Prepared by Steer Davies Gleave
Study on the prices and
quality of rail passenger
services
European Commission
Directorate General for Mobility
and Transport
Final Report
April 2016
Our ref: 22870601
Client ref: MOVE/B2/2015-126
Steer Davies Gleave has prepared this material for European Commission, Directorate General for
Mobility and Transport. The copyright of all the material belongs to the EU in accordance with article I.9
the public service contract between the European Commission (Directorate General for Mobility and
Transport) and Steer Davies Gleave. Nevertheless, the information and views set out in this report are
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Commission. The
Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this study. Steer Davies Gleave has
prepared this material using professional practices and procedures using information available to it at
the time and as such any new information could alter the validity of the results and conclusions made.
Steer Davies Gleave, the Commission or any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may not be held
responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. Any person other than
Steer Davies Gleave or the Commission choosing to use any part of this material shall be deemed to
confirm their agreement to indemnify Steer Davies Gleave and the Commission for all loss or damage
resulting therefrom.
Study on the prices and
quality of rail passenger
services
European Commission
Directorate General for Mobility
and Transport
Final Report
April 2016
Our ref: 22870601
Client ref: MOVE/B2/2015-126
Prepared by:
Prepared for:
Steer Davies Gleave
28-32 Upper Ground
London SE1 9PD
European Commission Directorate
General for Mobility and Transport
Directorate-General for Mobility and
Transport, MOVE B2
Rue de Mot 28
B-1040, Brussels
Belgium
+44 20 7910 5000
www.steerdaviesgleave.com
April 2016
Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
Study background ......................................................................................................................... 1
Study objectives and methodology .............................................................................................. 1
Organisation of this report ........................................................................................................... 3
2 The passenger rail market in Europe ................................................................................... 4
European rail travel demand ........................................................................................................ 4
European rail fares ........................................................................................................................ 6
National institutional arrangements .......................................................................................... 19
National railway characteristics .................................................................................................. 27
3 Suburban fares and tickets................................................................................................ 34
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 34
Suburban fares sampled ............................................................................................................. 34
Suburban fares setting and sharing revenue .............................................................................. 43
Fares structures .......................................................................................................................... 47
Discounts and reductions ........................................................................................................... 51
Smart cards ................................................................................................................................. 53
4 Other fares and tickets ..................................................................................................... 54
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 54
Regional fares ............................................................................................................................. 54
Interurban fares at distances under 300 kilometres .................................................................. 59
Interurban fares at distances over 300 kilometres .................................................................... 62
Domestic high speed fares.......................................................................................................... 64
International fares ...................................................................................................................... 67
Setting fares ................................................................................................................................ 70
Discounts .................................................................................................................................... 73
Complexity .................................................................................................................................. 77
Clarity and sales channels ........................................................................................................... 78
5 Intermodal competition .................................................................................................... 83
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 83
Competition with car .................................................................................................................. 84
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Competition with coach.............................................................................................................. 90
Competition with air ................................................................................................................... 95
Frequency and reliability ............................................................................................................ 98
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 99
6 Intramodal competition ................................................................................................... 101
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 101
Competition within an operator or group ................................................................................ 101
Competition for the market...................................................................................................... 104
Competition in the market ....................................................................................................... 109
Findings ..................................................................................................................................... 110
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 118
7 Quality and customer satisfaction .................................................................................... 120
Journey time and feasible day trips .......................................................................................... 121
Service frequency ..................................................................................................................... 127
Punctuality and reliability ......................................................................................................... 130
Station facilities ........................................................................................................................ 134
Customer satisfaction ............................................................................................................... 136
8 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 140
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 140
Factors influencing rail demand ............................................................................................... 140
Summary of findings ................................................................................................................. 142
Conclusions on market liberalisation ....................................................................................... 143
Figures
Figure 2.1: Rail passenger-kilometres by Member State (2013) .................................................. 4
Figure 2.2: Propensity to travel by rail by Member State (2003-2013) ........................................ 5
Figure 2.3: Average annual growth in rail passenger-kilometres (2003-2013) ............................ 6
Figure 2.4: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices: all transport (2005-2014) ............................ 7
Figure 2.5: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices: rail transport/all transport (2005-2014) ..... 8
Figure 2.6: Trends in Anytime fares in Great Britain (nominal) .................................................. 10
Figure 2.7: Trends in Off-peak fares in Great Britain (nominal) ................................................. 10
April 2016
Figure 2.8: Trends in Advance fares in Great Britain (nominal) ................................................. 11
Figure 2.9: Rail fare trends in Sweden (2015 prices) .................................................................. 12
Figure 2.10: Rail fare trends in Finland ....................................................................................... 13
Figure 2.11: Fare revenue per passenger-kilometre (2012, excluding Luxembourg) ................ 14
Figure 2.12: Average annual change in revenue per passenger-kilometre (2007-2012) ........... 15
Figure 2.13: Average annual growth rate: peak return fare ....................................................... 17
Figure 2.14: Average annual growth rate: off-peak single ......................................................... 17
Figure 2.15: EU total rail operating costs, revenue and subsidy (2012) ..................................... 23
Figure 2.16: Passenger rail revenue as a proportion of total rail operating costs (2012) .......... 24
Figure 2.17: Average yield and network length .......................................................................... 29
Figure 2.18: Average yield and network density ........................................................................ 29
Figure 2.19: Average yield and urban population ...................................................................... 30
Figure 2.20: Average yield and population density .................................................................... 30
Figure 2.21: Average yield and propensity to travel by rail ........................................................ 31
Figure 2.22: Average yield and car ownership ........................................................................... 31
Figure 2.23: Average yield and GDP per capita .......................................................................... 32
Figure 3.1: Suburban fares: single .............................................................................................. 37
Figure 3.2: Suburban fares: multi-trip ........................................................................................ 37
Figure 3.3: Suburban fares: monthly or 30-day .......................................................................... 38
Figure 3.4: Suburban fares: variation of single and 30-day fares within Member States .......... 42
Figure 3.5: Suburban fares: types of zoning system ................................................................... 48
Figure 3.6: Suburban fares: capital cities with zones ................................................................. 50
Figure 4.1: Regional fares: peak single ....................................................................................... 56
Figure 4.2: Regional fares: off-peak return ................................................................................. 56
Figure 4.3: Regional fares: monthly or 30-day ........................................................................... 57
Figure 4.4: Interurban fares under 300 kilometres: peak single ................................................ 60
Figure 4.5: Interurban fares under 300 kilometres: off-peak return.......................................... 60
Figure 4.6: Interurban fares under 300 kilometres: monthly or 30-day .................................... 61
Figure 4.7: Interurban fares over 300 kilometres: peak single ................................................... 63
Figure 4.8: Interurban fares over 300 kilometres: off-peak return ............................................ 63
Figure 4.9: High speed fare: peak single ..................................................................................... 65
Figure 4.10: High speed fares: off-peak return .......................................................................... 66
April 2016
Figure 4.11: International fares: peak single .............................................................................. 68
Figure 4.12: International fares: off-peak return ....................................................................... 69
Figure 4.13: International and domestic rail fares over 300 kilometres: peak single ................ 70
Figure 4.14: Examples of discounts for children ......................................................................... 76
Figure 5.1: Rail and car costs: regional trips ............................................................................... 85
Figure 5.2: Rail and car costs: interurban trips under 300 kilometres ....................................... 85
Figure 5.3: Rail and car costs: interurban trips over 300 kilometres.......................................... 86
Figure 5.4: Rail and car costs: international trips ....................................................................... 86
Figure 5.5: Rail and car average speeds: regional trips .............................................................. 88
Figure 5.6: Rail and car average speeds: interurban trips under 300 kilometres ...................... 88
Figure 5.7: Rail and car average speeds: interurban trips over 300 kilometres ......................... 89
Figure 5.8: Rail and car average speeds: international trips ...................................................... 89
Figure 5.9: Rail and coach costs: interurban trips under 300 kilometres (lowest observed fare)
.................................................................................................................................................... 91
Figure 5.10: Rail and coach average speeds: interurban trips under 300 kilometres (lowest
observed fare) ............................................................................................................................. 92
Figure 5.11: Rail and coach costs: international trips (lowest observed fare) ........................... 93
Figure 5.12: Rail and coach average speeds: international trips (lowest observed fare) .......... 94
Figure 5.13: Rail and air costs: interurban trips over 300 kilometres (lowest observed fare) ... 95
Figure 5.14: Rail and air average speeds: interurban trips over 300 kilometres (lowest observed
fare) ............................................................................................................................................ 96
Figure 5.15: Rail and air costs: international trips (lowest observed fare) ................................ 97
Figure 5.16: Rail and air average speeds: international trips (lowest observed fare) ................ 97
Figure 5.17:Direct air and rail services per weekday (interurban trips over 300 kilometres) .... 98
Figure 6.1: Izy’s service offer .................................................................................................... 104
Figure 6.2: Market entry: incumbent and new entrant frequency and fares .......................... 114
Figure 6.3: Market entry: measured punctuality and reported satisfaction with punctuality. 116
Figure 6.4: Comparison of fares on routes with one or more operators ................................. 117
Figure 7.1: Regional trips: average effective speeds ................................................................ 121
Figure 7.2: Regional trips: longest day trip ............................................................................... 122
Figure 7.3: Interurban trips under 300 kilometres: average effective speed ........................... 123
Figure 7.4: Interurban trips under 300 kilometres: longest day trip ........................................ 124
Figure 7.5: Interurban trips over 300 kilometres: average effective speed ............................. 125
April 2016
Figure 7.6: Interurban trips over 300 kilometres: longest day trip .......................................... 125
Figure 7.7: Domestic high speed trips: average effective speed .............................................. 126
Figure 7.8: Domestic high speed trips: longest day trip ........................................................... 127
Figure 7.9: Regional trips: rail service frequency ..................................................................... 128
Figure 7.10: Interurban trips under 300 kilometres: rail service frequency ............................ 128
Figure 7.11: Interurban trips over 300 kilometres: rail service frequency ............................... 129
Figure 7.12: Domestic high speed trips: rail service frequency ................................................ 129
Figure 7.13: Punctuality of regional and local passenger services by Member State .............. 131
Figure 7.14: Punctuality of long-distance passenger services by Member State ..................... 132
Figure 7.15: Reliability of regional and local passenger services by Member State ................ 133
Figure 7.16: Reliability of long-distance passenger services by Member State ....................... 133
Figure 7.17: Eurobarometer scores: railway stations and rail services (2012-2013) ............... 137
Figure 7.18: Eurobarometer scores: ticketing attributes (2012-2013) ..................................... 138
Figure 7.19: Eurobarometer scores: frequency and punctuality and reliability (2012-2013) .. 139
Tables
Table 2.1: Fare and average yield: an example ............................................................................ 9
Table 2.2: Member States and routes in 2009 fares study for Passenger Focus ....................... 16
Table 2.3: Changes in the structure and level of fares (2005-2015) .......................................... 18
Table 2.4: Stakeholder responses on PSO contracts in provision of rail services ...................... 20
Table 2.5: Approaches to setting fares ....................................................................................... 21
Table 2.6: Stakeholder comments on developments in rail competition .................................. 26
Table 2.7: Member State characteristics and their influence on rail fares ................................ 28
Table 3.1: Suburban fares: stations selected for 10-kilometre radial journey in capital cities .. 35
Table 3.2: Suburban fares: fares found for 10-kilometre radial journey in capital cities ........... 36
Table 3.3: Suburban fares: multi-trip discount relative to full “cash” fare ................................ 39
Table 3.4: Suburban fares: personal and bearer tickets in London ............................................ 40
Table 3.5: Suburban fares: variation between cities within a State ........................................... 42
Table 3.6: Suburban fares: setting fares and sharing revenues ................................................. 45
Table 3.7: Suburban rail services between London terminals and Crystal Palace ..................... 47
Table 3.8: Suburban fares: capital cities with suburban rail networks ...................................... 49
April 2016
Table 3.9: Suburban fares: discounts available in different cities .............................................. 52
Table 4.1: Regional fares: sample of station pairs ...................................................................... 55
Table 4.2: Interurban trips under 300 kilometres: sample of station pairs ............................... 59
Table 4.3: Interurban trips over 300 kilometres: sample of station pairs .................................. 62
Table 4.4: Domestic high-speed trips: sample of station pairs .................................................. 65
Table 4.5: Domestic and international long-distance fares ........................................................ 67
Table 4.6: Other international routes ......................................................................................... 68
Table 4.7: Approaches to setting fares ....................................................................................... 70
Table 4.8: Setting other fares and sharing revenues .................................................................. 72
Table 4.9: Discounts: tickets combining travel, social and group characteristics ...................... 74
Table 4.10: Discounts: examples of how discounts may be set ................................................. 74
Table 4.11: Relationships between fares and sales channels..................................................... 78
Table 4.12: Transparency and clarity: information criteria and scoring..................................... 79
Table 4.13: Transparency and clarity: online ticket sales channels ............................................ 80
Table 5.1: Modal competition: data collection for competitor modes ...................................... 83
Table 6.1: Intramodal competition ........................................................................................... 101
Table 6.2: Intramodal competition through low cost services ................................................. 103
Table 6.3: Intramodal competition for the market .................................................................. 104
Table 6.4: Liberalisation: market entry by domestic open access operators ........................... 110
Table 6.5: Liberalisation: market entry and effects in the UK, Italy and the Czech Republic ... 111
Table 6.6: Liberalisation: routes, incumbents and new entrants for comparison ................... 114
Table 6.7: Corridors with more than one operator and comparator corridors ........................ 117
Table 7.1: Quality: analysis by market sector ........................................................................... 120
Table 7.2: Quality: services defined as on time in RMMS ........................................................ 130
Table 7.3: Quality: station facilities scoring system ................................................................. 134
Table 7.4: Quality: online information on station facilities ...................................................... 135
Table 8.1: Factors affecting travel demand .............................................................................. 141
Table 8.2: Rail fares and service quality (regional) ................................................................... 143
Table 8.3: Domestic coach market regulatory frameworks ..................................................... 220
April 2016 | 1
1 Introduction
Study background
Under Article 15 of Directive 2012/34/EU establishing a single European railway area (the 1.1
Recast Directive), the European Commission (the Commission) is required to monitor
developments in rail transport across the European Union and to report on these to the
European Parliament and the Council. Accordingly, the Commission collects a wide range of
information on the rail sector of each Member State through the annual Rail Market
Monitoring Survey (RMMS). All European Union Member States except Cyprus and Malta
(which do not have railways), together with Norway, submit RMMS questionnaire responses.
In preparing reports on the rail sector, the Commission must include information on fares and 1.2
service quality. These are key determinants of the competitiveness of rail services relative to
other transport modes, and it is important for policy makers to understand how they are
influenced by policy at the Union, national and regional level. However, given the wide range
of fares and services offered, a reflection partly of the different fare setting and subsidy
policies prevailing in different Member States (and in different regions within individual
Member States), it is difficult to obtain comparable information through the RMMS.
Against this background, the Commission has initiated this study on the prices and quality of 1.3
rail passenger services. Steer Davies Gleave was awarded the contract to undertake the study
in October 2015 and this Final Report sets out the findings and conclusions.
Study objectives and methodology
Study objectives
The study is intended to investigate the rail service offer, defined in terms of fare levels and 1.4
service quality, to passengers across the European Union and to assess how this has been
influenced by policy in different Member States. The Commission is particularly interested in
how the prices and service offer have evolved and vary in different States. It is also concerned
with the impact of market liberalisation and competition, and policy in relation to services
operated as Public Service Obligations (PSO services) under contract between a transport
authority and a railway undertaking.
A key objective is therefore to determine how far policy in each of these areas has influenced 1.5
the attractiveness of rail services in different markets, more specifically suburban, regional and
long-distance services operating on routes on the main European rail network. The findings
are expected to inform the Commission’s Fifth Report on Rail Market Monitoring, to be
published during the first half of 2016.
The study covers all 26 Member States of the European Union which have operating railways, 1.6
plus Norway and Switzerland. For simplicity, in this report the term Member State is taken to
April 2016 | 2
apply to all of these countries, notwithstanding that Norway and Switzerland are not members
of the Union
1
.
Overview of methodology
In view of the multiplicity of fares and services available, it has not been possible to undertake 1.7
a comprehensive study of the rail service offer across the European Union. However, we
sought to ensure that the results of our analysis are representative of the passenger
experience in different Member States and of the influence of policy on the fares and service
quality offered to them. Accordingly, our methodology included the following elements:
Review of trends in yield and fare data: where data are available, we reviewed historical
trends in fares and yields to determine how these developed over the last decade.
Review of national and rail sector characteristics: we investigated the impact of factors
such as rail network length, degree of urbanisation and income levels on yields, providing
context for the more detailed investigation of fares policy and fare levels in different
countries that provided the main focus for the study.
Desk research by Member State: we carried out desk research into the rail service offer in
each Member State, and prepared case studies of 12 of them. This work included a
review of various websites, covering railway undertakings, infrastructure managers and
other rail sector organisations. It allowed us to identify developments in fares policy and
sales and distribution channels, including applications of new technology to help buy
tickets, and to assess the extent of innovation in rail markets more generally.
Assessment of station facilities: based on a review of website information, we
investigated the services and facilities available at a major station located in the capital of
each Member State, assessing aspects of service quality such as provision of ticket
facilities, train information and assistance for persons with reduced mobility (PRMs).
Review of data from RMMS and the ERADIS database: to inform the case studies and our
broader understanding of service quality, we also reviewed and analysed data from
RMMS and from reports on service quality submitted by rail operators and included in the
European Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and Safety (ERADIS). This enabled
us to assess the service offer in each Member State by reference to measures such as
punctuality and customer satisfaction.
Sampling of rail fares: we sampled fares systematically for a selection of services, covering
all Member States and suburban, regional, long-distance domestic and international
markets. This enabled a comparison of fares within and between countries, taking
account of the influence of factors such as type of fare and booking horizon (the period
between booking and travel).
Sampling of fares offered by competitive modes: building on the analysis of rail fares, we
identified the cost of car travel, and coach and airline fares for equivalent origin-
destination pairs, to determine how effectively rail competes with these modes on a
range of shorter and longer distance routes across the European Union.
Stakeholder engagement: we carried out extensive stakeholder engagement through
interviews with, or written responses from a total thirty-three stakeholders including
railway undertakings, transport ministries, regulatory bodies, passenger representative
1
Norway is a member of the European Economic Area and Switzerland is a member of the European
Free Trade Area. Both comply with aspects of European railway law.
April 2016 | 3
bodies and a number of pan-European organisations
2
. These responses informed our
understanding of rail policy, notably in relation to the provision of services operated as
Public Service Obligations (PSOs) and the introduction of on-rail competition.
Review of the impact of on-rail competition: we investigated a number of examples of on-
rail competition in the Czech Republic, Italy and the UK, identifying impacts on the
behaviour of new entrant and incumbent operators and comparative fare and service
quality levels.
Review of the impact of national rail policies: drawing on the stakeholder responses and
published information, we compared the ways in which fare levels and service quality are
determined in different Member States and different markets, contrasting the importance
of administered fares, PSO specifications and the availability of public subsidy in some
markets with the effect of commercial incentives and competition in others.
To supplement the core research team, we also engaged a broader team of staff with country-1.8
specific transport sector experience across all Member States. In addition to providing their
own knowledge and experience, our country experts assisted with data collection and
stakeholder contacts, and reviewed the outputs of the desk research and stakeholder
engagement exercises.
Based on our findings, we sought to draw conclusions about the overall competitiveness of rail 1.9
relative to other modes in different markets, and about the impact of different rail policies on
the attractiveness of rail services from the perspective of passengers.
Organisation of this report
The remainder of this report is organised as follows:
1.10
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the passenger rail market in Europe, the institutional
arrangements that govern rail policy and the characteristics of the national networks.
Chapter 3 provides our analysis of suburban fares and tickets.
Chapter 4 provides our analysis of other fares and tickets.
Chapter 5 discusses competition between rail and car, coach and air transport.
Chapter 6 discusses competition between rail operators, whether for or in the market.
Chapter 7 examines quality and customer satisfaction.
Chapter 8 synthesises and draws conclusions on the preceding analysis.
The following additional information is provided in appendices: 1.11
Appendix A, our country case studies
Appendix B, a statistical analysis of national railway characteristics
Appendix C, a case study on fares between Exeter and Fareham
Appendix D, background on factors influencing travel demand
Appendix E, a summary of the extent of coach market liberalisation
Appendix F, a glossary of terms
2
This represents a response rate of 22% of the 150 organisations contacted.
April 2016 | 4
2 The passenger rail market in Europe
European rail travel demand
Over the ten years to 2013, and as reported to Eurostat, passenger rail demand in the 2.1
European Union (EU28) increased by 61.8 billion passenger-kilometres to 424 billion
passenger-kilometres. This represents an average growth rate of 1.6% per annum and
suggests that in 2013 rail had a 7.4% share of all surface transport including private car, bus
and coach, rail, tram and metro.
Figure 2.1 shows how the largest markets for rail travel are in large and high-income Western 2.2
European Member States.
Figure 2.1: Rail passenger-kilometres by Member State (2013)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of Eurostat data
April 2016 | 5
Many rail services in these large high-income Member States are not part of a Public Service 2.3
Obligation (PSO) agreement
3
, except in the UK where the PSO operator (franchisee) may have
offered to pay a premium to operate the service. Across the European Union, however, two
thirds (or 280 billion passenger-kilometres) of the estimated travel by rail in 2013 was made
on PSO services.
Figure 2.2 shows how estimated rail travel per inhabitant varies by a factor of ten between the 2.4
Member States which have railways. In 2013, estimated rail travel per head of population was
typically over 1,000 kilometres per year in Western and Northern Member States and less than
100 kilometres in Lithuania and Greece.
Figure 2.2: Propensity to travel by rail by Member State (2003-2013)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of Eurostat data
Growth in rail use over the ten years to 2013 also varied significantly by Member State, as 2.5
shown in Figure 2.3.
3
Public Service Obligations are defined in Regulation (EC) 1370/2009 to mean requirements defined or
determined by a competent authority in order to ensure public passenger transport services in the
general interest that an operator, if it were considering its own commercial interests, would not assume
or would not assume to the same extent or under the same conditions without reward.
April 2016 | 6
Figure 2.3: Average annual growth in rail passenger-kilometres (2003-2013)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of Eurostat data
The largest increases in rail passenger-kilometres, with average annual growth of at least 2%,
2.6
were in EU15 Member States: the UK, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Germany, France and Estonia.
A decline in rail patronage over the ten years to 2013 was reported in eleven Member States, 2.7
with average rates of decline of over 6% in Romania, 4% in Lithuania and Greece and 3% in
Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, the decline may result from the consolidation activity required by its
Railway Reform Programme. In Greece, it may be due to the contraction of state funding
required as part of the wider fiscal austerity packages implemented from 2010.
The divergence in growth rates with EU13 Member States also reflects a broad range of 2.8
exogenous and endogenous factors. For example, increased access to car ownership and
higher car use in new Member States will suppress rail demand. Conversely, the opening of
new infrastructure or services, such as the West Coast Main Line upgrade works in the UK
(2008) and the HSL-Zuid line in the Netherlands (2009) will support rail demand and encourage
modal shift.
European rail fares
Each year millions of fares are calculated and marketed by a wide range of national, regional, 2.9
local and urban authorities and operators. However, databases of historic fares may not be
saved or made available to third-parties. Nevertheless, we identified a number of sources of
data providing some indication of historical trends, although each source is subject to some
caveats. More specifically, the data sources identified to investigate changes in fares through
time include the following:
April 2016 | 7
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) can be disaggregated to allow some analysis
of how rail fares in individual Member States have changed relative to average prices
across all transport modes.
Historical fares data at the national level are published by the UK Office of Rail and Road.
National average yield data can be calculated from time-series data on passenger revenue
and passenger kilometres reported in Eurostat.
Fares data collected for the 2009 Comparisons between fares and ticketing in Britain and
continental Europe study by Steer Davies Gleave for Passenger Focus (now Transport
Focus, the representative body for rail passengers in Great Britain) includes information
on 2009 fare levels that can be compared with 2015.
Information that has been obtained from stakeholder engagement.
We discuss each of these sources below. 2.10
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)
Figure 2.4 uses data from the HICP to illustrate inflation across all transport modes from 2005 2.11
to 2014.
Figure 2.4: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices: all transport (2005-2014)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of Eurostat HICP data
The dominance of private car travel in the index means that these figures are heavily affected 2.12
by volatility in the price of crude oil and improvements in fleet efficiency. They are also
influenced, in some part, by the strength of the economy in each Member State, including the
perceived quality of macroeconomic policy.
Figure 2.5 uses disaggregate HICP data to consider the relationship between the price of rail 2.13
and the “all modes” average shown in Figure 2.4. In this chart, a value greater than zero
suggests that rail travel is becoming more expensive than a basket of transport services
April 2016 | 8
(private and public) across all modes. A value less than zero suggests that rail travel is
becoming cheaper.
Figure 2.5: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices: rail transport/all transport (2005-2014)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of Eurostat HICP data
In all but two Member States (Belgium and Sweden), rail travel appears to be becoming more 2.14
expensive relative to other modes. While across the European Union (together with Norway
and Switzerland) the divergence is modest (approximately 1% per year), there are some
notable outliers (Estonia and Latvia) where rail travel appears to be becoming considerably
more expensive than other modes. In Estonia this may be due to the reduction in Russian
freight transit traffic which previously cross-subsidised passenger journeys.
At this level of disaggregation, the reliability of conclusions based on HICP data is limited. The 2.15
HICP aims to be representative of the developments in the prices of all goods and services
available for purchase within the euro area for the purposes of directly satisfying consumer
needs. It measures the average change over time in the prices paid by households for a
specific, regularly updated basket of consumer goods and services. As part of a large bundle of
goods that is weighted to produce whole-economy inflation estimates, HICP therefore relies
upon a small sample of rail products which may not be representative of the rail market in
general, and many individuals or households will experience different fares depending upon
the corridor and type of ticket bought
4
.
4
On average, the prices of around 700 products are collected every month in different outlets and in
approximately 1,600 different towns and cities across the euro area.
April 2016 | 9
National fares data
The UK Office of Rail and Road publishes time series data on rail fares. We investigated the 2.16
availability of similar data for other Member States and identified Sweden as the only country
which provided a similar time series on advertised fares at the point of sale, rather than
average yields which reflect changes in the mix of fares that are bought.
It is important to distinguish between fare and average yield, in particular, if the calculation of 2.17
average yields includes multiple ticket types. Average yield may not always provide a reliable
proxy for changes in fares since passengers may change their travelling habits in response to
fare changes. Table 2.1 provides a stylised example of the distinction between fare and
average yield.
Table 2.1: Fare and average yield: an example
Class of travel
Indicator
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
First Class
Fare (1)
€50
€75
Journeys (2)
100
50
Revenue (3) = (1)x(2)
€5,000
€3,750
Second Class
Fare (4)
€20
€20
Journeys (5)
500
525
Revenue (6) = (4)x(5)
€10,000
€10,500
Average yield (7) = ((3)+(6))/((2)+(5))
€25
€24.78
In Scenario 1, a train has fares of €50 in First Class and €20 in Second Class. With 100 2.18
passengers travelling in First and 500 in Second, this generates an average yield of €25.
In Scenario 2, the First Class fare increases to €75. This reduces the demand for First Class to 2.19
50 passengers, 25 of whom choose to travel in Second Class instead, and the remaining 25 no
longer travel by rail, but may use alternative modes, make a different trip, or choose not to
travel at all.
The result of changing from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 is that, while the First Class fare has risen 2.20
and the Second Class fare has not changed, the average yield has fallen from €25.00 to €24.78.
Due to the way in which it incorporates elements of behavioural change, care must be taken 2.21
when interpreting average yield data that covers multiple ticket types or fare levels.
The Office of Rail and Road time series data on rail fares take the form of indices for different
2.22
fare types for each the main categories of PSC (franchise) in the UK. These are calculated each
year in January, the month in which fares increases permitted under the regulatory
mechanism in the franchise agreements are applied. Separate indices are calculated for
Anytime, Off-peak, Super-off peak, Advance and season fares. Figure 2.6 to Figure 2.8 inclusive
show trends in anytime, off-peak and advance fares for each franchise category from 2004 to
2015. Note that the data covers services operating in the privatised rail industry in Great
Britain and hence does not include fares in Northern Ireland.
April 2016 | 10
Figure 2.6: Trends in Anytime fares in Great Britain (nominal)
Source: UK Office of Rail and Road
Figure 2.7: Trends in Off-peak fares in Great Britain (nominal)
Source: UK Office of Rail and Road
April 2016 | 11
Figure 2.8: Trends in Advance fares in Great Britain (nominal)
Source: UK Office of Rail and Road
The figures indicate a steady annual increase in the real value of most fares over the period as 2.23
a whole, in the range of between 1% and 2% per annum for Anytime and Off-peak fares. The
apparent substantial reduction in Advance fares on London and Southeast services in 2009
may reflect the major reclassification of fares that occurred in that year. If so, Figure 2.8 may
illustrate a more general issue concerning discontinuities in data sets even where these appear
to allow analysis of long term trends.
In Sweden, the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) has produced a report which describes the 2.24
changes in rail fares and patronage in Sweden between 1990 and 2015. Some key findings are
summarised below
5
.
5
KTH Sweden (2015) Development of supply and prices on Swedish railway lines 1990-2015
April 2016 | 12
Figure 2.9: Rail fare trends in Sweden (2015 prices)
Source: The Royal Institute of Technology (KTH Sweden)
Figure 2.9 illustrates considerable variation in Swedish rail fares (per 10 km) over the past 25 2.25
years. The price of SJ Express’ highest fare has grown steadily year on year, whilst the lowest
priced SJ Express fare decreased dramatically between 1990 and 2008 and has almost levelled
off since. This is indicative of SJ’s pricing policy, which has been strongly influenced by the
introduction of yield management (a policy that tends to increase the range of fares paid). The
prices of other, specific rail products have remained broadly fixed in real terms, with the
exception of the RPTA Monthly pass which has grown steadily and has almost doubled since
1990. The downward trend observed on SJ services from 2014 can be partly explained by the
complete market liberalisation of Swedish railways in 2010
6
. This has introduced some
competition on the network and has pushed SJ to lower its fares.
The Finnish Transport Agency also provided an extract of time-series fares data which is 2.26
reported in Figure 2.10 below.
6
Deregulation started on October 1
st
2010, however, train paths needed to be submitted by April 2010
for the timetable that came into place in 2011, which corresponded with train operation year 2012.
April 2016 | 13
Figure 2.10: Rail fare trends in Finland
Source: Statistics Finland
Figure 2.10 shows a steady increase in in the cost of a 200km trip between 2002 and 2012. 2.27
Between 2012 and 2015 the sample trip was changed to Helsinki to Tampere by IC2, however,
the trend observed is similar. Since the data only represent a trip type, it is not possible to
infer whether fares on average followed the same pattern.
National average yield data
A further potential source of national time-series data on rail fares is passenger revenue and 2.28
passenger-kilometre data reported at national level. Again, where available, this data is not
subject to many of the shortcomings of HICP data, providing a more comprehensive picture of
rail travel across all routes and ticket-types. However, we examined the source information on
which these data are based and are aware that they may be inaccurate for a number of
reasons:
Reported passenger revenue data may exclude revenue associated with gross cost Public
Service Contracts (PSCs), or not allocated to rail by a competent authority, particularly in
urban areas
7
.
Reported passenger revenue reflects the number of passengers who pay each fare, but
this will change not only with underlying demand but also when fares are changed
relative to the passengers’ willingness to pay (as illustrated in Table 2.1). Changes in the
average fare paid by passengers will not be the same as changes in the average fare set
by competent authorities or operators.
7
In recent but unpublished work for the Commission on the implementation of Regulation 1370/2007,
we found the revenue for multimodal urban and suburban travel was rarely identified or allocated to a
mode.
April 2016 | 14
Reported passenger-kilometres are estimated, and in other studies we found that these
estimates are sometimes based on assumptions, such as that there is a fixed average trip
length.
Despite the shortcomings described above, Figure 2.11 highlights the disparity in average 2.29
yields (fare revenue per passenger-kilometre) between States.
Figure 2.11: Fare revenue per passenger-kilometre (2012, excluding Luxembourg)
Source: Study on the Cost and Contribution of the Rail Sector (Steer Davies Gleave, 2015).
Note: fare revenue data is not available for Croatia.
Note: for ease of presentation the reported €0.58 per passenger-kilometre in Luxembourg has been excluded.
However, this high average yield is difficult to reconcile with our findings of low individual fares (see Chapter 4).
As might be expected, the highest average yields are found in high-income EU15 Member 2.30
States with well-developed, high-quality passenger networks. Fares in Sweden are a notable
exception to this general observation, where average fares are broadly half those charged in
neighbouring Denmark and Finland.
The observed difference in average yield may reflect the proportion of industry costs covered, 2.31
through necessity or design, by subsidies. As we discuss later (see Figure 2.16), the operating
cost recovery from fare revenue in Western European Member States is typically higher than
elsewhere in the EU. However, in some markets fares may be low, even if railway undertakings
seek to maximise revenues, because of either low incomes or competition from other modes
8
.
Figure 2.12 shows the average annual change in average yield (measured as fare revenue per 2.32
passenger-kilometre) between 2007 and 2012 for a sample of Member States.
8
In some Member States, particularly where services are poor, there is evidence of rail being
considered an ‘inferior good’. In economics terminology, an inferior good is one for which demand falls
when consumer income rises.
April 2016 | 15
Figure 2.12: Average annual change in revenue per passenger-kilometre (2007-2012)
Source: Study on the Cost and Contribution of the Rail Sector (Steer Davies Gleave, 2015).
Note: average annual change calculated as a compound annual growth rate (CAGR).
In the majority of cases, average yields have risen, although the average rate of increase 2.33
varied considerably. The very high increases in average yield in Greece may be a result of large
reductions in the number of passenger services on offer and consequent reductions in rail use.
Only the most profitable services, typically those with higher average yields, have been
retained at the expense of less profitable routes and services.
As noted previously, these outcomes are likely to reflect a number of factors, not least the 2.34
potential for passengers to trade down to a cheaper product when faced with a fare increase
(as illustrated in Table 2.1) and external factors such as the economic slowdown which began
in 2007. For example, despite well-documented increases in UK rail fares, average yields fell
between 2007 and 2012. This is probably due to passengers shifting from First Class and
unrestricted (“open”) tickets to Standard Class and yield-managed advance purchase
(“Advance”) tickets
9
. The transfer of some high-yield London suburban services from a
national net cost to a municipal gross cost PSC may also have affected reported average yield.
Comparison with fares data obtained from previous work
In our previous work for Passenger Focus (see paragraph 2.9), we identified a range of fares 2.35
available in 2009 on specific routes within a limited number of States
10
, as shown in Table 2.2
below. In each case we sought to compare 2009 and 2016 fares of each type.
9
Due to the way in which the data presented in Figure 2.12 has been constructed, some of the change
in average yield may also be due to a fall in the value of the pound relative to the euro over the same
period, leading to an apparent fall in revenues when converted to euros.
10
Comparisons between fares and ticketing in Britain and continental Europe (SDG, 2009)
April 2016 | 16
Table 2.2: Member States and routes in 2009 fares study for Passenger Focus
State
Origin
Destination
Germany
Hamburg
Berlin
Spain
Valencia
Madrid
France
Paris
Marseille
Italy
Milan
Rome
The Netherlands
Leeuwarden
Rotterdam
Poland
Krakow
Warsaw
Sweden
Malmö
Gothenburg
Source: Comparisons between fares and ticketing in Britain and continental Europe (Steer Davies Gleave, 2009)
Figure 2.13 and Figure 2.14 overleaf show compound average growth rates for two ticket 2.36
types booked on the day of travel and a week ahead. In each case, the growth rate represents
an average annual change in the real ticket price.
They illustrate the variation between Member States, markets (defined by ticket types), and 2.37
booking horizons. While it is not possible to generalise on the basis of the evidence shown, we
note that:
France, Poland and Spain appear to have applied significant fare increases in both peak
and off-peak markets;
the benefits of buying tickets a week in advance rather than on the day have increased
significantly in Italy, possibly reflecting a sharper commercial focus following the
introduction of on-rail competition (Milan-Rome is one of only a few corridors with on-rail
competition, and may not be typical);
the benefits of buying tickets a week in advance have fallen in France as the price
differential with tickets bought on the day of travel has narrowed;
in the Netherlands, there has been a substantial fall in real fares across a range of routes
which may, in part, be due to the introduction of the OV Chipkaart card and the
associated restructuring of fares; and
in Poland, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands, fare changes were similar for each ticket
type and booking horizons.
April 2016 | 17
Figure 2.13: Average annual growth rate: peak return fare
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis (based partly on data from 2009 study for Passenger Focus).
Note: analysis is based on the corridors described in Table 2.2. It was not possible to identify a directly comparable
advance fare for the UK, because of ticket reclassification in 2009 and subsequent changes to ticket restrictions.
Figure 2.14: Average annual growth rate: off-peak single
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis (based partly on data from 2009 study for Passenger Focus).
Note: analysis is based on the corridors described in Table 2.2
April 2016 | 18
Information from stakeholders
While none of the stakeholder responses included quantitative information on trends in fares, 2.38
several provided information on some of the underlying causes of changes in fare levels.
Table 2.3 below summarises responses to specific questions for each of the Member States 2.39
where information has been provided. Note that it has been compiled on the basis of
information provided by a mix of stakeholders, including transport ministries, regulatory
bodies and train service operators. Where different responses were received from
stakeholders within the same Member State, the study team reached a judgement based on
the advice of country experts. The question relating to PSO and non-PSO services was not sent
to Member States for which the column is shaded grey.
Table 2.3: Changes in the structure and level of fares (2005-2015)
Member State
Significant changes
in the last ten
years?
Do fares depend
on whether the
service is PSO or
non-PSO?
Were changes
driven by
intramodal
competition?
Were changes
driven by
intermodal
competition?
BE
Belgium
n/a
BG
Bulgaria
CZ
Czech Republic
DK
Denmark
DE
Germany
IE
Ireland
IT
Italy
EL
Greece
ES
Spain
n/a
n/a
HR
Croatia
HU
Hungary
NO
Norway
AT
Austria
PL
Poland
PT
Portugal
RO
Romania
SK
Slovakia
FI
Finland
SE
Sweden
SI
Slovenia
UK
United Kingdom
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of stakeholder responses
As the table shows, the majority of Member States have changed either the structure or level 2.40
of fares (or both) over the last 10 years. In many cases, significant changes have been driven
by competition with other modes, at least in part, and intramodal competition has an effect
on fare setting in some. Almost all Member States to which the question was submitted
confirmed that the level and/or structure of fares depended on whether the service in
April 2016 | 19
question was operated under a PSO contract. The approach to provision of PSO services in
different countries is discussed further below.
Further examination of the responses highlighted a number of reasons for introducing 2.41
changes, some commercial and others policy-driven. In particular, we note the following:
In Bulgaria, off-peak fare reductions have been introduced on regional services to
promote off-peak travel.
In Austria, Italy, Finland and Romania, fares on some routes have been changed in
response to competition. For example, yield management systems have been introduced
in Italy to support fare-setting on routes on which there is competition from low-cost
airlines, although we could not confirm that they are used where there is on-rail
competition. In Austria, yield management has been introduced on the Vienna-Salzburg
route, on which there is competition between rail operators. Elsewhere, for example in
the Czech Republic, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, yield management has been
introduced purely to increase revenues on commercial interurban services.
In Hungary, fare increases have been introduced explicitly to cover the costs of new long-
distance rolling stock.
Smartcards have been introduced in a number of Member States. For example, in Ireland
smartcards have been introduced in Dublin to attract passengers and to monitor travel
behaviour, with a view to offering passengers tailored information about services.
National public transport smartcards have been introduced in Denmark (Rejsekort) and
the Netherlands (OV Chipkaart).
In Finland, Greece and Romania, discounts have been introduced to promote rail travel
and encourage patronage.
National institutional arrangements
Use of PSO contracts
To provide context for the fares analysis, we examined the extent to which Member States 2.42
rely on PSO contracts for the provision of rail services, and on the different approaches to their
procurement. We identified Member States making direct awards of contracts and others
awarding them through competitive procurement procedures, as well as a number using both
approaches.
Table 2.4 overleaf summarises our findings. 2.43
April 2016 | 20
Table 2.4: Stakeholder responses on PSO contracts in provision of rail services
Member State
PSO award
PSO contract
type
Types of service covered by PSO
Direct
Tender
Gross cost
Net cost
Urban
Interurban
Suburban
Regional
Interregional
High speed
BE
Belgium
BG
Bulgaria
CZ
Czech Republic
DK
Denmark
DE
Germany
IE
Ireland
IT
Italy
EL
Greece
ES
Spain
HR
Croatia
HU
Hungary
NO
Norway
AT
Austria
PL
Poland
PT
Portugal
RO
Romania
SK
Slovakia
FI
Finland
SE
Sweden
SI
Slovenia
UK
United Kingdom
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of stakeholder responses
We did not seek information from all Member States on the types of service covered by PSO 2.44
contracts, and in some cases received different answers from the transport ministry and the
corresponding regulatory authority.
For example, in one Member State the ministry reported that some PSO contracts on the 2.45
state-owned network are directly awarded, while the regulatory authority indicated that all
services were competitively tendered
11
. This inconsistency may, in part, reflect recent market
developments. For example, central contracts for the state-owned rail operator which
provides the majority of the long-distance and regional services, were extended by a further
10 years in 2009. However, a number of tendering opportunities are emerging and a number
of private sector bidders are preparing accordingly.
11
As before, where divergent responses were received from stakeholders within the same Member
State, the study team reached a judgement based on the advice of country experts.
April 2016 | 21
Our more detailed review of the responses highlighted the following: 2.46
only Poland makes exclusive use of gross cost contracts
12
;
PSO contracts with national operators tend to be net cost, as in the Czech Republic and
Hungary, but there is variation in the allocation of revenue risk at the regional level;
even where contracts are gross cost, with operators taking little or no revenue risk,
operators may nevertheless face significant financial risk as a result of contractual
incentive mechanisms in the form of reward or penalty schemes (as in Sweden); and
national legislation providing for competitive tendering of PSO contracts does not
guarantee the application of competitive procurement procedures, as in Spain where
Renfe, the incumbent national operator, continues to benefit from a direct award.
Fares on PSO services
As already noted, a number of stakeholders have confirmed that the structure and/or level of 2.47
fares can depend on whether services are commercial or operated under PSO contracts.
However, we could not categorise either services or fares as “PSO” or “non-PSO”:
There is rarely any indication of whether a train is operated under a PSO, unless it is a
suburban service specified by the local competent authority or there is a national PSO
13
.
PSO fares may be administered (as in many suburban areas), regulated (as in some
Member States), or left to the market (as with many fares in Sweden and Great Britain).
National operators may operate both “PSO” and “non-PSO” services but choose, or be
required, to have a common fare structure.
A competent authority or “PSO” operator may set or regulate fares that all operators
must accept. This means that fares which operators are in principle free to set may be
“quasi-regulated” by the regulated or administered fare which they must accept.
An individual train service may include both “PSO” and “non-PSO” station calls.
A station pair may be served by both “PSO” and “non-PSO” services.
Where possible, however, in later chapters of this report we have identified whether fares 2.48
appear to be administered, regulated or constrained only by reference to the market, as
summarised in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Approaches to setting fares
Approach
Body setting fare
Operator may vary fare
Lower
Higher
Administered
Fares are set by a national, regional, local or municipal authority,
and there is no deviation from the specified fares.
Regulated
Fares are set subject to constraints, typically an upper limit on
individual fares or in a “basket” of fares.
No, or only
in basket
Market
Fares are set by the rail operator and not subject to regulation,
but may be constrained or “quasi-regulated” by other rail fares.
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
12
Gross cost contracts require the contracting authority to take revenue risk, with bidders paid a fixed
fee per unit or period, and therefore incentivised to minimise costs subject to meeting contract
obligations.
13
National PSO arrangements only appear to be in place in Estonia, Ireland, Greece and Luxembourg,
where all domestic passenger rail journeys are made on PSO services.
April 2016 | 22
In practice, while we also found that the various websites we used to research the fares may 2.49
offer one or more fares, they do not always name them, list all the fares available and any
differences in their validity, or say how they are calculated. For example, it was rarely possible
to infer:
what authority or operator had set the fare;
the reasons for any variation in fares between trains;
whether different fares had different validities or conditions of use; or
the highest or lowest fares that might be charged.
Variation in prices between individual trains might be due, inter alia, to: 2.50
different service quality or stopping patterns;
market pricing in response to competition;
differential pricing by time of day;
discounts on certain trains available only a certain period in advance;
special offers; or
active yield management in response to forecast and emerging bookings on each train.
The study timescale constrained us to carry out research late in 2015, and we found that some 2.51
“month ahead” fares quoted for travel in 2016 were higher than those quoted for travel in
2015. Where this was the case, we assumed that this was due to general annual fares rises,
rather than any of the factors listed above.
The impact of subsidies on revenues
While PSO services are not necessarily subsidised, many rely on financial support from
2.52
national, regional or local transport authorities, whether they are operated under net or gross
cost contracts. As noted above, it is not possible to categorise either individual services or
individual fares as PSO or non-PSO, and any estimate of the extent to which PSO services rely
on fare revenue rather than public subsidy is therefore problematic. It is nevertheless possible
to estimate the contribution of fare revenue to the overall costs of the rail industry in a given
Member State. This provides an understanding of the policy and political framework in which
fares are set. We note, for example, that in the UK, where fare revenue as a proportion of
costs has been steadily increasing in recent years, there is now strong political pressure to
restrain annual fare increases, notwithstanding ongoing public sector funding constraints.
The overall operating cost of railways in the European Union reported in 2012 was around 2.53
€110 billion, as shown in Figure 2.15 below
14
. This figure covers all European Union Member
States with a railway except Croatia, for which full data was not available. On average, the mix
of infrastructure and operator costs is approximately 30:70. This ratio reflects both the
underlying cost structure of the EU rail industry, and the way in which it is financed. In those
Member States which make significant subsidy payments to infrastructure managers, track
access charges are typically lower and hence the operating costs of freight and passenger
operators are lower. Alternatively, if subsidies are channelled through operators delivering
14
Operating costs include the provision of both passenger and freight services and the operation and
maintenance of fixed infrastructure. As far as possible capital expenditure on rolling stock replacement,
infrastructure renewal and enhancements is excluded. The figures are likely to mask significant
differences in input and output trends, and in costs, revenues and subsidies, between different Member
States. Moreover, aggregate analysis of this kind cannot identify hidden costs such as maintenance
backlogs in some Member States.
April 2016 | 23
public service obligations, track access charges are typically higher and hence operator costs
make up a larger proportion of the total. In countries with more rail freight, the proportion of
total costs accounted for by the infrastructure manager is greater.
Figure 2.15: EU total rail operating costs, revenue and subsidy (2012)
Source: Study on the Cost and Contribution of the Rail Sector, Steer Davies Gleave, 2015.
Roughly 60% of costs are covered by fare box and freight revenue (40% passenger and 20% 2.54
freight) and a further 30% by subsidy. The remaining 10% (around €11 billion) is a residual
balancing item that is likely to include freight income not captured at the Member State level
(data was not available for all Member States) and other sources of income such as property
rents and retail revenue.
This analysis, originally undertaken for the Study on the Cost and Contribution of the Rail 2.55
Sector, has been further developed as Figure 2.16. The figure illustrates the extent to which
passenger revenue from fares covers total rail sector operating costs (incurred by freight and
passenger railway undertakings, and infrastructure managers) by Member State. As this
analysis relies upon a range of “top-down” assumptions applied to aggregate rail industry
data, the results should be considered as indicative of broad trends and not representative at
the Member State level.
The distribution of cost coverage is highly skewed, with only the large passenger rail networks 2.56
in Germany and the UK recovering more than 60% of operating and maintenance costs
through passenger fare revenue. This may, in part, be due to exogenous factors such as
population distribution and density, and factors such as policy initiatives to reduce the
taxpayer burden of rail sector funding and track access charging regimes. The remaining
Western European Member States typically recover 25-40% of operating costs through fares.
April 2016 | 24
Cost coverage from fares is lowest among Eastern European Member States, where 2.57
approximately 5-15% of total operating costs are met by fare revenues. This similarly reflects a
range of factors which vary by country, but which may include the cost burdens imposed by
legacy networks with high fixed costs, lower service frequencies and uncompetitive journey
times, lower network densities and lower fares. It also reflects the relative importance of, and
the share of costs incurred by, rail freight traffic as in the Baltic States, which are
predominantly freight rail networks. Poland is a notable outlier, where 37% of operating costs
are met by income from fares.
Figure 2.16: Passenger rail revenue as a proportion of total rail operating costs (2012)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of data collected for the Study on the Cost and Contribution of the Rail Sector.
On the basis of the evidence presented in Figure 2.16 it is not possible to assess the proportion 2.58
of passenger rail costs covered by the passengers themselves since it is not possible to allocate
all network costs to either passenger or freight traffic. In Sweden, for example, infrastructure
charges are very low and do not cover the full marginal cost of running services over the
network. Central government subsidy paid directly to the infrastructure manager means that
many infrastructure costs are common and cannot be allocated to passenger or freight.
The development of competition
A previous study by Steer Davies Gleave on the Fourth Railway Package in 2012 included a 2.59
review of the extent of competition in the market (on-rail) and competition for the market (in
the form of competitive tendering for rail concessions) at the time. It noted:
the well-established structural and regulatory frameworks in Sweden and the UK, which
provide for competition for the market while allowing some on-rail competition on
specific routes;
the emergence of new entrants offering commercial services competing with those
provided by incumbent national operators in a number of Member States; and
April 2016 | 25
growing use of competitive tendering in some Member States, notably Germany.
At the same time, the study highlighted various barriers to entry, including access to stations 2.60
and key facilities such as maintenance depots, that appeared to be hindering the further
development of competition. The analysis indicated that measures proposed for the Fourth
Railway Package legislation, in particular those covered by the governance pillar, would help to
address these and deliver substantial customer benefits.
While the Fourth Railway Package has not yet been adopted, the level of competition in rail 2.61
passenger markets across the European Union has developed since 2012. Table 2.6, which is
limited to information from stakeholders who responded to our call for evidence, summarises
the current situation regarding competition in the market for rail services
15
.
Table 2.6 ignores competition for the rail market through competitive tendering and the 2.62
introduction of differentiated rail products by existing operators, which are often lower cost
and serve new and emerging markets. Recent examples include Ouigo (SNCF) services in
France in 2013 and Izy (Thalys) services between Paris and Brussels in 2016
16
.
As already highlighted in Table 2.3, a significant number of Member States have indicated that 2.63
both intermodal and intramodal competition have affected rail fares on one or more routes
within their national networks over the last ten years.
15
Member States are omitted from Table 2.6 if no stakeholder response was provided: this does not
imply that intermodal competition or on-rail competition have had no influence on the rail market.
16
Izy services will operate on conventional rather than high speed lines in France to reduce
infrastructure costs, will have no buffet, and will offer digital-only ticket sales. Ten tickets for each
service will be available for €10, but will not guarantee the passenger a seat.
April 2016 | 26
Table 2.6: Stakeholder comments on developments in rail competition
Member State
Intermodal competition
On-rail competition
BE
Belgium
BG
Bulgaria
Fares on routes subject to road competition can
be 30% lower
CZ
Czech
Republic
Road competition on the Prague-Brno route
Competition on a few routes
DK
Denmark
Formal cooperation between rail operators and
regional traffic agencies regarding rail and bus
fares
Private coach competition
Multiple operators, but coordinated fares
DE
Germany
Coach competition permitted from 2013
Competition on price between long-distance
and regional services, and some open access
long-distance operators
IE
Ireland
IT
Italy
Competition on routes served by low-cost airlines
Competition on HS services.
55% of tickets are discounted, compared to
20% in 2012.
EL
Greece
ES
Spain
Coach competition limited to national concessions
FI
Finland
VR announced fare reductions of 25% in February
2016, partly in response to the entry of low-cost
coach operators
HR
Croatia
Generally no, but there are discounts on certain
lines, for some periods of time
HU
Hungary
No explicit differentiation when there is
intermodal competition
NO
Norway
Two operators in the corridor to Oslo
Gardermoen Airport, but they are both state
ownership
AT
Austria
No significant competition with other modes,
standard fares are based on mileage
Competition on the Vienna-Salzburg route,
between the incumbent ÖBB and WESTbahn
Management GmbH
PL
Poland
PKP (train operator) offers a discounted ticket
when train services compete with highways
Some competition Warsaw – Lodz corridor
PT
Portugal
Fares are influenced by intermodal competition
RO
Romania
CFR Calatori (incumbent) sets discounts on some
interregional and regional trains
CFR Calatori (incumbent) applies fares and
discounts similar to those offered by
competitors when operating on the same
route
SK
Slovakia
Fares are influenced by intermodal competition
Some competition
FI
Finland
Bus competition influences fares on long-distance
services
SE
Sweden
Fares are influenced by intermodal competition
Competition on a few routes
SI
Slovenia
UK
United
Kingdom
Fares can be influenced by intermodal
competition, depending on the route
Competition on a few routes
Source: Steer Davies Gleave review of stakeholder responses.
April 2016 | 27
National railway characteristics
We also considered how rail industry and other characteristics of Member States, for example 2.64
network size, the degree of urbanisation and propensity to travel by rail, might influence rail
fares. This is a complex question given the range of factors that influence fares. For example:
As already noted, rail operators typically offer a wide range of fares, which might be
administered or regulated, set according to factors such as government policy, regulatory
constraints, commercial objectives and market conditions.
Travel patterns differ substantially between Member States, even where their respective
rail networks are otherwise comparable. For example, the proportions of urban or
suburban travel and longer distance travel may vary, with implications for average fares
and yields.
Nevertheless, the characteristics of national rail networks and the geographical and 2.65
demographic profile of Member States are part of the background against which fares policy is
determined, and might conceivably contribute to average fare levels, whether administered,
regulated or set only by reference to the market. We therefore examined the relationship
between average yields in individual Member States and a range of characteristics, set out in
Table 2.7 below with a comment on their potential influence.
Table 2.7 is followed by a number of figures based on national 2012 data collated for our 2.66
recent study on the cost and contribution of the rail sector. These show the relationship
between each of the factors in the previous table and average rail revenue per passenger-
kilometre. As expected, they suggest a complex set of relationships, although a number are
broadly consistent with the influences described above.
First, Figure 2.17 appears to show a positive relationship between network length and average 2.67
yield, at least in the case of Member States with larger networks. At first sight, this is at odds
with the relationship expected, since the longer journeys made possible on larger networks
tend to have lower average yields. Those with networks of around 5,000 kilometre or less have
a wide variation in average yield, reflecting variations in fares policy and/or commercial
objectives. There is no clear relationship between network density and average yield.
Second, Figure 2.19 shows that an apparent broadly positive relationship between the share of 2.68
urban population and average yield, although there is substantial distribution of Member
States across both axes and a number of apparent outliers (such as Austria, Estonia and
Latvia). The overall relationship is consistent with the view that a high degree of urbanisation
tends to generate a relatively high level of shorter rail journeys resulting in higher average
yields. The relationship between population density and average yield may reflect a similar
effect, to the extent that the more densely populated Member States are likely to exhibit
higher levels of urbanisation.
Third, there appears to be a broadly positive relationship both between propensity to travel by 2.69
rail and average yield (Figure 2.21) and between car ownership and average yield Figure 2.22).
Both figures probably reflect the strong positive correlation between GDP per capita and
average yield shown in the final Figure 2.23, with higher income leading to both more rail
travel at a given fare level and higher levels of car ownership.
April 2016 | 28
Table 2.7: Member State characteristics and their influence on rail fares
Characteristic
Measure
Potential impact on fares and yields
Network
length
Track
kilometres
Network length will vary with the size of the Member State but also with
network density. Larger networks may provide opportunities to take longer
journeys, for which fares are likely to be higher. However, the revenue per
passenger-kilometre generated by longer journeys tends to be lower than for
shorter journeys, since fares typically do not increase in proportion to the
length of the journey (even in the case of some kilometric fares).
Network
density
Track
kilometres
per square
kilometre
Denser networks may provide more opportunities for making relatively short
journeys by rail. These might result in lower average fares (revenue per
journey) but higher average yields (revenue per passenger-kilometre), again
because fares tend not to increase proportionately with distance.
Share of
urban
population
Urban
population as
a proportion
of total
population
Member States with relatively large urban populations may have a larger
proportion of suburban and interurban, rather than regional, travel. The impact
on rail fares and yields will depend on the specific characteristics of their rail
networks, but urban areas that are well served by local networks will generate
relatively high numbers of short journeys. Again, these might result in lower
average fares but higher revenue per passenger-kilometre.
Population
density
Population
per square
kilometre
Population may have similar impacts as the share of the urban population,
depending on the coverage of the rail network. A higher population density
may mean a greater degree of urbanisation.
Propensity to
travel by rail
Passenger-
kilometres by
rail per capita
It is particularly difficult to identify cause and effect in the case of this measure
of propensity to travel. If lower yields reflect lower fares (for example, as a
result of policy decisions taken by one or more transport authorities), these
could be expected to lead to a greater tendency to travel by rail. However, if
the population in a Member State is more inclined to use rail services,
passengers may be more willing to pay higher fares than would otherwise be
the case. The relationship between rail passenger-kilometre per capita and
observed fares and yields is therefore difficult to predict.
Car ownership
Number of
cars per
capita
Similarly, any relationship between car ownership and rail fares and yields may
be hard to determine from a simple correlation of relevant measures. A high
level of car ownership may reduce the market power of rail services and have
the effect of constraining fares and yields, but may also be highly correlated
with average income, which we discuss next. However, Member States with
higher average incomes are also likely to exhibit higher levels of car ownership
leading to road congestion and making rail travel relatively more attractive.
This allows rail operators to charge higher fares for rail travel.
Average
income
GDP per
capita
Higher income Member States tend to have more developed rail networks
commanding higher fares and generating higher average yields. We note,
however, that countries with broadly similar average incomes may adopt very
different rail fare policies with some, for example, relying more on tax rather
than fare revenue to fund rail services and investment than others. Hence, we
would expect significant variation around a broadly positive relationship
between GDP per capita and average yield.
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
April 2016 | 29
Figure 2.17: Average yield and network length
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis using data collected for a study on the cost and contribution of the rail sector
Figure 2.18: Average yield and network density
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis using data collected for a study on the cost and contribution of the rail sector
April 2016 | 30
Figure 2.19: Average yield and urban population
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis using data collected for a study on the cost and contribution of the rail sector
Figure 2.20: Average yield and population density
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis using data collected for a study on the cost and contribution of the rail sector
April 2016 | 31
Figure 2.21: Average yield and propensity to travel by rail
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis using data collected for a study on the cost and contribution of the rail sector
Figure 2.22: Average yield and car ownership
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis using data collected for a study on the cost and contribution of the rail sector
April 2016 | 32
Figure 2.23: Average yield and GDP per capita
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis using data collected for a study on the cost and contribution of the rail sector
We investigated the significance of these apparent relationships using statistical techniques as 2.70
reported in Appendix B. The results could be interpreted as in a number of ways.
First, GDP per capita may influence the levels of administered, regulated and market fares, in 2.71
that higher fares may be affordable in countries with higher average incomes, but some
Member States are outliers from this apparent relationship:
The UK and Austria appear to have slightly higher yields than might be expected given the
size of their respective networks (Figure 2.17) and their GDP per capita (Figure 2.23).
Sweden, in contrast, has lower yields than suggested by its GDP per capita (Figure 2.23),
although these are consistent with its more limited rail network (Figure 2.17) and
relatively low level of urbanisation (Figure 2.19)
17
.
Second, average revenue per passenger-kilometre rises with network length among the larger
2.72
networks. This might suggest either of the following:
Longer networks provide greater rail connectivity, increasing the number of relatively
short journeys undertaken by rail, which tend to generate higher yields per unit of
distance.
Rail travel in these countries is relatively more dominant within certain market segments,
with the result that competition from car travel and other modes is less of a constraint on
rail fares than would otherwise be the case. This means that rail is a “price-maker”
18
.
17
In addition, Sweden’s incumbent operator, SJ, reports passenger kilometres “excluding Regional
Public Transport Authority season tickets” but yield “including PTA season tickets”. It is not clear how
this apparently inconsistent reporting has been reflected in Swedish national statistics, but one
possibility is that some or all urban journeys and revenue have been omitted from the data for Sweden.
April 2016 | 33
Third, in the case of Member States with networks of around 5,000 kilometres or less, other 2.73
factors influencing fare and yield levels dominate, resulting in a wide range of yields among
these countries. Examination of Figure 2.17 indicates that they fall into two broad groups:
countries joining the EU after 2004, with average yields in the range €0.01-0.07 per
passenger-kilometre; and
higher income countries from among the EU15, with average yields in the range €0.09-
0.17 per passenger-kilometre.
This is consistent with the general relationship seen between average income and average 2.74
yield shown in Figure 2.23.
18
In economics terminology, a “price-maker” is an individual or company which is sufficiently influential
within the market to be able to affect the price of a product or service.
April 2016 | 34
3 Suburban fares and tickets
Introduction
In this chapter we examine regional and interurban fares, which are commonly set by 3.1
administrative means by an urban or municipal competent authority and are often integrated
with other modes. We did not limit this analysis to the case studies examined in Appendix A
but instead included all the capital cities with material suburban rail networks.
We collected data during November 2015 for journeys undertaken during either November or 3.2
December 2015, dependent upon whether fares were sampled one day, one week or one
month in advance.
We expressed all fares in PPP-adjusted euros, converted at the market exchange rates, and 3.3
adjusted to reflect differences in purchasing power in different Member States
19
. Thus the
relative level of reported PPP-adjusted fares reflects their cost relative to a standard basket of
goods.
Suburban fares sampled
Following discussions with the Commission, we assumed that a suburban network should 3.4
consist of at least one line with regular services at intervals of (illustratively) 30 minutes or less
connecting at least five stations within 10 kilometres. Using this criterion we excluded a
number of capital cities:
Luxembourg, Riga, Bucharest and Ljubljana have no frequent suburban commuter
services.
Vilnius in Lithuania has a number of stations in the communities surrounding the city, but
the only frequent rail service we were able to identify is to the airport, to which a single
rail vehicle operates a three kilometre shuttle service intended only for airport
passengers and workers.
Sofia in Bulgaria has services to Iskarsko Shose, but with intervals of up to two hours
between trains. There are more frequent services between Sofia and Sofia-Sever, but
these stations are only two kilometres apart.
We did not attempt to analyse details of the rail timetables in each capital city, but found 3.5
suburban stations in most of the remaining cities had more frequent, but not necessarily
regular, services. Szemeretelep (Budapest) and Holendrecht (Amsterdam) had regular services
every 30 minutes. After consideration, we also included services at Ivanka pri dunaji
19
Exchange rates from www.xe.com on 7 December 2015, purchasing power parity data from
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00
120 updated 9 November 2015
April 2016 | 35
(Bratislava), with regular services every 60 minutes for most of the day, and Lagedi (Tallinn),
where some corridors have several trains per hour at peak times.
To enable an indicative comparison of fares in each of the capital cities, we identified a 3.6
suburban station approximately 10 kilometres from the city centre, as defined in Table 3.1. We
then identified the range of fares available for travel between the suburban station and the
city centre:
Single tickets might be used by a traveller or visitor making only occasional journeys.
Multi-trip tickets, where available, might be used by a traveller or visitor making
infrequent journeys.
30-day or one month period passes might typically be used by a regular commuter,
although passes for shorter and longer periods are often available.
Table 3.1: Suburban fares: stations selected for 10-kilometre radial journey in capital cities
Member State
City
Station selected for “10-kilometre” sample journey
Name
Kilometres
AT
Austria
Vienna
Brunn-Maria Enzersdorf
11
BE
Belgium
Brussels
Lot
11
CH
Switzerland
Bern
Flamatt
12
CZ
Czech Republic
Prague
Radotin
12
DE
Germany
Berlin
Lichterfelde Ost
11
DK
Denmark
Copenhagen
Glostrup
11
EE
Estonia
Tallinn
Lagedi
12
EL
Greece
Athens
Piraeus
8
ES
Spain
Madrid
Fuencarral
10
FI
Finland
Helsinki
Tapanila
11
FR
France
Paris
Choisy-le-Roi
11
HR
Croatia
Zagreb
Sesvete
10
HU
Hungary
Budapest
Szemeretelep
11
IE
Ireland
Dublin
Dun Laoghaire
10
IT
Italy
Rome
Capannelle
10
NL
Netherlands
Amsterdam
Holendrecht
10
NO
Norway
Oslo
Rosenholm
10
PL
Poland
Warsaw
Piastow
12
PT
Portugal
Lisbon
Queluz/Belas
11
SE
Sweden
Stockholm
Helenelund
10
SK
Slovakia
Bratislava
Ivanka pri dunaji
12
UK
UK
London
Crystal Palace
11
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
April 2016 | 36
Our findings are summarised in Table 3.2 below and in Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.3. 3.7
Table 3.2: Suburban fares: fares found for 10-kilometre radial journey in capital cities
State
City
Monthly or 30-day
Single
30-day off-peak
30-day resident
30-day personal
30-day bearer
Kilometric
(see note)
Multi-trip/carnet
Card off-peak
Card peak
Cash
AT
Austria
Vienna
BE
Belgium
Brussels
CH
Switzerland
Bern
CZ
Czech Republic
Prague
DE
Germany
Berlin
DK
Denmark
Copenhagen
EE
Estonia
Tallinn
EL
Greece
Athens
ES
Spain
Madrid
FI
Finland
Helsinki
FR
France
Paris
HR
Croatia
Zagreb
HU
Hungary
Budapest
IE
Ireland
Dublin
IT
Italy
Rome
NL
Netherlands
Amsterdam
OV
NO
Norway
Oslo
PL
Poland
Warsaw
PT
Portugal
Lisbon
SE
Sweden
Stockholm
SK
Slovakia
Bratislava
UK
UK
London
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Note: kilometric fare only found for Bratislava, but OV-Chipkaart in the Netherlands is similar to a kilometric fare.
April 2016 | 37
Figure 3.1: Suburban fares: single
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Figure 3.2: Suburban fares: multi-trip
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Note: multi-trip fares identified are for ten single trips, except for Bratislava, see text for details.
April 2016 | 38
Figure 3.3: Suburban fares: monthly or 30-day
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Note: monthly or 30-day fares have been divided by 40 to estimate the effective single fare for a commuter.
Note: where not specified, and no photocard required, we assume that tickets are transferable, see text for details.
Single tickets
In many cities a range of single fares are available (see Figure 3.1), including some or all of: 3.8
a full “cash” fare obtainable at a ticket office or ticket machine by cash or by card;
a discount obtainable using a smart card;
a further discount for off-peak travel, available in London on the Oyster smart card; and
a distance-based or “kilometric” fare for the national railway and valid on local services.
We only found kilometric fare tables for the Czech Republic and Slovakia
20
. In Slovakia the 3.9
kilometric fare, set in 2011, is €0.50 for the first five kilometres and then an additional €0.05
per kilometre. This means that, for the 14-kilometre journey we examined, the kilometric fare
of €0.95 (shown in Figure 3.3 as €0.11 per kilometre after PPP adjustment) undercuts the cash
single fare of €1.20 (€0.14 per kilometre after PPP adjustment). We have not established
whether passengers are aware of this, or how many take advantage of it, but are aware of
similar anomalies in other cities.
We found other examples of different fares charged by the national railway and by the local or 3.10
urban authority:
Fares set by the local or urban authority may either be zonal or rise in discrete steps.
Both types of fare may be accepted on the same service.
20
PKP in Poland publishes tariff tables, up to 300 pages long, but they do not appear to be kilometric.
April 2016 | 39
Tallinn, Dublin, Stockholm, and London give a discount on the cash fare for using a smart card. 3.11
London is unique in offering a further discount for off-peak fares on Oyster pay as you go
(PAYG) and, more recently, in accepting “wave and pay” payment by debit and credit cards.
We are also aware that: 3.12
In Stockholm, cash fares for single journeys have been raised relative to period fares, with
the apparent aim of encouraging residents to buy a period ticket valid throughout
Stockholm County.
In London, cash fares have been raised relative to PAYG fares, with the explicit aim of
minimising the use of cash in the system.
In Tallinn, the discount for using smart cards will be increased from 1 March 2016 to
encourage their use and to reduce bus dwell times at bus stops.
Multi-trip tickets
In many cities multi-trip tickets or carnets are also available (see Figure 3.2). Brussels, 3.13
Copenhagen, Paris, Budapest and Lisbon offer discounts for 10 tickets bought together, and
Bratislava offers €6.60 tickets with 24 “fields”: cancelling four of the fields for a three-zone
journey results in the €1.10 fare mentioned above.
The effective discount relative to the full “cash” fare varies, as summarised in Table 3.3 below. 3.14
Table 3.3: Suburban fares: multi-trip discount relative to full “cash” fare
City
Brussels
Copenhagen
Paris
Budapest
Lisbon
Bratislava
Effective discount
52%
48%
20%
14%
10%
8%
Ticket type
10-trip carnet
“Fields”
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
We note that, in cities such as Tallinn, the introduction of smart cards has been accompanied 3.15
by withdrawing multi-trip or carnet tickets. We assume that this is partly because they are
close substitutes, but also to encourage occasional users to acquire a smart card.
Monthly or 30-day tickets
Regular commuters in many cities will typically buy weekly, monthly or annual tickets offering 3.16
increasing levels of discount relative to single, return or day tickets. The relative prices of
these tickets also vary:
In Switzerland, an annual interregional travelcard, involving travel beyond the area
covered by a single suburban pass costs the same as 9, or sometimes 10, monthly tickets.
In Brussels and some other cities, an annual ticket costs the same as 10 monthly tickets.
In London, an annual ticket costs the same as 40 weekly tickets.
In all the capital cities with suburban services it is possible to buy both an annual tickets and 3.17
either a monthly or a 30-day ticket. We focused on the price of the latter (see Figure 3.3), but
note that these might be issued for three different durations:
a rolling period of 30 days;
a rolling period of one month, with validity varying from 28 to 31 days; and
an exact calendar month.
April 2016 | 40
Prague, Helsinki, Rome and Warsaw issue two distinct types of ticket: 3.18
Transferrable or “bearer” tickets may be used by different people at different times of
day. These may be intended for businesses lending them to visitors for local travel, or
households with a variety of working hours.
Non-transferrable or “personal” tickets are cheaper, and may be used only by one person,
typically identified by a photocard.
While in these cities there is a clear distinction between these types of tickets, in many others 3.19
there is not. In London, for example, we are aware that period tickets or Travelcards were
originally non-transferrable and accompanied by a photocard, so that the identity of the user
could be checked. With increasing reliance on automatic checks by barriers instead of staff,
the requirement for a photocard has now been removed, except for discounted passes such as
those for the elderly. Since the introduction of Transport for London’s multimodal Oyster
smart card, however, we understand that the situation is as shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Suburban fares: personal and bearer tickets in London
Medium
Modes
covered
Type
Transferrable?
Photocard
required?
Debit/credit card
Multimodal
PAYG
Oyster smart card
Multimodal
PAYG
Multimodal
Day “Travelcard”
Multimodal
Period “Travelcard” with no discount
Multimodal
Period “Travelcard” discounted for individual
(such as a Senior)
Paper ticket
Rail-only
Period “season” with no discount
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
A further complexity in London is that Travelcard and PAYG products can be loaded on the 3.20
same Oyster card, with the effect that an Oyster card with both products might be either
transferrable or not transferrable, depending on the journey being made.
We note that many of the discounts available in some cities are intended to apply to an 3.21
individual, and hence are in principle non-transferrable, and in some cases require a photocard
or other proof of identity. In practice, however, it may not be cost-effective or even possible to
ensure that they are not transferred between passengers, which would also require at least
sample checks on the identity of travellers and, in the case of smart cards such as Oyster, the
product being used for the journey in question.
In London, where we work extensively with the local transport authorities, we found no clear 3.22
statement of which ticket products are transferrable or non-transferrable. In most cities we
found no conspicuous reference to whether 30-day tickets are intended to be transferrable. In
Figure 3.3 we therefore assumed that 30-day tickets are transferrable unless they require a
photocard or are specifically referred to as non-transferrable or “personal”.
We also found an off-peak only monthly ticket in Berlin, the “10-Uhr Karte” valid only after 3.23
10am and aimed at those willing to defer travel until after the morning peak. Berlin does not
as yet have a smart card system, or gated entry and exit, and this might be the only effective
way of deterring or managing morning peak travel.
April 2016 | 41
Two further arrangements are not shown in Figure 3.3: 3.24
Warsaw offers a small discount available only to those who can demonstrate that they are
resident in the city by having filed a local tax return in the preceding year. These tickets
require a photocard identifying the user
21
.
Tallinn allows residents of the city free travel within the city area, Zone 1, and all visitors
(domestic and international) need to buy tickets within this area. Our analysis is based on
fares between Tallinn and Lagedi in Zone 2.
While monthly or 30-day tickets are normally cheaper than single, return or day tickets, we 3.25
also noted that
22
:
In Dublin a monthly zonal ticket is poor value if used only for commuting by train between
Dun Laoghaire and Connolly (€0.31 per kilometre after PPP adjustment) and it is cheaper
to buy single fares or use the Leap smart card (€0.27 and €0.21 per kilometre after PPP
adjustment).
In Warsaw all three types of 30-day ticket cost more than 40 times a point-to-point cash
rail fare from Piastow to Centralna, and the full cash fare would be the cheapest means of
commuting between these stations.
In Rome, a point-to-point cash fare (€0.10 per kilometre after PPP adjustment) costs less
than a monthly bearer ticket but more than a monthly personal ticket (€0.12 and €0.08
per kilometre after PPP adjustment).
Variations of fares between cities within a State
We stress that the analysis described above is based on a single station-to-station journey, and 3.26
fares per kilometre for other station-to-station pairs might be considerably different,
particularly in cities with large fare zones such as Oslo, Helsinki, Stockholm and Berlin.
Most suburban fares are administered by the competent local or municipal authority, and 3.27
there is no requirement that fares should be consistent nationally. Switzerland and the
Netherlands have national zoning systems, but we understand that the authorities in Bern set
the fares in the zones in their area of competence, and the authorities in Amsterdam are free
to set local fares which undercut the national OV-Chipkaart fares.
We therefore examined fares set by local competent authorities in two additional regional 3.28
cities in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as summarised in Table 3.5.
We found the single “cash” ticket price and the monthly of 30-day fare, and also calculated the 3.29
“break-even” number of single journeys at which the 30-day fare would be cheaper. Figure 3.4
compares these fares, expressed as a PPP-adjusted fare per kilometre.
21
London also offers a 100% discount on off-peak rail travel to residents over the age of 60.
22
These observations are based upon a small sample of flows and may not be representative of the
relative discount available to season ticket holders across the wider suburban networks in these cities.
April 2016 | 42
Table 3.5: Suburban fares: variation between cities within a State
State
Cities
Station selected for “10-
kilometre” sample journey
Fare at local prices
Name
km
Single “cash”
ticket
Monthly or 30-
day fare
“Break-even”
trips per month
DE
Germany
Berlin
Lichterfelde Ost
11
€2.70
€79.50
30
Munich
München-Aubing
11
€10.80
€76.60
8
Hamburg
Hochkamp
11
€3.20
€65.00
21
SE
Sweden
Stockholm
Helenelund
10
SEK 54
SEK 790
15
Gothenburg
Kållered
12
SEK 41
SEK 790
20
Malmö
Hjärup
11
SEK 40
SEK 829
21
UK
UK
London
Crystal Palace
11
£4.20
£91.80
22
Liverpool
Meols
11
£4.00
£82.00
21
Glasgow
Paisley Gilmour Street
11
£3.40
£87.10
26
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Note: fares in München, Hamburg, Gothenburg and Malmö are at 2016 levels, others are at 2015 levels.
Figure 3.4: Suburban fares: variation of single and 30-day fares within Member States
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see Table 3.5 for station pairs.
Figure 3.4 shows wide variation between cities in the same state: the single fare sampled in 3.30
Stockholm was 50% more than those in the other Swedish cities. A possible explanation is that
the competent authority in Stockholm has a deliberate policy of making single fares expensive
to encourage residents to buy a period ticket. The most conspicuous outlier, however, is
Munich’s four-zone single fare of €10.80 for the 11-kilometre journey from the Hauptbahnhof
to München-Aubing. A monthly ticket for four zones costs less than eight single tickets.
April 2016 | 43
Suburban fares setting and sharing revenue
Relating fares to costs
Ideally, fares would send a signal to passengers, suppliers and investors about the need for 3.31
future investment. This would require fares to reflect “efficient” pricing. Economically efficient
pricing is where the price reflects the marginal costs of providing the service. However,
estimating marginal costs for the rail industry is not straightforward, as long run marginal costs
may differ significantly from their short run values. They will also differ between groups of
passengers: estimates of the marginal costs of passengers may vary widely depending on
whether they travel with the peak flow, against the peak flow, or at off-peak times.
A significant problem in calculating marginal costs for the rail industry is the high proportion of 3.32
fixed, joint and common costs involved in providing a railway service. The marginal cost of
carrying extra passengers is very small up to the point where all spare capacity is used up, at
which point it can become very large, as more rolling stock, trains or infrastructure is required.
Decisions regarding the extent to which marginal costs are covered by fares (and hence the 3.33
relative balance of rail industry funding between fares paid by passengers and subsidy paid by
taxpayers) are typically made by competent authorities when determining their fares policy. In
most cases, adherence to national fares policy is a requirement enforced through the terms of
PSO contracts. Non-PSO services may not be subject to the same fares policy but may, in
effect, be constrained or “quasi-regulated”, by PSO fares.
In practice, therefore, while competent authorities may monitor, and set targets for, the 3.34
overall proportion of costs recovered through fares (see Figure 2.15), no individual fare is set
by calculating the cost of the journey to which it relates.
More typically, fares are set by administrative means to reflect a mix of objectives which may 3.35
include a cost-recovery target but may also include simplicity, reducing barriers to interchange
between trains and between modes, and encouraging use of spare capacity. This commonly
results in a combination of a zonal fares system with discounts for buying tickets permitting all
travel within a defined area for a defined period.
Zonal fares systems
Most capital cities have zonal fares systems in which fares are determined by the competent 3.36
local or municipal authority. Only Switzerland and the Netherlands have national zonal
systems, but these still offer flexibility for municipal authorities to set fares, or to undercut
national fares, in the zones in their area of responsibility. Suburban fares are therefore often
specific to a city or conurbation and may not be typical of those elsewhere in a Member State.
Most suburban fares are set by these competent authorities using administrative processes. 3.37
Even where rail operators are constrained only by regulation or by market conditions, the
administered fare may act as an effective cap on any fares they set.
As far as possible we attempted to identify how the fares within the capital city and its 3.38
surrounding area for each Member State were set, and the extent to which market forces
were involved. Our findings for each of the cities are summarised in Table 3.6.
We noted any references to the year in which some or all fares were last set. In doing so we 3.39
found two extremes of behaviour:
In some cities, such as in London, fares are updated annually on a basis linked to inflation.
April 2016 | 44
In other cases fares may be left unchanged for several years. In Prague and Tallinn, fare
levels do not appear to have been changed since 2011. In Tallinn, however, multi-trip
tickets have been withdrawn and smartcards introduced in 2013 include a 10% discount.
However, an increase in fares from 1 March 2016 has been announced.
We also identified whether fares in the capital city appear to be administered, regulated or 3.40
constrained only by reference to the market:
means that at least some fares are set on this basis.
? means that we have not identified whether any fares are set on this basis.
means that we understand that no fares are set on this basis.
We also attempted to identify the extent to which revenue associated with suburban rail 3.41
travel is shared between operators and modes:
means that at least some revenue is shared on this basis
? means that we have not identified whether any revenue is shared on this basis.
means that we understand that no revenue is shared on this basis.
April 2016 | 45
Table 3.6: Suburban fares: setting fares and sharing revenues
Member State
City
Setting of fare(s) are used within
capital area
Sharing revenue
Year last set
Administered
Regulated
Market
Dedicated
Among rail
Between modes
AT
Austria
Vienna
2014
?
BE
Belgium
Brussels
-
?
CH
Switzerland
Bern
-
?
?
CZ
Czech Republic
Prague
2011
?
DE
Germany
Berlin
2015
?
DK
Denmark
Copenhagen
2015
?
EE
Estonia
Tallinn
2011
?
EL
Greece
Athens
-
?
ES
Spain
Madrid
-
?
FI
Finland
Helsinki
2015
?
FR
France
Paris
2015
?
HR
Croatia
Zagreb
-
?
HU
Hungary
Budapest
2014
?
IE
Ireland
Dublin
-
?
IT
Italy
Rome
-
?
NL
Netherlands
Amsterdam
2016
?
NO
Norway
Oslo
2015
?
PL
Poland
Warsaw
2013
?
PT
Portugal
Lisbon
2014
?
SE
Sweden
Stockholm
-
?
SK
Slovakia
Bratislava
2015
UK
UK
London
2015
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Note: the year fares were set is not always stated on websites, Netherlands showed 2016 fares at time of research.
A dash “-” means that we have not identified the date of the last fare change.
Note: analysis of fare setting and revenue sharing is based on limited information.
Administered fares include all fares set by local or municipal authorities, in some cases 3.42
through a formal Regulation or, in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, a kilometric
fare table. In contrast, regulated fares are set by the operator, but under constraints set by the
relevant competent authority. Fares regulation may be by a range of mechanisms including
price caps and links to inflation indices (“RPI-X”).
The only confirmed examples of fares for travel wholly within an urban area being regulated, 3.43
rather than administered, are in London, where point-to-point rail fares continue to be set by
April 2016 | 46
individual operators, subject to regulation by fares basket, and Copenhagen
23
. We discuss the
complexities of fares setting in London further in Table 3.7.
We did not identify any journeys within a capital city area where rail fares are left wholly to 3.44
the market. In practice, the near-universal existence of administered rail fares set by a
municipal authority sets an effective cap on the fare any rail operator could charge for travel
wholly within the urban area, so where market fares exist they are in any case “quasi-
regulated” by other fares which must also be accepted.
Turning to the mechanisms through which revenue is shared, we note that rail fares may be 3.45
dedicated to one operator in a number of cases, such as where:
kilometric fares are dedicated to the national rail operator, as in Bratislava;
the long-distance operator’s fares are not valid on local services (although we note that
long-distance operators rarely make multiple stops in the same city on a frequent and
regular service); or
operator-specific fares are issued by a franchisee in Great Britain, where there is price
competition on corridors such as from central London to East Croydon
24
.
Rail and other modes are ticketed separately in Tallinn, but in every other capital city the 3.46
existence of multimodal tickets means that some or all revenue is shared with other modes.
For multimodal tickets, however, revenue is often not apportioned to individual operators or
even to modes, particularly where transport is operated by internal operators or under a gross
cost contract in which all revenue from fares is collected by, or passed to, the competent
authority.
A further complexity is where a national incumbent operator may provide services in the same 3.47
corridor both under gross cost contract to a competent authority and on a commercial basis,
and may accept both multimodal and rail-only tickets on all its trains. In these circumstances,
revenue may be shared between the competent authority and the operator on some basis.
Sharing of revenue between rail operators may be relevant where two or more operators 3.48
provide services within a urban area. We have only been able to confirm that this is the case in
London where multimodal, rail-only and operator-specific fares may need to be shared
between all the rail operators on whose services the ticket was valid. Rail travel between
central London and Crystal Palace, for example, might make use of any of the services listed in
Table 3.7.
23
In Berlin, through long distance services may call at a number of stations within the urban area, local
tickets are not valid for travel on these services.
24
The single fare from London Victoria to East Croydon, set by Southern Trains, is lower than the
interavailable fare accepted by all operators by £0.10 (2015) and £0.20 (2016). This small reduction
suggests that Southern’s aim was not to offer price competition, but to ensure that revenue from sales
of its “dedicated” tickets need not be subject to potentially inaccurate apportionment through ORCATS.
April 2016 | 47
Table 3.7: Suburban rail services between London terminals and Crystal Palace
Operator
Competent authority
Gross
cost
Net
cost
Fare type
Operator-specific
tickets
London Overground
Transport for London
Administered
Thameslink
Department for Transport
Administered
Southern
Department for Transport
Regulated
Southeastern
Department for Transport
Regulated
None identified
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
In London, revenue-sharing makes use of a number of distinct systems: 3.49
Revenue from rail-only tickets is allocated using the ORCATS (Operational Research
Computerised Allocation of Tickets to Services) model developed in the 1970s. Revenue
from tickets not dedicated to a single operator is shared between them on the basis of a
modelled estimate, using standard assumptions, of what proportion of use of the ticket
would be on each operator’s service. ORCATS can be challenged where operators produce
evidence, such as from ticket inspections, that its allocations are materially incorrect.
Revenue for day and period Travelcards valid on all modes is allocated on the basis of
surveys of passengers including household diaries, in which a sample of households
provide a record of all travel on the tickets they hold.
Revenue from pay as you go (PAYG) Oyster smart cards and” wave and pay” debit and
credit cards provide a record of all uses of a particular ticket or card and can also be used
to identify and allocate revenue.
In Berlin, revenue from multimodal tickets is allocated between operators on the basis of 3.50
surveys of usage. We understand that this approach is also used in other German cities.
Fares structures
Many rail fares were originally calculated as a function of distance, a “kilometric fare”, and this 3.51
system has been retained in some national railways including the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Some railways have adopted systems in which fares are broadly distance-related but rise in
fixed steps, reducing the total number of prices of tickets which need to be sold.
In many Member States, the majority of rail travel takes place in urban or suburban areas with 3.52
a zonal system, in which fares can be identified by counting the number of zones between
origin and destination stations. Some zonal systems date back to the 1970s or earlier and
some have been changed over time. Bratislava’s system, for example, has been redesigned
and expanded since 2013 to include commuter rail services.
We devised the following categorisation of zonal systems, illustrated in Figure 3.5: 3.53
a single zone, in which all fares are fixed, typical of smaller cities such as Brussels or low-
fare cities such as Rome;
rings, with fare calculated from the number of rings, used in Berlin, Tallinn and London;
rings divided into sectors, so that orbital services, where they exist, pass through a
number of different zones, as used in cities such as Copenhagen, Oslo and Bratislava; and
a mosaic dividing the whole suburban area, region or State into zones, as around Bern.
April 2016 | 48
Figure 3.5: Suburban fares: types of zoning system
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis and nomenclature.
In all these cases the zone boundaries may follow municipal or administrative boundaries or 3.54
may be modified to reflect local requirements, such as to fine tune the fares to major
suburban centres, or to ensure that a community falls into a single zone, or that zonal
boundaries coincide with large gaps between stations or stops.
Table 3.8 summarises our analysis of the 30 capital cities of the EU28 plus Norway and 3.55
Switzerland. In each city with a zonal system, we identified the maximum number of zones in
any direction from the city centre to the outer limit of the zonal system. For the suburban
station-to-station fare we examined (as reported in Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.3) we also identified,
for the rail corridor including the 10-kilometre journey:
the number of zones within 10 kilometres of the city centre;
the distance from the centre to the edge of the system (in the single, ring and sector
terminology of Figure 3.5, the radius of the outermost circle); and
the average incremental radius of each successive zone over this distance.
Single Rings Sectors Mosaic
April 2016 | 49
Table 3.8: Suburban fares: capital cities with suburban rail networks
State
City
Smart card
Sampled commuter
rail interval
Zonal system
Characteristics of
selected corridor
Name
Valid on rail
Type
Zones on
radial rail
services
Zone at 10
kilometres
Outer edge
(kilometres)
Average radius
(kilometres)
AT
Austria
Vienna
(Planned)
-
+
Sectors
3-8
2
43
9
BE
Belgium
Brussels
Mobib
+
Single
1
Outside
8
8
BG
Bulgaria
Sofia
Yes
-
No regular suburban rail services
CH
Switzerland
Bern
+
Mosaic
National
4
National
4
CY
Cyprus
Nicosia
No railway
CZ
Czech Republic
Prague
Opencard
+
Rings
4-8
1
35
7
DE
Germany
Berlin
-
+
Rings
3
2
26
9
DK
Denmark
Copenhagen
Rejsekort
+
Sectors
3-13
4
45
4
EE
Estonia
Tallinn
Ühiskaart
60
Rings
5
2
73
14
EL
Greece
Athens
-
+
No zonal system for rail
ES
Spain
Madrid
Sube-T
+
Rings
5-6
2
26
5
FI
Finland
Helsinki
Travel Card
+
Municipal
2-3
1
52
26
FR
France
Paris
Navigo
+
Rings
5
3
50
10
HR
Croatia
Zagreb
-
+
Rings
3
1
34
12
HU
Hungary
Budapest
(Planned)
-
30
Single
1
1
15
15
IE
Ireland
Dublin
Leap
+
No zonal system for rail (Dublin Bus has zones)
IT
Italy
Rome
Metrebus
+
Single
1
1
11
11
LT
Lithuania
Vilnius
-
airport rail service only
LU
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
e-go
No regular suburban rail services
LV
Latvia
Riga
E-talons
No regular suburban rail services
MT
Malta
Valletta
No railway
NL
Netherlands
Amsterdam
OV-Chipkaart
30
National distance-based
NO
Norway
Oslo
Reisekort
+
Sectors
3-4
1
55
14
PL
Poland
Warsaw
Karta Miejska
+
Rings
2
1
18
9
PT
Portugal
Lisbon
Viva
+
Sectors
4-5
2
23
6
RO
Romania
Bucharest
Cardul activ
-
No regular suburban rail service
SE
Sweden
Stockholm
SL Access
+
Rings
2-3
1
40
13
SI
Slovenia
Ljubljana
Urbana
-
No regular suburban rail service
SK
Slovakia
Bratislava
-
60
Sectors
6-12
2
31
5
UK
UK
London
Oyster
+
Rings
6-9
3
23
4
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Note: “+” = commuter rail more frequent than every 30 minutes in the sample radial corridor.
Note: zone numbers and radii are in a sample radial corridor which may not be typical.
April 2016 | 50
Figure 3.6: Suburban fares: capital cities with zones
Source: railway and transport authority websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Note: zone numbers and radii are in a sample radial corridor which may not be typical.
Note: in some cities the minimum fare includes more than one zone.
April 2016 | 51
Figure 3.6 summarises our analysis of the 17 cities with zonal systems, sorted by the diameter 3.56
of the zonal system on the radial corridor we examined, relative to a notional 10 kilometre
journey shown by the green line. It also shows the approximate sizes, and numbers or names,
of the zones in the radial corridor. It illustrates a number of points about zoning systems.
First, some cities have a single zone, with flat fares for the whole urban area, although there 3.57
may be lower “short hop” fares within this zone. The boundary of the zone is typically the area
for which the municipal authority is responsible for transport. This structure tends to be used
in cities which are small or have relatively low fares, such as Brussels, Rome and Budapest.
Second, some cities have large fare zones with large average radius. The principal examples, 3.58
and average zone radii in the selected corridors, are Helsinki (26 kilometres) and Tallinn, Oslo
and Stockholm (13-14 kilometres). This can mean relatively large steps between fares for
different numbers of zones, although in Stockholm all period tickets cover all of Stockholm
County including Zones A, B and C, effectively making period tickets flat fares.
Third, and at the other extreme, some cities have small fare zones with a small average radius. 3.59
The average radii of the zones in Copenhagen, Bratislava, London and Bern in the corridors
selected is only 4-5 kilometres, with relatively small steps in fares. In London, for example,
some tickets group the zones, with common fares for Zones 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6.
Fourth, the radius covered by a ticket for the central zone varies widely, from 2-3 kilometres in 3.60
London and Copenhagen, via 4 kilometres in Paris and around 10 kilometres in Warsaw,
Stockholm, Vienna and Oslo to over 20 kilometres in Helsinki.
Discounts and reductions
We investigated the discounts offered and the conditions attached to them. In practice, 3.61
passengers falling into certain categories may be entitled to either discounted or reduced
fares, which we define as follows:
Discounted fares are lower than the full adult fare by a fixed percentage. We have found
discounts at levels of 20%, 25%, 33%, 40%, 50%, 90% and 100% in different cities.
Reduced fares are lower than the full adult fare, but the percentage reduction varies
between different station pairs.
For example, fares of €5 and €4 may be discounted by 20% to €4 and €3.20 respectively. 3.62
Reduced fares, on the other hand, may be €4.50 and €3.50, reductions of 10% and 12.5%
respectively.
Discounted fares are simpler to administer and for passengers to understand, but may limit 3.63
the operator’s flexibility to either maximise revenues or manage demand, as they cannot tailor
the discount offered to match an individual’s willingness to pay. Fares for travel in different
quantities (singe, return, season), or at different times (peak, off-peak, weekend) are often
therefore reduced by amounts which vary between tickets to meet operator objectives.
Passengers travelling in suburban areas will normally benefit from any discounts or reduced 3.64
fares required by national legislation (“general rules” provided for in Article 3 in Regulation
1370/2007) or offered throughout the railway industry. For example, a “general rule” might be
that people defined as pensioners in social legislation must travel half price. In this case the
railway has not set a pensioner discount and has no control of the age at which it is available,
since the pensionable age may be determined in separate legislation.
April 2016 | 52
Passengers may also benefit from discounts or reduced fares offered by regional or municipal 3.65
competent authorities. Discounts and reduced fares are common for the young, students, the
elderly and persons with reduced mobility (PRM), with varying eligibility rules. However, not
all sources (including RMMS) list all discounts and/or reduced fares. Table 3.9 illustrates some
of the discounts and reduced fares we identified as being available in various cities.
Table 3.9: Suburban fares: discounts available in different cities
State
City
Examples of discounts or reduced fares
BG
Bulgaria
Sofia
Preferential tariffs, at different rates, for:
University students
Holders of a PhD
Life guards from the mountain rescue service
Persons with reduced mobility (PRM) and their attendants, tiered by severity of
disability
Foster parents
Veterans and war victims
“Honourable citizens” of Sofia
CZ
Czech
Republic
Prague
100% discounts for babies in strollers
(empty strollers require a ticket)
ES
Spain
Madrid
Discounts for large families
IT
Italy
Rome
Discounts for unemployed residents
NO
Norway
Oslo
Group ticket for kindergarten groups and school classes
PL
Poland
Warsaw
Discount of 100% for, inter alia:
Holders of Warsaw Uprising Cross or “For Warsaw 1939-1944” medal, or
members of “The association of Poles harmed by the Third Reich”
Honorary citizens of Warsaw
Those born on public transport vehicles in the city
Those who have given more than 18 litres (men) or 15 litres (women) of blood
The disabled, and carriers escorting them or returning from escorting them
Participants in various marathons and half-marathons
Retired transport staff
Widows and widowers of transport staff killed in accidents at work
UK
UK
London
Discounts for residents of London over 60, and separate scheme over 65:
100% on services funded by Transport for London
33% on services funded by Department for Transport, off-peak only
Discounts for non-residents over 60 years old, on purchase of a photocard:
33% on services funded by Department for Transport, off-peak only
Source: railway and transport authority websites, RMMS data, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
In reviewing eligibility for discounts and reduced fares, we found no evidence of the 3.66
discriminatory practice of using nationality as a criterion. Residence was often cited as a
criterion, but this is permitted.
Nonetheless, discounts for suburban fares are highly variable and need not be consistent 3.67
between cities in the same State. Even if “general rules” are applied nationally through
Regulation 1370/2007, local competent authorities may be free to offer more generous
discounts within their area of responsibility, and do so in capitals such as Sofia, Warsaw and
London. We also note the potential complexities involved if the same two stations are served
by trains supported by different competent authorities applying different discount policies. In
at least some corridors in London, entitlement to a discount may depend not only on the
passenger’s age but also on their place of residence and the operator of the train boarded.
April 2016 | 53
Smart cards
Table 3.8 shows how many capital cities now have smart card ticketing, which is also planned 3.68
in Vienna and Budapest. However, some of the smart card systems are limited to non-rail
modes and in Riga, for example, the E-talons card is not valid on the limited local rail services.
Smart cards allow authorities and operators to include a range of customer-focused 3.69
functionality more easily than with paper tickets. For example:
Discounts may be offered relative to cash fares, although in many cities the price is the
same.
Discounts specific to individuals may be built into a personal card, often supported by a
photocard.
Discounts may be offered for off-peak travel, as is now the case in London.
Fares can be made specific to each individual station-to-station journey, as is now the case
with the OV-Chipkaart covering the Netherlands.
Smart cards also offer a number of advantages for the authorities and operators responsible 3.70
for administering suburban fares:
They have low costs which can make it commercially viable, once the system has been
established, to offer a discount for smart card use.
They can set fares which vary in small steps with location and time.
They can offer discounts or even free travel on specific services, or to specific groups if
they are non-transferrable or “personal”.
They can provide detailed information on patterns of travel, such as identifying regular
journeys and connections.
They can provide registered users with targeted information based on their travel habits,
such as informing them of planned or unplanned changes at stations, or on routes, that
they are known to use.
However, London has already moved to accepting “wave and pay” payment by debit and 3.71
credit cards, which does not require a separate card, and which allow complex discounts to be
calculated in arrears on a “back office” system.
Replacement of special smart cards with existing debit and credit cards, used as an identifier 3.72
rather than as a ticketing device, means that discounts can be calculated, and fares collected
from passengers, after the journey has taken place. However, any reliance on smart cards
relies upon the provision of a comprehensive system of points at which passengers can “check
in” and “check out” of the system, whether supported by physical gates or not. Some cities
prefer to have an “open” system.
Other cities, including Helsinki, Stockholm and Zagreb, have introduced M-ticketing, in which 3.73
tickets can be bought with a mobile phone, in some cases requiring a local SIM card.
April 2016 | 54
4 Other fares and tickets
Introduction
In this chapter we examine regional, interurban, high speed and international fares, some of 4.1
which are set by administrative means but many of which are regulated or left to the market.
We collected data during November 2015 for journeys undertaken during either November or 4.2
December 2015, dependent upon whether fares were sampled one day, one week or one
month in advance.
We expressed all fares in PPP-adjusted euros, converted at the market exchange rates, and 4.3
adjusted to reflect differences in purchasing power in different Member States
25
. Thus the
relative level of reported PPP-adjusted fares reflects their cost relative to a standard basket of
goods.
All fares per kilometre have been calculated using the straight-line distance between the two 4.4
cities identified. In some countries this will be closely related to the distance by rail but in
others, such as Denmark which has a large number of islands, this is not the case. Straight-line
distances allow meaningful comparisons between modes and reflect the impact of direct
versus indirect routing by different modes within this comparison.
We next discuss in turn fares for: 4.5
regional journeys, over distances of 50-100 kilometres not involving the capital city;
interurban journeys under 300 kilometres;
interurban journeys over 300 kilometres;
domestic high-speed journeys; and
international journeys.
Regional fares
We agreed with the Commission that we would take the “regional” market segment to mean 4.6
journeys, typically over distances of 50-100 kilometres, which do not involve a major city,
although in practice in some smaller Member States the only material services meeting this
definition were to or from the capital. The regional fares we examined are summarised in
Table 4.1 overleaf.
25
Exchange rates from www.xe.com on 7 December 2015, purchasing power parity data from
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00
120 updated 9 November 2015
April 2016 | 55
Table 4.1: Regional fares: sample of station pairs
Member State
Regional station pair examined
Origin
Destination
Kilometres
AT
Austria
Salzburg
Linz
110
BE
Belgium
Ghent
Antwerp
50
BG
Bulgaria
Burgas
Zimnica
80
CH
Switzerland
Lausanne
Biel
80
CZ
Czech Republic
Ostrava
Prerov
85
DE
Germany
Cologne
Duisburg
80
DK
Denmark
Århus
Viborg
60
EE
Estonia
Tallinn
Rakvere
90
EL
Greece
Thessaloniki
Katerini
70
ES
Spain
Valencia
Castellón
75
FI
Finland
Turku
Salo
60
FR
France
Cannes
Menton
65
HR
Croatia
Zagreb
Varazdin
60
HU
Hungary
Debrecen
Nyíregyháza
50
IE
Ireland
Limerick
Galway
70
IT
Italy
Bologna
Ravenna
85
LT
Lithuania
Vilnius
Kaunas
90
LU
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Troisvierges
60
LV
Latvia
Krustpils
Daugavpils
80
NL
Netherlands
Utrecht
Zwolle
80
NO
Norway
Bergen
Dale
60
PL
Poland
Poznan
Gniezno
60
PT
Portugal
Porto
Penafiel
40
RO
Romania
Suncuius
Huedin
60
SE
Sweden
Malmö
Helsingborg
65
SI
Slovenia
Ljubljana
Celje
60
SK
Slovakia
Kosice
Prešov
30
UK
UK
Cambridge
Ipswich
70
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
For each of the station pairs described in Table 4.1 we compared fares by ticket-type and 4.7
booking horizon. Our findings are summarised in Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 below.
April 2016 | 56
Figure 4.1: Regional fares: peak single
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.1 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 4.2: Regional fares: off-peak return
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.1 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 57
Figure 4.3: Regional fares: monthly or 30-day
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.1 for details) and may not be representative.
We identified regional fares which, when expressed in PPP-adjusted euros, varied from €0.26 4.8
per kilometre between Lausanne and Biel in Switzerland (where many citizens buy annual all-
lines passes) to €0.017 per kilometre (for a monthly ticket) from the city of Luxembourg to
Troisvierges. The most expensive fares were usually found on journeys in Western European
Member States, although some of the highest peak single fares were found in Slovenia and
Croatia, each with a fare of over €0.20 per kilometre.
Discounts for booking in advance were only available in a few Member States: 4.9
In Finland a discount of (exactly) 50% could be obtained by booking a week or more in
advance
26
.
Spain and Romania had smaller advance booking discounts for peak single fares.
Spain and Germany had smaller advance booking discounts for off-peak return fares.
For the majority of regional journeys however, discounts for booking in advance were not 4.10
available.
In the majority of Member States, peak single and off peak-return fares per kilometre were 4.11
the same: return fares were often always the same as two single fares. This implies that there
is neither a discount for return fares nor a distinction between peak and off-peak journeys.
In seven Member States (Croatia, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom) 4.12
however, a lower fare per kilometre for off-peak return journeys was available, with discounts
26
We are also aware the Finland has made experimental fares cuts on at least one route, but cannot
confirm whether this affects fares between Turku and Salo.
April 2016 | 58
of over 30% in Slovenia and the UK. A discounted return was also available in Germany, but
only if booked in advance. Where yield management is used, the lower cost per kilometre of
an off peak-return fare than a peak single fare may be due in part to lower off-peak pricing
instead of solely a return booking discount.
In Greece and Romania, the return fare we found was more than two single fares, which could 4.13
be a feature of a yield management system but which is more likely an anomaly within the
fares structure. Anomalous fares can arise where two different authorities set fares, for
example at the boundary between competent authorities or where the regulatory framework
allows differential changes to different types of fares or fare regimes.
One reaction to such an anomaly might be that this is evidence of choice, and passengers are 4.14
free to choose the better priced product. Another interpretation is that operators, or
intermediaries such as travel agents, should not offer fares which are worse value than other
fares, although we note that if they were not to do so it might prove harder for passengers to
establish that they had found all the fares available.
Finally, only in about half of all Member States was it readily possible to find a season ticket 4.15
fare, although it is possible that fares may be available on request at a ticket office. For
Member States where data was available, monthly tickets were consistently cheaper on a fare
per kilometre basis than the equivalent peak single fares. The saving per kilometre ranged
from 2% in Sweden to 88% in Belgium.
April 2016 | 59
Interurban fares at distances under 300 kilometres
We took the interurban market segment to involve a domestic journey from the capital city to 4.16
another major urban area over a distance under 300 kilometres
27
. On this basis we concluded
that there were no effective domestic interurban services in either Luxembourg or Slovenia,
which are largely monocentric, as shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Interurban trips under 300 kilometres: sample of station pairs
Member State
Interurban under 300 kilometres: station pair examined
Origin
Destination
Kilometres
AT
Austria
Vienna
Graz
140
BE
Belgium
Brussels
Liege
90
BG
Bulgaria
Sofia
Plovdiv
130
CH
Switzerland
Lausanne
Zürich
170
CZ
Czech Republic
Prague
Brno
180
DE
Germany
Munich
Stuttgart
190
DK
Denmark
Copenhagen
Aalborg
220
EE
Estonia
Tallinn
Tartu
160
EL
Greece
Athens
Patras
180
ES
Spain
Madrid
Cuenca
140
FI
Finland
Helsinki
Turku
150
FR
France
Paris
Reims
130
HR
Croatia
Zagreb
Osijek
210
HU
Hungary
Budapest
Szeged
160
IE
Ireland
Dublin
Cork
220
IT
Italy
Rome
Naples
190
LT
Lithuania
Vilnius
Klaipėda
290
LV
Latvia
Riga
Daugavpils
190
NL
Netherlands
Rotterdam
Groningen
200
NO
Norway
Oslo
Lillehammer
130
PL
Poland
Warsaw
Lublin
150
PT
Portugal
Lisbon Oriente
Faro
220
RO
Romania
Bucharest
Constanța
200
SE
Sweden
Stockholm
Örebro
160
SK
Slovakia
Bratislava
Žilina
170
UK
UK
London Paddington
Cardiff
210
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
For each of the station pairs described in Table 4.2 we compared fares by ticket-type and 4.17
booking horizon. Our findings are summarised in Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 below.
27
In practice we sampled city pairs approximately 100 to 200 kilometres apart
April 2016 | 60
Figure 4.4: Interurban fares under 300 kilometres: peak single
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 4.5: Interurban fares under 300 kilometres: off-peak return
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 61
Figure 4.6: Interurban fares under 300 kilometres: monthly or 30-day
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be representative.
The single highest peak single fare we found was an unregulated single fare of £109 from 4.18
London Paddington to Cardiff, equivalent after PPP adjustment to nearly €0.60 per kilometre
and twice the cost of the next highest fare in Germany. However, other, advance purchase
fares for this corridor with the same operator were as low as €0.20 per kilometre.
Unlike regional journeys, on many interurban routes under 300 kilometres discounts were 4.19
available, for both peak single and off-peak return fares, when booking in advance. In most
cases the discounts offered a month in advance were greater than those offered a week in
advance. In a number of Member States including Germany, Austria, France, Finland and
Ireland, the fare when booking in advance or purchasing a monthly season ticket was around
half the fare when booked on the day.
In The Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain we found some fares which, when booked a month in 4.20
advance, were slightly higher than the fare booked on the day. This may be an effect of the
research methodology in which the fare data was collected during November and early
December 2015. Some rail operators implement their annual fare increases in January, so the
“month in advance” fare may have included the fare increase for the following year.
On just under half the interurban routes under 300 kilometres, return fares were less than 4.21
twice the single fare. The largest saving was in the UK, where the off-peak return fare was
more than 60% less than the equivalent peak single. This illustrates the significant premium
applied on many routes into central London during the peak period and is reflective of the
heavy constraints on the network during the peak. Lithuanian railways provide a discount of
15% (if bought in the station) or 20% (if bought on internet) for round-trip tickets, compared
to the equivalent single ticket.
April 2016 | 62
In Bulgaria and France the quoted return fare was more than twice the single fare. For 4.22
example, between Paris and Reims there is an advance booking discount of 25% when booking
a month in advance, but the fare booked a week in advance is 5% more expensive than when
bought on the day. While the fare may be considered superficially anomalous, it may also
reflect a particularly busy period one week ahead of when the fares data was collected and
the subsequent yield management response by the operator. We collected data in December
2015, when fares may have been affected by the proximity to the Christmas period.
For those Member States where it was possible to find monthly fares, these were significantly 4.23
cheaper than 20 peak return tickets: the effective discount ranged from 19% in Latvia to 90%
in Belgium.
Interurban fares at distances over 300 kilometres
We took the interurban market segment to involve a journey from the capital city to another 4.24
major urban area over a distance over 300 kilometres. On this basis we concluded that long-
distance interurban services over 300 kilometres exist in only 16 of the 28 Member States with
rail networks, as shown in Table 4.3. We did not investigate season tickets for daily travel over
300 kilometres.
Table 4.3: Interurban trips over 300 kilometres: sample of station pairs
Member State
Interurban over 300 kilometres: station pair examined
Origin
Destination
Kilometres
AT
Austria
Vienna
Innsbruck
390
BG
Bulgaria
Sofia
Varna
380
CZ
Czech Republic
Prague
Ostrava
280
DE
Germany
Berlin
Cologne
480
EL
Greece
Athens
Thessaloniki
500
ES
Spain
Madrid
Barcelona
500
FI
Finland
Helsinki
Vaasa
370
FR
France
Paris
Lyon
390
IT
Italy
Rome
Milan
480
NO
Norway
Oslo
Bergen
310
PL
Poland
Warsaw
Wroclaw
300
PT
Portugal
Lisbon
Porto
280
RO
Romania
Bucharest
Timisoara
420
SE
Sweden
Stockholm
Malmö
510
SK
Slovakia
Bratislava
Kosice
310
UK
UK
London
Edinburgh
540
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
For each of the station pairs described in Table 4.3 we compared fares by ticket-type and 4.25
booking horizon. Our findings are summarised in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 below.
April 2016 | 63
Figure 4.7: Interurban fares over 300 kilometres: peak single
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 4.8: Interurban fares over 300 kilometres: off-peak return
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 64
In France, Germany, Italy and Spain, some or all of the journey may be undertaken on high-4.26
speed rail infrastructure using high-speed rolling stock. As a consequence, the fares found in
these Member States may be higher than for other interurban journeys over 300 kilometres
which do not involve high-speed infrastructure or trains. Fares and track access charges for
high speed services are typically greater than those for conventional rail. While, to some
extent, this may affect comparisons drawn between Member States, journeys on these
corridors may be considered both typical and representative.
The highest fare we found was an unregulated single fare of £140.50 from London Kings Cross 4.27
to Edinburgh, equivalent after PPP adjustment to nearly €0.30 per kilometre, half the London
to Cardiff fare shown in Figure 4.4. Previous studies in Great Britain have shown that rail fares
between London and Edinburgh are heavily constrained by competition from domestic air
services which link Edinburgh to five London airports.
Advance booking discounts were available on the majority of interurban routes over 300 4.28
kilometres, particularly on the more expensive Western European networks. On journeys
where discounts were available, there were often savings of over 50%; the largest of which
was in Norway, where there was a reduction of more than 70% for booking a week or month
in advance. Advance booking discounts were not available on most of the interurban corridors
over 300 kilometres in Eastern European Member States (Poland is a notable outlier) although
the walk-up fare on these routes was usually much lower than in Western Europe.
As with the shorter interurban corridors described above, in ten Member States the fare per 4.29
kilometre was lower when purchasing a return ticket when compared to an equivalent one-
way ticket. The largest observed reduction for purchasing a return ticket was almost 50% in
the UK. Again, this may have reflected the distinction between peak and off-peak fares, rather
than being directly attributable to a return versus a single fare.
Domestic high speed fares
We agreed with the Commission that high speed services should mean those that operate 4.30
mainly or wholly on high speed lines, rather than those that use trains able to travel at 200
km/h, which in some states would include a large proportion of “conventional” long-distance
services, including some on regional routes at low speed.
On this basis we concluded that high speed domestic rail travel exists in only seven Member 4.31
States, and in only four of them is it possible to travel more than 100 kilometres on dedicated
high speed line, as shown in Table 4.4 below.
April 2016 | 65
Table 4.4: Domestic high-speed trips: sample of station pairs
Member State
Domestic high-speed station pair examined
Origin
Destination
Kilometres
BE
Belgium
Brussels
Liege
90
DE
Germany
Berlin
Cologne
480
ES
Spain
Madrid
Barcelona
500
FR
France
Paris
Lyon
390
IT
Italy
Rome
Milan
480
NL
Netherlands
Amsterdam
Rotterdam
57
UK
UK
London
Ashford
82
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
For each of the station pairs described in Table 4.4 we compared fares by ticket-type and 4.32
booking horizon. Our findings are summarised in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 below.
Figure 4.9: High speed fare: peak single
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.4 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 66
Figure 4.10: High speed fares: off-peak return
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.4 for details) and may not be representative.
We did not systematically investigate monthly or 30-day season ticket fares for high speed 4.33
services, but note that:
In France, we found no clear information online, and sought information through SNCF’s
call centre. We were told that there are no season tickets for high speed rail services, and
that a commuter would need to buy a ticket for each journey, but could buy a card giving
25% or 50% discount on each individual ticket.
In Germany, season tickets are in principle available for any journey up to 400 kilometres,
which does not include Berlin to Cologne, but in practice at distances over around 200
kilometres it may be cheaper to buy an annual “all-lines” German Rail Pass, costing €4,090
for Second Class and €6,890 for First Class travel. At distances at which season tickets are
available, there may be a lower priced season ticket restricted to the regional trains which
use (?) the high speed line.
In Italy, two high speed operators provide services between Rome and Milan. Italo offers
monthly season tickets between some city pairs, but not between Rome and Milan, but
regular travellers between the cities can buy a 10-trip carnet for €575, advertised as a
discount of approximately 50%.Trenitalia offers a total of seven monthly season ticket
fares, including First and Second Class and whether including high speed services. A
monthly season valid on high speed services between any stations in each city costs €905
for Second Class and €1,292 for First Class.
In Great Britain, season tickets are available for high speed services. A total of twelve
monthly season ticket fares are available between Ashford and London, including First
Class and Standard, different routing options, whether including high speed services, and
whether including travel within London on arrival.
The highest fare we found was an unregulated off-peak single fare of £29.50 from Ashford to 4.34
London, equivalent after PPP adjustment to over €0.40 per kilometre. This may be reflective of
the explicit premium placed upon high-speed domestic services to support capital cost
April 2016 | 67
recovery. For example, access charges levied by High Speed 1 Limited (the infrastructure
owner) include an investment recovery charge set at the maximum permissible by the
Secretary for State as a maximum value per minute of train service. In collecting the fares data
we separately identified an unregulated Anytime fare, valid on all trains, costing £35.30
(equivalent to over €0.50 per kilometre). We also found, but do not discuss here, lower
regulated and unregulated fares.
The lowest fare we found was €0.05 per kilometre in Italy, for a week-ahead fare using open 4.35
access operator Italo. This low fare may be as a consequence of competition with the
incumbent operator Trenitalia. Further evidence regarding rail market liberalisation and
competition in the market for rail services is provided in Chapter 6.
Advance booking discounts and yield management systems on high-speed services appears to 4.36
be offered in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The higher cost of a fare booked a week in
advance than on the day in Spain, and a month in advance than a week in advance in Italy,
reflect the particularly dynamic nature of the yield management systems on these routes.
Despite this, the highest fare per kilometre for both peak single and off-peak return fare types,
the UK and the Netherlands respectively, are on routes that do not appear to be yield
managed.
International fares
The Commission asked us to assess whether there are differences in prices for domestic and 4.37
international long-distance services. For each domestic long-distance service we identified a
comparable international service as shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Domestic and international long-distance fares
Member State
Domestic long-
distance station pair
km
Proposed equivalent international station pair
km
AT(-DE)
Austria
Vienna-Innsbruck
390
Vienna-Nuremberg (Germany)
410
BG(-EL)
Bulgaria
Sofia-Varna
380
Sofia-Thessaloniki (Greece)
235
CZ(-AT)
Czech
Republic
Prague-Ostrava
280
Prague-Vienna (Austria)
250
DK(-SE)
Denmark
Copenhagen-Århus
160
Copenhagen- Gothenburg (Sweden)
230
DE(-PL)
Germany
Berlin-Köln
480
Berlin-Warsaw (Poland)
520
IE(-UK)
Ireland
Dublin-Cork
220
Dublin-Belfast (UK)
140
EL
Greece
Athens-Thessaloniki
500
No comparable international service
n/a
ES(-FR)
Spain
Madrid-Barcelona
500
Barcelona-Marseille (France)
340
FR(-DE)
France
Paris-Lyon
390
Paris-Frankfurt (Germany)
480
FR(-UK)
France
Paris-Lyon
390
Paris-London (UK), via Channel Tunnel
340
IT(-CH)
Italy
Rome-Milan
480
Milan-Geneva (Switzerland)
250
NO(-SE)
Norway
Oslo-Bergen
310
Oslo- Gothenburg (Sweden)
250
PL(-DE)
Poland
Warsaw-Wroclaw
300
Poznań-Berlin (Germany)
240
PT(-ES)
Portugal
Lisbon-Porto
280
Lisbon-Madrid (Spain)
510
RO(-HU)
Romania
Bucharest-Timisoara
420
Timisoara-Budapest (Hungary)
260
SK(-CZ)
Slovakia
Bratislava-Kosice
310
Bratislava-Prague (Czech Republic)
290
April 2016 | 68
Member State
Domestic long-
distance station pair
km
Proposed equivalent international station pair
km
FI(-RU)
Finland
Helsinki-Vaasa
370
Helsinki-St Petersburg (Russia)
300
SE(-NO)
Sweden
Stockholm-Malmö
510
Stockholm-Oslo (Norway)
420
UK(-DE)
United
Kingdom
London-Edinburgh
540
London-Köln (Germany), via Channel Tunnel
500
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
Note: fares from Wroclaw to Berlin were not available, so Poznań was chosen as equivalent fare.
In addition, we gathered information for a number of important international routes which do 4.38
not have a direct domestic long-distance comparator, as listed in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Other international routes
Member State
Origin
Destination
km
LU(-CH)
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Basel
250
NL(-DE)
Netherlands
Amsterdam
Hannover
330
BE(-FR)
Belgium
Brussels
Paris
270
BE(-UK)
Belgium
Brussels
London
325
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see text for details.
For each of the station pairs described in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 we compared fares by ticket-4.39
type and booking horizon. Our findings are summarised in Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 below.
Figure 4.11: International fares: peak single
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 for details) and may not be
representative.
April 2016 | 69
Figure 4.12: International fares: off-peak return
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 for details) and may not be
representative.
The highest international fare we found was a single fare of £170 from London St Pancras to 4.40
Paris Gare du Nord, equivalent after PPP adjustment to nearly €0.58 per kilometre. The two
routes served by Eurostar (Paris to London, Brussels to London) are the most expensive
journeys within the sample and, in the peak period, are 50% higher than the next highest fare,
Brussels to Paris. The lowest peak fare we found was €0.031 per kilometre from Bratislava to
Prague.
In contrast to the equivalent domestic services, there are large advance booking discounts for 4.41
the majority of international services. This is likely to be because a greater proportion of
international services are operated by non-incumbent operators who have the flexibility to
yield manage, since international fares are less likely to be set or regulated by competent
authorities. The four most expensive international services are operated by international
commercial operators Eurostar, Thalys and Eurocity.
Figure 4.13 compares peak single rail fares on domestic interurban services over 300 4.42
kilometres (in Table 4.3) and comparable international rail services (in Table 4.5).
April 2016 | 70
Figure 4.13: International and domestic rail fares over 300 kilometres: peak single
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
Note: fares are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 and Table 4.5 for details) and may not be
representative. The relevant domestic comparator is labelled first, with the destination of the international
comparator in parentheses.
Most international fares per kilometre are roughly equal to or higher than the domestic 4.43
equivalent. The Paris to London fare (labelled FR-UK) is three times as much per kilometre as
the Paris to Lyon fare, although typically the international rail fare is no more than twice the
equivalent domestic fare.
Setting fares
We set out in Table 2.5, reproduced below as Table 4.7, how fares can be administered, 4.44
regulated or set by the market.
Table 4.7: Approaches to setting fares
Approach
Body setting fare
Operator may vary fare
Lower
Higher
Administered
Fares are set by a national, regional, local or municipal authority,
and there is no deviation from the specified fares.
Regulated
Fares are set subject to constraints, typically an upper limit on
individual fares or in a “basket” of fares.
No, or only
in basket
Market
Fares are set by the rail operator and not subject to regulation,
but may be constrained or “quasi-regulated” by other rail fares.
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Outside urban areas, fares are unlikely to be set by urban or municipal authorities. They may 4.45
be set by a regional or national competent authority as part of a PSO or, where services are
April 2016 | 71
commercially viable, may be regulated by various means, or left to operators to set in the
market.
In practice, public information rarely explains how fares are set for any given journey. 4.46
Nonetheless, Table 4.8 uses additional information collected alongside data on rail fares by
market segment, responses to the stakeholder engagement exercise and evidence gathered in
the preparation of the Member State case studies (see Appendix A) to summarise how fares
are set. We identified fares as follows:
means that at least some fares are set on this basis.
? means that we have not identified whether any fares are set on this basis.
means that we understand that no fares are set on this basis.
We also attempted to identify the extent to which the revenue associated with regional rail 4.47
journey examined is shared either between rail and other modes or between rail operators or
authorities. We identified sharing mechanisms as follows:
means that at least some revenue is shared on this basis.
? means that we have not identified whether any revenue is shared on this basis.
means that we understand that no revenue is shared on this basis.
Table 4.7 illustrates a number of arrangements: 4.48
In some States, all fares are administered by a national authority, sometimes through a
published tariff table as in Slovakia.
In Germany, fares may be set by local authorities or by operators, but the latter are
subject to regulation.
In France, the government specifies maximum fares but SNCF may set lower ones.
In Sweden, fares are set either by local authorities or by the market, and there is no
regulated segment. Between Malmö and Helsingborg, SJ is not subject to price regulation,
but is required to accept any fares set by Skånetrafiken, the Scania County authority.
In Great Britain, fares may be set by all three means, and the journey between Cambridge
and Ipswich has both regulated off-peak return fares and market-based (non-regulated)
single and peak return fares.
April 2016 | 72
Table 4.8: Setting other fares and sharing revenues
Member State
Setting of fare(s)
used within the
State
Sharing
revenue
Comments
Administered
Regulated
Market
Intermodal
Intramodal
AT
Austria
?
?
?
BE
Belgium
?
?
BG
Bulgaria
?
?
CH
Switzerland
CZ
Czech Republic
?
?
?
Not known if operators can or do share revenue
DE
Germany
?
Not known if operators can or do share revenue
DK
Denmark
?
?
EE
Estonia
?
?
EL
Greece
?
?
?
ES
Spain
?
?
FI
Finland
?
?
FR
France
?
HR
Croatia
?
?
HU
Hungary
?
?
IE
Ireland
?
?
IT
Italy
?
?
Not known if operators can or do share revenue
LT
Lithuania
?
?
LU
Luxembourg
?
LV
Latvia
?
?
NL
Netherlands
?
?
NO
Norway
?
?
PL
Poland
?
PT
Portugal
?
?
RO
Romania
?
?
SE
Sweden
?
Not clear if multimodal products are available
SI
Slovenia
?
?
SK
Slovakia
?
UK
UK
?
Source: railway and urban transport authority websites, stakeholder responses, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
Note: analysis of fare setting and revenue sharing based on limited information.
Little information is available either on how fares are set or on how revenue is shared. We 4.49
note, however, that revenue-sharing seems inevitable where services funded by different
parties link two stations, or tickets issued by different parties are accepted on a train.
April 2016 | 73
We are aware of arrangements for revenue-sharing in Sweden and Great Britain, both of 4.50
which have more than one operator:
In Sweden, trains between Malmö and Helsingborg are operated by Öresundståg, under a
gross cost contract with Skånetrafiken, and by SJ, which must accept Skånetrafiken’s
fares. We have not established how revenue is shared in practice.
In Great Britain, all trains between Cambridge and Ipswich are operated by Abellio
Greater Anglia. Other rail operators, intermediary websites and travel agents may all sell
tickets for this journey but, after deduction of their sales commission, the revenue will all
be allocated to Abellio.
Discounts
As with suburban fares, passengers on regional, long-distance, high speed or international 4.51
journeys may be offered discounted or reduced fares.
In suburban markets, as we noted in paragraph 3.63, fares for travel in different quantities 4.52
(singe, return, season), or at different times (peak, off-peak, weekend) are often reduced by
amounts which vary between tickets to meet operator objectives. Outside suburban markets,
fares may also be reduced to reflect different booking conditions, such as where advance
purchase tickets may be offered, over time, at a range of prices. Nonetheless, some fares may
also include a fixed percentage discount on the full fare, such as with railcard products for
particular social groups such as the young, the elderly and the disabled.
In our case studies in Appendix A we attempted to distinguish ticket types and the availability 4.53
of discounts. In practice, we found that is rarely practicable to separate them in this way,
because there are often interactions between the time and type of travel, the passenger(s)
age or social status, and the size of the group in which they are travelling. At first sight, it
might be possible to deal, in turn, with:
What is the most cost-effective time to travel?
What additional discount is available because of my social status or railcard holding?
What additional discounts are available for a larger group?
We illustrate some of these issues in Table 4.9 overleaf. 4.54
April 2016 | 74
Table 4.9: Discounts: tickets combining travel, social and group characteristics
State
Ticket type
Factors
Details
Travel
Social
Group
Travel
Social
Group
BG
25% reduction
Only certain types of
train
Only holders of
certain Railcards
ES
Carné Joven
Discount varies with
train type
Age 14-25, or holder
of foreign youth card
UK
HM Forces Railcard
Not all fare types,
different in July/August
Must be in HM Forces
CZ
Group of 2-5
Weekends and holidays
only
Mix of adults and
children
Group of 2-5, but
need not be related
FR
Junior & Cie
Only certain types of
train
Age 4-11
Discount only valid for
a group
CH
Junior and Grandchild
Travelcard
Children 6 to 16
Child needs a card for
each
parent/grandparent
FR
Familles nombreuses
Discounts vary by train
Family including
children
Minimum family size
required
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis, see Appendix A for further details.
In practice this means that, instead of the simple hierarchy of decisions listed in paragraph 4.55
4.53, it may be necessary to consider additional factors such as:
What Railcards should I buy, given my likely pattern of travel over their period of validity?
Can I pay less if I bring the children, but use a different train?
Is the extra cost of bringing colleagues so low that they might as well come with me?
We list in Table 4.10 below a number of ways in which discounts may be set in practice. 4.56
Table 4.10: Discounts: examples of how discounts may be set
Type
Approach
Examples
Process
Administered
National legislation
Czech Republic, Poland,
Slovakia
Detailed fare table and discount table
specified in conditions of carriage
Regional legislation
Warsaw
Resolution of the City Council
Fares published, subject
to political review
London
Transport for London sets fares and
discounts, but politically accountable
Regulated
PSO contract terms
UK
Operator licence requires that certain
railcard “schemes” be honoured
Market
State-owned operator
is free to set some fares
Germany
Operator sets fares, state as shareholder
may specify some elements of policy
State-owned operator
has pricing freedom
Sweden
Operator sets fares, and state explicitly
permits it full commercial freedom
PSO operator has
pricing freedom
UK
PSO operators (franchises) set a number
of fares and discount conditions
Open access operator
has pricing freedom
Austria, Czech Republic,
Italy, Sweden
Open access operator is free to set its
own fares and discounts
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
April 2016 | 75
In principle, tickets priced lower than the full fare might be specified by administered 4.57
processes including national, regional and local legislation, regulated through specific
agreements within the industry, or set only with respect to market conditions. In practice,
while we have not been able to identify what party devised and specified each of the
discounts identified in our case studies in Appendix A, we consider it likely that a significant
proportion of reduced fares and discounts have been set by operators, in the market, typically
with the objectives of meeting targets for one or more of:
revenue, in the case of wholly commercial operators;
passenger volumes, in the case of some state-owned operators; or
social objectives.
Even on the limited sample of twelve States covered in our case studies, it is difficult to 4.58
summarise how discounts vary between Member States, for a number of reasons.
Discounts vary between competent authorities
Discounts may be different in regional and municipal networks, as illustrated in Table 3.9. 4.59
Many regional and municipal competent authorities offer ticket products and/or discounts
which are more generous than those applying on the national network, with the result in cities
such as London that there may be four sets of fares between two similar station pairs (see
Table 3.7) and both national and local discount schemes.
Discounts have different eligibility criteria
Basic features such as the age at which passengers are eligible for discounts vary widely. 4.60
Among the case studies we identified discounts with upper and lower cut-off birthdays of 4, 5,
6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24, 26, 35, 60, 65, 66 and 70, and other discounts depending on
the passenger’s status, such as being a current or recent student.
To illustrate this point, Figure 4.14 illustrates, in simplified form, the range of discounts 4.61
available for children. There is no consistent definition of the age of a child or the conditions
on which they travel. At the extremes:
The Netherlands allows free travel for children up to 3 after which, with a “Railrunner
card”, they pay a nominal fare until they are 12, after which they appear to be treated as
adults.
The Czech Republic allows free travel up to the age of 15 with proof of date of birth.
For groups such as pensioners the variations can be more complex, as entitlement may
4.62
depend on having reached the retirement age set nationally, or for a particular profession, or
following early retirement on health grounds. The railway itself may have no control over
either the level of discount or the range of passengers who are entitled to it, which may not be
specified by either railway or transport authorities.
April 2016 | 77
Discounts may vary by location, direction or time
Similarly, the times at which discounts are obtainable may vary with type of train, direction of 4.63
travel or even boarding point, typically to manage overall demand within the capacity
available. Exceptions to general rules may also be permitted on specific trains which would
otherwise be lightly-loaded, or to travel to or from specific stations which have few other
services.
Discounts may reflect local needs or national social policy
Products devised by railways to meet different revenue, volume or social objectives are almost 4.64
invariably designed in the context of local markets. For example:
Bulgaria, Spain and France offer discounts for families. However, our understanding is that
discounts of this type may not have been introduced by the railway or as a matter of
transport policy, but as social policies towards the family originating in different parts of
government.
Switzerland offers four different types of season ticket because passengers might
reasonably require local travel to their home, to their workplace, to both, or to all points
in between, but may require a child to obtain up to six cards to travel with parents and
grandparents.
The Netherlands has a system of Keuzedagen allowing holders of some ticket types to
nominate days on which they may travel free.
In Sweden, some children’s tickets have been limited to the hours of travel to and from
school for one term, with a different ticket permitting travel from after-school activities.
Notwithstanding the difficulties described above, it is possible to make generalisations 4.65
regarding the broad types of discount available in case-study Member States.
Complexity
Stakeholders in a number of Member States reported that fares and discounts can be complex 4.66
and confusing. The apparent complexity of rail fares has been raised by stakeholders in
Germany and in Great Britain, from which an extreme example of complexity is illustrated in
Appendix B. Appendix A also suggests that the interaction of fares and discounts is also
complex among our case studies in Switzerland (Table A.8), the Czech Republic (Tables A.10
and A.11), Spain (Table A.22), France (Table A.25) and the Netherlands (Table A.29),
particularly when deciding in advance whether to obtain one or more types of railcard.
In practice, buying any rail ticket other than for immediate travel requires the passenger to 4.67
make a judgement. Even in the simplest fares systems we have examined, with only single,
return and season tickets, and paid railcards offering standard discounts:
With return tickets, how certain is the passenger that they will return by rail, within the
time period(s) permitted by the ticket?
With season tickets, how certain is the passenger that they will travel enough for it to be
good value? This is particularly an issue for those who work part-time or in a variety of
locations, of who travel elsewhere regularly on business or leisure.
With railcards, how certain is the buyer that they will make enough trips, in the right
groups, during the validity of the card, for it to be good value?
However, the decision can become more complex, as we illustrate in Appendix B, when in
4.68
addition to these common variables there are also choices of route, operator and degree of
April 2016 | 78
flexibility and, as we discuss above, further decisions are required on what railcards to buy and
in what groups to travel.
Clarity and sales channels
In many Member States not all fares are sold via all sales channels and information sources. 4.69
This means that, in addition to the issues of complexity discussed above:
Passengers may not know whether the information source they are using provides all
relevant information, and in particular identifies the best or cheapest fare for their
requirements.
Passengers who have identified the fare they require may find that it is not available via
the sales channel they have chosen. This can be particularly problematic when fares
advertised online cannot be bought at stations or ticket machines.
Table 4.11 below summarises stakeholders responses to a number key questions seeking 4.70
information about the relationship between fares and sales channels and the clarity of fares.
Table 4.11: Relationships between fares and sales channels
State
Do fares vary by
sales channels?
Are lower off-peak
fares available for
early booking?
Are any fares
available only via
specific sales
channels?
Are there
complaints about
the complexity or
unpredictability of
rail fares?
BE
Belgium
BG
Bulgaria
CZ
Czech Republic
DK
Denmark
DE
Germany
-
IE
Ireland
IT
Italy
-
EL
Greece
HR
Croatia
HU
Hungary
NO
Norway
AT
Austria
PL
Poland
PT
Portugal
RO
Romania
SK
Slovakia
FI
Finland
-
-
-
SE
Sweden
-
SI
Slovenia
UK
United Kingdom
-
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of stakeholder responses.
Note: “-“ means no response provided.
April 2016 | 79
Overall, it indicates that practices such as varying the fares offer according to the sales 4.71
channel, restricting certain fares to specific channels (e.g. discounted fares available only
online) and offering discounts for early booking are widespread. It also suggests that
passengers in many Member States find the range of fares available and the restrictions
applying to them confusing.
Examples of where the availability of rail fares and products differs according to the sales 4.72
channel used include the following:
Many travel agents or websites do not sell low value fares for relatively short trips. This is
likely to be a consequence of low sales commission (usually a fixed proportion of the
ticket face value) and fixed listing, advertising and transaction costs which mean it is less
profitable for third-parties to sell these products.
Some fares are only available online, which may reflect the lower costs associated with
electronic, rather than manual, transactions. Online sales channels may be the only route
through which a rail operator can sell rail tickets directly to its customers. However, it is
often suggested that the limited wider availability of online discounts effectively
discriminates against some categories of passengers, such as the elderly and disabled
passengers.
Ticket vending machines may only sell a subset of tickets. For example, in London the
fares available from TVMs vary by route, exclude fares for travel more than day-ahead
and do not offer advance purchase products.
In many smaller stations, predominantly in rural locations, it is not possible to buy off-
peak products from ticket offices during the off-peak period when many such offices are
closed.
To investigate further the transparency and clarity of fares by Member State, we simulated the 4.73
online ticket buying process for an off-peak return ticket and made a subjective assessment of
operator or operator association ticketing websites as reported in Table 4.13 according to the
following criteria:
ease of buying tickets online;
availability of information regarding the cheapest fare;
transparency and simplicity of fares on offer; and
quality of information provided regarding ticket restrictions.
We assessed the quality and clarity of online information available for each Member State and 4.74
gave it a subjective combined score according to the criteria in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12: Transparency and clarity: information criteria and scoring
Finding
Score
No information available
N/A
Limited or poor quality information available
1
Reasonable information available
2
Exhaustive and clear information provided
3
Table 4.13 shows how, in most Member States, the information available to passengers 4.75
wishing to buy tickets online is at least satisfactory, although in some cases the structure of
fares available via this channel is relatively complicated.
April 2016 | 80
Table 4.13: Transparency and clarity: online ticket sales channels
Member State
None
1 - Limited
2 - Satisfactory
3 - Good
Comment
Website
BE
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://www.belgianrail.be
BG
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions, must register to book online
http://www.bdz.bg
CH
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions, cannot buy all tickets online
http://www.sbb.ch
CZ
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
https://www.cd.cz
DK
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://www.dsb.dk
DE
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://www.bahn.com
EE
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://elron.ee
IE
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://www.irishrail.ie
EL
Complex online booking process, fare structure
unclear
http://www.trainose.gr
ES
Complicated fare structure, ticket information
available but unclear
http://www.renfe.com
FR
Simple booking process, limited clear information on
fares and restrictions
http:// voyages-sncf.com
HR
Clear information on timetable and fares, but cannot
buy online
http://www.hzpp.hr
IT
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions, high speed rail site has complicated
fare structure
http://www.trenitalia.com
LV
Clear information on fares and timetable, less so on
ticket type, cannot book online
http://www.pv.lv
LT
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
https://www.traukiniobilietas.lt
LU
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://www.cfl.lu
HU
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://www.mavcsoport.hu
NL
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions, must register to book online
http://www.ns.nl
NO
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
https://www.nsb.no
AT
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
https://www.oebb.at
PL
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://www.intercity.pl
April 2016 | 81
Member State
None
1 - Limited
2 - Satisfactory
3 - Good
Comment
Website
PT
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions, cannot buy all tickets online, need
to register to book online
https://www.cp.pt
RO
Limited clear information on fares and restrictions,
website difficult to navigate
http://www.cfrcalatori.ro
SI
Cannot book online, clear information on timetable,
fares and restrictions
http://en.slo-zeleznice.si
SK
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
http://www.slovakrail.sk
FI
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions
https://www.vr.fi
SE
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions, fare structure unclear
https://www.sj.se
UK
Simple booking process, clear information on fares
and restrictions, fare structure unclear
http://www.nationalrail.co.uk
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Taken with the evidence from the stakeholder responses, it also highlights the potential trade-4.76
off between, on the one hand, providing passengers with a wider range of fare options (and
encouraging them to use channels that reduce distribution costs) and, on the other, enabling
them to make simple choices between options. This trade-off is not unique to the rail industry
but, given the range of rail users purchasing tickets in any Member State (from regular, well-
informed commuters to occasional travellers and new users across all potential station pairs),
the difficulty of identifying the appropriate balance is also challenging for, say, mobile phones
or electricity contracts.
This examination identified a number of points regarding the clarity of rail fares across all non-4.77
suburban market segments:
It is often not possible to identify the name of the fare, how and by whom it has been set,
and whether the process of setting the fare takes any account of market conditions.
It is often not possible to establish whether a particular fare quote is the maximum or
minimum fare, or some intermediate value. Where fares are extensively yield-managed, a
passenger researching a particular journey may have no way of knowing whether the
fares being quoted include the cheapest (or most expensive) fare which may be available
at other times of travel.
The availability of season tickets is often difficult to determine. Some websites routinely
quote single, return, weekly, monthly and annual fares, and others provide a link to a
“season ticket calculator”. Even where this exists, however, it may not always provide a
price, as we found in the example of Cambridge to Ipswich.
Even within a small sample we found a number of anomalous fares, such as return fares
costing more than two single fares.
Booking specific trains in advance may be either more or less expensive than buying a
discounted return ticket. This means that a passenger may need to check both
approaches before deciding which ticket(s) to buy.
April 2016 | 82
A further specific issue was the difficulty on finding the availability, and conditions of use, of 4.78
fares for persons with reduced mobility (PRM). We identified a number of issues:
Telephone call centres rarely provide information in all the official European languages.
Websites claiming to be cover many languages often only include partial information in
some of them.
Websites sometimes do not provide full information even in the official national
language(s).
Websites, or railway conditions of carriage, sometimes refer to documents which must be
held before PRM fares or assistance can be obtained, but in some cases the documents
specified may not be available, or issued, to all persons legally entitled to such fares or
assistance. A particular issue is where obtaining entitlements is effectively linked to the
passenger’s nationality, which is not permitted.
April 2016 | 83
5 Intermodal competition
Introduction
In parallel with collecting data on rail fares and journey times, we captured data on the travel 5.1
costs and journey times associated with equivalent journeys by car, bus or coach and air
travel, as summarised in Table 5.1. We sampled corridors similar to those chosen in Chapter 4.
Table 5.1: Modal competition: data collection for competitor modes
Member State
Regional
(50-100
kilometres)
Interurban
(under 300
kilometres)
Interurban
(over 300
kilometres)
Domestic high-
speed
International
SI
Slovenia
LU
Luxembourg
LV
Latvia
CH
Switzerland
DK
Denmark
IE
Ireland
HR
Croatia
LT
Lithuania
EE
Estonia
BG
Bulgaria
EL
Greece
SK
Slovakia
FI
Finland
RO
Romania
PL
Poland
PT
Portugal
NO
Norway
HU
Hungary
ES
Spain
FR
France
NL
Netherlands
BE
Belgium
SE
Sweden
AT
Austria
DE
Germany
April 2016 | 84
Member State
Regional
(50-100
kilometres)
Interurban
(under 300
kilometres)
Interurban
(over 300
kilometres)
Domestic high-
speed
International
IT
Italy
UK
United Kingdom
CZ
Czech Republic
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis with some simplifications.
Material competitive modes are shown as coach (), air () and car ().
“Domestic high speed service” is defined as those that operate mainly or wholly on high speed lines.
Competition with car
We gathered data on car competition for all rail market segments. In doing so we extracted 5.2
data for car journey times, distances, routes and tolls using viamichelin, an online map and
route planner, and used this data to generate an estimated point-to-point car cost:
We estimated the proportion of the private car fleet by fuel type (diesel, petrol and LPG)
by Member State.
We used average vehicle consumption rates by fuel type to estimate weighted fleet
average fuel consumption (litres per 100 kilometres) by Member State.
We multiplied the point-to-point distance by the fleet average fuel consumption and
pump price (PPP-adjusted) to estimate fuel costs.
We applied a multiplier to fuel costs to represent the non-fuel marginal costs (that is, the
perceived costs at the point of usage) of car travel, such as tyre wear and tear and
consumables such as oil and brake fluid
28
.
We added the toll charges provided directly by viamichelin.
For the suburban market segment we collected car cost and journey average speed data. 5.3
However, without detailed information or assumptions on car parking charges, congestion
levels and journey time reliability, we could not readily draw comparisons between modes.
Given that such factors are likely to represent a significant proportion of the total cost of a
short (approximately 10 kilometre) suburban trip, we have not presented any analysis on car
competition for the suburban market segment.
Our findings for regional, interurban and international corridors are shown in Figure 5.1 to 5.4
Figure 5.4 below.
28
In Member States with no published data we used UK-based multipliers from Department for
Transport Appraisal Guidance (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transport-analysis-guidance-webtag)
April 2016 | 85
Figure 5.1: Rail and car costs: regional trips
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.1 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 5.2: Rail and car costs: interurban trips under 300 kilometres
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 86
Figure 5.3: Rail and car costs: interurban trips over 300 kilometres
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 5.4: Rail and car costs: international trips
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.5 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 87
For most regional and interurban trips less than 300 kilometres, rail journeys appear more 5.5
expensive, on a fare per kilometre basis, than the equivalent journey by car. In most EU15
countries, rail travel is more than twice the cost of travel by car. The largest disparities for
regional and interurban journeys less than 300 kilometres (shown as a green triangle in Figure
5.1 and Figure 5.2) are in Switzerland (CH) between Lausanne and Biel, and the United
Kingdom between London and Cardiff, where we estimate that the cost of a rail journey is
more than five times the cost of a car journey. While rail journeys are generally more
expensive than car journeys among EU13 Member States, the disparity is less marked. Rail
journeys are cheaper for both regional and interurban journeys less than 300 kilometres in
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal and Romania (shown as a red square in Figure 5.1
and Figure 5.2).
We found similar trends in the longer distance interurban market (over 300 kilometres) and 5.6
the international market, with rail journeys only cheaper than the equivalent journey by car in
a handful of cases.
Since the prevailing oil price at the time of completing this study was at historically low levels, 5.7
we carried out sensitivity tests on fuel pump prices that were 10%, 20% and 30% higher than
at present. While this narrowed the gap between car and rail costs, rail remained more
expensive in the majority of cases. The greatest impact was in the regional market, where
there is a large number of corridors in which the cost differential between rail and car trips is
small.
We anticipate that other factors, in particular group size, are likely to have a far greater impact 5.8
on the relative cost between car and rail. All of the analysis above is based on the presumption
of individual journeys and solo car occupancy. If two individuals were travelling together, in
the absence of group discounts, the cost per journey of travelling by car would
(approximately) half, while the cost per journey of travelling by rail would remain the same.
Another important factor individuals take into account when considering their choice of mode 5.9
is the convenience (or otherwise) each mode provides. Figure 5.5 to Figure 5.8 show the
relative average speed between rail and car for the regional, interurban and international
markets. As a proxy for the city centre, journey times and distances are calculated to/from the
central train station at the origin and destination. In those cities with more than one rail
terminus we identified a suitable central point for calculating the equivalent car journey time
and speed, such as Notre Dame in Paris and Charing Cross in London.
April 2016 | 88
Figure 5.5: Rail and car average speeds: regional trips
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.1 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 5.6: Rail and car average speeds: interurban trips under 300 kilometres
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 89
Figure 5.7: Rail and car average speeds: interurban trips over 300 kilometres
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 5.8: Rail and car average speeds: international trips
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.5 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 90
The figures indicate that across all market segments, more expensive rail journeys also tend to 5.10
be faster. Rail has a higher average speed than car for both regional and interurban trips less
than 300 kilometres in most EU15 countries. The fastest rail journeys, relative to the
equivalent journey by car, are interurban trips in France (FR) between Paris and Reims and
Spain (ES) between Madrid and Cuenca (shown as green triangles in Figure 5.6) where rail has
twice the average speed of car. Interurban trips over 300 kilometres and international trips are
almost always faster by rail.
In contrast, car travel is faster than rail for both regional and interurban trips in Bulgaria, 5.11
Croatia and Portugal (shown as red squares in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6). The slowest rail
service relative to car is the regional corridor in Bulgaria (BG) between Burgas and Zimnica
(Figure 5.5) where car is more than three times faster than rail.
Competition with coach
Coach market liberalisation
The extent to which coach competition to rail services is permitted varies widely across 5.12
Europe. In Appendix E we summarise how EU legislation had harmonised the definitions and
procedures for international services, but the arrangements for domestic services vary widely
between Member States.
This means that barriers to entering the coach market can exist at a number of levels, ranging 5.13
from tight national control of services, through regional awards of concessions with exclusive
rights (whether directly awarded or competitively tendered), to local requirements for, or
prohibitions on, stopping in particular locations.
Competition with coach
We collected comparable fare and journey time data for both peak single and off-peak return 5.14
journeys where coach services run parallel to rail for:
the interurban station pairs under 300 kilometres listed in Table 4.2; and
the international station pairs listed in Table 4.5.
We sampled both rail and coach fares one day, one week and one month ahead on a range of 5.15
operator and booking agent websites. For the coach market we captured both the minimum
and maximum fare available, but include only the minimum fare identified in the modal
comparisons in this section. We stress that our findings are for a single city-to-city pair and
should not be considered representative.
Competition on interurban routes under 300 kilometres
Our findings for interurban trips less than 300 kilometres are presented in Figure 5.9 and 5.16
Figure 5.10.
April 2016 | 91
Figure 5.9: Rail and coach costs: interurban trips under 300 kilometres (lowest observed fare)
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be representative.
Most interurban rail journeys appear to be more expensive, on a fare per kilometre basis, than 5.17
the equivalent journey by coach. This may be because rail offers superior journey time,
comfort and reliability, and coach is often perceived as an inferior mode. We found no
interurban coach fare higher than €0.2 per kilometre; the highest coach fare we found was
€22 between Vienna and Graz in Austria (AT) shown as a green triangle in Figure 5.9,
equivalent after PPP adjustment to over €0.15 per kilometre.
The largest price difference is the journey in the UK between London and Cardiff, also shown 5.18
as a green triangle in Figure 5.9, where rail is six times the cost of the journey by coach. Peak
rail fares between these points are not regulated, and the connecting M4 motorway may be
congested at peak times.
April 2016 | 92
Figure 5.10: Rail and coach average speeds: interurban trips under 300 kilometres (lowest observed fare)
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be representative.
For those Member States shown in red in Figure 5.9 (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia and 5.19
Lithuania) coach fares are higher than the equivalent rail fare. As can be seen in Figure 5.10,
these coach journeys are only marginally faster (or only slightly slower in the Czech Republic)
than the corresponding rail service. In all other Member States apart from Greece and Croatia,
rail services are typically faster than the parallel coach service.
Competition on international routes
Similar findings for international trips are presented in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12. 5.20
April 2016 | 93
Figure 5.11: Rail and coach costs: international trips (lowest observed fare)
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.5 for details) and may not be representative.
Most international rail services are more expensive, on fare per kilometre basis, than the 5.21
equivalent coach service. As with interurban domestic journeys, this may be because rail often
offers faster journeys, as shown in Figure 5.12, and can therefore operate as a market “price-
maker”. However, in two corridors between Romania and Hungary, and Bulgaria and Greece,
coach fares are between two and three times greater than the equivalent rail fare, despite
average speeds being similar between modes. In this case it is likely that there are additional
factors such as service frequency and quality which permit coach operators to charge a much
higher fare.
April 2016 | 94
Figure 5.12: Rail and coach average speeds: international trips (lowest observed fare)
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.5 for details) and may not be representative.
The high speed rail services from Paris to London (FR-UK) and Frankfurt (FR-DE), shown as 5.22
green triangles in Figure 5.12 are the fastest relative to the equivalent coach services. The
percentage difference in fares is largest on the Paris to Frankfurt route, where the rail fare is
over five times the cost of the equivalent coach fare. However, the absolute difference is
largest on the Paris to London route (FR-UK) where the rail fare per kilometre is €0.42 higher
than the equivalent journey by coach. The Paris to London journey is operated by Eurostar,
which, as noted in paragraph 4.41, is one of the most expensive European operators. Coach
operators may be able to charge more on the London to Paris route is because there is less
price competition from Eurostar compared with TGV on the Paris to Frankfurt route.
International coach journeys are more expensive than rail between Sofia and Thessaloniki (BG-5.23
EL), Timisoara and Budapest (RO-HU) and Bratislava and Prague (SK-CZ). These journeys are
shown in red in Figures Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12. Along these corridors, and as with
domestic interurban services, coach can compete because it is as fast as, or faster than, the
parallel rail service. Largely as a consequence of poor rail infrastructure, travel in Bulgaria is
consistently cheaper and slower by rail than by car or coach, suggesting that rail is the inferior
mode of land transport.
April 2016 | 95
Competition with air
We collected comparable fare and journey time data for the sample of interurban (over 300 5.24
kilometre) and international station pairs described in Table 4.3 and Table 4.5. We used
Skyscanner, an online web portal comparing prices from airlines and travel suppliers. We
collected the maximum and minimum fares one day, one week and one month ahead but
include only the minimum fare identified in the modal comparisons in this section.
In addition to air fare and journey time we included allowances for access and egress costs and 5.25
time and check-in and border controls at the origin and destination airports.
In the same way as we estimated car costs, city centre origins and destinations were
defined with reference to the central train station at the origin and destination. In those
cities with more than one rail terminus we identified a suitable, alternative central point.
We assumed that journeys to and from the airport from the city centre were made using
taxis licensed to and using the fare structure of Uber Technologies Inc. We assumed that
these were under free-flow road conditions and we used local tariff structures where we
could identify them.
We extracted taxi journey times and distances using the same viamichelin website used to
generate car costs.
We assumed that check-in times were thirty minutes for domestic flights and one and a
half hours for international flights.
We assumed that exit times at the destination were thirty minutes for both domestic and
international flights.
Figure 5.13 to Figure 5.16 below summarise our findings.
Figure 5.13: Rail and air costs: interurban trips over 300 kilometres (lowest observed fare)
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 96
The costs of travelling by air were more than rail, on a fare per kilometre basis, on all 5.26
interurban routes except in Germany (DE) and Spain (ES) shown as red triangles in Figure 5.13.
The most expensive air costs, relative to rail fares, were in Finland (FI) between Helsinki and
Vaasa and the Czech Republic (CZ) between Prague and Ostrava shown as green triangles in
the same figure. Both air routes have few flights per day by a single airline, whose main
market is likely to be business travellers with a relatively inelastic demand for travel.
Figure 5.14: Rail and air average speeds: interurban trips over 300 kilometres (lowest observed fare)
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be representative.
In most cases, on routes where rail travel was faster than air travel it was nevertheless, less 5.27
expensive. For example, between Paris and Lyon (FR) shown as a red square in Figure 5.14, rail
offered double the average speed, and half the price, of air travel. In practice, air fares bought
on the day of travel on this route might be priced for last minute business travellers with a
relatively inelastic demand. The corridor between Madrid and Barcelona (ES), also shown as a
red square in Figure 5.14, is the only route on which rail was both faster and slightly more
expensive than the air, suggesting that rail is the superior mode on this route.
April 2016 | 97
Figure 5.15: Rail and air costs: international trips (lowest observed fare)
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.5 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 5.16: Rail and air average speeds: international trips (lowest observed fare)
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.5 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 98
Rail was more expensive than air for more international journeys than domestic interurban 5.28
journeys. The largest difference in fares was on Eurostar between Paris and London (FR-UK),
shown as a red square in Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16, which is twice as fast as the equivalent
journey by air and 30% more expensive. The journey between Poznań and Berlin (PL-DE), also
shown as a red triangle in Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16, was the only other international route
on which rail is both faster and more expensive than air, although only marginally so.
Air fares between Prague and Vienna (CZ-AT), shown as a green triangle in Figure 5.15 were 5.29
eight times higher than rail fares. As with the domestic route in the Czech Republic, this route
is operated by a single airline and the main market may be last minute business travellers with
a relatively inelastic demand.
Frequency and reliability
Frequency
Timetable-related quality attributes, such as service frequency, have an important influence 5.30
on rail demand and rank alongside fares and exogenous variables as the prime determinants
of the volume of rail travel. For the corridors included within the sample for this study, it has
only been possible to draw comparisons between the frequency of rail services and domestic
air services. For the sample of routes described in Table 4.3, a comparison of rail and air
frequency is provided in Figure 5.17.
Figure 5.17:Direct air and rail services per weekday (interurban trips over 300 kilometres)
Source: European Rail Timetable (January 2016) supplemented by railway websites, Skyscanner, Steer Davies
Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be representative.
There are no domestic city pairs within our sample that provide more than 30 direct air 5.31
services per day, and only four city pairs with more than 30 direct rail services. In the majority
of Member States the frequency of rail and air services is reasonably well matched although,
April 2016 | 99
in general, rail frequencies tend to be higher. Further analysis of the frequencies of regional,
interurban and high speed rail services is provided in Chapter 7.
It has not been possible to gather meaningful frequency data for the coach market as a 5.32
consequence of the fragmentation of the market and the flexibility of coach as a transport
mode. Subject to sufficient capacity at terminal facilities and other stops, coach timetables can
vary from one month to the next in response to changes in demand. Moreover, the
liberalisation of the international coach market and the emergent liberalisation of domestic
markets facilitates market entry and exit. As a consequence, and unlike rail where operators
have limited degrees of freedom on constrained networks, it is difficult to provide a
comprehensive snapshot of all coach services at a point in time on a given corridor.
Reliability
Journey time reliability refers to the variation in journey times that individuals are unable to 5.33
predict. Such variation could come from recurring congestion at the same period each day
(day to day variability) or from non-recurring events, such as incidents. In the case of
scheduled transport services, reliability is often referred to as punctuality.
Evidence on reliability for other modes is not available, for the following reasons: 5.34
Car journey time reliability data is seldom published and often inconsistent between
Member States. Where data is published it typically covers journeys within urban areas
and/or on the trunk road network
29
. It is not, therefore possible, to generate an end-to-
end journey reliability measure which captures city-centre to city-centre journeys.
Coach punctuality data is not recorded or published. Neither the Comprehensive Study on
Passenger Transport by Coach in Europe (SDG, 2016), or its predecessor Study of
Passenger Transport by Coach (SDG, 2009) found any evidence of the proportion of coach
services which arrive at their ultimate (or intermediate) destination on time. This reflects
the fact that coach services are generally operated by private companies which have no
obligation or indeed incentive to publish service quality indicators.
Air punctuality data is routinely collected and published by third parties based on
information collected by airports, air traffic control and trade associations). However, data
is typically disaggregated by airline or airport, rather than nationally by domestic and
international services, as we would require for this study
30
.
In light of these difficulties, we have not been able to present a comparison of journey time 5.35
reliability between rail and other modes.
Summary
We have only examined a small sample of routes, with different market conditions and levels 5.36
of intermodal competition. However, our findings are consistent with the twin hypotheses
that:
the operator with the best cost-quality mix is best able to set fares in marketplace (the
“price setter”); and
29
See, for example, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/road-congestion-and-reliability-
statistics-table-index
30
Data can be bought through commercial organisations such as OAG Aviation Worldwide.
April 2016 | 100
fares offered by other modes (“price takers”) are determined by the relative quality of
their mode, subject to the constraint that they must either remain profitable or be
supported through a PSO.
At very long distances, outside the scope of this study, airlines offers both the lowest costs and 5.37
the fastest journey time, and are the dominant mode.
For the domestic or international journeys over 300 kilometres which we have examined in 5.38
this study, rail operators may have to charge less than airlines unless they can offer a faster
city centre to city centre journey time. It can often do this in Western Europe and in particular
where it makes use of dedicated high speed lines, such as on routes radiating from Madrid and
Paris. Coach operators can often compete with both air and rail because they can offset longer
journey times with lower fares. Car is less attractive because of the cost and time penalties of
entering and parking in large cities, and because it is not possible to work or rest while driving.
For the domestic interurban journeys under 300 kilometres which we have examined, air 5.39
travel is not normally available, and coach and rail fares tend to depend on their relative speed
and frequency, and hence their market power. In much of Eastern Europe, coach is faster than
rail and operators can charge higher fares (rail is an “inferior good”), whereas in Western
Europe the reverse is more typically the case. Car remains relatively unattractive because of
the cost and time penalties of entering and parking in large cities, and the journey time
variability that arises from journeys into congested city centres.
On regional journeys, rail may face competition from coach but, without the cost and time 5.40
penalties of entering and parking in large cities, car may set an effective ceiling on their fares.
Both rail and coach operators may be constrained to set fares, in some cases through PSO
contracts, at levels low enough either to attract passengers from car or to be affordable to
those with no car.
On suburban journeys, as we noted in paragraph 5.3, we could not readily draw comparisons 5.41
between modes without detailed information or assumptions on car parking charges and
other factors. Our 2009 study for Passenger Focus highlighted the fact that the cash costs of
parking and road tolls dominated the decision in some cities, but that for some journeys
parking charges would apply to rail (at a suburban station) but not to road (where free parking
is available at the destination).
In every case the actual choice of mode may depend on the characteristics of the travelling 5.42
party. Airlines can offer extremely low fares up to one year ahead, whereas rail can rarely
confirm timetables this far ahead due to its reliance on engineering timetables issued by the
infrastructure manager. In many cases these are not required to be made available more than
twelve weeks in advance. This constrains the scope for rail operators both to compete with
airlines over longer booking horizons, or to provide complementary travel services and
through-ticketing.
Coach operators can often provide additional capacity at short notice and for demand peaks, 5.43
allowing them to keep fares low when rail operates have to price off excess demand. Car (or
taxi) may be used by large groups with heavy luggage, unless rail reduces average fares
through family or group discounts.
April 2016 | 101
6 Intramodal competition
Introduction
In Chapter 5 we discussed intermodal competition between rail and other modes. In this 6.1
chapter we discuss intramodal competition within the rail industry, and Figure 6.2 illustrates
some of the ways in which this can arise.
Table 6.1: Intramodal competition
Type of competition
Examples
Within operator or group
First and Second Class products
Day and night trains
Express or premium services
Flexible and restricted fares
Slow and fast routes and high speed lines
Low cost services
For the market
Management contract
Gross cost contract
Net cost contract
Flexible “franchise”
In the market
Parallel routes
Overlapping services
Open access operation
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
We discuss each of these types of competition in turn below. 6.2
Competition within an operator or group
Even where there is a single operator on the railway, there may be effective competition 6.3
between some of the products it offers. This competition can arise either naturally, as a result
of the network, timetable and fares, or deliberately, through the design of products to offer
choices to passengers, which typically involve trade-offs between price and some element of
quality. We discuss briefly below examples of how such competition arises.
First and Second Class products
A very early example of offering passengers a trade-off between price and quality was the 6.4
offer of more than one class of travel, which in many railways have become standardised as
First Class and Second Class, although some operators name the classes differently or offer
April 2016 | 102
more of them. Airlines subsequently adopted the same principle, and long haul aircraft may
carry up to four types of seating – typically First, Business, Premium Economy and Economy –
offering gradations in price, seat size and personal space, and the quality of additional features
such as food, drink and, more recently, the quality of inflight entertainment headphones and
screens.
Some railways which still offer two or more classes may offer fixed differentials between 6.5
them, such as three rather than four seats across the vehicle, or a 50% higher First Class fare,
but others may manage quality differentials, and use dynamic pricing, with the aim of making
the best use, and extracting the maximum revenue, from the space available on each vehicle
and train.
Day trains and night trains
Some railways offer a choice between day trains and night trains, which typically operate with 6.6
no or few stops for several hours overnight, and often have special sleeper or couchette
carriages
31
. Where they are offered, passengers are able to make a trade-off between price
and quality, or price and the convenience of travelling in “dead time” and avoiding overnight
accommodation costs.
Express or premium services
Some railways have historically offered premium services which offer faster journey times, 6.7
higher quality rolling stock, or additional on-board services. Examples have in the past
included brands such as “Express”, “Rapido”, “Pullman”, “Intercity” and “Eurocity” or named
trains such as the Flying Scotsman, le Train Bleu, the Rheingold and the Danube Express. Some
of these distinctions have been withdrawn, and replaced with others such as the flexibility of
the fares, or the use of high speed lines, as we discuss below.
Flexible and restricted fares
In addition to the range of seating types they offer, many airlines now also offer three or four 6.8
different combinations of fare and flexibility, typically including a fully flexible fare, a slightly
more restricted fare, special fares which are tied to a particular flight and cannot be changed,
and “reward” travel paid for with accumulated loyalty of “frequent user” points. This means
that, at any one time, passengers on a single long haul flight may be offered up to four classes
of travel and up to four ways of paying for each, giving up to 16 different combinations of
quality, price and flexibility.
A number of rail operators now offer “frequent user” schemes and, as our analysis in 6.9
preceding chapters has shown, also offer travel flexibility as an element of “quality” which can
be paid for. We set out an extreme example in Appendix C, based on an example in the UK,
but note that many operators offer a choice between fares valid on any train, off-peak trains
only, or a single train.
Slow and fast routes and high speed lines
Operators may also charge premium fares for faster routes between the same points, and this 6.10
has become increasingly common with the introduction of dedicated high speed lines. High
speed services, with different or higher fares, began in France in 1981 and now operate in a
31
We have not investigated fares or quality for night trains, but note that their use is in gradual decline.
Both Germany and France have recently announced major reductions in their night train networks.
April 2016 | 103
number of Member States, including dedicated and non-stop airport services in a number of
cities, and the Javelin domestic high speed commuter services operating in the UK since 2009.
Low cost services
We noted above how many airlines have increased revenues by offering a wider range of 6.11
seating classes and fares types. An alternative approach, pioneered by Southwest Airlines in
the USA from 1967 and Ryanair in Europe, effectively from 1991, was to offer a single product
but to focus on reducing every aspect of costs. Ryanair now carries more passengers than any
other airline in Europe.
Ouigo
A broadly analogous attempt to introduce low cost rail services was made by SNCF in 2013, 6.12
through its subsidiary Ouigo. Ouigo uses a number of features analogous to those used by the
low cost airlines, as summarised in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Intramodal competition through low cost services
Feature
Low cost airline model
Ouigo model
Operating hours
Long operating day
Long operating day
Classes offered
Single class
Single class
Seating density
High density
High density
Catering and on-board staff
Minimal
Minimal
Locations served
Often secondary airports
Often secondary stations
Sales and ticketing
Online or app only
Online or app only
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Ouigo trains carry no buffet car, and serve secondary stations such as Marne-la-Vallée for 6.13
Paris, TGV Haute Picardie for Arras and Amiens, and Tourcoing for Lille. As with the low cost
airlines, use of secondary destinations may enable Ouigo to reduce unit costs, either through
more efficient operating patterns or through avoiding congested infrastructure where the
opportunity cost of capacity is high.
The combination of small percentage gains in each of the factors listed in Table 6.2 can result 6.14
in a material reduction in the direct operating costs of the train service and hence the levels of
fare at which they become commercially viable. This in turn allows SNCF, through Ouigo, to
offer a wider range of price and quality while minimising direct “cannibalisation” of demand
from its core TGV high speed services.
Izy
A second low cost approach is the Izy concept between Paris and Brussels launched by Thalys 6.15
on 3 April 2016. As shown in Figure 6.1, Izy offers low fares which vary with the quality of
seating provided.
April 2016 | 104
Figure 6.1: Izy’s service offer
Source: Izy (www.izy.com), each train has 10 tickets for a non-guaranteed seat and 25 tickets for folding seats.
Izy has no bar car or WiFi on board, and offers a journey time of 2 hours 15 minutes on the 6.16
conventional network compared with Thalys’s 1 hour 22 minutes on high speed lines. The
absence of facilities, and longer journey time, appear to be designed to abstract from Thalys
those passengers who are less willing to pay for facilities and speed.
Summary
None of the variations described above is a form of direct competition between different 6.17
providers of rail services, but they still have the potential to benefit the passenger by
increasing the choices available, and in particular by allowing passengers to select from a
range of combinations of quality, price and flexibility.
Competition for the market
Liberalisation of access to rail networks also allows two distinct types of competition between 6.18
operators, either for the market or in the market.
Competition for the market can in practice take a number of forms, which we summarise 6.19
briefly in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Intramodal competition for the market
Type of competition
Competition on fares
Competition on quality
Comments
Management contract
Cost risk is not transferred
Gross cost contract
Net cost contract
Possible
Flexible “franchise”
Yes, with regulation
Common model in the UK
“Concession”
Examples include Arlanda Express
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Management contract
In some cases a competitive tender is used to award a management contract in which the 6.20
“operator” does not bear cost risk but is instead rewarded either with a fixed fee or with
elements of payment linked to performance or to delivery of specific outputs. We are aware of
management contracts having been used in a number of circumstances:
April 2016 | 105
In the UK, management contracts have been used when a franchisee withdraws and
services are temporarily managed under contract by a “manager of last resort” appointed
by the competent authority.
In the UK, management contracts have been used when a franchisee and competent
authority cannot agree terms for the transfer of cost risk, such as when costs are subject
to factors over which the operator has little control.
In New Zealand, Veolia operated suburban services in Auckland under a management
contract.
In these circumstances the competition is typically limited to the award of the management 6.21
contract, and based on the cost and quality of the management staff, and the subsequent
service performance, rather than on the cost and quality of services.
Gross cost contract
A more widely used arrangement is a gross cost contract in which an operator provides all 6.22
services and bears all the risks associated with their costs, but does not bear any risk in
relation to revenue. Fares are typically set by the competent authority, although they may be
collected by the operator on the authority’s behalf.
Gross cost contracts are relatively common in urban and suburban systems, particularly where 6.23
some or all fares are multimodal and there is neither an opportunity for the rail operator to
vary fares nor, in some cases, even any allocation of fares revenue to modes or operators,
some of whom may be internal operators owned by the competent authority. This approach
allows the authority to change fares, or to introduce new services, which may abstract
revenue from those already operating, without the need for frequent and/or major contract
renegotiation.
Gross cost contracts may still allow operators to vary quality, however, either through their 6.24
proposals for how they will operate the service, such as whether new or existing stock will be
used, or through performance payments related to aspects of quality such as punctuality,
reliability, cleanliness, security and the introduction of additional features as the contract
progresses. Competition for the market may therefore be based not only on low cost but also
provision of high, and improving, quality.
Net cost contract
Under net cost contracts, operators typically accept risks associated with revenue as well as 6.25
with costs, although the extent to which they are able to manage pricing and revenue varies.
Even where fares are fixed by the competent authority, however, higher quality, effective
information, marketing and promotion can increase revenues. The operator can be
incentivised to grow revenue through any of these means, but may still also be subject to a
performance regime.
Flexible “franchise”
Progressively more flexibility can be offered to operators through the competitive process 6.26
through a number of measures. These have included:
In the Netherlands, operators have been paid on the basis of a percentage uplift on
revenue, rather than a fixed PSO payment. This incentivises them to provide whatever
services are most valued by the public and, subject to safeguards to ensure that minimum
service levels are met, means that bidders can not only propose their own service levels
April 2016 | 106
and quality standards, but also vary them over the life of the PSO contract to reflect
changing market conditions.
In the UK, the initial rail franchises had considerable flexibility to vary service patterns,
subject to a minimum service level, and fares, subject to regulation of the extent to which
certain fares, or “baskets” of fares, could be raised. One effect was that operators
introduced a wide range of discounted fares, with reduced levels of flexibility,
contributing to the major growth in passenger demand since franchising began.
“Concession”
Perhaps the most flexible model of competition for the market is a concession such as that 6.27
awarded for the provision of direct services between Stockholm and Arlanda airport. Potential
operators competed for the exclusive right to build infrastructure and operate trains, with no
restrictions on what services they operated or what fares they charged.
The concession model may be suitable for a relatively simple service such as a point-to-point 6.28
airport shuttle, which has incentives to provide services throughout the hours of operation of
the airport. It may, however, be less suitable where not all socially valuable services are
commercially viable, including operation at the beginning and end of the day, and calls at
minor stations.
PSO services
Our review of stakeholder responses found that that: 6.29
only Poland makes exclusive use of gross cost contracts;
PSO contracts with national operators tend to be net cost, as in the Czech Republic and
Hungary, but there is variation in the allocation of revenue risk at the regional level;
even where contracts are gross cost, with operators taking little or no revenue risk,
operators may nevertheless face significant financial risk as a result of contractual
incentive mechanisms in the form of reward or penalty schemes (as in Sweden); and
national legislation providing for competitive tendering of PSO contracts does not
guarantee the application of competitive procurement procedures, as in Spain where
Renfe, the incumbent national operator, continues to benefit from a direct award.
The specification and award of a PSO contract gives a competent authority a choice over the 6.30
extent to which it will either:
specify the quality of the required services, such as journey time, frequency and
punctuality; and/or
regulate some or all of the fares offered, whether through a kilometric or zonal fare,
specific individual fares, or through regulation such as with a fares basket.
In most cases a clear specification of what is required, and what flexibility will be offered, will 6.31
enable train operators to estimate costs and (where relevant) revenues and allow passengers
and other stakeholders to comment on the proposed service and fare levels in advance. It will
also provide authorities with the means to assess the delivery of the service, for example
through regular monitoring of operational performance and service quality metrics defined by
the specification.
As we noted above, however, it may not always be possible to transfer to the operator risks 6.32
associated with costs which are not under their control. This can be the case if they are
April 2016 | 107
required to provide services during a period in which there will be major changes to the
infrastructure, rolling stock or other facilities made available to them.
The specification of quality
A more rigorous specification of rail services in a given PSO contract will not necessarily either 6.33
increase or optimise service quality:
Over-specification of features such as punctuality may merely result in a performance
target which cannot be met, particularly if the operator is constrained by the reliability of
the infrastructure or of other operators.
Over-specification of features such as frequency, or levels of comfort, may result in a
more additional costs to the competent authority than additional value to the passengers.
Mechanisms such as the flexibility provided in many franchises in the UK allow operators 6.34
either to select the most cost-effective level of quality, whether:
at the time of the competition, as part of their price/quality offer to the competent
authority; or
during the life of the contract, as part of their price/quality offer to the passenger.
More recently in the UK, steps have been taken to encourage innovation through the 6.35
application of a weighted scoring system to assess bids, reflecting initiatives in bids that drive
service quality improvements for passengers. One practical issue, however, is that operators
competing to win a PSO contract may naturally tend to add “quality” to their offer as a means
of improving their chances of being awarded the contract. For example, the rapid proliferation
of WiFi on trains may be driven in part by a competitive environment in which manufacturers,
or the operators they supply, do not want to lose competitive advantage to other
manufacturers, operators or modes.
Our own experience of supporting franchise and concession bids, and observations of open 6.36
access operations in Italy and the UK, demonstrate that train operators participating in a
competition face a powerful incentive to identify service quality improvements. These can
range from maintenance at stations, through facilities for cycle storage, to better customer
information on station platforms, through innovative apps and through website tools.
In their recent consultation document Competition in passenger rail services in Great Britain 6.37
(2015) the UK Competition and Markets Authority provides a case-study of service quality and
innovation following competition between Grand Central (market entrant) and Virgin East
Coast (incumbent). They note that:
The entrant was the first company (in the UK) to offer free WiFi to all passengers.
The entrant introduced a ‘carnet’ ticket offer where a book of 20 fully flexible tickets is
sold at a 25% discount. The incumbent at the time (GNER) responded by offering its own
carnet.
When the entrant launched its services from London to York, the incumbent responded by
adding additional services to York.
The entrant makes provides a wider range of walk-up tickets available for purchase on-
board the train, compared to the incumbent.
A new service offered by the entrant led to infrastructure improvements, including the
refurbishment of Wakefield Kirkgate station, and the use of a former freight-only line.
April 2016 | 108
This can, however, result in a “ratchet” effect in which ever-increasing quality is demanded by 6.38
stakeholders, or offered by bidders, and bought by competent authorities, without being
valued by passengers. Over time, this can have the effect that competitive tendering leads to
increases in costs, at least relative to a situation in which quality was no higher than was
valued or required. We are aware that some competent authorities, including Transport for
London (TfL), have developed mechanisms to assess the value placed by passengers on
particular quality increments and to avoid buying quality enhancements which passengers
value less than the alternative of reducing fares
32
.
The specification of fares
Regardless of the allocation of revenue risk, competitive tendering of PSO contracts can be 6.39
expected to benefit competent authorities and/or passengers, since it encourages operators
to make cost savings which can, in principle, be used to lower fares. However, control, or
reduction, of costs does not necessarily result in a reduction in fares, unless either:
The competent authority explicitly reduces fares, or subjects the operator to a regulatory
regime which requires it to reduce fares.
An operator bearing revenue risk identifies markets which are highly price-elastic, and is
permitted to introduce lower fares, in some cases subject to restrictions on flexibility, as a
means of growing overall revenue.
In Germany, the introduction of tendering for regional services resulted in tender prices up to 6.40
50% lower than offered prior to competition for the market, and reductions in subsidy of 18-
25%. As noted by Alexandersson and Hultén (2006) there have been cases of very low bids in
German regional tenders, and optimistic efforts to establish new long-distance passenger
services, leading to the exit of some firms
33
. In the absence of disaggregate time-series fares
data it is not possible to identify whether competition affected fare (or cost) levels, although
the quantity and coverage of local transport networks in Germany (whose transport
associations are responsible for setting local multi-modal tariffs within the local boundary)
means the scope for entrants to vary fares is limited.
In the UK a number of different approaches to fares policy have been adopted: 6.41
Initially (from 1995) operators were required to reduce regulated fares by less than
inflation, but free to increase unregulated fares and to introduce new fares.
Subsequently, operators were permitted to increase fares by slightly more than inflation,
in exchange for accepting less subsidy from (or paying higher premia to) the competent
authorities.
Most recently, policy has included an explicit cost-recovery target for the industry, and
operators are permitted to increase fares by amounts which vary from year to year, again
in exchange for accepting less subsidy or paying higher premia.
32
TfL’s Business Case Development Manual (BCDM), which provides details of the process used, can be
downloaded here
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/197881/response/495035/attach/3/Business%20Case%
20Development%20Manual%20May%202013%20Redacted.pdf.
33
Alexandersson. G and Hultén. S (2006) Competitive tenders in passenger railway services: Looking into
the theory and practice of different approaches in Europe, European Transport n33
April 2016 | 109
In Prague and Tallinn, in contrast, administered suburban fare levels do not appear to have 6.42
been changed since 2011.
However, where competition for PSO services leads to a multiplicity of operators with 6.43
responsibility for adjacent and overlapping services, it can result in a range of fares that
passengers find difficult to understand. This is highlighted by the case study of Exeter to
Fareham in Appendix C. Simplification of the fare structure is advocated by passenger
representative bodies such as Passenger Focus in the UK. However, it is likely to require more
prescriptive fares regulation, whether through contracts or the broader regulatory framework,
which will constrain operators’ ability to offer market-based fares to meet the needs of
particular groups of passengers. However, competent authorities may conclude that this is
justified either:
as a principle, where passengers collectively value simplicity and transparency more than
the saving from fares which are lower but difficult to understand and use; or
in practice, where the complexity of the existing fare offer prevents passengers from
making informed decisions about the appropriate ticket for them.
The interaction between services provided by different operators also needs to be considered 6.44
where transport authorities wish to ensure that interavailable tickets continue to be available.
Any such tickets create a need for systems to allocate or apportion the value of the ticket to
the operator(s) on whose services it has been, or is likely to have been, used. Allocations and
apportionments can be based on electronic gating and ticket checks, or on diary systems and
behavioural models such as the UK’s ORCATS revenue allocation model.
Summary
Two-thirds of all rail travel is made on services contracted under PSO, and so there are 6.45
significant opportunities for competent authorities both:
to specify the quality and fares of the services they procure; and
to benefit from the innovation and efficiency offered by a competitive supply market, at
least to the extent that the market is willing to bear cost and revenue risk.
Competition in the market
We set out in Table 6.1 above how the presence of multiple operators on a network, even if 6.46
providing PSO services and even if required to accept interavailable fares, can result in
competition in the market, either between PSO operators or between a PSO operator and a
commercial operator:
alternative routes, where a journey between two stations is possible by two or more
routes served by different operators, as is the case with many of the larger rail networks;
or
overlapping services, where services of different operators use the same route.
Both types of competition are common in networks on which long-distance services operated 6.47
commercially use the same route as regional or suburban services operated under a PSO.
In the remainder of this section, however, we focus on the potential effects of the 6.48
introduction of new competition, in particular through the introduction of commercial open
access services.
April 2016 | 110
We examined routes with two or more operators, at least one of them in private ownership, 6.49
and looked for evidence of changes in the level and structure of fares after the introduction of
competition. Table 6.4 lists where there has been market entry by domestic open access
operators.
Table 6.4: Liberalisation: market entry by domestic open access operators
State
Operator
Begun
Ended
UK
United Kingdom
Hull Trains
September 2000
DE
Germany
InterConnex
December 2001
December 2014
UK
United Kingdom
Grand Central
December 2007
UK
United Kingdom
Wrexham Shropshire & Marylebone
January 2008
January 2011
IT
Italy
Arenaways
November 2010
February 2012
CZ
Czech Republic
RegioJet
September 2011
SE
Sweden
Blå Tåget
November 2011
SE
Sweden
Öresundståg (Veolia)
December 2011
AT
Austria
Westbahn
December 2011
IT
Italy
NTV
April 2012
DE
Germany
Hamburg-Köln-Express
July 2012
CZ
Czech Republic
LEO Express
December 2012
SE
Sweden
MTR Express
March 2015
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis for Fourth Railway Package impact assessment, updated August 2015.
Note: excludes cabotage by high speed international services and airport-only operators.
Our approach focused on the best-documented cases of new entry: 6.50
In the UK (with which we are familiar through other work), Hull Trains and Grand Central
operate open access services on the East Coast Main Line.
In Italy, NTV operates high speed services on the corridor between Turin and Naples,
described in a paper by Bergantino et al.
34
In the Czech Republic, RegioJet and LEO Express operate services in the Prague-Ostrava
corridor, described in a paper by Tomes et al.
35
Findings
Our findings on patterns of entry and their effects, including on fares, are summarised in Table
6.51
6.5.
34
Bergantino et al. (2015), The impact of open access on intra- and inter-modal rail competition. A
national level analysis in Italy
35
Tomes et al. (2014), Competition in the railway passenger market in the Czech Republic
April 2016 | 111
Table 6.5: Liberalisation: market entry and effects in the UK, Italy and the Czech Republic
Member State
Operator
Entry
Effect
Year of entry
Share of train services
Initial stock
Entry unrestricted?
Target markets
Incumbent adds services
Incumbent cuts elsewhere
Capacity now constrained
Connections difficult
Share of rail passengers
New entrant fares
Incumbent fares
Share taken from air
Market profitable
UK
Hull Trains
2000
10%
New
NPA
test
New direct
services
No
No
Yes
?
10%
Lower than
incumbent*
?
N/A
Yes
Grand Central
2007
10%
Old
IT
NTV
2012
25%
New
Yes
Major
cities
Yes
Yes
?
No
30%
Lower by
around 25%
?
Yes
?
CZ
RegioJet
2011
10%
New
Yes
Major
cities
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
?
Price war, some
fares down 75%
N/A
N/A
LEO Express
2012
10%
New
Source: Bergantino et al, Tomes et al, Steer Davies Gleave research, see text for details.
Note: NPA test is “Not Primarily Abstractive”, see text for details.
* Lower incumbent fares have been observed for equivalent distances on other routes with no competition
Share of train services
New entry has typically been on a relatively small scale, with an operation broadly 10% the
6.52
size of the incumbent on the route and a particular focus on serving major city pairs at peak
times. The exception is NTV in Italy, which has entered the “spine” high speed route linking
with principal Italian cities with an operation around 25% the size of the incumbent, Trenitalia.
Entry on a small scale may be possible with a small fleet of leased stock that is appropriate to a 6.53
niche strategy and which minimises overall financing needs and risk
36
. Doing so, however,
means offering services less frequent than the incumbent which may, in turn, mean offering
passengers lower fares as we discuss below.
Initial rolling stock
In the UK, Hull trains entered the market in 2000, initially with leased “Turbostar” stock. After 6.54
a number of changes it announced in 2015 an order for new Hitachi trains, to be named Class
802, similar to the Class 800 stock ordered by the Department of Transport for use by the
incumbent PSO operator. Grand Central’s entry was conditional on operating stock capable of
200 km/h, and it entered the market with leased High Speed Trains (HSTs) but has since also
acquired Adelante 200 km/h Diesel Multiple Units (DMUs).
In Italy, NTV entered the market with new and purpose-built Alstom AGV train sets equipped 6.55
with its Club, Prima and Smart classes of accommodation.
In the Czech Republic, RegioJet entered the market using ex-ÖBB stock which, at the time, 6.56
were of higher quality than incumbent ČD’s stock. LEO Express entered the market with new
36
Many airlines begin “opportunistically” with a single aircraft procured on a short term lease.
April 2016 | 112
Stadler Flirt rolling stock. Tomes et al argue that, when incumbent ČD subsequently upgraded
its rolling stock, the quality of LEO Express’s stock became the worst on the route.
New entrants may either lease existing stock or buy new stock, sometimes, as in the case of 6.57
Hull Trains, as a “follow-on” from a large fleet being bought by another operator. Once a
commitment has been made to a long lease or new stock has been bought, however, it may
become a sunk cost which may not be recovered, even if the service covers its recurring direct
operating costs. We discuss this point further below under market profitability.
Entry restrictions and target markets
In the UK, the independent safety and economic rail regulator the Office of Rail and Road 6.58
(ORR, formerly the Office of Rail Regulation) generally requires that new operators satisfy,
inter alia, the “not primarily abstractive” (NPA) test that a service generates £3 of revenue for
every £10 that it abstracts from other operators. This had the effect that new entry to date
has focused on providing direct services between London and medium-sized cities, off the
main lines, which previously required a connection.
In Italy and the Czech Republic there is no directly analogous restriction, and in both cases new 6.59
entrants have focused on providing direct connections between the largest cities along a
single main route.
Incumbents’ responses and cuts to smaller markets
One possible effect of new entry is that the incumbent moves resources to markets where it 6.60
faces competition at the expense of other markets. This is difficult in the UK, where the
incumbent operator on the East Coast Main Line must continue to meet detailed PSO
specifications and its own franchise commitments, and has only limited scope to rebalance
services between markets. However:
In Italy, Bergantino et al note that, in advance of the introduction of competition from
NTV, Trenitalia added high speed services but cut conventional services. They argue that
the aim was to deter, or minimise the benefits, of entry.
In the Czech Republic, Tomes et al noted that “the pressure of competition has forced the
incumbent to concentrate on peak times and main stations while reducing connections at
off-peak times and stops in medium-sized cities”, and that there has been a reduction in
late night trains.
Therefore it is important to ensure that service agreements are set up in a manner which does 6.61
not allow the incumbent to respond to competition on certain routes by cutting services
elsewhere.
Capacity constraints
One potential concern is that new entry may place additional strain upon limited capacity, 6.62
particularly where it duplicates existing services rather than introducing new ones, or
increases frequencies. We understand that capacity on the routes with competition in the UK
and the Czech Republic are now constrained. At the same time, overall ridership has
increased.
In Italy, in contrast, the limited number of potential stops in the 940-kilometre corridor 6.63
between Turin and Naples appears to mean that both operators have similar stopping
patterns, and we did not identify any capacity constraints on the route.
April 2016 | 113
Connectivity
Tomes et al also reported that the increasing capacity constraints in the Prague to Ostrava 6.64
corridor had required bunching of long-distance trains, making it difficult to provide
connecting and local services which were both convenient and regular. As far as we were able
to identify, this has been less of an issue in the UK, where the East Coast Main Line timetable is
increasingly based on a standard hourly service pattern.
New entrant share of rail passengers
We found no data on market shares in the Czech Republic, but in the UK and Italy the new 6.65
entrants’ share of rail passengers appears to be broadly consistent with its share of supply.
New entrant fares
A number of studies suggest that new entrants in the UK generally offer lower fares than 6.66
incumbents. Bergantino et al compared NTV and Trenitalia fares and concluded that the new
entrant’s fares were typically lower by 10-25%. In Sweden, the introduction of services by MTR
Express has led to a reduction in fares as the incumbent, SJ, has been forced to lower its fares
and provide faster services to compete with MTR Express
37
.
In the Czech Republic Tomes et al refer to a price war. In 2011 incumbent ČD’s standard fare 6.67
was CZK 438, but by the end of 2012 LEO Express had entered with an average fare of CZK 209,
and fares as low as CZK 95 were available. In January 2012 the Anti-Monopoly Office initiated
proceedings against ČD regarding the alleged abuse of its dominant position on the line in the
form of inadequately low (predatory) prices in response to the new entry. In 2015, ČD’s
Interim Report stated that the proceedings with the Anti-Monopoly Office were still
continuing, and that the Anti-Monopoly Office was collecting supporting documents for its
ruling
38
. The Anti-Monopoly Office will subsequently either issue a statement of objections,
which will formally open the proceedings against ČD, or it will not issue the statement of
objections and will discontinue the proceedings and thereby effectively allowing ČD to push
LEO Express out of the market.
We examined the number of services offered, and the “walk-up” fares for immediate travel, 6.68
on a number of routes with new entrants summarised in Table 6.6.
37
The services between Stockholm and Gothenburg are split as follows, 8 MTR Express services and 18
SJ operated services.
38
2015 Interim Report, České Dráhy Group
April 2016 | 114
Table 6.6: Liberalisation: routes, incumbents and new entrants for comparison
State
Station pair
Incumbent
Entrant 1
Entrant 2
Comments
AT
Austria
Vienna-
Salzburg
ÖBB
Westbahn
CZ
Czech
Republic
Prague-
Ostrava
České Dráhy
(ČD)
RegioJet
LEO Express
DE
Germany
Hamburg-
Köln
DB
Hamburg-Köln-
Express
Hamburg-Köln-Express has only
one train per day
IT
Italy
Rome-
Milan
Trenitalia
NTV (Italo)
SE
Sweden
Gothenburg
Stockholm
SJ
MTR Express
Blå Tåget
Blå Tåget is a once-a-day service
using “classic” rolling stock
Gothenburg
Malmö
SJ
Öresundståg
(Veolia)
UK
UK
London-
Doncaster
East Coast
Hull Trains
Grand
Central
Source: operator websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
In our analysis, shown in Figure 6.2 the incumbent operator is shown with a larger data-6.69
marker than the new entrant(s).
Figure 6.2: Market entry: incumbent and new entrant frequency and fares
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of 2016 timetables and fares, see Table 6.6 for details of routes in each
Member State.
The chart illustrates a number of points. First, comparing only the incumbents (large data-6.70
markers), it can be seen that more frequent services are normally associated with higher fares.
At one extreme, between London and Doncaster, the incumbent offers 54 trains per direction
April 2016 | 115
per day, but the PPP-adjusted walk-up fare is almost €0.45 per kilometre. At the other
extreme, between Gothenburg and Malmö, the incumbent offers 16 trains per day, but the
PPP-adjusted walk-up fare is less than €0.13 per kilometre. A noticeable outlier is services
between Prague and Ostrava where, as we noted above, all the operators may be engaged in a
price war.
Second, new entrants usually offer many fewer services than the incumbent but in exchange 6.71
offer at least slightly lower fares (all the lines slope downwards from right to left). In Austria,
Germany and Sweden between Gothenburg and Stockholm, the cheapest new entrant fare
available on the day was approximately half that of the incumbent. The exception to this
finding is again services between Prague and Ostrava, where incumbent ČD offered the lowest
fares on the day for which we simulated a booking.
Third, none of the routes is a duopoly of two operators offering almost identical services, as 6.72
has emerged in some transport markets although, on the Rome to Milan route, NTV now
offers almost as many services, and charges almost the same prices, as incumbent Trenitalia
39
.
We have, however, as yet seen no claims that the route has the characteristics of a duopoly.
We understand from research in the UK that the limited experience available provides no 6.73
conclusive evidence that new demand can be attributed to the offer of additional or better on-
board services by new entrants. However, we have in the past found that new entrants may
benefit from targeting a different mix of passengers with different journey purposes and
preferences. In our work on the Fourth Railway Package we compared an objective measure of
performance with the subjective satisfaction with punctuality reported by passengers, which
we repeat below as Figure 6.3
40
.
39
Under Australia’s Two Airlines Policy, QANTAS and Ansett offered near-identical timetables and fares
on many domestic routes until Ansett entered administration in 2001.
40
See “Further Action at European Level Regarding Market Opening for Domestic Passenger Transport
by Rail and Ensuring Non-Discriminatory Access to Rail Infrastructure and Services” at
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/studies/rail_en.htm
April 2016 | 116
Figure 6.3: Market entry: measured punctuality and reported satisfaction with punctuality
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis for Fourth Railway Package.
The figure shows that on the objective Public Performance Measure (PPM) of punctuality, 6.74
three operators on the East Coast Main Line achieved similar scores which were lower than
those of all the other operators in the sample shown by blue blobs. However, passengers using
the open access operators reported much higher subjective satisfaction with punctuality (high
satisfaction was also reported with Heathrow Express, an open access operator on another
route). We concluded that this was partly due to the fact that the new entrants cater for more
leisure and less commuter travel.
Incumbent competitive response
None of the evidence we examined suggested that the incumbent had reduced its services in 6.75
response to competitive entry. In the UK this would not be possible because the incumbent
must continue to operate the services specified or agreed as part of its franchise agreement.
Other than the price war in the Czech Republic, evidence on incumbents’ fares is more mixed: 6.76
In the UK, researchers have found no clear evidence that the incumbent, obliged to
maintain its PSO services and constrained by the fares it charges between station pairs
with no competition, has reduced its fares.
In Italy, NTV reported to the competition authorities that Trenitalia’s pricing policies
amounted to dumping and cross-subsidisation, but no abuse of Trenitalia’s dominant
position was found. We did not, however, find any time series data on average Trenitalia
fares before and after NTV entered the market. A further complication is that both NTV
and Trenitalia have introduced multiple classes of travel as an aid to market
segmentation, preventing direct comparison with the previous First and Second Class
fares.
April 2016 | 117
Table 6.7 matches those corridors examined in Figure 6.2, with other domestic corridors 6.77
sampled for this study. While we have attempted to compare corridors with and without on-
rail competition, in some cases, such as between Rome and Naples, there may also be
competition on the comparator corridor. The observed differences in fares (shown in Figure
6.4) may be due, in part, to the presence of on-rail competition. However, there is a multitude
of other factors that may influence fare levels between rail corridors in each Member State,
and the differences in fare levels presented here cannot be directly attributed to the number
of operators on each corridor.
Table 6.7: Corridors with more than one operator and comparator corridors
Member State
Corridor with more than one operator
Interurban comparator
AT
Austria
Vienna-Salzburg
Vienna-Graz
CZ
Czech Republic
Prague-Ostrava
Prague-Brno
DE
Germany
Hamburg-Köln
Munich-Stuttgart
IT
Italy
Rome-Milan
Rome-Naples
SE
Sweden
Gothenburg-Malmö
Stockholm-Örebro
UK
United Kingdom
London-Doncaster
London-Cardiff
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Figure 6.4 compares fares on corridors with more than one operator with those with less or no 6.78
competition.
Figure 6.4: Comparison of fares on routes with one or more operators
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
Note: data are for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 6.7) and may not be representative
April 2016 | 118
Fares for the incumbent operator on corridors with intramodal competition appear to be 6.79
lower than the comparator corridor, on a fare per kilometre basis on the majority of routes
shown. In Italy, fares appear to be marginally more expensive on the Rome-Milan corridor
than the Rome-Naples corridor but, as noted previously, this corridor also experiences on-rail
competition. The largest disparity is in the UK, where the fare per kilometre on the corridor
with a single operator is €0.14 higher than the fare on the corridor with more than one
operator.
Share taken from air
Only in Italy has new entry been in a corridor in which air has a large share of total demand. 6.80
Bergantino et al note that that the air share of the Rome to Milan market fell from 51% in
2008 to 26% in 2012, and estimate that average air fares fell by up to €13 as a result of the
increased rail services.
Market profitability
In Great Britain, some parties have claimed that open access operators are loss-making, but 6.81
we note that Hull Trains has reported profits in some years. It is also committing to buy new
trains, which suggests that its shareholders consider the market to be commercially viable.
In Italy, Trenitalia has expanded services and NTV has accused it of dumping, but these 6.82
representations have been dismissed.
In the Czech Republic, Tomes et al reported that “all three operators are most likely currently 6.83
operating at a loss”. RegioJet announced 2012 losses of CZK 76 million on revenues of CZK 267
million CZK (70% cost recovery) and LEO Express announced 2013 losses of CZK 159 million on
revenues of CZK 193 million (18% cost recovery).
Unless operators are able to sell trains that they own, or return trains that they lease, then 6.84
they may stay in the market as long as cash revenues exceed the variable costs of
infrastructure, rolling stock maintenance, fuel and staff. This does not, however, mean that
the services are commercially viable and represent a positive return on investment at current
levels of demand and fares. On the evidence to date:
It is unclear which new entrants will be commercially viable in the longer term,
particularly if incumbents reduce fares but do not, or cannot, reduce service levels.
It is unclear to what extent incumbents have responded to open access operators by
better pricing or quality, increased efficiency or, where permitted, service reductions, or
whether the principal effect has been lower earnings for the same cost base.
Summary
Competition and choice can arise through a number of mechanisms, including between the 6.85
products of a single operator, through competition for the market, and through competition in
the market.
New entry can offer a wider range of services and price/quality options, but may have 6.86
offsetting disbenefits including infrastructure congestion, less effective timetables, and a
reduction in services elsewhere to focus on markets with competition. In the Czech Republic,
prioritising competing interurban services may have led to a loss of regular services and
connections.
April 2016 | 119
New entrants typically offer many fewer services than incumbents, which means that to be 6.87
attractive they must offer a combination of higher quality, better service timings, or lower
fares, which may be as low as half of those of the incumbent.
The evidence of the effect of new entrants on incumbents’ fares is varied: 6.88
In the UK, researchers have found no clear evidence that the incumbent has reduced its
fares.
In Italy, we found no time series data, and note that the incumbent now offers different
classes of travel, making comparison with its previous fares difficult.
In the Czech Republic, there has been a price war, with the incumbent offering some of
the lowest fares, but it may be loss-making and its prices are under investigation by the
Anti-Monopoly Office.
In Sweden, the introduction of competition on the Stockholm to Gothenburg market has
forced the incumbent to lower its fares.
It is not yet clear either: 6.89
which new entrants will be commercially viable in the long term; or
whether incumbents’ response to competition has been improvements to quality or
efficiency or merely a loss of the revenue earned, and hence profit, with the same cost
base.
Competition in rail markets, particularly through open access operations, remains limited and 6.90
relatively new, and the longer-term dynamics of competition are not yet known.
April 2016 | 120
7 Quality and customer satisfaction
Table 7.1 summarises the analysis presented in this chapter. 7.1
Table 7.1: Quality: analysis by market sector
Market segment
Train
service:
average
speed
Train
service:
length of
day trip
Train
service:
frequency
Punctuality
Reliability
Station
facilities
Suburban
Regional
Interurban under 300 kilometres
Interurban over 300 kilometres
Long-distance high speed
Note: Information regarding station facilities was only gathered for the capital city of each Member State. Since, by
definition, regional services do not call at the capital city, no information regarding station facilities has been
gathered for the regional market segment.
In the absence of consolidated data on rolling stock fleets across Europe, one notable omission 7.2
from this chapter is an analysis of fleet quality by Member State. Even if such data were
available, quality attributes tend to be fleet-specific and may vary according to operator, time
of day, day of week, service pattern and even within the same train formation, if rolling stock
of different levels of equipment or from different fleets is joined to form a single train.
When passengers travel by rail, having accepted the primary factors such as fare, journey time 7.3
and the frequency and costs involved in accessing the rail network, they have a number of
requirements or ‘needs’. From the perspective of rolling stock quality and the passengers’ in-
train experience, these ‘needs’ can be usefully grouped into six on-train factors:
Cleanliness;
Environment;
Catering;
On-train information provision;
Technology; and
Security.
It is unlikely that the extent to which an individual passenger’s needs are being met by rolling 7.4
stock quality attributes will be linear. In practice, there may also be a minimum threshold that
passengers expect. Hence, while moving from ‘reasonable’ to ‘good’ quality rolling stock may
only have modest benefits, an equivalent deterioration may have significant disbenefits.
April 2016 | 121
It is also likely that incremental improvements to specific attributes are valued less after a 7.5
certain quality thresholds are achieved. Moving from a good condition to a very good
condition is likely to be valued higher than moving from a very good condition to an excellent
condition. In some cases, passengers may not even notice additional improvements to
conditions that were already considered to be very good.
A second notable omission from this chapter is quality and satisfaction data for Switzerland, 7.6
which is not covered by the monitoring sources identified. Alternative sources, such as the
European Railway Performance Index compiled by Boston Consulting Group, consistently rank
the Swiss railway system as the best in Europe when measured against the intensity of rail use,
the quality of service and railway safety standards
41
. Looking at rail service quality in isolation
(which captures whether trains are punctual and fast, and whether rail travel is affordable),
Switzerland ranks fourth behind France, Finland and Denmark.
Journey time and feasible day trips
Regional
For a sample of stations described in Table 4.1 we estimated the average end-to-end speed 7.7
from the direct distance between the two stations and the timetabled rail journey time. The
results are shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Regional trips: average effective speeds
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: average speed is for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 4.1 for details) and may not be
representative
41
See
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/transportation_travel_tourism_public_sector_eu
ropean_railway_performance_index/#chapter1
April 2016 | 122
The figure suggests that average speed is a function both of the infrastructure provided and of 7.8
the number of intermediate stops, which may in turn be a function of patterns of settlement
in the relevant region
42
. For example:
The fastest regional journey in the sample, from Cologne to Duisburg in Germany, may
have only one intermediate stop, in Düsseldorf.
The slowest regional journey in the sample, from Zagreb to Varaždin in Croatia, may have
up to 30 stops.
We also estimated the longest midweek day trip which could be made between the sample of 7.9
stations, selecting the first outbound departure after 05:00 and the last return departure
before 00:00 (midnight), using the timetable current from December 2014 to early December
2015. The results are summarised in Figure 7.2, which shows the earliest arrival and latest
departure that can be achieved within a day, subject to the restrictions described above. The
dark blue shaded area represents the duration of time that can be spent at the destination.
Figure 7.2: Regional trips: longest day trip
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: length of day trip is for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 4.1 for details) and may not be
representative, December 2014 timetable
It was possible to spend more than 18 hours at the destination in Germany and Sweden and 7.10
more than 16 hours in a total of ten States. At the other extreme, in Latvia, the earliest
possible arrival in Daugavpils from Krustpils was 11:26, and the last departure was at 17:20,
giving a maximum stay of 5 hours 54 minutes. Following the introduction of the December
42
In unpublished work for the Commission on the coach market we noted that, in the event of coach
deregulation, operators might target end-to-end passengers on regional or interurban rail services with
low average end-to-end speeds.
April 2016 | 123
2015 timetable, we rechecked this journey option, and noted that the new timetable made it
possible to arrive at 11:04 and leave at 17:35, giving a maximum stay of 6 hours 31 minutes.
This illustrates how the length of stay available between any pair of stations may vary from
year to year.
Interurban trips under 300 kilometres
For a sample of stations (described in Table 4.2) we estimated the average end-to-end speed 7.11
from the direct distance between the two stations and the timetabled rail journey time. The
results are shown in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Interurban trips under 300 kilometres: average effective speed
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis. Note that services in France and Spain use high speed lines
Note: average speed is for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be
representative
Average speeds varied from over 160 kilometres per hour, between Paris and Reims, to 40-50
7.12
kilometres per hour, in Greece, Croatia, Latvia and Bulgaria.
We also estimated the longest midweek day trip which could be made between the sample of 7.13
stations, again selecting the first outbound departure after 05:00 and the last return departure
before 00:00 (midnight), using the timetable current from December 2014 to early December
2015. The results are summarised in Figure 7.4.
It was possible to spend more than 16 hours on a visit from Brussels to Liege, although the 7.14
cities are only 90 kilometres apart, and over 14 hours on a visit from Munich to Stuttgart. At
the other extreme, it was only possible to spend between five and six hours at the destination
in Latvia and Croatia.
April 2016 | 124
Figure 7.4: Interurban trips under 300 kilometres: longest day trip
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis. Note that services in France and Spain use high speed lines
Note: length of day trip is for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be
representative, December 2014 timetable
Interurban trips over 300 kilometres
For the sample of stations described in Table 4.3 we estimated the average end-to-end speed 7.15
from the direct distance between the two stations and the timetabled rail journey time. The
results are shown in Figure 7.5.
The highest average end-to-end speeds were around 200 km/h in Spain and France, where 7.16
Madrid-Barcelona and Paris-Lyon services both use part of the dedicate double-track domestic
high speed network. In contrast, Norway’s Oslo to Bergen service operates over Europe’s
highest main railway line which climbs to, and descends from, an altitude of 1,237 metres en
route. It is mainly on single track, which means that trains have to wait to pass in loops, and
Oslo to Bergen services average less than 50 kilometres per hour.
We also estimated the longest midweek day trip which could be made between the sample of 7.17
stations, again selecting the first outbound departure after 05:00 and the last return departure
before 00:00 (midnight), using the timetable current from December 2014 to early December
2015. The results are summarised in Figure 7.6.
April 2016 | 125
Figure 7.5: Interurban trips over 300 kilometres: average effective speed
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis. Note that services in France and Spain use high speed lines
Note: average speed is for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be
representative
Figure 7.6: Interurban trips over 300 kilometres: longest day trip
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis. Note that services in France and Spain use high speed lines
Note: length of day trip is for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be
representative, December 2014 timetable
April 2016 | 126
It is possible to spend over 14 hours in Wroclaw on a day trip from Warsaw and almost as long 7.18
in Lyon on a day trip from Paris. Among other examples:
To spend more than one hour in Bergen on a day trip from Oslo, it is necessary to return
on the overnight train departing at 23:59 and not arriving until 06:25.
We identified an option allowing 5 hours in Thessaloniki on a day trip from Athens, rather
than the 23:55 return overnight shown, but it was not available on the day we researched.
Domestic high speed
For the sample of stations described in Table 4.4 we estimated the average end-to-end speed 7.19
from the direct distance between the two stations and the timetabled rail journey time. The
results are shown in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Domestic high speed trips: average effective speed
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: average speed is for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 4.4 for details) and may not be
representative
The highest average end-to-end speeds were around 200 kilometres per hour in Spain and 7.20
France, where Madrid-Barcelona and Paris-Lyon services both use part of the dedicated
double-track domestic high speed network. Average speeds are lower over shorter distances,
as in the UK, Netherlands and Belgium, or where high speed infrastructure is only available
over part of the route, as in Germany.
We also estimated the longest midweek day trip which could be made between the sample of 7.21
stations, again selecting the first outbound departure after 05:00 and the last return departure
before 00:00 (midnight), using the timetable current from December 2014 to early December
2015. The results are summarised in Figure 7.8.
April 2016 | 127
Figure 7.8: Domestic high speed trips: longest day trip
Source: railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: length of day trip is for a single illustrative station-to-station pair (see Table 4.4 for details) and may not be
representative, December 2014 timetable
High speed services generally make it possible to spend a relatively long period away on a day 7.22
trip. The shortest time at destination in the sample is 8 hours in Milan, 480 kilometres from
Rome.
Service frequency
Rail service frequency data was taken from the European Rail Timetable: January 2016, 7.23
supplemented with information from railway booking websites where necessary, for regional,
intercity and high-speed services. The station pairs examined are reported in Table 4.1 to
Table 4.4, and the results are presented in Figure 7.9 to Figure 7.12 below.
April 2016 | 128
Figure 7.9: Regional trips: rail service frequency
Source: European Rail Timetable (January 2016) supplemented by railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.1 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 7.10: Interurban trips under 300 kilometres: rail service frequency
Source: European Rail Timetable (January 2016) supplemented by railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.2 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 129
Figure 7.11: Interurban trips over 300 kilometres: rail service frequency
Source: European Rail Timetable (January 2016) supplemented by railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.3 for details) and may not be representative.
Figure 7.12: Domestic high speed trips: rail service frequency
Source: European Rail Timetable (January 2016) supplemented by railway websites, Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: data are for a single station-to-station pair (see Table 4.4 for details) and may not be representative.
April 2016 | 130
Punctuality and reliability
We extracted punctuality and reliability data from the Rail Market Monitoring Scheme 7.24
(RMMS) dataset. RMMS does not include data for all Member States and data is shown for all
years (2012-2014) where it is available
43
.
Punctuality
RMMS punctuality data is almost complete, with only Greece and Switzerland (which is not a 7.25
member of the RMMS scheme) not recorded. Most Member States define a train as being on
time if it is delayed by 5 minutes or less for regional services, and by 15 minutes or less for
long-distance services. Member States that define on time services differently from this are
reported in Table 7.2 below.
Table 7.2: Quality: services defined as on time in RMMS
Regional services
Long-distance services
Austria
Delayed 5 minutes or less
Delayed 5 minutes or less
Denmark
Delayed by 2 minutes 29 seconds or less
Delayed by 4 minutes 59 seconds or less
France
Delayed 5 minutes and 59 seconds or less
Delayed by:
5 minutes or less for a journey of a
maximum duration of one hour and a half
10 minutes or less for a journey of a
duration between one hour and a half and
three hours
15 minutes or less for a journey of a minimum
duration of three hours
Germany
Delayed by 5 minutes 59 seconds or less
Delayed by 5 minutes 59 seconds or less
Lithuania
Delayed 5 minutes or less
Delayed 5 minutes or less
Netherlands
Delayed 3 minutes or less
Delayed 5 minutes or less
Spain
Delayed by:
Less than 10 minutes for ‘middle
distance’ services
Less than 3 minutes for ‘commuter
services
Delayed by:
Less than 5 minutes (AVE long-distance services)
Less than 10 minutes (other long-distance
services)
Poland
Delayed 5 minutes or less
Delayed 5 minutes or less
United Kingdom
Delayed 5 minutes or less
Delayed 10 minutes or less
Source: Rail Market Monitoring Scheme dataset
Given the range of exogenous and endogenous factors that might affect the level of 7.26
punctuality recorded, it is difficult to draw meaningful comparisons between punctuality data.
Nonetheless, Figure 7.13 illustrates that the proportion of regional and local services arriving
at their destination “on-time” ranges from 99% in Estonia to 78% in Hungary.
The best performing Member States have small passenger rail networks, and Spain is the only 7.27
large network recording punctuality over 95%. Three of the best performing regional and local
networks are those of the Baltic States where the number of passenger services is limited on
fixed infrastructure dominated by freight traffic. This may be because the relatively sparse
43
RMMS punctuality and reliability data is only available from the years 2012-2014
April 2016 | 131
passenger timetable reduces the consequential impact of service disruptions, or because of
greater recovery times in the timetable which limit the impact of perturbations.
The punctuality of long-distance services is shown in Figure 7.14 and tends to be worse than 7.28
regional and local services. The number of on-time trains ranges from 99% in Estonia, to 63%
in Croatia. Germany and Italy, two of the largest networks, have some of the lowest long-
distance punctuality scores, both with under 75% of services being on time. While the
punctuality threshold used in Germany is stricter than in Italy (5:59 and 15 minutes
respectively) the punctuality of long-distance services in Germany is nevertheless significantly
worse than in Austria, the Netherlands and Denmark which apply an even stricter 5-minute
threshold. As with regional and local services, the relatively small networks of the three Baltic
States (and Ireland) are the best performing.
Figure 7.13: Punctuality of regional and local passenger services by Member State
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of RMMS punctuality data.
Note: definition of “on time” varies and may include trains up to 15 minutes late in some States.
April 2016 | 132
Figure 7.14: Punctuality of long-distance passenger services by Member State
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of RMMS punctuality data
Note: definition of “on time” varies and may include trains up to 5 minutes late in some States.
Reliability
Reliability is defined as the proportion of scheduled passenger services that are cancelled. As 7.29
can be seen in Figure 7.15 and Figure 7.16, comparable data is only available for a sample of
Member States. As a consequence it is not possible to make meaningful generalisations on the
data.
With the exception of regional services in Bulgaria, Eastern European Member States for 7.30
which we have data appear to cancel a far high proportion of their services than elsewhere.
This may, in part, explain Lithuania’s relatively strong performance against punctuality metrics:
if a train is cancelled it cannot be recorded as late. No Western or Central European Member
States cancelled more than 3% of regional or 5% of long-distance services.
April 2016 | 133
Figure 7.15: Reliability of regional and local passenger services by Member State
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of RMMS reliability data
Figure 7.16: Reliability of long-distance passenger services by Member State
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis of RMMS reliability data
April 2016 | 134
Station facilities
We based our assessment of station facilities primarily on desk research, supplemented where 7.31
necessary with information gathered through Member State case studies and questionnaire
responses. Our principal source of information was the infrastructure manager or operator
website for a main railway station identified in each capital city (Table 7.4 below lists the
stations selected).
We assessed and scored the quality and clarity of online information available for each 7.32
Member State against a range of criteria, to provide a subjective measure of the quality of the
information from the perspective of a passenger planning a journey. We examined both the
local language website and, where it existed, the English language website, focusing on the
former.
To obtain a score for each station we identified a list of station attributes which may be of 7.33
interest to prospective passengers. These include:
Train departure times and platforms;
Ticketing facilities (such as ticket vending machines and booking office facilities);
Ticket office opening hours;
Connections with other public transport services;
Accessibility and facilities for persons of reduced mobility and hours in which assistance is
provided;
Parking areas and cycle facilities; and
WiFi connectivity.
The majority of the websites we examined provide information on ticket facilities and on 7.34
booking office opening times. Information is also available on services for persons of reduced
mobility and the hours in which it is possible for assistance to be provided at each facility.
However, few station facilities websites provide clear and easy accessible information on train 7.35
times or departure platforms, which may be the responsibility of either the operator or
infrastructure manager. Many operators or infrastructure managers provide real time
information on train arrival and departure times at stations, but do not normally state on their
website whether or what information is available on screens at the station. The provision of
information at stations could only be confirmed either by visiting each station or contacting
station facilities managers, and is beyond the scope of this study. In addition to scoring the
station attributes themselves, we also scored the quality and clarity of online information
using the evaluation and scoring criteria shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Quality: station facilities scoring system
Finding
Score
No information available
N/A
Limited or poor quality information and/or provision
1
Reasonable information and/or provision
2
Exhaustive and clear information and/or extensive provision of facilities
3
Table 7.4 shows the results of our assessment. 7.36
April 2016 | 135
Table 7.4: Quality: online information on station facilities
Member State
Principal railway
station
Station facilities
Ticket buying
facilities
Train times/
platform
Public transport
connections
Assistance hours
PRM facilities
Booking office
hours
Parking facilities
Cycle hire
scheme
Wi-Fi
Total score
BE
Belgium
Brussels Gare Centrale
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
n/a
24
BG
Bulgaria
Sofia Central Railway
Station
1
2
n/a
2
1
2
n/a
n/a
n/a
8
CH
Switzerland
Bern Hauptbahnhof
2
2
n/a
2
3
2
3
3
n/a
17
CZ
Czech Republic
Prague hlavní nádraží
3
2
3
3
1
3
n/a
2
n/a
17
DK
Denmark
Copenhagen
Hovedbanegård
2
n/a
n/a
3
3
3
3
2
n/a
16
DE
Germany
Berlin Hauptbahnhof
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
27
EE
Estonia
Tallinn Balti jaam
1
1
3
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
2
6
IE
Ireland
Dublin Connolly
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
26
EL
Greece
Athens Syntagma
2
1
1
1
2
1
n/a
n/a
n/a
8
ES
Spain
Madrid Chamartín
n/a
3
3
3
3
3
2
n/a
n/a
17
FR
France
Paris Gare de Lyon
2
3
3
2
2
1
n/a
n/a
n/a
13
HR
Croatia
Zagreb Glavni kolodvor
1
2
n/a
n/a
n/a
1
n/a
2
1
7
IT
Italy
Rome Termini
1
3
n/a
1
1
1
n/a
n/a
n/a
7
LV
Latvia
Riga Centrālā stacija
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
1
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
1
LT
Lithuania
Vilnius Geležinkelio
stotis
2
2
n/a
1
3
1
n/a
n/a
n/a
9
HU
Hungary
Budapest Keleti
palyaudvar
2
2
n/a
2
3
2
n/a
2
n/a
13
NL
Netherlands
Amsterdam Centraal
3
3
2
2
3
2
3
3
2
23
NO
Norway
Oslo sentralstasjon
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
n/a
24
AT
Austria
Vienna Hauptbahnhof
n/a
3
2
n/a
3
n/a
3
n/a
3
14
PL
Poland
Warsaw Centralna
2
n/a
n/a
n/a
1
1
1
n/a
1
6
PT
Portugal
Lisbon Rossio
2
n/a
1
3
3
2
n/a
n/a
n/a
11
RO
Romania
București Gara de Nord
1
2
n/a
n/a
1
1
n/a
2
n/a
7
SI
Slovenia
Ljubljana Central train
station
1
n/a
n/a
2
2
2
n/a
n/a
n/a
7
SK
Slovakia
Bratislava hlavná
stanica
1
1
n/a
1
1
1
n/a
1
n/a
6
FI
Finland
Helsinki
Päärautatieasema
2
3
3
2
3
2
3
2
n/a
20
SE
Sweden
Stockholms
Centralstation
2
3
n/a
3
3
3
3
n/a
3
20
UK
UK
London Kings Cross
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
25
April 2016 | 136
Customer satisfaction
The principal source of comparable pan-European data on customer satisfaction with rail 7.37
services is the Eurobarometer survey of Europeans’ satisfaction with rail services
44
.
Reports on service quality performance are also made available through ERADIS (European 7.38
Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and Safety), published according to Article 28(2)
of Rail Passenger Rights Regulation 1371/2007, which states that railway undertakings shall
publish each year a report on their service quality performance
45
,
46
.
A preliminary review of information available in the ERADIS database identified a number of 7.39
heterogeneous reports on different aspects of service quality provided by train operators. We
have undertaken a further review of this information in the context of customer satisfaction
data and note that:
ERADIS contains incomplete operator level data, and therefore does not necessarily
provide a comprehensive indication of levels of customer satisfaction across the relevant
national network;
the data comes from diverse sources and is therefore rarely comparable between
Member States or even between individual operators; and
Responses provided under Article 28(2) of Regulation 1371/2007 typically describe the
nature and approach to undertaking customer satisfaction surveys, rather the results of
the surveys.
In light of the observations above we did not attempt to normalise the information provided in 7.40
ERADIS in order to draw conclusions regarding levels of customer satisfaction between
Member States.
The Eurobarometer survey
The Flash Eurobarometer Survey on Europeans’ satisfaction with rail services was conducted in 7.41
2012-13 to analyse public satisfaction with a number of features of rail transport. The two
main objectives of the survey were to:
“measure satisfaction with rail services”; and
“understand the accessibility issues that arise when using rail services and measure
satisfaction with rail service accessibility (particularly among those with accessibility
issues)
47
.”
Headline satisfaction scores for stations and rail services by Member State are presented in
7.42
Figure 7.17. These are composite measures which are based on the full range of satisfaction
questions for stations (four measures) and rail services (seven measures).
44
Flash Eurobarometer 382a European’s satisfaction with rail services, DG MOVE European Commission,
2013
45
Article 2 of Regulation 1371/2007 allows Member States to exempt domestic services from this
obligation
46
Member States may exempt domestic services from this obligation (see Article 2 of Regulation (EC)
1371/2007)
47
Respondents were asked whether they are satisfied with various aspects of the accessibility of railway
stations for persons with reduced mobility. Results were disaggregated according to whether the
respondent was mobility impaired.
April 2016 | 137
Figure 7.17: Eurobarometer scores: railway stations and rail services (2012-2013)
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 382a, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
Note: “High” and “good” satisfaction scores have been combined.
Overall, roughly half (51%) of respondents score their level of satisfaction with railway stations 7.43
as “high” or “good”, with the remainder (49%) recording “medium” or “low” satisfaction
levels. “High” and “good” satisfaction scores are typically more prevalent in Western European
Member States. However, Germany and Denmark underperform compared to their Northern
European peers, and Latvia outperforms other Baltic States by a considerable margin.
Respondents in Italy were particularly dissatisfied with their railway stations.
A slightly larger proportion (55%) of respondents score their level of satisfaction with rail 7.44
services as “high” or “good” compared to satisfaction with railway stations. While there is a
clearer distinction in satisfaction levels between Western and Eastern European Member
States, we note that satisfaction with railway services in Italy is considerably lower than in
other Mediterranean countries.
The Eurobarometer survey also collected satisfaction data on a wide range of railway station 7.45
and rail service characteristics, many of which are of direct relevance to this study. In
particular, the survey considered:
ease of buying tickets;
frequency of trains;
punctuality and reliability; and
availability of through tickets for journeys which may require the use of more than one
train, provided by more than one operator, or funded by more than one authority.
Satisfaction levels for each of these attributes by Member State are shown below. 7.46
April 2016 | 138
Figure 7.18 shows the proportion of survey respondents recording “high” and “good” 7.47
satisfaction for two measures related to ticket sales, the ease of buying tickets and the
availability of through tickets.
Figure 7.18: Eurobarometer scores: ticketing attributes (2012-2013)
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 382a, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
Note: “High” and “good” satisfaction scores combined.
French railways received the highest rating for both the ease of buying tickets (80%) and the 7.48
availability of through tickets (77%). Satisfaction with ease of buying tickets exceeded 50%
except in Estonia. Satisfaction with through ticketing was often low.
April 2016 | 139
Figure 7.19: Eurobarometer scores: frequency and punctuality and reliability (2012-2013)
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 382a, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
Note: “High” and “good” satisfaction scores combined.
Most railways received satisfaction scores of 50-80% for punctuality and reliability. As with all 7.49
subjective measures, however, it is not clear whether this reflects the quality of the facilities
themselves or a disparity between customer expectations and actual performance. As an
example of this, Figure 6.3 shows how operators with similar actual punctuality can be given
widely different subjective scores.
April 2016 | 140
8 Conclusions
Introduction
In Chapter 2, we discussed trends in rail demand and noted that in the ten years to 2013 the 8.1
European rail sector experienced an increase in demand of 61.8 billion passenger kilometres,
equivalent to average growth of 1.6% per annum. Further, rail’s share of surface passenger
transport was 7.4% in 2013. However, this overall performance masks substantial variation
between Member States.
The most significant increases in rail demand have been in Western Europe, with Austria, 8.2
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom all experiencing growth in rail
passenger kilometres of at least 2.5% per year. The factors underlying this growth also vary
between Member States, but include rising income, changes in employment in major cities,
road congestion as well as national rail policy (and notably major rail investment, such as the
construction of the HSL-Zuid line in the Netherlands in 2009 and the West Coast Main Line
upgrade works in the UK in 2008).
Conversely, 11 Member States have experienced declining rail patronage over the same 8.3
period. Rail usage in Romania fell by more than 6% per year, the result of a major
consolidation of rail services under the country’s Railway Reform Programme. Substantial
annual declines were also experienced in Lithuania (-4.3%), Greece (-3.9%) and Bulgaria (-
3.2%), a reflection of general economic conditions, constraints on public sector funding and, in
the case of Greece, the effects of the fiscal austerity packages implemented in the wake of the
recent sovereign debt crisis.
In the context of this study it is important to highlight the range of factors that can influence 8.4
travel demand in general and the demand for rail services in particular before commenting on
the effects of fares and service quality. We therefore briefly discuss the determinants of rail
demand before drawing conclusions from the analysis reported in previous chapters.
Factors influencing rail demand
Through time there have been rapid extensions to social and business networks, major 8.5
changes to the way in which people shop for both essential and luxury goods, and increases in
the time available for holidays and other leisure trips. At the same time, households seeking a
better quality of life have moved further away from employment opportunities to enjoy the
amenity offered by larger properties outside urban centres. In all of these changes, the price
and availability of motorised transport, in particular the flexibility offered by the private car,
has played a key role.
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 indicates some of the factors that may affect rail fares
8.6
and, therefore, the demand for rail travel. While necessarily limited by the size of the data
April 2016 | 141
sample, this suggested a correlation between average yield and not only average incomes but
also rail connectivity, as proxied by the length of the national network.
There is, however, a very broad range of demographic, geographic and economic factors that 8.7
can affect the demand for travel. Table 8.1 is derived from analysis presented in
Understanding Transport Demands and Elasticities (VTPI 2013) and demonstrates the
complexity in explaining travel patterns and the demand for any particular mode of transport
within a given area
48
.
Table 8.1: Factors affecting travel demand
Factor
Key influences
Demographic and
socioeconomic factors
Level and structure of population (residents, employees and visitors)
Employment rate
Average levels of wealth and income
Composition of population by age group
Lifestyles and preferences
Commercial activity
Level and profile of business activity
Number of jobs
Extent of freight transport
Level of tourist activity
Transport options
Extent and reliability of public transport network
Level of car ownership
Opportunities for walking, cycling and car sharing
Provision of taxi services
Extent of home/teleworking
Availability of delivery services
Land use
Land use density
Profile of land use
Connectivity of different locations
Quality and availability of pedestrian routes
Proximity of public transport
Design of road and other transport systems
Demand management
Road use prioritisation
Parking management
Policy towards pricing of roads and public transport systems
Passenger information and promotions
Prices
Fuel prices and motoring taxation
Road tolls and parking fees
Vehicle insurance and other motoring costs
Public transport prices
Source: Understanding Transport Demands and Elasticities: How Prices and Other Factors Affect Travel Behaviour
(VTPI, 2013), adapted by Steer Davies Gleave
Against this background, it is clear that distinguishing the impact of rail fares and service 8.8
quality on rail demand from that of the other factors listed in Table 8.1 is challenging. Hence,
48
Litman. T., Understanding Transport Demands and Elasticities: How Prices and Other Factors Affect
Travel Behavior (March 2013), Victoria Transport Policy Institute
April 2016 | 142
while the following observations reflect a broad consensus on key determinants of rail
demand, experience will vary significantly between different Member States, areas within
Member States and individual markets:
Rail tends to dominate where large numbers of passengers travel to a common
destination on a regular basis, particularly where it is located in an area subject to road
congestion and limited parking capacity.
Rail demand tends to rise with average income, although this effect may be offset by
increasing car ownership (particularly in Member States where the extent of car
ownership has, until recently, been limited) and the influence of dispersed land use.
Rail fares and the comfort, convenience and journey times offered by rail services,
nevertheless have a significant impact on mode choice and the willingness of some
passengers to travel at all.
Appendix D sets out a small sample of the empirically derived parameters used in forecasting 8.9
the impacts that different changes in fares and service quality can have on rail demand.
However, the wide range of factors that may influence an individual’s propensity to travel by
rail demonstrates the difficulty of drawing general conclusions about rail demand based on the
findings of a study of fares and service quality across Europe. Nevertheless, as reported in
previous chapters, we sought to assess rail’s attractiveness from the passenger’s perspective
based on:
comparisons of fares in different rail markets in different Member States;
comparisons of rail fares with the price of using other transport modes to make
equivalent journeys;
an assessment of the different pricing policies and distribution mechanisms currently in
place; and
a review of different aspects of the quality of different rail networks across the EU.
We consolidate below our findings in each of these areas before drawing conclusions on the 8.10
implications of rail market liberalisation for fares and service quality.
Summary of findings
Table 8.2 provides a snapshot of findings regarding rail fares (Chapter 4), fares for other 8.11
modes (Chapter 5) and service quality (Chapter 7) for the regional market segment. This
segment has been presented as it provides the widest coverage of Member States, and aligns
well with service quality indicators.
Given the sample basis upon which rail fares and service characteristics have been gathered, 8.12
reaching conclusions on the basis of these observations should be treated with caution.
Nonetheless, the table suggests that there is some evidence for a direct relationship between
absolute levels of fares and service quality, on the one hand, and rail demand, on the other
49
.
While rail fares and service quality appear to be determinants of rail demand, it has not been 8.13
possible within the scope of this study to isolate their impact from the wider range of
influences described in Table 8.1. Appendix D, however, presents the results of a number of
empirical exercises intended to produce demand forecasting elasticities which measure the
49
The elasticity approach used within the majority of rail passenger demand forecasting literature
concerns itself with how changes in the influences of demand (such as fares and service quality) affect
demand, rather than the absolute quantity of demand.
April 2016 | 143
sensitivity of rail demand to both timetable-related factors and other factors such as rolling
stock quality and station facilities.
Table 8.2: Rail fares and service quality (regional)
State
Rail
kilometres
per capita
Rail fare per
kilometre
Rail fare/car
costs
Punctuality
(local and
regional)
Reliability
(local and
regional)
Daily
service
frequency
Average
speed
BE
942
0.17
3.51
27
48
BG
250
0.07
0.69
88%
9
32
CH
0.26
6.45
17
83
CZ
714
0.03
0.33
92%
0.2%
21
106
DK
1,211
0.22
4.38
97%
1.8%
21
50
DE
1,105
0.21
3.57
93%
0.7%
46
141
EE
169
0.08
1.23
99%
0.1%
4
68
IE
342
0.12
1.79
17
29
EL
96
0.15
1.45
14
82
ES
508
0.23
1.61
0.6%
22
88
FR
1,332
0.12
0.84
91%
2.2%
41
50
HR
219
0.21
1.48
89%
0.2%
14
22
IT
817
0.08
0.62
82%
3.0%
19
86
LV
356
0.07
1.03
99%
4
70
LT
94
0.08
1.08
98%
8.3%
20
78
LU
717
0.03
0.72
21
55
HU
792
0.10
1.11
78%
11.5%
40
71
NL
1,053
0.17
2.45
95%
1.9%
38
92
NO
0.13
1.64
94%
2.2%
20
86
AT
1,453
0.22
4.57
97%
0.4%
35
102
PL
438
0.09
1.16
92%
0.2%
20
71
PT
348
0.08
0.55
94%
1.0%
43
51
RO
219
0.09
0.92
92%
8
69
SI
330
0.25
3.61
78%
0.2%
20
56
SK
459
0.09
1.08
93%
2
46
FI
747
0.15
2.69
97%
0.7%
14
120
SE
1,241
0.14
2.48
93%
1.1%
85
98
UK
970
0.21
3.80
90%
2.6%
17
54
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
Note: peak-single rail fares purchased on the day of travel have been used in this comparison
Conclusions on market liberalisation
As discussed in Chapter 6, the policy and regulatory framework governing national rail sectors 8.14
has a significant influence on both fares and service quality, a reflection of the fact that the
European rail industry continues to be heavily dependent on public subsidy (see Chapter 2).
While the industry has been moving in the direction of greater commercialisation and market
liberalisation within the evolving framework of EU legislation and, in some Member States, in
April 2016 | 144
response to changes in national policy, rail services are still largely specified by transport
authorities in line with a wide range of societal objectives. The majority of services are
therefore operated as PSOs, although it is often difficult to make clear distinctions between
PSO and purely commercial services.
It follows that the fares and service quality observed across much of the European rail market 8.15
will continue to be determined in large part by decisions taken within national, regional and
local transport authorities rather than market conditions, although these same authorities
may be constrained by competition from other modes. Furthermore, there is a spectrum of
possibilities regarding how and by whom rail services are specified. At the same time, on-rail
competition can be expected to have an increasing influence in some markets where available
capacity and levels of demand support the introduction of new commercial services.
PSO services
The specification and award of a PSO contract, whether competitively tendered or awarded 8.16
directly, provides a transport authority with an opportunity to specify the quality of the
required services (e.g. in terms of journey time, frequency and punctuality) and to regulate
some or all of the fares offered (either individually or through a fares basket). A clear
specification will enable train operators to estimate the costs of service provision and
determine the required level of subsidy with greater confidence, while enabling passengers
and other stakeholders to comment on the proposed service and fare levels in advance. It will
also provide authorities with the means to assess the delivery of the service, for example
through regular monitoring of operational performance and service quality metrics defined by
the specification.
However, it does not necessarily follow that a more rigorous specification of rail services in a 8.17
given PSO contract will tend to drive up service quality. Rather, it is likely to reflect more
explicit consideration of the cost-fare-quality trade-off, which may lead to a decision to
require lower quality in recognition that this will enable an operator to offer lower fares (for a
given level of public subsidy). At the same time, explicit reductions in service quality, defined
in a contract open to public consultation, are more likely to be met with objections from
stakeholders, potentially resulting in a ratchet effect whereby quality improves with each
successive contract award (notwithstanding changes to the demand for the service).
Similarly, the inclusion of explicit mechanisms for regulating fares in a PSO contract (or as part 8.18
of a supporting regulatory framework) will not necessarily result in lower fares. In the UK,
most franchise agreements have included provisions for regulating a basket of defined fares as
well as some individual fares, but fare levels since 2005 have nevertheless increased by more
than the rate of inflation (see Chapter 2). This was a response by the competent authority at
the time (the Strategic Rail Authority) to a policy decision to change the balance of rail industry
funding in favour of the tax payer and against the fare payer (with the aim of moving from a
broadly 50:50 tax payer-fare payer allocation to a 75:25 allocation over time). By contrast, in
In Prague and Tallinn, administered suburban fare levels do not appear to have been changed
since 2011.
In our discussion of PSO services in Chapter 2, we identified different approaches to the 8.19
allocation of revenue risk, with some Member States awarding net cost contracts, some gross
cost contracts and others a mix. The use of gross cost contracts is particularly attractive in
major cities where the transport authority wishes to establish and integrated fares structure
covering a range modes and services within modes (any or all of which may be operated by
April 2016 | 145
different organisations, including subsidiaries or departments of the authority itself). This
approach allows the authority to make changes to fares and introduce new services (which
may abstract revenue from those already operating) without the need for frequent and/or
major contract renegotiation. Moreover, even where individual operators providing urban
services accept revenue risk, it is likely that they will continue to charge administered fares
set, or at least heavily constrained by, the relevant transport authority.
Regardless of the allocation of revenue risk, competitive tendering of PSO contracts can be 8.20
expected to benefit passengers, since it encourages train operators to bear down on costs and
(in the case of net cost contracts) offer lower, more affordable fares for a given level of
subsidy. This effect is difficult to observe in fares data alone, given the wide range of factors
influencing fare levels (and not least the policy stance in relation to tax payer funding noted
above). However, we would expect competitive tendering to lead to lower fares, lower
subsidy, improved services or some combination these impacts.
In addition, competitive tendering encourages bidders to consider ways of improving service 8.21
quality at an acceptable price. Again, the evidence is difficult to interpret, since the
information on the origins of a particular service innovation is invariably limited. Nevertheless,
the rapid proliferation of WiFi on board trains may be symptomatic of a competitive (or at
least contestable) environment in which operators do not want to lose competitive advantage
to other bidders, other operators or other modes. In addition, our own experience of
supporting franchise and concession bids, as well as open access operations, in Italy, Spain and
the UK, demonstrates that train operators participating in a competition face a powerful
incentive to identify service quality improvements. These can range from the introduction of
new methods of providing customers with information on station platforms, through
innovative apps and website tools to facilities for cycle storage and maintenance at stations.
However, we also note that competition for PSO services, where it leads to a multiplicity of 8.22
operators with responsibility for adjacent and overlapping franchises and concessions, can
result in complex fare structures that passengers find difficult to understand. This is
highlighted by the case study of Exeter to Fareham in Appendix B. Simplification of the fare
structure, of the kind advocated by passenger representative bodies such as Passenger Focus
in the UK, is likely to require more prescriptive fares regulation, whether through contracts or
the broader regulatory framework, which will constrain operators’ ability to offer market-
based fares to meet the needs of particular groups of passengers. However, this may be
justified where the complexity of the existing fare offer prevents passengers from making
informed decisions about the appropriate ticket for them.
The interaction between services provided by different operators also needs to be considered 8.23
where transport authorities wish to ensure that tickets valid on any service continue to be
available. In Chapter 6, we noted that such tickets typically give rise to the need for revenue
allocation mechanisms, depending on the party receiving the ticket revenue generated by the
relevant services.
As shown in Figure 2.1, since two-thirds of all rail travel is made on services contracted under 8.24
PSO, there are significant opportunities for competent authorities to specify the quality of rail
services within Member States. Combined with competitive tendering procedures these
quality initiatives can be secured cost-effectively for taxpayers, so long as the market is able to
support a sufficient quantity of bidders. Subject to low barriers to market entry, for the
remaining one-third of rail travel which uses commercial, or non-PSO, services, competitive
pressure also comes from within the market for rail travel as discussed below.
April 2016 | 146
Competition and service offer
On-rail competition can similarly lead to improvements in the attractiveness of rail services by 8.25
providing passengers with a greater choice of services. Our case studies of competition in the
Czech Republic, Italy and the UK demonstrate that it can lead to the availability of lower fares.
Experience in the Czech Republic, in which LEO Express entered the market with new Stadler
Flirt rolling stock, also demonstrates that entrants may choose to invest in new rolling stock,
raising service quality significantly, although in the UK open access operators have introduced
new services by leasing existing rolling stock.
However, the introduction of on-rail competition, while it has been limited to specific markets, 8.26
has raised complex issues concerning both operational and financial impacts, which will need
to be resolved if the overall effect on service quality and fares is to benefit passengers. On the
operational side, it may become increasingly difficult to combine competition with efficient
timetable planning within constrained networks, especially as capacity expansion almost
invariably requires additional public support. Each route will require a different balance
between making infrastructure capacity available to open access operators and specifying a
timetable that is reliable, minimises journey times and offers attractive connections. The role
of regulatory bodies in assessing the trade-off between the benefits of competition and
efficient operational planning is therefore likely to increase. Such assessments are likely to
need to consider complex interactions between aspects of service quality including frequency,
journey time and punctuality, as well as the potential impact of competition on fares.
Any growth in the extent of on-rail competition is likely to raise issues concerning the 8.27
complexity of the fares structure of the kind highlighted above, not least because of the
challenges of encouraging operators to compete on fares while maintaining network benefits
such as through ticketing and interavailable fares. The case study on Exeter to Fareham
demonstrates the potential for confusion when different operators set some fares valid on any
permitted route and others only valid on particular trains. Any attempt to simplify fare
structures through policy change is likely to have implications for independent fare setting and
hence for on-rail competition.
Identifying the appropriate fare structure will need to consider the trade-off between offering 8.28
customers a wide range of fares and providing them with sufficiently simple fares information
to enable them to make informed travel choices.
Complexity and consumer choice
This chapter has highlighted the inherent trade-off between complexity and consumer choice. 8.29
The ease with which passengers can compare different fares and service offers has been
highlighted by consumer representative groups as an important issue for the rail industry to
address. However, this is challenging due to the broad range of sources from which complexity
can arise.
Complexity may be observed: 8.30
in the rail market where a range of routes and journey times may be available between
any two stations;
in suburban markets characterised by administered fares with zonal structures and
complex discounts;
in longer distance markets where the range of fares can also be wide and the need to
compare with the cost of using other modes adds further complexity; and
April 2016 | 147
in markets subject to on-rail competition, where fares valid only on particular services are
offered alongside interchangeable fares, and these are similarly overlaid with different
discount arrangements.
Operators have an incentive to offer a range of fares based on price, flexibility, time of day and 8.31
quality since it allows them to capture some of the market's consumer surplus through price
discrimination. This surplus arises because, in a market with a single clearing price, some
passengers would have been prepared to pay more than the single market price. Price
discrimination therefore transfers some of this surplus from the passenger to the operator.
However, since in many cases the operator cannot distinguish between passenger types, and
cannot prevent those individuals with a high willingness-to-pay from obtaining the lower
priced tickets, there are also opportunities for such passengers to realise windfall gains.
Moreover, some discounted tickets may be available at price lower than would be available in
the absence of differential pricing.
Given the considerable range of products on offer it is important that passengers from all 8.32
Member States can access good quality information about their ticket options within and
between all Member States so they can confidently select the best ticket for their journey, and
understand its terms and conditions. This should not require the passenger to understand all
of the layers of complexity set out above and the resultant fare structure, but should instead
guide the passenger to timely and accurate information tailored to their travel requirements.
Consequently, explicit consideration of the trade-off between passenger choice and ease of
decision-making in the development of fare and service quality offers across Europe should be
encouraged.
April 2016 | 149
Appendices
April 2016 | 150
A Country case studies
A.1 In this Appendix we collate a range of information on each of the Member States listed below.
Table A.1: Country case studies
Subject
Bulgaria
Switzerland
Czech Republic
Germany
Estonia
Spain
France
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Sweden
United Kingdom
BG
CH
CZ
DE
ES
EE
FR
IT
NL
PL
SE
UK
Overview of the rail market
Journey planning and sales channels
Station website(s)
Operator website(s)
Ticket types
Availability of discounts
Service quality
Persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.2 In developing the case studies, we drew on RMMS, ERADIS, stakeholder responses to the
questionnaire, stakeholder interviews and desk and telephone research. In practice RMMS and
ERADIS proved to be incomplete, and rarely up-to-date, while interviewees and telephone
research are sometimes ill-suited to obtaining detailed factual data. For some Member States
we received one or more stakeholder responses, but these often either referred us to, or
summarised, information on the internet. As a result, much of the verifiable factual
information for these case studies has been drawn from infrastructure manager and operator
websites.
A.3 The majority of the information in these case studies was collected prior to the end of
February 2016, but information on websites may be refreshed or updated at any time.
A.4 We also note the existence of a range of third-party travel agents and websites, such as Rail
Europe (www.raileurope.com), which provide a common interface for reserving rail travel
across Europe, sometimes in a number of languages. However, these sites may not have
access to, or offer, all fares, and may charge a commission which would not be paid if booking
locally or through an operator website, app, call centre, station or ticket vending machine.
A.5 Similarly, Germany’s Deutsche Bahn provides an online journey planner, supported in a
number of languages, covering public transport across most of Europe, but this does not have
access to all service details, fares and reservation systems.
April 2016 | 151
BG: Bulgaria
Bulgaria: sources
A.6 Bulgaria has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received one stakeholder
response.
Overview of the rail market
Table A.2: Bulgaria: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
110,879
square kilometres
Length of rail network
110,879
kilometres
Population
7,245,677
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
1,698
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
234.3
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€41
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
2.9%
2013
Routes with price competition
No
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
7.4%
2014
Reported punctuality
88%
77.5%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
N/A
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.7 Bulgaria has a single national operator, BDZ, and the majority of information on rail travel is
provided through its website at www.bdz.bg in Bulgarian and English.
Bulgaria: journey planning and sales channels
A.8 Journey planning information such as timetables, fares and conditions of travel are provided at
railway offices and stations, either in person or by phone, or via the BDZ webpage.
A.9 Tickets are sold at stations, shops and offices, on trains and online, as shown below.
Table A.3: Bulgaria: sales channels
Sales channels
Comments
Railway stations,
stops and offices
As of the end of 2014, passenger service was available at 276 stations and stops:
BDZ staffs 81 stations and 8 stops
The infrastructure manager provides sales staff at 177 stations, stops and mixed points.
At 10 stations, servicing is mixed.
In addition, 409 stations and stops have no sales service.
On train
Train crew sell tickets on trains.
Online
BDZ introduced online reservations and sales at the end of December 2013.
The system currently has a restricted range and functions, but a larger and more integrated
information system is being constructed.
Since September 2014 the system has included an additional six fast trains, on which
customers can buy tickets online.
Source: stakeholder engagement, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
April 2016 | 152
A.10 ERADIS records that information on the arrival and departure of trains, platforms and,
additional coaches on the major lines, are usually provided through announcements in the
mass media; and on the BDZ website.
A.11 Timetable changes or traffic disruption due to repairs or reconstruction work are also provided
in the same way. Information on delays to trains en route are provided in a number of ways:
Stations have electronic information boards and loudspeaker systems operated by station
staff, where these exist, or by telephone information staff.
Train staff provide information on trains.
Online data is available at BDZ’s website, although at present this only covers a limited
number of stations.
Bulgaria: station website
A.12 BDZ’s website provides telephone numbers and opening hours of on stations in both Bulgarian
and English. Telephone numbers and opening hours differ between the two languages.
Bulgaria: operator website
A.13 BDZ website acts as the operator website.
Bulgaria: ticket types
A.14 RMMS lists a range of ticket types for travel at different times, to different locations and for
different types of individual or group of travellers.
Table A.4: Bulgaria: types of tickets
Weekend travel
Travel to particular destinations
Travel with discount cards for different age groups
Family travelling together
Travel by persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
Travel by children aged 7-10
Transportation of pets
Source: RMMS 2015, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
A.15 BDZ also accepts a range of passes such as Interrail and Rail Plus.
April 2016 | 153
Bulgaria: availability of discounts
A.16 BDZ’s website currently reports the range of discounts summarised below.
Table A.5: Bulgaria: availability of discounts
Discount
Group
10%
Return tickets
15%
Small groups of 3-6 passengers
20%
Return tickets on certain routes
25%
Second Class on fast and ordinary trains for holders of Youth, Classic and Railcard “O”, valid for three
months
50%
“Adults” and “students”
75%
Students up to the age of 26
100%
Children up to 7 years old
Groups including children up to 7 years old (subject to signed and sealed documentation of their dates
or birth)
Disabled passengers with a 71% disability, subject to a certificate of disability, plus an accompanying
person
War veterans
Holders of the Order of Valour
Mothers with “many” children, subject to a certificate and a medical card
Members of Parliament, subject to an identify card issues by the National Assembly
Source: BDZ website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave, definitions have been summarised or omitted for brevity.
A.17 RMMS provides some earlier details on these entitlements, as set out below.
Table A.6: Bulgaria: passengers entitle to free travel
Category
Free travel
Mothers with three or more children
Two free return tickets per year
Disabled and blind persons reached 71% or more permanent
disability, disabled soldiers, affected soldiers by the war, both
children with severe physical and mental disabilities and their
assistants
Two free return tickets once a year
Veterans
One free return ticket once a year, and
unlimited free travel in the area in which they
live, using a special issued free travelling card
Holders of the military cross
Three free return tickets once a year
Source: RMMS 2015, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
Bulgaria: service quality
A.18 We did not identify any documentation setting out standards of service quality in Bulgaria.
Bulgaria: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.19 PRMs are offered transport on six fast trains with obligatory reservations, two fast trains with
seats provided for PRMs, and two fast trains with obligatory reservations. The night trains
between Sofia and Varna and Sofia and Burgas also include sleeping cars with separate cabins
for the disabled and PRMs.
April 2016 | 154
Switzerland
Switzerland: sources
A.20 Switzerland does not provide information to RMMS and ERADIS and we have had no
stakeholder responses or interviews. Our analysis therefore relies wholly on desk research.
Switzerland: overview of the rail market
Table A.7: Switzerland: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
41,277
square kilometres
Length of rail network
3,588
kilometres
Population
8,139,631
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
18,277
million kilometres
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
2245.4
kilometres
Reported rail passenger revenue
N/A
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
17.1%
Routes with price competition
No
Rail market share not held by incumbents
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
Nil
Reported punctuality
N/A
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
N/A
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.21 Switzerland has a dense rail network with a highly-integrated timetable. There are three
distinct railway systems:
SBB (or CFF or FFS) is the federal railway and operates the majority of the network.
BLS (Bern–Lötschberg–Simplon railway) operates a smaller network.
SOB (Südostbahn) is a relatively small network.
A.22 There is close integration between the systems include operations between the networks and
in seven different urban and suburban tariff areas, including the Libero pass covering Bern and
Solothurn, examined in our analysis of suburban fares.
A.23 Switzerland offers a General Abonnement (GA) all lines annual Travelcard which we
understand is held by a relatively high proportion of the population.
Switzerland: journey planning and sales channels
A.24 The major systems all provide some form of journey planning information:
SBB’s website www.sbb.ch provides an online timetable facility in German (the default
language), French, Italian and English.
BLS provides a simple online facility www.bls.ch in German (the default language), French
and English, with facilities to download detailed timetables, station departure posters or
personalised timetables.
SOB www.sob.ch provides more limited information but includes a detailed network plan.
A.25 SBB also provides a map with real time information on the progress of each train.
April 2016 | 155
A.26 Tickets are generally available at stations, from ticket machines, online and via apps such as
the SBB Mobile App. SBB’s website lists a Ticket Shop, Leisure Shop, Online Tickets, Mobile
Tickets and E-vouchers. However, not all ticket types or discounts are obtainable by all
channels, particularly where the application must be supported by evidence such as identity
documents.
Switzerland: station website
A.27 SBB provides details of station facilities at www.sbb.ch. This site operates in German (the
default language), French, Italian and English. This provides details of the following:
“Services” provides details of opening hours and contact information.
“Equipment” provides information on equipment for PRM and details such as the
availability of lockers and pricing.
“Mobility” provides information and pricing for parking and surface connections.
A.28 SBB’s website also provides access to station maps, plans, and arrangements for rail
replacement services, for stations on all the networks. The example below is from the BLS
station at Interlaken West.
April 2016 | 156
Figure A.1: Switzerland: station facilities information
Source: SBB website.
April 2016 | 157
Switzerland: operator website
A.29 Each system has its own website, as listed above.
Switzerland: ticket types
A.30 SBB’s website lists a wide range of ticket types, although the website is complex and could be
confusing: for example we found no concise list of the discounts available to different types of
passenger.
Table A.8: Switzerland: ticket types
Type of ticket
Options
Comments
Tickets for
Switzerland
Swiss Travel Pass
Individual tickets
Tickets are available for single, return or round trips, although round
trip journeys cannot be bought online.
Multipacks are available for six journeys on the same route and are
transferrable, with a 50% discount for those who hold a half fare
Travelcard.
City-Tickets include a 1-day Travelpass at the destination city, and
City-City-Tickets include a 1-day Travelpass at both origin and
destination cities.
Supersaver tickets
Supersaver tickets are E-tickets sold online or via the SBB Mobile app.
They are specific to a train but include a discount of up to 50%.
If passengers miss their train, these tickets can be refunded online
with proof of purchase of a full-fare ticket for the same journey on
another train.
1-day Travelpass
A range of 1-day tickets allowing unlimited travel or Class upgrade,
for all day or for after 09:00, for those with a half fare Travelcard.
1-day Travelpasses are also available for children and dogs.
First-class upgrade
These are add-on upgrades to Second Class tickets or 1-day Travel
passes.
Seat reservations
Seats can be reserved for CHF 5 online, using the SBB Mobile app, or
by telephone.
Group tickets
Group travel booked at least two working days in advance for ten or
more people gives a 20% discount and every tenth passenger is free.
Children
Children under 6 travel free when accompanied by a person at least
12 years old with a valid ticket escorting up to four children or a
person at least 16 years old escorting up to eight children.
Children aged 6 to 16 are entitled to a range of reduced fares.
Night supplement
Night supplements are charged for travel on Friday and Saturday
nights.
Dog
Dogs require a ticket for half the Second Class fare, which can include
1-day Travelpasses and a GA Travelcard (see below).
Swiss Travelcards
and SwissPass
General
Abonnement (GA)
Travelcard
Unlimited travel for a fixed price in either First Class or Second Class.
Prices vary for those aged 6 to 16, 16 to 25, 24 to 64/65 (depending
on sex), and from 64/65, the disabled (see below), partners in the
same household, families and dogs.
April 2016 | 158
Type of ticket
Options
Comments
Half fare Travelcard
Allow half price travel on a range of rail, bus, tram and ferry services.
Track 7
Provides unlimited travel for “young people” after 1900. This is an
addition to the half fare Travelcard for passengers under 25 travelling
Second Class.
Point-to-point
Travelpass
This is a season ticket between two defined points, available for
seven days, one month or twelve months.
Regional Travelcard
These are Travelcards for the seven regional urban and suburban
fares networks described below.
Interregional
Travelcard
Interregional Travelcards are intended for commuting journeys which
span more than one Travelcard area.
A route-zone Travelcard (equivalent to a period City-Ticket) allows
travel on local transport at one end of the route.
A zone-route-zone Travelcard (equivalent to a period City-City-Ticket)
allows travel on local transport at both ends of the route.
An annual interregional Travelcard usually costs as much as nine, or
sometimes ten, monthly cards.
Junior and
Grandchild
Travelcard
Junior Travelcard, costing CHF 30, allows free travel for a child aged 6
to 16 if accompanied by a parent with a ticket, on production of proof
of date of birth. The third child receives the Travelcard free.
The Grandchild Travelcard has broadly the same terms and
conditions but allows the child to travel with a grandparent and also
includes same sex grandparent couples. No more than four
Grandchild Travelcards will be issued for the same child.
It appears that a single child can be issued with up to six cards.
SwissPass
Now includes the half fare Travelcard.
From Switzerland
to Europe
International
supersaver
Interrail
Rail Plus
Source: SBB website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave, summary of conditions as set out on the website.
A.31 The website also provides links to the urban and suburban fare networks of:
Bern and Solothurn (Libero, examined in our analysis of suburban fares);
Geneva (unireso);
Zürich (ZVV);
Lucerne, Obwalden and Nidwalden (Passepartout);
Vaud (Mobilis);
Ticino and Moesano (Arcobaleno); and
northwestern Switzerland (TNW).
A.32 In effect, four distinct types of season ticket are available in Switzerland:
Point-to-point Travelpasses allow only travel on the route between two stations.
Route-zone Travelcards allow travel in the zone around one of the of journey.
Zone-route-zone Travelcards allow travel in the zones around both ends of the journey.
Regional Travelcards allow travel by all modes throughout the region covered.
April 2016 | 159
Switzerland: availability of discounts
A.33 SBB does not clearly list discounts but a range of discounted tickets are available through the
ticket types listed above.
Switzerland: service quality
A.34 We did not identify any documentation setting out standards of service quality in Switzerland.
Switzerland: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.35 SBB’s website provides information in German, French, Italian and English on “passengers with
a handicap”. Features include:
a call centre;
discounts for the General Abonnement, international traffic, and for assistance dogs; and
ID cards for persons with reduced mobility (PRM), distinguishing disabled passengers and
blind and visually impaired passengers.
A.36 As noted above, SBB’s website provides, in German, under “Equipment”, details of facilities for
PRM such as lifts, wheelchair-friendly entrances and exits, wheelchair-accessible ticket
counters, wheelchair-accessible toilets and step-free access.
April 2016 | 160
CZ: Czech Republic
Czech Republic: sources
A.37 The Czech Republic has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received two
stakeholder responses.
Czech Republic: overview of the rail market
Table A.9: Czech Republic: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
78,867
square kilometres
Length of rail network
9,459
kilometres
Population
10,512,419
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
7,664
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
727.1
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€290
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
8.5%
2013
Routes with price competition
Yes
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
8%
2013
Reported punctuality
92.21%
91.94%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
0.17%
0.07%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.38 The Czech Republic has an incumbent national operator České Dráhy (ČD) and two open
access operators, RegioJet and LEO Express, providing competing services on the principal
corridor between Prague and Ostrava.
A.39 Most other services are covered by a national net cost PSO, although there are some regional
and local PSOs on both gross cost and net cost bases.
Czech Republic: journey planning and sales channels
A.40 ČD’s website www.cd.cz provides timetable and ticket information.
A.41 ČD’s website also provides a map display with the real time location of all trains, which can be
clicked on for further details.
A.42 ČD offers reservations for seats, sleepers and couchettes.
A.43 Tickets are sold online and at ticket offices.
Czech Republic: station website
A.44 ČD’s website provides station details with a list of services available including, where
appropriate, contact telephone number and opening hours.
April 2016 | 161
Czech Republic: operator websites
A.45 ČD and the open access operators all have websites:
ČD at www.cd.cz, in Czech (the default language), German and English.
RegioJet at www.regiojet.cz, in Czech (the default language), Slovak, English and German.
LEO Express at www.le.cz, Czech (the default language), English, Polish, Russian and
Ukrainian.
Czech Republic: ticket types
A.46 ČD provides an online guide to searching for ticket types, summarised below.
Table A.10: Czech Republic: ticket types for domestic travel on ČD
Traveller(s)
Type of ticket
Comments
Individuals
One-day travel
Outbound journey
Basic Fare
Discounts for children and students
First Minute Česko
For travel between 114 cities
Action ticket
For travel between selected cities
IN 25%
25% discount card
IN 50%
50% discount card
Outbound and
return journey
Return Fare
Discounts for children
First Minute Česko
For travel between 114 cities
Action ticket
For travel between selected cities
With IN 25%
25% discount card
With IN 50%
50% discount card
Multiple journeys
in a day
Whole Day Ticket
One day of travel: the ticket is
transferrable but may only be used
by one person at a time
Frequent travel
Travel on a single
line
Commuter ticket
Weekly, monthly, quarterly, with
further discounts available
Travel throughout
the network
IN 100%
100% discount
IN 25% or IN 50%
25% or 50% discount
IN Senior
For over-70s, free travel on some
trains, 50% discount on others,
discounts on Pendolinos
For groups
Group of 2-5
Group weekend
ticket
Valid for up to 2 adults and 3
children, offers unlimited travel on a
Saturday, Sunday or state holiday,
either nationally or within a region
Group of 2-30
Group ticket
Discount on Basic Fare and Return
Fare
Business
Transferrable
company ticket
Incidental journeys
Kilometric bank
Pre-pay 2000 kilometres
Basic Fare
Return Fare
Action Ticket
Frequent journeys
IN Business
100% discount
Non-transferrable
individual ticket
IN 100%
100% discount
Source: ČD website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave, other fares apply for international travel.
April 2016 | 162
Czech Republic: availability of discounts
A.47 Rail fares are subject to price controls set by the Ministry of Finance under Act 526/1990 Coll.
“On prices”. Some tariffs and discounts must be honoured by all operators.
A.48 RegioJet summarises tariffs and discounts in a clear table on its website, summarised below,
but does not clearly state the level of discount which applies.
Table A.11: Czech Republic: discounts available on RegioJet
Tariff
Conditions
Validity
Details
Adult
Default tariff.
All rail services
Czech student
pass under 26
Students with a valid Czech under-26
student card issued by a carrier.
All rail services
Czech student
pass under 15
Students with a valid Czech student
card for students under 15 issued by a
carrier.
All rail services
On coaches, the passenger may not sit
in the front row.
ISIC
students with a valid ISIC international
student card.
All rail services
Child under 15
Children aged 0-14 inclusive with any
identity card with their date of birth.
All rail services
On coaches, the passenger may not sit
in the front row.
Attended child
under 6
Children aged 0-5 inclusive travel free
if accompanied by a person over 10
years of age with any identity card
with their date of birth.
All rail services
On coaches, the passenger may not sit
in the front row.
Each person over 10 years of age can
only accompany 1 child with this tariff.
The ticket must be bought as a group
ticket.
Senior over 60
Seniors aged 60 or more with an
identity card with their photo and
date of birth.
Selected rail
services
Senior over 70
Seniors aged 70 or more with an
identity card with their photo and
date of birth.
Rail services in
Slovakia only
Disabled person
ZTP (ZTP/P)
Disabled people with a valid Czech
ZTP or ZTP/P card
Domestic rail
services in the
Czech Republic
Disabled person
attendance ZTP/P
A person accompanying a disabled
person with a valid Czech ZTP/P card
must present the card of the person
they are travelling with, and they are
entitled to transport free of charge on
domestic lines in the form of a group
ticket in the Disabled person ZTP/P
tariff
Domestic rail
services in the
Czech Republic
EYCA
(Euro26)/ALIVE
Students with a valid EYCA/ALIVE
international student card issued by a
carrier
International
rail services
Source; RegioJet website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave, table omits discounts not valid on rail services.
A.49 LEO Express provides documentation on tariffs including entitlements to a special fare for
children, school pupils, PRM and their assistants, parents and guardians visiting disabled
children in institutions and disabled citizens holding ZTP and ZTP/P. We understand that the
LEO Express documentation complies with the elements of tariff regulations and discounts set
out by the Ministry of Finance under Act 526/1990 Coll. “On prices”.
April 2016 | 163
A.50 A stakeholder summarised the discounts available as shown below.
Table A.12: Czech Republic: availability of discounts
Discount
Category
25%
Disabled persons (PRM)
40%
Students up to 15 years
50%
Children under 15 years
60%
Students over 15 years
Source: stakeholder engagement, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
Czech Republic: service quality
A.51 We did not identify any documentation setting out standards of service quality in the Czech
Republic.
Czech Republic: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.52 ČD’s website provides detailed accessibility for stations, as shown in the example below, in
which detailed standards are assigned a code.
Table A.13: Czech Republic: facilities for PRM
Facility
Code
Details
Mobile Platform Lift
The station is equipped with a mobile platform lift for the boarding and
disembarking of passengers using a wheelchair into and out of the carriage.
Station Accessibility
b1
Access to the statin building is disabled accessible,
including marked accessible ticket counters.
Platform
Accessibility
n1
All platforms are disabled accessible.
Accessibility for the
Visually Impaired
z2
The station is equipped for the visually impaired
(guiding line).
Accessibility for the
Visually Impaired
z3
The station is equipped for the visually impaired
(information panels with voice output).
Accessibility for the
Hearing Impaired
s2
The station is equipped for the hearing impaired
(electronic information system).
Accessibility for the
Hearing Impaired
s1
The station is equipped for the hearing impaired
(induction loop in the ticket office).
Source: ČD website for Praha hlavní nádraží station, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
A.53 However, the table cannot be interpreted without the more detailed guide summarised
below.
April 2016 | 164
Table A.14: Czech Republic: coding of facilities including PRM
Issue
Code
Meaning
Degrees of
station
accessibility
b0
Not accessible even with the assistance of a ČD employee.
b1
Accessible without the assistance of a ČD employee (access from in front of the station to
at least one platform in some manner – even outside the building) without the possibility
of additional services.
b2
Accessible without the assistance of a ČD employee (access from in front of the station to
at least one platform in some manner – even outside the building) with the possibility of
additional services.
b3
Accessible including the platforms (access from in front of the station to all platforms)
without additional services.
b4
Accessible including the platforms (access from in front of the station to all platforms)
with substitute measures with the assistance of a ČD employee, without additional
services.
b5
Accessible including the platforms (access from in front of the station to the railway
building premises and to all platforms) including an accessible toilet.
b6
Accessible including the platforms (access from in front of the station to the railway
building premises and to all platforms) including an accessible toilet, with substitute
measures with the help of a ČD employee.
b7
Accessible and usable (access from in front of the station to all platforms) including an
accessible toilet and other services or at least one ticket counter designated as accessible
where persons using wheelchairs will be provided all necessary information as well as
assistance during ticketing.
b8
Accessible and usable (access from in front of the station to all platforms) with substitute
measures with the assistance of a ČD employee including an accessible toilet and other
services or at least one ticket counter designated as accessible where persons using
wheelchairs will be provided all necessary information as well as assistance during
ticketing.
Mobile platform
lift
Not even after modernising stations and elevating the level of platforms can accessible
boarding be assured for trains that are not low-platform and do not have their own
platform lift. This problem is addressed at certain stations with a mobile platform lift
allowing for boarding of such trains by wheelchair users.
Station
accessibility for
the hearing
impaired
s1
Equipped for the hearing impaired (induction loop in the ticket office).
s2
Equipped for the hearing impaired (electronic information system).
Station
accessibility for
the visually
impaired
z1
Equipped for the visually impaired (acoustic beacons, handrail plate) .
z2
Equipped for the visually impaired (guiding line).
z3
Equipped for the visually impaired (information panels with voice output).
Source: ČD website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
April 2016 | 165
DE: Germany
Germany: sources
A.54 Germany has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received one
stakeholder response.
Germany: overview of the rail market
Table A.15: Germany: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
357,022
square kilometres
Length of rail network
33,446
kilometres
Population
80,767,463
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
90,978
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
1126.4
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
11,547
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
8%
2013
Routes with price competition
Yes
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
8.5%
2013
Reported punctuality
93.3%
74.2%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
0.70%
0.30%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.55 Rail services in Germany can be subdivided into open access long-distance services and
regional services, which in the majority of the cases are competitively awarded by regional
PSO authorities, such as the Bayerische Eisenbahngesellschaft in the federal state of Bavaria.
A.56 In long-distance services, the operators set their own fares and market their services. The
incumbent operator Deutsche Bahn still has a market share of more than 99% in long-distance
services, so that its fares dominate the perception of long-distance rail fares in Germany.
Tickets for Deutsche Bahn long-distance services are often also valid on regional services on
the same route, with the exception of the services of some new entrants.
A.57 For short distances a tariff association may set fares, for travel wholly within its area, which
are often valid on other modes such as bus, tram and metro services.
A.58 Some federal states set fares for journeys on regional rail services of medium length within
their area. For journeys comprising multiple states and not covered by a single tariff
association, Deutsche Bahn’s fares generally apply.
Germany: journey planning and sales channels
A.59 Germany has no independent provider of information on rail journeys and/or tickets for all rail
operators, and passengers must rely on operator information on services.
A.60 Deutsche Bahn’s website offers a rail journey planning tool covering journeys by rail, and by
many other public transport services such as metros and local buses, by operators across
April 2016 | 166
Europe and beyond. This tool includes services of open access competitor HKX between
Hamburg and Köln. However, our initial research suggests that the algorithm may avoid
displaying HKX services, depending on the preferred departure time selected. For example:
A search for departure at 16:00 lists four Deutsche Bahn services departing between
16:01 and 16:46, but does not list the HKX service departing at 16:49, which is only shown
after clicking on “later”.
A search for departure at 16:15 lists only three Deutsche Bahn services departing between
16:10 and 16:46, but still does not list the HKX service departing at 16:49.
A search for departure at 16:30 lists the HKX service on the default screen.
A.61 Deutsche Bahn long-distance tickets are sold at stations, in ticket offices and at ticket
machines, and online, via its website or via an app for mobile devices. Tickets for long-distance
services can also be bought on the train with a surcharge of €7.50.
A.62 Deutsche Bahn’s annual quality report states that:
Its website it answers 7.5 million journey planning queries per day and sells around 2.5
million tickets every month.
Its mobile app, DB Navigator, Deutsche Bahn sells 420,000 tickets per month.
A.63 As of June 2014, tickets bought on the website can be loaded onto DB Navigator, avoiding the
need to print the ticket.
A.64 Deutsche Bahn also offers tickets valid on HKX services, but at a significantly higher price than
on the HKX website. This appears to be because it sells “interavailable” tickets such as the
Quer-durchs-Land-Ticket or Deutsche Bahn standard fare, which are also valid on HKX trains
50
.
Germany: station website
A.65 The company owning and operating many railway stations in Germany is DB Station&Service
AG, which like the incumbent operator Deutsche Bahn is a subsidiary of DB Mobility Logistics
AG. The website of DB Station&Service AG, www.bahnhof.de, offers basic information on
facilities and services available at each station. This includes and basic information such as
opening hours, ticket offices, left luggage, barrier-free access, a map of the station location
and, for larger stations, a layout map, as shown below.
50
KCW and Prognos (2015) Wettbewerber-Report Eisenbahn 2015/2016. Report prepared by KCW
GmbH and Prognos AG on behalf of mofair e.V. and Netzwerk Europäischer Eisenbahnen e.V.
April 2016 | 167
Figure A.2: Germany: station facilities information
Source: www.bahnhof.de.
A.66 The website also provides a link to an online real time departure and arrival board, showing on
each the next 10 trains with up to date information on delays and platforms.
Germany: operator website
A.67 Deutsche Bahn’s website provides a variety of information related to rail journeys to
passengers:
There is a detailed description of services provided, including urban, regional,
international and high speed services.
There is information on the different ticket types, fares and discounts available.
Trains can be tracked on a map in real time. (From April 2014, this service is also available
via the DB Zugradar app.)
Seats can be booked on many ICE services. The website shows a seat diagram of each
coach similar to those offered by airlines.
A.68 Open access operator HKX provides its own website (www.hkx.de) in German and also with
limited information in English (including a specific reassurance that all staff speak English).
Germany: ticket types
A.69 Deutsche Bahn offers special fares (Rail&Fly) for journeys between the airport and the final
travel destination in Germany. Rail&Fly tickets can be bought with the air ticket of Rail&Fly
partner airlines, and are valid on the day before and the day of the outbound flight, the day of
the return flight, and the following day.
April 2016 | 168
Germany: availability of discounts
A.70 A selection of the discounts available on standard fares set out below.
Table A.16: Discounts available in Germany
Category
Discount
Deutsche Bahn
Special Price
Non-flexible tariff starting from €29 (or €19 for journeys up to 250 kilometres) Second Class
and €39 First Class.
Bookable online up to 91 days in advance and in ticket offices up to six months in advance.
Deutsche Bahn
BahnCard
BahnCard 25: 25% discount on Deutsche Bahn standard fare and Special Price; €62 Second
Class, €125 First Class.
BahnCard 50: 50% discount on Deutsche Bahn standard fare only; €255 Second Class, €515
First Class.
BahnCard 100: 100% discount, or free travel, on all Deutsche Bahn services and most other rail
operators across Germany: €4,090 Second Class, €6,890 First Class.
Quer-durchs-
Land-Ticket,
and similar
tickets
Ticket valid one day in all regional services operated by Deutsche Bahn and other participating
operators across Germany. Price for one person is €44, and an additional €8 for each
additional passenger up to a group of five. On weekdays valid from 09:00 until 03:00 the
following day, on weekend days valid the whole day.
Ländertickets are similar tickets valid only in one federal state (such as Bayernticket), or a
combination of smaller states. In addition there are variations of this ticket, such as valid after
18:00.
Another variation of the Quer-durchs-Land-Ticket is the Schönes-Wochenende-Ticket which is
valid on a weekend day and costs €40 for one person and €4 for any additional passenger for a
group of up to five. In addition to all regional rail services, this ticket is also valid in all public
transport modes in many tariff associations across Germany. It is therefore not clear why this
ticket is substantially cheaper than the Quer-durchs-Land-Ticket which can also be bought for a
weekend day.
Deutsche Bahn
monthly
commuter
ticket
Valid for an unlimited number of journeys on Deutsche Bahn services between two stations;
available for station pairs with distances of up to 400 kilometres.
On Saturdays one additional person and up to three children travel at no additional charge.
Annual tickets cost the same as 10 monthly tickets.
Deutsche Bahn
Job Ticket
Deutsche Bahn grants additional discounts on monthly commuter tickets when an employer
buys at least 20 Job Tickets.
Discounts rise gradually from 5% for 20-49 Job Tickets to 13% for 2,000 or more Job Tickets.
Deutsche Bahn
discounts for
groups
Available as an online group ticket for 6-20 passengers, bookable up to three months in
advance, and as Group Special Price ticket for 6-99 passengers, bookable up to 12 months in
advance.
Source: Deutsche Bahn website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
A.71 KCW and Prognos (2015) point out that Deutsche Bahn recognised in internal analysis that
over time its tariff system became rather chaotic, and lost a clear structure. Some tariffs are
cannibalising others, and neither passengers nor its own staff fully understand it. For example,
for some long-distance commuter journeys an annual Bahncard 100 may be the most cost-
effective ticket.
Germany: service quality
A.72 DB Fernverkehr publishes an annual quality report (Qualitätsbericht) which includes
information on its activities related to passenger information and ticket sales, including
information on the quality of its services, services related to PRMs, and complaint
management.
April 2016 | 169
A.73 We did not identify any documentation setting out standards of service quality in Germany.
However, DB’s website provides, in a number of languages, details of passenger rights under
the Passenger Rights Act which came into force on 29 July 2009. Links in various languages are
provided to a Passenger Rights Claim Form, which is available in German and English.
A.74 This section of the website specifically states that rights apply to through tickets on trains
operated by different operating companies.
Germany: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.75 DB’s website provides detailed information in German for PRM. It makes clear that PRM
includes those with learning disabilities, the deaf and hard of hearing, the blind and those with
impaired grip, dwarfism or other disabilities. The website provides information, in German,
that:
Booking of assistance can be carried out through the Mobility Service Centre, contactable
by email, fax and telephone, and with provision for deaf customers.
Boarding lifts or ramps are available at “almost all passenger stations”
51
, many trains
including integrated lifts, ramps or manual levellers, and approximately 300 stations have
staff who can provide assistance.
Wheelchairs spaces are available on trains in limited numbers and booking is
recommended.
Those with at least a 70% disability can buy a BahnCard 25 or BahnCard 50 (see above) at
a reduced price.
A special luggage service is available, for €16.50, for those with a disabled pass.
A.76 DB provides specific details on periods when assistance is available, the availability of lifts and
ramps, meeting arrangements and minimum transfer times. Conditions for the carriage of
wheelchairs, mobility scooters, Zimmer frames, and crutches is covered, including where
appropriate details of the maximum sizes and weights that can be accommodated.
A.77 Disabled passengers are also reminded of the Passenger Rights legislation.
51
“ fast alle Bahnhöfe des Personenfernverkehrs”
April 2016 | 170
EE: Estonia
Estonia: sources
A.78 Estonia has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS but we have received no stakeholder
responses.
Estonia: overview of the rail market
Table A.17: Estonia: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
45,228
square kilometres
Length of rail network
1,510
kilometres
Population
1,315,819
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
280
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
212.8
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€2
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
1.7%
2013
Routes with price competition
No
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
2%
2013
Reported punctuality
99.18%
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
0.06%
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.79 Estonia has a single national rail operator, ELRON.
Estonia: journey planning and sales channels
A.80 ERADIS reports that information about Elron’s services is available via:
Elron website at www.elron.ee;
By phone, open 24 hours per day, and office phones during office working hours; and
on board trains, which usually have a customer service member ready to provide
information and help.
A.81 Information about trains is published on platforms and at stations. On some trains electronic
displays provide information about on the destination, next and subsequent stops, speed and
outside temperature.
A.82 Tickets for same day travel can be bought at information kiosks at the Baltic Station (Balti
Jaam, see above) and Tartu Station.
A.83 Advance ticket sales at ticket kiosks ends:
15 minutes before departure, for Second Class; and
1 hour before departure, for First Class tickets.
A.84 30 day tickets can be bought from:
Elron’s website and www.pilet.elron.ee;
On train, with cash or money loaded onto the Elron fare card or with a bank card.
April 2016 | 171
Estonia: station website
A.85 Elron provides only limited information on station facilities, but its website does have a plan of
the main Balti Jaam station in Tallinn, reproduced below.
Figure A.3: Estonia: station facilities information
Source: ELRON website, station shown is Balti Jaam in Tallinn.
Estonia: operator website
A.86 Timetables are published on Elron’s website and are available on every platform. Information
on arrival and departure platforms is published in large stations such as Tallinn and Tartu.
Estonia: ticket types
A.87 Fares are published at Elron’s website, by telephone, at selected platforms at large stations,
and inside the trains.
A.88 There are zonal fares around Tallinn and Tartu, but other fares are still “kilometric”, based on
a price per kilometre.
April 2016 | 172
Figure A.4: Estonia: example of presentation of fares
Source: ELRON.
A.89 A stakeholder reported the ticket types as listed below, but made no reference to the Ekspress
fares shown above.
Table A.18: Estonia: ticket types
Ticket types
Single tickets, valid on board a specific train
First Class tickets
24 hour Travelcards
30 day Travelcards
Source: stakeholder engagement, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
Estonia: availability of discounts
A.90 A stakeholder reported the availability of the discounts shown below, although Elron’s website
provides a slightly different list.
April 2016 | 173
Table A.19: Estonia: availability of discounts
Discount
Eligibility
10%
Travelcards
50%
School pupils
College and university students
People aged 65 and older
Retired persons
Persons accompanying disabled children
Persons aged 16 years or more who have a serious or moderate disability
Persons accompanying a person having a profound disability aged 16 years or more
100%
Pre-school children (only one pre-school child can travel for free with a parent in First Class)
Disabled children under 16 years old
Profoundly disabled people over 16 years old
Person accompanying a person having a profound or severe visual disability
A guide dog accompanying a person having a visual disability
Source: stakeholder engagement, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
A.91 Documents accepted as certifying the right for a discount are listed below.
Table A.20: Estonia: documents necessary for discounts
Documents certifying the right for a discount
Student card or the equivalent ISIC Scholar Card
Student identification card or the equivalent ISIC Student Card
Republic of Estonia pension certificate
Disability certifying document issued by the Estonian National Social Insurance Board, with an identity document
Source: stakeholder engagement, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
Estonia: service quality
A.92 The rights and obligations of passengers and the rail operator are set out in the passenger
transport rules, accessible on Elron’s home page with extracts publicised on trains. The
passenger transport rules include a section on the management of passenger complaints. A
separate document, issued by Elron, covers terms and conditions for refunds and the
voluntary return of tickets. This document is also accessible on Elron’s webpage.
A.93 Customer complaints and inquiries, by telephone, by email and online, are registered with an
individual identification number in the general document management system.
Estonia: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.94 ERADIS reports that information for PRM is provided through general procedures but that, as
of 2014, no station in Estonia had personnel to provide help for PRM. New FLIRT type electrical
trains are in compliance with TSI for disabled persons. Together with appearance of new type
of modern trains railway stations were reconstructed, platforms lowered and infrastructure
modernized to be in accordance with TSI. Elron’s customer service crew on board provides
necessary help only on board to the extent possible. Rules on carriage of disabled passengers
are under implementation.
April 2016 | 174
ES: Spain
Spain: sources
A.95 Spain has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received one stakeholder
response.
Spain: overview of the rail market
Table A.21: Spain: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
505,370
square kilometres
Length of rail network
15,937
kilometres
Population
46,512,199
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
24,915
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
535.7
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€1,875
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
6.1%
2013
Routes with price competition
No
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
6%
2013
Reported punctuality
91.88%
97.35%
85.57%
Local
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
0.58%
0.48%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.96 Spain has a single national operator RENFE, providing conventional and high speed services.
RENFE also operates commuter services (“Rodalies” in Barcelona, “Cercanías” elsewhere) for
competent authorities in the major regional cities.
Spain: journey planning and sales channels
A.97 Information on timetables, fares and arrival and departure platforms is available at ticket
offices located in the stations, and on the information panels, screens and data display
monitors. Information about timetables and fares can be found at:
Renfe’s website www.renfe.com;
a mobile app with Internet connection;
a telephone service, RENFE CONTIGO, which offers commercial information; and
web-based social networks.
A.98 Tickets can be bought through Renfe’s website, at travel agencies, at station ticket offices and
at ticket vending machines. With the exception of stations with very few passengers, stations
are staffed by employees who sell tickets and offer information to customers. Unstaffed
stations have automatic ticket vending machines which offer contact with sales staff.
Spain: station website
A.99 Infrastructure manager ADIF provides information on stations , as in the examples below.
April 2016 | 175
Figure A.5: Spain: station facilities information
Source: ADIF website.
Figure A.6: Spain: station facilities information
Source: ADIF website, note that plan does not show security-related barriers and equipment.
April 2016 | 176
Spain: operator website
A.100 Renfe’s website is at www.renfe.es.
Spain: ticket types
A.101 Renfe’s website at www.renfe.com/viajeros/tarifas offers the following fares in Spanish.
Table A.22: Spain: ticket types
As listed
Meaning
Conditions
Ida y vuelta
Return
Available for AVE, long-distance, Avant and medium distance conventional
services
Niños
Children
40% discount for children under 14 who occupy a seat
100% discount for children under 4 who do not occupy a seat
100% discount for up to two children, who do not occupy seats, under six (on
Cercanías services) or four (on Rodalies services in Barcelona)
Compra
Múltiple
Multiple
purchase
20% discount on three journeys completing a circuit back to the starting
point
Billete Promo
For AVE and long-distance trains, dynamically priced with discounts of up to
70%
Billete
Promo+
For AVE and long-distance trains, dynamically priced with discounts of up to
65%
Billete
Flexible
The same price as the General/Base tariff, but with better conditions
regarding changes and cancellations
Tarifa 4 Mesa
For AVE and long-distance trains, up to four people seated around a table, at
60% of the cost of four seats, only available on suitable trains and cannot be
combined with other offers
Combinado
Tren+Autobús
Combined train
and bus
Combines a rail ticket with a ticket on one of five interurban bus operators to
provide connections beyond the rail network
Turista Plus
For some AVE and long-distance trains, a 20% discount on Turista class,
which can be combined with any tariff
BonoAVE
For all AVE and some long-distance trains, a non-transferrable (“nominative”)
ticket giving a 35% discount on the General/Base fare for ten round trips
between named stations
BonoAVE
Flexible
For all AVE and some long-distance trains, a non-transferrable (“nominative”)
ticket for ten round trips anywhere on the trains covered, for €725 (Turista)
and €1,200 (Preferente), for travel to be completed within four months
BonoAVE
Colaborativo
For all AVE and some long-distance trains, a non-transferable ticket for four
named people for eight round trips between named stations
Abono Plus
(Avant)
For 30 or 50 journeys, to be completed within a 30-day period within six
months of purchase
Abonos
Mensuales
Monthly tickets
Non-transferrable ticket for travel between two name stations, with up to
two journeys per day on Rodalies services in Barcelona or unlimited travel
elsewhere, some variation between regions
Tarjeta Plus
10
On Avant trains, a non-transferrable ticket for ten single journeys to be
completed in eight days within two months of purchase
Tarjeta Plus
10
Estudiantes
On Avant trains, a non-transferrable ticket for ten single journeys to be
completed in ten days within two months of purchase, for holders of a
student card
Tarjeta
Dorada
Over-60,
disabled and
disabled
companion card
For AVE and long-distance trains, a €6 annual card for passengers aged over
60 or disabled passengers over 18 entitling them to a 25% discount Friday to
Sunday and a 40% discount Monday to Thursday: those over 65% disabled
can also take a companion
April 2016 | 177
As listed
Meaning
Conditions
Tarjeta
+Renfe Joven
50
Non-transferrable €50 card for those aged 14-25 (inclusive) with discounts on
AVE and long-distance (50% if booked over 30 days ahead, 40% if booked
over 15 days ahead, or 30%), 25% on suburban (Cercanías or Rodalies),
medium distance and Avant
Carné Joven
Youth carnet
For AVE, long-distance and medium-distance trains, for those aged 14-25
(inclusive), issued by a local administration, giving a 20% discount on any
train and class: for Avant trains, equivalent discounts are also offered to
holders of various youth cards issued in other countries
Familia
Numerosa
Large family
For families with documents issued by the competent authority, on any fare,
a discount of 20% for members of the Familia Numerosa and 50% for
members of the Familia Numerosa Especial
Grupos -
Descuentos
Group discounts
For AVE and long-distance trains, for groups from 10 to 25, 20% off the
General fare and 30% off return tickets
For medium-distance conventional trains, for groups of 10 or more, 20% off
the General fare and 40% for children under 14 (or 40% for adults and 50%
for children from schools, associations and cultural organisations) and free
for children under 4
For Avant trains, for groups from 10 to 25, and by application for groups over
25, 15% off the General fare
For charter trains, as agreed in the charter contract
For Cercanías and FEVE (narrow gauge lines), discounts on the General fare
of 30%, 40% for return tickets and 50% for children under 12, with additional
discounts in specific local marketing campaigns
Different rules apply in the Cercanías of Madrid, Murcia/Alicante and
Valencia
None of the group discounts can be combined with any other discount
Congresos y
Eventos
Conferences
and events
Discounts on all trains for a minimum of 75 people assisting an event, applied
for 30 days in advance, valid from two days before to two days after the
event
Renfe Spain
Pass
Valid only for non-residents of Spain, and requires a passport, for 4, 6, 8, 10
or 12 journeys in Turista or Club class completed in a month within six
months of purchase
Source: Renfe website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave, conditions have been translated and summarised.
Spain: availability of discounts
A.102 See the description of ticket types listed above. The range of discounts is complex.
Spain: service quality
A.103 Every year, Renfe conducts perceived quality surveys disaggregated into long-distance (high
speed and conventional), medium distance (high speed and conventional) and commuter.
Spain: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.104 In addition to the information systems available to any passenger, Renfe offers a specific
service for disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility (PRM) called ATENDO. This
offers help and personalised supervision during the journey and can be accessed by telephone,
online or at customer service centres in various stations.
A.105 Permanent assistance is provided at 68 rail network stations and may be requested up to 30
minutes before the train departs. Specific assistance is provided at 59 rail network stations and
must be requested at least 12 hours in advance.
April 2016 | 178
FR: France
France: sources
A.106 France has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received one stakeholder
response.
France: overview of the rail market
Table A.23: France: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
643,801
square kilometres
Length of rail network
30,581
kilometres
Population
65,835,579
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
89,499
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
1359.4
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€11,119
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
9.4%
2013
Routes with price competition
No
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
9%
2013
Reported punctuality
91.46%
90.61%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
2.15%
0.92%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.107 France has a single national rail operator, SNCF, providing high speed (TGV) and conventional
services including commuter services in Paris and other large cities.
A.108 SNCF Gares et Connexions provides information on station facilities.
France: journey planning and sales channels
A.109 SNCF’s main website (www.sncf.com) provides information in French (the default language),
German and English on reservations, timetables and real-time traffic, and information on
stations and points of sale.
A.110 The reservation facility provides functionality to search by origin, destination, time and class of
travel, and to specify the age of the passenger(s) and any discount or loyalty cards they hold.
A.111 Passenger services information provides a link to points of sale, which in turn provides details
of:
There is a map-based tool for finding authorised travel agencies.
There is a map-based tool for finding SNCF sales offices.
An online help service is based on instant messaging to “Léa”, a member of staff.
There is a client service hotline “36 35”.
There are internet and mobile app options.
Stations information is provided, including information on self-service machines.
A.112 Information is also accessible on promotions and special deals.
April 2016 | 179
France: station website
A.113 SNCF Gares et Connexions provides a range of information on stations including real time
departures, arrivals and platform numbers and details of the facilities available at the station.
A.114 Information on station facilities, shown below, includes opening and closing times and a link to
PRM services (“Services accessibilité”).
A.115 The information also includes an interactive panoramic viewer of parts of the station with
floating blue signs to particular facilities: by clicking on the sign the view will move through the
station to show the route between facilities, incidentally illustrating barriers such as steps.
Figure A.7: France: station facilities information
Source: SNCF Gares et Connexions, Poitiers.
Figure A.8: France: station facilities information
Source: SNCF Gares et Connexions, Poitiers, floating blue signs provide links to different parts of the station.
April 2016 | 180
France: operator website
A.116 SNCF’s timetable and real-time traffic updates facility provides functionality by journey, train
and station:
By journey, it provides the same functionality as a journey planner.
By train, it provides information based on a train number, showing timetable, progress
and platform numbers and the range of facilities offered on board.
By station, it provides real-time information on departures including platform number,
the stops to be served and the classes of accommodation available.
France: ticket types
A.117 A stakeholder informed us that SNCF fare policy by can be subdivided as:
commercial fares (freely decided by SNCF);
national social fares (decided by State); and
regional social fares (decided by regions as competent authorities).
A.118 Commercial fares, a stakeholder reported, may be designed for professional and/or leisure
purposes, such as the weekend discount pass (“carte week-end”), youth discount pass (“carte
jeune 12-27”) and senior discount pass (“carte senior 60+”), which allow fare reductions but
with restrictions on exchanges or refund.
A.119 National social fares are usually defined by the law and offer discounts for specific type of
passengers. The current types of discounts are listed below.
Table A.24: France: availability of discounts
Category
Large families (from 3 children under 18)
Military families paying a tribute to the grave of soldiers who have died on duty
War veterans
Work subscription from home to work under 75 kilometres
“Popular” ticket for annual leave
Children’s walks
Students/apprentices
Persons accompanying disabled people
Source: stakeholder engagement, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
A.120 National social fares are compensated in order to limit their effect on the commercial results
of the railway undertaking.
A.121 Regional fares are set by regions to improve the attractiveness of rail as a mode.
France: availability of discounts
A.122 SNCF’s website provides, under “cards & discounts” (the English version, at
www.sncf.com/en/special-deals) a structured list of the various cards and discounts available,
as summarised below.
April 2016 | 181
Table A.25: France: availability of discounts
Category
Discount
Details
Travel for
all ages
Under 12
Under
4
100%
Children under four travel free if not using a seat, except on
iDTGVs.
Three types of discounts are available: Bambin (TGV, TER and
Intercité services); Enfant+ Railcard, including a seat, and “kid
fares” (on Thalys services)
Under
11
50%
On all trains except iDTGV.
Junior & Cie service for children aged 4-11 to travel in a group.
12-27
25-60%
Jeune 12-17 Railcard (€50), Jeune 18-27 Railcard (€50)
25% saving on all fares
50% discount on off-peak TER and Intercité trains not requiring
booking
Up to 60% on pre-booked TGV and Intercité services
Special last minute discounts
28 or more
25-50%
Weekend Railcard (€75)
Various discounts at weekends
60 or more
25-50%
Senior+ Railcard (€60)
Travel with
others
Family
30-75%
Familles nombreuses Railcard (€19 for one family)
A range of discounts for a family
Minigroupes
Groups of 3-6 people travelling together on TGVs
Groups
Group discounts on request for travel by 10 or more people
Daily travel
Paris region
Navigo pass
Other regions
TER regional passes
National
All lines
Forfait pass, providing unlimited travel on TGV and Intercité,
subject to a €1.50 charge to reserve a seat
One route
Optiforfait pass, providing unlimited travel on a nominated
route
Business
Second Class
Pro 2nde flexible Second Class ticket
First Class
Pro 1ère flexible First Class ticket
Period
50%
Fréquence, giving a discount on Pro 2nde and pro 1ère for large
volumes of travel for the national network or a single route
Special
fares
Employees
Discounted period travel for commuting under 75 kilometres
Children’s
groups
75%
Discounts for 10 or more children under 15 years, on TGV,
Intercité and TER services
Students and
apprentices
Up to
50%
Under 21 and at school, under 23 and in an apprenticeship, or
under 26 and in higher education: nine journeys per month free
and 50% off further journeys
Military
personnel
Up to
75%
Militaire card, on TGV, Intercité and TER services, with discounts
of 25-50% for spouse and family members
Disabled
veteran
50-75%
Discount depends on disability rating
PRM
50-100%
On TGV, Intercité and TER services, for passenger and
companion
Source: SNCF website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
April 2016 | 182
France: service quality
A.123 SNCF’s website sets out, under “our commitments”, information , ombudsman and the
general conditions of carriage and a series of guarantees:
There is reschedule or refund guarantee if a train is delayed more than one hour.
There is a seat guarantee if no seat is available on a train journey of over 90 minutes.
There is an assistance guarantee, in the event of major problems, to help passengers
continue their journey and find accommodation.
There is a punctuality guarantee if arrival is delayed more than 30 minutes.
There is a complaint guarantee of a response within five days to online claim forms
submitted to the customer service department.
France: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.124 As noted above, the website of SNCF Gares et Connexions provides a link to accessibility
information at each stage, an example of which is shown below.
April 2016 | 183
Figure A.9: France: information in station PRM facilities
Source: SNCF Gares et Connexions, Poitiers.
A.125 The information includes the availability of station staff, assistance for boarding and alighting
from trains, wheelchairs, tactile marking on platform edges (only available on some
platforms), information screens, passenger announcements, toilets and wheelchair-accessible
toilets. There are also links to further information relevant to wheelchair users, those with
learning difficulties, the blind and the deaf.
A.126 SNCF’s main website also provides information, under passenger services, on “on-board
services & special amenities” including an overview of services offered on trains, a link to the
disability access services (Accès) with arrangements for PRM access to the network, and a link
to a (French language) 84-page “Limited Mobility Guide” (Guide Mobilité Réduite).
April 2016 | 184
IT: Italy
Italy: sources
A.127 Italy has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received two stakeholder
responses.
Italy: overview of the rail market
Table A.26: Italy: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
301,340
square kilometres
Length of rail network
17,070
kilometres
Population
60.8
million
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
48,881
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
804
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€2,950
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
6.3%
2013
Routes with price competition
Yes
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
7.60%
2013
Reported punctuality
81.5%
65.0%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
3.0%
0.7%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.128 Italy has an incumbent operator, Trenitalia, and a new entrant high speed operator, NTV,
operating as “Italo” in competition with Trenitalia on the main north-south high speed line.
Italy: journey planning and sales channels
A.129 Trenitalia’s website provides extensive information on train services, sales channels and
station facilities. Passengers can plan their journey by two means:
The Trenitalia website provides information on ticket types, discounts, means of payment
at the station or online and facilities for passengers with reduced mobility.
The central stations’ webpage provides real time updates on arrival and departure times,
platform information, service calling points and disruption.
Italo operates its own website and reservation system.
A.130 Tickets have in the past been sold:
in advance through travel agents;
at station ticket offices during opening hours; and
on board the train, at an additional charge.
A.131 Major stations continue to host travel agencies and local ticket desk as well as ticket vending
machines, but tickets are now also sold through call centres, online, and smartphone apps.
April 2016 | 185
A.132 Payment can be by credit card, PayPal, Masterpass or via Bemoov, an online payment system.
Those with no credit card can use the “Postoclick” reservation and sales system, in which
payment, identified by the passenger name record (PNR) code, may be made between 24 and
48 hours after booking and at least 24 hours before departure at Unicredit cashpoints or
online payments systems Lottomatica and Sisal.
Italy: station website
A.133 Most Italian railway station websites provide an overview of the services available, including:
ticket sales facilities, accepted payment methods and ticket office opening hours. Station
websites also provide information on other services such as local transport connections,
parking or cycle facilities and free WiFi.
Italy: operator website
A.134 Trenitalia’s website offers a detailed description of services provided, including urban,
regional, international and high speed services, and ticket types, fares and discounts available.
A.135 Italo’s website provides equivalent information on its own high speed services.
Italy: ticket types
A.136 Trenitalia tickets available, both online and at stations include:
Base tickets are valid on all services except executive services, and allow unlimited
changes to departure day and time before departure. A passenger missing a train is also
permitted, within one hour of the original departure, to change to another train.
Economy tickets are available on Frecciarossa and Frecciargento trains, in First and
Second class and for Business, Premium and Standard service, and sleeping cars and
couchettes. The date and departure time can be changed to another train of the same
category once before departure, subject to the payment of any difference in fare.
Super economy tickets are available on all trains in First and Second Class, Business,
Premium, Standard, and sleeping cars and couchettes. The number of tickets available is
limited and varies with the day, train, class and train. This ticket is usually the cheapest
available, but cannot be combined with any other reductions.
A.137 First Class, available on some trains, includes a welcome service, free morning newspapers,
bar, larger seating and luggage space, a baby changing table, “La Freccia” magazine and an on-
board cleaning service.
A.138 Other offers such as same day return, weekend return, blocks of 10 journeys and group travel
are available on the Trenitalia website and are usually available for both First Class and Second
Class services.
A.139 Cycles can be carried on trains with a bicycle icon in the timetable, usually for an additional fee
of €3.50 for urban and regional trains and €12 for international trains.
A.140 Trenitalia also offers reduced fares on rail tickets bought in combination with:
ferries, including Adria Ferries, Attica Group and SNAV; or
airlines, including Alitalia, Air France KLM, Meridiana Fly, Emirates, Air Canada, El Al,
Egyptair, Qatar airways, Singapore Airlines and Air Transat.
April 2016 | 186
Italy: availability of discounts
A.141 Discounts are available as set out below, in some cases requiring the possession or purchase of
a specific card.
Table A.27: Italy: availability of discounts
Category
Discount
Group of 10 or more travelling together
30% reduction on Frecciarossa, Frecciargento, Frecciabianca,
Espressi and InterCity services in sleeping cars and couchettes
10% on regional trains
Group including children aged 5 to 12
Age under 4
100%, if they are with an adult and do not occupy a seat
Age 4-12
50%
Age 12 to 26
By buying a €40 Green Card ("Carta Verde”):
10% for base fares (First and Second Class) on all domestic trains
including sleeping cars and couchette at Business, Premium and
Standard service levels
25% for international services
Age 60 to 75
By buying a €30 Silver Card (“Carta Argento”):
10% for sleeping cars and couchettes
15% for base fares (First and Second class) on all domestic trains
and at Business, Premium and Standard service levels
25% for international services
Age 75 or more
With a free Silver Card (“Carta Argento”):
10% for sleeping cars and couchettes
15% for base fares (First and Second class) on all domestic trains
and at Business, Premium and Standard service levels
25% for international services
“Night&AV”
Discount for travel on night or high speed trains (“Alta Velocità”, AV)
Source: Trenitalia website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave
A.142 Further offers and discounts, which may vary by time and location, are available online.
A.143 Standard, weekly and monthly fares are set by the regional authorities, who may also offer
different discounts for groups such as children and the unemployed.
Italy: service quality
A.144 Stations typically provide real time information on arrivals and departures, platform numbers,
delays and disruption, and facilities on each train such as WiFi, conditions of carrying cycles or
pets, assistance for children and food and drinks on board.
A.145 Trenitalia and the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure agreed on a set of minimum quality
standards for passenger services, summarised as follows:
“Carta dei Servizi Passeggeri media lunga percorrenza” setting out quality standards on
long-distance and international services.
“Carta dei Servizi Regionali” in each region, setting out quality standards for regional
services.
A.146 Trenitalia publishes an annual monitoring report (“Relazione sulla qualita’ dei servizi di
Trenitalia”) on the quality of the train services including punctuality, cancellations, on-board
April 2016 | 187
cleaning and customer satisfaction. This also sets out services for disabled passengers,
procedures for claiming refunds, and proposed service improvements.
Italy: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.147 RFI’s website provides details of the notice required to book assistance, the hours during
assistance is provided, and a detailed description of the facilities available, as shown below.
April 2016 | 188
Figure A.10: Italy: information for PRM
Source: RFI website.
April 2016 | 189
NL: Netherlands
Netherlands: sources
A.148 The Netherlands has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS but we have received no
stakeholder responses.
Netherlands: overview of the rail market
Table A.28: Netherlands: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
41,543
square kilometres
Length of rail network
3,032
kilometres
Population
16,829,289
million
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
17,700
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
1051.7
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€2,133
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
10.5%
2013
Routes with price competition
No
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
10%
2013
Reported punctuality
94.9%
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
1.9%
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.149 The Netherlands has a relatively dense network with a national fares system based on the OV-
Kaart. Services are provided by incumbent operator NS and a number of operators, including
Arriva, Breng and Connexxion (both Transdev companies), Syntus, Veolia, under contract to
regional competent authorities.
Netherlands: journey planning and sales channels
A.150 Operator NL’s website, www.ns.nl, provides information in Dutch and English. It opens with
an origin-destination journey planner.
A.151 There is also a travel planner “Reiseplanner Wear” for an Android smart watch.
A.152 Infrastructure ProRail’s website, www.prorail.nl, provides a network map, although a wide
range of other network maps are also available online.
Netherlands: station website
A.153 NS provides detailed information on all stations including plans for some larger stations, as
shown below.
April 2016 | 190
Figure A.11: Netherlands: station facilities information
Source: NS website, for larger stations only, example shown is Utrecht Centraal.
Netherlands: operator websites
A.154 The principal operators all have websites, including the following in addition to NL:
Arriva www.arriva.nl is in Dutch only. It provides a journey planner and access to sites for
each region in which Arriva provides services.
Breng www.breng.nl and Connexxion www.connexxion.nl are in Dutch only.
Connexxion’s site opens with a journey planner but also provides real-time updates and
information on the operator’s mobile website and app.
Netherlands: ticket types
A.155 NS’s website provides the following information on tickets and supplements.
April 2016 | 191
Table A.29: Netherlands: ticket types
Type
Comments
Tickets
Single
Valid from 00:00 to 04:00 the next morning (28 hours)
Break of journey is permitted within this period
Day return
Railrunner
Allows children to travel for €2.50: children under 3 travel free, children 4-11
can travel independently, valid in First Class with an adult aged 18 or over,
who can take up to 3 children
Valid on NS and InterCity Berlin, ICE International and Intercity direct in the
Netherlands, but not Thalys
NS Group return
€55 for 4 people, €2.50 for passengers 5-10, valid for a day after 09:00 and at
weekends
Day ticket
One day unlimited travel in Second Class (€52.60) or First Class (€89.40)
Can be loaded onto the OV-Chipkaart and combined with some other
discounts
Valid only on NS trains
Season
tickets
Dal Voordeel
40% discount off-peak (after 09:00), at weekends and on public holidays, with
up to 3 other passengers
Holder can also apply for Keuzedagen supplement
Altijd Voordeel
monthly or annual
20% discount at peak times
40% discount off-peak (after 09:00), at weekends and on public holidays, with
up to 3 other passengers
20% off on tram and metro if combined with OV Voordeel
Holder can also apply for Keuzedagen supplement
Gives free magazine and discounts for Greenwheels and Q-Park P+R areas
Trajet Vrij
monthly or annual
Unlimited monthly travel on a fixed route
40% off for 3 people travelling together
40% discount for travel on a different route off-peak
Discounts for Greenwheels and Q-Park P+R areas
Grensabonnement
monthly or annual
As Trajet Vrij but for regular cross-border travel
Unlimited monthly travel on a fixed route to a border station
Studentenreis-
product
For students, 40% discount outside free travel times
40% off for 3 people travelling together off-peak
Available to those eligible for student finance and not receiving any public
transport payment abroad
Season ticket
supplements
Bijabonnementen
Day, weekend and period versions of season tickets for partners and children
Intercity direct Altijd
Toeslagvrij/
€61 for unlimited travel on Intercity direct for a fixed monthly price
(Also referred to as Intercity direct Maandtoeslag)
Kids Vrij
Children aged 4 to 12 travel for free with a Kids Vrij season ticket
Valid with other train operators
Children travel with their own OV-Chipkaart
Also allows free travel for children into Belgium and Germany
Keuzedagen
Free travel on 7 nominated days, other than weekdays 06:30 to 09:00
Available to those over 60 or with a Dal Voordeel or Altijd Voordeel season
Second Class €24.50 or First Class €49.50
Supplement for travel InterCity direct between Schiphol and Rotterdam
Valid on other operators but not InterCity Berlin or ICE International
Source: NS website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave, some ticket, supplement and discounts omitted for brevity.
April 2016 | 192
Netherlands: availability of discounts
A.156 See the information on ticket types listed above.
Netherlands: service quality
A.157 We did not identify any documentation setting out standards of service quality in the
Netherlands. Unusually, however, the infrastructure manager ProRail (www.prorail.nl)
provides information on its website on Passenger Rights.
Netherlands: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.158 NL’s website has a section on “Travelling with a functional disability” (“Reizen met een
functiebeperking”) which provides a range of information.
A.159 “Extra facilities on the train and at the station” provides information on travelling with a
wheelchair, mobility scooter (“scootmobiel”) or special bicycle, and notes that:
Many Intercity trains are equipped with extra-wide spaces for wheelchairs or mobility
scooters. Entrances are marked by the International Symbol of Access (ISA).
Most Intercity trains are also equipped with a wheelchair-accessible toilet.
A.160 “Making it easier to go to and from the station” provides information on surface access,
include details (in Dutch only) of the NS Zonetaxi service offered at a number of station.
A.161 “Assistance while travelling” provides contact details to apply for 24-hour NS Travel
Assistance, including by telephone or fax (for those with impaired hearing). Assistance must be
requested at least one hour before departure.
A.162 There is a 16-page brochure (in Dutch) on assistance services and contact information,
including inter alia information on the maximum sizes of wheelchair accepted on different
types of service.
Table A.30: Netherlands: on-train assistance for PRM
Service
Wheelchair
Mobility scooter (“scootmobiel”)
ICE International,
Intercity Berlin
Maximum 1.25 metres long, 0.7 metres wide
including space for feet
Limited: contact Railway Service Centre for
advice
Intercity Brussels
Maximum 1.5 metres long, 0.85 metres wide
Maximum 1.5 metres long, 0.85 metres wide
Maximum 250 kilograms including user
Thalys
Maximum 0.7 metres wide
including space for feet
Not permitted
Eurostar
Too narrow for normal wheelchairs
Foldable wheelchair is available
Up to 1 metre.
Trip must be registered with EuroDespatch.
City NightLine
Maximum 1 metre wide in couchette cars
Not permitted
Source: NBS website, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
A.163 There is a map of stations offering assistance, reproduced below, and links to details of
facilities at each station.
April 2016 | 193
Figure A.12: Netherlands: stations with assistance for PRM
Source: NS website.
A.164 Stations are colour-coded according to whether the operator providing the service is NS,
Arriva, Breng, Syntus, Connexxion, Veolia, or NS International with a supplement.
A.165 The website also provides links (in Dutch only) to help for planning and seeking assistance.
April 2016 | 194
PL: Poland
Poland: sources
A.166 Poland has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received one stakeholder
response.
Poland: overview of the rail market
Table A.31: Poland: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
312,685
square kilometres
Length of rail network
18,959
kilometres
Population
38,017,856
million
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
15,479
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
407.2
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€1,237
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
6.2%
2013
Routes with price competition
No
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
7%
2013
Reported punctuality
91.6%
76.4%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
0.16%
0.03%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
Poland: journey planning and sales channels
A.167 PKP’s website www.rozklad-pkp.pl provides journey planning information in Polish (the
default language), German, Russian and English.
A.168 Only a limited number of fares are available on the internet, but with few exceptions all fares
are available at tickets offices. All tickets except season tickets can be bought on trains for a
charge of PLN 10, which will not be charged:
for PRMs; and
for those providing documentary proof that they are over 70.
A.169 Smart card tickets are only used in cities where railways services are integrated within the
local transport system.
A.170 A stakeholder informed us that some carriers had tried to promote self-service distribution
channels (such as the internet and ticket machines) with a slightly lower tariff, but this was
criticised by the Ministry of Transport on the grounds that it might lead to a reduction in the
number of ticket offices. Nonetheless, on some interREGIO trains run by Przewozy Regionalne
(formerly part of PKP), the SuperBilet promotional offer is only available on the internet.
Poland: station website
A.171 PKP’s website provides details of major stations as shown below.
April 2016 | 195
Figure A.13: Poland: station facilities information
Source: PKP website, station shown is Kraków Główny.
Figure A.14: Poland: station facilities information
Source: PKP website, station shown is Kraków Główny.
April 2016 | 196
Poland: operator website
A.172 PKP’s website provides information in Polish (the default language), German, Russian and
English.
Poland: ticket types
A.173 PKP’s website provides little clear information on the availability and validity of tickets, other
than to specify single or return and class of travel, but on searching for a journey it is possible
to download complete tables of fares, which can be several hundred pages long.
A.174 First Class fares are typically 50-60% more than the equivalent Second Class fares.
Poland: availability of discounts
A.175 Passenger categories and discounts applied for public obligation services for rail are described
in the Act of June 20, 1992 on entitlements to free and reduced fares for traveling by public
transport defines the rules that apply for such purposes.
A.176 RMMS reports the following discounts in Poland.
Table A.32: Poland: availability of discounts
Discount
Category
37%
Pensioners and their spouses
Children over four until the beginning of the mandatory annual kindergarten preparation
Children and adolescents from the beginning of the mandatory annual kindergarten preparation
until the end of middle-school, or secondary school, but not older than 24 years
Blind people
The holders of a valid Polish Charter
Teachers of primary schools, middle schools, secondary schools and schools-above-middle-schools,
whether public or non- public with public school rights
Academic teachers
49%
Disabled persons incapable of autonomic existence
51%
Students until they are 26 years old: for those who have completed their studies the right is
granted until 31 October of the year when they completed their studies
Graduate students until they are 35 years old
78%
Children and young people affected by disability or disabilities
This is valid on the basis of a one-time or monthly tickets registered
One of the parents or guardians of adults, young people or children with disabilities (based on a
single ticket)
This permission applies only to travel between the place of residence or the place of stay and:
kindergarten, school , college, care and education facility, educational and pedagogical facility,
special care centre, facilities allowing centre children and young people to fulfil the duty of school
and education obligation, rehabilitation and educational centre, nursing home, support centre,
health care facility , psychological and educational , including specialist clinics, or rehabilitation
holiday
Non-professional soldiers undergoing military service
Blind civilian victims of the war declared incapable of self- existence
93%
Blind people declared unable to live independently
April 2016 | 197
Discount
Category
100%
Children under four
Uniformed Border Guard officers
1) while performing official duties related to the protection of the state border, as well as during
the transport of detainees, during patrol activities and activities related to the control of cross-
border traffic
2) while protecting the territory of the Republic of Poland on routes of international importance
Customs officers in the performance of official duties
Uniformed police officers
While escorting detainees or protected property, transfer of the special mail, patrol services and
aid or assist in the activities of organs of execution
Military Police soldiers and military law enforcement bodies
While performing acts of patrolling and other activities in service inside the means of transport
Source: RMMS, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave and edited.
Poland: service quality
A.177 We did not identify any documentation setting out standards of service quality in Poland.
Poland: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.178 PKP provides free assistance for boarding, alighting and transfer between trains at stations
staffed with the relevant personnel. 48 hours’ notice is required of the need for assistance, via
either telephone or an online notification form:
Passengers must provide date and time of journey, contact phone number, departure,
transfer (if any) and arrival stations, a description of what assistance is needed, the type
of disability and the time and place at which PKP staff will be met.
Passengers may optionally provide coach and seat number (if they have a reservation),
information on whether they have a companion or guide dog, and any other useful
information, such as whether they are carrying luggage.
A.179 The website provides a list of the stations at which assistance is available.
April 2016 | 198
SE: Sweden
Sweden: sources
A.180 Sweden has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received two stakeholder
responses.
Sweden: overview of the rail market
Table A.33: Sweden: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
450,295
square kilometres
Length of rail network
10,957
kilometres
Population
9,644,864
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
12,121
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
1,256.7
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€633
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
9.3%
2013
Routes with price competition
Yes
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
9%
2013
Reported punctuality
92.5%
89.0%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
1.1%
1.0%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.181 Sweden has an historical incumbent operator and a number of other operators who provide
either:
PSO services to the various county authorities; or
open access services in competition with SJ.
Sweden: journey planning and sales channels
A.182 Journey planning in Sweden is possible via the websites of the County authorities and the train
operators. In some stations, ticket offices are available for both local services and SJ long-
distance services.
A.183 Most types of tickets can be bought through several different sales channels. The price paid by
the passenger, and the commission level paid by the operator, can vary by sales channel.
Sweden: station websites
A.184 Din station (www.dinstation.se) provides real time information and lists of facilities, including
for PRM, at all railway stations in Sweden. Information is in Swedish only.
A.185 Stations info (www.stationsinfo.se) provides details plans of rail and bus stations, including
step-free routes between different points, an example of which is shown below. Information is
in Swedish only.
April 2016 | 199
Figure A.15: Sweden: example of station facilities information
Source: www.stationsinfo.se.
Sweden: operator websites
A.186 All the principal operators in Sweden have their own websites. For example:
SJ, the former national incumbent and primary long-distance operator, provides
information in Swedish (the default language) and English at www.sj.se.
Blå Tåget (“blue train”) provides information in Swedish (the default language) and English
at www.blataget.com.
MTR Express, a recent new entrant on the corridor between Stockholm and Gothenburg,
provides information in Swedish (the default language) and English at
www.mtrexpress.se.
DSB Sverige AB, operator of the Öresundståg, provides information in Swedish at
www.dsb.se.
Sweden: ticket types
A.187 Ticket types vary according to the requirements of the competent authority, normally at
County level, specifying PSO services. For long-distance services crossing County boundaries,
dominated by SJ:
For single journeys SJ offers normal tickets and “Sista Minuten” (last minute) tickets for
students, those under 26 and pensioners.
For regular travel SJ offers Electronic 10-tickets, which give a 10% discount, and Monthly
Passes.
Sweden: availability of discounts
A.188 Discounts offered can vary. In general there are discounts for children, youths, students and
seniors, but the long-distance market is deregulated and the exact pricing structure is
determined by the operators.
A.189 DSB Sverige AB provides information on (in order) commuters, adults, children, the young and
students, the old and pensioners, professions, bicycles, groups, tourists, PRM and dogs, but
the information is in Danish and on its Danish website.
April 2016 | 200
A.190 Further details of discounts on local services are available on the websites of the relevant
County authorities. For example Skånetrafiken, covering Scania, offers:
Single tickets (Enkelbiljett);
Duo/Family tickets (Duo/Familj);
24/74 hour tickets (24/72-timmarsbiljett); and
Round the Öresund (Öresund Rundt).
A.191 A further complexity in Scania, where ticketing extends to Denmark via Copenhagen airport, is
that the age limits for child and youth discounts differ between Denmark and Sweden.
Children aged 16-18 are warned of this issue, and may find it cheaper to buy a child ticket for
the Swedish part of their journey and an adult ticket for the final journey element into
Denmark.
Sweden: service quality
A.192 We did not identify any documentation setting out standards of service quality in Sweden.
Sweden: persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
A.193 SJ’s website provides a section for PRM giving details of assistance and service on board,
special seats (wheelchair spaces, and spaces suited to those with a guide dog), trains, non-
discriminatory rules for domestic journeys
52
and contact information.
A.194 The information on trains summarises the facilities available by type of service and stock
including details of the maximum width, length and mass (up to 350 kilograms) of wheelchairs
and additional details such as which stock has on-board staff, or level access, or requires a
ramp.
A.195 For all other information, such as bookings and details of locations and times of assistance, it is
necessary to contact SJ by telephone or online.
52
This links to a document setting out rules consistent with elements of Regulation 1371/2007.
April 2016 | 201
UK: United Kingdom
United Kingdom: sources
A.196 The United Kingdom has provided information to RMMS and ERADIS and we also received five
stakeholder responses.
United Kingdom: overview of the rail market
Table A.34: United Kingdom: overview of the rail market
Measure
Value
Units or details
Year
Area
243,610
square kilometres
Length of rail network
16,423
kilometres
Population
64,351,155
2015
Reported rail passenger-kilometres
64,711
million kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger-kilometres per inhabitant
1005.6
kilometres
2014
Reported rail passenger revenue
€9,186
million
2012 at 2010 prices
Reported rail share of passenger surface transport
8.4%
2013
Routes with price competition
Yes
Rail market share not held by incumbent
(percentage of reported passenger-kilometres)
8%
2013
Reported punctuality
89.8%
91.0%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Reported reliability (percentage cancellations)
2.6%
3.1%
Regional
Long-distance
2014
Sources: various, note that definitions and consistency of reported data vary.
A.197 The United Kingdom has two independent railway networks: that of Great Britain, described
below, and the much smaller network of Northern Ireland.
A.198 Great Britain’s former incumbent operator was subdivided in the mid-1990s into a number of
operators, now managed by the private sector, providing PSO services specified by national
and metropolitan governments, and a number of open access operators, including Heathrow
Express which provides a shuttle service between central London and its largest airport.
United Kingdom: journey planning and sales channels
A.199 The structure of the industry in the UK means that both responsibilities and information
provision are dispersed:
Network Rail, the infrastructure manager, provides information on stations and generates
real time information on train services.
PSO operators provide information on their own services but, because of requirements
for “neutral” retailing, must also describe competing services and may sell tickets for
them, subject to an industry standard commission.
Metropolitan authorities such as Transport for London provide information on services
they specify and on their fares and ticketing system.
Independent websites and apps provide alternative sources of information.
A.200 However, a single website, National Rail Enquiries (www.nationalrail.co.uk) acts as a general
portal to information on stations, timetables, tickets and real time information. Once a
April 2016 | 202
journey has been selected, this website will direct requests to buy tickets to the operator
responsible for setting the fare selected.
A.201 We summarise below the mix of sales channels in Great Britain, as reported by the Office of
Rail and Road (ORR).
Figure A.16: United Kingdom: sales channels
Source: Office of Rail and Road stakeholder response, based on ORR’s “Retail market review”.
A.202 The chart distinguishes the following selling parties:
Almost 70% of sales are by train operators selling tickets, for themselves and other
operators, via call centres, online (including via apps), at station ticket offices, through
ticket machines, and on trains.
Almost 10% of sales are by third party retailers such as Trainline and Raileasy selling
tickets mainly direct to passengers, online and through apps, paying a commission to the
operator and in many cases adding their own charges.
Almost 9% of sales are by Travel Management Companies managing travel primarily for
businesses.
Almost 9% of sales are by Transport for London, whose Oystercard and wave and pay
payment systems cover a large volume of travel within London.
A.203 It can be seen that call centres handle only around 0.6% of total sales and have been largely
replaced by online sales.
A.204 Over half of sales are at stations, and although one-third are now at ticket machines, two-
third, comprising 36.8% of total sales, are still by relatively labour-intensive station ticket
offices. A further 4% are sold on train, which is also a relatively costly sales channel.
A.205 Ticket sales by operators, including at stations, are covered by the requirements of impartial
retailing, which requires them to offer the cheapest option meeting a passenger’s
0.3% 0.3%
11.7%
9.5%
36.8%
16.9%
4.0%
8.6%
9.0%
2.7%
0.3%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Operator Third party
retailer
Travel
Management
Company
Transport for
London
Other International
Percentage of revenue
Call centre Website Ticket office Ticket machine On train Total
April 2016 | 203
requirements, even in this is via another operator. This requirement has proved difficult to
monitor and enforce in practice, particularly where the choice of routes, operators and tickets
is complex, as we illustrate with the example of travel between Exeter and Fareham in
Appendix B.
A.206 ORR’s Retail market review also shows how the mix of sales diverges from the average mix
depending on the type of service:
In the high-value long-distance sector:
43% of sales are online, probably reflecting those booking discounted Advance fares.
19% of sales are by Travel Management Companies, mainly serving business travel.
In London and the South East:
45% of sales are at ticket offices, possibly reflecting high value season ticket renewals.
23% of sales are at ticket machines, used for simple and regular purchases.
17% of sales are by Transport for London.
In regional services:
44% of sales are at ticket offices.
14% of sales are on train.
A.207 We would except that patterns of sales channel mix also vary in other States, often for similar
reasons.
United Kingdom: station websites
A.208 National Rail Enquiries provides details of stations including schematic diagrams with
embedded photographs of the view each platform, as shown below.
Figure A.17: United Kingdom: station facilities information provided by infrastructure manager
Source: National Rail Enquiries
A.209 Individual operators may also provide similar information on stations on their own websites.
Virgin Trains approach to the same station, Warrington Bank Quay, is shown below.
April 2016 | 204
Figure A.18: United Kingdom: station facilities information provided by train operator
Source: Virgin Trains website.
United Kingdom: operator websites
A.210 As noted above, in addition to National Rail Enquires, operators typically provide their own
websites, in some cases covering all the PSCs they operate in a common format.
United Kingdom: ticket types
A.211 We summarise here the principal types of tickets available in Great Britain, which differ
between urban areas (and particularly London, in which approximately two-thirds of all rail
journeys begin and/or end), short-distance journeys of up to approximately 50 miles (80
kilometres) and long-distance journeys.
Table A.35: United Kingdom: ticket types
Urban areas
Short distance
Long-distance
Off-peak
Anytime
Off-peak
Anytime
Advance
Off-peak
Anytime
Day ticket
A
A
Single
A
A
M
R
M
R
M
Return within a day
M
R
Return within a month
M
M
Period ticket
A (Smart card)
R (Season ticket)
R (Season ticket)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave interpretation of typical ticket types. A = administered, R = regulated, M = market.
Note: only Standard Class fares are regulated: all First Class fare are market-priced.
Note: the definition of off-peak varies between operators and routes.
Note: in London “wave and pay” debit and credit cards can pay for single, day and weekly off-peak and peak fares.
A.212 In large urban areas, tickets are valid only on the day of purchase. In London, all fares are
administered (by Transport for London):
Zonal day fares are quoted for off-peak and anytime, but for most zones the prices are
now the same.
Single journeys have distinct off-peak and peak fares, allowing a return trip to mix peak
and off-peak legs. Payment may be made by cash but there are discounts for use of the
Oyster smartcard or “wave and pay” debit or credit cards.
April 2016 | 205
Zonal Travelcards for a week or longer are now all on the Oyster smartcard.
A.213 Further details are provided in our analysis of suburban travel.
A.214 For shorter-distance journeys, tickets are only available for travel on the same day. The full
single, return and season ticket fares are regulated, but operators may set lower off-peak fares
according to market conditions.
A.215 For longer-distance fares, only the return within a month off-peak return ticket and season
ticket are regulated, and operators may set lower off-peak fares according to market
conditions. These also include quantity-limited and dynamically priced Advance tickets, which
must normally be bought at least a day before travel, which are only valid for travel on a
specific train and, unlike other fares, include a free seat reservation. Appendix B illustrates
how a choice of routes or operators with different underlying fares, discounts and dynamic
pricing can lead to an extremely large range of fares depending on the restrictions the
passenger is prepared to accept.
A.216 PlusBus tickets are also available including local bus travel at the destination.
A.217 In addition to these fares it is also possible to buy a range of Rover fares giving unlimited travel
in an area and period. The most expensive are All Line Rover tickets for 7 or 14 days. In 2016 a
14-day All Line Rover costs £731 (£365.50 for a child) in Standard Class and £1117 (£558.50 for
a child) in First Class.
United Kingdom: availability of discounts
A.218 A wide range of national Railcards are available as set out below.
Table A.36: United Kingdom: availability of discounts
Discount
Railcard
Price
Details
33%
Two
Together
£30 (1 year)
On First Class and Standard Anytime, Off-peak and Advance fares,
for two named adults travelling together, after 09:30 during the
week and at weekends.
16-25
£30 (1 year)
£70 (3 years)
On Standard Anytime, Off-peak and Advance fares, airport express
services, PlusBus and Rover tickets, and First Class Advance fares.
Senior
£30 (1 year)
£70 (3 years)
On First Class and Standard Anytime, Off-peak and Advance fares,
for passengers over 60, airport express services, PlusBus and Rover
tickets, except in London and the South East during the weekday
morning peak.
Disabled
Persons
£20 (1 year)
£54 (3 years)
“Most” Standard and First Class fares, for a passenger with a visual
impairment, hearing impairment, epilepsy or in receipt of a
disability-related benefit (including War or Service Pensions for
80% or more disability), including one adult travelling with the
holder.
HM
Forces
£15
“Most” rail fares, subject to a minimum charge of £12 for travel
between 04:30 and 09:59 on weekdays, except on Public Holidays
or in July and August.
33-60%
Family &
Friends
£30 (1 year)
£70 (3 years)
On Standard Anytime, Off-peak and Advance fares, airport express
services, PlusBus and Rover tickets.
Source: National Rail Enquiries, interpreted by Steer Davies Gleave.
April 2016 | 206
A.219 In most cases the Railcard originated as a marketing initiative, and the lower fares it offers are
not mandated in law, although in practice all operators of PSO services may be contracted to
retain existing Railcard arrangements as part of their PSC “franchise agreement”).
A.220 As with other States, Regional Railcard discounts may also be offered by particular local or
regional competent authorities. For example, we discuss in our analysis of urban fares how
residents of London aged between 60 and 65 receive free off-peak rail travel within the area
covered by Transport for London.
A.221 Additional discounts may also be offered through special offers and promotions, not all of
which may be available through all sales channels.
United Kingdom: service quality
A.222 The National Rail Conditions of Carriage set out a number of details of passenger rights
including the minimum levels of compensation in the event of late-running or cancelled trains.
Operators also set our their arrangements for handling complaints and providing
compensation for delays.
A.223 Operators of PSO services (franchises) are also required to set out details of their approach to
passenger service as part of their franchise plan, which forms part of their contract with the
relevant competent authority.
United Kingdom: persons with restricted mobility (PRM)
A.224 As noted above, a Disabled Persons Railcard entitles the bearer and an adult travelling with
them to a discount of one-third off Anytime, Off-Peak and Advance tickets on Standard and
First Class.
A.225 An emerging issue in the UK is the need for some passengers with some mobility restrictions
to take a mobility scooter with them on a train
53
, which we noted has also been considered in
detail in Germany. The passenger can occupy a normal seat but some means is required of
lifting and securing the mobility scooter on board, which may be large and heavy, into the
train. The conditions for permitting them on the train, and arranging for them to be lifted onto
it, vary by operator.
A.226 National Rail Enquiries provides information for disabled passengers including on discounts
and travel assistance. Information on facilities on trains provides a link to all the different
classes of rolling stock used by each operator and details the facilities available on them, as
shown below.
Table A.37: United Kingdom: information on PRM facilities by operator and train type
Train type
Class 47 or 90 locomotives with Mk3 carriages
Routes operated
London Liverpool Street to Norwich (Class 90)
Norwich to Great Yarmouth/Lowestoft (Class 47 –
summer only)
Accommodation for wheelchair users in First Class?
Yes
First Class accessible toilet?
Yes
53
Our parallel work for the Commission on the coach industry has identified that mobility scooters are
often problematic for the coach industry. This is because in many cases they cannot be lifted into, or
carried in, any part of the coach without first being dismantled.
April 2016 | 207
Accommodation for wheelchair users in Standard Class?
No
Standard Class accessible toilet?
No
Standard toilet?
Yes
Boarding ramp available
No, but ramps are available at accessible stations
Priority seating?
Yes
Audible information?
Yes
Visual information?
No
Customer service staff available onboard?
Yes
Source: National Rail Enquiries
April 2016 | 208
B Statistical analysis of national railway
characteristics
This Appendix presents the results of our investigation into the significance of the 8.33
relationships shown in Figure 2.17 and Figure 2.23 using multiple regression analysis. This
involved specifying a regression equation with average yield as the dependent variable and all
of the factors identified in Table 2.7 as explanatory variables.
B.1 In the case of network length, we also included a slope dummy variable (taking the value 1 ×
network length for Member States with networks in excess of 5,000 track kilometres and 0
otherwise) to allow for the different apparent relationship with average yield among Member
States with networks of 5,000 kilometres or less. The results of the regression analysis are
shown in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Average yield multiple regression analysis: all variables
Variable
Coefficient
t-statistic
Intercept
-0.030435443
-0.911508684
Network length
1.17961E-05
2.191808318
Network length dummy
-9.71248E-06
-2.059292127
Network density
0.028846436
0.080642655
Share of urban population
0.029582421
0.692173593
Population density
1.38508E-05
0.111654979
Passenger-kilometres by rail per capita
-1.17705E-05
-0.424517617
Car ownership per capita
0.047505868
0.716872783
GDP per capita
2.39851E-06
2.598309887
Goodness of fit measure
Value
Number of observations
R squared
0.760132913
24
Multiple R
0.871856016
Adjusted R squared
0.6322038
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
B.2 While the equation exhibits a reasonably high level of explanatory power, the majority of the
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. In only three cases (the coefficient on
network length, the network length dummy and GDP per capita) are the associated t-statistics
April 2016 | 209
significant at the 95% level of confidence
54
. We therefore re-specified the regression equation
to include only the statistically significant coefficients, obtaining the results reported in Table
B.2 below.
Table B.2: Average yield multiple regression analysis: selected variables
Variable
Coefficient
t-statistic
Intercept
-0.005388369
-0.406977981
GDP per capita
2.4755E-06
5.388587993
Network length
1.22572E-05
2.711143121
Network length dummy
-1.01394E-05
-2.50787807
Goodness of fit measure
Value
Number of observations
R squared
0.720791302
24
Multiple R
0.848994289
Adjusted R squared
0.678909997
Source: Steer Davies Gleave analysis
B.3 The simpler equation exhibits a similar degree of explanatory power to the full equation, and
the t-statistics for each of the explanatory variables are all significant at the 95% level. The
adjusted R squared value for the simpler equation is actually higher, indicating that the
additional variables included in the full equation do not help to explain the underlying data.
54
A t-statistic is a measure used to determine whether a hypothesis will be rejected or accepted. In this
case, the hypothesis is that we can be 95% confident that the relationship estimated is materially
different to zero.
April 2016 | 210
C Fares between Exeter and Fareham
Introduction
C.1 Transport Focus, an organisation representing transport users in Great Britain, provided us
with an example of the potential extreme complexity of setting and selecting fares resulting
from:
multiple routes between two stations;
multiple bodies responsible for setting fares;
different fares for single tickets, return the same day and return within a month;
season tickets;
First Class travel;
discounts, which may vary, for booking specific trains in advance;
discounts for groups; and
special promotional fares.
Multiple routes between two stations
C.2 The example is for travel between Exeter and Fareham, two stations 166 kilometres apart in
south west England, shown below
Figure C.1: Rail routes between Exeter and Fareham
Source: Transport Focus
C.3 There are no direct services between the stations, and shorter routes may involve slower
trains or longer connecting times, which means that all the routes shown in the figure above
may provide a reasonable connection in one or both directions at certain times of the day or
April 2016 | 211
week. Variations in the speed and quality of services on different lines, and the connecting
times at intermediate points mean that routes which may be effective include:
via Honiton/Southampton;
via Westbury/Salisbury;
via Basingstoke; and
via Reading avoiding Basingstoke by following the green line.
Multiple bodies responsible for setting fares
C.4 While no operator provides a direct service between Exeter and Fareham, the regime of fares
regulation in Great Britain allocates to one of the PSO operators the responsibility for setting a
number of interavailable fares, some of which are subject to regulation. However, other
operators are entitled to offer their own fares, and distinct through fares are offered for all
four of the routes listed above. The figure below illustrates the 28 fares between Exeter and
Fareham offered on a ticket vending machine.
Figure C.2: Rail fares between Exeter and Fareham
Source: Transport Focus research at a ticket vending machine, Steer Davies Gleave analysis.
Fares for single tickets, return the same day and return within a month
C.5 Passengers will typically know whether they wish to make a single or return journey, when
they are prepared to travel and when they wish to return, or whether they require a weekly
(or longer) season ticket to make multiple journeys. To cater for these requirements, seven
distinct types of ticket are available, from left to right in the figure above:
single tickets valid only on off-peak trains;
single tickets valid at any time;
return tickets, for return the same day, valid only on off-peak trains;
return tickets, for return the same day, valid at any time;
April 2016 | 212
return tickets, for return within a month, valid only on off-peak trains;
return tickets, for return within a month, at any time; and
season tickets for a week, a month, or any period up to a year.
C.6 Many of these tickets are available for more than one of the four routes listed.
C.7 For a single journey, tickets are available at three slightly different fares: £42.20
(Honiton/Southampton); £45.10 (Westbury/Salisbury); and £45.40 (Basingstoke). Fares via
Reading are also quoted from £89 to £118.50 and therefore the most expensive single fare is
2.8 times the cheapest. This fare may, however, be irrelevant for the majority of journeys for
which the alternatives are both cheaper and faster.
C.8 For a return journey the same day, passengers would pay little more than the single fare,
whether committing to travelling off-peak or willing to pay extra to travel at any time. The
most expensive day return fare quoted is 1.9 times the cheapest off-peak fare via
Honiton/Southampton. At first sight, buying a return by one route restricts travel to that
route, but in practice it is possible to buy a return via one route and then return via a more
expensive route on payment of half the difference in return fare. This creates a wide range of
additional fares not listed on the ticket machines, but such “open jaw” fares can only be
bought through ticket offices, and few passengers are aware of their existence.
C.9 For a return journey at any time within a month, another series of slightly higher fares are
available. The most expensive return fare, a £237 anytime via Reading, is five times the
cheapest £47.10 off-peak via Westbury/Salisbury.
Season tickets
C.10 While the journey between Exeter and Fareham normally takes over three hours, and would
not normally be practicable for a daily commute, a weekly season might be cost-effective for a
passenger needing to make more than one return trip. For example, season tickets via
Honiton/Southampton are available and cost only 4.3 times as much as the cheapest single
ticket.
First Class travel
C.11 In addition to these fares, a higher First Class fare is available on all routes, although this does
not necessarily mean that every train has First Class accommodation. Some passengers might
decide on their preferred time of travel and hence routing and then consider whether to pay
extra for First Class. Others might want to select trains with First Class accommodation.
C.12 Note also that 9 of the 28 fares offered are via Reading and alternatives may always be both
cheaper and faster. However, any requirement that sales channels offer all fares may mean
that passengers must be offered fares which are, in effect, irrelevant. In addition, Advance
fares via Reading, which are not sold by ticket vending machine, may be cheaper than fares via
shorter or faster routes.
Discounts for booking specific trains in advance
C.13 All the tickets listed above are available at ticket machines for immediate travel. In practice,
however, many operators in Great Britain also offer “Advance” tickets, tied to a specific train,
at discounted fares bookable online, via apps or at ticket offices. Transport Focus identified
single fares as cheap as £10.50, and in February 2016 we found Advance tickets for £17.50
booking one day ahead and as little as £12.00 if booked further in advance. At these fares it
April 2016 | 213
could be cheaper to buy fares in advance on a number of trains than to buy a flexible ticket on
the day of travel.
Discounts for groups
C.14 Passengers can key into ticket machines the details of any discounts or Railcards they hold,
and will then be offered fares taking these reductions into account. However, “GroupSave”
discounts for off-peak travel in large groups are not normally available through ticket
machines and can only be obtained online or through ticket offices.
Special promotional fares
C.15 Over and above standard fares, discounted tickets and group discounts, train operators may
also provide specific promotional fares for individuals or groups or travellers. These may be
available via any or all of website, call centres, ticket offices and other channels, depending on
the design of the promotion.
Summary
C.16 While potential passengers may claim to welcome choice, discounts and price competition in
principle, the cumulative effect can be an extremely large range of fares in practice. In the
specific example of Exeter to Fareham, 28 fares are offered on ticket vending machines, but
we estimate that more than 100 fares may be available once “open jaw”, Advance tickets and
discounts are taken into account. A requirement that all fares must be quoted may mean that
passengers must be shown every fare, no matter how poor value or irrelevant. As a
consequence, any passenger wishing to make a journey may find it difficult either:
to identify the most appropriate fare for their journey; or
once having paid the fare, to ensure that they do not violate any restrictions or conditions
associated with it.
C.17 In addition, train operators must generate all these fares. Great Britain’s requirement that
fares are made available between any two stations means that millions of fares must be
generated, published and made available at all times. The overwhelming majority of these
fares, however, relate to tickets that are probably never requested.
C.18 Industry commentators have suggested that one approach to simplifying the fares structure
would be to abolish return fares and have three types of single ticket, similar to the structure
becoming common in the airline industry
55
:
full fare, valid at any time and fully flexible;
off-peak, valid on any off-peak train; and
train-specific, with no flexibility and subject to availability and yield management.
55
See, for example http://www.transportfocus.org.uk/research/publications/passenger-focus-
response-to-the-governments-rail-fares-and-ticketing-review
April 2016 | 214
D Factors influencing travel demand
Trends in travel choices
D.1 The volume of travel in Europe has increased substantially through time, in large part
reflecting a tendency for travellers to make longer, rather than more trips. With rising
incomes, households demanded more space and increased levels of amenity, and began living
further from places of work. At the same time, there have been major changes to the way in
which people shop for both essential and luxury goods, rapid extensions to social and business
networks, and increases in the time available for holidays and other leisure trips. In all of these
changes, the price and availability of motorised transport, in particular the flexibility offered
by the private car, played a key role.
D.2 The table below is derived from analysis presented in Understanding Transport Demands and
Elasticities (VTPI 2013), and highlights the various demographic, geographic and economic
factors that can affect the demand for travel
56
. It demonstrates the complexity in explaining
travel patterns and the demand for any particular mode of transport within a given area.
56
Litman. T., Understanding Transport Demands and Elasticities: How Prices and Other Factors Affect
Travel Behavior (March 2013), Victoria Transport Policy Institute
April 2016 | 215
Table D.1: Factors affecting travel demand
Factor
Key influences
Demographic and
socioeconomic factors
Level and structure of population (residents, employees and visitors)
Employment rate
Average levels of wealth and income
Composition of population by age group
Lifestyles and preferences
Commercial activity
Level and profile of business activity
Number of jobs
Extent of freight transport
Level of tourist activity
Transport options
Extent and reliability of public transport network
Level of car ownership
Opportunities for walking, cycling and car sharing
Provision of taxi services
Extent of home/teleworking
Availability of delivery services
Land use
Land use density
Profile of land use
Connectivity of different locations
Quality and availability of pedestrian routes
Proximity of public transport
Design of road and other transport systems
Demand management
Road use prioritisation
Parking management
Policy towards pricing of roads and public transport systems
Passenger information and promotions
Prices
Fuel prices and motoring taxation
Road tolls and parking fees
Vehicle insurance and other motoring costs
Public transport prices
Source: Understanding Transport Demands and Elasticities: How Prices and Other Factors Affect Travel Behaviour
(VTPI, 2013), adapted by Steer Davies Gleave
D.3 Note that the pricing and quality of public transport, while they are important influences,
compete with many other factors affecting travel demand. Moreover, even if price and quality
are considered in isolation, their impact is complicated by the interaction between them. This
is because the demand for travel is largely derived, since the majority of journeys are
undertaken in order to enable another activity such as work, education, shopping or leisure.
Hence, journey purpose is a key determinant of the choices travellers make when considering
different modes and, within individual modes, different fares and service offers. For example,
business travel is usually particularly sensitive to quality relative to price, because it is
undertaken in the time, and at the expense, of the employer. From the employer’s
perspective, getting employees to the required destination quickly and in a fit state for work is
usually an important consideration.
April 2016 | 216
Rail specific factors
D.4 Against this background, it is clear that distinguishing the impact of rail fares and service
quality on rail demand from that of the other factors listed in the table above is challenging.
Hence, while the following observations reflect a broad consensus on key determinants of rail
demand, experience will vary significantly between different Member States, areas within
Member States and individual markets:
Rail tends to dominate where large numbers of passengers travel to a common
destination on a regular basis, particularly where it is located in an area subject to road
congestion and limited parking capacity.
Rail demand tends to rise with average income, although this effect may be offset by
increasing car ownership (particularly in Member States where the extent of car
ownership has, until recently, been limited) and the influence of dispersed land use.
Rail fares and the comfort, convenience and journey times offered by rail services,
nevertheless have a significant impact on mode choice and the willingness of some
passengers to travel at all.
D.5 The picture is further complicated by the fact that fares and aspects of service quality may
themselves be influenced by the demographic characteristics of an area, the availability of
other modes and profiles of land use. The analysis in Chapter 2, while necessarily limited by
the size of the data sample, suggested a correlation between average yield and not only
average incomes but also rail connectivity, as proxied by the length of the national network.
More generally, the dynamic interactions between exogenous and endogenous factors
affecting rail demand, while powerful, are difficult to isolate for the purposes of estimation
57
.
D.6 In the light of these complexities, much of the research underpinning rail demand forecasting
has focused on the concept of generalised cost, a means of expressing the overall disutility of
travel in monetary terms. This approach effectively abstracts from the many dynamic
interactions affecting rail demand, placing a value on different aspects of a rail journey and
aggregating them to derive an overall cost of travel from the perspective of the passenger.
When combined with estimates of price elasticity of demand, generalised cost can be used to
determine the impact of changes in rail fare and service quality on the demand for rail
services, distinguishing between diversion from other modes and newly generated demand.
D.7 Parameter values for the various elements of generalised cost, and the associated demand
elasticities, have been extensively researched over may years, and values that are generally
accepted for the purposes of forecasting in a number of different countries have been widely
documented. The tables below provide examples of fares and income elasticities as well as
other value parameters used in estimating the effects of changes in the price of rail travel and
particular aspects of service quality.
57
See Revisiting the Elasticity Based Framework (2008), Arup and Oxera for an example of the
complexities involved (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/revisiting-the-elasticity-based-
framework-rail-trends-report)
April 2016 | 217
Table D.2: Examples of price elasticities of demand for travel in Europe
Travel mode
Peak price
Off-peak price
Income
Vehicle travel (essential trips)
-0.16
-0.43
0.70
Vehicle travel (optional trips)
-0.43
-0.36
1.53
Bus, tram and metro travel (passenger-kilometres)
-0.19
-0.29
0.59
Rail (passenger-kilometres)
-0.37
-0.43
0.84
Source: Understanding Transport Demands and Elasticities: How Prices and Other Factors Affect Travel Behaviour
(VTPI, 2013) (summarising the results of various studies of European travel demand).
D.8 The price elasticities in the table above, which summarises results from research into
European travel demand, indicate that, at current levels of fares, the demand for rail services
is generally more sensitive to changes in price than the demand for other public transport
modes, and also varies with time of travel, which tends to be related to journey purpose.
During the peak, when rail passengers are typically travelling work, rail use is considerably
more sensitive to price than car use for essential trips (a 1% increase in price leads to a fall in
demand of 0.37% in the case of rail but only 0.16% in the case of travel by car). During the off-
peak, both modes have the same sensitivity. Note, however, that in all cases demand is
relatively price-inelastic, as the estimated elasticity values are less than one. The sensitivity of
rail travel to income exceeds that of all other modes except optional travel by car.
D.9 The table below shows a sample of multipliers applied in estimating the impacts of lateness
when forecasting rail demand in the UK.
Table D.3: Late time multipliers in the UK
Route
Multiplier for commuter traffic
Multiplier for non-commuter traffic
London inter-urban
2.5
3.0
Non-London inter-urban
3.9
3.4
Non-London under 20 miles
3.0
2.3
South East outer suburban
2.5
2.3
South East inner suburban
2.5
2.3
Source: UK Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook v5.1 April 2013
D.10 Each minute of lateness on a non-London interurban journey is worth 3.9 minutes in the case
of commuter traffic and 3.4 minutes in the case of non-commuter traffic. This is because
lateness represents unplanned journey length, which carries costs for passengers expecting to
reach their destination at a particular time. The range of multipliers applied within a single
Member State demonstrates the precision needed to assess the impact of one particular
dimension of service quality on demand.
D.11 The table below shows parameter values used to determine the impact of other aspects of
service quality on demand.
April 2016 | 218
Table D.4: Impact of selected quality improvements in the UK
Change in quality
Commuter
traffic
Business
traffic
Leisure
traffic
From
To
Train service value of time multipliers
Train very dirty
Train spotlessly clean
0.035
0.039
0.039
Train in poor condition -
damaged fixtures/seating
Train in excellent condition –
everything as new
0.028
0.031
0.031
Train with no electronic
displays/ announcements
inaudible
Train with flat screen display showing
relevant information
0.034
0.037
0.037
Passengers do not feel secure
Passengers feel secure
0.052
0.057
0.057
Station facilities: demand uplift
No information about service
disruptions
Electronic display showing service
disruptions
3.9%
6.5%
No waiting room or area
protected from weather
Wind shelters in some places providing
protection
1.2%
1.9%
No kiosk
Kiosk
1.0%
1.7%
No CCTV
CCTV
5.0%
8.0%
Source: UK Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook v5.1 April 2013
D.12 The impact of train service quality is expressed in terms of value of time multipliers, since the
value of an improvement to the passenger (e.g. higher standards of cleanliness) is considered
to vary with journey length. The multipliers represent proportionate decreases in journey time
that are considered to cause an increase in demand equivalent to the impact of the given
quality improvement. For example, in the case of a journey of 1 hour 40 minutes, improving
cleanliness from dirty to spotlessly clean would result in an increase in commuter traffic
equivalent to that arising from a 3.5 minute (100 minutes × 0.035) reduction in journey time.
D.13 Station improvements are considered to result in a percentage uplift in demand regardless of
journey length. As shown, the introduction of electronic customer information displays and
CCTV are estimated to have particularly significant effects, although in practice the application
of these parameters requires judgement, taking into account the location of the station and
types of service operating from it.
April 2016 | 219
E Coach market liberalisation
E.1 On 4 December 2011 Regulation 1073/2009, which provides a set of common rules for access
to the international market for coach and bus services, came into force replacing Council
Regulation (EEC) 684/92 and Council Regulation (EC) No 12/98. Regulation 1073/2009 was
intended to clarify and simplify rules and to improve enforcement and avoid unnecessary
administrative burden regarding access to the international coach market.
E.2 Regulation 1073/2009 also defines three types of international coach service:
“Regular services” means services which provide for the carriage of passengers at
specified intervals along specified routes, passengers being picked up and set down at
predetermined stopping points.
“Special regular services” means regular services, by whomsoever organised, which
provide for the carriage of specified categories of passengers to the exclusion of other
passengers.
“Occasional services” means services which do not fall within the definition of regular
services, including special regular services, and the main characteristic of which is the
carriage of groups of passengers constituted on the initiative of the customer or the
carrier himself.
E.3 Domestic coach markets, in contrast, are governed by national regulatory frameworks which
allocate responsibility for the market between national and other authorities. In practice there
are wide variations in how responsibilities are subdivided. In some Member States, for
example, different regional authorities interpret their powers in different ways.
E.4 Table E.1 overleaf summarises our findings on the regulatory frameworks in each Member
State from data collected through desk research and from stakeholders, gathered for a
separate Comprehensive Study on Passenger Transport by Coach in Europe.
E.5 The date of the most recent legislation relating to domestic coaches varies widely, from 1980
in the UK to 2015 in France. Partly as a consequence of this, both the types of services which
have been liberalised and the extent of liberalisation vary widely between Member States.
E.6 In addition, in different Member States, special regular and occasional coach services may
variously be liberalised, a national responsibility, or a regional responsibility with varying
degrees of liberalisation in different regions. This has the effect that the extent of liberalisation
varies within a Member State, depending on how regional and local competent authorities
choose to exercise their powers. For regular and some special regular services, for example,
variations include:
whether regional authorities consider regional coach services to be an extension of urban
and suburban services, operated by bus and other modes, or a distinct mode;
April 2016 | 220
where regional coach services are seen as a distinct mode, whether they are let as an
area-wide concession, procured through PSO contracts, or allowed to operate
commercially; and
whether local or urban authorities provide and/or designate terminals, or require
operators to use them, or permit them to stop on street.
E.7 This means that barriers to market entry can exist at a number of levels, ranging from tight
national control of services, through regional awards of concessions with exclusive rights
(whether directly awarded or competitively tendered), to local requirements for, or
prohibitions on, stopping in particular locations.
Table 8.3: Domestic coach market regulatory frameworks
State
Liberalisation
Obligatory use of terminals
Latest
local
law
Summary
Largest operator
share
AT
Not liberalised: all services are either PSCs or
five-year concessions.
60%
No
BE
Direct award of regional concessions to two
incumbents.
100% in each
region
No, as few terminals exist.
BG
1999
Fully liberalised.
When no terminal space
available, mayors allocate
locations to operators.
CY
2009
Not liberalised.
100%
N/A
CZ
Fully liberalised. Community licences and
authorisations are issued by regional
authorities.
Other than at motorway services,
restrictions only on safety
grounds.
DE
2013
Liberalised if over 1 hour by rail or
“50 kilometres between stops”.
53%
(by 2015)
No
DK
2005
Liberalised if no infringement of a public
services.
EE
2000
Not liberalised.
Stops in Tallinn are permitted,
subject to the agreement of the
city government.
EL
1996
Not liberalised.
100%
N/A
ES
2009
Competition for national and regional
concessions.
54% of national
concessions
Yes, unless negotiated with
municipalities.
FI
Liberalised.
FR
2015
Liberalised if over “100 kilometres between
stops”, otherwise assessed.
May be high,
market is evolving
No, as few towns have terminals.
HR
2013
Regular at Counties’ discretion.
Special regular liberalised.
Occasional liberalised.
HU
2012
Not liberalised.
Any stops can be used if safe,
with landowner’s permission and
if clearly marked.
IE
2009
Liberalised.
IT
2005
Regular services are liberalised, but regional
services within one or two NUTS2 regions
are subject to authorisation.
Illegal loading and unloading
outside terminals has been
reported.
April 2016 | 221
State
Liberalisation
Obligatory use of terminals
Latest
local
law
Summary
Largest operator
share
LT
Regular services are subject to authorisation
at national or municipal level.
No, except at route end points.
LU
Too small for a commercial interurban
market.
LV
2007
All interurban services are concessions.
Stopping points may be agreed
with the competent municipal
authorities.
MT
2011
Too small for coach services.
N/A
N/A
NL
2000
Regular and special regular are all
concessions: exemptions are permitted but
have not been sought.
Occasional liberalised.
Yes
PL
1988
Regular and special regular services require
authorisation.
PT
1990
Interurban services are liberalised.
Urban, suburban and regional services are
concessions.
RO
2011
Fully liberalised.
No
SE
1993
to
1999
Liberalised if over 100 kilometres or inter-
county.
19% plus
“partners”
No
SI
2006
Regular only by PSO.
Special regular liberalised.
Occasional liberalised.
Varies between urban areas.
SK
2012
Interurban services are liberalised subject to
protection of PSO services.
UK
1980
Liberalised fully, except in London.
75-87%
No
Source: Steer Davies Gleave desk research and stakeholder responses.
April 2016 | 222
F Glossary of terms
Term
Meaning
Administered fare
Fares set by the local, regional or national competent authority
Booking horizon
The time between booking date and intended travel date.
Cash fare
Fare if bought in cash or by credit/debit card at the time of travel.
Gross cost contract
A public service contract in which variations in revenue are a borne by the competent
authority.
Inferior good
A good for which demand increases when consumer income rises or, conversely, falls
when consumer income falls.
Interurban traffic
Domestic journey from the capital city to another major urban area over a distance of
at least 100km.
Kilometric fare
Fare determined by distance travelled irrespective of origin and destination
Management contract
A basic contract in which an operator agrees to deliver a service as specified by a
contracting party, usually the local/regional authority. Under a management contract
an operator may be rewarded or fined if it exceeds or fails to meet minimum
requirements set in the contract.
Market liberalisation
Relaxation of rules in order to introduce competition in the market with the aim of
improving services and efficiency
Net cost contract
A public service contract in which variations in revenue are borne by the service
operator.
Price-maker
An individual or company which is sufficiently influential within the market to be able
to affect the price of a product or service.
PSC
See Public Service Contract.
PSO
See Public Service Obligation.
Public Service Contract
One or more legally binding acts confirming the agreement between a competent
authority and a public service operator to entrust to that public service operator the
management and operation of public passenger transport services subject to public
service obligations.
Public Service
Obligation
A requirement defined or determined by a competent authority in order to ensure
public passenger transport services in the general interest that an operator, if it were
considering its own commercial interests, would not assume or would not assume to
the same extent or under the same conditions without reward.
Regional traffic
Journeys, over distances of 50-100 kilometres, which typically do not involve a major
city
Regulated fare
Fares set by the operator, but under constraints set by the relevant competent
authority. Fares regulation may be by a range of mechanisms including price caps and
links to inflation indices.
Smart card
An alternative to a paper ticket where the travel document is stored in an electronic
chip within a plastic card.
Suburban traffic
Suburban network consisting of at least one line with regular services at intervals of
(illustratively) 30 minutes or less connecting at least five stations within 10 kilometres.
April 2016 | 223
Term
Meaning
Through ticket
A ticket for a journey which may require the use of more than one train provided by
more than one operator or funded by more than one competent authority.
Yield
Revenue per passenger-kilometre.
Yield management
Managing demand to maximise revenue from a fixed capacity by either or both of two
approaches:
defining different ticketing products, but limiting sales of the cheaper ones to
ensure that space is available for passengers buying more expensive ones; or
increasing prices over time in response to emerging bookings, so that the price of
each service reflects the emerging demand to use it.
U:\Folder per name\Kroon Annika\studies\Pricing and customer satisfaction\Final\Final as approved\For Publishing\Study on the prices and quality of rail passenger services
Main Report.docx
Control Information
CONTROL INFORMATION
Prepared by
Prepared for
Steer Davies Gleave
28-32 Upper Ground
London SE1 9PD
+44 20 7910 5000
www.steerdaviesgleave.com
European Commission Directorate General for
Mobility and Transport
Directorate-General for Mobility and
Transport, MOVE B2
Rue de Mot 28
B-1040, Brussels
Belgium
SDG project/proposal number
Client contract/project number
22870601
MOVE/B2/2015-126
Author/originator
Reviewer/approver
Jake Cartmell
Simon Ellis
Other contributors
Distribution
Angela De Carlo, Ramona Cuc, Dick Dunmore,
Roberta Frisoni, Stefan Kouris, Davide
Ranghetti, Clémence Routaboul, Mark Scott,
Andrea Stanghellini, Christoph Vollath
Client:
Annika Kroon
SDG:
Version control/issue number
Date
Version 1.0
Version 2.0
29 March 2016
19 April 2016
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