related decision-making tends to
sit at the family or household level. At this level, decision-making in the context of climate-change and
disaster-related (im)mobility is closely tied to land tenure and governance systems.
182
It is to be noted,
however, that household-level decision-making will not always be determinative of (im)mobility in this
context. As the research into the relocations which occurred after the 2022 volcanic eruption in Tonga,
177
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).
178
Idem. 88.
179
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024a). 7.
180
Newport, C. et al. (2024d).11.
181
Ibid.
182
This is addressed in greater detail in the section ‘The Driver’.
84 | P a g e
establishes, the confluence of the impact of hazard on populations within an exposed settlement and the
particular land tenure and governance arrangements in place may mean that mobility-related decision-
making is taken out of family hands.
Second, that decision-making, while gendered, does not mean that women do not influence decisions at
the village- and household-level. The University of Auckland’s report ‘Community-level decision making:
Dealing with Mobility’ note that women were on the village committees, albeit as representatives of their
gender group.
183
Describing their role in aiga-level decision-making processes, participants in the women’s’
workshop in Lalomanu in Samoa shared with the University of Waikato that their role is to provide advice
on the benefits of a given decision; to openly discuss all aspects of the decision, including the implications;
to make sure a decision is fair for all family members; to support the decision (once made); and to prepare
the family (and/or the village) for what is decided.
184
Finally, and importantly, the research highlights that the perspectives of persons of authority at the village
level is nuanced and highly attuned to the trade-offs which shape household-level decisions about staying
in place or moving. This is demonstrated by talanoa in Samoa:
I encourage people not to leave here – we are higher and safer here than other places. This land and
its position is a gift from God… Apia is one of the most flood prone places in Samoa. (Paramount
Chief, Savai’i)
When I preach I say to stay here. I say, if you stay in Samoa you boss yourself. You won’t miss your
parents. You go to New Zealand to work? The palagi will boss you… it is ok if single people go
overseas, get educated. I say ‘don’t forget your kainga when you get something in your hand’…
people don’t really come to consult me on decisions to join the RSE anymore. It’s all political now.
(Reverend, Savai’i)
185
Decision-making and staying in place/immobility
The research in Tonga highlights that both voluntary and involuntary factors may coexist as influencing a
household-level decision to remain in place. Pa’atangata, a settlement on a narrow sand spit in eastern
Nuku’alofa on the outskirts of Tongatapu, is particularly exposed to cyclonic storm surges and was impacted
by the post-eruption tsunami in 2022. Many of those settled in this area are largely relocated from other
island groups in Tonga. The research there established that, while lack of financial capital was highlighted by
many as influencing why they remained in place despite the risk, obligations to family also featured as a
factor. As one research participant felt compelled to explain,
Forgive me, I feel I need to explain my responses. Though I’ve said I have not moved and do not plan
to move, it is because I cannot move, not because I don’t realise the risk of living [in Pa’atangata]. I
do not have the [financial] means to move, but I am also the eldest in the family. I need to stay to look
after my parents, as well as my younger siblings who are not married. (Research participant,
Pa’atangata)
186
This sense of obligation may be particularly strong in Tonga. The University of Waikato observe “one’s
fatongia – their obligation and fulfilling one’s role (to the family, to church even obligations to the land itself),
is a deep-set and critical driver of behaviour for Tongans. Obligation came up frequently in discussions around
183
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024a).
184
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 89.
185
Idem, 87-88.
186
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). Case Study Pa’atangata.
85 | P a g e
mobility.”
187
Obligation to land derives from its role in nurturing the individual, the family and ancestors.
Research in Samoa revealed cases of children remaining in hazard-exposed family land in order to remain
close and care for their family (e.g., parents) buried in that land.
188
This is significant as the confluence of obligation and lack of financial capital will to be common at the
household level across the Pacific.
Many research participants also reflected on Samoa being where they preferred to remain, their attachment
to place and being in Samoa were seen by them as contributing to their sense of peace and wellbeing. As
one research participant from Savaii said,
No matter what, we will stay here. We will find ways to make our houses stronger to withstand the
changes. This is where I grew up, its where my roots are. This is where I belong .
189
This element of the research also generates a more nuanced understanding of immobility at the
international scale, with many research participants reflecting on their choice not to move abroad because
of the sense of peace and wellbeing they have, compared to the stress, pressures and cost associated with
moving abroad to New Zealand or elsewhere. This emerged in the family studies of Mana Pacific Consulting.
For example, a member of the Tumua Tafea family of Nanumaga, Tuvalu reflected:
Ki te aku loa, toku mafaufau loa pela, tino nei la fia move la ki tua mo Nanumaga… pela mo ...
mafulifuliga o ‘tau o aho… aku e fia noho loa iluga i te fenua nei… ona loa ko te filemu ... e tonu e
uke a mea pela, mea fai… kae ko koe loa, ko te filemu… pela la mo fenua kola, e tonu… kafai koe e
mafi i te galue, koe e ola ki te sene…e uke hoki a fakalavelave tupu e haa ke iloa pela…
[To me personally, most people wanted to move out of Nanumaga… like ... (because) of the threats
of climate change… but I wanted to stay here on the island… only because of ‘filemu’ (peace)… of
course, we have many contributions to the community… but it is the ‘filemu’ (that makes me
wanted to stay)… unlike those bigger countries… if you are strong in working, you will survive as you
will need money (to survive) … there are also many other problems that you will never know…]
190
A common sentiment emerged in interviews in Tonga where “many shared feelings of peacefulness in Tonga,
being able to wake up and do this and that”. Many spoke of the fact that overseas everything costs money,
while in Tonga one doesn’t need paid employment to live or to feed their family. Interviewees valued the
sense of security around food access in Tonga:
if you’re hungry in Tonga you just go down to your uncles for food!
(Fanau’ifo’ou, talanoa, Nuku’alofa, March 2023).
191
Decision-making structures and informal selements
Informal settlements can be, but far from always are, inhabited by communities with no settled community-
level decision-making structures. Often there is some community governance structure and leadership
around which decision-making on matters relevant to climate (im)mobility can be wrapped.
187
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).
188
Morrison, S. et al (2024b). 10.
189
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 88.
190
Peneta Hauma, T. (2024) Tumua Tafea family of Nanumaga, Tuvalu Pacific Climate Mobility Family Stories Case Study. Mana Pacific
Consultants Ltd. 12.
191
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024h). 35.
86 | P a g e
These are highlighted in community studies on the Lord Howe and Red Beach communities in the Solomon
Islands. In Lord Howe, the informal settlement is inhabited by ethnic Polynesians who migrated to Honiara
between 1940s-1960s for economic reasons. It has a multi-layered governance structure and retains a chiefly
system, with the Chief assisted by a Honiara-based committee on issues concerning village health, law and
order. There is also a Lord Howe Settlement Committee which owns the area encompassing the Lord Howe
Settlement meaning, any issues or disagreements by occupants must be taken to the Committee.
192
Red
Beach (Tenaru) is an informal settlement of residents of Polynesian descent originally from Sikaiana in
Malaita. Here also committees are established for dealing with community issues such as policing and
livelihoods diversification by securing grant funding for the establishment of Red Beach Sikaiana Cultural
Village, which attracts tourists and visitors.
193
What emerges is that community-based structures will be a key focal point for local action on matters
relating to the impacts of climate change. While in some settings structures may need to be established to
ensure community participation and consent, there will typically be an existing local framework, which can
be adapted or developed as needs be, around which a process to ensure meaningful community engagement
around (im)mobility can begin to be mapped.
Transnaonalism and transnaonally distributed families
Support across ‘place’
Turning to Aotearoa New Zealand, in 2009, at the first whole-of-government, multi-stakeholder conference
looking specifically at climate change related migration in the South Pacific and its policy implications for
Aotearoa New Zealand, the then Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs drew attention to a then recent study
carried out among Pacific host communities (McLeod, 2010). McLeod notes participants were asked to
describe positive settlement outcomes.
194
Echoing the point made earlier about the dynamic nature of
‘place’, McLeod observed:
Central to the groups’ definitions of positive settlement outcomes was the notion that migration and
settlement are not static, separate, or linear concepts that start with a point of departure, migration,
and then settlement. Participants did not separate from their land and kin of origin to settle in the
new context. Rather their motivation was to grow ‘family’ in the new context; to create another home
with secure employment, increased earning power, and increased educational achievement to share
with kin at home in the Pacific and elsewhere in the world.
195
McLeod describes the study’s range of findings, including the socio-economic burdens Pacific communities
face when assisting others with their resettlement in New Zealand. She identifies a need for policies to
support host families to carry out this function.
The research sheds further light on this dynamic. The research in Tonga and Samoa, for example, shows how
values, and the ‘reciprocal flow of value’ are central to the dynamic in both countries. Tongan concepts such
as ofa/alofa and fatongia/tuatua (an obligation to fulfil one’s role in the family, and sometimes beyond) have
been aptly characterised by the Tongan politician, academic and author, Langi Kavaliku (1977) as “the
philosophy behind their way of life”. In Samoa, Fa'asāmoa describes “a network of values which interact, and
192
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024h). 3-4
193
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024j). 2-3, 7
194
McLeod, D., (2010) Potential Impacts of Climate Change Migration on Pacific Families Living in New Zealand, in B Burson (ed.)
Climate change and migration in the South Pacific region: policy perspectives Institute for Policy Studies. 135-158.
195
Idem. 139.
87 | P a g e
which have laid the foundation of customary practices in Samoa (and now for Samoan people outside of
Samoa). Some of these values include 'autasi (consensus), alofa, fa'aloalo (respect) and mamalu (dignity).”
196
This translates to various forms of material support. In talanoa with Samoan diaspora in New Zealand and
Australia, many reported regular payments, often pooled across a number of siblings, to cover
accommodation and healthcare costs of family members in Tonga and Samoa.
197
Substantial proportions
of both diaspora surveyed (80% of the Tongan diaspora and ~75% of the Samoan diaspora) reported
providing money to family in Tonga/Samoa at least once per year, while ~20% of both diaspora groups
reported sending building materials and household appliances to family in Tonga/ Samoa. There was
divergence in other areas, however. While ~half of Tongan diaspora reported sending food to family in Tonga
at least once per year, only 13% of the Samoan diaspora reported the same and twice as many members of
the Tongan diaspora than the Samoan diaspora reported sending items to family in Tonga/Samoa to sell as
part of a business or in order to generate some income.
198
Hosting was also a significant support provided. 75% of the Tongan diaspora surveyed, and 57% Samoan
diaspora surveyed said family moving from Tonga and Samoa respectively have stayed with them. The
research into transnational families demonstrates that the obligation to hosts can be burdensome.
I still stay with family. It’s too hard to find a place of my own. As long as the house is not too full,
then it’s okay because I help with buying things at home. That’s the other problem, it’s hard to get a
place to live.
Yes, we will need help with homes, financial help for the community, and jobs for those that move.
It’s like us when we moved here. We had to stay with family until we get our own place if we are
able to. Some people can’t get their own place and still staying with family. It’s okay if that’s their
own family’s house. But if it’s not, if they are renting, then it is a problem, because you only allowed
a certain number of people in the house. If you break the rules of your rental house, you will get
kicked out and then where are you going to go. It takes a long time to get a house from the Housing.
Definitely help in housing and accommodating families. Some of our families are already living in
overcrowded houses. This is no good. People get sick from living like this. It’s okay for a few days,
but not for more than two weeks.
199
The nature of the duties which can be faced by host communities include ‘burdens of obligation’ and
‘burdens of time’:
I think that our community are doing their best. But the problem in New Zealand is that you don’t
have time to do these community things or go to these community events. You go to work from 5, 6,
7, 8 in the morning till 5 or 6 in the evening, every day. By the time you finish work, you are tired.
The desire for our culture to live on its there. The problem is that there is no time. We do come
together for main events like our Pukapuka day, where we sing our tila, mako, and yimene in our
Tawas. Tawa Lalo and Tawa Ngake will compose new songs and chants and recite old ones. It is so
much fun.
200
196
Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024a).
197
Idem. 7.
198
Idem. 20.
199
Newport, C. et al. (2024).14.
200
Idem.16.
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Transnaonally distributed Pacific families
As observed earlier in this report, while intra-island mobility is nothing new, over the last 70 years, the scale
and pattern of Pacific mobility has changed significantly. This is due to the movement of increasing numbers
of nationals from some PICTs to countries on the Pacific rim, most notably Aotearoa New Zealand, the United
States of America and, increasingly, Australia. Across the transnational field, the most enduring and most
(im)mobility-relevant impact of this has been the creation of distributed kin/family groups.
Across the research, there is a common theme that transnational networks serve as vital support systems for
communities facing climate-induced (im)mobility. The Nukunukumotu case study highlights the plight of
families who, driven by the harsh realities of sea-level rise and land erosion, find themselves relocating across
national borders, often in the form of chain migration:
Toko lahi homau kāinga ‘i muli pea muimui atu ai pe fa’ahinga
[A lot of our people are overseas, and some are following them]
201
Despite the physical displacement, the strength of transnational networks facilitates the maintenance of
cultural and familial ties, ensuring that the essence of community is not lost in the physical transition.
202
Similarly, the Kwai Kwakwaru community illustrates how displaced groups actively work to preserve their
cultural identities. This case underscores the role of transnational cultural ties in maintaining a sense of
community and belonging, even in the face of displacement. The continuous flow of remittances from
migrants back to their home countries plays an economic role, supporting the resilience of communities
against climate vulnerabilities.
203
These networks not only help to maintain cultural and familial ties but also play a significant role in the socio-
economic stability of both origin and host communities. In Ambu, the research indicates that the local
economy is sustained by remittances and seasonal employment abroad illustrating the interconnectedness
of Pacific communities across the region.
204
The research confirms that mobility introduces complexities and challenges. Transnationalism facilitates the
maintenance and strengthening connections to people, place, identity, language and culture; however, it also
requires individuals to navigate and reconcile diverse cultural norms and legal networks. Furthermore, the
disparities in access to mobility owing to economic, legal, or social barriers can exacerbate inequalities within
transnational networks, affecting the cohesion and support these networks can provide.
The case study of the Tokelau Atafu community vividly highlights the complex dynamics of transnationalism
and demonstrates how transnational networks play a crucial role in preserving Tokelau cultural identity. This
is evident in the transnational community's participation in cultural practices and language use, at places like
the Matauala Community Hall in Porirua, Wellington, Aotearoa New Zealand. Importantly, the study also
illustrates the importance of relationships between the Tokelau transnational population and Ngāti Toa
Rangatira, the mana whenua of Porirua, and how the hall has become a shared community resource space
through which this relationship is strengthened.
205
Recognising Māori as integral to the transnational field is reflected within the research as being important to
the transnational community in terms of honouring Māori while fulfilling legal and Treaty obligations,
201
Nailasikau Halauitui, D. (2024b).10.
202
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024e).
203
Filoa, A. (2024).
204
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024e).
205
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024f). 9.
89 | P a g e
fostering meaningful relationships based on shared cultural understandings, cultural identities and
aspirations. Acknowledging the significance of the relationship between the Tokelau transnational
population and Ngāti Toa Rangatira highlights the importance of engaging with indigenous communities
within transnational contexts. This relationship could be further strengthened by Māori sharing “experiences
that could be of value with those in the Pacific in the context of future climate change mobility.”
206
The family case study on the Gwailao tribe from Ngongosila Islands includes mobility stories of circular
mobility from Ngongosila Islands to the mainland of Malaita Province and as well as reflections from those
who have more permanently relocated to Honiara and Aotearoa New Zealand. These accounts reflect a
variety of factors influencing mobility, including environmental hazards such as tsunamis, as well as food
insecurity and economic prospects.
207
A significant aspect highlighted within this case study is the tribe's spiritual and communal resilience amid
environmental challenges such as disappearing reefs and declining fish populations. Despite these
adversities, the tribe remains deeply connected to their land and heritage, drawing strength from spiritual
beliefs and communal values. Participants living away from Gwailao also share deep attachment to the
village. Despite some members migrating to Honiara and Aotearoa New Zealand in search of better
opportunities, the essence of the tribe's interconnectedness and resilience endures across borders.
Intergenerational dialogues within the tribe highlight a shared awareness of challenges and the necessity to
protect their way of life. The younger generation expresses worries about the diminishing resources on
Ngongosila, prompting the urgency for adaptation while maintaining cultural identity. Meanwhile, elder
members pass down traditional knowledge and stories, stressing the importance of resilience and looking
ahead.
Living transnaonally
A defining condition of the “connected Pacific” is the interdependence of families living in the islands and
their extended families living overseas. This section incorporates insights from a small sample of research
participants and provides compelling examples of how interpersonal connections, cultural exchanges,
economic interdependence, and interconnectedness contribute to and strengthen Pacific transnationalism.
This synthesis seeks to highlight the breadth and nuance of discussions on Pacific transnationalism and
relationality by presenting discrete examples that illustrate the different dimensions evident across the
research.
The concept of transnationalism manifests in various dimensions across the Pacific, as evidenced by case
studies illustrating interpersonal, cultural, and economic ties that span national borders. In
Nukunukumotu
208
, families facing environmental challenges like sea-level rise and land erosion have
relocated to other countries, yet they maintain strong cultural and familial connections to their homeland.
These ties serve to affirm their identity and preserve their sense of belonging, highlighting the interpersonal
dimension of transnationalism.
It seems that the diaspora overseas, Nukunukumotu people for example, are drawn to affirm their
identity through kāinga linkages. That without doubt leads to their land of origin, in this case,
Nukunukumotu.
209
206
Morrison et al. (2023).
207
Sanga, F. (2024).
208
Nailasikau Halauitui, D. (2024).
209
Nailasikau Halauitui, D. (2024). 13.
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Similarly, in the Kwai Kwakwaru
210
community, the practice of "tok stori," where stories and experiences are
shared among tribe members despite geographical separation, demonstrates the cultural dimension of
transnationalism. These discussions reinforce cultural identity and community bonds, although migration can
sometimes lead to feelings of disconnection among youth and tensions over issues like land ownership, as
seen in Vaiea
211
.
Moreover, the economic dimension of transnationalism is evident in examples from Kiribati, Papua New
Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Remittances from family members working overseas play a vital role in
supporting communities, providing financial stability and resources for those left behind. This economic
interdependence underscores the interconnectedness between Pacific nations and highlights how
transnational networks facilitate the flow of resources across borders.
Looking to the future, research exploring potential scenarios of international migration in response to climate
change impacts in Tonga and Samoa suggests that transnationalism linked to environmental change will
increasingly influence migration patterns, as communities adapt to changing conditions and seek
opportunities in other countries.
212
The separation of these dimensions of transnationalism is not intended to overshadow the relationality
between these different dimensions. Cultural ties influence both perceptions of home and migration
decisions, while economic factors drive individuals and families to seek opportunities elsewhere.
Environmental changes directly impact livelihoods and resources, prompting displacement and shaping
perceptions of future risk. Interpersonal relationships shape migration patterns and experiences, serving as
both support networks and sources of tension. These dimensions interact dynamically, shaping the complex
processes of climate change-related mobility and highlighting the need for comprehensive approaches to
support affected communities.
The study of the Vaiea
213
community in Niue illuminates the interconnectedness of various dimensions of
transnationalism between PICTs. Originating from Nuitao in Tuvalu, the Vaiea community illustrates
transnational ties as Tuvaluan families have settled in Niue, and their discussions on land and marine tenure
that reveal a transnational dimension to shared resources. Additionally, this case study highlights a degree
of cultural and social integration within the community.
Similarly, transnationalism through diverse migration pathways is illustrated by youth from Aruligo
214
and
Red Beach
215
who aspire to participate in Australian and Aotearoa New Zealand labour schemes for better
opportunities, illustrating cross-border movements for employment that impact economic and social ties.
Personal relationships also serve as bridges between cultural and national identities.
Despite climate change challenges, many Pacific community members prioritise remaining connected to their
ancestral lands, reflecting the deep cultural ties that shape responses to environmental changes. Moreover,
generational differences in views highlight evolving identities, with younger members often more receptive
to mobility as an adaptation strategy.
216
210
Filoa, A. (2024). Kwakwaru Tribe of East Malaita, Solomon Islands - Pacific Climate Mobility Family Stories Case Study. Mana Pacific
Consultants Ltd
211
Ibid.
212
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d).
213
Newport, C. et al. (2024f).
214
Newport, C., et al. (2024f).
215
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., & Galokale, K. (2024j). Red Beach: A community case study from The Solomon Islands.
Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
216
We examine youth attitudes to mobility in the ‘Future scale, pattern and impacts’ section.
91 | P a g e
Pacific transnational networks play a pivotal role in shaping decisions about whether to move in response to
climate challenges or to stay and adapt. These networks, often woven through families and communities that
span across borders, are not just social constructs but pathways that influence economic opportunities,
cultural preservation, and personal choices in profound ways.
The research teams highlighted various ways transnational families living in countries on the Pacific rim
support their relatives in the islands, including offering opportunities to consider overseas destinations for
future migration. The evidence shows that family members abroad play an important role in transnationally
distributed family groups by supporting their kin in home communities. This support promotes choices about
whether to move and is likely to directly influence the future scale and pattern of mobility. As climate change
continues, the influence of transnational family support on mobility is likely to grow even more significant
.
Therefore, the research shows the important role overseas members of transnationally distributed family
groups play in decisions influencing the scale and pattern of international migration, as well as shaping its
impact. The research suggests this is a common feature of life within transnationally distributed families.
The transmission of information about the sometimes harsh realities of international migration as an aspect
in decision-making also featured strongly in the research. Building awareness of what international migration
involves on the part of those moving and those hosting is an important element of transnational
relationships:
When our people come over, families generally look out for them and help them settle. But I think
with this situation of movement of everyone for good, there needs to be a lot of awareness. I mean
awareness on both sides.
217
In Samoa, for example, a Paramount chief in Savai’i shared how a Matai overseas influences decision-making
in the village through family in Samoa and the fact that the Matai resides overseas did not lessen the
weighting of their input. Several other research participants in Samoa shared how family overseas participate
in, and influence aiga decision-making, including in mobility scenarios. Participants in Tonga shared how
family (typically children but, in the case of an unmarried female participant, an adult cousin) had directly
encouraged them to move to live with them abroad.
218
The most common reported role in mobility decision-making was providing information to help with the
decision (Tongan diaspora) or providing financial support and information to help with the mobility decision
(Samoan diaspora). A slightly higher proportion of the Samoan diaspora (50%) reported involvement than
for the Tongan diaspora (40%). Nevertheless, these are large percentages. The various forms of diaspora
involvement include:
a. being first responders in post-disaster settings. Participants (both in Tonga, but mainly in Samoa)
shared with the team how diaspora family provided support financially, in-kind and through physical
support following natural disasters including deciding to return to Tonga or Samoa temporarily to
clean up or rebuild a family house.
b. leveraging international networks, and in particular international churches in which the diaspora
forms an important part of the congregation, to provide post-disaster relief and support.
c. providing critical direct financial and livelihoods/income stream support and for disaster risk
reduction and climate change adaptation at the village-/community-level.
217
Newport, C. et al. (2024a).
218
Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024a).
92 | P a g e
d. communicating that land, over which they have title or lease is available for the purposes of growing
crops or for resettlement.
219
The evidence is significant in that it demonstrates how the support provided by socially and economically
entrenched overseas family members directly influences the scale and pattern of existing disaster and
climate change-related (im)mobility in PICTs. First, it ensures that both the scale and impact of existing
disaster displacement is minimised. Second, by reducing vulnerability to hazards, it allows households and
communities to choose to stay in place. Third, by making land available for relocation it increases the flex of
land tenure arrangements in PICTs to absorb future movement.
One final point of note, is the making of decisions to send younger family members to home communities to
strengthen intergenerational relationships and to deepen understandings through immersion in cultural
knowledge and practices:
I think it’s a good thing for our children from New Zealand to go and see Wale. To get to know their
family there. To see where they come from. Have a change in the pace of life. It will be a good
change. You can get a chance to rest even if you go every day to the taro swamp or prepare the food
the way that our parents did – the traditional food. It will be good. (Pukapuka)
220
We situate such mobility practiced by transnationally distributed family groups within the broader discussion
around circulation later in this report.
Women and (im)mobility in the context of climate change
Understanding gender dynamics in the context of climate change is essential because climate impacts are
not experienced equally by all. Gender significantly influences how individuals and communities are affected
by and respond to these challenges. This section delves into some of the unique experiences and
contributions of women included in the research. Whilst gender diverse perspectives and experience
focused on men and other gender are not fully explored within the research, some observations have
emerged. These are addressed at the end of this section to signal that more research with these groups is
warranted in the future.
Women, everyday life and community resilience
The research highlights how women are integral to building and maintaining community resilience in the
face of climate change. Their leadership, traditional knowledge, and commitment to family and community
demonstrate the necessity of climate strategies that empower women and leverage their unique strengths.
Women in Tonga and Samoa mentioned that they hadn't previously considered the idea of resilience in
specific terms; it was generally assumed that one simply perseveres in the face of adversity.
221
Some women
identified with the notion of ‘bouncing back’ after setbacks. In Samoa, many women emphasised their faith
and religion as a crucial source of strength, highlighting the importance of regular church attendance. They
also stressed the significance of maintaining the traditional Samoan way of life and the values of fa’a Samoa,
such as respect, which they believe are essential for a peaceful and happy life for all.
222
219
Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024a). 10-11. The communication about land availability arose in talanoa with members of the Tongan diaspora.
This is interesting given the particular structure of land-holding in Tonga
220
Newport, C. et al. (2024a). 12.
221
Vaioleti, L., Morrison, S., Vaioleti, T. (2024c) (Im)movable Women. University of Waikato. 15.
222
Ibid.
93 | P a g e
Family was also identified as both a source of motivation and support. Women expressed that their love for
and from their families gave them the strength to continue facing challenges. Although they did not
specifically label it as such, women in both Tonga and Samoa mentioned overseas mobility options as a form
of resilience. They were confident that their family members abroad would support them if they needed to
relocate. Additionally, many women shared that they have relied on and will continue to lean on their
overseas family members for help with rebuilding their lives after natural disasters.
223
The experiences shared during Talanoa with women in Tonga and Samoa led the University of Waikato to
note that “women are the social weavers, the ‘glue’ for the family, and keeper of critical genealogical
knowledge that affords a great deal of power.”
224
In the Tongan context women’s roles and influence are
described as being pivotal to household and community resilience:
“some reflected on older Tongan society (one to two generations ago) and shared how the mothers
in the family decided how food would be shared within the family, initiated the sharing of food with
neighbours and others of status in the broader community and were deeply ‘tapped in’ to the social
fabric of the community – effectively nurturing, building and protecting the family’s critical social
capital.”
225
Women as wealth creators
In traditional Tongan and Samoan societies, women are recognised as the creators of wealth through the
skilled production of cultural items such as ngatu/siapo (tapa cloth), woven mats, and other crafted treasures
(koloa). These works are often produced through village women’s committees, with agreed-upon outputs
expected annually. These items are presented and celebrated at significant events and often given to estate
holders, Matai, and Churches as a sign of respect, contributing to the maintenance of va lelei (good
relationships). Some items are sold to generate family income. Women also play a crucial role in providing
the appropriate koloa for major social events like funerals, weddings, or baptisms. For example, a senior
woman from Kolomotu’a, Tonga, shared that if there is a death in New Zealand, people will travel to Tonga
to collect the necessary koloa, often accompanied by women from Tonga.
226
Women are also seen as koloa themselves, embodying knowledge, skill, and wisdom. In Tongan and Samoan
cultures, ‘ilo (Tongan)/iloa (Samoan) can mean knowledge or insight, while poto refers to the wise
application of this knowledge. Achieving an advanced stage of poto brings respect and an esteemed social
position. Women are responsible for observing those with greater knowledge and experience and passing
this knowledge to others, including the younger generation, through demonstration and practice. As one
female community leader in Samoa stated, “to pass on knowledge is to practice it”.
227
Overall, women
emphasised that practising their crafts, such as weaving in group settings, is vital for well-being. These group
activities allow women to observe and share knowledge, contributing significantly to community cohesion
and resilience.
228
Women in disaster preparedness, responses, and recovery
Women in Tonga and Samoa play an important role in disaster preparation, response, and recovery. Women
in Lalomanu village, Samoa, emphasise the importance of fulfilling their roles within the family and village
for broader well-being and this commitment extends to disaster preparedness, where they assume
223
Ibid.
224
Idem. 6.
225
Ibid.
226
Ibid.
227
Idem. 9.
228
Idem. 15.
94 | P a g e
significant responsibilities in coordinating community responses and recovery efforts.
229
Their experiences
with tropical cyclones have equipped them with valuable knowledge for responding to future disasters.
230
A resident from the flood-prone village of Lelata shared that women increasingly bear the burden of
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. She noted that women often manage
evacuations during floods, as men are usually occupied with formal employment either in the country or
overseas. In Lelata, a woman shared that they are responsible for the arduous task of cleaning up and she
expressed frustration over the lack of recognition and support for the crucial roles women play in disaster
management.
231
In Tonga, women are increasingly taking on leadership roles in disaster preparedness, response, and
recovery, not only within their households but also at the community and village levels. For example, one
woman chairs an all-women disaster preparedness committee in the district of Kolomotu’a. This committee
organises community disaster drills, lobbies local government for funding, and maintains emergency food
kits at a local church hall. The formation of such an all-women-led group is unique, and participants in related
workshops expressed aspirations to establish more all-women groups focused on enhancing district
resilience and improvement.
232
Personal accounts highlight the critical roles women play during disasters. A woman who had relocated from
the island of ‘Atataa, now residing in the village of ‘Atataa Si’i, recounted how she carried her elderly mother
and uncle up a hill to escape the tsunami triggered by the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai eruption. Other
women from Tongatapu also shared how they led coordination and evacuation efforts, confirming the
whereabouts of each family member and making crucial decisions during the crisis.
233
Women’s decision-making and leadership are vital in tackling climate change-related challenges and
ensuring community mobility and safety, contributing significantly to the resilience of Pacific Island
communities. In Tonga and Samoa, women are particularly crucial in leadership roles, especially during
emergencies. At a women's workshop in Tonga, participants emphasised their duty to consider "everything
and everyone" when making critical decisions during crises. Women frequently advise family and village
elders, evaluating the pros and cons of different options, discussing fairness, and considering the impacts on
all family members. Although men may have the final decision, women exert considerable influence on
decision-making, often in subtle ways.
234
Specific challenges and vulnerabilies faced by women
Access to essential services is critical for women in the Pacific, especially in the context of climate change
and mobility. Pacific women experience some of the poorest health outcomes globally, including high rates
of maternal and newborn deaths, low antenatal coverage, high rates of home births, low contraceptive use,
and high rates of unplanned pregnancy. These issues are exacerbated by significant barriers to accessing
adequate maternal health services, particularly in remote communities. Ensuring access to health services
and infrastructure is vital for improving health outcomes and resilience among women. As climate change
continues to impact the region, enhancing access will be crucial for mitigating health risks and supporting
the well-being of women and their communities.
229
Vaioleti,L. et al. (2024c).
230
Idem. 10.
231
Ibid.
232
Idem. 9.
233
Ibid.
234
Idem.
95 | P a g e
Access to basic resources such as water, sanitation and food was highlighted by numerous participants as a
significant and additional climate and mobility related challenge for women. Due to the impacts of climate
change, in some communities, some women must now walk long distances to fetch water, and in situations
where water is scarce, conflicts may arise.
235
According to one participant in Aruligo,
"Having a good life is helping access to proper sanitation, water and helping women in the
community who are struggling. Because currently, they have to walk to the valley to fetch water for
drinking and washing. Due to conflict with those owner of the water sources, so they stop pipe to
come to the village."
236
The challenge of access to safe drinking water was also captured by during a conversation with a member of
Kwakwaru Tribe of East Malaita:
“Insaed lo island blo mifala hem garem wata bat taem high tide and si kam insaed aelan hem kam
go insaed lo wata, den taem hem no rain mifala ba no garem wata na lo tank blo mifala. So mifala
have to go moa lo maenlan fo tek wata [Our island used to have drinking water, but since we have
had high tides, the tides make our drinking water salty, and when we have no rain our tanks are
empty so we have to go to the mainland to fetch water] (middle-aged female)”
237
Water and sanitation also emerge within the research as a challenge identified by female participants.
Sanitation issues reveal the diverse impacts of climate change on different community groups:
"In terms of health, we need health workers, good facilities to help the mothers to deliver. The
mother’s in the community find it difficult to find water; kids don’t drink clean and safe water."
(Managalas)
"Another challenges face is in terms of sanitation. Before the mangrove was used for defecation.
That is one side if for female and another side for male.Today most of the mangroves disappeared
so people no longer have privacy. However, on the other hand open defecation also pollute their sea
as well." (Ambu)
"In the community they also have barriers in terms of sanitation because old people needs their
toilet to be closer to the house." (Aruligo)
238
In many Pacific communities, remoteness due to vast distances across the ocean or difficult land terrain, is
making travel to medical facilities challenging. For example, communities like Papae/Kolosulu in the
highlands of the Solomon Islands face difficulties due to inadequate roads and infrastructure, preventing
women from receiving timely medical services and interventions.
239
In Managalas, health workers and
adequate facilities are essential for mothers giving birth, but women struggle to find clean water, and
children lack access to safe drinking water. Ambu faces challenges with sanitation practices, as the loss of
mangroves has eliminated traditional defecation areas, compromising privacy and contributing to sea
pollution due to open defecation. In Aruligo, older adults need toilets close to their homes, highlighting
sanitation barriers. These disparities underscore how access to proper sanitation systems is influenced by
gender and age
240
.
235
Ng Shiu,R. et al. ( 2024b).
236
Ng Shiu,R. et al. ( 2024b).16-17.
237
Filoa, A. (2024). 14.
238
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024).17.
239
Idem. 20.
240
Idem. 17.
96 | P a g e
Economic constraints also impact women's ability to secure nutritious food, leading to food insecurity and
health issues. The burden of ensuring family well-being often falls on women, who prioritise the needs of
their children and community over their own.
241
In Ambu, access to nutritious food was identified by
participants as disproportionately impacting women and girls in the community. Enhancing women’s access
to personal and/or community gardens will be an important consideration in terms of promoting everyday
resilience at the community level.
In the informal relocated community of Red Beach, members shared that fishing has become increasingly
challenging for women who typically fish near the shoreline, while deep-sea fishing with men has gained
prominence. One community member noted,
"It’s now more difficult for women to catch fish easily. Sometimes you have to fish all day to catch
enough for your family, unless you go out with the men into the deep sea by boat. Fish have become
scarce due to overfishing, population increase, the use of dynamite along the shore, which destroys
breeding sites, and warming seas that shift these sites."
242
Research undertaken with the Patnav clan families in Yaga Village on Umboi Island further illustrates the
challenge of food security:
“Today, if you go to the nearest reef that is within our perimeters, you won't find any shell or fish. In
the past, my grandparents were able to bring back a lot of fish from these nearby reefs. Today, we
have to paddle far to bring back fish. And even when we go and fish or dive outside the boundaries,
we (women) get chased. It is no longer safe.”
243
Climate change has significant health-related impacts on women and their families, affecting their sense of
security and well-being. For instance, women in West Coast communities on Niue expressed reluctance to
leave their homes despite the risks, emphasising their responsibility towards their children.
244
In some
communities, relocation has become necessary for safety due to climate change. Families in places like
Bareho, Papae/Kolosulu, Pukapuka, and Vaimaanga have started moving within their villages to safer areas.
In Managalas, plans for relocating women and children closer to rivers or bushes during droughts have been
discussed to ensure access to food and safety.
245
Women in Tongatapu expressed a deep love for their land
and a strong sense of obligation to care for it.
Economic impacts and opportunies
Access to economic opportunities is vital for women in the Pacific, particularly as they face the challenges of
climate change. The research findings evidence how (im)mobility has adversely impacted Pacific women’s
economic security in two areas.
First, relocation has disrupted traditional economic activities and significantly reduces income sources for
many women. In a workshop held in Lalomanu, Samoa, women reported that relocation had severely
impacted their livelihoods. Many had previously earned a good income from small businesses selling crafts
and seafood along the coastal road. However, relocation inland has cut them off from easy access to the sea
and the flow of potential customers, drastically reducing their income.
246
241
Vaioleti, L. et al (2024c).
242
Ng Shiu, R et al (2024b). 15.
243
Saguba, L. (2024). 16.
244
Ng Shiu, R. et al (2024b). 28.
245
Ibid.
246
Vaioleti, L. et al (2024c). 11.
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In Tonga, the economic impacts of relocation were found to be similarly significant. Women from Mango
and ‘Atataa, who have been relocated, have lost access to pandanus plants essential for weaving, a
traditional income-generating activity. This loss has left them without the means to be productive and self-
reliant. A skilled weaver from ‘Atataa, now living in a church hall in Tongatapu, expressed despair over her
uncertain housing situation, which prevented her from continuing her weaving work and earning an
income.
247
Economic barriers make it extremely difficult for displaced families to rebuild their lives. Families forced to
relocate often lack the financial means to start anew, and minimal government assistance exacerbates their
struggles.
Second, seasonal work programmes, which often take men—and increasingly women—away from their
families, pose additional social and cultural challenges. In Samoa, a female pastor highlighted the issue of
men leaving for work abroad and not returning, leaving women to raise children alone. A senior government
official expressed frustration over the unrecognised impacts of seasonal work and mobility on women,
sharing tragic stories of overwhelmed women taking their own lives. The loss of staff members to seasonal
work programs also disrupts community support systems and economic stability
248
.
Yet, there is also opportunity where women serve as the primary and most reliable sources of income. For
example, the economic stability of a family heavily depends on three sisters working in New Zealand. Their
financial support is crucial for managing economic challenges, coping with the impacts of climate change,
and enhancing overall resilience. However, these women face significant challenges, including the lack of
permanent residency in New Zealand, preventing them from bringing family members to live with them.
249
Moreover, the phenomenon of "missing men," due to overseas work, has led women to assume roles
traditionally held by men in Tonga. Women now engage in jobs such as electrical line work and sea shipping.
Data from the Tonga Statistics Department show an increase in women's employment across various sectors.
Women are also taking on more responsibilities in agriculture, leading community efforts to teach
agricultural skills. Notably, the top root crop exporter in Tonga is a woman.
250
Domesc violence
The challenges of climate change and mobility have exacerbated domestic violence against women in many
Pacific communities. Before relocation, women often reminisced about happier times spent with their
families and community, including playing with children in the ocean. Now, many of the women shared
challenging stories about greater levels of domestic violence in the home, reportedly mostly driven by
financial worries. The issue of increased domestic violence following relocation came up frequently in the
women’s workshop, with some women wishing for greater implementation of domestic violence laws to
protect the women in the village. In one-on-one talanoa with other women in Samoa, including those in
government and academia, they shared similar sentiments about the issue of violence against women,
particularly during times of uncertainty and disaster. One woman shared “Change brings that out in people
– it manifests in violence.” Another woman shared this perspective and related it to an ‘unaddressed history
of violence in Samoa.’
251
247
Idem.13.
248
Idem. 7.
249
Alofa, P (2024). 16.
250
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024c). 7.
251
Idem.11.
98 | P a g e
Gender-based violence is a persistent health and social issue across the Pacific region. A male community
member in Managalas described the precarious situation of a couple where the male partner continually
beats his female partner as she struggles to look after a growing family,
Giving birth to too many children can potentially kill her. So, this is the problem women are facing in
Naokanene.
252
Family planning is crucial for addressing some stressors of gender-based violence and is a key issue in Pacific
countries, where high natural fertility rates indicate limited options and choices for desired family size, often
tied to economic and educational aspirations for children. This was recognised by several participants in the
research, for example:
Having a good education must go with family planning because if there is no family planning then
there will be a lot of children and some of them will not attend formal education and only go to
traditional education" (Bareho).
253
"Their advice for young people is teaching them about family planning and birth control to reduce
population growth" (Red Beach).
254
...after a year or two in high school, my children often must stop due to financial constraints. This
situation strains our household, leading to their return home and inability to continue their
education. It would be beneficial to implement family planning measures within our community to
receive support in managing our children’s future education and ensuring their successful
completion of higher studies. (Member of the men’s community workshop, Mangalas).
255
Women and mobility
Within the research, women's leadership is highlighted as significant in navigating the complex challenges
brought about by climate change-related mobility in Pacific Island communities. Some women in the
research found relocation to be a positive experience, as highlighted in discussions with residents of Satitoa
in the Aleipata district. One woman expressed gratitude for improved amenities like a new school and better
infrastructure, such as newly sealed roads to their plantation land. She also appreciated the opportunity to
spread out housing, fostering a sense of privacy and independence within the community.
256
However, for many women affected by relocation in Tonga and Samoa, movement elsewhere has introduced
significant challenges that impact various facets of their lives. Women in these communities, who hold
influential roles at household, community, and church levels, face heightened anxiety regarding their social
vulnerability in the face of relocation. This fear is rooted in concerns about losing social status and the
recognition they have earned within their communities.
In Tonga, women voiced concerns about their limited land rights, which amplify their fears of future mobility.
Furthermore, unmarried women may feel particularly uneasy about leaving their family homes due to
restricted housing options and psychological unpreparedness. Similarly, in Samoa, women often feel a strong
sense of duty to their homeland and family, opting to stay despite environmental risks, illustrating their deep
cultural ties and personal commitments.
257
252
Ng Shiu, R. et al (2024b). 17.
253
Ibid.
254
Ibid.
255
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al (2024c). 8
256
Vaioleti, L. et al (2024c).13.
257
Idem. 11.
99 | P a g e
Financial constraints pose another significant barrier to adaptation in new locations. Women in Samoa note
the financial impracticality of starting anew, especially when relocating with no established support network.
As mentioned previously, this economic strain is exacerbated by a lack of government assistance.
Additionally, the psychological readiness for change proves challenging for many women, hindering their
ability to plan and adapt effectively to adverse scenarios.
258
Land and marine resources
Land management systems are often gendered, with rights, responsibilities, and decision-making power
typically allocated based on gender roles and norms. However, in some communities, women do hold land
rights. For instance, in Pukapuka, taro swamp plantations are inherited matrilineally, and women are
responsible for maintaining and passing on these lands. Similarly, in Matupit, Papua New Guinea, land
belongs to the Vunatarai clan under a matrilineal system, where the mother is the primary landowner.
259
In
Tonga the research highlights that women are particularly vulnerable due to current land laws that provide
them with tenuous land holding rights at best. While cultural norms like fatongia dictate that brothers and
their children will take care of female relatives, the encroachment of capitalism and individualism may
weaken these practices.
260
The intersection of land and marine resource management with climate impacts presents significant
challenges for women in the Pacific. The policies around land gifting, land leasing, and land holding rights,
especially for women, are critical in understanding how climate mobility affects them. Codifying land holding
rights for women is essential to reduce the reported land insecurity risks exacerbated by weakening
traditional values such as fatongia (obligation to care for and shelter women). Reviewing these policies can
engage critical stakeholders, including the influential overseas diaspora, to secure their input and support
for potential changes.
261
Generational concerns further complicate land management. In Matupit, disputes over land ownership arise
from inadequate information dissemination and adherence to matrilineal traditions. These conflicts are
exacerbated by climate mobility, as men marrying women from other regions leave their children without
land rights in Matupit, creating tension and uncertainty.
262
Customary land tenure systems, embedded in
local customs, traditions, and social norms, are relational, gendered, and generational. These systems
sustain community lives and livelihoods, manage resources, and guide decisions about migration within and
between boundaries, necessitating close negotiation.
263
In highland communities like Managalas in Papua
New Guinea, tensions over land are both physical and social, as women increasingly claim rights to land
traditionally passed down to sons. This shift challenges established norms and adds complexity to land
management in the context of climate mobility.
264
Understanding women’s role in environmental
management and resource preservation is also important and in St. John (Betio), a Women’s Group in Kiribati
has developed community waste and marine management plans to preserve resources and maintain clean
marine waters.
265
258
Ibid.
259
Newport, C. et al (2024b). 14.
260
Morrison, S. et al (2024b). 20.
261
Idem. 5.
262
Newport, C. et al (2024b). 21.
263
Idem. 14.
264
Idem. 21.
265
Idem. 14.
100 | P a g e
Other Gender Contexts: Men and the Rainbow Community
While the research has focused principally on situaon of women, this is not to underesmate the
importance of understanding gender implicaons of (im)mobility more broadly, for men and other gender
groups such as the rainbow community. We set out here observaons on these groups which emerged from
the research.
Differenal experiences of men
Understanding the experiences and perceptions of men in the context of climate change and mobility is
important for comprehensively addressing community resilience and adaptation strategies. Historically, men
have been recognised for their technical skills and knowledge, particularly in vital areas such as food planting
regimes and resource management. Traditionally, they were primarily responsible for tasks like firewood
collection, food preparation, cooking, and family cleanup prior to the introduction of indoor kitchens. In
Samoa, discussions in women's workshops underscored the significance of upholding traditional gender
norms within villages, to serve practical ends and to foster harmony within the aiga (extended family) and
the broader community.
266
Moreover, cultural practices like the haus boi, which serve as gathering places for young men, have evolved
differently across communities. While places like Tuam maintain these traditions as vital social and learning
environments under elder guidance, others, like Yaga, have seen declines in such spaces, impacting
community dynamics and knowledge transmission.
267
These spaces are important in terms of addressing
climate change -related (im)mobility: they not only facilitate socialisation but also play crucial roles in
community decision-making and resilience building.
Gender diversity
Future research on climate mobility must include an understanding of gender diverse experiences, including
those of individuals who identify as fakaleiti/fa’afafine in Tonga and Samoa. These participants face unique
challenges and their perspectives are crucial to consider in planning for future mobility scenarios.
In Tonga, fakaleiti participants shared their experiences and concerns regarding future mobility. They
discussed the difficulties of social acceptance within conservative Tongan culture, which often leads them to
take on community roles such as government jobs to increase their perceived value. Moreover, many
fakaleiti experience lower educational attainment due to bullying, which diminishes their ability to adapt in
mobility scenarios.
The research highlights that fakaleiti often prefer moving overseas, particularly to places like New Zealand
and Australia, where there is greater acceptance and opportunities for them. One participant expressed
enthusiasm about the prospect of relocating to New Zealand, emphasising the appeal of the lifestyle and
opportunities available there, humorously noting, "You have all the honey and cheeses!".
268
Including gender diverse perspectives in future research is essential for developing inclusive policies and
strategies that address the specific needs and challenges faced by different communities. Understanding
how gender identity intersects with climate mobility can lead to more effective support mechanisms and
adaptation strategies that promote resilience and well-being among all individuals, regardless of their
gender identity or expression. By amplifying these voices in research and policy, we can ensure that climate
266
Vaioleti, L. et al (2024c). 6
267
Ibid.
268
Idem. 12.
101 | P a g e
responses are equitable and inclusive, fostering environments where all individuals can thrive amid
environmental changes.
THE DRIVER OF CURRENT AND FUTURE CLIMATE-RELATED
(IM)MOBILITY
The research demonstrates that it is the intersecon and of localised populaon pressure, tenure (land
and marine), and food/water insecurity which has shaped the scale and paern of past and current
(im)mobility, and will shape the scale and paern of future (im)mobility arising in the context of climate
change.
These factors not only intersect but are highly interdependent. It is tenure which determines access to the
food and water resources necessary for sustenance. The size and age-sex structure of localised populaons
at any given me will place a parcular demand on systems of tenure and governance. This demand is
amplified when localised populaon trends outpace the capacity of local tenure systems, and the access
to water and food resources they govern, to cope. Such capacity will be undermined by future changes in
the environment – including degradaon and biodiversity loss and whether linked to climate change or
not – and by this means affect the scale and paern of future mobility by shaping decisions at the
household and family levels around whether to connue to stay in place, or whether to move.
We will return to how this mul-dimensional driver may manifest in terms of future scale, paern and impact
later in the report. For now, what is important to stress is that the intersecon and interdependency of these
factors has an enduring history of driving (im)mobility in the Pacific. Mobility in response to pressures
linked with access to resources (terrestrial and marine), populaon change (both growth and decline) and
water insecurity has long been a feature of life in many parts of the region.
The movement of I-Kiriba from drought-prone southern atolls and reef islands in the 1950s and 1960s to
islands in the Central Gilberts and to the Phoenix Islands is an example of voluntary relocaon, with some
support from the colonial administraon to relieve pressure on resources in their home islands and to have
access to more land for their own subsistence. Water insecurity contributed to the movement, and to the
subsequent reselement of those in the Phoenix Islands in the Solomon Islands.
269
The contemporary presence of this driver is reflected in the community studies. In the study on Takaeang,
Aranuka, the fieldwork revealed that the community were descendants of persons who had moved from
Southern drought-prone islands in Kiriba and had purchased the land.
270
The study on the Niutao
community that moved to Niue is an interesng example of transnaonal movement in response to resource
and populaon pressures on Niutao in Tuvalu. Research parcipants described how climate-change related
impacts were increasing food insecurity. In parcular, saltwater intrusion associated with sea-level rise was
affecng swamps where pulaka (taro), a tradional food source, is grown. This is causing some people to
contemplate migraon, either internally to Funafu, or abroad.
For me the reason why I would support migraon, if we take this crop named pulaka, before it is
very hard to die but as me went on to around 2002 it started becoming affected from underneath
the swamp. Then they started to die off. Time went on, there were completely no pulaka under the
swamp. Now there is no pulaka swamp. Now it is all dead. (Mens Focus Group, Niutao)
271
269
These relocations, and others in the post-World War Two colonial-era are described in Lieber (1970).
270
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024d).
271
Ng Shiu, R., et al. (2024g). 5.
102 | P a g e
In turn, the study on Funafu reveals just how the intertwining of tenure, localised populaon pressure and
food/water insecurity shapes internaonal migraon.
Back in the days people or families that jointly own lands easily have the right to access their family
lands, but nowadays it is very hard because most of the lands belongs to people are now own by
Government for developments purposes. And some people are really facing a lot of challenges
because of lands. Lands are limited to build houses for families or individuals who have rights to
lands, and geng more difficult. And this is one of the reason why people are moving or migrate to
other countries because not enough lands.
272
Localised populaon pressure
Populaon trends at the naonal level give rise to important mobility-relevant policy issues concerning
maers such as urbanisaon, employment, social support and, from a cross-border perspecve, immigraon.
Nevertheless, it is populaon dynamics at the local scale which helps drive the scale and paern of
(im)mobility and it is here where policy development needs to also focus aenon. That localised populaon
pressure is important was evident in the research. A research parcipant highlighted in a family study :
Taim ol i bin lusim Tuam na ol i kam insait em long populaon blong sidaun na hevi blong giraun
long kaikai [My parents le Tuam to come here because of increased in populaon on the Island and
the difficulty in culvang or growing food there. Also to allow enough land space for others on the
Island to use to grow food.] (Male elder, Patnav clan family, Yaga Village , Umboi Island, Papua New
Guinea)
In some communies, localised populaon pressure dynamics have resulted in sustained pressure on the
environment and contributed to increased food and water insecurity. A Church leader in Papae/Kolosulu,
Solomon Islands noted:
One main change is that land for gardening has become smaller due to the growing populaon. In
terms of gardening, it is usually in the same place, so the yields are not good. Also, water is affected
due to the cung down of trees. If it is a sunny period, water or a small stream dries up.
273
The family study in Nagamito Village in Papua New Guinea paints a similar picture nong that “[t]radional
salt producon and seaweed growth were integral to the livelihoods and cultural heritage of our community
in the past. Due to populaon growth and expansion of food gardens, compounded with annual climate
change impacts, large saltwater lakes/wells that grow seaweed and produce salt are lost.”
274
Many of the towns in coastal locaons have informal selements in locaons that are very vulnerable to
inundaon from waves, spring des and flooding of rivers, as well as strong winds and saltwater intrusion of
freshwater lenses (especially in towns on atolls). Community studies in the main urban areas in the Solomons
(Red Beach and Lord Howe Selement in Honiara), Kiriba (St John, Beo in South Tarawa), and Tuvalu
(Funafu) all made reference to problems linked with increasing populaon pressure and limits to access to
land for migrant families in the selements and the damage that wave erosion and saltwater intrusion were
doing to house and garden sites and to fresh water supplies.
272
Ng Shiu, R., et al. (2024f). 7.
273
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., Galokale, K., & Futaiasi, D. (2024i). Papae, Kolosulu, Guadalcanal Province: A community
case study from The Solomon Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland. 6.
274
Steven, H. (2024) Nagamito People of Korofeigu, Unggai Bena District, Eastern Highlands Province, Papua New Guinea - Pacific
Climate Mobility Family Stories Case Study. Mana Pacific Consultants Ltd. 20.
103 | P a g e
Land and marine tenure
All of the communies covered by the research have customary land and marine governance systems
embedded in local custom, tradions, and social norms which regulate how land and marine resources are
used and why, including in relaon to mobility to, from and within communies.
For example, in relaon to
the Tuvaluan community living in Niue it was remarked,
If someone want to build, they can build... if Tuvaluan families want to build or extend their homes,
that’s their prerogave, but they have to come and ask me (the Leveki) if it’s ok and I will tell them
it's ok or not. (Vaiea, Niue)
Tenure systems will also influence how communies negoate access to land and marine areas:
Before, the families that migrated first used to have areas on the reefs that they call ‘Ere.’ They used
to build wall stones on the reefs that mark their boundaries and the families that marks the
boundary are allowed to dive and fish in that area. (Aruligo, Solomon Islands).
Land tenure arrangements in Tonga are such that plans for future relocaons will involve negoaons not
only with the government but also with the Royal Estate and the nobles. In Tonga, there is a low incidence of
leasing agricultural land, currently in low-lying urban areas, for growing food or for home relocaon. There
is, however, an emerging pracce of land swaps on Ha’apai, where the Office of the Governor has contacted
heirs of Ha’apai land and is offering to provide land in Tongatapu in exchange for their Ha’apai land. Some
have taken up these offers, allowing some in Ha’apai impacted by significant coastal erosion to remain in
Ha’apai and relocate inland.
275
In summary:
Anecdotal evidence would suggest that perceived or actual issues with land availability in Tonga could
be a mobility barrier. Research parcipants have expressed in talanoa and in workshops that there is
a lack of land availability and/or land access for subsistence food producon or for relocang. Anxiety
has been expressed by a few around land availability, parcularly on islands of higher relave
elevaon (e.g., 'Eua) given expectaons that those islands may connue to host internally displaced
people. Others have shared concerns around emerging leasing and/or giing pracces that some
believe could further threaten land availability for Tongans in future.
276
The research generated by the teams usefully nuances a typology of movement (Fitzgerald 2022, adapng
Campbell et al 2007) developed for the Pacific Resilience Partnership. This highlights how different land
tenure arrangements may enable or constrain movement at various scales and the issues which can arise
with each type of movement. These movements are:
movement within customary territory;
movement to other customary territory (rural);
movement to alienated land (rural);
movement to other customary land (peri-urban); and
movement to alienated land (urban).
As to this typology, the research has revealed the following important insights.
275
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 36.
276
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b). 10.
104 | P a g e
Although the first type of movement (within customary territory) may be the least problemac in relave
terms, this is not to say that say that it is always problem-free. For example, the research in Samoa has
uncovered evidence of a shi away from living on inland plantaon sites in favour of leasing alienated land
in Apia. We return to this below.
Second, in terms of movement to non-customary territory (that is, all but the first bullet-pointed movement),
while migraon for marriage or work is an important mechanism by which movement occurs at the individual
scale, such movement elsewhere is collecve in nature, relaonally connected to allowing more people in
the form of other family members (oen the elderly and the very young at a minimum) to stay in place:
277
E rarabwa te Uea iroun tariu Ruta are e roonai n au reirei n minare i Tangintebu. I nako ni makuri is
Kirima ao e reke boou ikekei ao e reke naba aba. Ngai te bina n au utu ae waniman ngaira. Iataia
ae akea abau i Maiana bwa e nang mwai ngaira. I kukurei ba ea reke abau i Kirima ao ia katuka
Maiana bwa a babai iai tariu ma maneu.
I thank the Lord for my sister Ruta who sponsored me to do a ministerial course at Tangintebu. I
graduated and posted to Kirima to work. I got married and was able to get a land lease for me. I
am the last born in my family of eight. I know there is no land for me at Maiana because there are
so many of us in the family. I know that my siblings will have more land in Maiana to share. (Rote
and Ruta’s Family, Maiana Island, Republic of Kiriba)
278
distaem mifala lukm si hem raes fising hem lelebet had nao… mifala go lo Honiara fo mifala waka fo
helpem oketa families wea stae lo hom
[We realise with the high sea rise, it is harder to fish, so we have migrated to Honiara so that we can
work to support families.] (Kwai Kwakaru Tribe East Malaita, Solomon Islands)
279
As educaon and the populaon increase, the available land will become limited. So, in my opinion,
providing acvies that engage our students and future community members would be beneficial.
This could involve offering opportunies for connued educaon, job placements, and other income-
generang acvies. By doing so, we can ensure that those who move away have opportunies while
those staying behind can ulise the space for gardening. If we neglect this, the limited land might lead
to daily conflicts and, in the long run, seriously impact the future lives of our children. (Managalas,
Papua New Guinea)
280
Another important dimension of ‘move-to-stay’ is a process of dual-mobility that involves movement abroad,
even for an extended period of 10-15 years as indicated by two Tongan research parcipants, as part of a
deliberate strategy to fund longer-term internal relocaon in Tonga.
281
This idea of possible climate change-
related dual-mobility was further strengthened through survey data that showed that a high proporon of
those planning internal mobility in the next five years to ‘escape the impacts of climate change’ were
concurrently planning overseas mobility in the next five years.
282
277
See, for example, Mana Pacific Consultants Family Studies in Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga.
278
Alofa, P. (2024).
279
Filoa, A. ( 2024).
280
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R. & Galokale, K. (2024c). Managalas: A community case study from Papua New Guinea.
Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland
281
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). 34.
282
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b). 9.
105 | P a g e
This process of ‘move-to-stay’ underscores how, in the Pacific socio-cultural context, (im)mobility-related
policy is best developed from a family/kin/community-oriented perspecve. One implicaon of this is that
policy intervenons successfully supporng the flex or capacity of place-based land and marine
tenure/governance systems to absorb populaon movement, must be predicated on the understanding
that increasing the range of flex will influence not just the scale and paern of movement into the future,
but also the scale of stay.
Third, it is not simply that place-specific land and marine tenure and governance systems will have a
differing amount of flex/capacity to absorb the movement elsewhere of persons, because of the
accumulated or ancipated effects of disasters or climate on either a temporary of long-term basis, but
that these systems also shape decision-making around whether and where to move.
The research in Samoa provides some valuable insights into the relaonship between non-customary land
tenure and decision-making and, in turn, how this has influenced, and may influence future scale of
(im)mobility in the context of disasters and climate change. Lelata village in Apia sits relavely low, adjacent
to the Vasigano river, and is prone to recurrent flooding. Most of the land in the village is freehold. The village
was severely impacted by Tropical Cyclone Evan in 2012, resulng in loss of life, as well as the paral or
complete destrucon of homes and plantaons. While for some the decision to remain in place or return
was due to a lack of alternave opons, that the land was freehold and not customary also emerged as a
factor influencing the decision of some families to move elsewhere:
We are original selers but other families bought land from someone else and have no aachment
like us… its just land they have and no connecons but for us it’s deeper.
283
Other research in Samoa suggests that ease of access to non-customary land may be shaping current mobility
paerns in Samoa, buressing the findings by IOM (2021) which found that the direcon of internal
migraon in Samoa corresponds to areas with the highest proporons of freehold or leasehold (versus
customary) land. In a small group talanoa, one couple reported having recently moved to leased residenal
land (on a 20-year lease) from family/village land to have some independence and space for their growing
family. Further, many survey parcipants reported plans to move internally, with the reason or driver given
as ‘moving away from extended family’ and frequently, ‘move to our own land/moving to bought property
away from communal property’.
284
Further context-specific nuance emerges from research into how the structure of land tenure in Tonga has
shaped mobility-related decision-making in two separate communies relocated in the aermath of the 2022
Hunga Tonga-Hunga-Ha’apai erupon. As already noted, not only was the decision to move taken for them,
but the research shows how different rules have applied to different populaons, based on the whether the
village land was Royal Estate or not. Mango was relocated permanently while others in neighbouring islands
were simply advised to retreat from the coast but remained in place.
285
Moreover, there has been further
differenaon between those villages relocated to new villages on ‘Eua island and Tongatapu. For those
evacuated from Mango, the King has reportedly forbidden them to return to the land of Mango because of
safety concerns. They can, however, return to the water and do so. In contrast, for those from ‘Atataa, the
Royal Estate indicated that they were free to come and go from ‘Atataa as they like.
286
283
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 79-80. The team note that, in the absence of compensation from the government, some families took out
loans while others sought funding from family overseas to fund their rebuilds.
284
Idem. 83.
285
Idem. 38.
286
Idem. The authors note, however, that permanent return is not practicable this stage as there is no government school, nor is there a
church operating there.
106 | P a g e
A final point emerging from the research is that the emergence of transnaonal communies has created a
situaon whereby absentee holders can impede steps to relocate households and communies. For example,
in Ha’apai in Tonga, vacant land that might otherwise be used to relocate households away from erosion-
impacted coastal locaons is sll vacant as the landowners now live overseas in New Zealand, Australia and
the United States of America.
287
Climate change and food and water (in)security
As noted, localised populaon pressure can contribute to food and water insecurity in some communies. In
this part, we set out the evidence from the research as to how communies experience climate change as a
factor threatening food and water security, exacerbang the effects of local populaon pressure.
In all research contexts and communies, the pivotal role of food and water security in Pacific communies'
lives is evident. Across the Pacific, and regardless of geography, communies are observing first-hand how
extreme weather events are exacerbang exisng food shortages, with reliance on subsistence farming and
fishing further highlighted as vulnerable to disrupons caused by climate change. The case studies by the
University of Auckland of coastal communies report saltwater intrusion, increased seasonal variability and
the lack of arable land as factors impacng the quality of gardens while in upland or inland communies and
highland communies, dry weather and excessive heat were impacng yields of gardens. A research
parcipant in Papua New Guinea reflected:
As we have menoned, the heat is one of the major destroyers of our gardens. Even if we move out
and plant, the soil is not as ferle as it used to be. It is dry mostly. (Matupit, Papua New Guinea)
288
Atoll communies reported that observed climate change impacts have meant that tradional fishing
pracces based on the shoreline have become less frequent with people moving further out to sea to fish:
Nowadays if people go out fishing they hardly catch fish, and somemes not enough to feed the
whole family. And this we witness, is not because of the overpopulated of people, but because of
climate change. The fishes are travelling to more cooler and far away seas to survive instead of
being in here which is geng hoer. (Funafu, Tuvalu)
289
So, too, the family-based studies of Mana Pacific Consultants record that coastal communies have also
observed how changes in the marine environment due to climate change impact food security:
Fishing is hard because of the changes in climate. High des breaking coral where fish live in the
surrounding reef. (Kwakwaru Tribe of East Malaita, Solomon Islands)
290
The same concerns around marine-based food insecurity emerge from the research in Samoa and Tonga. A
Paramount Chief in Samata-i-tai, Savai’i had changed given that due to higher water temperatures causing
fish to move much further out, and much deeper, now only those who have motorboats could reach the fish.
Others who previously could take the canoe out to fish daily, must now resort to buying fish from the few
with motorboat access, pung fish access out of reach for some.
291
Water security emerged as a strong theme across all research locaons and many parcipants shared their
reflecons on how climate change has impacted water security. Droughts, as an impact of climate change,
287
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024) Case Studies Ha’apai
288
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al (2024d).
289
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024b). 13-14.
290
Filoa, A. (2024).
291
Morrison, S. et al. (2024b). 15.
107 | P a g e
were noted by parcipants to have forced reliance on underground water sources in Atafu
292
and, in
Bareho
293
, droughts were understood by the community to have led to saler water wells. Amongst the
community in Vaimaanga,
294
in the Cook Islands, parcipants aributed intensifying water shortages to
extreme weather events. Similarly, in Samoa
295
, concerns were expressed about high temperatures leading
to water scarcity. In Malagas
296
, Papua New Guinea, parcipants in the Community Men’s Workshop stated
that water contaminaon of the river has resulted in people relocang to other parts of the village, or even
further away to find cleaner water sources. In Papae Kolosolo
297
, in the Guadalcanal Province, parcipants
shared that they must now trek longer distances for water due to drying sources.
In regard to the impact of sea-level rise and saltwater intrusion, West Coast
298
communies in Niue stated
that they are encountering challenges accessing clean water due to rising sea levels. Nukunukumotu faces a
lack of clean water due to sea intrusion,
299
and according to one parcipant in Bareho,
The sea regularly covered children’s playground and created a shortage of new house sites as sites
for planng vegetables. The rising sea also changed the physical appearance of the island, with the
shoreline shrinking and higher than the average high des experienced by villages. The sea is also
destroying family houses on the island as the shoreline moves into the village areas.
300
The research highlights how drought condions are also undermining water insecurity. Benabena in Papua
New Guinea experiences limited water access due to drought impacts on sources.
301
Environmental, economic, and social factors are strongly connected with food security challenges, prompng
individual, familial, and communal adaptaons to safeguard tradional pracces amidst a changing
landscape. The economic necessity of local food sourcing, compounded by the high costs and logiscal
challenges of imporng food, underscores the urgency of addressing these issues.
Adaptaon strategies such as market gardens, elevated farming, and innovave agricultural methods
302
are
emerging as crucial responses within Pacific communies. However, the reliance on imported foods also
raises concerns about malnutrion, parcularly among vulnerable populaons. Overall, both rural and urban
areas in Pacific countries are grappling with the persistent and mulfaceted impacts of climate-related
impacts on food security, necessitang ongoing resilience-building efforts and adaptaon measures.
The following small sample of examples from across the research illustrate a range of food insecurity
challenges were noted by each of the research teams. In Vaimaanga
303
, shis in the lagoon ecosystem,
aributed to the movement and accumulaon of silt and sand, have detrimentally impacted marine life,
notably octopus populaons, thereby affecng local food sources.
The research undertaken in Funafu also places the issue of food insecurity within the wider seng of
changes in biodiversity, which community members perceive will influence mobility decisions.
292
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024e).
293
Underhill-Sem, Y., Newport, C., Ng Shiu, R., & Galokale, K. (2024g). Bareho Village, Nono Lagoon: A community case study in the
Western Province, The Solomon Islands. Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
294
Newport, C., et al. (2024e).
295
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024).
296
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024c).
297
Underhill-Sem. Y., et al (2024i).
298
Newport C. et al. (2024g).
299
Nailasikau Halauitui, D. (2024b) Tonga Nukunukumotu Case Study - Kāinga, Nukunukumotu, Tonga - Pacific Climate Mobility Family
Stories Case Study. Mana Pacific Consultants Ltd
300
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024g).
301
Steven, H. (2024).
302
Ng Shui, R. et al. (2024c); Morrison, S. et al. (2024b).
303
Newport, C. et al. (2024e).
108 | P a g e
The crops, coconut trees and breadfruits were abundant, unlike today’s we can see that the trees
and crops are not abundant. Our Tuvaluan people depend on these crops and trees, as well as fish.
However, the people are running away to New Zealand because they are looking for a beer life for
their children. (Funafu, Tuvalu)
304
In Kiriba, it was also noted that in St John Beo's
305
tradional food acquision methods like fishing and
farming are threatened by climate change-induced adversies like coastal erosion and water scarcity, posing
existenal challenges to food security. So, too in Atafu, Takelau where one family member remarked,
Ko na aho ie nae fakahoa fakatahi te kaga a na kaukāiga. Ko na no foki nae makeke lele toto na
lakau, kua he ve na aho nei. [Distribuon of local food, our extended family food was shared at this
very place. People were avid farmers in the past compared to today.]
306
In Tonga, lower family crop yields (due to soil salinaon in low-lying areas and/or heat affected plants) and
delayed or missed crop planngs (due to unpredictable seasons and/or uncommonly heavy rainfall) leading
to impacts on food insecurity and income were all raised in talanoa:
The soil is eroding, the seasons are all out. We are months behind on the crops we usually plant… The
tractors here can’t operate in muddy soil” (Fanau’ifo’ou Akau’ola, Tonga)
307
In Samoa, in a range of talanoa in Upolu and Savai’i revealed concerns of village mayors, High Chiefs, Church
leaders and other community leaders that climate change was impacng food security by diminishing
producvity. The team also heard that severe heat was prevenng people working in the plantaon or
liming people’s work me to only the early morning hours. An agriculture consultant working with
communies across Samoa shared his concerns that climate-impacted household food security is a
significant risk and is currently a driver in mobility from rural to urban centres as people seek alternate ways
to feed their families.
308
In the Future Scenarios session in Samoa, it was a clear shared belief that
unaddressed food insecurity would drive significant increases in rural to urban movement.
309
Whereas the above speaks to food insecurity as contribung to decisions to move within borders, the family
study of kāiga Atafu, Tokelau yields important insight as to how cross-border migraon pathways within
clusters may shape percepons of food insecurity and contribute to cross-border mobility:
Elia talked about how the term ‘halofia’, or weakness brought on by the lack of food, is not heard of
these days, probably because rice, milk and cereal is now available most of the me. Aofata talked
about ‘tupulaga o te alaiha’, or the rice generaon, where many or most of the children prefer rice to
local food. It is the convenience offered by faster food preparaon and less strenuous work as more
and more people opt for imported food, according to Aofata. Climbing coconut trees is hard work and
only young men who are of slight build can climb coconut trees. This links to what Elia and Timo
referred to as the mes of the past and present are different, and more people are voluntarily moving
to villages and or countries where you can have access to food which is a lot easier instead of catching
them.
310
304
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024f).
305
Ng Shui, R. et al. (2024c).
306
Tulano, T. and Toloa, L. (2024) Kāiga Atafu, Tokelau - Pacific Climate Mobility Family Stories Case Study. Mana Pacific Consultants Ltd.
12.
307
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 25.
308
Idem. 77.
309
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023c). 8.
310
Tulano, T. et al. (2024). 13.
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Finally, this study is important has it evidences how these changes in the diet away from tradional food
sources are leading to an increase in non-communicable diseases in Tokelau, most notably cancer. This
contributes to further cross-border mobility in order the access treatment.
311
These research examples make it clear that the climate change-related food and water security challenges
and associated biodiversity loss facing communies across the Pacific are wide-ranging and mulfaceted.
They undermine tradional pracces centred on gathering sufficient catch and/or harvesng sufficient crops
to provide sustenance to families and communies across diverse geographical sengs, from coastal areas
to inland regions and atolls. These challenges intersect with local populaon pressure and land and marine
tenure to influence the scale and paern of (im)mobility.
CURRENT SCALE, PATTERN AND IMPACTS
What follows is a picture of trends, not an exercise involving extensive modelling. In keeping with the
architecture of the Pacific Climate Mobility Framework, we focus on staying in place, displacement
migraon, and relocaon as descripons of points along the way of the (im)mobility connuum. While
recognising these are technical terms not anchored in the Pacific vernacular on which the research draws,
their endorsement by Pacific Island Forum Leaders in the Framework signals the desirability of this analysis
orientang around these terms.
Before doing so, there are three points of fundamental importance that policy makers need to have firmly in
mind, regardless of the policy domain when seeking to development policy relang to the (im)mobility of
Pacific peoples.
(Im)mobility as a connuum
A crical feature highlighted by the research in terms of current scale and paern of (im)mobility is that at
all forms – staying in place, displacement, migraon and relocaon – are present at any me, albeit at
different scales.
This means that, while necessarily separated to capture a sense of scale, paern and any movement-specific
issues, they are best regarded as exisng along a connuum of experience and intrinsically connected. By this
we mean that some, but far from all Pacific people, experience these different forms throughout their life
cycles.
Scaling up, all forms exist side-by-side within families and communies. Again, this is not to say all families
and all communies experience all forms. At the local scale, there is variaon. But, once we telescope out
to the naonal and regional level, the picture homogenises to some extent with all forms present to some
degree. However, as noted in the preceding secon, the extent to which internaonal migraon features
along the connuum of experience is the most variable.
The mulgeneraonal family/kin group studies of Mana Pacific Consultants capture this picture at the
individual and family/kin scales. That these studies span the length and breadth of the Pacific means they
also paint a compelling picture at the regional scale, including that movement of some family members is
typically connected to allowing others to stay in place.
311
Idem.
110 | P a g e
The Maiana kāinga/family study from Kiriba vividly captures the extraordinary level of connected
(im)mobility currently exisng in the Pacific. The study records some family members inially moving to Beo
on Tarawa, with one then moving to Kirima (for study, then marriage) and another Nauru (for study). Three
women of the family, including family member who went to Nauru, are in New Zealand as RSE workers where
they support family in Beo. Summarising this family’s experience of (m)mobility, the study notes:
This family has travelled and moved over 3,000 km away from home at different mes. When the
family members decided to move to Tarawa, Kirima, Nauru or New Zealand, it was for economic
reasons mostly to support and care for their family. Their mobility in the past was not directly driven
by climate change. Today, members of the family working in New Zealand moved with the intenon
that some day they will have a chance to have permanent residence in New Zealand and be able to
help their families back in Kiriba to stay or to migrate. The desire to work overseas or to find a job
anywhere, where they could earn enough to support families, is of utmost importance to them
because they have experienced coastal erosion and the lack of clean drinking water. This family will
connue to work hard to build stronger seawalls, purchase water tanks and build resilient housing.
They fear that me is not on their side!
312
The co-existence of immobility and mobilies at different scales is also in evidence from the findings from
field work in the Ha’apai group – one of the island groups in Tonga that is most exposed to threats affecng
low-lying coral islands and where approximately 40 metres of coast has eroded over the last four decades. In
areas such as Hihifo families were being allocated government land inland to allow them to move. However,
some families have moved to Tongatapu “following significant loss of their land to the sea” and one family at
least relocated to New Zealand for the same reason.
313
Reflecng how (im)mobility can operate as a connuum at the individual level, a parcipant from Ha’apai,
reported that, for her, it is easier to move to Tongatapu first before moving overseas, using Tongatapu as a
place to build some confidence, and possibly raise some capital, before undertaking onwards mobility to New
Zealand, then ulmately the USA where she has close family.
314
The final point to note is that, in keeping with the Pacific hazard-scape we outline above, the studies in Samoa
and Tonga also make clear that displacement, migraon and relocaon arise in the context of geophysical
hazards. In Samoa, in the wake of the 2009 tsunami, several villages residing at the coastal end of their village
retreated inland to limit their exposure to future tsunami risk. This includes the village of Lalomanu which
has a populaon of just over 700 people.
315
We wish to re-emphasise two important points about ‘place’ that emerge from this secon on the connected
Pacific which are fundamental to understand the scale, paern and impacts of current (im)mobility: the
mulfaceted nature of ‘place’ and Pacific peoples’ relaonship to ‘place’ and the dynamic nature of ‘place’.
The mulfaceted nature of ‘place’ for Pacific peoples
The mulfaceted nature of place for Pacific peoples comprises several elements, namely:
Place as belonging. This dimension captures the very essence of what it means to be a Pacific human
‘being’, with people and place intertwined. It is this sense of place as belonging which drives much of
the circulaon discussed above which characterises Pacific peoples’ mobility.
312
Alofa, P. (2024). 5-6.
313
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). Case Studies: Ha’apai.
314
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). 34.
315
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). Case Studies: The Women of Lalomanu.
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Pikinini foldaon from mami, foldaon lo insaed sanbis nao. Iu save go na wanem diswan meanim.
[As a child is “dropped”, it’s the sand that receives the child. This meaning, the island has received the
child, where else will the child go?] (Kwakwaru, East Malaita Solomon Islands)
‘Place’ as a site of aachment /connecon to the tangible – to land (including here people, past and
present), ocean and sky, to flora and fauna, to language and culture – as well as the intangible – to
values, faith and protocol.
iu mi man lo island ya, ples blo iumi na ya
[we are people of the island, this is our place] (Gwailao Tribe, Ngongosila Island, Solomon Islands)
‘Place’ as a site of everyday life and acvity where tradional knowledge is passed from generaon-
to-generaon and tradional pracce is the true source of resilience to environmental change.
‘Place’ as a source of spiritual and emoonal sustenance and wellbeing.
Ples God givim iumi na ya
[This is the place God has given us, not anywhere else]. (adult female, Ngongosila, Solomon Islands)
Describing how intertwined the ocean is to any discussion of staying ‘in place’, under the heading
“Indigenous cosmologies and their relaonship to the natural world” Veitayaki et al (2024) state:
“Pacific peoples’ relaonship with the ocean is inscribed in cosmologies which span the liquid
connent and the islands. Narraves of origins, genealogies and worldviews are steeped in
connecons with the ocean and the gods, deies and animals which inhabit it. Ancestral humans of
the Pacific are believed to have shape-shied, taking on the form of turtles, sharks or birds, and they
have tradionally called on the assistance of marine creatures such as the sngray and eel (Maude
and Maude, 1994, 23) to pull up islands, creang them by dropping stones or separang heaven, sky
and earth, and to establish new communies aer crossing vast distances.”
316
The mulfaceted nature of the relaonship Pacific people have to ‘place’ is crical for policy for three
reasons:
First, it explains why ‘staying in place’ features prominently in current paern and will connue to do so
in the future.
Second, it makes very clear just how profound loss and damage to place is and will be, ensuring policy
debates transcend the sterile technical language of economic and non-economic loss.
317
The scale of loss
of ‘place’ as ‘being,’ while having a non-economic dimension, is not well served by such language. The
potenal scale of place-based loss and damage at certain thresholds of climate change is viscerally
foreshadowed in the University of Waikato’s ‘Visions’ report. They observe in their high-level summary of the
visions (their emphasis):
The majority of parcipants assumed future disconnecon with nature, parcularly in relaon to
the ocean. Compared to the past where they described many people in the ocean fishing, in the
316
Veitayaki, J., Kitolelei, S., Vave, R., Kensen, M., Huer, E., Ah Siu-Maliko, M., Young, L. and Vunibola, S. (Forthcoming 2024)
Solwara, moana, ocean and local communities—the social, cultural and economic connections. In Ratuva el al. Pacific Ocean and
Climate Crisis Assessment University of Canterbury and University of the South Pacific .
317
This element of place is also emphasised by Baleinakorodawa and Boege ( 2024) in relation to relocation in Fiji. 6-7.
112 | P a g e
shallows swimming and collecng food, playing in the ocean, in all futures there was a clear pull-back
from that. Some said that no one was in the ocean anymore, no one was fishing or collecng
seashells, and an absence of fish traps, or, that they could only see a few people fishing. Someone
described it ‘as though it were no longer possible [to go in the ocean]’. Given the ongoing dependence
of many in Tonga and Samoa on ocean resources (for subsistence and income) this could hint at a
future driver of mobility - moving as a means to ensure food security and income.
318
Third, it suggests that establishment of a sense of place should be a policy/ operaonal imperave in
relocaon and cross-border migraon. Parcularly when relocaon and cross-border migraon occurs in
Aotearoa New Zealand then the relaonship with Māori becomes significant. Māori also are a place-based
people. They reference the boundaries of their territories to arculate genealogical connecon or
whakapapa through which they introduce themselves acknowledging their mountain, rivers, land and
oceans. Marae or meeng spaces within tribal boundaries stand as testament to these physical and spiritual
connecons to place. Several families from a common ancestor belong to a marae and they also hold the
role of kaiaki or guardians of their territories acvang their leadership or rangaratanga in place. Marae
are places where identy is celebrated which include being places to commune, places of mourning, places
of learning and storying and places where the spirit of ancestors can be sourced. In a climate mobility context,
marae could play a crical supporng role in the inial and ongoing response as well as possible longer term
integraon support.
The example given earlier of the Murihiku/Bluff community partnerships with a Samoan community is an
example of how the marae, Te Rau Aroha has supported and integrated families (some of which have
intermarried) into marae social and cultural acvies. At the top of the South Island, Te Awhina marae in
Motueka has both historically and in the present been welcoming of Pacific communies. In the 1970’s some
300 Fijians were flown into Motueka as part of a seasonal labour scheme and found solace and support at
the Te Awhina hall which was opened in 1958 to provide a facility for the Māori community and in parcular,
seasonal workers who had come to harvest tobacco and hops.
319320
The support provided to the Fijian
community at that me was a crical catalyst to the development of a proper wharekai (dining hall) and later
to Te Awhina marae.
321
Te Awhina marae which was opened in the 1990’s connues to ritually welcome RSE
workers into the area through powhiri and ensures that the workers are included in cultural and social
events.
322
For Pacific peoples, relaonship to ‘place’ has been, is, and will connue to be, dynamic
Pacific peoples have long moved from ‘place’ to ‘place’, the oral tradions of whom tell of movement to form
new selements in new places stretching back centuries. These are captured in the various community case
studies. For example the study on Pukapuka- Te Ulu o te Watu , Cook Islands, notes one key informant
recounng,
...our origins are that we are descendants of Mataliki. The story goes that the God Tamayei was flying
over the ocean and needed a place to rest and so commanded a rock to rise from the ocean floor and
when it did our ancestor Mataliki was in that rock. He later sailed to a land called Tongaleleva and
found a wife, and from their children we became a people. We sll tell that story today to our children.
323
318
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023c). 8.
319
https://www.tam.org.nz/about.
320
https://www.theprow.org.nz/yourstory/Seasonal-Workers-Motueka/
321
Talanoa with Barney Thomas, 29 June 2024.
322
Morrison, S. L. (2018). Ako ki he nofo ‘a Kāinga: A Case Study of Pastoral Care Between Wakatū/Kono and Recognised Seasonal Employment
Workers. Handbook of Indigenous Educaon. Springer, Singapore. doi: hps://doi. org/10.1007/978-981-10-1839-8_9-1.
323
Newport, C. et al. (2024e). 5.
113 | P a g e
Similarly, the community case study on Mangalas, Papua New Guinea notes:
Oral tradions of the local people idenfy and menon migraon routes from the mountains to their
current place of residence separated and disnct from tribe to tribe and then differenated by clan
to clan. Tradional myths and legends tell of the origins of different tribes who migrated from one
place of origin and scaered to different places in the Managalas area over centuries. There is a
common myth or legend that tells a story of how people seled on the Managalas plateau.
324
Talanoa with a land expert and with another academic leader in Samoa has revealed the increasing thinking
and evidence – including mapping – building a more detailed history of mobility, where ‘place’ was originally
inland and upland villages prior to the movement of populaons to coastal areas in response to greater levels
of trading with foreigners.
325
This dynamic formaon of addional or new ‘place’ connues. In the 1960’s, elders from the atoll of Sikianna
in Malaita bought the land from the tradional Guadalcanal landowners and established Red Beach
selement. This community study records that that “although from Sikaiana by culture, some of the second-
generaon occupants at Red Beach believe that for them, their home is Red Beach, not Sikaiana.”
326
So, too, in family study of the Patnav clan. In 1962 in Papua New Guinea one family of the Patnav clan,
including children and grandparents, moved to live in Yaga Village on Umboi Island, Siassi. The move was due
to severe food shortages, compounded by populaon increase on Tuam Island in the 1950s. A male elder in
the family, recounted as part of the family study,
Plan nau yet na bipo olsem rot blo kam insait long hia ol sa kam painim hat ah olsem ol bai kam
stap wantem usait tru taim ol i kam long painim ol samng olsem Morata na kaikai , saksak na ol
disala kain samng. Ol i kam em olsem i nogat man em i luksave long em long sidaun so wanpla rot
tasol long ol i mas rausim ol i kam long savim ol Tuam long larim giraun mas i stap bikpala liklik. Ol
arapla i stap long peles ol i mas kaikai long em na ol i kam insait tu bai ol i kamap briris long ol long
taim ol i kam. I mas i gat hap long ol long ol i sidaun na mekim ol disala wok blo ah painim ol
morata, sampla kaikai na bihain ol i go bek ken. Bikos plan taim em ol sa trade wantem ol Bikpeles
long kisim ol disala ol samng.
[My parents le Tuam to come here because of increased in populaon on the Island and the
difficulty in culvang or growing food there. Also to allow enough land space for others on the
Island to use to grow food. One of the challenges of the Island people is when they come here to
trade or do other business, most mes they don’t have people that they can come and be with so
my parents moving here is like a link to their families back home. So now when they come to trade
for sago leaves (materials for building house) or food, they have people that they can be with to do
these things and once they are done, they can return to the Island. Because a lot of mes they trade
with the mainlanders (Umboi locals) to get these things.
327
Informal selements have been a feature of Pacific towns from the outset — they partly reflect the
challenges of accessing land but also the desire to establish a base in town for wantoks from the outer islands.
For the laer, the establishment of an addional ‘place’ is not necessarily linked to long-term movement by
324
Idem. 4.
325
Morrison, S., et al. (2024b). 11.
326
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024j). 3.
327
Saguba, L. (2024) Resettlement of Patnav clan families in Yaga Village on Umboi Island, Siassi, Morobe Province, Papua
New Guinea - Pacific Climate Mobility Family Stories Case Study. Mana Pacific Consultants Ltd. 12.
114 | P a g e
specific individuals, but more the establishment of a place where fellow kin can have a base in town. This is
a long-established pracce in Vanuatu.
As we have noted, this dynamism includes Aotearoa New Zealand. Although the movement of Pacific
peoples to Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere on the Pacific rim at scale is a very recent phenomenon,
this means transnaonally distributed family/kin groups have relaonships with more than one ‘place’
and along some or all of these dimensions. Aer nong the movement of Pacific peoples to Aotearoa New
Zealand for work, at first in manufacturing centres but increasingly also in the ‘rural and agricultural
heartland’, Damon Salesa argues:
A key lesson pacific peoples offer is of bodies in moon. Their stories show that much labour sll
has to happen in parcular places and there are opportunies there. Pacific peoples have also
discovered that they can move not just families but can also take community with them, or fashion
new community when they arrive – that home is partly a cargo of relaonships, and that they can
build genealogies and places that hold Pacific people together. They can build new islands of the
Pacific.
328
Having made these general framing observaons, it is now possible to turn to the specific (im)mobilies
referenced in the Pacific Regional Climate Mobility Framework.
Staying in ‘place’
The mulfaceted nature of place means not moving is unarguably the most common element of current
paern. Despite environmental challenges like sea-level rise, many communies show a steadfast
commitment to their ancestral territories, preferring to stay. The following statement by a research
parcipant in Bareho, captures just why staying in place dominates current (im)mobility scale and paern:
Reluctance to move is based on loss of connecon and scared sites. It is the place where ancestors,
parents, spouses and other loved ones are buried. They tend their graves as part of maintaining their
relaonship with them. So, if they relocate the graves will become covered with bushes and this will
make them feel sorry. If I move out who will look aer their graves? (Bareho, Solomon Islands)
That a livelihoods-oriented identy forged by ancestral es to land and ocean also drives decisions to stay in
place emerges from the case study on Pa’atangata:
We don’t want to move like the Mango people. We are fisher people, we don’t want to work in a
plantaon.
We don’t have land here, but we do have the sea. And when we are here we can get money every
day. (Pa’atangata, Tonga)
The research in Papua New Guinea illustrates how strong family and community relaonships influence
decisions to remain in place, parcularly among older generaons:
Our children, born here, make this place our own. Our connecon to Itokama is strong; it's where
our roots are. Although we might consider tending gardens or other acvies back in our original
places, essenals like the Airstrip, school, and health facilies anchor us here. These services are
328
Salesa, D. (2017). 102.
115 | P a g e
integral to our community, so we maintain and care for them collecvely. Unity binds us, making it
hard to imagine separaon or going back, as we've grown and built our lives here.
(Managalas, Itoakama, Papua New Guinea)
329
The cohort least likely to/or to want to move for Tonga and Samoa was the 45-54 year age group – the
“steadfast stayers”. There was a gender difference for Tonga, not for Samoa.
330
This is not to say no
movement occurs among those who stay in place. Daily life is of short-term movement: to markets, to
planaon sites, to the foreshore and ocean, to town, to visit relaves. Yet, for most Pacific peoples their lives
remain rooted in parcular places, some involuntarily, but many voluntarily. As we have already noted, for
many, their staying in place is connected to the migraon elsewhere of other family members.
Displacement
Tracking and geng an accurate sense of the scale of displacement is a difficult in the Pacific. Many survival
displacement events occur far from administrave centres, are localised (such as from landslides) and of
relavely small scale. Nevertheless, these displacements do increase regional scale and the impacts can be
just as adverse for the affected populaon. Disaster displacement in PICTs tends to be underreported because
a lack of dedicated and skilled capacity, and insufficient data and informaon governance (May 2022, 11).
This is parcularly the case in relaon to Papua New Guinea.
331
Given the demographic context highlighted
in this report, this is a significant regional public policy challenge.
The Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon has developed a displacement tracking matrix, the aim of which
is to produce data on displacement as it occurs, to beer guide humanitarian response. Its reach into the
Pacific is limited with tracking being done only in relaon to some events, and then only in Fiji, Vanuatu and
Papua New Guinea.
332
A recent study on Fiji indicates that one feature of paern is that some people displaced to informal
selements will sele there on a more long term basis where their livelihoods have been severely impacted
by weather and climate-related events, although more research was need to establish the extent to which
this was a trend (Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding, 2023).
The Pacific Response to Disaster Displacement (PRDD) (2019-2022)
The reports generated of the recently completed Pacific Response to Disaster Displacement Project provide
some important insights into the current scale, paern and impacts of disaster-related displacement.
333
Work by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) as part of the project indicates significant levels
of disaster displacement in the Pacific connected to sudden-onset events.
While it does not contain esmates
for sudden-onset events, given the relaonship between some weather-related sudden-onset events and
slow-onset processes, there will be some element of hazard interseconality behind these esmates.
329
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al (2024c). 12.
330
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b). 8.
331
IDMC (2022d) Disaster Displacement: Papua New Guinea Country Briefing. 8. https://www.internal-
displacement.org/publications/disaster-displacement-papua-new-guinea-country-briefing/
332
See IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix Datasets. Website. https://dtm.iom.int/datasets?f%5B0%5D=dataset_region%3A139
333
The project partners were Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the
Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD). They worked with governments in Fiji, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands,
Tonga and Vanuatu to generate new evidence and develop new and improved operational tools. See https://www.internal-
displacement.org/project-spotlights/pacific-disasters/
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IDMC has esmated that 30 displacement events have triggered approximately 153,000 displacements in Fiji
alone, between 2008 and 2019.
334
A further 19 displacement events in Vanuatu between 2008 and 2020
triggered almost 175,000 further internal displacements with the vast majority (about 87%) being triggered
by weather-related events, parcularly storms. The remaining 13% caused by geophysical events.
335
In the
Northern Pacific, for the Marshall Islands, IDMC esmated there were 2,046 displacements between 2008
and 2021. These resulted from three weather-related events – high des impacts aggravated by storms and
floods.
336
One important aspect of the scale of new displacement emerging from IDMC’s data is variability, depending
on the event. In Fiji, for example, these ranged from 10 and 80 new displacements due to landslides in
Cakaudrove in April 2019 and Navosa in February 2019, respecvely. However, some of the 15,000 new
displacements resulted from flooding in 2012, and 18,000 were a result of Tropical Cyclone Tomas in 2010.
IDMC’s data also draws aenon to how a single catastrophic event can significantly affect the scale and
impact of displacement. Tropical Cyclone Winston in 2016 resulted in 62,000 new displacements – some 40%
of all displacements in Fiji the last decade – and there were 44 deaths. 350,000 people were affected, and
32,000 houses were destroyed or damaged.
337
In the Solomon Islands, the 2014 flooding in Honiara was the most impacul event to date, with 10,000
persons displaced to 30 evacuaon centres. Protected displacement was also a feature of paern with 4,000
people sll living in emergency shelters a month later. 22 persons were killed, and it is esmated that almost
10% of the country’s populaon (around 52,000 people) were affected. Reflecng its seismically acve geo-
morphology, IDMC’s data reveals that geophysical events triggered almost 8,000 movements between 2008
and 2020, represenng almost a third of the displacement recorded during that period.
A magnitude 8.0 earthquake which struck off the Santa Cruz islands in Temotu province in February 2013,
caused a tsunami that was parcularly devastang on livelihoods of the mostly subsistence farmer
populaon. These, along with landslides also triggered by the event, displaced 3,500 people, destroyed 588
homes and directly affected around 37% of the populaon of the Santa Cruz islands.
338
In the Marshall Islands a single event – a king de in March 2014 – triggered outsized displacement at around
1,000 people, and damaged 70 homes in Majuro. A further 246 persons were displaced, and 36 homes were
damaged on Arno atoll. Around 80 per cent of its sanitaon facilies were affected with sewage leaks
reported in some areas.
339
Urban Displacement
More granular analysis of impacts in urban sengs also featured as part of the PRDD project, with case
studies on Ba Town in Fiji and Port Vila in Vanuatu where internal migraon has contributed to the growth of
334
IDMC (2020) Sudden Onset hazards and the Risk of future Displacement in Fiji. Website. https://api.internal-
displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/fiji_riskprofile_idmc.pdf
335
IDMC (2022c) Disaster Displacement: Vanuatu Country Briefing. Website. https://api.internal-
displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Vanuatu_country_briefing.pdf
336
IMDC (2022). Marshall Islands: Disaster Displacement Risk Profile. Website. https://www.internal-
displacement.org/publications/marshall-islands-disaster-displacement-risk-profile/
337
IMDC (2020). 8-9.
338
IDMC (2021a) Sudden Onset hazards and the Risk of future Displacement in the Solomon Islands. Website. https://api.internal-
displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/21_0907_IDMC_SolomonIslands_Riskprofile.pdf
339
IDMC (2022b) Sudden Onset hazards and the Risk of future Displacement in The Marshall Islands. Website. https://api.internal-
displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/220224_IDMC_RiskProfile_TheMarshallIslands.pdf
117 | P a g e
informal selements.
340
In each town, survey interviews were conducted with households who had been
displaced by floods and other natural hazards in the past year. 300 survey interviews were conducted in Ba
and 307 in Port Vila, in Teouma, Prima, and Blacksands. Although not claiming to be representave of each
town’s displaced populaon, the studies provide a useful window on contemporary displacement in Pacific
urban sengs. Key findings were:
1. Poor urban planning and poor housing exacerbated climate risk and increased the scale of
displacement.
2. Repeat displacement was a feature of paern.
341
3. Urban displacement paerns were highly localised and typically of short duraon with only a small
minority experienced protracted displacement.
342
4. Family were typically the primary source of support. Mostly, people displaced in both studies were
accommodated by friends and relaves who are the front line of response.
5. In terms of impact, displacement affected livelihoods, disrupted schooling and led to health problems.
Persons who experienced mulple displacement suffered a significant and progressive erosion in
resilience, contributed to by limited financial or technical support.
The key conclusion of both studies is that housing needs to be priorised in recovery programming and in
development. This is not simply a maer of improving construcon, but also improving tenure. The lack of
official documentaon at the me of displacement had disincenvised using income to construct of more
permanent and durable structures.
The research undertaken in Tonga provides further evidence of event-related variability and protracted
displacement, albeit linked to the 2022 Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai erupon and not a climate-related
hazard. The case study on ‘Atataa reveals a situaon of protracted displacement, with not all persons
displaced being as yet reseled. While 21 homes had been built for some of the families of ‘Atataa, at the
me of the fieldwork in April 2023, many other families and individuals were sll living with extended family
or in a church hall in Nuku’alofa, “not knowing when they may have a home built or assigned, nor the locaon
of their small plot of land where their unbuilt house would rest.”
343
Displacement and Data Gaps
Displacement is a common form of disaster risk in the Pacific. Understanding the scale and paern and
impacts of exisng displacement is crical to designing effecve disaster risk reducon acvies. Yet, there
is currently no central systemised informaon repository of disaster displacement. This creates issues for
policy. If the scale of displacement is not understood, it is difficult to develop effecve policy or finance
acons to reduce its likelihood or minimise its impacts when it occurs.
340
IDMC (2022e) Pacific Response to Disaster Displacement, Urban Case Study: Ba Town Fiji. Website. https://www.internal-
displacement.org/publications/pacific-response-to-disaster-displacement-urban-case-study-ba-town-fiji/ and
IDMC (2022f) Pacific Response to Disaster Displacement, Urban Case Study: Port Vila Vanuatu hps://www.internal-
displacement.org/publicaons/pacific-response-to-disaster-displacement-urban-case-study-port-vila-vanuatu/
341
Some 77.2 % of survey respondents had been displaced more than once, with 20.5 % reporting having been displaced three times or
more. In Ba, 94% of respondents reporting being displaced more than once.
342
In Ba, approximately 75% of survey respondents were displaced less than a week during their most recent displacement, with a
23.3% were displaced for up to three months. Only 1.3% (four respondents) were displaced for three months or more. In Port Vila, nearly
90 % of survey respondents were displaced less than a week during their most recent displacement, with 9.1% displaced for up to three
months. Only 1.6 % (four respondents) were displaced for three months or more.
343
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). Case Studies: ‘Atataa, ‘Atataa Si’i 1.
118 | P a g e
The Disaster Inventory System – DesInventar – developed by UNDRR, UNDP and partners is being replaced
with a new hazardous event and disaster losses and damages tracking system. The new system will be
synergised with the WMO-approved Cataloguing Hazardous Event (CHE) methodology, linking “weather
observaons and hazardous events with related impacts/ losses and damages informaon and their
cascading impacts.”
344
SPC is working with UNOCHA to use secondary sources to get a proxy measure of displacement. Figures may
be skewed by inclusion of short-term (survival) evacuaons, which, while a form of displacement, are oen
of very short spaal and temporal dimension (such as evacuaon to the village hall or church overnight), and
the impacts are comparavely negligible. In respect to higher risks to livelihood and wellbeing, survival
evacuaons can be contrasted with more sustained movement away from home lasng many days or weeks,
and even more so from protracted movement lasng many month or years,.
Migraon
There has already been extensive reference in various types of voluntary migraon in the secons dealing
with the Diverse Pacific and the Connected Pacific. To avoid repeon of material relang to what census
data tells us about the variable paerns, scales and impacts of urbanisaon and transnaonalism in Pacific
populaons that are covered in those secons, aenon is focussed here on three current issues:
1. circulaon as a dominant feature of paern;
2. the scale, paerns and impact of temporary migraon linked with immigraon policy iniaves in
Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia since 2007;
3. the scale and paern of intra-Pacific mobility to meet specific labour demands in Pacific countries;
and
4. the scale and paern of voluntary migraon that can be idenfied as being a response to the impacts
of climate change.
Migraon as short- and long-term circulaon
Reflecng the discussion in the preceding secon, a core feature of current paern is circular migraon –
circulaon. Not all movement is circular; there are always some people who never return. Nor is it suggested
that ‘returns’ to some other place are long term, let alone permanent. But, the research demonstrates that
intergeneraonal mobility over me occurs across mulple places, including more than one place that might
be regarded as “home” at any one me.
One of the challenges with the census definion of “place of usual residence” is that “usual residence” is
frequently defined as the place where you have spent at least six months in residence. People who end up
staying in parcular places for educaon, medical treatment, employment or while caring for family
members in that place will be classified as “migrants” in a census even if they have no intenon of staying in
those places long term or permanently. The fact that people can move mulple mes in response to a wide
range of what are oen called “push” and “pull” factors makes migraon a very complex process to model
and forecast.
Research on populaon movement in Pacific contexts has frequently placed emphasis on circularity in
movement paerns rather than the more common focus on flows between parcular types of origin and
desnaon places. The circular mobility literature privileges the connecons people have at any one me
344
UNDRR (2024) Disaster losses and damages tracking system. Website. https://www.undrr.org/disaster-losses-and-damages-
tracking-system
119 | P a g e
with mulple places, oen because of the distribuon of immediate as well as extended family members,
but also because of histories of their previous mobility and the places where they have parcular economic,
cultural or emoonal aachments.
These aachments, which are well illustrated by the research, lie at the heart of research by indigenous as
well as expatriate scholars on circular mobility that has been parcularly prevalent in the western Pacific.
345
The research which underpins this report, using methodologies anchored in indigenous ways of
understanding relaonships between people and place, has made it very clear that when populaon
movement is viewed through an intergeneraonal or a mulgeneraonal lens, circulaon between places,
rather than migraon from one locaon to another, remains the dominant form of movement.
The daily circulaon of people away from and back to the place of residence associated with their everyday
lives in villages and towns within Pacific countries, as well as in places of residence in other countries, is the
most obvious form of voluntary circular mobility. Closely linked with this everyday movement are less
frequent circuits, oen associated with parcular types of economic and social acvity, most commonly
within countries, but also to other places that are separated by the invisible boundaries between countries
in the Pacific that are a legacy of colonialism in the region.
These invisible boundaries created an arficial separaon between places that were oen much more closely
connected before European colonisaon; something that the late Epeli Hau’ofa highlighted in his insighul
essays challenging western concepons of space and me in the interpretaon of Pacific sociees,
economies and environments.
346
The intergeneraonal approach to understanding contemporary Pacific
mobility that has been adopted in one form or another by the three research teams connues this challenge
to western ways of conceptualising populaon movement and its place in the lives of Pacific peoples.
Temporary labour migraon schemes
A series of temporary labour migraon schemes that were iniated in Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia
from 2007, and which are referred to in various outputs from the three research teams, have arguably had
more impact on voluntary migraon to overseas desnaons in all of the parcipang Pacific countries than
any other policy iniaves affecng the scale and paern of migraon in the region in recent years.
347
The three schemes are: Aotearoa New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme which
commenced in 2007, Australia’s Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) which was piloted between 2009 and 2012
and then implemented in 2012, and Australia’s Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS) which was piloted between 2016
and 2018 and implemented in 2019. Since 2019 the SWP and PLS have been managed under the Pacific
Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) scheme. A recent study has established that more than 50,000 individuals
from parcipang countries worked at least once on the RSE scheme – more than the combined total of
Pacific parcipants in all of the temporary work schemes for Pacific peoples between the early 1970s and the
late 2000s that had operated in Aotearoa New Zealand.
348
345
See, for example, the essays in Murray Chapman and Mansell Prothero (eds)(1985) Circulation in Population Movement: Substance
and Concepts from the Melanesian Case, London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
346
See, for example, the collection of selected works in Epeli Hau’ofa (2008) We are the Ocean, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
347
All of countries in the western Pacific and central Pacific clusters are participants in these schemes along with Samoa and Tonga in
the eastern Pacific. The Realm countries and American Samoa in the eastern Pacific are not part of the schemes, and neither are
countries in the northern Pacific.
348
Establishing the actual numbers of people involved in these schemes is not straight-forward, but recent research makes reference to
reaching the 50,000 milestone in numbers of individuals participating in the RSE scheme around mid-2023. See Bedford, R. and
Bedford, C. (2024) The RSE after 16 years: a milestone, a stocktake and a forecast. Report for the Pacific Migration Unit, Ministry of
Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE). Accessible at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/379226878_The_RSE_after_16_years_a_milestone_a_stocktake_and_a_forecast
120 | P a g e
Data are not available to determine how many individuals as disnct from annual arrivals have parcipated
in the SWP and PLS schemes since their incepon. However, as can be seen from Figure 14, there have been
more visas issued to arrivals in Australia for parcipaon in these schemes since 2021 than arrivals on RSE
visas in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Figure 14: Annual arrivals of RSE, SWP and PLS workers, 1 July 2007-30 June 2023
The large dips in the numbers arriving between 2019/20 and 2022/23 are the result of border closures
throughout the region during the COVID 19 pandemic. For all three visa categories – RSE, SWP and PLS --
numbers arriving or approved were at record levels in 2022/23.
It is worth nong that there are no country quotas for temporary migraon, just the overall cap on total
recruits in the case of the RSE. The quotas apply to the PAC and are for residence visas. The swi rise post
COVID –19 is just a return to the situaon pre-COVID but with some increases because the cap was higher.
Vanuatu has always had a significant share of RSE numbers – the post-COVID situaon is not unusual in this
regard.
The numbers arriving from specific countries in 2022/23, the last year for which visa arrival data are available,
are summarised by scheme in Figure 15.
121 | P a g e
Figure 15: Sources of RSE, SWP and PLS workers, 2022/23
On the basis of these findings it is esmated that over 100,000 men and women from countries in the Pacific
have parcipated in the three schemes since their incepon. Vanuatu has been by far the largest contributor
of temporary workers to the two seasonal schemes in both countries, followed by Samoa (parcularly the
RSE) and Tonga (especially the SWP).
In the year ended 30 June 2023 Vanuatu provided over 16,000 seasonal workers to the RSE and SWP schemes
(34% of the 48,000 that arrived in Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia in that year) – the equivalent of 11.5%
of the country’s populaon aged between 20 and 59 years.
349
When account is taken of the strong bias
towards recruitment of men for seasonal work this percentage rises to 20% of Vanuatu’s men aged 20-59 in
the country’s census populaon for 2021.
Samoa and Tonga contributed a further 10,500 RSE and SWP workers between them in 2022/23 , accounng
for 27% of the 48,000 arrivals in the two countries. In the case of Tonga the shares of their populaon aged
20-59 years (11%) and men in that age group (20%) who were absent in that year on seasonal work visas in
the two countries were virtually the same as in Vanuatu. In Samoa’s case the absences on seasonal work
accounted for smaller shares of their total (6%) and male (11%) populaons aged 20-59 years, levels of
engagement that were aracng the aenon of the Samoan Government.
During the second half of 2022 the governments of Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu iniated reviews of their
parcipaon in the temporary work schemes in response to pressure from local businesses that were losing
their skilled staff to much higher-paying temporary work overseas.
350
In the other source countries, the
349
Data on participation in the two seasonal work schemes and in Australia’s longer-term Pacific Labour Scheme come from Bedford, R.
and Bedford, C. (2023) Staying ahead of the game: the RSE and PALM schemes, 2022/23. Paper presented at the RSE Conference 2023,
Christchurch, 1-2 August 2023.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375992616_Staying_ahead_of_the_game_the_RSE_and_PALM_scheme_202223
350
See, in the case of Samoa, Sharman, E. and Bedford, C. (2023) Samoa’s shifting seasonal work priorities. DevPolicy Blog, Canberra;
Development Policy Centre, Australian National University, 17 November 2023. https://devpolicy.org/samoas-shifting-seasonal-work-
priorities-20231117/ The Vanuatu Government commenced a review of their Seasonal Employment Act of 2007 and their 2019
National Labour Mobility Policy towards the end of 2022 and in March 2023 announced the introduction of an Emergency Employment
Visa allowing at least 1,500 foreign workers to enter Vanuatu to fill labour shortages in the country’s private sector
(https://www.dailypost.vu/news/emergency-employment-visa-order-signed/article_b50d2857-9f69-5e29-894b-a3269be38954.html.
The Tongan Government, with the support of the PACER Plus Implementation Unit (PPIU) in Samoa, commenced a major review of its
122 | P a g e
numbers involved in the seasonal work schemes were much smaller and comprised much smaller shares of
their working age populaons. This was especially the case in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Fiji
where absences for seasonal work each year accounted for less that 0.5% of their populaons aged 20-59
years.
Community percepons of impacts
In terms of current scale and paern, Aotearoa New Zealand’s RSE scheme and the two programmes (SWP,
PLS) managed by Australia’s PALM scheme are having quite variable impacts in the countries where the three
research teams conducted their inquiries. Some of the negave social impacts these temporary labour
migraon programmes are having on families and communies in Tonga and Samoa have been noted.
351
In
both countries, the research has found that the schemes had reduced the long term social resilience of
families and communies to future stressors, such as progressive climate change. With regard to Samoa, for
example, they noted, “Many spoke to concerns about the lack of culvaon of exisng (land) assets, and the
impact of having many in overseas seasonal work schemes for ‘short term gain’ was seen as being acvely
corrosive for longer term resilience potenal for Samoa and Samoans.”
352
In contrast, comments on the temporary labour migraon schemes in the community and mulgeneraonal
family studies in Kiriba, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, these tended to be more posive,
emphasizing the support that remiances by absentee workers were providing to families, especially those
who had moved recently because of adverse impacts of climate change. The following statement in the
report on the mobility of a family from Maiana is instrucve in this regard:
In this study, families were moving for economic reasons, to ultimately support their families.
They first moved to Tarawa, Kiritimati and Nauru, but today they are working in New Zealand.
Families maintain ties across borders, supporting each other emotionally and financially. Family
members working abroad often send remittances back to their families in Kiribati. Because of
limited resources and the impacts of climate change, they now focus on climate change
adaptation. The money they save or send home is not just for livelihood but for housing with
catchment, water tanks and permanent house above the ground. There are three women from
this family working in New Zealand to help support their families on Tarawa. These financial
contributions provide crucial support for households, helping them cope with economic
challenges, climate change impacts and enhancing their ability to withstand external pressures.
353
A common point that emerges is the impact that labour mobility is having on the atudes of workers when
they return to their communies in Tonga and Kiriba. Prominent Tongan journalist Dr Kalafi Moala, when
commenng on how parcipants in in the seasonal work schemes oen appeared disoriented on return with
lile purpose in their lives, noted:
People if they were out walking [in the past] were always going somewhere with purpose – like to
the plantaon to work. Now you see people just out walking, you stop and ask them where they are
going and they say ‘just over there’, but there is nowhere.
354
Kalafi observed that sending so many, mostly young men, overseas for extended periods has created
psychological harm reflected in reported loneliness and increased use of alcohol and drugs. More broadly,
labour supply management strategies in November 2022 and the relevant report can be accessed at: https://www.mted.gov.to/wp-
content/uploads/2023/07/FINAL_Final-TLMSMS_23-March-20231.pdf.
351
See Vaiolei, L. et al. (2024, 41-43 (Tonga). 71-72 (Samoa). for comments on adverse social impacts of these schemes.
352
Ibid, 71.
353
Alofa, P. (2024). 9.
354
Cited in Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 42.
123 | P a g e
the absence of so many young men has created fractures in the family unit leading to higher levels of
school truancy and marriage break ups.
355
In the study of Maiana, one of the parcipants observed with regard to young people that Kiriba now
had a new normal. In his words this was:
Te taneaia ae boou / Te tareboon / Te nangkona / Te matu / Te taningaroti / Te raraun [The
new normal / The mobile phone / The kava / The sleeping / The laziness / The wasting of
time]
356
Without doubt, temporary labour migration overseas, as well as migration from villages to towns in Pacific
countries is having a range of positive and negative impacts on families and communities. These impacts are
not specific to mobility, however. They are also reflective of more general social changes taking place across
the region, especially in towns, and the comment cited above could have been made by community leaders
and others in all of the in-scope countries where participants were interviewed.
Intra-Pacific migraon
The scale and paern of intra-Pacific migraon is an area of parcular interest to the PACER Plus Labour
Mobility Unit given that one of the objecves of the Arrangement on Labour Mobility (ALM), that sits on the
side of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relaons (PACER) Plus, is “to facilitate the temporary
circulaon of temporary workers amongst the Parcipants”.
357
One of the reasons for this is the differenal impacts of voluntary migraon to countries on the Pacific rim
on the availability of skilled labour in their domesc labour forces to meet the needs of parcular sectors of
the economy and, in the Realm countries especially, the needs of ageing populaons. Intra-Pacific migraon
is more extensive than oen appreciated given the aenon researchers have placed on migraon from
PICTs to countries on the Pacific rim and in other parts of the world. The internaonal migraon data bases
compiled by the UN and the World Bank, showing the distribuon of people born in each country across all
other countries around 2019, revealed that 71,780 (22%) of the 232,000 overseas-born in-migrants in the 21
PICTs had been born in other countries in the region.
358
Intra-Pacific migraon was especially significant in terms of the shares of overseas-born in-migrants in Wallis
and Futuna (91%), Kiriba (76%), American Samoa (69%) and Tokelau (56%). The small overseas-born
populaon in Wallis and Futuna is a mix of children born to migrant parents from these islands who had been
working in New Caledonia’s nickel industry and spouses born in other parts of the region. In the case of
Kiriba, the overseas-born Pacific migrants were mainly from Nauru – either I-Kiriba born in Nauru when
their parents were employed there in the phosphate industry, or spouses of I-Kiriba men and women who
had married Nauruans while living there.
In American Samoa, it was Samoans from their larger western neighbour and other Polynesians who had
moved to Pago Pago for employment, mainly in the fish processing and canning industry, and children who
had been born in Samoa to spouses of American Samoans. Most of the small number of overseas-born in-
migrants to Tokelau from other Pacific countries were children who had been born in Samoa’s hospital. There
355
Idem.
356
Cited in Alofa, P. (2024). 8.
357
See Key Objectives (Paragraph 3(e), Arrangement on Labour Mobility, accessed at: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-
agreements/PACER-Plus/arrangement-on-labour-mobility.pdf
358
An assessment of these data on intra-Pacific migration can be found in the University of Auckland team’s reports on population
dynamics (Bedford, R. et al. (2023a). 62-66; Bedford, R. et al. (2023b) 14-15.
124 | P a g e
is no hospital in Tokelau. The close links between Samoa and Tokelau are discussed in the family study of
Kāiga Atafu and the community studies in Atafu, Fakaofo and Nukunonu.
359
These four examples illustrate two of the key groups that can be idenfied in the flows into Pacific countries
from other Pacific countries. The first is people born in hospitals in other Pacific countries. The second is
linked with flows of labour into major industries in selected countries: although it should be noted that the
country with the largest extracve industry base in the region, Papua New Guinea, had very small in-migrant
flows from other Pacific countries. Only 1.8% of its in-migrants had been born in other Pacific countries with
Fiji and Solomon Islands being the major sources. The major flows into Papua New Guinea were from
Australia and Asia.
There are two other groups in the intra-Pacific flows of people born in Pacific countries. The first is skilled
labour from Fiji, especially teachers, medical personnel, security personnel, retailers, seamen and a wide
range of people with specialist trade skills.
360
In recent years Fiji has become an important source of
labour in the tourism and domesc are industries in some countries, especially Cook Islands and Samoa.
Contribung to their supply of skilled migrants is the Fiji Volunteer Scheme for rered professionals that
was introduced in 2009. This scheme has been an important source of teachers in several countries in
the central, eastern and northern Pacific. Burson et al. (2021, 45) note that 14 of the 21 potenal PICT
desnaons had Fiji-born residents in their populaons around 2019.
The other important group of overseas-born in-migrants in selected Pacific countries includes members
of reseled communies from Kiriba and Tuvalu in Fiji, Solomon Islands and Niue. The reseled
communies in Fiji were discussed briefly in the review of the central Pacific cluster in the Diverse Pacific
secon. In the Solomon Islands the reseled communies were I-Kiriba who were required by the
colonial administraon to move to sites in the country’s Western Province in the 1960s because of water
shortages in the Phoenix Islands, where they had inially been reseled from the southern Gilbert
Islands.
The reselement schemes involving I-Kiriba have been the subject of considerable research both
around the me they were iniated as well as in recent years.
361
They were not the subject of any specific
community or mulgeneraonal family studies for the current project, although the case study of
Takaeang on Aranuka in Kiriba does make reference to the Phoenix Islands Reselement Scheme
because Aranuka was also an island that was considered to be a suitable site for reselement of I-Kiriba
from the drought-prone southern islands in the 1950s and 1960s.
362
The community-led voluntary reselement of Tuvaluans from Niutao in Vaiea on Niue was the subject of
community case studies both in Tuvalu and on Niue.
363
Niutao is a small, low-lying coral island in Tuvalu
with an enclosed lagoon. Some families from Niutao relocated to the village of Vaiea on Niue in the mid-
1990s. They note that:
364
This took place when former Tuvalu Governor General, Sir Toomu Sione, made an agreement
with former Niue Premier and Member of Parliament, Young Vivian, who was reported as
having family es. Some community members in the workshops recalled discussions with Sir
Toomu Sione about moving but had decided to remain. Families from Niutao shared that some
of their family members did not stay in Vaiea; some returned to Tuvalu while others moved to
359
See Toloa T. and Toloa L.(2024), Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024e).
360
For further information on the role of Fiji as a prominent source of skilled migrants for countries in the central and eastern Pacific
clusters especially see ILO (2019) Labour mobility in Pacific Island countries. ILO Oice for Pacific Island Countries, Suva. 20.
361
For a recent review, see Campbell, J.C. (2022) Climate change, population mobility and relocation in Oceania. Part II: Origins,
destinations and community relocation, Policy Brief No. 132, Toda Peace Foundation.
362
See Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024d).7.
363
See Newport, T. et al. (2024f) for the case study on Vaiea and Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024g) for the case study on Niutao.
364
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024g). 7.
125 | P a g e
New Zealand once they were eligible. Some of those who remain in Vaiea have intermarried
into the Niue community and have had children.
There is no explicit reference to climate change being a reason for the decision to seek a new home in Niue,
but the research team do note that saltwater intrusion in the swamps where their tradional root crop,
pulaka, was grown was becoming an increasing problem in the 1990s and early 2000s. Parcipants in
workshops for Niutao migrants in Funafu observed that increasing salinity of the swamps had prompted
their migraon:
365
For me the reason why I would support migraon, if we take this crop named pulaka, before it is
very hard to die but as me went on to around 2002 it started becoming affected from
underneath the swamp. Then they started to die off. Time went on, there were completely no
pulaka under the swamp. Now there is no pulaka swamp. Now it is all dead. (Member of men’s
community workshop).
The community study in Vaiea also noted that the move by Niutao residents to Niue in 1996 was not
specifically related to climate change – it was linked to a move by the Niuean Government to encourage
immigraon from places where they had ancestral connecons because of the extensive out-migraon of
Niueans to Aotearoa New Zealand. Tin this study, the University of Auckland note that:
366
Over me Vaiae community members have le and moved to Aotearoa New Zealand and
Australia. At its lowest, a community member recalled there were only six true Vaiea people
remaining. At this me, Vaiea was considered all but abandoned. In 1996, because of this mass
exodus, Niuean government leaders and village leaders from Niutao in Tuvalu and Vaiea agreed
to provide opportunies for the Niutao families to come to Niue as a means to alleviate the
declining populaon. Such an agreement was considered agreeable because there is an
ancesatral e between the Niutao descendants from the villages of Avatele and Hakupu and
Vaiea.
The PACER Plus Implementaon Unit is in the process of preparing an Intra-Pacific Labour Mobility Strategy
to address labour shortages in Niue and Cook Islands.
367
A key challenge facing the governments of both
countries is the ageing of their populaons and the shortages of personnel to provide support for the older
members of their communies. The community studies in Pukapuka and Vaima’anga in the Cook Islands and
the West Coast communies in Niue made reference to labour shortages in key public services and domesc
industries.
368
The Unit is also working with the Solomon Islands government on a labour mobility strategy as this country
becomes an increasingly important source of trained nurses for other PICTs, especially neighbouring
Vanuatu.
369
Contribung to these shortages of skilled labour in domesc labour forces in an increasing
number of Pacific countries is parcipaon in the RSE, SWP and PLS schemes. As noted earlier, Vanuatu has
introduced its own temporary visa to fill crical gaps in its domesc labour market.
365
Ibid. 7-8.
366
Newport, C. et al. (2024f). 6.
367
See PPIU’s PACER Plus e newsletter for March-April 2023 where several schemes to enhance Pacific labour mobility for sustainable
development are outlined, including the intra-Pacific labour mobility strategy for Cook Islands and Niue. Available at:
https://pacerplusimplementationunit.cmail19.com/t/y-e-plhuuhk-ikkrluelh-a
368
See Newport, C. et al. (2024d, 2024e, 2024g).
369
See Roberts, A. (2024) More Solomons nurses arrive, 414 vacancies yet to fill. Vanuatu Daily Post, 17 May 2024. Accessed at:
https://www.dailypost.vu/news/more-solomon-nurses-arrive-414-vacancies-yet-to-fill/article_46070e24-2cd6-533b-b99b-
0b86fe138d9a.html
126 | P a g e
Tracking the circulaon of labour between Pacific countries is being compromised by a trend towards
publishing less informaon on the birthplaces of the populaons enumerated in censuses. This issue is
discussed in the reports on populaon dynamics and is raised in the final secon of this report that addresses
policy implicaons of findings from the MFAT-funded research on climate (im)mobility.
Migraon as a response to climate change
Populaon movement within Pacific countries and to overseas desnaons, that is directly linked with
ancipated or actual events or changes in the environment associated with climate change, has been a reality
in parts of the region for at least two decades now. There is a very extensive literature on the implicaons of
global warming for Pacific peoples and places and evidence that changes linked with this process has been
having a direct effect on voluntary migraon decisions by individuals, families and communies is presented
in reports.
370
This evidence is reviewed extensively in other secons in this report but it is useful in concluding
these comments on the current scale, paern and impact of voluntary migraon to make reference to some
of findings about recent migraon in Tonga and Samoa that emerged from the surveys in those two countries.
The insights gained about current and future climate (im)mobility of Tongans and Samoans merit careful
consideraon by policy makers, especially with regard to differences in perspecves and responses that were
provided by parcipants from the two countries. There are some novel findings in their research relang to
emerging paerns of voluntary mobility linked with climate change. One of these is ‘dual focus mobility’
which involves an extensive period of residence overseas, typically in Aotearoa New Zealand, earning money
to fund purchases of land and building of houses on higher ground on another island in Tonga, or away from
coastal areas to inland areas or away from low-lying urban areas to relavely elevated areas, when they
return.
371
This period overseas served the purpose of accumulang necessary funds to pay for the land
and/or the relocaon of the family home (i.e., there was a dual focus on both internaonal and internal
mobility – one being the means to the end) to effecvely build a new life back in Tonga on return.
It is clear from the in-country surveys in Samoa and Tonga that climate change is influencing current
mobility decisions. These revealed that 7% of the Tongans surveyed and 6% of the Samoans surveyed
reported that ‘escaping the impacts of climate change’ was the top reason given for planned mobility in the
coming five years.
372
These percentages represented, respecvely, 39% and 33% of the respondents who had
plans to move. The other 60+% with plans to move in the near future did not menon climate change could
be one of the factors influencing these voluntary migraon plans.
A key finding is that climate change is likely to result in significant numbers of Tongans and Samoans moving
internally as well as to overseas desnaons during the coming decades. Further, the data in the surveys
seemed to back up findings from talanoa that there was this link between plans for internal climate mobility
and plans for overseas mobility - data showed that a higher proporon (than the total sample) of those
planning internal mobility due to climate change were also planning overseas mobility. Results from the
survey and scenario building exercises are discussed further in the next secon with reference to the future
scale and paern of voluntary migraon in the region.
In concluding these brief comments on voluntary migraon linked with recent disrupve changes in
environments an observaon by Samoan historian, Damon Salesa, about the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai
erupon is instrucve. It captures the essence of one of the major contribuons that the three research
teams have collecvely made to widening our understanding of climate (im)mobility in the Pacific.
373
370
Two papers by John Campbell published in 2022 in the Toda Peace Institute’s Policy Brief series, contain very useful reviews of the
literature on climate change and (im)mobility in the Pacific. Details can be found in the references for this report.
371
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 16
372
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b). 5.
373
Salesa, D. (2024) An Indigenous Ocean. Pacific Essays. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books. 27.
127 | P a g e
With the right proximity or sensivity, the right ear or lens, you can understand both the local and
the global impact of a local event in Tonga. But you also don’t need to. It is enough to understand
these and other events in the Pacific on their own terms, in their own ways and tongues. But there
is something to be said for being able to comprehend how this erupon, like the indigenous
Pacific, straddles mulple scales, and requires more than a single way of seeing or hearing in order
to recognise it and understand it.
Relocaon
State-led relocaon
We have already highlighted how historical relocaon has contributed to the overseas born populaon in
some Pacific countries. The research highlights state-led relocaon in the colonial and independence eras
beyond the o-cited relocaon of the Banaban populaon. It documents that the people of Leauva’a (people
of the boat/canoe) were relocated by German colonial administraon from their villages on the island of
Savai’i to Upolu following the erupon of Mount Matavanu in 1905.
374
It also notes the 1977 government-
led relocaon of families from three villages the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal inland to Aruligo, onto land
the colonial government purchased from the Guadalcanal tradional landowners but later made available
for families to relocate. Although only five families moved originally, the current populaon is around 4,000
people.
375
Also examined is the 1994 relocaon in Matupit.
Currently, aenon is, rightly, focussed on the state-led process of planned relocaon being undertaken by
the Government of Fiji. By way of context the goverement of Fiji has noted evidence inficang that the rate
of sea level rise in the Southwestern Pacific is 2-3 mes the global average; some 27 per cent of the
populaon lives up to 1km from the coast with 76 per cent of the populaon lives within 5km of the coast.
A recent assessment had suggested that – without acon – approximately 4.5% of all exisng buildings on
Fiji will be inundated by 2050 under a highly likely sea level rise of 0.22m and 6.2% by 2100 based on an
expected experienced sea level rise of 0.63m.
376
As early as 2014, the Government of Fiji had indicated that 676 coastal communies needed relocaon based
on projected climate impacts, of which 42 were expected to require relocaon "in this decade, with 17 [at
the me] considered as priorized for relocaon as soon as possible”.
377
Naonal-level response is characterised by the development of a dense and integrated legal, policy,
operaonal and financial framework. Led by the Climate Change and Internaonal Cooperaon Division of
the Ministry of Economy, in collaboraon with the Deutsche Gesellscha fur Internaonale Zusammenarbeit
GmbH (GIZ) and drawing on financial support from GIZ and MFAT, the with Government of Fiji has:
Adopted Planned Relocaon Guidelines A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related
Relocaon (2018).
Established a Climate Relocaon of Communies Trust Fund (2019).
Enacted a Climate Change Act which legislates the “organizaon, governance, and execuon of
planned relocaon as a means to address loss and damage and enable adaptaon” (2021).
378
374
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). Case Study People of Leauva’a.
375
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024f).
376
Government of Fiji Case Study: The Development of Fiji’s National Planned Relocation Arrangements and Associated Financing
Mechanism ( 25 April 2023). 3. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/casestudy_fiji_relocation_financingmechanism.pdf
377
Idem. 3.
378
Idem.
128 | P a g e
Established and stood-up under the authority of the Climate Change Act, the intra-governmental
Fijian Taskforce on the Relocaon and Displacement of Communies Vulnerable to the Impacts of
Climate Change (2021).
Mandated the use of the Climate Relocaon of Communies Trust fund to support relocaon efforts
in Fiji (2021).
Developed a comprehensive set of ‘Standard Operang Procedures for Relocaon’ (2023).
Developed Financial Management Policy Guidelines for the operaon of the Climate Relocaon Trust
Fund (2023).
While the current scale of relocaon in Fiji is difficult to gauge with accuracy, relocaon processes are
underway, including at least one community-led relocaon being implemented by a civil society
organisaon.
379
Aenon is turning to how the processes and outcomes of that programme can be
improved, adapted and scaled up as required.
380
As will be discussed in the next secon, the extent to which
other PICTs replicate this iniave will be a significant factor in shaping future scales and paerns of
(im)mobility.
Looking beyond the example of Fiji, the research in Tonga in the wake of the 2022 erupon, draws aenon
to how state-led relocaon remains a feature of current paerns, parcularly in the context of geophysical
hazards. The research evidences there was significant leadership, influence, enablement by the Royal Estate
in this exercise, including the provision of land for new villages, plantaons and vehicles.
Community-led relocaon
Community-led relocaon due to environmental changes has been part of Pacific everyday acon, and the
research of all teams has shed further valuable light on the scale of household and community-led relocaon.
The research notes this has been a structural feature of paern in pre and post-colonial eras. For example,
the University of Auckland document how some people from Luaniua in Ontong Java migrated to Honiara
between the 1940s and 1960s, eventually establishing the Lord Howe selement. Several factors contributed
to this migraon including limited resources and space available on the small island of Luaniu.
381
Community discussions around whether to relocate connue. In some communies, albeit technically staying
in place, internal movement of some in the community has become necessary for safety. The research
documents this emerging paern in Bareho, Papae/Kolosulu, (Solomon Islands) and in Pukupuka and
Vaimaanga (Cook Islands), where, due to the impacts of climate change, families have begun moving to
different parts of their respecve villages and selements. In Managalas, Papua New Guinea, they have also
discussed plans of relocang within their own selement:
In the case of a drought, the decision would be made to move women and children closer to the rivers
or the bushes where there is food. Moving out of the land would not be a good decision. It is safer to
remain in an environment they know and have food to eat. (Managalas, community member)
382
In Bareho, household level relocaon due to sea-level rise and increasing populaon on Bareho Island has
already begun. The chief has made available a few hectares of land on the mainland for those who want to
move, where they can build their houses and for gardening. Some families have already moved.
383
379
See discussion in Regional Talanoa on Climate Induced Planned Relocation , 5 October 2023 At
https://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Report_Regional_Talanoa_05Oct_Final.pdf
380
Idem.
381
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024h). 2.
382
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024). 28.
383
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024g). 6.
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At the household level, the research documents the pracce of building second homes or shelter on inland
plantaon sites to reduce risk from coastal hazards. For example, the family study on Tuvalu highlights how
a kaupaapaa (a wooden shelter with open doors) has been built in the island's interior. This "second home"
will protect the family from the immediate effects of natural disasters because the effects of the waves will
be neutralised when they reach the ponds adjacent to the second home.
384
In the Tongan context, it is common for families with tax allotments to have at least a shack built there for
shelter, altough these are typically not fully stand-alone residences. A parcipant in women’s workshop in
Tongatapu disclosed plans to build a house inland on their plantaon and to rent out their coastal home,
while in a different talanoa discussing resilience, a parcipant discussed their family’s decision to have an
addional house built inland on their tax allotment/plantaon land “for the explicit reason of having an
alternave place to move to or shelter in should there be an environmental event that required it”.
385
However, not all families have tax allotments, including many living in Tongatapu.
Self-reselement – a form of circulaon in the relocaon context – is an established feature of current
paern. In Tonga this is happening, not just in relaon to some Mango relocaons following the 2022 Hunga
Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai erupon, but also with the kāinga Niuafo’ou evacuated from the volcanic erupon in
1946, and Niuatoputapu reselement aer the 2009 tsunami. In each instance, “people returned to their
tradional homeland.”
386
Other research confirms circulaon/reselement as a feature of paern connected to relocaon as form of
mobility. For example, the community study on Matupit notes that, almost 30 years aer being relocated
following a volcanic erupon, people are returning to Matupit and remaking their home, albeit close to the
sll acve volcanoes, because “life on reselement blocks is oen fraught with tensions.”
387
The research also shows that community-level relocaon can feature circular mobility. For example, the
Kwakwaru people who originally migrated from Gaita to Kwai Island in the early 1900s have, since 2018, been
in discission with kin in Gaita (and kin now living in Honiara) about relocang back to Gaita due to coastal
erosion on Kwai. Many meengs were conducted in a spirit of togetherness, with discussions “concerning
genealogies, land boundaries, tribal affiliaon with neighbouring tribes and idenfying important
landmarks”. While a slow process, discussions (tok stori) have led to a site for relocaon being idenfied and
allocated on the coast called Kwainiula.
388
The research in Samoa also reveals anecdotal evidence of households who had moved inland following the
2009 tsunami beginning to return to urban centres on the coast, including for beer access to food and links
to transport.
389
384
Peneta Hauma, T. (2024). 7-8
385
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 27.
386
Nailasikau Halatuituia, D. (2024) Tonga Mango Case Study - Kāinga Mango, Tonga - Pacific Climate Mobility Family Stories Case
Study. Mana Pacific Consultants Ltd. 15.
387
Underhill-Sem, Y. et al. (2024d). 5.
388
Filoa, T., (2024). 8.
389
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 77.
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Impacts
Conflict and tension
The research conducted in the different Pacific communies highlights a range of tensions and conflicts
stemming from environmental, socio-economic, and cultural factors. In Vaimaanga, Cook Islands, the needs
to relocate due to climate change has created a tension between staying for tradional land es and moving
for safety. This tension is exacerbated by economic disparies in affording adaptaon measures. Concerns
over cultural loss due to relocaon add another layer of conflict between environmental adaptaon and
cultural preservaon, parcularly impacng youth who grapple with preserving their identy amidst climate
change impacts.
Modern challenges like land shortages and saltwater intrusion in Bareho village, Solomon Islands, have
contributed to tensions related to the rise in overcrowding and emoonal losses due to potenal relocaon.
In Funafu, Tuvalu parcipants share experiences of tensions arising from urbanisaon and populaon
pressure, compounded by climate change impacts on tradional subsistence acvies and resource access.
Similar conflicts arise in West Coast Communies, Niue, and Nanumaga, Tuvalu where land disputes and
water scarcity contribute to community tensions.
What emerges from the research is that land and marine boundary issues are the most common source of
conflict, arising regardless of the selement type.
390
More geography-specific sources of conflict are also
present. These concern access to foreshore and the sea for coastal high island selements, and the pressure
of increasing populaon on some atolls, and in coastal and highland selements. In several communies
“issues around land shortages were seen mostly in regard to populaon density and increases.”
391
At this me, we are having a land dispute among us. Our populaon was increasing and I am so
grateful for the volcanic erupon that reduced the populaon. However, at this present me there is
an increased populaon. The new couples can’t live by their own they are crowded in that same land
space with their parents. (Community Member, Matupit, Papua New Guinea)
A community elder in Aruligo, Solomon Islands recounted:
Another changes experience is the increase in populaon growth. Before in the village there is only
less and the community is easy to maintain and control whereas due to populaon increased today
social unrest also increased.
Aer referencing over-populaon and food insecurity as factors, the Nagamito family study noted that
‘staying in place’ has contributed to a rise in pey crime including the from gardens, the killing of other
people’s animals for meat, and starng bushfires that destroy coffee plots and gardens. These acvies
undermine community cohesion and trust and pose “significant threats to food security, livelihoods and
overall safety.”
392
Community-tension arising from the intersecon of land tenure and localised populaon can have an
intergeneraonal element:
“Today the new generaon hears a lot of argument going on concerning land because they're not
properly given the right informaon. This poron of land here belongs to that Vunatarai and [the
390
Newport, C. et al. (2024b).
391
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024). vii.
392
Steven, H. (2024). 20.
131 | P a g e
land] is not given to them. That's the reason why a lot of argument now going on. On top of that,
because it is matrilineal, when a man from Matupit goes out of his way to another place Like
Karavia or Malaguna, and gets a wife there, his kids consequently will not own any land on Matupit,
because their mother is not rom Matupit. Some people are now wary of this tradion and are
causing a lot of problems.” (Matupit, Papua New Guinea)
Tensions with host communies can arise when planned relocaon occurs. Populaon expansion over me
– localised populaon in relocaon context – is an exisng source of tension. The case study on Leauva’a in
Samoa notes tension over land boundaries in a village relocated in 1905 in the wake of a volcanic erupon.
The relocang families were allocated a block of land to establish a new village for themselves. That allocaon
passed down, and connues to pass, through bloodlines in a way that runs counter to other village land
systems. Tensions have arisen within a neighbouring village who claim the relocated community have built
houses and established plantaons outside their alloed land.
393
This case study highlights how community-level research into relocaons from the early part of the 20th
century provides an important window on issues which may arise over the long- term, in the event of scaled-
up planned relocaon programmes in the 21
st
century.
A soer tension between relocated and host communies experienced in Tonga is around expectaons
following the relocaon of people from Mango Island to ‘Eua Island in the aermath of the 2022 Hunga
Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai erupon.
394
Members from the host community expressed the following frustraons
to the team:
We prepared plantaon land for them, [we] planted them food, all they need to do is harvest [it] but
they don’t.
It’s about me they adapt to where they are now – it’s been over a year. They need to forget Mango
and accept they are in ‘Eua now. People are talking about stopping supporng them so much. We will
connue to support them as they are part of our church. If they change churches [though], we might
stop then.
For their part, the people from Mango, tradionally fisherfolk, mourn the loss of their skilled livelihoods:
When in Mango, [the people] were not thinking about going out to the plantaon. They were just
used to resng then fishing. And when they fish they would catch big fish – tuna and other large fish,
[they would] collect lobster. The fish in Mango are different to the ones around ‘Eua, and it takes a
different technique to catch them.
We miss how we used to earn a living from fishing. Because we are here now, I had to plant kava but
it will take 3-4 years to mature. [With] fishing, we would have the money straight away. I could have
paid the contribuon to this house in one month fishing how we used to. Family overseas had to pay
that instead.
This brings into focus the importance of understanding and supporng tradional governance systems for
resolving community-level conflict. For example, in Managalas selement in Papua New Guinea, it was
remarked:
393
Vaioleti, L., et al.. (2024). Case Study Leauva’a – People Of The Boat.
394
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024) Case Study ‘Eua, Mango-‘Eua.
132 | P a g e
Disputes occasionally arise, but our community has mechanisms to resolve these by revising
agreements and finding compromises that ensure peaceful cohabitaon and resource ulizaon.
However, the rapid surge in populaon is now causing concerns. This growth might lead to land
disputes in the future, despite our exisng understanding of boundaries... Despite this, the 38 years
of discussions have equipped us with a general understanding of where each clan should be,
allowing us to manage our resources efficiently.” (Managalas, Papua New Guinea)
The University of Auckland point out that,
[s]ome pracces passed down through generaons explicitly preserve community togetherness and
social cohesion and draw on tradional conflict resoluon methods to maintain peace and unity.
These pracces not only reflect cultural values but also build community resilience needed in the
face of the mulplying effects of climate change. By building upon tradional mechanisms, policy
makers can align with community-led approaches to conflict resoluon that are contextually
appropriate, culturally sensive, and environmentally sustainable.
395
As coastal erosion, sea-level rise, and extreme weather events increasingly threaten tradional ways of life,
communies face difficult decisions about relocaon, which oen leads to internal conflicts. For instance, in
the case of Vaimaanga, community members expressed deep concerns about losing cultural identy and
tradional land es due to potenal relocaon. Similarly, in Niutao, mobility decisions, oen made without
broad family consultaon, have led to gendered and social tensions. Moreover, environmental degradaon
not only forces physical mobility but also strains resources, exacerbang conflicts over land and marine
tenure, as seen in communies like Ambu and Funafu. These tensions are further complicated by economic
disparies, where some can afford protecve measures against climate impacts while others cannot, creang
disparies within communies.
It is important to note that each community is facing, and/or will face, unique challenges that exacerbate
exisng societal tensions and create new conflicts as communies navigate the impacts of climate change
and other modern pressures.
The examples provided illustrate that tensions and conflicts within these communies are driven by a
complex interplay of environmental, economic, social, and cultural factors. Where conflict and tension
already exist within a community, climate change impacts are likely to exacerbate the conflict and tension.
In the future, further research is needed to explore dimensions of gender, different age cohorts, and
vulnerability within the factors that manifest conflict and tension.
Non-economic loss and damage
The teams’ research powerfully documents how employing a place-based approach to loss and damage
makes very clear the various forms of ‘non-economic’ loss and damage which have been, and will connue
to be, experienced by Pacific communies in the context of disasters and climate change. Summarising how
loss and damage is intrinsically connected to the mulfaceted nature of place, the University of Auckland
observe that,
understanding climate-im/mobility associated loss and damage requires a fundamental
understanding in Pacific terms of sense of place. This is because the aachment to place is more than
having a sense of aachment to any place. Rather, in relaonal terms, connecon to place refers to
essenal cultural, spiritual, mulgeneraonally layered bonds to place across me and space. The
395
Newport, C. et al. (2024b). 2.
133 | P a g e
loss of cultural alignment, of spiritual balance and relaonal es are immensely profound. The crical
resources that Pacific communies depend on for their lives and livelihoods are prominently reported
as loss of biodiversity, including coral reefs, mangroves, marine life, land-based ecosystems, but
cultural and spiritual resources are equally crical such as the ceremonies and rituals, ancestral
pracces and tradions, language and community elders and spiritual leaders.
396
Parcularly poignant evidence emerges from the case study on Satoa in Samoa. Satoa was located at
coastal end of their village land before the 2009 tsunami and has subsequently retreated inland to limit their
exposure to future tsunami risk. Following the tsunami, a lot of the villagers’ ancestors’ bones were washed
up from the old graveyard.as to this, the University of Waikato record:
they described how they gathered the bones, washed them and placed them on a bed ‘like a funeral’.
When they went to put them back into their original graves with prayers, they described how the
bones grew heavy “very heavy, like the weight of a body”. They thought this might mean that they
did not want to return to the old graves, but they told them that they must return – that they need
to be there to look aer the land.
397
Similar concerns featured among research parcipants engaged in Niue, reflecng on what moving to upper
terraces would mean:
They talk about our ancestors being the first vicms because what they own gets washed away from
sea level rises and storm surges. So, you are losing that connecon with those sites that are, you know,
they are sacred, they are special places, they are being destroyed that way.
398
This Satoa case study – a community relocaon in the wake of a geophysical hazard-related disaster – yields
other valuable insights, including around how the impacts of relocaon in the context of climate change –
posive and negave – may manifest over me. Posives, such as having more space, being closer to
plantaon sites and having a beer school for the children, were counterbalanced by a sense of loss of a way
of life:
Though they used to be in the sea a lot, they don’t go to the sea anymore. And even if they lived
closer, they say fishing has changed – one needs a boat to get to the fish as the fish have migrated
out to deeper waters because of the water temperature.
399
A further example is highlighted whereby a woman was moved to ‘Eua from ‘Atataa aer the volcanic
erupon, but was no longer able to harvest pandanus for weaving.
We don’t do anything in the hall. I used to weave and earn an income. I could spend a month
making a ta’ovala and sell it for TOP$800-1000. There is no land here to grow pandanus, and even if
[we were] given access now, it would take a couple of years for it to reach maturity to be able to use
it.
400
While this case study signals that relocaon away from ancestral land and plants threatens important cultural
pracces and can create non-economic loss, it also shows how the same relocaon may lead to economic
loss when the relocaon site moves people away from their tradional subsistence-based lifestyles:
396
Newport, C. et al (2024c). 2.
397
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). Case Study Satitoa.
398
Newport C. et al (2024g) 22-21.
399
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). Case Study Satitoa
400
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). Case Study ‘Atataa, ‘Atataa Si’i
134 | P a g e
One of the hardest things for people here connues to be income. Having enough money to provide
for your kids, your family. In ‘Atataa you would pick the produce you grow in the morning then sell it
that evening. Here it’s very hard now. People are trying to grow small gardens on their small land
[around their house]”
401
The impacts can be gendered. The research in Tonga heard of the significant social and personal loss women
felt with the loss of their koloa. It was a major personal loss for one parcipant when “The tsunami just swept
it all away”. As to these gendered impacts, the University of Waikato note:
women have a crical role to play to provide different koloa for different occasions – like weddings,
bapsms, birthdays and funerals. For a funeral in New Zealand for example, people will travel to Tonga
to collect koloa or people will travel from Tonga to bring back certain koloa. These koloa represent
family wealth and many have been passed down to them by many generaons past. Women in ‘Atataa
suddenly being in a posion where they could not fulfil that role reportedly affected their sense of
self-worth. One woman shared how there was an explicit message sent out that the women of ‘Atataa
have no obligaon to provide koloa for occasions, and that this act was a relief for her and others who
carried a degree of shame about the situaon.
402
Community fragmentaon following relocaon has also featured across the research. This is noted in the
research in relaon to West Coast communies in Niue, and in relaon to ‘Atataa in Tonga.
Even the issue of the naming new villages in relocaon sites is replete with issues around loss of aachment
to place. Mango’s new village in ‘Eua was named Mango-‘Eua, which the research suggests reflected some
expectaon of integraon. For ‘Atataa, the local noble wanted their new village to be named Kolovai Si’i,
nong how it sits adjacent to the village of Kolovai. The Royal Estate reportedly declined this suggeson,
stang ‘Atataa is sll there, so this is just ‘Atataa Si’i.”
403
The University of Auckland focussed their analysis on non-economic loss and damage. around McNamara et
al.’s (2021) typology,
404
and revealed that all communies perceive and/or experience a range of non-
economic loss and damage, largely in terms of health, wellbeing as well as biodiversity-linked cultural loss.
Tradional boats are rare now because we have no resources to make and pass on knowledge.
(Funafu, Tuvalu)
The natural environment has changed. For example, in the past we used to build vaka from the
trees. Those trees are no more. We don’t build vaka. Our fishing boats are built with imported
materials. (Pukapuka, Cook Islands)
405
All of the eight communies that had experienced relocaon and displacement experienced non-economic
loss and damage in relaon to their previous locaons. All are experiencing climate change impacts in their
new locaons with associated non-economic loss and damage, notwithstanding the variance in the
typography of each selement. While highland communies do not have the same relaonship to the sea as
atoll communies, they nonetheless share deep connecons to their lands and waterways to which non-
economic loss and damage are aached.
401
Ibid.
402
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 40.
403
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024) Case study Atataa, ‘Atataa Si’i.
404
This issue is explored in Newport, C. et al. (2024c).
405
Idem. 26.
135 | P a g e
The research undertaken demonstrates how lived and ancipated experience of loss and damage informs
decisions to both move and to stay in place. People are choosing to remain in place, despite risks, because
of concern about economic and non-economic loss and damage. At the same me, staying in place will bring
exposure to future loss and damage.
We are living with climate change. The impact of climate change can be seen with what it had done
with our land, resources, sea, and survival. As a result of costal erosion, there are houses and homes
that are in the blink of washed away or got damaged. Some plants and trees are no longer there.
They uprooted and got washed away. Primary school buildings are not in good condions and can
be seen that, maybe for another year or less, there will be water everywhere in that place.” (St John
(Beo), Kiriba)
406
Mobility-related loss of culture, and the tradional structures and pracces of everyday life that have
served Pacific communies well in the face of past environmental change, featured prominently as a core
community concern across the research. This concern is typified by comments made by parcipants in
workshops led by the University of Auckland in Pukapuka, Cook Islands:
We will lose the way we plant, especially the wawa and the way in which we look aer our animals.
We will lose our cras such as weaving, making vaka and other carving, because our natural
materials will be no more. We will lose our wonderful pracce of communal gathering of food and
sharing this for all in the community. We will lose the kavekave and all our other pracces that are
unique to our way of life and to our identy as people of Pukapuka
We will lose the essence of every pracce that we have that is based on the village (oile), tawa,
yolonga, wua and pule. With the loss of everything that is related to our identy and who we are,
we will be lost.
407
The potenal for loss of language over me, as new generaons are born abroad within transnaonally
distributed family groups, also emerged as a concern.
Given the importance of faith in the lives of so many Pacific peoples, it is perhaps unsurprising that the field
research in Tonga also revealed a fear of loss of status in Church was a worry for some if they had to relocate
elsewhere.
Psychosocial harm
The relationship between climate mobility and wellbeing in the Pacific region is intricate and multifaceted,
as evidenced by various community experiences and discussions. Despite facing environmental challenges,
such as fluctuating water temperatures and shoreline erosion, residents often express a sense of resilience
and adaptation to changing conditions. However, climate-related impacts, such as increased stress, mental
health issues, and domestic violence, underscore the importance of factoring wellbeing considerations into
policy concerning both mobility and staying in place.
The research illustrates the complex psychological and social effects stemming from environmental
vulnerabilies. This includes increased anxiety due to unpredictable weather, stress from displacement, and
cultural disconnecons due to the loss of tradional lands. It shows how these changes weaken community
406
Ng Shui, R. et al (2024c).
407
Newport, C. et al (2024c). 16.
136 | P a g e
bonds, cause stress from relocaon, and diminish cultural and spiritual es, illustrang the lasng impact of
climate change on the mental health and social cohesion of Pacific communies.
The examples provided across various Pacific communies highlight the pervasive and interconnected nature
of psychosocial harm associated with climate change impacts and displacement. In places like Vaimaanga,
Cook Islands, Red Beach in the Solomon Islands, and communies in Kiriba, Tuvalu, and Papua New Guinea,
stress and anxiety arise from water scarcity, cyclones, sea-level rise, and environmental degradaon,
threatening livelihoods, cultural identy, and social bonds. Addionally, the fear of forced relocaon and the
loss of ancestral lands contribute to a deep sense of loss and uncertainty among communies in places like
Pukapuka, Niue, and Matupit, Papua New Guinea. This uncertainty extends to youth, who face anxiees
about their future roles and decisions amidst environmental changes.
Displacement following natural disasters, such as the 1986 cyclone in Papae Kolosulu, Solomon Islands, and
the 2009 tsunami in Lalomanu and Satoa Villages, highlights the trauma and disrupon to community life
and cultural connecons to land and spirits. Moreover, concerns about the future sustainability of
communies, as seen in Lord Howe Selement and Funafu, Tuvalu, contribute to chronic stress and anxiety.
Reluctance to relocate from coastal areas, as observed in Ambu, Solomon Islands, underscores the deep
emoonal aachment to homes and memories, further exacerbang psychosocial harm. These examples
emphasise the urgent need for comprehensive support systems and policies that address the emoonal,
social, and cultural dimensions of climate-induced displacement, while fostering community resilience and
wellbeing.
The importance creang a sense of place, to promote wellbeing and minimise the trauma, which will
inevitably arise from movement away to a new relocaon site, is exemplified in the talanoa with an elderly
couple who had relocated from Mango. The couple shared how the husband used to deep sea dive and
spearfish in the waters of Mango. Their old fishing spear and equipment were displayed on their front porch
in of their new home in Mango-‘Eua.
408
This example demonstrates that place-based programming as a core
element of a well-designed, parcipatory planned relocaon and need not be expensive to be successful.
Factors of wellbeing like family support, cultural values, and access to resources like clean water and
nutrious food play vital roles in ensuring community resilience and prosperity. As communies face the
complexies of climate-induced challenges, it is essenal for policymakers to recognise the interconnected
dimensions of wellbeing, heritage, and cultural knowledge. This understanding can help support thriving
communies, whether they choose to remain in place or relocate. Examples from research highlight various
aspects of wellbeing impacted by climate change, including mental health, domesc violence, physical
health, community resilience, spiritual and cultural wellbeing, economic wellbeing, and social wellbeing.
These examples underscore the importance of holisc approaches to address the diverse needs of
communies facing climate-related challenges.
FUTURE SCALE, PATTERN AND IMPACTS
Painng the picture
Taking the previous secon as a point of departure, in this secon we seek to paint the picture of what the
research tells us about the future scale and impacts of climate-change related mobility will be, and idenfy
points of policy intervenon.
408
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024).
137 | P a g e
The picture that emerges reflects that the inter-connected factors of localised populaon pressure, land and
marine tenure and food and water insecurity – what we have idenfied as ‘the driver’ – will connue to be
of major importance.
That these interdependent factors also represent the ancipated drivers of (im)mobility clearly emerges in
the future scenario planning undertaken in relaon to Tonga and Samoa. Parcipants came with a range of
professional backgrounds, as well as student and youth representaon. A number of government ministries
were represented in the workshops in both Tonga and Samoa. There was a mix of genders represented
through the parcipants, including two who idenfied as transgender. Parcipants were taken through an
intensive day-long process of scenario development and exploraon to design and detail four possible futures
- set in the year 2050 - for each Tonga and Samoa.
Parcipants believed that “while family will connue to provide shelter wherever they can, the tolerance of
receiving communies will drop as more people move inland or to higher land” (an issue of localised
populaon pressure and land/marine tenure) and that “food security is a concern and it will have an outsized
impact on internal and overseas mobility”.
409
That such a diverse mix of parcipants idenfied these as being
among the important themes relevant to the future experience of climate change underscores the degree to
which they will connue to drive future (im)mobility in the region.
That this driver will influence (im)mobility is predictable. Quite what this means in terms of future scale
and paern is less so. Drawing on the previous secons it is important for policy makers to keep in mind the
following, when thinking about future (im)mobility in the context of climate change .
First, the localised experience of naonal-level populaon trajectories is important, parcularly of
burgeoning youth and aged populaons. In communies in which the populaon is or will become skewed
towards older cohorts, this will likely impact how much staying in place features. For those skewed towards
the youth, the trajectory brings into focus the capacity of land and marine tenure arrangements to peacefully
absorb current and future growth.
It is also important to recognise the importance of ‘stay-to-move’ mobility. Today’s 0-4 year olds are
tomorrow’s students, workers and, potenally, migrants – whether internal or internaonal. The willingness,
and ability, of a youthful populaon to move elsewhere for study, for work, for marriage will shape not just
their own contribuon to future scale and paern, but also the contribuon of others, for whom their
movement enables connued stay.
This will have different implicaons depending on which cluster the country falls in. For example, in the
Western Pacific, as we have noted already, the challenge for policy is how to support communies mostly
living in villages simultaneously coping with demand for access to land for farming as well as increasing the
mobility of increasing numbers of young adults, while addressing issues associated with preferences for
staying in place amongst the older populaon.
In other clusters the populaon-related challenges are more likely to be linked with increasing urbanisaon
of populaons both internally and overseas. Young adults are seeking livelihoods based on cash earnings
rather than subsistence producon and increasing numbers are seeking opportunies for work in towns.
Where there are large overseas-based components to the cluster’s populaon internaonal mobility has
become part of the way of life in Pacific transnaonal families.
409
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d). 8-9.
138 | P a g e
Second, the everyday acon of households and communies will connue to provide resilience.
Communies will innovate and adapt to meet changing environmental condions impacng their site or sites
of selement, as they have done in the past. These condions will be shaped, depending on the geography
of their selement, by exposure to weather, climate and/or geophysical hazards. The degree to which this
every day resilience is maintained and enhanced – including though external support as required – will have
a direct bearing on the scale and paern of future (im)mobility by dampening the effect that climate change
would otherwise have on food and water insecurity and thereby easing the impact of a local populaon
pressure. This means more people will be able to choose to remain in place for longer. Maximum scale will
connue to be delineated by the populaon-absorpve capacity of land and marine tenure arrangements.
There are policy entry points in relaon to each factor. Invesng in beer, more comprehensive hazard data
will improve early warning capacity and, if aligned with forecast-based financing, beer drive ancipatory
acon. Supporng everyday acon places a premium on community-led development projects in which the
mobility implicaons are factored into design.
Third, future scale and paern will be influenced by informaon around ancipated climate change
impacts. While decision-making is likely to remain at the household or family level (including here, family
members living beyond naonal borders), it will connue to be influenced by discussions that are occurring
at the community level. The extent to which informaon around future climate change flows into community
level governance structures and is transmied to households in village meengs in digesble form will,
alongside the lived experience of environmental change, shape percepons of risk and influence – at least
for some – the decision around whether some or all of a family unit connue to stay in place. This means
invesng me in understanding and supporng tradional governance structures and leadership.
For members of transnaonally distributed families, communicaon with kin abroad provides another
informaon portal. As with community structures, the extent to which informaon about climate change –
here, both in the PICT and in the other country or countries where ‘place’ is located – will also shape decision-
making around whether, when and where to move.
Fourth, families will connue to be first responders and the primary support mechanism in cases of future
mobility. The extent to which families are supported by well-designed policy to fulfil these funcons will
influence how these forms of movement impact not just those moving, but also the wider family unit.
Fih, changes in immigraon policy in the main desnaon countries within the region as well as on the
Pacific rim will obviously have an impact on the scale and paern of populaon movement. Responses to
the introducon of seasonal work programmes by the governments of Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia
in the late 2000s have already been discussed under Current Scale, Paern and Impact. These policy
iniaves, which will connue to have a significant impact on temporary migraon in the region, have
recently been augmented by the introducon of Australia’s Pacific Engagement Visa
410
, and plans by the
Coalion Government in Aotearoa New Zealand to expand the RSE scheme.
411
While these policy
developments will provide new opportunies for temporary and long-term migraon from parcipang
countries throughout the region, they are likely to have most impact in the western and central Pacific
clusters.
410
See Dingwall, D., Voloder, D., Movono, L. And Kupu, M. (2024) The Pacific Engagemnt Visa is set to grow the region’s diaspora in
Australia – but experts warn of challenges ahead. ABC News, 7 June. Accessible at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-07/pacific-
engagement-visa-ballot-diaspora-migration/103936844
411
NZ Herald (2024) PM Christopher Luxon wants thousands more seasonal workers from Pacific countries in New Zealand. NZ Herald
17 June. Accessible at: https://www.nzherald.co.nz/talanoa/pm-christopher-luxon-wants-thousands-more-seasonal-workers-from-
pacific-countries-in-new-zealand/FV3Q37JKIRCJBLFR5SJNND4RXI/
139 | P a g e
While climate change is not specifically menoned as a reason for these more general labour migraon policy
iniaves climate (im)mobility is beginning to feature in specific bilateral arrangements like the recent Falepili
Union between Australia and Tuvalu
412
During the next decade climate change is likely to be referenced
directly much more in proposals relang to cross-border movement of Pacific peoples within as well as
beyond the region.
Having made these general remarks, we now turn to set out what we believe the research signposts by way
of the specific forms of immobility and immobility set out in the Pacific Regional Climate Mobility Framework.
Staying in place
Overall, the research as a whole indicates that staying in place will connue to feature prominently in future
paern. How this will present depends on the household and community contexts, and the extent to which
staying in place represents a manifestaon of voluntary and/or involuntary immobility. As noted, however,
these are not binary posions, and both may influence a decision to stay in place at the household level.
Moreover, choosing to stay will in some cases reflect concern about movement. For example, concerns about
the loss of agricultural lands, changes in diets, and the possibility of forced relocaon if climate trends persist
contribute to the reluctance to leave.
Where staying in place is of an involuntary nature – for example through a lack of financial or of social capital
in the form of having family networks elsewhere – the future scale of staying in place will depend on the
extent to which these barriers are reduced though policy. Where staying in place is predominantly voluntary,
the key policy challenge will be how to best support family to stay, parcularly should food and water
insecurity ramp up over coming decades because the impacts of climate change outpace the ability of
communies to cope through innovang tradional pracces.
Despite the challenges posed by climate change, many communities in the Pacific have chosen to remain in
their current locations for various reasons, and these reasons will endure. First, this decision often stems
from a deep sense of attachment and obligation to the land, and ancestors buried there, particularly among
older generations who resist the idea of moving elsewhere. There will be many, like the Vaimaanga
community, which has no immediate or long-term plans to relocate, opting instead to adapt to the changing
climate conditions.
413
So too in Tonga and Samoa where some individuals have invested in climate-resilient
infrastructure, such as raising homes using earth and rocks, to mitigate the risks of flooding.
414
Family ties – both internal and to family beyond national borders – will continue to play a significant role in
shaping the scale of future (im)mobility. Many participants highlighting the importance of staying close to
relatives, especially children, as a driving factor in their decision to remain in place. Ties to family beyond
national borders provide for financial and in-kind remittances. The survey of Tongan diaspora showed that
the most common application of family-funded adaptation in Tonga was raising a family home, and in Samoa,
the rebuilding a home or business post flooding or storm.
The research also tells us that framing policy entry points is important. Despite facing challenges like coastal
erosion, communities such as Takaeang view them as opportunities for growth rather than vulnerabilities.
Additionally, factors such as proximity to opportunities and emotional ties to ancestral lands further solidify
the resolve of communities like Aruligo and Matupit to stay, despite the adversities posed by climate change.
In Atafu, the construction of seawalls represents a collective effort to bolster resilience against rising sea
412
See, for example, Dziedzic, S. (2024) Australia, Tuvalu lay out terms of landmark climate and security pact, ABC 9 May. Accessible at:
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-05-09/penny-wong-australia-tuvalu-signs-climate-security-pact/103825000
413
Newport, C. et al. (2024e).
414
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).
140 | P a g e
levels, reflecting the community's determination to adapt and persevere in the face of environmental
changes.
Staying in place will continue to exert a powerful influence on future scale and pattern because it is the site
where everyday resilience is practiced. This may become even more true, given the understanding that other
places to where movement might occur given the presence there of family will also be exposed to hazards.
This sentiment is clearly expressed in the family study in Nanumaga:
A latou e heki galue keatea mo Nanumaga ona ko pokotiaga o mafulifuliga o ‘tau o aho tela e pokotia
i ai a tatou katoa. Kae ne galue keatea mo Nanumaga ona me ia latou e halahala o he olaga tai lei
atu. Ke taku ne tatou pela me ia latou nei ne galue keatea ona ko mafulifuliga o ‘tau o aho, ki te aku
he ‘mau e haa tonu, me i matagi malohi mo galu lahi ne mea loa kola e ‘tupu ia latou… e haa iloa ne
tatou a te taimi tela e poko mai ai pela hoki mo te taimi e gata i ai. A mea konei ne mea loa e tupu.
Me ne gahue koe ki Vaitupu, e pau loa e poko hoki i Vaitupu. Io me e gahue koe ki Niusila, me he
fenua hoki fakatea, e pau katoa loa, e haa iloa ne tatou a te taimi e oko mai i ai a mea kona.
[They moved out of Nanumaga not because of the threat climate change poses to all of us. But they
moved because they were in search of a better life. To think that climate change caused these people
to move out of Nanumaga is incorrect, for these strong winds and high tides were things that do
happen on their own… we do not know when they will arrive and when they will cease. Those things
will happen whether we like it or not. Whether you move to Vaitupu, it will be the same, those
disasters will also strike there. Or whether you move to New Zealand, or any other country, it is all the
same, we will never know when those disasters strike…]
415
It is also important to recall how the (im)mobility of some family exists in relaonal symbiosis with the
mobility of others through ‘move-to-stay’ decision making . Over the longer-term horizon, the scale of
(im)mobility both at the community and naonal levels will, to some extent, be a funcon of degree to
which naonal, bilateral and regional policy sengs provide opportunity for individuals to become mobile.
Displacement
Displacement will connue to feature and will likely increase. The scale of increase is uncertain, in part,
because of a lack of accurate baseline data of current levels of displacement.
Urban displacement will also feature, including repeated displacement, parcularly in sites of informal
selements where communies are more exposed to underlying hazards. The extent to which urban
displacement features in the future will depend on a number of factors including the extent to which the
urban populaon increases through internal rural-urban migraon (thereby exposing more people to the
relevant hazard or hazards) and the extent to which urban disaster risk reducon and climate change
adaptaon measure are targeted towards informal selements or other places where internal migrants may
be residing.
As part of the PRDD project, IDMC included in its country risk assessment projecons of future scale of
displacement. These are expressed in terms of a ‘probable maximum displacement’ over different return
periods and an ‘average annual displacement’.
415
Peneta Hauma, T. (2024). 7.
141 | P a g e
Probable Maximum Displacement
This is explained as represenng “the maximum displacement expected within a given me period, and
outlier events that could occur during it”. IDMC states it is best expressed as the probability of a given amount
of displacement being exceeded over different periods of me. Table 2 provides the probable maximum
displacement for selected countries.
Table 2: Probable Maximum Displacement for selected Pacific countries
Hazard type
IDMC’s Future Displacement Analysis Country/Year return period
(% probability of occurring ‘-‘ =no esmate provided/insufficient data)
Solomon
Islands
Fiji Vanuatu PNG Tonga
20y 50y 20y 50y 20y 50y 20y 50y 20y 50y
Storm Surge 8000
(56%)
_ 35,000
(56%)
- 10,060
(33%)
- 10,000
(39%)
- -
Cyclonic
Wind
- 68,000
(64%)
- 65,000
(18%)
- 34,600
(64%)
-- 1000
(39%)
- 21,400
(64%)
Earthquake - 41,000
(39%)
- 1,100
(39%)
- 6,290
(39%)
- 100,000
(18%)
- 3000
(50%)
Tsunami - 3000
(5%)
- 80
(5%)
- 230
(5%)
- 10,000
(10%)
- -
Riverine
Flood
- - - - - - 375,000
(18%)
-
Source (IDMC: 2020; 2021a, b; 2022 b,c,d)
For example, for Papua New Guinea, IDMC esmate that there is an 18% probability that “an earthquake”
will displace 100,000 people “at some point” in the next 50 years. Similarly, there is a 39% probability that a
storm surge will displace 10,000 over the same period. For Fiji, IDMC esmate a 5% probability that a tsunami
will displace 80 people; a 39% probability that ~1,100 people will be displaced by an earthquake; and an 18%
probability 65,000 people will become displaced by cyclonic winds in about the next 50 years .
Average Annual Displacement (AAD) per hazard and mul-hazards
Average annual displacement is the “magnitude” of future displacement by hazard types that a country can
experience. It is not the number of displacements that the country will incur each year. Rather, it represents
the number of people expected to be displaced per year, considering all the events that could occur. IDMC
state that “the AAD is useful for providing a sense of the scale of the annual risk of displacement”. IDMC
note that its AAD projecon will tend to mask outlier events of low frequency but high intensity, which can
cause significant levels of displacement. Table 2 sets out IDMC’s figures for the scale of annual displacements
by hazard type.
142 | P a g e
Table 3: Average Annual Displacement (AAD) per hazard(s) in selected Pacific countries
Hazard
COUNTRY
Solomon
Islands
Fiji
Vanuatu
PNG
Tonga
Storm Surge
1,368
3,614
1,125
234
-
Cyclonic Wind
2,372
2,076
2,133
2134
1051
Earthquake
278
75
417
24,000
168
Tsunami
11
1
1
159
10
Riverine Flood
-
-
-
-
-
Totals
4029
3614
3700
31,000
1229
Source (IDMC: 2020; 2021a, b; 2022 b, c, d)
Table 3 shows that IDMC have esmated that, in any given year in the future, 31,000 people could be
displaced in Papua New Guinea due to the various hazards. More than 4000 could be displaced in the
Solomon Islands in any given year in the future, and in excess of 3500 in any given year in the future in both
Fiji and Vanuatu.
Apart from giving an indicave sense of the scale of future displacement in certain PICTs, Tables 2 and 3
highlight two important points. First, they demonstrate the uneven nature of hazard mapping within
countries. Volcanic erupons and landslides do not feature as specific hazards for which modelling was
undertaken, despite each driving oen substanal and protracted displacement. Second, the tables are
notable for the large number of cells for which insufficient data has been available for modelling to occur.
It is to be recalled that a lack of relevant data was menoned by both Kiriba and Tuvalu in their reports to
the recent mid-term review of the implementaon of the Sendai Framework. For both countries, this has
acted as a constraint on progress towards reducing the numbers of persons affected by disasters – including
through displacement – one of the targets of the Framework. Addressing such data challenges will be central
to developing displacement-sensive policy.
Migraon
The research as a whole cautions against over-generalisation about both the impact of climate change on
individuals, households and communities in the region, as well as over-generalisation of migration responses
to climate change. Policy responses to climate change require approaches that are very sensitive to local
conditions, cultures and contexts. They also require appreciation of the continuing importance of circulation
of people between places where they have resources, family members, and opportunities to achieve
important economic and wellbeing goals.
In addition, the variable histories of international migration in the different clusters will continue to have a
major impact on responses to climate change. For individuals, families and households in the western Pacific,
for example, there are none of the well-developed and tested pathways to temporary and long-term
residence overseas that can be found in the central, eastern and northern Pacific. However, opportunities
143 | P a g e
for voluntary movement overseas from the western Pacific have increased significantly, especially to
Australia, since 2010 and, over time these are going to have a major impact on the development of
transnational communities of Papua New Guineans, Solomon Islanders and ni-Vanuatu.
Migration in response to climate change is unlikely to involve complete abandonment of particular
localities for most movers. Except where places disappear under the sea or under debris from volcanoes or
landslides, circular mobility patterns will keep “the fires burning” for future generations in places that have
cultural significance for the movers and their multigenerational families. Even should such abandonment be
necessitated by catastrophic changes in the local environment, return by smaller groups of people to
reconnect with such places to draw spiritual and emotional sustenance will likely feature at some scale.
While internal or internaonal migraon will remain circular in character, the scale, periodicity and
duraon of circulaon will vary over me depending on the locaon of selement in the PICT, the
parcular circumstances of the family unit (including its age-sex structure) and, in the case of internaonal
migraon, the immigraon and social policy sengs of the country which is also home to transnaonally
distributed family groups.
In terms of scale, the research has made use of populaon projecons produced by the UN and SPC in their
reports.
416
Reservaons are expressed in the reports about the migraon assumpons used in the
projecons and they cauon that the projected populaons at the country level out to 2050 were likely to
be too high if climate change resulted in significant increases in numbers leaving Pacific countries for overseas
desnaons in the region, or in countries on the Pacific rim.
Net migraon rates – a review
To provide more robust evidence to support this concern of both teams, esmates of net migraon rates
around 2020 and 2050 have been derived from unpublished data provided by SPC and from the UNDESA
medium projecon series. These rates, presented in Table 4, are expressed per 1000 people in the populaon
in 2020 and 2050 for the five clusters, for the Pacific populaon as a whole, and for the Pacific populaon
excluding Papua New Guinea. Comparable esmates for New Zealand and Australia can be obtained from
the UNDESA projecon series, and these are included in Table 5.
416
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023a); Bedford, R. et al. (2023a, 2023b).
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Table 4: Projected net migraon rates for 2020 and 2050 by cluster
Net migration rates (per 1000 population)
Cluster SPC 2020 UN 2020 SPC 2050 UN 2050
Western Pacific -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Central Pacific -5.8 -6.0 -3.5 -1.8
Eastern Pacific -18.0 -9.8 -12.4 -5.2
Northern Pacific -9.4 -8.2 -6.1 -2.7
French Territories -0.5 -2.7 -0.3 0.5
Pacific -1.6 -1.3 -0.7 -0.4
Pacific (excl. PNG) -3.1 -4.6 -1.4 -1.5
Aotearoa New Zealand n.a. 7.6 n.a. 2.2
Australia n.a. 4.6 n.a. 4.3
Source: Based on SPC’s 2020 and UNDESA’s 2022 Medium projecon variant.
Three key things stand out in the esmated net migraon rates in Table 4:
1. The estimates derived from the SPC migration assumptions for both 2020 and 2050 are higher than
the estimates derived from the UNDESA assumptions in both years for the five clusters and for the
two Pacific region totals;
2. The estimates for 2020 from both sources are higher than their estimates for 2050 in the five clusters
and for the two Pacific region totals; and
3. The eastern Pacific cluster, which includes Samoa and Tonga, has the largest net migration losses per
1000 population in both years and in both data series. The other clusters are consistently ordered,
from largest net losses to smallest, as follows: northern, central, French territories and western.
The data presented in Table 4 for the UNDESA esmates for net migraon gains to Aotearoa New Zealand’s
and Australia’s populaons in 2020 and 2050 provide a reality check for the Pacific rates. Both of these
countries had large net migraon gains before the COVID 19 pandemic closed internaonal borders, and
these net gains have picked up again since borders reopened. The magnitude of the net gains per 1000
populaon for Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia in the two years shown suggest that the net losses for
the Pacific clusters are not out of kilter with what might be expected given the nature of the migraon
assumpons used by UNDESA.
A lot more could be said about the SPC and UNDESA migraon assumpons for the PICTs between 2020 and
2050, but it is clear from Table 4 that constant or declining rates going forward are quite conservave and
they definitely do not make any allowance for increases in internaonal migraon as a result of climate
change.
Changes in immigraon policy
As noted, changes in immigraon policy will now be moderated by a regional policy context which includes
the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility. This Framework recognises that “rights -based” cross-
border migraon can play a crical role in allowing people to move “safely and on their own terms on the
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context of climate change” and as adaptaon strategy leveraging “ state-led iniaves to develop specific
[migraon] pathways....”.
417
This regional framework provides further impetus to the development of
migraon policy in two broad trajectories:
(a) cross-border movement as form of short of long-term voluntary adaptaon to the lived and/or
ancipated impacts of climate change; and
(b) cross border, movement (admission) and stay on humanitarian grounds due to the effects of a
disaster in the country of origin, transit or desnaon.
418
The scale of the laer is, to some extent, conngent of the scale of the former in that the greater the volume
of temporary movement a visitors, students or workers, the more persons whose temporary visa status may
be adversely impacted when a disaster occurs and who may require an immigraon response on
humanitarian grounds to remain lawfully in the country.
419
At the regional level, the extent to which cross-border/internaonal migraon features in terms of scale and
paern of future climate change-related mobility depends to a significant extent of the migraon policy
seng at the naonal level, parcularly in countries who act as a hub for a wider cluster of PICTs. The
research has charted the emergence of Fiji and Australia as hubs, alongside the established hubs of
Aotearoa New Zealand, the United States of America and France. This development is important as it has
increased the volume of migraon policy nodes around which internaonal migraon in the context of
disasters and climate change might occur.
The research has idenfied five mobility relevant sub-regional groupings, as opposed to the more
tradional grouping of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. These developments are important as they
signal a more variegated landscape for immigraon policy. The future scale and paern will this be shaped
by the degree to which the migraon policy sengs of the various hubs reach into one of more of the five
sub-regional clusters and the extent to which any parcular PICT is represented in more than one.
The significance of these developments can be seen in the changes in immigraon policy in Australia which
will have an impact on internaonal migraon to that country from many PICTs. The Pacific Engagement Visa
(PEV), discussed briefly in the Diverse Pacific secon, is likely to have an impact on flows from the western
and central Pacific especially. The Pacific Access Category and Samoan Quota, on which the PEV is modelled,
have certainly had major impacts, over me, on migraon from eligible countries, and have made significant
contribuons to building Pacific transnaonal communies in New Zealand.
New bilateral arrangements, like the Falepili Union which has now been finalised by the Tuvalu and Australian
governments will allow for up to 280 cizens of Tuvalu to seek residence in Australia on an annual basis, have
the potenal to have a profound impact on populaon change in PICTs with small populaons.
420
There are, however two important caveats which emerge from the research. First, even if migraon policy
sengs in a hub country are loosened, this does not mean that all those eligible to take advantage will do
so; many will likely connue to choose to stay in place. While there will be a generaonal signature underlying
this phenomenon in some instances, the research makes clear that this will not be the only factor.
Significantly, there is evidence that an awareness that even hub countries are also experiencing the impacts
417
At paras 28 and 30.
418
At paras 38 – 42.
419
This element of the Regional Climate Mobility Framework draws on Burson et al. (2021) which reviewed the various tools which some
countries in the regional have at their disposal to deal with
420
See Dziedzic, S. (2024) Australia-Tuvalu lay out terms of landmark climate security pact, ABC News, 9 May 2024. Website. Accessible
at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-05-09/penny-wong-australia-tuvalu-signs-climate-security-pact/103825000
146 | P a g e
of climate change, coupled with an aachment to place, may cause even younger persons to choose to
remain in home islands, even if internaonal migraon pathways exist.
Second, this loosening of migraon policy sengs will not translate into permanent movement in all cases.
While some who migrate abroad may move their principal ‘place’ of residence, many will, if enabled, also
connue to return to the home island temporarily to visit family, for work, and/or for important gatherings
as they do now. Some will choose to return permanently aer spending many years abroad, as they also do
now. In other words, while any loosening of migraon policy sengs will cause the volume of person
circulang across borders to increase, the fundamentally circular nature of cross-border movement will
likely remain a dominant feature of paern.
The case of American Samoa
There is one Pacific populaon where the UNDESA migraon assumpons, along with declining ferlity, do
lead to absolute populaon decline every year between 2020 and 2050 and that is American Samoa (Figure
16).
The net migraon rate in 2020 (-35.8 per 1000) for this populaon, which is almost four mes the UNDESA’s
overall rate (-9.8 per 1000) for the eastern Pacific and, although these rates decline slowly through to 2050,
they remain much higher than the UNDESA average for the cluster right through to that year and beyond. It
is not clear why this very different set of migraon assumpons is used for American Samoa but, as can be
seen in Figure 16, the effect of such high rates on the curve for populaon change (the solid pale blue line)
is very different from the curve derived from the SPC’s esmates and projecons (solid dark blue line) from
as early as 2000.
Figure 16: Populaon change in American Samoa since 1950: SPC and UNDESA esmates and projecons
While this radical change in the paern of populaon growth in American Samoa in UNDESA’s esmates and
projecons cannot be aributed to factors linked with climate change, the graph provides an illustraon of
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what much higher rates of net migraon overseas, as one of the responses to climate change, might mean
for small Pacific populaons in the eastern, central and northern Pacific in the future.
Esmates and scenarios for Tonga and Samoa
In their reports on surveys and climate change scenario exercises carried out in Tonga and Samoa, and in
their dra synthesis report, some very valuable insights into how residents perceive both the impact of
climate change on their future mobility plans and the impacts that different scenarios for climate change
could have on their ways of life by 2050.
421
Surveys of 305 Tongan parcipants and 290 Samoan parcipants sought informaon on general mobility
‘willingness’, beliefs around future climate mobility, internal and overseas desnaon preferences, and
recent and planned mobility, including climate-related mobility (internal – with planned direcon, and
overseas – with planned country). While small percentages of the survey populaons in both countries
indicated that climate change had already had an impact on movement decisions they had made, when these
percentages are applied to the naonal populaons, they provide some useful insights into the potenal
scale of mobility that might be aributed to climate change.
The limitaons surrounding esmates of recent and potenal future (im)mobility that may be aributed to
climate change, based on findings from non-random sample surveys are expressly noted. But, despite the
caveats, the results provide very useful insights into the future scale, paern and impact of climate change
in Tonga and Samoa. Some of the headline findings from the surveys, can be summed up as follows:
422
1. The proportion of the population already moving due to climate (+/- environmental) factors seems
higher in Tonga than Samoa.
2. The proportion of people expecting or actively planning climate-related mobility in Tonga and Samoa
in the next five years is higher than over the past five years.
3. A high proportion of those who are planning internal climate-related mobility are also planning
overseas mobility in the next five years.
4. A higher proportion of those looking to be mobile from Tonga than Samoa will look to Aotearoa New
Zealand as their destination, with the survey in Tonga suggesting this could be as high as 75%.
5. More women seem to have been mobile in Tonga than Samoa, and those with a 'pent-up desire' for
mobility/facing involuntary immobility are also predominantly women.
A very comprehensive overview of the outcomes of their field research in Tonga and Samoa is provided in
the draft synthesis report, which highlights similarities and differences between the two countries. This is
reproduced in full below (Table 5). It contains the estimates of mobility that have been and might be
impacted by climate change.
423
421
See Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b, 2023c, 2023d).
422
As communicated to the synthesis team by Lora Vaioleti email (17 April 2024).
423
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 9-11.
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Table 5: Overview of findings from fieldwork in Samoa and Tonga: similaries and differences
Similaries
Differences
Scale - Household food security as a current and
future driver of mobility.
- Access to funding as an enabler for mobility,
as an enabler to rebuild (i.e., crical for
choice).
- Obligaon (to family, living and passed, to
the land itself) as a barrier to mobility, as a
reason to remain in place and keep rebuilding.
- Family, including close and extended,
enabling mobility opons – both internally
and overseas.
- Erosion of residenal land, already a mobility driver in
Tonga.
- Higher proporon of the Tongan populaon have
undergone or are in the process of mobility where
climate change is a factor (based on Survey One
results), though both esmate ~1,600 annually in
Tonga and Samoa (nong Samoa’s populaon ~double
Tonga).
- In the next five years, Samoa could see ~3,083
mobilise annually where climate change is a factor,
Tonga could see ~3,650 annually (a higher proporon
of total populaon).
- ~1,233 people in Samoa could (also) mobilise
overseas annually in the next five years due, at least in
part, to climate impacts (~1,000 people in Tonga).
- 72,900-125,000+ people by 2050 could be under
parcular climate stress in Samoa, compared with
10,500-35,000+ in Tonga (nong different availabilies
of exposure mapping between Samoa and Tonga –
more specific studies of coastal inundaon for a larger
capture of the populaon done for Tonga at this stage).
Note also that this climate stress will play out very
differently in Tonga and Samoa given e.g., land tenure
systems.
Paern How people may move
- Climate mobility is happening and will
happen as a (nuclear) family.
- An impermanency (for many) in plans for
overseas relocaon, including for climate
impacts (unless land lost to sea erosion or
inundaon).
Where people may move
- For overseas desnaons, the preference is
for Aotearoa New Zealand over Australia or
the USA (though Australia was a closer second
preference for those in Samoa).
- For internal mobility, can move to extended
family.
Who may move
- Those with family, including spouses, already
overseas, will be the ones more likely to move
overseas in the future.
- Mobility opons may be reduced in the
future in both Tonga and Samoa as the noon
of ‘family’ narrows from extended to nuclear
family ("immediate needs, immediate
family”).
How people may move
- Future climate mobility in Samoa will likely be as a
group/family; climate mobility (internal) in Tonga likely
to involve many levels of family separaon and
dispersal.
- Tongans displaying hints of a paern of dual-focus
climate mobility – taking steps for internal relocaon
while planning overseas mobility (for 10-15 years) to
fund this longer-term (internal) relocaon.
- Could be inter-island group differences in hazard or
risk exposure and differences in approaches to mobility
(return versus move and stay) for Tonga (e.g., the
Ha’apain approach is typically to leave and not return).
Where people may move and direcon
- Future climate mobility in Samoa more likely to be
internal versus overseas.
- Much mobility for households in customary land in
Samoa will be coastal to inland and upland.
- Rural to urban climate mobility predominates in near
term and longer-term future for Samoa, coastal and
urban to rural predominates in Tonga.
Who moves (or does not)
- Women appear to face both unique blockers to
mobility (most with a possible ‘pent-up desire for
mobility’ are female) and were also as a group more
‘mobility willing’ in Tonga .
- Generally, the younger age group (18-24 years) in
Samoa are more mobility willing (seeking economic
opportunies), in Tonga. Survey One showed 34-45
149 | P a g e
Similaries
Differences
years most mobility willing (supporng children into
overseas educaon or work).
Decision-
making
- Decisions for family mobility made at a
nuclear family level (‘mother and
father’/’husband and wife’, though possibly
husband > wife in Samoa).
- The diaspora is oen involved in mobility
decisions for family in Tonga/Samoa (though
uncommon to make the final decision).
- Land tenure systems different – Samoa characterised
by flexibility (at least of customary land) though
possible increasing complexity with spling of Matai
tles in a family, and ongoing trend of fewer
households on customary land will impact this in
future.
- Differenated land holding rights for women versus
men in Tonga with resultant vulnerabilies for women
and women-led households.
- Village level decision-making involving Matai on
whether to move, allocaon of land etc. in Samoa.
- In Tonga, the influence of the King in village level
decision-making, the role of the government in
coordinang village mobility (in Samoa, some village
level relocaon has occurred autonomously).
- Diaspora in Samoa possibly insgang conversaons
around mobility more than Tongan diaspora.
Impacts - Impact on income/income connuity the
priority challenge following relocaon.
- Psychological trauma le unaddressed and
was idenfied as a priority issue by those who
moved, as well as the general community (and
diaspora), Tonga more than Samoa.
- Upck in domesc violence in Samoa (nong this
could be sampling, cultural or otherwise, that it was
not raised in Tonga).
- Integraon issues, anxiees in Tonga on internal
mobility, including social/status vulnerability, issues
around self-identy (linked to inter-island group
cultural and social diversity).
Acons (to
reduce harm)
- Ongoing climate awareness campaigns
across all levels of the community and
including praccal training and access to
equipment for adaptaon (housing and
planng).
Values as resilience – invest in revitalising and
reinterpreng in the context of future climate
change and mobility.
Invest in psychological preparedness for
future climate-driven mobility (praccal and
emoonal planning).
- Samoa is ahead of Tonga in the government’s
dedicated efforts to strategically approach and
coordinate engagement with overseas diaspora to
support with development priories.
- Need for a contextual naonal framework for mobility
decision-making/relocaon, and monitoring and
evaluaon.
- Financial support opons / land access opons for
climate stressed populaons.
Future Scenario Building as a tool highlighng potenal paern
Research into how Tongans and Samoans view the impacts of climate change in the future using well-
established techniques for scenario building has also produced valuable insights into potentially different
responses in the two countries. Again, a useful infographic is reproduced from the University of Waikato
report “Moving futures. The scenarios” (Table 6). It summarises some of the elements of the scenarios that
emerged from the visioning and development workshops conducted with groups of participants from a wide
range of sectors and interest groups in both countries.
Table 6. Mobility assumptions by future scenario: a summary
424
424
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023d). 7.
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A clear message from both the surveys and the scenario building exercises is that generalisation about
current and potential impacts of climate change on decisions to move or stay, or decisions to move to stay,
across Pacific countries is very dangerous. Research at the regional, sub-regional, national, community and
multigenerational family scales for this climate (im)mobility project has made this very clear.
Relocaon
Relocaon will, at the regional scale, remain predominantly internal in nature. Household and community-
led relocaons will connue as they have done for centuries. Future scale will depend in part on the extent
to which other counes follow Fiji’s lead and develop an organised programme of state-led relocaons.
In 2022, the Solomon Islands government published its own Planned Relocaon Guidelines which records:
Climate-driven relocaon is already occurring in Solomon Islands and more communies are
expected to need to relocate in the future. The Solomon Islands Government (SIG) has already
idenfied several communies that may benefit from Planned Relocaon, such as Choiseul Province’s
capital, Taro.
425
The document envisages the development of standard operang procedures, as has occurred in Fiji.
The research indicates that the Tongan Cabinet passed a bill for some people to move from an exposed area
in Nuku’alofa as the areas had been mapped by both the Ministry of Lands, and the Ministry of Meteorology,
Energy, Informaon, Disaster Management, Environment, Climate Change and Communicaons as part of a
series of subprojects to reduce flooding risk in key exposed areas. There was no naonal-scale planning.
While areas of Ha’apai (Lifuka) have been idenfied as at high risk of erosion and sea inundaon, direcons
to relocate have not been issued simply due to the lack of land availability to enable relocaon internally.
426
Scaling up planned relocaon in Tonga might be complicated by the feasibility of taking back land from
overseas landholders, given the significance of remiance flows to the naonal economy.
427
425
Government of the Solomon Islands Planned Relocation Guidlines (2022). 4.
426
Morrison, S., et al (2024b). 16.
427
Vaioleti, L., et al. (2024). 39.
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Given the strong aachment to place, including the naon as a ‘place’ at a larger scale, the research does
not support a finding that there will be a desire to relocate internaonally en masse:
Our people prefer to stay here in Kiriba, it would be great to visit other countries for site seeing, but
not to migrate and stay in the countries. We prefer to be with our communies here in Kiriba. If we
were to relocate we prefer to relocate within Kiriba, this is why assistance from developed countries
in needed so that we can reclaim land to move our people.
428
Pacific youth as a window of future (im)mobility
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, growth in the youthful component of many Pacific
populaons was aracng considerable aenon from academics, policy makers and planners, and
policians in the region. Concerns about the implicaons of rapid populaon growth in the region had been
smulated by journalist Rowan Callick’s very pessimisc assessment of populaon prospects for the Pacific
in his 1993 essay “A doomsday scenario?” in a monograph addressing the region’s development through to
2010.
429
The book, Pacific 2010: Challenging the Future (edited by R. V. Cole), aracted a wide range of
aenon and reviews, and for the next decade, into the 21st century at least, there was a great deal of
interest in the demography of the Pacific.
At the heart of the concerns of the Pacific development debate that Cole and his colleagues were addressing
in 1993, and which connues to be a maer of considerable concern, was the queson: where will the
burgeoning youthful populaons in the region, and especially in the western Pacific, find employment and
sasfying livelihoods? In 2006, this was a central queson addressed by the World Bank team that produced
the highly influenal report Pacific Islands at home and away. Expanding job opportunies for Pacific
Islanders through labor mobility.
430
It was this report that paved the way for the introducon of the seasonal
labour mobility schemes in New Zealand and Australia that have played a major role in opening the door to
temporary, as well as long-term, migraon from the Pacific to Australia for the first me in over a century.
Heather Booth’s contribuon to the World Bank’s report, entled “The young and the restless: the challenge
of populaon growth” addresses populaon projecons for the region and highlights the major increases
that were taking place, and would connue to occur, in the child and young labour force age groups. Her final
sentence makes reference to at least two of the challenges linked with contemporary demographic and
economic change in the region: “The high projected levels of excess supply of labour for the formal sector
indicate the enormous challenge that the Papua New Guinea and Pacific island country governments have in
front of them. The other side of this coin is that in the Pacific region there will be an increasingly larger pool
of young people from which those countries with ageing populaons will be able to draw.”
431
428
Ng Shui, R. et al. (2024c). 13.
429
Callick, R. (1993) A doomsday scenario? In R.V. Cole (Ed.) Pacific 2010: Challenging the Future, Canberra: National Centre for
Development Studies, The Australian National University, pp.1-11.
430
Luthria, M. et al. (2006) Pacific Islands at home and away. Expanding job opportunities for Pacific Islanders through labor mobility.
New York: World Bank.
431
Booth, H. (2006) The young and the restless: the challenge of population growth. In M. Luthria et al. (2006) Pacific Islands at home
and away. Expanding job opportunities for Pacific Islanders through labor mobility. New York: World Bank, pp. 27-40.
152 | P a g e
Growth in youthful populaons in the 21
st
century: a cluster-level perspecve
Two graphs, using index numbers for the vercal axis,
432
provide a useful summary of trajectories for growth
(or decline) in two components of their youthful populaon: children aged 0-14 (Figure 17) and the working
age populaon between 15 and 29 years. (Figure 18). The data come from UNDESA’s esmates and medium
variant projecons for naonal populaons in the Pacific between 1950 and 2100.
When the trajectories for change in the child populaon (0-14 years) are compared with those for the total
populaon in the five clusters (see Figure 8) it is very clear that declining ferlity is slowing growth in all
clusters (Figure 17). Growth in the child populaon in the western Pacific cluster is much slower than growth
in the total populaon but it is the only cluster which sees progressive increases in numbers of children in
the populaon through to 2060. Aer 2060, numbers are projected to begin declining as the curve for the
cluster’s child populaon in Figure 17 suggests.
In three clusters (the northern Pacific, the French territories and the central Pacific) the numbers of children
present in 2000 are larger than the numbers actually or projected to be present at the beginning of any
subsequent decade through to 2100 (Figure 17). The child populaon of the central Pacific cluster peaked in
1990s, while those in the northern Pacific and the French territories peaked around 2000. In the eastern
Pacific, numbers of children present in the populaon stay prey stac through to mid-century when they
are projected to begin falling consistently below the number present in 2000.
Figure 17: Change in the populaons aged 0-14 years in the five clusters,
2000-2100, using index numbers: 2000=100
Not surprisingly, given that children constute the next generaons of workers, these variable trajectories
for change in the child populaons of the clusters are reflected in the trajectories for the populaons aged
15-29 years (Figure 18).
432
The graphs use index numbers to represent the actual numbers in the populations of the five clusters at dierent years between 2000
and 2100. In all cases the number 100 is equal to the cluster’s population in 2000. Where the curve of the line representing the
population trajectory for a particular cluster goes above 100, the populations in subsequent years are larger than the one in 2000. Where
the curve goes below 100 the populations are smaller than the one in 2000.
153 | P a g e
The numbers of youth in the western Pacific’s populaon are projected to connue to increase through to
the 2070s, reaching double their 2000 total by 2030. The eastern Pacific cluster’s youth populaon is also
projected to keep growing through to the 2070s, but at a much slower rate than in the western Pacific.
In the central Pacific, numbers in the youth workforce connue to grow slowly through to the 2040s, where
they are projected to plateau at around 10% above the number present in 2000, and then begin to decline
slowly, eventually falling below the 2000 total by the 2080s (Figure 18). The French territories also experience
some growth in their youth workforce through to the 2030s, and then numbers start to decline steadily. In
the northern Pacific cluster, numbers aged 15-29 in their combined populaon never exceed the 110,000
present in 2000; the projected trajectory for numbers in their youthful working age populaon is a
progressive decline (Figure 18).
Figure 18: Change in the populaons aged 15-29 years in the five clusters,
2000-2100, using index numbers: 2000=100
The increasing numerical dominance of the western Pacific’s youthful populaon is well known. The variable
trajectories for the two components of this populaon in the other clusters are less well-known. The graphs
provide a useful perspecve on the dynamics of two youthful components of Pacific’s populaons that will
definitely experience the impacts of climate change for most of their lives.
Youth perspecves on future (im)mobility
The previous secon makes very clear that both the quantum and distribuon of youth in the Pacific will
be different in the future. Yet, like their parents, grandparents and ancestors before them, the current and
future Pacific youth populaon will be confronted, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on their
community, with the same interconnected factors which have shaped (im)mobility.
154 | P a g e
One youth, imagining their future self, reflected:
Due to lack of land area or space in Red Beach I will not be living here ... I would relocated or
migrate to another place. ... my grandchildren must aend formal educaon to be able to look aer
themselves and their family. (Red Beach Youth)
433
As recently reported, a poll of hundreds of sciensts suggests there is every likelihood that the 1.5C target
in the Paris Agreement will not be met and that the planet is headed for at least 2.5C of heang.
434
Such a
scenario makes it increasingly likely that climate change impacts will exacerbate the exisng pressures being
experienced by today’s youth on their localised water and food security.
This is reflected in the Mana Pacific Consulng family study on Gwailao Tribe of Ngongosila Island, East
Malaita, Solomon Islands, which records:
Countless tales are told by the young tribe members describing their fathers that have to go out
further and further because nearest havens where fishing grounds once where, have now been
plundered to build walls to both hold the sea back and create stability for houses on the edge of the
island’s borders.
435
As we note in the secon on hazards, the extent to which these impacts undermine localised food and water
security is conngent on the capacity of communies to adapt, including the extent to which tradional
knowledge and pracce can meet these challenges. It is important to recognise that tradional knowledge
and pracce is not ossified. It has evolved over centuries and will connue to evolve. Exisng pracce will
be adapted, and new pracce may well emerge to meet future environmental challenges and become
tomorrow’s ‘tradional’ knowledge and pracce. Yet, given the current trajectory of carbon emissions,
impacts of climate change-related hazards will, alongside other hazards, increasingly intrude on
(im)mobility decision-making.
What this means is that, in the western Pacific, many more young people will be trying to live on their own
land in inland villages under increased climate change condions. Increasing opportunies in towns,
freeing up agricultural land, and increasing pathways to travel abroad, must therefore be important policy
objecves.
In relaon to the eastern Pacific, the survey revealed that ~ 50% of those aged 18-24 ‘strongly agreed’ or
‘agreed’ that climate change would mean that their family will need to leave home at some point in the
future. Those in the 25-34 year age group (which they note can sll be considered as youth in Tonga) showed
the strongest belief (~30% strongly agreeing) of all age groups. The team also note that the youth engaged
in a workshop “overwhelmingly” indicated a preference to move to New Zealand over other overseas
desnaons, if they ‘had’ to choose. However, the majority said that they were not yet ready to leave their
family or their heritage and move to New Zealand now. Rather, their preference was to adapt.
436
What also emerges from the research is that youth across the Pacific display a range of atudes towards
(im)mobility. Any discussion of future (im)mobility of today’s youth is necessarily connected to both ancestral
and living memories of mobility, and shape future possibilies.
437
While, as youth, they may not be formally
433
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024b). 24.
434
Carrington, D. World’s top climate scientists expect global heating to blast past 1.5C target The Guardian (8 May 2024). Website.
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/article/2024/may/08/world-scientists-climate-failure-survey-global-temperature .
435
Sanga, F. (2024). 5.
436
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 64.
437
Underhill-Sem, Y., et al. (2024b). 9.
155 | P a g e
involved in making (im)mobility decisions, they are kept informed and their knowledge and lived experience
of such decisions by elder generaons will necessarily be drawn upon to inform decisions they make as
adults, and as parents and grandparents as they age.
Like elder generaons, Pacific youth also are aached to the land, ocean and waterways of their ‘place’ and
from which they draw a sense of wellbeing by staying in that place, connected to family:
Living near the sea also brings good life for us because we have access to fishing. (Ambu)
Life in Bareho is very easy, if you want to go to the garden you can easily paddle for a few minutes to
the mainland to do gardening and access food. That is what good life means. We access to free
water and if we want to eat fish then we can easily go fishing for free and eat our catch rather than
pay for it. This is why I live a good life. (Bareho)
As a youth from Kiriba, a good life means having a secure future with access to resources like
water, enjoying the beauty of our islands, and feeling confident that our community is resilient and
well-prepared to face environmental challenges. (St John, Beo)
438
Others are alert to the need to move, for educaon, for work and to allow others in their family to remain in
place:
My thinking is that I must be diligent in my educaon so that I can get knowledge and have a career
so that I can have a good life. Later on I can have a good life with my wife and children. Money is
important so when I work I will have money to support my family. (Matupit)
439
Youth workshops in Samoa and Tonga also revealed a range of atudes, with some envisaging a future in
Samoa, others abroad:
My hope is to move out of the country and work and send money to family”
[My hope is for] our dreams to become a reality - move to Australia for a beer job and educaon
440
The research shows that youth were acvely engaged in community discussions and understood the non-
economic losses due to climate change. This was vividly demonstrated at a youth workshop held in Apia.
The University of Waikato record:
Some groups when asked to describe their feelings or thoughts about the future chose to draw a
picture. In the workshop held in Apia, one group shared a detailed drawing of a tree. One half was
lush and thriving, which was said to represent Samoa in current state. The other half was void of all
leaves, its roots dry and contorted. Another group depicted people holding hands and gathering
around a large crucifix at the centre of the page.
441
The University of Auckland conclude from their youth engagement that “youth from communies already
facing increasing threats to the habitability of their lands appear more cognisant of what was at stake.”
442
438
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024b).
439
Idem. 22
440
Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 100.
441
Idem. 110.
442
Newport, C. et al (2024c). 42.
156 | P a g e
You cannot live a good life when water is not safe. (Aranuka)
Having access to proper sanitaon, water and helping women in the community who are struggling.
Because currently, they have to walk to the valley to fetch water for drinking and washing. (Aruligo)
Having a good house where access to water, food and everything including having access to proper
playing ground. (Ambu)
443
Recalling the collecve and communal building blocks of the Pacific way of life, the team note that “two
common themes across all youth workshops were the need to have a ‘good job’ and the youth's commitment
to their families”:
Difolopmen hem happen long community
[Development takes place within the community] (Papae/Kolosulu, youth member)
444
Such percepons of both risk and loss of connecon to people and place will necessarily be factored into the
decisions they make about whether, when and where to move, and for how long.
For those contemplang internaonal movement, the research indicates that the pathways that today’s
youth contemplate are linked to the choices they have based on the cluster in which their country falls.
For example, youth from Aruligo and Red Beach
reported aspiraons to parcipate in Australian and New
Zealand labour schemes for beer opportunies.
445
Pacific youth are, like their parents, grandparent and ancestors, steeped in the everyday life which has
allowed their families and communies to thrive. They, too, have a mulfaceted connecon to place. But
they face a future in which the impacts of climate change will likely feature as a context in which they have
to make decisions about where to live their lives. Many will connue to move to allow others to stay. Many
Pacific youths are nestled within transnaonally distributed families, and like their parents, and possibly
grandparents, may circulate between the various ‘places’ of their family at different mes, for different
reasons. This feature of Pacific family life is not evenly distributed and responding to this is one of the main
policy implicaons arising from the research as a whole. It is to these that we now turn.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The main policy implicaons which emerge from the rich evidence and analysis provided by the research are
now outlined. The aim is not to offer detailed policy recommendaons, but instead to highlight key findings
about current and future (im)mobility that are crical to policy development in order to promote ancipatory
public governance.
Climate change-related (im)mobility is already a feature of the regional
landscape
One of the most important findings from the research is that climate change-related (im)mobility is already
a present reality, making it a current policy issue rather than a future one. The research demonstrates that
concern about the current and ancipated impacts of climate change are beginning to influence decisions at
the individual, family, household, and community levels about whether, who, when, and where to move away
443
Idem. 23.
444
Ng Shiu, R. et al. (2024). 35.
445
Ibid.
157 | P a g e
from their ‘place’. While climate change is oen not the sole context for these decisions, it is becoming an
increasingly important factor alongside more typical consideraons of socio-economic beerment.
In the secon on the Pacific hazard scape, the report notes the significance of the indicaon by the IPCC in
the Sixth Assessment report that there is now more than a 50% chance that the 1.5°C temperature threshold
will be consistently exceeded within the next decade or two, especially for the PICTs comprised enrely of
coral atolls and reef islands.
The clear implicaon of the research is that, as Pacific peoples connue to experience environmental
changes in such a warming world, their lived experiences will increasingly factor climate change into
household and community decision-making processes. It is reasonable to expect that, should the localised
impacts of such climate change undermine food and water security at the household and community levels,
these impacts will increasingly feature in decision-making, including a decision to move some or all family
members to another locaon.
Ancipang increasing internaonal mobility
Some of the populaon movement in response to climate change is linked with temporary labour mobility
schemes in Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia where the movers take advantage of opportunies to earn
much higher incomes than they could if they remained based at home. These incomes, in turn, are used by
some to support investment in strategies to increase the resilience of their families to actual or potenal
adverse impacts of climate change.
There is also movement in response to climate change linked with Aotearoa New Zealand’s quota-driven
residence visa policy, the Pacific Access Category (PAC). The large numbers involved annually in the ballots
for PAC residence visas are a crude indicator of the level of interest in the parcipang countries in
opportunies for families to make a livelihood overseas. Australia’s very similar quota-driven Pacific
Engagement Visa (PEV) is likely to generate a similar response in parcipang countries.
The PEV covers a much wider range of countries than the PAC, including all of those in the western and
central Pacific clusters. It provides all cizens of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu with their
first opportunies to be part of a residenal migraon programme in Australia. It is a scheme that has been
designed with a view to growing Pacific diaspora communies in Australia, especially communies from the
western and central Pacific.
446
It is not possible to say how much of the current populaon movement between Pacific countries and
Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia is in response to climate change but the three research teams all
made reference to discussions at the family and community level about the importance of temporary and
long-term internaonal mobility as a strategy for adapng to the impacts of climate change in Pacific
communies. The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union, with its associated provisions for an annual quota of
residence visas for Tuvaluans seeking opportunies to live and work in Australia, directly recognises “special
and unique circumstances faced by Tuvalu and that climate change is Tuvalu’s greatest naonal security
concern”.
447
Surveys in Tonga and Samoa as well as in their diaspora provided clear evidence of the growing impact of
climate change on decisions to move to new locaons within countries and overseas within the past five
446
See Dingwall et al. (2024). Accessible at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-07/pacific-engagement-visa-ballot-
diaspora-migration/103936844
447
For the full text of the Australia-Tuvalu Falepile Union can be found at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-
tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty
158 | P a g e
years, as well as in plans for moverment over the next five years.
448
As opportunies for cizens of Pacific
countries to qualify for longer-term temporary migraon visas (like the four year PALM visa and Aotearoa
New Zealand’s Accredited Employer Work Visa) become more widespread applicaons from countries in the
western, central and eastern Pacific clusters can be expected to increase. If Aotearoa New Zealand was to
allocate PAC visa quotas to a wider range of countries in the region, including those in the western Pacific
cluster, the response, as measured by applicaons in the ballot process, would be immediate and
significant, based on the experience of PAC-eligible countries in the central and eastern Pacific clusters.
There is no shortage of people looking for opportunies to move to Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia in
the Pacific region and the numbers seeking these opportunies will only increase over the coming decades.
Inevitably the impacts of climate change in the region are going to increase pressure on the two
metropolitan countries on the Pacific’s southern rim to free up opportunies for short-term and long-term
circulaon of Pacific peoples as well as possibilies for residence for families in the overseas part of Pacific
transnaonal sociees.
While acknowledging that there will be an obvious and logical internaonal mobility response to the impacts
of climate change it must be stressed that for countries like Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Solomon Islands the
great majority of their populaons will remain resident in their own countries, at least through to the end of
the current century. The sheer size of their resident populaons, and the contribuons that momentum-led
growth connues to make to their populaons, coupled with preferences by the majority of cizens to stay
in their countries rather than moving overseas, will ensure that internaonal migraon does not make the
home country the base of the smaller component of their transnaonal society.
These countries, which are home to over 80% of Pacific peoples, will not repeat the experience of the much
smaller populaons of the Realm countries which have had ready access to cizenship and residence in
Aotearoa New Zealand and, by extension through the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, to residence in
Australia. Dealing with the impacts of climate change for the great majority of peoples from countries in
the western Pacific cluster as well as Fiji will be something that is navigated within countries, with the
support of proporonately small but growing diaspora.
Addressing the Driver of (Im)mobility
The research has also shed valuable light on how interdependencies between local populaon pressures,
land and marine tenure, and water and food insecurity intersect at the household level and drive
(im)mobility-related decisions and will connue to do so.
Mobility-centred policy will therefore need to take account of the interdependencies between all three
factors and their interseconality at the local scale.
However, the potenal for policy intervenons to influence each factor, and in turn influence decision-
making, is variable both generally and at the naonal level. For example, land and marine tenure systems
can, in principle, be influenced through legislave change over the short term yet, in pracce, to do so is not
an easy exercise given the extent to which exisng tenure arrayments are grounded in customary rights and
systems of governance and will likely lead to conflict and tension.
What the research highlights is that, in the context of mobility at scale, engagement with community leaders
and supporng community governance structures and processes which aim to increase the flex of exisng
448
See Vaioleti, L. et al. (2023b) and Vaioleti, T. et al. (2024).
159 | P a g e
tenure to absorb populaon at scale is a more sustainable direcon of policy travel.
449
However, in some
naonal contexts, even maximising the flex within tenure arrangements may be an insufficient policy
response given the total amount land available relave to the future demographic context. At the sub-
naonal level, context is also important.
As regards localised populaon pressure, while the research shows how migraon policy sengs can
influence populaon pressure at the local scale over the short term, such as through move-to-stay decisions,
changes in populaon trajectories at the naonal scale will only occur at longer mescales. While migraon
policy can play its part here also, policy intervenons implemented in the short term which promote sexual
and reproducve health in PICTs must be included as part of the overall policy mix to dampen down
populaon pressure over me at household and community levels.
Arguably, of the three factors, addressing water and food insecurity will be the easiest to influence though
policy in the short term. Across the region, there are a plethora of projects addressing these issues. While
crical, these are only part of the policy puzzle in terms of addressing (im)mobility in the context of climate
change. Such intervenons must be developed and implemented though the lens of how the project outputs
will intersect with other factors at the local scale. For example, in some naonal contexts, limited land and
even relavely small increases in local populaon may limit on the extent to which improvements in water
and food security will enable people to choose to remain in place.
Addressing these factors holiscally, rather than in isolaon, necessitates a standing coordinaon mechanism
across policy sectors.
A new model is needed to develop more (im)mobility-sensive policy
There is a need for policy development to shi from the tradional approach of viewing the Pacific in terms
of the three subregions of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia toward a more mobility-relevant framework.
Research into populaon dynamics from 1950 to 2100 at the sub-regional level suggests that grouping PICTs
into five clusters based on contemporary and historical demographics, as well as colonial and post-colonial
connecons, provides a more relevant sub-regional grouping for analysing the impacts of climate change.
This approach beer acknowledges the variable transnaonal dimension to contemporary Pacific
populaons, which all research teams have carefully considered in their studies of families, communies,
populaons in parcular countries, and the overseas components of transnaonal populaons.
Recognising the diversity in contemporary and future populaon trajectories at regional, sub-regional and
naonal levels is essenal. Equally important is acknowledging the significant connecons that island
residents have with their kin and others across different parts of their country, other Pacific countries, and
beyond, parcularly on the Pacific rim. The nature and significance of these connecons, especially as lives
are increasingly impacted by climate change, are the focus of this synthesis of findings from the research
conducted by the three teams.
Populaon trajectories maer
The research has emphasised the need for nuanced approaches to policy responses to the implicaons of
climate (im)mobility in the Pacific – nuanced approaches at the sub-regional level, the naonal level and the
community level. The research also demonstrates not just variability at all scales of inquiry, but also that
variability is increasing, due in part to the different trajectories of populaon change.
449
See discussion on community level decsion-making earler in this report and Underhill-Sem, Y., et al (2024a). 6-10 and
Mafile’o, T. et al. (2024a). 33.
160 | P a g e
It is crical that policy engage with the very different populaon structures and trajectories across the Pacific.
This means engaging with the western Pacific where most of the future, natural populaon growth in the
region will be occurring. This is especially the case regarding the youthful populaon – the children and the
youth in the labour force. As we note, in 2020, just over 3 million (83%) of the region’s 3.6 million people in
the younger (15 – 29) working age populaon are living in the western Pacific.
The policy implicaons for youthful populaons in this cluster in a world that is being heavily impacted by
climate change are very different from the implicaons for other populaons, like the ones in the northern
and French territory clusters for whom greater opons for movement already exist. Increasing the
opportunity of youth of the Western Pacific cluster to move abroad for study, including through the provision
of scholarships, and/or to work must be factored into policy development. Polices allowing transion to
residence or standalone pathways to residence will be crical to the establishment over me of a greater
volume of transnaonally distributed families in this cluster which feature socially and economically
entrenched members in in other countries.
The importance of considering populaon trajectories is not limited to the western Pacific cluster. As we have
also noted in the secon on the Diverse Pacific, internaonal migraon has played a significant role in shaping
the populaon pyramids in other clusters. Turning to the much smaller populaons of Tuvalu and Kiriba in
the central Pacific cluster, a populaon projecon exercise that was carried out some years ago for a
conference on climate change and migraon in the Pacific assessed what might happen to the populaons
of Kiriba and Tuvalu if the Pacific Access Category was increased at five year intervals between 2020 and
2050.
450
In Tuvalu’s case, one scenario included a Pacific Access Category (PAC) quota of 250 a year, which is
not too different from what is proposed under the Falepili Union arrangement. In small populaons, such
losses each year quickly compensate for any momentum growth in the populaon, and it is not long before
the populaon starts to decline numerically. Such a policy step would, however, need to be carefully
calibrated and developed in consultaon with the government of the PICT, and affected communies who
will be concerned with the implicaons of such a move.
It is not just populaon trajectories in the Pacific which are important, but also populaon trajectories within
Aotearoa New Zealand (and other countries on the Pacific rim). The recent census data shows an increase
in the number of persons idenfying as having Pacific ethnicies in Aotearoa New Zealand. A significant
number are in the younger populaon cohorts. This momentum led driver of future growth will result in an
increasingly larger footprint of the Aotearoa New Zealand situated members of transnaonally distributed
Pacific families.
The Aotearoa New Zealand component of transnaonally distributed Pacific families from countries with
small domesc populaons will become the dominant components of their combined domesc and overseas
populaons. In the case of the large populaons in the western Pacific this shi in balance in the distribuon
of naonal and overseas-based populaon components is not going to happen — the naonal populaons
will remain the base for the great majority of the populaon.
There will connue to be very different paerns of populaon distribuon in terms of shares “at home” in
their countries, and shares overseas, and acknowledging this variability, in itself, is important for policy
makers.
450
See Bedford, R. et al. (2016) Population change and migration in Kiribati and Tuvalu, 2015-2050: some hypothetical
scenarios, New Zealand Population Review 43: 103-134.
161 | P a g e
In the eastern Pacific overseas desnaons are already the base for the larger share of the aggregate
Polynesian populaon. In Fiji, the Melanesian country with the largest overseas diaspora in the central Pacific,
the home country remains the base for the great majority of i-Taukei and Fiji Indians.
So too, with the upwards populaon trajectory of Māori. As both populaons increase within Aotearoa New
Zealand in coming decades, deepening engagement with Māori will become even more crical, a policy
implicaon issue we discuss separately below as an Aotearoa New Zealand-specific context of relaonality.
Navigang relaonality as a key policy framing
Perhaps the most crical implicaon for naonal-level policy is to develop and implement policies through
the lens of relaonality to others and other places, at different spaal scales.
Recognising the mulfaceted dimensions of relaonality within Pacific communies is essenal for
understanding the complexies of climate-related (im)mobility. Interpersonal connecons, cultural
exchanges, interdependence, and environmental interconnectedness all intersect to shape (im)mobility
scale, paerns and impacts/experiences. By understanding these nuanced interacons, policymakers can
develop more effecve and culturally sensive intervenons to support communies affected by
(im)mobility, parcularly as climate change challenges intensify.
Navigang relaonality:
requires policy intervenons to orient around the mul-faceted and dynamic nature of place. Both
within and across naonal borders, relaonships to land and people are influenced by customs, values, and
histories of mobility that have allowed individuals, households, and communies to move and/or stay for
generaons. This has implicaons for policies related to sustainable economic development, disaster risk
reducon, and climate change adaptaon. What the research emphasises is that different acons are
needed in relaon to more than one locaon in relaon to the same family and/or community. For
example, improving housing condions for Pacific families in Aotearoa New Zealand or in other desnaon
countries would be accompanied, where required, by improved housing condions the home island, for
example through disaster risk reducon and climate change adapon measures.
means recognising that families have tradionally been and will connue to be 'first responders' when
disasters strike, and providing primary support for short- or long-term stays. Marriage and employment in
other parts of the country will remain strategies to address localised populaon pressure, land tenure, and
food and water insecurity. Over me, new relaonships to people and places will emerge, creang further
opportunies for future mobility. Such relaonality needs to be considered in policy development.
requires policy to consider how spirituality and faith influence atudes towards and experiences of
(im)mobility. Consultaon with churches and faith-based organisaons should be conducted to ensure that
indigenous spiritual beliefs are taken into account.
underscores the importance of relaonships and relaonship management in the context of
relocaons. Naonal authories must priorise this aspect over both short and long-term me horizons. The
research suggests profound implicaons for naonal policy regarding relaonality to people and places that
extend beyond naonal borders.
demands a place-based approach to policy relang to loss and damage be taken. It is only though
understanding the mulfaceted relaonship of Pacific peoples to place – in all its dimensions – that the true
scale of loss and damage arising in the context of climate change-related (im)mobility will become apparent.
162 | P a g e
Recognising and Operaonalising Relaonality with Māori
Recognising and operaonalising relaonality with Māori in policy is fundamental. This requires deepening
engagement with Māori.
The research for this project, which included an examinaon of the impact of future mobility through the
lens of Te Ao Māori and obligaons under Te Tiri o Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi, has uncovered new
insights into the Māori experience of mobility and of Māori and Pacific relaonships regarding supporng
mobility and explored some of the potenal impacts of future climate change mobility for Māori
451
.
This research has also shown the potenal for more focussed and deliberave talanoa with Māori and other
stakeholders in Aotearoa New Zealand to begin to scope out the complex sets of risks and opportunies in a
future of higher climate mobility for the region and for Aotearoa New Zealand as a country. The wisdom that
is contained in Six Kōrero is missing the voices of rangatahi. Research by all teams has made it very clear that
there is an increasingly urgent need for an ongoing climate change and mobility awareness campaign to begin
to prepare minds, and support praccal family, village and naonal planning and priorisaon around
possible climate mobility futures at differing scales and/or with different triggering hazards. Key insights from
the research, as well as a view of possible policy implicaons are as follows.
Relaonality equally important to Māori as it is for Pacific communies.
Policies that understand and which are sensive to the historical relaonship between Māori and Pacific
peoples will provide a context in which other policies relang to climate mobility and Māori relaonality
to Pacific can be framed. This is important given that cultural values have underpinned both Māori and Pacific
peoples to adapt to change over me resulng in a foundaonal cultural resilience and cultural cohesion.
Equally, connecons to place and land are connecons that are spiritual and physical for both groups. Marae
or meeng spaces within tribal boundaries stand as testament to the importance of place including being
places of commune, places of identy, places of support and places of resilience. In a climate mobility
context, marae could play a crical supporng role in the inial and ongoing response as well as possible
longer term integraon support.
452
The marae as a place where kanga Māori is pracsed can also provide a
place where innovave ideas and opportunies to further both group’s aspiraons can be tested.
How decision-making is done is crical.
Future planning for Pacific climate mobility should engage Māori from the start and be equally led by
Māori, Pacific peoples and the Crown in the spirit of inclusion with discussion and decision-making based
on Māori and Pacific values. Engagement could be at both a ‘naonal’ and iwi or hapū level, and tesng or
pilong of approaches could occur at a local/hapū/whānau level inially. Decision-making should also
include space for bilateral discussions between Māori and Pacific as the sharing of needs, aspiraons and
lessons learned can push thinking and the imaginaon to the boundaries of what is possible so that all risks
and opportunies can be explored and tested.
There will be a broad diversity of views to navigate for Māori i.e. there is not one ‘Māori view’ and a great
diversity of Pacific perspecves and priories exist within Pacific peoples as well.
451
See, Morrison et al. (2023); Newport, C. et al (2024).
163 | P a g e
Land is a Central Dimension to Address.
The mana of Māori must be protected throughout planning and decision-making around land and Pacific
climate mobility. In any planning or decision making, mana whenua groups must be consulted on decisions
that may impact their rights. The Treaty of Waitangi and its principles must be central for the protecon of
Māori land, and to give effect to kaiakitanga. Further work could explore the principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi specifically in the context of climate mobility. Both the Crown and Māori would benefit in
progressing efforts to reduce the barriers to land access and ulisaon by Māori of Māori land. Other land
related risks such as conflict from unequal power dynamics of landowners versus ‘selers’ will need to be
migated.
Learning from Māori Climate mobility within Aotearoa New Zealand.
Māori climate mobility is also a reality and valuable lesson have been learned. These lessons can be applied
for future Māori and Pacific climate mobility including leveraging lessons and experiences on maers to
priorise and maers to avoid. The sharing of Mātauranga Māori, local knowledge and enduring and well-
tried pracses will support future processes and can be shared at a. family, community, naonal and regional
levels. ‘No regrets’ efforts could include priorising the sharing of knowledge systems and data on
experiences and addressing data sovereignty concerns or issues. Sudden-onset hazard-related mobility
scenarios for those in the Pacific may happen in concert with similar relocaon context for Māori (and others)
in Aotearoa New Zealand. Planning should consider a range of scenarios or contexts for regional mobility and
local needs might be priorised or balanced under shared and intensified climate stressors.
Māori in Partnership with Pacific Peoples Shows Promise.
Exisng Māori-led or Māori-Pacific led organisaons could be valuable assets for improving future Pacific
mobility outcomes in Aotearoa. There would be further ‘best pracce’ examples of partnerships that can be
supported and scaled e.g. RSE partnerships and accompanying support. However, this must be led by beer
understanding the desires and wishes of Pacific peoples, as well as their broader capability sets and skills
that have, and could develop, with targeted investment e.g. around training or educaon. Māori-Pacific
enterprises that could support integraon and mobility outcomes, and their priority support needs will need
idenficaon.
Differenated scale and engagement with Māori.
Given that the research indicates that climate (im)mobility in the next two to three decades will likely be
occurring at a family level, engagement with Māori as hapū and iwi enes under this scenario is likely to
be minimal if at all. Engagement between Māori and Pacific peoples is more likely to be where personal
lives, interests and values intersect and is more likely to occur in the absence of support for transnaonal
communies and Pacific social service providers. Future policy development could consider how, at a
community level, Māori social service provision could be extended to include and provide informaon for
Pacific families. In some Māori communies such as the Ngā Toa/Tokelau relaonship and the
Murihiku/Bluff communies, iwi have been deliberate in their approach to supporng all families who live in
their rohe.
Nevertheless, that mobility to Aotearoa New Zealand may occur at a larger scale ( for example, mulple or
whole-island communies) someme in the future and involve guidance of both the Pacific governments
and the New Zealand government cannot be enrely ruled out, it is important to give early thought to the
appropriate structures to be established to allow for meaningful dialogue on priority maers between Māori,
Government and Pacific states, including legal, cultural, social, economic and other priories. Should larger-
scale mobility, arise mana whenua must be consulted on land-related decision-making, and opons should
164 | P a g e
be tested with Māori ahead of me on agreed frameworks that will be necessary under different
circumstances. In the context of a sudden-onset hazard scenarios, consultaon with mana whenua on what
‘bare minimum’ engagement might look like for inclusive engagement and Māori and Pacific leadership
would be necessary. Appropriate structures should allow for meaningful dialogue and with mana whenua at
the local level.
Irrespecve of scenario and scale, in migang risks while realising opportunies, bold and creave thinking
should be promoted by all involved including Governments, social service providers, hapū and iwi collecves
and Māori and Pacific social service providers as well as Māori and Pacific enterprises. Resilience may be
found in opportunies for Māori businesses and enterprises already engaging or employing Pacific people or
Māori-Pacific enterprises to ‘flex’ employment and support more people into work as needed.
Empowering communies
As noted in respect of ‘the driver’, comprehensive and coordinated responses to address the complex and
evolving challenges posed by climate change on food and water security in the Pacific will be the factor most
able to be influenced in the short-term.
Pacific peoples have lived with the impacts of cyclonic winds, king des, droughts, and volcanoes for
centuries. Stories of ancestors not only coping but thriving despite these challenges highlight aconable,
indigenous technical knowledge, and a culturally rooted driver of emoonal wellbeing. This wellbeing
stems from a sense of strength derived from a direct connecon to ancestors through storytelling.
Supporng community-based everyday acon should thus be a key focus of policy. In terms of (im)mobility,
this has mul-scaled policy implicaons. Communies possess insncve knowledge for coping with
environmental change and need direct support to address the impacts of climate change through their
everyday acons.
The research reinforces the need to integrate indigenous knowledge and tradional pracces, suggesng
that projects and programmes should move away from technical language like "adaptaon" and "resilience."
Instead, empowering language that acknowledges communies' exisng knowledge and skills, should be
used. This approach does not exclude the value of technical upskilling or non-tradional knowledge, nor does
it diminish the importance of naonal policy statements like Naonal Adaptaon Plans. Rather, it emphasises
that projects and programmes should focus on enhancing the effecveness of exisng knowledge, rather
than teaching Pacific peoples "how to adapt" to environmental change or "be resilient."
Localised policy intervenon
Relaonality to place requires recognion that local contexts are the primary sites for policy intervenon.
Engaging with exisng community structures, where mobility-related discussions already occur, is essenal.
The research shows that community leaders are deeply auned to the issues raised by climate change and
how these impact the interdependent factors driving (im)mobility decision-making at the household level.
Empowering these leaders through improved access to relevant and up-to-date informaon in an accessible
form should be a key policy goal. Given the increased funding coming into the region recently within the
context of increased geo-strategic focus on the Pacific, improving climate finance literacy to enable
community leaders to beer access bilateral and mullateral financing mechanisms will also be important.
This approach requires engaging civil society and other local actors who are well-posioned to inform
communies about mobility opportunies, should they choose to move, as well as supporng those who opt
to stay. For instance, local business development bodies can provide advice and support for starng or
165 | P a g e
developing local businesses with funds from labour migraon. It also involves including communies in the
design of policies and programmes to address the health and wellbeing implicaons they face.
Empowering and supporng women
It is well recognised already that policy must be cognisant of how climate change disproportionately affects
women and girls, exacerbating existing inequalities and vulnerabilities and limiting their access to resources
and opportunities.
What the reach demonstrates, however, is the important role of women in disaster preparation, response,
and recovery. The status of woman as agents of everyday resilience at the household and community level
warrants more policy attention in the context of climate (im)mobility. The roles women play in decision-
making, social connectivity, and cultural preservation highlight the necessity of their active involvement in
preparing for future mobility due to climate change.
Ensuring women's preparedness for such mobility is essential, and policies need to support their existing
climate resilience and leadership roles. Furthermore, it is critical to address barriers and provide support for
facing climate mobility and climate (im)mobility. Economic impacts, such as income loss from traditional
crafts and disrupted access to resources, should be mitigated through alternative income-generating
activities and improved market access.
Mental health support is also vital. Women need support to navigate anxiety related to social status and
pride. Policies should safeguard women's social roles and status post-relocation, recognising their influential
roles in decision-making at family and community levels. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider the diverse
needs of women and the elderly, particularly regarding inequities in water access, gender-based violence,
and fishing practices.
More broadly, special aenon is also needed for community members living with disabilies and those
from rainbow communies, although their impacts from climate-induced mobility require further
exploraon due to limited engagement.
453
As we move forward, it's imperave to address these complexies
inclusively to build resilient and supporve communies for all.
Loss and Damage
What the research suggests is that a more appropriate framing for what is currently described as ‘non-
economic’ loss and damage is ‘place-based loss and damage’ as this beer directs aenon to both the
nature and scale of potenal loss and damage being experienced by Pacific peoples due to the impacts of
climate change.
Posioning loss and damage to ‘place’ under the “non-economic” label involves a false binary. While this
framing has been necessary to ensure that economic losses are not privileged in the loss and damaged
debate, and that sight is not lost the profound impact that climate change is having on indigenous cultures
and ways of life, it needs reframing.
In 2023, aer a process stretching back to 1991 when Vanuatu on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS) suggested using insurance-like remuneraon for countries experiencing rising sea levels, Pares to
the UNFCCC finally operaonalized the Loss and Damage Fund on the first day of COP28. It was a
breakthrough even though developing countries have been crical of aspects of the decision, and long-term
453
Ng Shiu , R. et al. (2024). 7.
166 | P a g e
financing of the fund is not guaranteed. Importantly, included in the scope of the fund are “finance for
addressing a variety of challenges associated with
the adverse effects of climate change, such as climate-related emergencies, sea level rise, displacement,
relocaon, migraon,..”.
454
It remains to be seen how the fund is operaonalised in pracce, but re-orienng
discussion around the concept of ‘place’ – in all is mulfaceted dimensions – will bring into sharper focus the
various challenges PICTs face than simply categorising such loss and damage as non-economic. Whether
remaining in place in the face of climate-related impacts on the local enviroment and bioversity, or having to
rebuild a sense of place elsewhere for communies who have to move from their ancestral place, loss and
damage will be experienced to a greater of lesser extent along one of more of these dimensions by Pacific
peoples across countless sites of selement.
Supporng and Engaging Pacific Transnaonal Families in Aotearoa New
Zealand
While this secon is principally focussed on what the research reveals about developing (im)mobility-
sensive policy in Aotearoa New Zealand, the implicaons for policy are relevant to all naonal sengs
where there exists transnaonal families. Fundamentally, in terms of Pacific peoples, this is the base policy
unit and one which we believe is opmally viewed in any parcular domesc policy context as 'family
beyond naonal borders'
The secon on ‘the Diverse Pacific’ makes very clear that the prominence of such as a policy context in
Aotearoa New Zealand and other countries varies, and will connue to vary, depending on the sub-regional
mobility cluster engaged. Nevertheless, the secon on ‘the Connected Pacific’ is equally clear that, in context
of climate change-related (im)mobility, understanding transnaonalism provides an essenal lens through
which to view the resilience and adaptability of communies facing environmental uncertaines, including
through circular migraon, thus informing appropriate policy responses. It underscores the blend of local
and global strategies employed by communies to ensure their survival and connuity in a rapidly changing
world. The teams’ fieldwork and analysis which underpin this report are singular in idenfying that policies
and governance frameworks in the future need to accommodate the unique features and needs of
transnaonal communies.
Conceptual implicaons
The concept of a ‘mass arrival’ commonly features in debates around migraon policy sengs in desnaon
countries. New Zealand is no excepon. The Immigraon Act 2009 contains special provisions for a ‘mass
arrival’, defined as constung a group of more than 30 persons who board on the same cra or groups of
cra not constung a scheduled internaonal service ( i.e. irregular arrival).
455
While these provisions are
unlikely to apply to Pacific migraon, the idea of a mass arrival of persons whose home island may become
uninhabitable is a feature of contemporary discourse around migraon to other countries for populaons of
so-called ‘sinking islands’.
What the research suggests, however, is that from the perspecve of Pacific peoples: (a) the ‘mass’ in a
‘mass arrival’ is at the family or community scale; and (b) will most commonly happen at an individual or
household level over an extended period of me in the coming two or three decades rather than all at
once at a community or island scale (although the laer cannot enrely be ruled out at parcular
thresholds of future climate change over longer me horizons).
454
UNFCCC. ( 29 November 2023)Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
FCCC/CP/2023/L.1 Annex 1 at 6. At https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2023_L1_cma2023_L1_adv.pdf
455
See seections 9A and 317.
167 | P a g e
In other words, the ‘mass’ arrival in Aotearoa New Zealand of an increasing number of Pacific people in
the context of climate change requires the specific aenon of policy at the family and community scale
both in New Zealand and in the home island. This because of the impact such ‘arrival’ will have on other
members of the transnaonally distributed family – both those who may remain in the home island as
well as those already present in Aotearoa New Zealand or other desnaon Pacific country. While this
does not obviate the need to think about what arrival at larger scales might mean, it is crical that policy
does not lose sight of the family and community scale which is likely to connue to dominate scale and
paern in the coming decades. This is made more crical given the indicaon in the research of Aotearoa
New Zealand being a preferred overseas desnaon for some Pacific populaons.
456
Instuonal implicaons
A further crical implicaon emerging from the research is that it is arficial and out-of-keeping with the
reality of transionally distributed families to maintain a strict binary of domesc and foreign policy
domains. This is not to say that policy responsibility cannot not be allocated between agencies. Rather, it is
to recognise that the transnaonally distributed family – albeit of differing configuraons – forms the base
unit of Pacific society and the Pacific economy in Aotearoa New Zealand. This implies that posive outcomes
for families are more likely where cross-agency and even cross-border policy networks are maintained where
they exist, established where they are not, and supported on an ongoing basis in either case.
Further, it is not simply relaonships within or across governments which maer in terms of developing
(im)mobility-sensive policy. As noted already, community-level organisaons such as business associaons,
educaonal and faith-based organisaons serve as important connectors of populaons distributed across
borders and channel informaon, material and spiritual support in ways which influence decision-making at
the household and community level. They need to be engaged with both in terms of developing policy and
as an object of policy.
The need to deepen engagement across naonal jurisdicons requires instuonal arrangements that
support and engage with the Pacific diaspora in a more coherent manner. The research has highlighted the
recent establishment of a Diaspora Relaons Unit in Samoa, which is sll in its relave infancy. As of late
2023, the Unit has a database of around 1,000 people and a social media presence to promote and celebrate
the support given through this iniave.
The establishment of an administrave body dedicated to diaspora engagement is significant and warrants
consideraon by other Pacific governments. It will enable greater reaches into the untapped potenal of
diaspora communies and exisng organised means of community collaboraon such as church groups,
schools and early learning centres, community halls, and business networks. Equally important is that such
an instuonal development provides a clear focal point for engagement, not only across naonal
governments but also between them, facilitang inter-governmental cooperaon on how best to support
transnaonal families.
Sectoral Implicaons
Pacific families living beyond naonal borders in desnaon countries such as Aotearoa New Zealand will
connue to play a role in shaping decisions by kin in home islands to move, and host those kin who do,
regardless of the financial impact on them. For the large part, movement across borders will be at the family
456
See, for example, Vaioleti, L., et al (2023b,4) who note in relation to the survey data generated “New Zealand is the clear
destination of choice for those in Tonga and Samoa, for those planning overseas mobility in the coming five years, as well
as in response to questions on hypothetical overseas mobility given the need and opportunity.”
168 | P a g e
scale, and it will be in the form of circulaon albeit of varying periodicity and duraon of return. Supporng
such paern, at scale, requires long-term and coherent intervenons across policy domains which transcend
migraon policy which increase the capacity to live ‘the Pacific way’. (Im)mobility-sensive policy consistent
with the vision contained in The Ministry of Pacific Peoples’ All-of -Government Pacific Wellbeing Strategy’
must be part of the overall policy response to climate change in the region.
— Immigraon: the key implicaon for migraon policy emerging from the research is recognion of
the fundamentally circular nature of Pacific migraon now and in the future, and how this is enabled
and supported in migraon policy sengs. In the Diverse Pacific secon, we reference earlier work
(Burson et al 2013; Burson et al 2021) which establishes how changes in migraon policy sengs may
influence the scale and paern of migraon both to Aotearoa New Zealand and between PICTs. We
also noted in that secon that, while migraon policy sengs are crical to the formaon of
transnaonally distributed families, changes in migraon policy will have limited impact on responses
to climate change at the naonal level in the western Pacific cluster given the sizes of the populaons
in these countries and their ongoing high rates of natural increase. (Im)mobility-sensive policy
development as regards the western Pacific cluster will, by necessity, have to connue to reflect
household- level consideraon of desnaons within these countries, at least through to 2050.
457
By
way of contrast in relaon to the long term-policy horizon, we have noted above in the ‘Populaon
trajectories maer’ discussion, how in relaon to small populaons such as those in Tuvalu and
Kiriba, changes in exisng migraon policy sengs implemented now may give rise to associated
populaon losses each year which compensate for any momentum growth in the populaon over the
long term and thus reduce the localised experience populaon pressure there.
As for the implicaons for specific policy sectors beyond immigraon, we start with housing. Not only is a
home this most tangible expression of ‘place’, how (im)mobility intersects with housing shapes impact in
significant ways.
— Housing: Fale-Mo-Aiga – the Ministry of Pacific Peoples Pacific Housing Strategy 2030 – notes the
significant housing deficit faced by Pacific families living in Aotearoa New Zealand: 24 percent of families
experiencing severe household deprivaon idenfy as Pacific families; 39 percent live in crowded
accommodaon, while 46 percent live in damp housing.
458
Yet, to a family, these will be part of an
intergeneraonal and transnaonally distributed family group, even if to differing extents. Many will have
already hosted kin. The increasing Pacific populaon in Aotearoa New Zealand will be the first responders
in relaon to future migraon here in the context of disasters and climate change. Fale-Mo-Aiga contains
four priority areas acon including to “Develop and grow the Pacific housing sector” and “Influence and
strengthen the housing system to improve housing outcomes for Pacific peoples”. It is imperave that
acons to deliver on this take account of future climate-change related mobility, and the pressure this
may place on the stock of Pacific housing are factored into policy development in associated policy.
(Im)mobility-sensive policy means more than building more social housing and increasing tenure rates
among Pacific families. Important though these things are, it is also about building appropriate housing.
In parcular, the research supports housing policy which reflects the mu-generaonal and transnaonal
structure of Pacific families. Two broad direcons of policy travel arise. First, the recently announced
iniave to make it easier to build addional dwellings – ‘granny flats’ and the like – may be out-of-reach
of many Pacific families given associated building costs and current cost-of-living pressures.
457
For further discussion of mobility options in response to climate change, see Bedford, R. et al. (2023b) and Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024).
458
Ministry of Pacific Peoples Pacific Housing Strategy 2030 https://www.mpp.govt.nz/assets/Resources/Housing/Fale-mo-
Aiga_Strategy-Placemat_DIGITAL-7_0.pdf
169 | P a g e
Yet, the idea at the core of the policy – rethinking the use of exisng structures on residenal land – is
an important one in terms of Pacific (im)mobility in the context of climate change. Central the history of
Pacific migraon to Aotearoa New Zealand has been the creave use of garages to house extended family
groups (McPherson 2014; Salesa 2017, 66). Reimagining the use of exisng garage structures on land
owned or rented by Pacific families, including necessary financial support to ensure such dwellings
comply with healthy homes and other health and safety regulaons, will be important to consider.
Second, it also means working with communies in meaningful partnership to design appropriate
housing. There is exisng good pracce on which to build policy in this regard. Howden-Chapman, P., et
al (2024, 292) highlight how the Kāinga Ora/Housing and Health Research Programme, an architect, and
Tokelau elders and researchers co-designed a mul-bedroom house for extended Pasifika families, which
was built by Housing NZ in Porirua East, Wellington. Parcular aenon was paid to the
mulgeneraonal needs of the family and the need for good venlaon and heang in order to improve
health and wellbeing outcomes.
Finally, as we have already noted in relaon to the dynamic nature of place, a transnaonal housing
policy framing is warranted. Given the circulaon of family members between ‘place’ in Aotearoa New
Zealand and in home islands, invesng in beer housing in in Aotearoa New Zealand will need to be
complemented by invesng in beer, more climate resilient housing in PICTs.
— Employment: the research in relaon to Tonga and Samoa has highlighted issues of economic inequality,
such as the significantly lower median income for Tongans and Samoans in New Zealand compared to the
naonal median income and higher rates of unemployment. As the All-of-Government Pacific Wellbeing
Strategy recognises, such inequality affects other Pacific communies in Aotearoa New Zealand, and sits
alongside lower educaonal aainment to constrain the capacity of the Aotearoa New Zealand situated
members of transnaonal families to connue to provide for the resilience of families in the Pacific, as
well as supporng those who arrive. The foundaonal strength, wellbeing, and capacies of exisng
populaons in Aotearoa New Zealand to receive and support the successful integraon of family in the
future is an important component of successful transnaonalism.
— Health: policy development must also recognise the ‘dual exposure’ of Pacific families in Aotearoa New
Zealand, which have the addional pressures of being physically exposed to climate change and disasters
here while simultaneously being emoonally and spiritually exposed to climate change and disaster
impacts in the home PICT though the connecon with family there. This not only has financial
implicaons but also has health and wellbeing implicaons that need to be part of a coherent, whole-of
-government approach for supporng the Aotearoa New Zealand-situated members of transnaonally
distributed families.
459
Travel to Aotearoa New Zealand to access health services and treatment is an exisng feature of paern
and will remain so. Yet, the research tells us that such movement can place strain of family members
here. Recognising this, the Atafu Matauala community in Porirua have a long-term plan which includes
iniaves to assist paents referred from Tokelau.
460
Such iniaves will be important should movement
to Aotearoa New Zealand due to climate change ramp-up. How to best support the development and
implementaon of such community plans will be an important policy consideraon.
— Educaon: the challenges faced by many Pacific families struggling to meet day-to-day needs, means
financing costs associated with terary-level studies may make higher educaon for their children
unaffordable. Yet, it is the Pacific youth in Aotearoa New Zealand today, who will shoulder obligaons to
459
Ng Shiu, R., (2024e). 11-12.
460
Tulano, T., et al (2024). 14.
170 | P a g e
host and support family in home islands and improving access to higher educaon, and the employment
and income gains this may bring, will be important for increasing their capacity to fulfil these obligaons.
Moreover, developing (im)mobility-sensive educaon policy will be an important intervenon in terms
of regional populaon trajectories. Improving access to higher educaon in Aotearoa New Zealand and
elsewhere, for example though enhanced availability of scholarships, will be important given the
populaon trajectory of the western Pacific cluster, and Papua New Guinea in parcular.
— Social development: (im)mobility-sensive social development policy means recognising circulaon
between mulple ‘places’ where transnaonally distributed families reside in which persons in various
age cohorts will likely move in and out of New Zealand for various lengths of me as members of
transnaonally distributed families. It will be important to consider how current portability arrangements
reflect this reality. Presently while New Zealand has Special Portability Arrangements with many PICTs,
these cover only superannuaon and veterans’ pensions and only where the recipient intends to reside
in the specified PICT for more than 52 weeks.
461
It also means recognising the role families in Aotearoa New Zealand play as families, not just as
individuals. For Pacific peoples, the family is the base economic and social unit. It is in this collecve
capacity that Pacific families funcon as the primary support mechanism for the displaced, for migrants,
and they will be so in the context of any future relocaon of communies. Yet, this funcon can impose
on families – as families – significant burdens and costs, both tangible/financial and intangible/emoonal.
Places where Pacific families gathered as a community to preserve language and culture also funcon as
spaces enjoyed by host communies. As such, they enhance social cohesion as well as becoming focal
points for service delivery, parcularly in mes of crisis. Community-level funding pathways to support
the building of such spaces and to support appropriate governance structures will be important to
consider.
Rethinking Funding
Pacific island governments increasingly access disaster risk and climate change adaptaon funds through
both bilateral and, since the operaonalisaon of the Green Climate Fund in 2015, mullateral funding. At
the bi-lateral level, increasing geo-polical compeon in the Pacific is resulng in larger amounts of
government-to-government funding, and some of it ed to addressing the impacts of climate change in the
coming years. Any increase in financial support is to be welcomed, but at a general level, needs coordinaon
between donors.
From an (im)mobility perspecve, four important policy implicaons emerge from the research in relaon to
financing.
First, it is well understood that projects such as building sea walls to protect crical infrastructure on the
main or capital island are important, but not sufficient. What the research makes clear is just how much
everyday acon is the cornerstone of resilience for Pacific families and communies. As the Sendai
Framework Mid-Term Review indicates, improving ease of access to community funding will be crical
towards meeng the goal of reducing the numbers of persons affected by disasters. Invesng more in
localised ancipatory measures is therefore fundamental to prevent or reduce the scale of displacement
461
Work and Income New Zealand Special portability arrangement with Pacific Countries
https://www.workandincome.govt.nz/pensions/travelling-or-moving/social-security-agreements/pacific-countries.html
171 | P a g e
and to minimise loss and damage. Equally, minimising loss and damage aer a disaster not only maintains
resilience but also reduces risk of future displacement.
There are already encouraging examples of innovave financing mechanisms being piloted or rolled out.
Examples include weather-indexed micro-insurance schemes being piloted in Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu under
which payment is triggered as certain levels of rainfall or wind-speed are recorded
462
and forecast based-
financing ulised by the Tuvalu Red Cross in 2021 to trigger early acon on drought (IFRC 2021). Such
innovave financing needs to be scaled up.
Second, at the household level, remiances are oen the most direct form of climate change adaptaon
funding and need to be recognised as such. Whether financial or in-kind, assistance is ed to relaonships
to people and place, and draw on core Pacific values. Finding ways to beer support transionally distributed
Pacific families to support kin in the home island (or to join them abroad) will be an important influence on
the future scale, paern and impact of climate change-related (im)mobility. Incenvising remiances to be
used in such a manner will be an important policy consideraon.
This, however, comes with an important policy caveat. While the existence of remiances is a modern from
expression of core Pacific values, the extent to which remiances are being used to help families in home
villages or other places to adapt to climate change or reduce disaster risk is a funcon of the deficit in
support from other funding sources. It is inequitable that transnaonally distributed families bear the
burden of a problem not of their making. While it is necessary for policy sengs to incenvise such use of
remiance flows, this cannot be at the expense of improving access to other funding sources.
In this regard, there is a welcome increase in the number of PICTs establishing naonal-level adaptaon
funding mechanisms such as the Palau Protected Areas Network Fund, the Tuvalu Climate and Disaster
Survival Fund, and more recently the Tonga Climate Change Fund and Fiji Climate Change Fund (UNDRR
2023a). To the extent that this is not happening already, it will be crical to ensure that project and
programmes dealing with (im)mobility are included within the scope of such naonal funding mechanisms.
Telescoping out to the regional level, supporng the development and sustainable financing of such adapon
funds and consideraon given to establishing a regional support mechanism to reduce administrave
burdens could be usefully included in the Regional Framework on Climate Mobility implementaon plan
being developed currently, if not already done.
Fourth, at the regional level, the research emphasises the importance of recognising intra-Pacific mobility
between PICTs. While there are indicaons of clear preferences for some to move to metropolitan countries
of the Pacific rim, even if not necessarily permanently, others will not be so inclined, should they decide to
move at all. This raises the issue of establishing financial support for other PICTs to receive populaons
from other PICTs who may relocate there in the future. Further, social security penetraon in Pacific is
uneven. While there have been important advances, many gaps remain (Knox-Vydmanov et al. 2023).
Enhancing social security penetraon will also influence future scale and paern by supporng families who
choose or are compelled to stay in place and/or to provide support as host communies.
Addressing data issues
There are several areas where data gaps exist. Hazards are unevenly mapped in terms of type and geography,
and displacement is poorly understood. Without a clear understanding of the scale of exisng displacement,
462
MFAT ‘After the storm - innovative disaster response’. At https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/environment/climate-change/supporting-our-
region/the-climate-change-programme/climate-change-programme-case-studies/after-the-storm-innovative-disaster-response In
relation to tonga specifcally, see Vaioleti, L. et al. (2024). 38.
172 | P a g e
it becomes challenging to develop effecve policies or finance acons to reduce its likelihood or minimise
impacts when it occurs.
There are also important gaps in analysis of data relang to contemporary internal migraon.
463
Most
censuses of Pacific populaons contain data on internal migraon but there has been lile quantave
analysis of this process using census data in recent years. This is a research gap that merits aenon given
that in most Pacific countries, and especially those in the western Pacific, where most of the populaon
growth is occurring, internal relocaon is likely to be a much more significant migraon response to hazards
linked with climate change than relocaon to another country within or outside the region.
There is also an important data gap relang to the transnaonal dimension of Pacific populaons. There has
been a trend in censuses throughout the region to restrict published data to a small number of specific
countries-of-birth and ethnic groups, even though much more detailed informaon on these variables is
collected in the censuses. This poses major problems for the analysis of transnaonal populaons because
birthplace is the most common reference variable used when examining migrant flows between countries,
and the numbers and characteriscs of migrant groups in parcular countries.
This is not a difficult problem to resolve – it simply requires a more fine-grained presentaon of data on
birthplace and ethnicity in the published census tables, recognising that the requirement to ensure that no
specific individual in the populaon can be idenfied in the published data is met.
Finally, it is important that longitudinal data is captured, both in relaon to communies who stay and
communies who have moved. Impacts and consequences – both posive and negave – may take me to
manifest. It is only though comming to gathering robust quantave and qualitave data over longer me
horizons that trends and unforeseen issues can be captured and factored into future policy development.
463
Bedford, R. et al. (2023b).13-16
173 | P a g e
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