Searching For My Homeland: Dilemmas Between Borders

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Synthesis Paper Series

Searching For My Homeland:

Dilemmas Between Borders

EXPERIENCES OF YOUNG AFGHANS RETURNING

“HOME” FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN

Mamiko Saito

July 2009

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Synthesis Paper Series

July 2009

Mamiko Saito

Searching For My Homeland:

Dilemmas Between Borders

EXPERIENCES OF YOUNG AFGHANS RETURNING

“HOME” FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN

Funding for this research was provided by the

European Commission (EC) and the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or

otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] or by calling +93 799 608 548.

Editorial Team: Meredith Lewis, Brandy Bauer and Toby Miller for AREU; Cynthia Lee and

Jay Lamey

Layout: Jay Lamey

Cover Photograph: Mamiko Saito. Afghans in Pakistan preparing to return “home”.

About the Author

Mamiko Saito was the Senior Research Ofcer for migration at AREU. She began working in Afghanistan and

Pakistan in 2003 and has worked with Afghan refugees in Quetta and Peshawar. She holds a master’s degree

in education and development studies from the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom.

About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

AREU is an independent research organisation based in Kabul. AREU’s mission is to conduct high-quality

research that informs and inuences policy and practice. AREU also actively promotes a culture of research

and learning by strengthening analytical capacity in Afghanistan and facilitating reection and debate.

Fundamental to AREU’s vision is that its work should improve Afghan lives.

AREU was established in 2002 by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board of

directors with representation from donors, the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, and non-

governmental organisations. AREU currently receives core funds from the governments of Finland, Norway,

Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Specic projects have been funded by the Foundation of

the Open Society Institute Afghanistan (FOSIA), the Asia Foundation (TAF), the European Commission (EC),

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),

the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the World Bank.

Acknowledgements

This paper is the result of the contributions, patience and collaboration of many people. Generous funding

from the European Commission enabled this study to be undertaken. We owe so much to the countless

organisations and governmental ofces of the three countries. In particular, AREU expresses its sincere

appreciation to the host organisations: in Pakistan, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Peshawar,

Save the Children USA in Quetta, and FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance Pakistan in Karachi; in Iran, the

Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Tehran led by Dr M.J. Abbasi-Shavazi as a partner organisation

in the implementation of the study; and the central and district ofces of the various Afghan ministries for

their guidance and introduction to relevant institutions in Afghanistan. Gratitude is also extended to the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its sub-ofces in three countries which, along

with community elders and representatives, supported researchers’ access to the areas and communities

selected as research sites.

We wish to thank those Afghan youths and young adults—both male and female—who participated in this

study and shared their experiences with the research team, as well as their families who gave permission

for the research team to conduct interviews. Their profound emotional struggles as Afghans who grew up

away from “home” touched the heartstrings of the research team, which became a key motivation to the

researchers involved in completing this work. Drawing out the internal voices of these second-generation

Afghan refugees and returnees was only possible because the skilled interviewers in Pakistan, Iran and

Afghanistan were also Afghan youth, who willingly shared their own stories of growing up over the past

decades in Afghanistan as well as neighbouring countries. It encouraged respondents to express themselves

to produce a piece of history for the future of Afghanistan through various testimonies.

We would like to thank Ewen Macleod of UNHCR for his careful review and comments on the report and

his thoughtful support throughout the project. Comments from several reviewers added signicant shape

to the nal form of the paper. Kathrin Köller of Oxford University gave profound input on developing the

theoretical background of the arguments. Interactions with Dr Pamela Hunte, with her extensive knowledge

and experiences in Afghanistan over the last three decades, have simply been a simply continuous discovery.

Anil Ahmad Shaheer played a key role in implementation of this project as an irreplaceable co-worker.

Special thanks go to AREU’s support staff and editorial team. The editorial team took time to review this

paper, providing creative suggestions and giving it a strong argument; without their contribution, this

paper would not be what it is.

Finally, the AREU migration project has been expertly overseen by Dr Paula Kantor. Her extensive technical

and theoretical input, exceptionally professional management, and moral support to the research team

enabled the project to be accomplished, even in an ever-changing environment. I would like to also

express my personal gratitude and deepest respect to Paula for all the support she has offered me in

developing my research and writing capabilities, enabling me to undertake and complete the research for

and writing of this paper.

March 2009

Mamiko Saito

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... xi

Part 1: Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1

Part 2: Context ..........................................................................................................3

2.1 Afghanistan ........................................................................................................ 3

2.2 Pakistan and Iran ................................................................................................. 3

Part 3: Key Concepts ....................................................................................................8

3.1 Struggling to nd an identity and the role of “the other” .................................................8

3.2 Acculturation ................................................................................................... 10

3.3 The concept of homeland and second-generation refugee return .............................................11

Part 4: Methodology .................................................................................................. 13

4.1 Field approach and sampling ................................................................................. 13

4.2 Selecting the research sites and communities ............................................................. 15

4.3 Seeking “the ideal respondent” in the eld ............................................................... 15

4.4 Research tools .................................................................................................. 16

Part 5: Growing Up Afghan in Pakistan and Iran: The Formation of Afghan Identity ........................ 17

5.1 Learning about Afghanistan ................................................................................... 17

5.2 Opportunities to learn about Afghanistan .................................................................. 18

5.3 Growing up Afghan in Pakistan and Iran: the dilemma of different values ........................... 20

5.4 Being mohajerin in the context of “others” ............................................................... 22

5.5 The formation of Afghan identity outside Afghanistan ................................................... 24

Part 6: To Return or To Remain? ..................................................................................... 31

6.1 Intentions to return or to remain ............................................................................ 31

6.2 Complex attitudes toward return to Afghanistan ........................................................ 31

6.3 Household decision-making about return................................................................... 34

Part 7: From Mohajer to Hamwatan ................................................................................ 36

7.1 The complex reintegration process ......................................................................... 37

7.2 Finding fullment in the watan or failing to resettle .................................................... 39

7.3 The external environment—social acceptance or rejection ............................................. 41

7.4 Personal fullment ............................................................................................. 43

7.5 Reintegration prospects ....................................................................................... 45

Part 8: Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 47

Part 9: Recommendations ............................................................................................ 50

Annex I: Study Sites in Three Countries ............................................................................. 55

Annex II: Location Descriptions ...................................................................................... 56

Annex III: Key Characteristics of Respondents ...................................................................... 57

Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 58

Recent Publications from AREU ....................................................................................... 62

List of Tables, Photos and Figures

Tables

Table 1: Refugee context in Pakistan and Iran ....................................................................... 5

Table 2: Comparative pattern in Pakistani and Iranian society .................................................... 7

Table 3: Second-generation Afghan refugee respondents (in-depth interviews) ............................... 14

Table 4: Characteristics of respondents in Pakistan and Iran ..................................................... 23

Table 5: Second-generation refugees’ intentions to return or remain .......................................... 31

Table 6: Push and pull factors in Pakistan and Afghanistan ....................................................... 33

Table 7: Second-generation refugees’ expectations of life in watan ............................................ 39

Table 8: Future intentions of 48 returnee respondents ............................................................ 46

Photos

Photos 1, 2 and 3: Afghan learning in Pakistan ...................................................................... 19

Photos 4 and 5: Afghans in Iran ........................................................................................ 27

Figures

Figure 1: Afghan refugees’ social networks in Pakistan/Iran ...................................................... 21

Figure 2: Returnee reintegration: the decision-making process .................................................. 38

Acronyms

AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

BAFIA Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (Iran)

EC European Commission

IOM International Organization for Migration

NWFP North West Frontier Province (Pakistan)

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

Glossary

Amayesh a census conducted by the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (BAFIA)

to identify foreign nationals; it is carried out periodically in Iran

azadi freedom

baghairat zealous

guna sin

hamwatan person from the same area or country, compatriot

hijab covering women’s head and body; being modest and moral

sawab spiritual reward

madrassa Islamic religious school

mohajer(in) refugee(s)

mujahid(din) holy warrior(s) ghting in jihad (holy war)

Naw Roz Persian New Year

wasita relations to powerful people

watan homeland

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

More than two decades of protracted conict

from the late 1970s onward saw Afghan refugee

communities settle around the world. At the end of

2007, Afghanistan was still the source of the world’s

largest number of refugees under the mandate of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR). While Afghans are dispersed among 72

different countries, 96 percent of displaced Afghans

remain in Pakistan and Iran.

The majority of those

who remain in Pakistan and Iran have lived in exile

for over 20 years, and half of them are estimated

to have been born outside Afghanistan.

Currently,

around 2.7 million registered Afghan refugees

are still living in Pakistan and Iran

—the majority

are in their second or even third generation of

displacement. In Pakistan, 74 percent of the Afghan

population is under 28 years old,

while 71 percent

of the Afghan population in Iran is 29 years old or

younger.

In both contexts, these second generation Afghans

have grown up in very different circumstances to

those of their parents and peers in Afghanistan. For

these young refugees, returning to their “homeland”

does not necessarily mean returning “home.”

Understanding the characteristics of this signicant

group of young Afghans, their perceptions toward

return, and their reintegration experiences holds

critical importance for policymaking around the

issues of: facilitating the return and reintegration

of young Afghans; securing the lives and livelihoods

1 UNHCR, 2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees,

Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008), 8.

2 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal 2008-2009 (Geneva: UNHCR,

2007), 260.

3 IRIN News. “Afghanistan: Limited Scope to Absorb More Refugees,”

15 March 2009, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83474

(accessed 5 May 2009).

4 Government of Pakistan and UNHCR, Registration of Afghans in Pakistan

2007 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan and UNHCR, 2007), 10.

5 Amayesh data 2005, in Second-Generation Afghans in Iran:

Integration, Identity and Return, ed. M.J. Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (Kabul:

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit [AREU], 2008), 3.

of the multiple generations of Afghans remaining

in exile; and managing continuing cross-border

population movements to the benet of both the

migrants and the sending and receiving countries.

This study delves beneath the surface of refugees’

simple “yes” or “no” response as to whether

they intend to return, as represented in existing

quantitative data. Rather, it illustrates the profound

difculties that they face in weighing the benets

and disadvantages of returning to Afghanistan. It

considers the complexities of deciding to return to

one’s “homeland,” the inuence of ties to Pakistan,

Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the less visible

social and emotional reintegration trajectories of

returnee respondents, including the crucial links

between these issues and material challenges of

reintegration. This study is based on interviews

with 199 purposively selected respondents across

three countries.

With a focus on gender, this report analyses returning

refugees’ reactions to the environment in which

they nd themselves upon returning to Afghanistan

and the various adaptation processes through which

individuals undergo. It concludes that the way in

which individuals nd meaning for themselves in

relation to Afghanistan as their homeland is one of

the crucial factors affecting their perceptions of

return and future outlook. The study emphasises

the importance of less visible, non-material support

for young returnees, and identies the need for

greater external assistance for these young Afghans.

The process of reintegration in their “homeland” is

not a simple geographical movement of population,

and these second-generation Afghan refugees are

not homogeneous. They have diverse interests and

intentions depending on individual background,

experiences, place of residence and opportunities—

all of which were inuenced by changing political

and social dynamics. These elements need to be

carefully considered to support their permanent

settlement in Afghanistan.

Executive Summary

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Recommendations

Voluntary return: reducing the risks of

reintegration failure

1. Improving work skills and access to

employment during transition

The Government of Afghanistan, in coordination •

with the governments of Pakistan and Iran and

with the support of donors, should engage

in continuous efforts to develop the skills of

refugee youth, driven by the demand and

needs of local labour markets in Afghanistan.

Existing training centres and technical courses •

in cities and refugee camps in Pakistan and

Iran should be improved with facilities focused

on the needs of the Afghan market.

Facilitate realistic resettlement planning:

information and visits

In collaboration with the governments of •

Pakistan and Iran, radio and other media

could be used effectively to convey reliable

information to refugee youth on support

systems available to returnees in Afghanistan.

The governments of Iran and Afghanistan are •

encouraged to engage in further bilateral talks

to facilitate greater access to preparatory

visits for young refugees.

Education in transition: a key concern for

second-generation Afghan refugees

Young refugees’ fear of losing the opportunity •

to be educated if they return to Afghanistan

must be addressed through improved access to

quality education.

In coordination with the governments of the •

two host countries, the Afghan Ministry of

Education should actively facilitate securing

the legal status of Afghan schools in Pakistan

and Iran as the places where second-generation

Afghan refugees would earn qualications to

prepare themselves for their return.

Clearer and more accessible procedures should •

be in place for the approval and acceptance

of certication from schools and universities

in the neighbouring countries, particularly in

Pakistan where the language of instruction

may differ from that of Afghanistan.

4. Advocacy: positive motivation for return

In collaboration with the Pakistani and Iranian •

governments, the Government of Afghanistan

with the support of international agencies

should build a comprehensive communications

strategy targeting young refugees. The

importance of one’s own “homeland” should

be highlighted in promotional campaigns

delivered via a range of media and community

outlets.

It is important to create positive motivation for •

voluntary return rather than pressure through

deportation, which results in strong resistance

to returning to Afghanistan.

Complex reintegration: Inuencing the

balance of factors

1. Promoting emotional security: Advocacy

for social inclusion and anti-discrimination

policies

The Government of Afghanistan, together with •

international agencies, should develop media

campaigns advocating for social acceptance

and non-discriminatory treatment of all

Afghans—including returnees.

For some returnees, encouragement that •

facilitates social inclusion has sometimes simply

been the result of the generous compassion of

others. Education programmes that promote

the equal treatment of all people for those

in positions of some authority (e.g. teachers,

headmasters and mullahs) would improve their

ability to positively inuence the receiving

community, particularly in social spaces such

as schools or villages.

Interaction with fellow returnees and Afghan •

friends who understand how returnees lived

previously should be facilitated. This may offer

opportunities for individuals to express the

values they formed during refuge, providing a

valuable outlet to release some of the tension

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Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

resulting from experiences of being unable to

t in.

As a part of more long-term social and economic •

programming, the reintegration process of

selected second-generation returnees should

be monitored not only at the time of initial

return but also over the medium and long

term. The lessons accumulated from this

initiative could be applied to improve further

programming for permanent resettlement.

Enhancing opportunities for employment

The outreach of existing employment service •

centres should be extended to more districts

and rural areas. Postings at the employment

service centres should be provided in local

languages and cover a wider range of positions

(unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled) compared

to limited postings targeting the skilled and

educated. Incen tives should be provided as a

part of an income-generating programme to

encourage employers to post job vacancies at

newly established employment centres.

A more transparent, afrmative-action •

recruiting system to provide equal access

for youth from socially and economically

underprivileged backgrounds, in particular

returnees who are not familiar with the

local environment, is proposed as a priority

programme for local government and

development organisations. This system

could involve actively employing returnees as

teachers, literacy trainers and health workers

in community organisations where their

exposure to new ideas from their experience

outside Afghanistan could positively affect

local communities.

Female members of vulnerable returnee •

families are often unable to work in Afghanistan

because of restrictive social norms. This may

reduce household responsiveness to crises,

prompting remigration. The Ministry of Women’s

Affairs, along with the ministries of Labour,

Social Affairs and Martyrs, and the Disabled

as well as NGOs, should improve existing

efforts to provide more market-oriented,

culturally sensitive livelihood opportunities for

economically vulnerable women in rural and

urban areas.

Meeting material needs during

reintegration: access to connections, skills,

capital and property

Second-generation Afghan returnees of a lower •

socioeconomic status and without skills and

basic education should be key beneciaries of

programmes providing material support.

The right to own property is one of the key pull •

factors drawing refugees back to Afghanistan.

Although challenging, the existing system of

land allocation, with the support of an oversight

committee, must be further promoted to be

realistic, efcient and transparent.

Urban planning processes should take greater •

priority given the increase in urban populations

related to the inux of returnees and internal

migrants. At the same time, attention should

be paid to employment generation in both

urban and rural areas to reduce challenges

related to meeting material needs and to slow

the ow of migrants to urban locations.

4. Increasing needs: Quality education as a

pull factor

Donors and civil society must be strongly •

committed to longer-term funding of post-

primary education in both urban and rural

areas, reecting the growing needs of young

returnees both with or without formal

education and for future generations.

Opportunities in higher education, which are •

not readily available to Afghans in Pakistan

and Iran, are strong pull factors that could

bring educated refugees back to Afghanistan.

The Afghan government should: ensure that

equal, corruption-free opportunities for

higher education in Afghanistan exist; invest

in scholarships for returnees; and improve the

governance systems that allocate university

places, reducing perceived and actual

corruption in university admissions processes.

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6. Managing legal migration: Options for

gradual return

A focus on managing—rather than limiting or •

prohibiting—labour migration would better

support the successful resettlement of Afghan

households. The Afghan government should

ensure Afghans can easily obtain a passport.

The Government of Afghanistan and those of the

host countries should continue their bilateral

dialogue to develop laws and agreements

facilitating a more manageable migration

framework that reduces illegal migration.

The gradual return of household members is •

a common strategy used by Afghan families to

mitigate the risks associated with repatriation.

The Government of Iran in particular, supported

by international aid agencies, should facilitate

these strategies by providing re-entry visas for

those heading to Afghanistan for reconnaissance

visits and by maintaining support to vulnerable

households that remain in the host country.

It is important to recognise that not all •

Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, rst- and second-

generation alike, will return to Afghanistan

voluntarily in the near future; among these

cases are those who have protection needs and

those who have married Pakistanis or Iranians.

Furthermore, the capacity of Afghanistan

to absorb the vast numbers of refugees who

remain in these neighbouring countries

requires continuous, realistic re-examination

and a consistent humanitarian approach.

5. Physical security: Desire for police reform

and protection

Respondents in this study commonly mentioned •

concerns about less serious crimes (such as

robbery and theft) and uneasiness over the

unreliability of the police (related to corruption

issues) as factors affecting return decisions and

the willingness to stay after return. To improve

the performance and public image of the

police, the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the

international community should increase the

pace of police reform and enforce penalties

for proven corrupt behaviour.

Stronger government-led, gender-sensitive •

social protection efforts may lead to a

reduction in the harassment of women in

public, providing safeguards similar to those

that some respondents beneted from while

outside of Afghanistan. The Afghan Ministry

of Interior Affairs and the international com-

munity should strengthen efforts to recruit

female police ofcers and increase provision

of effective and relevant gender training for

all police ofcers. New laws should be adopted

and existing laws enforced to protect women’s

safety and security in both public and private

domains.

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Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

Part 1: Introduction

This report synthesises the ndings of case studies

conducted in three countries (Iran, Pakistan and

Afghanistan)

as part of AREU’s research project

focusing on second-generation Afghan refugees

living in Pakistan and Iran, and returnees from

these neighbouring countries to Afghanistan since

2001. The research project, “Second-Generation

Afghan Refugees in Neighbouring Countries,”

was

administered through the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and funded

by the European Commission. It was initiated

in 2006 and follows on from AREU’s work on

transnational networks undertaken in 2004-05,

which drew attention to a gap in information about

the signicant number of Afghan youth and young

adults currently living in Pakistan and Iran. Many

were born or grew up in exile and have little or no

experience of living in their “homeland.”

Most of this new generation have grown up in a very

different environment to that of their parents and

to that of their own generation that remained in

Afghanistan during prolonged war. They have had

signicantly greater access to urban facilities and

many different experiences as a result of living

as refugees among Pakistanis and Iranians while

maintaining ties with Afghan communities.

The large-scale return of these young Afghan

6 Fieldwork in Iran was conducted by the University of Tehran in

partnership with AREU; see: M.J. Abbasi-Shavazi et al., Second-

Generation Afghans in Iran: Integration, Identity and Return (Kabul:

AREU, 2008). See also: M. Saito and P. Hunte, To Return or to Remain:

The Dilemma of Second-Generation Afghans in Pakistan (Kabul: AREU,

2007); and M. Saito, Second-Generation Afghans in Neighbouring

Countries: From Mohajer to Hamwatan: Afghans Return Home (Kabul:

AREU, 2007).

7 Afghanistan is surrounded by six countries, but in this research

project, the term “neighbouring countries” refers to Pakistan and Iran,

where the majority of Afghans reside. Precisely, the title of the study

can be argued as “Second-generation Afghan refugees and migrants in

Pakistan and Iran, and those returnees who returned to Afghanistan.”

The project uses the term “second-generation Afghans” implying the

blurred border between refugees and migrants, and continuity among

refugees and returnees, and further migration of the individuals.

8 See A. Monsutti, Afghan Transnational Networks: Looking Beyond

Repatriation (Kabul: AREU, 2006).

refugees from neighbouring countries must be seen

as a crucial strategy for Afghanistan in rebuilding its

society from the grassroots level. This is particularly

signicant in rural areas where reconstruction is

still underway, with limited resources and a lack of

educated personnel after the decades of war. Some

of the returnee respondents interviewed as part

of this research project were found to be covering

teacher shortages in remote villages. One was asked

by other women in her village to teach them to read

and write, even though she had left school at a very

early age herself. Whether or not respondents had

gone to school in Pakistan or Iran, many reported

that they had acquired new technical skills, a

better understanding of health and hygiene, and

the skills to communicate with different people.

Migration impacted on Afghan refugees as a whole

but more so for younger generations who grew up

in the place of refuge.

Returnees are usually considered less economically

vulnerable than those who remained in Afghanistan

throughout the conict years, because of the

education and skills that many were able to acquire,

as well as the savings some were able to accrue.

9 For example, in AREU research on family dynamics and family

violence, changes have been observed in perceptions of the

acceptability of violence toward children among both adults and the

community as a whole, and respondents often talked about the reason

for this as having been their experience of life in “other places”–either

as refugees in neighbouring countries or while internally displaced.

Deborah J. Smith, Love, Fear and Discipline: Everyday Violence

Towards Children in Afghan Families (Kabul: AREU, 2008), 57–60.

10 C. Faubert, A. Mojaddedi and A.H. Sozada, Repatriation and

Reintegration: An Appraisal of Progress in Afghanistan (Kabul: UNHCR,

Over 2.7 million registered Afghan refugees are

still living in neighbouring countries: approximately

1.7 million in Pakistan and 1 million in Iran.

In Pakistan, 74 percent of the Afghan population is

under 28 years of age while 71 percent of the Afghan

population in Iran is 29 years or under.

Source: IRIN News, 15 March 2009; Registration of Afghans in

Pakistan 2007, Amayesh 2005 data.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

However, from the point of view of returnees

(particularly those of the second generation),

repatriation is often accompanied by a complex

mix of stresses and emotional struggles, brought on

by leaving the place they knew best. Returning may

have meant that their experience of being a non-

citizen of the country, regardless of the degree of

familiarity there, was simply repeated when they

returned to their “homeland”; their psychosocial

vulnerability (the feeling of “non-belonging,”

marginality or helplessness) may have been the

same or worse than in the place of refuge. While

meeting the immediate material needs of this group

is highest on the agendas of the government and

international actors in relation to bringing young

Afghan refugees home, their psychosocial needs—

while much less visible—are possibly no less crucial

to their successful and permanent reintegration.

2005), 11. Also, according to Altai Consulting, Integration of Returnees

in the Afghan Labour Market (Kabul: International Labour Organization

and UNHCR, 2006), 15, the monthly income of returnee households in

urban areas is higher than the national average.

The next section looks at the social, cultural and

economic context of each of the three countries,

highlighting the contrasts in the refugees’

environments in Pakistan and Iran. Section 3

reviews the relevant literature on identity and

second-generation refugees returning “home” in

other contexts, forming a conceptual background

for the overall analysis. Section 4 describes the

methodology used during eld research, followed by

a description of the types of interviews conducted

for 199 individual second-generation Afghan

refugees in three countries, including a limited

comparison of quantitative data. In sections 5, 6 and

7, ndings and a discussion based on data collected

are presented, beginning with respondents’

experiences of “learning about Afghanistan” and

Afghan identity while growing up in neighbouring

countries, leading to complex decision-making

about whether or not to return, the reintegration

process among returnee respondents, and whether

or not they have settled in their homeland. The

nal sections 8 and 9 conclude the discussion and

provide recommendations based on the study’s

results to the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan

and Iran, to international organisations and to

concerned stakeholders.

Focusing on the less tangible notion of psychosocial

well-being (living contently emotionally and

socially, with a positive self-image), this study

tries to better understand the experiences and

ideas of the large number of young Afghan refugees

remaining in Pakistan and Iran, as well as those of

second-generation returnees, in order to contribute

toward facilitating their successful and sustainable

return and permanent reintegration.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

This section provides an overview of the three

countries in which eld research was conducted—

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The situational

context in which respondents grew up and

to which they returned impacts on individual

identities: not only the background of each family

and community, but the broader issues of state

regulation, opportunity and the prevalent values

in the society. Firstly, the history of the refugee

movement from Afghanistan and the situation of

returnees to Afghanistan are discussed. Secondly,

the political background and refugee policy of the

two comparative host countries are explained.

Lastly, the social environments in Pakistan and Iran

are contrasted, highlighting the particular situation

for Afghan refugees living there. All of these factors

affect identity formation processes among young

Afghans.

2.1 Afghanistan

Afghan populations are historically highly mobile;

continuous multidirectional cross-border movement

can be seen as a key household survival strategy

through which Afghans can spread risk and diversify

their livelihoods. The most signicant recent

outward population movement from Afghanistan

took place in the 1970s, prompted by a combination

of severe drought in the country and the oil boom

and growth in the construction industry in Iran. This

was followed by the massive population movement

in the late 1970s when the Soviet intervention

in Afghanistan began.

By 1992, over six million

people—more than 20 percent of the population—

had left the country.

Since then, subsequent waves of refugee return to

Afghanistan have continued, with notable peaks in

1992 and 2002. Since 2002, over 5.6 million Afghans

have been recorded by UNHCR as returning from

11 Monsutti, Afghan Transnational Networks, 12-13.

12 UNHCR, Finding Durable Solutions for Refugees and Displacement

for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Kabul: UNHCR, 2007), 1.

Pakistan and Iran. They returned through UNHCR’s

voluntary assisted repatriation programme (4.3

million), of which 46 percent returned to Kabul and

Nangarhar provinces, as well as spontaneously (1.3

million).

The majority of these early returnees

in the 2002 “season” had been in refuge during

the past seven years—leaving behind many “old

refugees” who had been living in neighbouring

countries for decades.

It is not clear, however, what proportion have

successfully settled in Afghanistan for the long

term. According to a survey conducted across 32

provinces targeting mostly rural residents, 29.4

percent of interviewed returnees mentioned that

they were unhappy with their current situation

primarily due to unemployment (45 percent), lack

of housing (32.8 percent), and lack of access to safe

water (10.2 percent).

Since 2005, the repatriation

trend has declined, reecting worsening security

after the waves of mass repatriation following the

establishment of the new government.

2.2 Pakistan and Iran

Refugee policy in Pakistan and Iran

The Afghans who ed to Pakistan during the 1980s

and 1990s were predominantly Pashtuns from rural

areas, many of whom settled in Pashtun-dominated

locations in Pakistan. Initially, Afghans were

welcomed as honourable guests within the codes

of tribal solidarity; however, the refugee camps’

13 UNHCR, Operational Information Monthly Summary Report –

January 2009.

14 D. Turton and P. Marsden, Taking Refugees for a Ride? (Kabul:

AREU, 2002), 49.

15 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Economic

and Social Rights in Afghanistan II (Kabul: AIHRC, 2007), 15. Among

11,186 interviewees, 90.9 percent were from rural areas; 5,277 (47

percent) were returnees and responded to the questions about their

satisfaction in relation to return.

16 UNHCR, Global Appeal 2008-2009.

Part 2: Context

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

political structures and the prolonged refugee

situation gradually saw a shift in their status to

more dependent “clients of the asylum-giver.”

the end of 1990, more than 300 refugee camps had

been created by UNHCR in Pakistan, housing over

3.3 million refugees.

These camps became the

focal points for various Islamic armed resistance

groups ghting against Soviet forces, collectively

known as mujahiddin.

Many Afghan schools both inside and outside the

camps have been supported by various donors—

although a decline in funding has increased dropout

rates, as seen in some respondents from lower

socioeconomic backgrounds after mid-1995, when

dropouts begin to increase. Similarly, in recent

years, lack of funding, particularly for secondary

schools, has been reported as a serious problem.

Many of this study’s respondents beneted from

access to education (secular and religious

) while

living in Pakistan, regardless of whether or not they

had legal documents. This, however, depended

entirely on each family’s situation and values, as

well as their community’s attitude to education.

The policy of the Government of Pakistan towards

refugee education was to maintain a parallel Afghan

education system teaching in native languages

(Pashto and Dari)—eventually facilitating the

reintegration of refugees into the Afghan education

system.

At the time of eldwork for this research

17 D.B. Edwards, “Marginality and Migration: Cultural Dimensions of

the Afghan Refugee Problem,” International Migration Review 20, no.

2 (1986):313–325.

18 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of

Humanitarian Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 116.

19 The reduction of funding since 2005, along with the closure and

consolidation of camps, dramatically decreased enrolments in refugee

village schools (A. Wilder, Needs Assessment Exercise of Education

Sector [Islamabad: CCAR-UNHCR, 2006], 37).

20 Madrassas supported by Zia-ul-Haq’s government and various

donors including Saudi Arabia and the United States were established,

producing support for jihad. H. Haqqani, “Islam’s Medieval Outposts,”

Foreign Policy 133 (2002):58-64. According to some respondents, well-

equipped madrassas were well supported (free dormitory, allowances,

etc.) and scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia were available for

qualied students.

21 Wilder, Needs Assessment Exercise of Education Sector, 31.

project, there was one Afghan tertiary institution in

Peshawar, although it issued certicates that were

not recognised in Afghanistan.

According to this study’s respondents, harassment

of refugees (usually men) by the police did occur,

but this was often not directly related to immediate

deportation. They were usually allowed to move

freely within Pakistan to seek employment with

a degree of relative choice in occupation: some

respondents’ households were able to continue

their previous professions (if available) such

as carpet weaving, tailoring, repairing various

goods and business. After the fall of the Taliban

government in 2001, the policy shift toward the

repatriation of all Afghans accelerated, and there

was increased emphasis on regulation of refugees

through measures such as the Proof of Registration

(PoR) cards.

However, Pakistan’s less strict border

control, especially for Pashtuns, is evidenced by

many respondents in this study (including women)

who had grown up in Pakistan being able to visit

Afghanistan prior to return.

The situation of Afghan refugees in Iran—mostly

non-Pashtuns from either Herat city or rural areas to

the west, north and central region of Afghanistan—

contrasts markedly with life for refugees in

Pakistan. In Iran, less than 2.5 percent of Afghans

settled in refugee camps;

the majority resided

among Iranians in urban areas. Documentation

was provided to the early arrivals, with which they

were ensured access to health care and food, and

free primary and secondary education (although

employment opportunities were mostly restricted to

22 Under the Taliban government, there were four Afghan

universities in Peshawar, but these were closed in July 1998 by the

local government in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). See:

UNHCR, Impact Study on Closure of Universities on Afghan Students

(Kabul: UNHCR, 1998), 3. The students of the existing Afghan tertiary

institution in Peshawar showed earnest hopes that their certicate

would be approved in the future; otherwise, they will be discouraged

to return to Afghanistan after graduation.

23 Proof of Registration cards were provided by the Government

of Pakistan and UNHCR, which demonstrate the status of holders as

Afghan nationals temporarily staying in Pakistan and allowed to remain

until the end of 2012.

24 UNHCR, Afghanistan: Challenges to Return (Geneva: UNHCR,

2004), 9.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

manual labour).

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution,

the new Iranian government distanced the policy

away from Western countries, resulting in limited

international assistance being provided to refugees

in Iran—although refugee numbers were estimated

at 3 million by 1990.

Since the mid-1990s, access to education has only

been provided for documented refugee children.

In 2002, the Iranian government declared Afghan

self-run schools illegal, on the grounds that they

encouraged Afghans to remain in Iran.

Among

those who did attend school, it was acknowledged

that there were limitations on access to higher-

level education (except for the limited number who

could afford high private tuition fees—this was the

same case in Pakistan) especially in recent years.

The government’s attempts to speed up repatriation

have been increasing and have included imposing a

charge on extending identity documents, charging

fees for all Afghan children, and sharing the cost of

health insurance.

Multiple respondents agreed that it was very

25 Monsutti, Afghan Transnational Networks, 13.

26 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees, 118-9.

27 Abbasi-Shavazi et al., Second-Generation Afghans in Iran, 19.

28 UNHCR, Global Report 2003 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2004), 326.

difcult to get Iranian national identication cards;

this was not entirely impossible in Pakistan using

the right networks and for the right price, however.

The possession of valid legal documents has been

an ongoing issue for Afghan refugees, particularly

in Iran; this impacts refugees’ personal security,

access to services and ability to move within Iran

(problematic due to required travel documents

and limitations on changing registered residences).

Systematic control by Iranian authorities resulted

in fewer respondents being able to visit Afghanistan

prior to repatriation, and increased reliance on

smugglers to assist with their return to Iran.

Social environments in the Pakistani and Iranian

sphere

Both Pakistan and Iran consist of multiple ethnic,

linguistic and religious minorities. However, the two

countries have shown slightly different effects of the

state’s control over different regions in the country.

Ayres considers the question of national unity in

Pakistan since the establishment of the nation.

Urdu, which was originally a minority language,

29 Although respondents who grew up in Iran rarely visited

Afghanistan while in refuge, many of their fathers had often commuted

to Afghanistan to visit relatives, arrange marriages, attend funerals,

check on property and to work–as mujahid.

30 A. Ayres, “The Politics of Language Policy in Pakistan,” in Fighting

Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia, ed. M.E. Brown

and S. Ganguly (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003), 51.

Table 1: Refugee context in Pakistan and Iran

Iran Pakistan

Since 1979 Islamic revolution: US$150

million in international assistance

International

assistance

More than US$1 billion in international

assistance (1979-99)

3 million refugees (by 1990)

Less than 2.5% of Afghans settled in

camps (as of 2004)

Refugees’

residence

Over 3.3 million refugees in 300 camps

(by 1990)

45% of Afghans in camps (2007)

Work opportunities controlled, limited

to 16 manual work categories

Work

opportunities

Freedom to move within Pakistan to

seek work

1996: free education for all Afghans

ended, with only documented Afghan

children allowed to continue attending

Iranian schools

Education

Access to education regardless of legal

documents (both secular Afghan school

and madrassas)

Necessity of possession of valid

documentation, especially since mid-

1990s (additional cost to renew)

Tighter border control (smugglers)

Legal status

Required possession of Proof of

Registration cards since 2007

Looser border control, especially for

Pashtuns

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

females) tends to be greater in Pakistan compared

to Iran.

Table 2 highlights the contrast of the two countries:

the proportion of the total urban population (versus

rural), youth literacy rate, and reproductive health

indicators of Pakistanis and Iranians. Remarkably,

almost all young Iranian women are estimated to be

literate, compared to only half of Pakistani women.

Overall, the respondents in this study unanimously

described Iranian culture as “modernised,”

“advanced,” or “cultured,” often referring to a

well-organised public system and order.

Such a

prevailing “cultured” atmosphere in Iran impacted

returnees’ reintegration experiences, especially

women and those returning from Iran, leading

them to view Afghan society as “less cultured”

(see Section 7.4). The study data collected during

eldwork in Iran is potentially biased toward

more educated urban residents, even though

fewer Afghans settled in border provinces where

Iranian minorities largely reside (such as in West

Azerbaijan, Ilam, Mazandaran

). If research had

been conducted in Sistan and Balochistan, the

least developed province in Iran, different patterns

might have emerged.

Integration or assimilation?: Tendency of

Pakistani/Iranian sphere

State policies as well as attitudes toward minorities

can be broadly classied as integrationist or

33 In Pakistan, the literacy rate for females aged ten years and

above in urban Punjab (66 percent) is ve times higher than that of

women in rural Baluchistan (13 percent). (Wilder, Needs Assessment

Exercise of Education Sector, 12).

34 For example, in urban areas in Iran, the government has greater

control over public hygiene and sanitation. Public garbage bins are

found on many public roads and residents are accustomed to following

established social rules and behaviours. In contrast, the opposite

scenario largely exists in Pakistan except limited areas.

35 Samii, “The Nation and its Minorities.”

36 For instance, perceptions toward reproductive health among

Afghan refugees appear to vary depending on location (in selected

Afghan communities in Mashhad and Zahedan city) as well as

generations. P. Piran, “Effects of Social Interaction between Afghan

Refugees and Iranians on Reproductive Health Attitudes,” Disasters

28, no. 3 (2004):283-293; see also M.J. Abbasi-Shabazi et al., Return

to Afghanistan? A Study of Afghans Living in Zahedan (Kabul: AREU,

2005), 9-10.

has been adopted as a symbol of “the imagined

Muslim country,” but provincial and regional ethnic

tension against the central government has been

provocative.

Meanwhile, Iran is a country with

Persians as the largest ethnic group (51 percent of

the population) and a range of minorities and tribes.

Samii points to Tehran’s sensitivity to any local

movement. He argues that minority movement is

not entirely caused by cultural issues but also closely

linked to the frustrations of unemployment and

underdevelopment. Therefore, Persian nationalism

and Shia Islam have been emphasised as the state’s

unifying factors. Iran’s central control appears to

be somehow effective

—at least when compared

to Pakistan.

In Iran, non-mainstream groups (who often speak

Iranian Persian with an accent) are often the

subject of jokes. For example, a few returnee

respondents noted that Turkish-Iranians (Iranian

nationals but an ethnic minority) were a target

of teasing in Iran. Therefore, second-generation

Afghans in Iran faced greater pressures to speak

Iranian Persian in public (see Section 5.5), which

resulted in easily being identied as returnees from

Iran upon repatriation to Afghanistan. In addition,

the comparatively lower prevalence of English in

Iran (although language and computer courses are

becoming more popular), and the emphasis on

Persian as the national language, resulted in a gap

of English prociency among respondents who grew

up in Iran—eventually impacting on the access to

well-paid job markets in Afghanistan. The disparity

in language prociency among second-generation

Afghan refugees within a country (e.g. urban/

rural, regional differences, and between males and

31 Sixty years ago, only 7.3 percent of population in Pakistan claimed

Urdu as one’s rst language. Regional movements against central

government include the separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in

1971, the Sindhi language movement, and the demand to rename

“Pashtunistan” from the NWFP’s party in 1998.

32 There is no private TV company in Iran (although satellite is

available) and the state controls the programmes broadcast in regional

“dialects.” However, regarding minorities, its quality and quantity

is not always appropriate (“making a parody of our language”). An

example was introduced that a professor in Tabriz University confessed

that educated individuals could no longer speak Azeri-Turkic properly

due to the usage of Persian and English. A.W. Samii, “The Nation and

its Minorities: Ethnicity, Unity and State Policy in Iran,” Comparative

Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East no. 1&2 (2000): 128-

137.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

time and the personal situation of the refugees

themselves. Youth and young adult Afghans who

grew up in the neighbouring countries are not one

homogeneous group; rather they are individually

distinct in relation to language spoken, degree of

religiosity, family attitudes and location of origin

and education level, among many other factors.

Although respondents in this study may have grown

up geographically close to their homeland (in some

cases just across the border), they themselves

featured a range of different experiences and

traits, which were then combined with other

characteristics of host populations.

and Z. Olszewska, “The Iranian Afghans,” Iranian Studies 40, no. 2

(2007):137-65.

assimilationist. The integrationist approach involves

a state that is supportive of multiculturalism, while

the assimilationist model requires minorities to

become homogeneous members of the majority of

the population. Non-mainstream cultures are viewed

as less worthy or even as harmful.

As reviewed in

this section, regulation by the Pakistani and Iranian

authorities of Afghans living in those countries,

regional language policies, and social attitudes of

the host population all shape the environment of

the two host countries. Overall, according to the

contexts in which the study’s respondents resided

and their experiences within host populations,

some urban areas of Iran may be viewed as more

assimilationist, while Pakistan may be understood

as a more integrationist environment.

However, it is important to remember that the

situation for individual Afghan refugees who

sought asylum in Pakistan and Iran cannot be over-

generalised; it differed markedly depending on the

place of residence

, changes experienced over

37 S. Castles and M.J. Miller, eds., The Age of Migration: International

Population Movements in the Modern World (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-

Macmillan, 2003), 250-51.

38 For example, according to a male Pashtun returnee who grew

up among Sunni Iranian neighbours close to the border area, he was

familiar with perahan o tomban (popular Afghan male dress) in Iran,

while another respondent who grew up in Tehran saw this type of dress

for the rst time upon his rst return to Afghanistan. Similarly, Afghans

in Torbat-e Jam (eastern Iran) are mostly Sunnis, and are reported

to be well-integrated in Iran through mixed marriages. F. Adelkhah

Table 2: Comparative pattern in Pakistani and Iranian society

Iran (greater homogeneity) Pakistan (greater regional gap)

Signicance of the national language, English

utilised less

Language

Prevalence of local languages, English

important

66.7% Urban population

34.1%

98.1% for males (15-24 years old)

96.7% for females

Youth literacy

76.7% for males (15-24 years old)

53.1% for females

Urban: 25.2 children

Rural: 34.7 children

Infant mortality (per

1,000 live births)

Urban: 74.6 children

Rural: 102.2 children

Urban: 1.8 children

Rural: 2.4 children

Fertility rate (per

woman)

Urban: 3.7 children

Rural: 5.4 children

Modernisation, centralised control (more

assimilationist)

Prevalent tendency

Cultural tradition, regional diversity (more

integrationist)

Note: There is no doubt that both Pakistan and Iran consist of a variety of elements and can hardly be generalised; an easy dichotomy does not

exist. However, such broad tendencies inuence how young Afghans are brought up. This is a general comparison of two distinctive host countries

as a whole.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

insight in the case of similar cultural, geographical

and regional contexts.

3.1 Struggling to nd an identity and

the role of “the other”

In anthropology, “identity” is dened on two levels.

In one meaning, it refers to the unique qualities of

individuals that differentiate them from others. On

another social level, it is associated with the sense

of sameness “in that persons associate themselves,

or be associated by others, with groups or categories

on the basis of some salient common feature.” The

latter social-level identity, which closely correlates

with development of individual characteristics,

emphasises the linkages with individuals and one’s

social and cultural environments.

In this research

project, self-consciousness in a collective sense is

focused in relation to how second-generation Afghan

refugees position themselves among Pakistanis or

Iranians if they grew up in a foreign country, and

among those Afghans who grew up in Afghanistan

or are from a different cultural background. Upon

return to Afghanistan, how their values have

transformed or reconstructed is explored in detail.

Ethnicity, an aspect of group relationships between

those who consider themselves to be culturally

distinct from others, can be explained as one of the

social identities.

Ethnic identity can be associated

not only with biological roots and connections, but

also can be utilised as an instrument for political

mobilisation in pursuit of benets and purpose, or

understood as an ongoing process that is open to

negotiation and modication.

Such uid natures

42 R. Byron, “Identity” in Encyclopaedia of Social and Cultural

Anthropology, eds. A. Barnard and J. Spencer, 292 (London: Routledge,

2002).

43 T.H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological

Perspectives (Chippenham: Pluto Press, 2002), 12-3.

44 S. Sokolovskii and V. Tishkov, “Ethnicity,” in Encyclopaedia of

Social and Cultural Anthropology, eds. A. Barnard and J. Spencer

(London: Routledge, 2002), 190-2.

This section provides key concepts underpinning

this research project, reviewing relevant literature

from similar studies in other contexts in support

of the conceptual framework within which data

was analysed and results are presented. Beyond

generating a knowledge base for policymaking in

relation to the repatriation of Afghan refugees, this

research also aims to make a contribution to the

academic study of forced migration. More dominant

psychiatric approaches study refugee youth in terms

of trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder; in

contrast to these, some recent studies have begun

to use an anthropological perspective, viewing

the impact of their prolonged displacement on, in

particular, their perception of self, homeland, and

future outlook.

Still, there is limited literature on the broader

outcomes of second-generation refugees’ return

to their homeland in the context of prolonged

forced migration—in particular, not only regarding

their initial settlement after repatriation but also

the later, complex reintegration process.

The

study of identity and adaptation among youth

and the second generation of diasporas tends

to assume greater signicance in the Western

context, where often the migrant and receiving

culture are markedly different.

This study of

second-generation refugees living in Afghanistan’s

neighbouring countries attempts to provide greater

39 See: D. Chatty, “Researching Refugee Youth in the Middle East:

Reections on the Importance of Comparative Research,” Journal of

Refugee Studies 20, no. 2 (2007):265-80; J. Boyden and J. de Berry,

Children and Youth on the Front Line: Ethnography, Armed Conict

and Displacement (Oxford, New York: Berghahn Books, 2004).

40 F. Cornish, K. Peltzer and M. MacLachlan, “Returning Strangers:

The Children of Malawian Refugees Come ‘Home’?,” Journal of Refugee

Studies 12, no. 3 (1999):264-83.

41 For example: M. O’Neill and T. Spybey, “Global Refugees,

Exile, Displacement and Belonging,” Sociology 37 (2003): 7-12; M. J.

Melia, “Transatlantic Dialogue on Integration of Immigrant Children

and Adolescents,” International Migration 42, no. 4 (2004): 123-39;

P.A. Kurien, “Being Young, Brown, and Hindu: The Identity Struggles

of Second-Generation Indian Americans,” Journal of Contemporary

Ethnography 34, no. 4 (2005): 434-69; C. Mcauliffe, “Religious Identity

and Transnational Relations in the Iranian Diaspora,” Global Networks

7, no. 3 (2007):307-27.

Part 3: Key Concepts

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

For second-generation Afghan refugees, the

emergence of identity in relation to the subgroups

among Afghans in exile (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras,

etc.) follows a similar path to that of their

identity as refugees. Both identities are formed

by encountering differing values over time. It is a

common feature of respondents’ childhoods that

they played with many different children without

taking into consideration ethnicity or nationality.

Second-generation Afghan refugees would have

certain inherited memories of these divisions from

their parents. Some experienced conict over

ethnicity or politics that related to their place of

origin in Afghanistan during their time in Pakistan

or Iran; this, however, was more likely to be an

issue for rst-generation Afghan refugees (while

sometimes transmitted to the second generation),

or was more frequently referred to as an issue within

Afghanistan—particularly by returnee respondents

(see Section 7.3) or those voicing concerns about

repatriation.

A recent study conducted in two

different areas in Isfahan reports that ethnic

identity was, at times, considered subordinate to

hopes for national unity, due to an understanding of

how ethnic religious divides destroyed Afghanistan.

Therefore, as refugees born or brought up in Pakistan

and Iran, the dominant feeling of “difference”

was—as refugees—the sense of being residents of

inferior status to the citizens of that country.

Adolescence is often a period during which an

individual’s identity is further developed—a time

that is dominated by issues of positioning oneself

in relation to peers, followed by a period of young

adulthood.

For many youth, particularly those

who belong to an ethnic minority, the process of

learning about one’s own ethnicity takes on great

signicance, particularly in the context of forced

displacement and the effect of having a legal

47 Concerns about ongoing ethnic tension in Afghanistan (and also in

Pakistan/Iran to a various degree) were raised by multiple respondents

in Pakistan and Iran regardless of their ethnicity.

48 D. Tober, “My Body is Broken Like My Country: Identity, Nation,

and Repatriation among Afghan Refugees in Iran,” Iranian Studies 40,

no. 2 (2007):263-85.

49 C.G. Mooney, Theories of Childhood: An Introduction to Dewey,

Montessori, Erikson, Piaget, and Vygotsky (St. Paul, Minnesota: Redleaf

Press, 2000), 68.

of ethnic identity were often observed among our

respondents, particularly in how they presented

themselves (see Section 5.5) and how they

experienced tensions in the face of Pakistani or

Iranian social values in pursuit of balance between

the Afghan self in exile and the link to Afghanistan

(see Section 5.5). Ethnic identity is not xed; it

changes over time when individuals understand

themselves in the context of those around them in

different circumstances, as Jenkins notes:

Neither culture nor ethnicity is “something”

that people “have,” or indeed, to which

they “belong.” They are, rather, complex

repertoires which people experience, learn

and “do” in their daily lives, within which

they construct an ongoing sense of themselves

and an understanding of their fellows

This uid nature of identity may be inuenced to

an even greater degree by different environments,

particularly in the context of refugees and migrants

as minority groups in society: the “other” is not

only a member of one’s own family, kin or ethnic

group, but also a “national other.” Relating to a

particular group or groups becomes crucial for a

sense of belonging in the presence of “others” who

are markedly different from one’s own identity.

In the case of Afghanistan, Schetter points out

that Afghan national consciousness, shared by the

majority of non-Pashtun populations, rst emerged

in response to the fragmentation of the country due

to war and the intervention of a foreign power. In

particular, Afghans in exile started to perceive the

territorial border nostalgically, albeit hardly rooted

in common traditions or experiences.

However, for

second-generation Afghan refugees, the national

awareness of themselves as Afghans was often

reinforced in the face of Pakistanis or Iranians,

rather than via the sentiments and nostalgia of

the past days that the rst-generation Afghans had

experienced in Afghanistan (see Section 5.4).

45 R. Jenkins, Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations

(London: Sage, 1997), 14.

46 C. Schetter, “Ethnoscapes, National Territorialisation, and the

Afghan War,” Geopolitics 10 (2005): 50-75.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

status different from that of the citizens of the

host country. Children who are subject to negative

images and perceptions of their ethnic group may

encounter challenges in relation to positioning

themselves within their external environment. From

the social, psychological and child developmental

perspectives, a strong ethnic identity is achieved

when an individual has positive feelings about

his or her group, leading to inner strength and

positive psychological well-being.

It is a critical

point whether these young Afghan refugees can

associate any positive meaning with themselves and

Afghanistan, as it eventually inuences decision-

making about return (see Section 5.5).

Unity for Afghans

“I’d like to say that our generation should stop

racism. We should stop thinking that I’m from

Kabul, or you’re from Khost, etc. Racism destroyed

our country... We should bring a faith among us

that we’re Afghans.”

— Pashtun male student in Karachi who

has never seen his native Kunduz

Identities of young refugees are often contradictory.

In a participatory study, common features drawn

from comparisons of young Palestinian, Afghan

and Sahrawi refugees raised in different contexts

are pointed out: possession of multiple and/

or contested identities with places; gendered

opportunism and agency (for example, acquiring an

education alongside helping their family, but often

with gender disparity); and resilience in the face

of challenges and optimism for the future.

The

formation of identify of young refugees as they

grow up in social contexts with different values

is a complex process that can lead to conicting

internal identities.

50 J. Phinney et al., “Ethnic Identity, Immigration and Wellbeing: An

Interactional Perspective,” Journal of Social Issues 57, no. 3 (2001):

493–510.

51 Chatty, “Researching Refugee Youth in the Middle East,” 271-278.

3.2 Acculturation

Acculturation is the process in which individuals

acquire cultural patterns due to intercultural

contact.

There are two distinct processes

of acculturation: psychological adaptation

(individual emotional well-being, mental health)

and sociocultural adaptation (acquiring culturally

appropriate social skills to manage daily life in

a particular external context).

This is a critical

point: many second-generation Afghan refugees

have acquired the culture and lifestyle of the

host society and are familiar with it, but they are

also not entirely free from periodic feelings of

“non-belonging” that are rooted in their refugee

status (see Section 5.4). Upon repatriation to

their “homeland,” a similar process of adaptation

to the “new” context must again take place:

becoming accustomed to Afghanistan, which is not

necessarily a familiar environment, from a point of

view acquired while growing up in Pakistan or Iran.

Some returnees similarly experience the struggles

of psychological adaptation even though they have

managed to resettle physically and socially.

“I’m neither Iranian nor Afghan.”

— 30-year-old male, studying at a

postgraduate level in Iran

Furthermore, a quantitative study on the degree

of acculturation and adaptation of immigrant youth

in 13 (primarily Western) contexts undertaken

by Berry et al. suggested that there are four

acculturation “proles” that represent possible

outcomes of the acculturation process,

as well

52 J.W. Berry et al., Immigrant Youth in Cultural Transition:

Acculturation, Identity, and Adaptation Across National Context (New

Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 212.

53 C. Ward, “Acculturation,” in Handbook of Intercultural Training,

eds. D. Landis and R. Bahagat (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1996),

124-147.

54 These include separating oneself from the host community and

mixing largely with their own social group; assimilating through a strong

orientation to the host community; integrating by maintaining aspects

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

on the process of “place-making” and its impact on

identity. The focus has turned to how individuals and

groups can recreate a “home” that is not necessarily

tied to a particular place or space.

Thus, focusing

on “‘places of birth’ and degree of nativeness is to

ignore the multiplicity of attachments that people

form to places through living in, remembering, and

imagining them.”

Perceptions of “return” and “homeland” among

displaced peoples are dependent to a degree on the

circumstances that led them to leave their native

land, and their experiences and opportunities at

their destination.

In the case of Afghanistan, it has

been noted that, as a Shia minority in the country,

Hazara refugees continue to perceive their status

in their home country as vulnerable and their life in

the asylum country as potentially more prosperous.

This analysis is quantitatively supported by the lower

percentage of Hazara returns to Afghanistan from

Iran compared to refugees of other ethnicities.

Refugee experiences vary by context. In some cases

the notion of homeland may lose its territorial

afliation, while in others homeland remains a

“territorially anchored identity”. It is the place

where rights are ensured to equal treatment,

freedom of movement and residence, and access to

resources, livelihoods and property. When refugees

experience displacement, social exclusion or the

feeling of non-belonging, this feeling is brought

into even sharper focus (as supported by data from

this study). Kibreab concludes:

[T]he relationship between a territory and

57 D. Turton, “The Meaning of Place in a World of Movement: Lessons

from Long-Term Field Research in Southern Ethiopia,” Journal of

Refugee Studies 18, no. 3 (2005): 258–280.

58 Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples,” 38.

59 G. Kibreab, “Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Identity and

Displacement,” Journal of Refugee Studies 12, no. 4 (1999): 384–410.

60 Hazaras comprise 43 percent of documented Afghans in Iran,

while only 25.6 percent of the total number of UNHCR-assisted returns

(to August 2005) were Hazaras. M.J. Abbasi-Shavazi and D. Glazebrook,

Continued Protection, Sustainable Reintegration: Afghan Refugees

and Migrants in Iran (Kabul: AREU, 2006), 7. Overall, 25.3 percent of

the total UNHCR-assisted returnees from Iran are recorded as Hazaras

(as of May 2008) according to statistics acquired from UNHCR, Kabul.

as some gender disparity (boys showed slightly

greater psychological—but less sociocultural—

adaptation than girls). This suggests that female

immigrant youth may be more at risk in relation

to psychological well-being when they experience

a cultural transition. This may be relevant when

synthesising the results from the three AREU

case studies conducted earlier: many second-

generation Afghan refugee respondents exhibited

a bi-multicultural outcome (somehow maintaining

a balance of their external social sphere with

their internal Afghan domain even when facing

contradictions),

and female returnees did indeed

tend to face greater psychological stress during

the process of reintegration in their homeland (see

Section 7.4).

3.3 The concept of homeland and

second-generation refugee return

In the context of forced migration, it is essential to

understand how the transnational refugee society

maintains its identity and how each individual copes

with the changes brought about by displacement.

Traditionally, national identity was linked to a

territory (the nation) and individuals perceived as

rooted in one place. In this model, displacement

from one’s own soil implies uprootedness, disorder

and a loss of emotional connection to a place.

These assumptions have been challenged by recent

dramatic increases in the mobility of people and

information—driven by globalisation and ongoing

situations of forced displacement. Rather than

viewing places as xed, anthropologists now focus

of their own and the external host society’s customs and culture; or a

mix of these, demonstrating uncertainty about their position in society

and showing inconsistent attitudes. J.W. Berry et al., “Immigrant

Youth: Acculturation, Identity, and Adaptation,” Applied Psychology:

An International Review 55, no.3 (2006): 303-332.

55 In contrast to Berry’s quantitative study, this study is based on

a qualitative analysis of oral histories; therefore, classication of the

acculturation prole of this study’s respondents is relative. Second-

generation Afghan refugees with complex identities are not easily

categorised within a set of proles.

56 L. Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the

Territorialisation of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees,”

Cultural Anthropology 7, no. 1 (1992): 24–44.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

For younger refugees in particular, life after

returning to their “homeland” often presents many

new difculties. Empirical studies of young returnees

in other parts of the world have demonstrated

the emotional stress experienced after return,

primarily in relation to facing “others” who did not

leave during the period of conict or emergency.

In the case of Malawian children who were born

outside their country when their homeland was

under dictatorship, which lasted from 1964 to 1993,

young returnees from Zambia exhibited adjustment

stress because their experience of being “outsiders”

did not end as expected after returning to their

homeland. Rather, the stress of still feeling like

“outsiders” was combined with a lack of material

possessions, education and work opportunities to

produce a set of factors that seriously jeopardised

their successful reintegration.

It is the balance of multiple experiences that

inuence the complex reintegration process of

young returnees. This was examined in depth among

returnee respondents in the Afghanistan case study,

the results of which are explored in Section 7.

63 Cornish et al., “Returning Strangers,” 281.

identity, not in terms of a link between a

people and a soil, as such, but rather in terms

of membership of a state occupying a given

territory with the right to exclude others from

that territory, is signicant. People tend to

identify strongly with their territories because

of the opportunity this offers regarding rights

of access to resources and protection by virtue

of being a member or citizen of that territory.

“Returning” to one’s “homeland” for second-

generation refugees does not necessarily mean an

actual return: many have grown up without ever

having experienced life in their own homeland. For

this group, return intentions are less motivated by

recovering an idealised past, kept alive through the

stories of relatives and other refugees, than by ideas

of rights, access to property, and citizenship.

This

is an important expectation of their country that

many second-generation Afghan refugees embrace

upon return. If expectations are great but not met

in reality, they experience further disappointment

(see Table 7 in Section 7.1).

61 Kibreab, “Revisiting the Debate,” 408.

62 R. Zetter, “Reconceptualising the Myth of Return: Continuity and

Transition Amongst the Greek-Cypriot Refugees of 1974,” Journal of

Refugee Studies 12, no. 1 (1999): 1-22.

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Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

those not even allowed to visit relatives). In both

Pakistan and Iran, at least one case of a mixed

ethnicity marriage was identied by each team

in each country, and the inclusion of a female-

headed household (one where the primary income

was earned by females) was also set as a selection

criterion for each research site. With this range

of considerations in place, identifying “the ideal

respondent” was not a simple task.

Fieldwork for this qualitative study was conducted

in three countries over different periods during one

year, starting in April 2006. The 12-month period

included: organising the research team (hiring

and training); conducting meetings with local

government institutions and related organisations;

identifying respondents and obtaining their informed

consent; and conducting intensive interviews with

respondents and transcribing data collected. AREU’s

research team conducted eldwork in Pakistan and

Afghanistan, while in Iran, given the difculties that

an independent Afghan organisation would have

had in obtaining the required permission to conduct

research, AREU entered into a partnership with the

University of Tehran to complete the eldwork.

In Pakistan, AREU’s partner organisations, which

have worked extensively with Afghans in Peshawar,

Quetta and Karachi and have accumulated vast

experience and local understanding of the prevailing

issues, assisted the research team’s work there.

UNHCR, in cooperation with relevant government

authorities, facilitated the research in Pakistan.

AREU’s research team was comprised of two two-

member teams: a male Afghan team and a female

Afghan team. An expatriate supervisor directly

managed the work of both teams and a senior

research manager oversaw the research project.

The research team in Iran was comprised of ve

university-based academics (three demographers,

a sociologist and an anthropologist) and ve Afghan

interviewers (two males and three females).

65 AREU’s host organisations in Pakistan for this research project

were: International Rescue Committee in Peshawar; Save the Children

USA in Quetta; and FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance in Karachi.

4.1 Field approach and sampling

The main criteria for selecting second-generation

Afghan refugee and returnee respondents, both

male and female, were that they:

were 15-30 years old and had spent more than •

half of their lives in Pakistan or Iran; and

for returnees, had returned to Afghanistan after •

the Afghan Interim Authority was established

in late 2001 and had lived in Afghanistan for at

least six months.

It was also important to include respondents with

diverse demographic characteristics to ensure that

a representatively broad range of opportunities,

experiences and future perceptions would be

reected in this qualitative study. The following

key issues were taken into account in the quota

sampling process, based on the assumption that

these variables would have been likely to affect

the personal experiences and return intentions of

young Afghans:

marital status;•

education level and occupation (of the •

respondent);

economic status (of the household);•

ethnicity; and•

location of refuge and return (e.g. Pakistan/•

Iran, urban/rural/camp, main local language

spoken in the area).

In addition, more detailed criteria were used where

possible to further diversify the sample, including:

degree of religiosity; positive/negative attitude

to Pakistanis/Iranians; and mobility of women (for

example, women working outside the home versus

64 During the initial identication of respondents, their relative

economic status (low, middle, upper) was estimated through

observation where possible (dress, belongings, housing) and informal

conversation about their families. This information was later used

during data analysis to further categorise respondents.

Part 4: Methodology

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

greater depth the life histories of each individual:

time prior to migration, experiences in the country

of refuge, return decision-making, reintegration

and future prospects. While efforts were made to

ensure that data collected was as comparable as

possible, there were certain operational limitations

for comparative analysis between the countries.

In Iran, respondents with tertiary education and

professional employment were over-represented

(see “Education” in Annex III). Data limitations

from the neighbouring countries and some gaps

were mitigated by the strength of data collected

among a range of returnees in three geographical

areas in Afghanistan (Kabul, Herat and Baghlan),

which captured information about respondents

who had returned from a range of locations (not

predetermined) within Pakistan and Iran—and

not only from those xed research sites in which

respondents were interviewed in the neighbouring

countries (for example, tribal areas in Pakistan and

Torbat-e Jam in Iran).

This qualitative study cannot attempt to represent

the full spectrum of experiences of all the second-

generation Afghan refugees among either the large

populations of refugees remaining in neighbouring

countries or the nearly 5.6 million returnees to

Afghanistan from neighbouring countries over the

past six years. It does, however, aim to understand

The fact that the interviewers were Afghans

themselves, in the same age group and speaking

the same languages as the interviewees, was

particularly important for this study. The research

team shared personal memories with respondents,

which built trust and encouraged them to share

their experiences. Interviews were conducted in

the languages with which respondents felt most

comfortable, mostly either Dari or Pashto, while a

few were done in Urdu and English.

As a result, a total of 199 second-generation Afghan

refugees were interviewed in three countries as

shown in Table 3.

The number of respondents in

Afghanistan was reduced in order to explore in

66 In Pakistan, one Afghan male and two female interviewers

(covering four languages: Dari, Pashto, Urdu and English) were

employed and trained at each site, and at least one male and one

female interviewer remained unchanged in the three research sites.

One permanent AREU staff member (male) undertook eldwork in both

Pakistan and Afghanistan, which was of great value in maintaining

continuity and data quality. In Iran, interviewers spoke Dari and Iranian

Persian. In Afghanistan, only Dari was used by female interviewers

outside Kabul due to the unavailability of Pashto-speaking Afghan

female interviewers who were able to travel.

67 The number of respondents in each site varies. Sampling from

Quetta was limited because of the suspension of eldwork after two

weeks due to local political tensions and legal issues. Sampling from

Peshawar was increased to compensate for the shorter time spent in

Quetta. Only two weeks of eldwork were conducted in Isfahan due to

time constraints.

Table 3: Second-generation Afghan refugee

respondents (in-depth interviews)

Country

Research

site

FEMALE MALE

TOTAL

Single Married Single Married

Pakistan

Peshawar 10 10 8 10 38

Quetta 4 3 3 4 14

Karachi 7 3 5 4 19

Iran

Tehran 9 7 9 7 32

Mashhad 9 7 7 9 32

Isfahan 4 4 6 2 16

Afghanistan

Kabul 4 4 4 4 16

Herat 3 5 4 4 16

Baghlan 5 3 4 4 16

TOTAL

55 46 50 48

199

101 98

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Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

site simply provided an entry to eldwork rather

than being a key selection criterion itself.

4.3 Seeking “the ideal respondent”

in the eld

In Peshawar, Pakistan, which has a high concentration

of Afghan refugees, the task of identifying young

Afghans who t the quota-sampling criteria was

much easier compared to other sites. The male

research team initially spent time in the communities

talking to elders, shopkeepers, property dealers,

restaurant workers and others, asking if they knew

any Afghans who had lived in Pakistan for a long

time. At the same time, the female research team

approached women and children on the street, or

sometimes in a health clinic or school, to ask similar

questions. Introductions from NGOs, government

organisations, various institutions and community

leaders were also helpful in accessing certain

members of the neighbourhood, particularly when

the team needed to identify respondents with more

specic criteria.

The identication of second-generation Afghan

refugees became more difcult in Quetta and Karachi.

In many parts of Karachi, Afghans are very similar to

Pakistanis in their physical appearance and manner

of dressing. Furthermore, the research team noted

that there was signicant fear and suspicion directed

toward them because of the refugees’ ambiguous

legal status, and this presented a major obstacle in

respondent selection. Potential respondents were

reluctant to talk, as many believed that revealing

their refugee status could lead to being reported to

the police, sent to jail or deported. This was the case

among both the low-income group (such as garbage

collectors) as well as those who were wealthier

(such as businessmen). The research teams made

signicant efforts to develop a rapport through

informal talks within the community.

70 During eldwork, education emerged as a key factor in the

diverse experiences of second-generation refugees. In the latter

stage of eldwork in Pakistan, highly specic criteria in relation to

educational background were used in the selection of respondents, for

example, those who had studied entirely in the Pakistani school system

or those who had moved from Afghan schools to Pakistani schools and

vice versa.

the perceptions about return, reintegration

experiences and changing values of a number

of individuals from purposively selected groups

exhibiting a range of characteristics, and from

these, some important insights may be drawn. Some

of the key characteristics of the 199 respondents

in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan are described in

Annex III, and further details appear in each country

case study (published separately).

4.2 Selecting the research sites and

communities

Each of the three research sites in the three countries

studied were selected primarily because of their

concentrated Afghan population (either refugees or

returnees), along with their balance of linguistic/

ethnic groups and logistical feasibility in relation

to security for researchers undertaking eld work.

The locations were also chosen so that there would

be as broad a geographical representation as was

possible in each country.

For the eldwork carried

out in Pakistan and Iran, the sampling approach

was initially based on neighbourhood selection, and

focused on nding communities in each site with

high concentrations of Afghan refugees.

Preliminary ndings in Pakistan suggested that

Afghans’ experiences as refugees there have been

strongly inuenced by whether they lived in a

homogeneous Afghan neighbourhood or in an area

with greater exposure to Pakistanis. For this reason,

a primary consideration in neighbourhood selection

in Pakistan became the neighbourhood’s specic

characteristics (whether homogeneous, comprised

mostly of Afghan residents or otherwise) rather

than geographical diversity (urban, peri-urban or

rural); later, greater emphasis was placed on highly

specied respondent characteristics. This was the

case to an even greater extent in locating second-

generation Afghan refugees who had returned to

Afghanistan—the initial location of the research

68 Abbasi-Shavazi et al., Second-Generation Afghans in Iran; Saito

and Hunte, The Dilemma of Second-Generation Afghans in Pakistan;

and Saito, From Mohajer to Hamwatan: Afghans Return Home.

69 Further details on site selection are available in the case studies

for each country.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

consent for conducting the interview.

In the case

of eldwork in Afghanistan, at least two interviews

per individual (of two to 2.5 hours each) were

conducted to capture the fullest picture of the life

history of respondents.

A total of 12 focus group discussions (six in both

Pakistan and Iran) and 14 parental interviews (six in

Pakistan, eight in Iran)

were conducted in order to

explore issues beyond individuals’ own experiences

and to generate dialogue among second-generation

Afghan refugees. However, the individual in-depth

interviews were found to be more effective in

building an understanding of the context and

background of statements made, making focus

group discussions a less useful methodology later.

Participant observation was another powerful

research tool that complemented the data collected

at the community, household and individual levels.

Dress, appearance and behaviour of respondents

were systematically noted and compared to

others in the community, particularly in non-urban

areas, as a signal of their degree of integration.

When interviews were conducted in respondents’

homes, assets and belongings were some other

indicators used to estimate the economic status

of the household. In particular, the team recorded

emotional and behavioural interactions and changes

observed during conversations.

71 In Pakistan and Afghanistan, condential interviews were written

down in detailed eld notes (one interviewer led the conversation

while the other took notes), while digital recorders were used in Iran

(one led the conversation while the other recorded and transcribed)

after gaining informed consent. Following all interviews, notes and

tapes were transcribed and translated, and the transcriptions reviewed

for clarity and accuracy.

72 Parental interviewees were selected from among the families

of respondents, in particular where respondents had opinions that

differed from those of their parents.

In Iran, an Afghan team manager in the eld played

a key role in contacting local Afghan networks in

the research sites—residents, elders, shops, schools

and cultural centres—to identify potentially suitable

respondents exhibiting a range of characteristics

that would meet the quota-sampling criteria. The

research team then arranged interview times with

selected respondents in appropriate locations

(such as at an Afghan school or at the home of

the respondent). Interviewers were provided with

a letter from the University of Tehran indicating

the purpose of the study, a letter from the agency

responsible for funding the research project,

and written approval from the relevant Iranian

authorities. The condentiality of information

provided by respondents was explained, particularly

as some respondents expressed concerns about the

interview being recorded.

In Afghanistan, a reduced number of respondents

were specically selected in order to capture

detailed and diverse information about returnee

experiences. The research team spent a number

of weeks networking within the study sites,

documenting second-generation returnees they

encountered along with any basic information

gleaned during informal conversations. After

considering potential respondents, the team

then selected those who best fullled the quota

requirements in each location. Where a certain

criterion in the quota sampling was not identied

as part of this process, researchers continued their

attempts to nd “the ideal respondent” throughout

the eldwork.

4.4 Research tools

A series of semi-structured interview guides

containing highly specic probing questions were

prepared for interviewers in Pakistan and Iran

in order to facilitate the comparability of data

collected. These guides were modied over time

during eldwork, and were further revised for the

eldwork in Afghanistan. Individual interviews

in Pakistan and Iran usually took two to 2.5

hours, excluding the time required for a general

introduction of the research team, an explanation

of the purpose of the project, and acquisition of

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

represent an idealised past and nostalgic thoughts

of the “old days”; they often include memories

of tough lives in times of poverty and war, the

martyrdom of loved ones, physical threats to life,

and fear. The same storytellers often had multiple

versions of events to tell with many layers of

complexity, reecting their different experiences

in Afghanistan at various times in their life.

Naturally, their memories and own interpretations

of past incidents probably changed over time with

the input of additional information and comparison

with their new experiences in Pakistan and Iran.

A complex and ever-changing interpretation of

a family’s roots was then passed on to second-

generation refugees.

Most of this study’s respondents’ families had had

some degree of interaction with their relatives in

Afghanistan while living in exile. Sending letters

and cassette tapes through travellers was a common

way of keeping in touch with relatives, particularly

during the years of war.

In more recent years,

telephone contact, mostly for special occasions

such as family celebrations, has also become

popular.

Among some educated and wealthier

respondents, the use of the internet to communicate

from Pakistan and Iran was an important means of

maintaining contacts in Afghanistan as well as in

other countries.

When encountering visitors and relatives from

Afghanistan, respondents were sometimes surprised

at the gap between themselves and other Afghans

in Afghanistan. It was not limited to those who

while the mother of a 23-year-old female college student in Peshawar

had described pre-war Kabul as a liberal environment in which women

used to work and had relatively equal rights.

75 Even in recent years, sending letters through tribal or village

networks still appears to be common practice, particularly to rural

areas in Afghanistan without mobile phone coverage.

76 Mobile phones in Afghanistan play a signicant role in maintaining

direct contact with relatives in foreign countries. In some villages

in Afghanistan, a few wealthier villagers had mobiles, and others

beneted from this.

This section explores respondents’ backgrounds

in relation to having grown up as Afghan refugees

in neighbouring countries. The data analysed is

drawn from interviews with refugee youth living

in Pakistan and Iran, as well as with returnees in

Afghanistan looking back on their lives as refugees

prior to return. Understanding that refugees’

past experiences directly inuence their present

situation is crucial to a full exploration of their

repatriation to Afghanistan and potential future

prospects.

Firstly, the ways in which respondents learned

about their homeland while growing up in

neighbouring countries are discussed. Secondly,

the discrepancies between internal values and

the external sphere, and adjustments made to

compensate for these, are described. The point

is then made that returnees often experience

ongoing feelings of “non-belonging” upon their

repatriation to Afghanistan. The section concludes

with a discussion of comparative formation of

Afghan identity in Pakistan and Iran, which link to

attitudes to Afghanistan and return.

5.1 Learning about Afghanistan

Family histories told by refugees’ parents, elder

siblings and grandparents, particularly about the

time before eeing from their homeland, helped

many respondents to begin to visualise life in

Afghanistan.

Afghans’ stories of their pre-refugee

lives, particularly in relation to their family roots

and background, are diverse.

They do not simply

73 “Elders are often regarded as symbols of the homeland and

represent a physical and immediate connection to the past and

family history. Oral history is important to transfer knowledge across

the generations.” D. Chatty and G. Crivello, Lessons Learnt Report:

Children and Adolescents in Sahrawi and Afghan Refugee Households:

Living with the Effects of Prolonged Armed Conict and Forced

Migration (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 2005), 11.

74 For example, a 21-year-old unemployed male interviewed in a

periphery area of Baghlan, who grew up in a remote camp in Pakistan,

had heard from his father about their family’s previous nomadic life,

Part 5: Growing Up Afghan in Pakistan and Iran: The

Formation of Afghan Identity

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Many respondents in Pakistan and Iran mentioned

that mass media (television, radio, magazines and

internet) act as important resources in updating

refugees about the current situation in Afghanistan.

It was often pointed out, mostly by those with

higher levels of education, that the mass media

within their host countries tended to exaggerate

dramatic events that happened in Afghanistan

in relation to war and conict (and in recent

years, in relation to bombings and kidnappings).

International news services such as BBC Radio

lled gaps in the information available. In some

selected areas in Pakistan, some respondents said

that they watch Afghan programmes in order to nd

out about the current situation at home—although

not all the respondents had access to television

at home.

Meanwhile, there was no Afghan

programmes ofcially available in Iran (although

satellite is available among well-off families). In

both countries, information published in Afghan

magazines and newspapers, and by Afghan schools,

organisations and even political parties during the

war, helped many respondents become more aware

of the history, culture and political issues of their

homeland.

Among respondents’ households, a degree of gender

disparity was observed in relation to access to

information as well as learning languages—more so

in Pakistan where several languages are commonly

used. Information ltered into the household from

male family members was an important source

of learning about the external world, including

Afghanistan, for less mobile female respondents. In

some family contexts, little was discussed or known

about Afghanistan—some parents did not talk much

about their past lives because of emotional pain

associated with recalling their memories, or concern

about upsetting small children and having them focus

instead on their current life and future prospects.

Not feeling that they knew enough about Afghanistan

sometimes discouraged them from talking about

their homeland—even with Afghan friends.

78 For example, a few female respondents were not allowed to

watch television because of concerns about cultural inappropriateness.

Besides, the family of one highly educated male respondent interviewed

in Pakistan did not watch television at home because the male elders

did not allow it; however, this respondent had access to information

outside the home.

were well assimilated into Pakistani and Iranian

society, but it also occurred among some second-

generation Afghan refugees who remained isolated

from the host society and associated only with

their own Afghan culture.

Stories told by visitors

from Afghanistan, representing a mix of individual

backgrounds and experiences, are heavily inuenced

by the ever-changing social, political and security

context there.

For these reasons, this study tended to nd that

it was a minority of second-generation refugees

who had heard either entirely positive or entirely

negative stories about their homeland. Having

absorbed a range of both similar and conicting

retellings of complex pre-refugee experiences,

the formation of each respondent’s notion of their

“homeland” was not straightforward. It was also

open to further inuence.

5.2 Opportunities to learn about

Afghanistan

Impacting on an individual’s mobility, residential

area and neighbourhood are important elements of a

refugee’s environment. Respondents who grew up in

refugee camps in Pakistan or on the border with Iran

where the host population was scarce tended to be

cognisant of the fact that they were all Afghans from

Afghanistan. This situation provided opportunities

to learn through daily interaction with the general

public, mostly for males who spent more time outside

the home among the community (communicating with

Afghan shopkeepers, going to the mosque, attending

community gatherings, etc.). Conversations about

Afghanistan would start when one individual asked

another where he was from, leading to a discussion

based on them both being Afghan. These kinds of

daily communications reinforced the refugees’

awareness of being Afghan.

77 For example, a 17-year-old girl who grew up in Quetta was

essentially living in an Afghan enclave in Pakistan. When she was young,

she did not even know what a school was because no one from among

her relatives had attended. When her cousin (who was physically dirty

and untidy) visited her family from a rural village in Afghanistan two

years ago, her perception of Afghanistan deteriorated because her

cousin did not know what soup was.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

An Afghan cultural institution in Pakistan

Afghan children in Pakistan often attend a madrassa

The pin-up board at an Afghan School in Pakistan

Photos 1,2 and 3:

Afghan learning

in Pakistan

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

is actually discovered there is necessarily dependent

on the location visited, the time at which the visit

takes place, and the people encountered. Visits

to Afghanistan made around the time of decision-

making can potentially persuade refugees to return,

by providing an accurate understanding of the

current situation in their intended return location—

both positive and negative aspects

—in addition to

allowing them to make practical preparations for

return.

“When I returned to my village in Afghanistan,

I came to know about Afghanistan and being a

real Afghan. I had heard the name “Afghanistan”

and I knew that I belonged to it. When I was asked

where I’m from, I would say Kabul. But I had only

heard of Kabul as somewhere in Afghanistan. I

didn’t know about other things there.”

— 19-year-old shopkeeper in rural Baghlan who

returned from Pakistan without an education

5.3 Growing up Afghan in Pakistan

and Iran: the dilemma of different

values

The process of identity formation for second-

generation Afghans in Pakistan and Iran is often

beset by the tension of conicting values. This

occurs in two concurrent contexts—the Afghan

internal sphere and the Pakistani or Iranian social

sphere, and it is exacerbated by the individual

undergoing the adolescent and young adult

developmental stages of life. Figure 1 shows the

relationships an individual refugee has with his or

her family and external society (both Afghans and

host population) while growing up in Pakistan and

Iran, all of which would feature different norms

81 Several respondents reported that their image of Afghanistan as

devastated by war had changed after observing reconstruction efforts,

encouraging some to return. On the other hand, negative experiences

also discouraged return—not only seeing the high unemployment but

also observing corruption and bribery, discrimination, the marginalised

poor and powerless, and unfavourable conditions particularly for

women.

The opportunity to attend Afghan schools offered

a safe way of becoming familiar with background

information about Afghanistan, encouraging

students’ loyalty to their homeland and offering

socialisation among the Afghans—particularly in

areas where there were few Afghans in Pakistan

and in self-run schools in Iran. Afghan schools in

Iran often provide a space in which students feel

a sense of safety and belonging.

The quality of

some Afghan schools was often described as not

competitive enough compared to Pakistani and

Iranian state schools, which was primarily related

to resource constraints (but also more affordable

fees for Afghan households). However, the positive

aspects of Afghan schools included their use of

Afghan textbooks,

instruction in Dari and Pashto,

and inclusion of appropriate topics and celebrations

related to Afghanistan—all of which encouraged

refugee students to study hard and to consider

ultimately returning to serve their own country.

The clear differences in frequency and reasons

for visiting Afghanistan between male and female

respondents in this study also highlight the contrast

between genders in household responsibility

and mobility. The majority of second-generation

Afghans who grew up in Iran, particularly women,

had rarely visited Afghanistan, particularly during

the war, often having overwhelmingly uneasy

images of Afghanistan in relation to fear of the

unknown. According to multiple respondents,

there appears to be uncertainty if they come to

Afghanistan temporarily, and returning to Iran

could be difcult, inuenced by changing policy at

times. The most inuential element in refugees’

formation of realistic perceptions of Afghanistan

is going to the country and seeing the situation

there for themselves. It was reported by a few

respondents that they had rst experienced truly

missing Afghanistan only after returning from their

rst visit to the country.

The outcome of such fact-nding missions and what

79 Chatty and Crivello, Lessons Learnt Report; Chatty, “Researching

Refugee Youth,” 13.

80 Refugee village respondents in NWFP and Balochistan showed

a strong preference for the Afghan curriculum. See: Wilder, Needs

Assessment Exercise of Education Sector, 50.

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Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

developed a much greater attachment to their host

society, as it is the place where many were born

and that most know best. This difference between

the generations causes certain contradictions in

values.

Regardless of the extent to which respondents

integrated or not with the host society, they

sometimes faced contradictions between their

internal values and external social norms associated

with their Afghan families, relatives, communities,

and host societies.

In addition, individuals,

living in a foreign country among Pakistanis and

Iranians, frequently exhibited shifts in behaviour

depending on their context (for instance, trying to

present themselves as Pakistani or Iranian outside

while maintaining their own accent at home).

Fundamentally, however, their values were more or

less shaped by Afghan norms, and their behaviour,

especially within the Afghan domain, was dened

by family, relatives and their community.

84 For example, a 16-year-old uneducated girl, who was born in

Karachi but only speaks Dari because she had no relationships with

Pakistanis, wanted to wear a Punjabi dress like her Afghan friend

did, but her mother did not allow it because of considered to be

inappropriate to do so in the light of their own culture. This made her

aware of her own Afghan dress and the difference between herself and

Pakistanis. This is a case of non-assimilation in the host society.

and values. Respondents

almost unanimously

reported that among

family was where their

“own Afghan culture”

was rst learned. Passing

on Afghan culture was an

integral part of bringing

up boys and girls to be

respectful Afghans who

would t in with each

family’s context. A

family’s reputation often

depends on maintaining

modesty—particularly

that of its female

m e m b e r s —w h er e ve r

they live. Sometimes the

very fact that they were

living in a foreign country

meant that the desire to

preserve and keep pure the family’s “own Afghan

culture” was even greater, at times expressed in

relation to the potential contaminating threat of

Pakistani or Iranian culture.

The social space outside respondents’ homes was

sometimes very different to that within the home,

particularly for those living in predominantly host

population areas, where languages other than their

own were used. Afghan culture itself has also been

transformed over the recent decades of war and

large-scale migration, both within Afghanistan

and in the countries of exile. The rst generation

of refugees, eeing from their homeland, had to

adjust to life in asylum countries. This study’s

respondents, who represent the second-generation

of forced displacement, have in most cases

82 Afghan culture is not homogeneous. Respondents reported

considerable diversity among other second-generation Afghans who

had grown up in Pakistan or Iran. For example, a 19-year-old male

student who grew up in Karachi rst heard of Naw Roz (New Year) only

when his friend at an Afghan course visited Mazar-i-Sharif for New Year

celebrations.

83 It was generally perceived by both male and female respondents

that Pakistani and Iranian women were often much “freer” in their

relationships with men than Afghan women, and that there were

benets associated with the relatively higher social status of those

women (greater degree of gender equality, better access to education

and work).

Afghans in

AFGHANISTAN

Afghans living in Pakistan/Iran

SELF

Afghan

Household

Pakistanis/Iranians

Figure 1: Afghan refugees’ social networks in Pakistan/Iran

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

economically (ownership of property, income).

The external context in which second-generation

refugees grow up is a critical factor in how they

dene themselves. Whether they nd similarities,

differences, or both depends on a combination of

the background of individual respondents and the

host society.

However, the simple fact of being a mohajer—a

legal status that clearly differed to that of the

citizens of the host countries—could not be ignored

by second-generation Afghan refugees living in

Pakistan and Iran, regardless of the similarities they

found to their host society and their stated levels of

comfort due to having grown up there. The feeling

of “non-belonging” can be exacerbated in the face

of solidarity among the host population, such as on

Pakistan’s Independence Day, Iran’s Revolution Day,

or a state election; refugees do not feel connected

to the real meaning of such occasions, and do not

prioritise taking time off to celebrate them but

rather work and earn money. Similarly, the more

advanced systems of law and social order in Pakistan

and Iran compared to the less developed situation in

Afghanistan (as heard by second-generation refugees

from their various sources of information) also tend

to bring into sharper focus the complexities that

second-generation refugees feel—the uneasiness

of being a mohajer combined with ambivalence or

even anger towards Afghanistan.

86 For example, a 20-year-old married woman who remained

uneducated and had almost no interaction with Pakistanis remembered

becoming conscious of being Afghan for the rst time when she went

to Lahore. Until then, while living in a periphery area of Peshawar, she

had not felt that she was in a foreign country—with many of her Afghan

relatives living nearby as well as strict Pakistani Pashtun neighbours

(whose culture was similar to that of her own family).

“My mother told me about Pashtun culture—what

girls should do in the house and out of house.

She was afraid that her daughter might be like a

Pakistani if she did not explain anything.”

— 19-year-old female with 12th grade

education who grew up in Peshawar

5.4 Being mohajerin in the context

of “others”

Another way in which refugees come to learn

about Afghanistan is triggered by understanding

the meaning of being a mohajer

—creating further

internal complexities as they became aware of the

feeling of “non-belonging” in Pakistan or Iran. For

example, some respondents—mostly those who

were highly assimilated into the host society and

who were not conscious of their refugee status in

childhood—reported that they thought of themselves

as Pakistani or Iranian until they began to notice

that their external relationships and environment

were different. During childhood, both second-

generation Afghan refugees and children of the

host population may not have been aware of the

differences between each other, but this awareness

gradually developed through their interactions with

broader society.

This kind of learning not only took place through

particular events or moments such as being singled

out as refugees by the host population; it also took

place in the daily context of living among host

communities and gradually discovering similarities

and differences there. This often caused second-

generation refugees to rethink themselves and their

position culturally (language/accent, dress, food,

celebrations, religion, gender relations), legally/

politically (opportunities, access to services) and

85 The terms mohajer (refugee) and mohajerin (refugees) imply

those who seek asylum for religious reasons, originally used as an

honourable term: “when the regime in power does not allow the free

practice of Islam… [an individual] who voluntarily goes into exile, and

who has severed the ties with his own people and his possessions to

take refuge in a land of Islam.” P. Centlivers and M. Centlivers-Demont,

“The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan: an Ambiguous Identity, “Journal of

Refugee Studies 1, no. 2 (1988):141-152.

“I was born in Karachi and I feel myself to be a

Pakistani. But I have an Afghan family so I know

I am an Afghan, just by name. I don’t have any

wish to stay as an Afghan. When I was small and

ghting started with children, people called me

an Afghan.”

— 23-year-old male worker in

Karachi, without education

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Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

directly toward to the respondent, but toward

Afghans in general) contributes to their feelings of

being foreign—the full realisation of what it means

to be a mohajer—and points to the inevitability

of return. This was commonly understood, even

among those respondents who were, at the time

of interview, reluctant to return. Mohajerin cannot

become Pakistani or Iranian citizens, even if they

have lived outside their own country for decades

and over several generations—unlike some of their

relatives who have been able to acquire citizenship

in other countries (such as those in the West). The

Interviewer: “What makes it difcult

for you when Iranians say ‘Afghani’ to

you, when you are Afghan?”

Respondent: “For example, you are

sitting in your room now, and someone

comes here and yells, ‘Tajik!’ Isn’t that

an insult? You are a woman. There is no

need to shout that you are a Tajik.”

— 26-year-old university-educated

female returnee from Iran to Kabul

It was almost unanimously reported by

respondents in this study that being

labelled as a refugee or “mohajer,”

regardless of their degree of individual

integration with the host population,

was the greatest factor leading to

feelings of marginalisation in exile. This

was especially the case during those

times when bilateral relationships

between the neighbouring countries

and Afghanistan were strained. The

term “mohajer” originally used to

refer to refugees who had ed their

homes to avoid religious oppression

or persecution; however, it does not

necessarily retain its original meaning

any longer. Some respondents noted

that the fact that they were mohajerin

was not the problem, but rather the

way they came to be derogated by

the host population as “mohajer,” and

these feelings were often shown to

persist even after repatriation. The stress and fear

associated with being taunted and labelled with

derogatory terms are more acute among children

and youth, who face the already difcult situation

of growing up among “others” who were different

and seeking their own anchor point from which to

establish their values and ideas.

Whether done intentionally or not, the repeated

abuse that Afghan refugees suffer (even if not

87 Phinney et al., “Ethnic Identity, Immigration and Wellbeing,” 496.

Table 4: Characteristics of respondents

in Pakistan and Iran

Iran Pakistan

External pressures to

speak Iranian Persian,

relatively less

internal control

Less resistance/more

willingness to blend in

with Iranian society’s

values

1. Language,

education, and

cultural response

External choice/

diversity but internal

pressure to speak

mother tongue

Attempts to maintain

Afghan culture

Persistent fear of

deportation, valid ID

essential

2. Identication in

public

Increasing need for valid

ID, but used to be less

Shame, denial of

being Afghan

3. Perception of

self as Afghan

within host society

Struggle for honour, self

autonomy, pride

More passive

or powerless

connotations, such

as being employed as

labourers

4. Stereotypical

characteristics of

Afghan-ness

More active

connotations, such as

zeal, strength, honour

(although vulnerable at

the same time)

Note: As there is regional diversity within each country as well as among each

community/family/individual personality, this table makes generalisations based on

tendencies observed among respondents, which are inuenced by the cultural and

political frameworks within which they primarily grew up (for this reason, for example,

the characteristics are mostly a reection of selected urban areas in Iran).

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

In contrast, respondents who grew up in Iran needed

to speak Iranian Persian outside the home (as seen

in Table 2). At home, some parents attempted to

maintain their own accent to preserve their Afghan

heritage, but this was less common than found

within refugee households living in Pakistan.

particular concerns were raised among respondents

in Iran about sending Afghan children to Iranian state

schools in relation to them “becoming Iranians.”

Iranian state schools, with their higher quality of

education (better facilities, teaching methods and

discipline), were recognised as a place for gaining

an education, while cultural matters were learnt

at home.

“Iran was good in terms of this. Afghan refugees

learnt something; went to a literacy course, knew

more about how to keep house clean and hygiene,

but those who remained here don’t care about

cleanness and hygiene.”

— 24-year-old housewife in Herat who could not

attend a formal school in Iran due to not having

legal document (but she attended an informal

literacy course)

The prevailing social norm in many parts of Iran

is to educate boys as well as girls, among both

Iranians and Afghans. Iran’s evolution in education,

which was strongly supported by religious scholars,

was perceived by Afghans as the role model for

Muslim men and women and as their responsibility.

The positive aspects of Iran—a country perceived

as being cultured, respectful of women’s rights,

Islamic and less patriarchal—were praised by the

majority of respondents. The literacy rate clearly

shows a contrast between the two countries, with

90 Among Pashtun respondents, if both parents were Pashtun most

families spoke Pashto at home, regardless of their residential area in

either Pakistan or Iran.

91 Gender roles among Afghan refugees in Iran have been transformed

in various aspects: participating in income-earning activities, more

decision-making in reproductive health and marriage, and positions

in the family, education, etc. See discussions of H. Hoodfar, “Families

on the Move: The Changing Role of Afghan Refugee Women in Iran,”

HAWWA: Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 2,

no. 2 (2004):141-71; Adelkhah and Olszewska, “The Iranian Afghans,”

144-148.

majority of refugees still living in Pakistan and Iran

believe that they must ultimately return, although

the time has yet to be decided and that there is no

place to go but Afghanistan.

5.5 The formation of Afghan identity

outside Afghanistan

Based on analysis of individual characteristics, some

comparative key aspects emerged (Table 4) that

are heavily reective of the prevailing environment

of the two host countries (see Table 1 and 2).

These issues necessarily inuence the formation

of internal values and the basis on which second-

generation refugees perceive their own Afghan-

ness, linking to their attitudes toward Afghanistan

and later reintegration process.

1. Language, education, and cultural response

Language and accent acquired in childhood, including

from schooling, are primary aspects of individual

distinctiveness. For this reason, households in

Pakistan tended to make greater efforts to ensure

that their children should grow up with their parents’

mother tongue in the correct accent as a mark of

being Afghan. Respondents reported that their use

of language and accent depended on context, but

that they were particularly careful to use their

family’s language correctly at home in front of their

elders, especially in Pakistan. Similarly, in the case

of educating children in Pakistani schools, where

the language of instruction was either Urdu or

English,

the language problem was a critical issue

that often meant Afghans were unable to read and

write in their family’s language. This study even

came across a few cases of lack of prociency in

their mother tongue (for example, where they felt

more comfortable speaking Urdu than the family’s

own language, Dari or Pashto).

88 The sampling for this study also included those who were

looking at the possibilities of moving further aeld, mostly to Western

countries. See Table 5.

89 In Pakistani private schools, English is often the main teaching

language, followed by Urdu. In government schools, Urdu is the main

language of instruction. In some government schools where Pashto is

predominantly used in the region, Pashto is also used as a teaching

language.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

Overall, second-generation Afghans in Iran grew

up in an environment where Iranian social norms

were accepted with less resistance or were more

valued; thus, many young Afghans were more

willing to (or needed to) blend in. In contrast,

the experience of peers in Pakistan had a range

of variations, but more attention was paid to

ensure that children maintain the characteristics

of Afghans regarding proper language and accent;

the decision to educate was heavily inuenced

by the location of residence and family context.

In both countries, respondents unanimously

voiced the desire to educate themselves and their

future children. Educating oneself seems to take

on profound meaning, whether it be standard or

religious education. The importance of education

was acknowledged by males and females, both

educated and uneducated. In general, educated

people were perceived as being knowledgeable

and having favourable characteristics. This is often

connected to the ideas of being a good human being

and a good Muslim.

2. Identication in public

As seen above, Afghan cultural response to

assimilation within the Iranian sphere can be

explained due to more positive acceptance by Afghans

of Iranian societal norms, but it is also connected

to the environmental necessity to do so. To shift

one’s identication in public through pretending

to be an Iranian or Pakistani was observed among

respondents in this study, especially when they

were seeking some kind of benet (for example,

escaping from police, employment, admission to

educational institutions) as a way of managing their

daily lives. Trying to be less noticeable as Afghans,

either in the short or long term, was seen more

frequently among respondents who grew up in Iran

compared to those in Pakistan. The fear of being

stopped by authorities (Afghans in both countries

were often unjustly blamed for committing petty

crimes or instigating public unrest) is often a

factor in refugees’ attempts to blend in in public

in response to the situation. This is more so for

men who are at greater risk of police harassment;

however, women are also aware of this issue from

listening to the stories of their male family members.

In Iran, Afghans without legal documentation face

links to attitudes towards girls’ education, for both

the host population and Afghans. While almost

all Iranian males and females aged 15 to 24 can

read and write, only one in two Pakistani females

in the same age bracket (an environment in which

second-generation Afghan refugees grew up) can do

so. As a whole, the literacy rate of Afghans in Iran

evolved dramatically over the decades: from 6.9

percent in 1991 to 69 percent in 2008,

in contrast

to 70.3 percent of Afghans in Pakistan who were

estimated to have no education in 2007—although a

gradual rise from generation to generation is seen.

Evolution of the literacy rate is a symbolic aspect of

transformation of values of the individuals, families,

and Afghan social norms in exile, which links to

various behaviours and opportunities pursued.

Around one-third of the respondents interviewed

in Pakistan did not attend formal schooling.

Nevertheless, many of them learnt in madrassas

or other private learning institutes focused on the

teachings of the Quran, including some females

whose families regarded it as a big shame for families

if girls go outside for schooling. Even though formal

schooling was regarded as unacceptable for female

household members, many of them were sent

to learn the Quran in various ways. Learning the

Quran and Islam was generally perceived as a duty

and spiritual reward (sawab) for Muslims, whereas

not knowing about Islam is considered a sin (guna).

Some madrassas appear to be systematic and not

that much different from ordinary schools with

dormitory facilities. However, the majority of these

females were only allowed to study in madrassas

before reaching puberty; this is in contrast to the

general situation in Iran where many Afghan females

from religious families often continued studying

until higher grades.

92 Tehran Times, 24 July 2008. (12.5 percent of the Afghan population

living in Iran as refugees) http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.

asp?code=173799

93 93.1 percent no education (over 60 years old), 84.5 percent (18-

59 years old), 61.6 percent (12-17 years old), and 50.2 percent (5-11

years old). Registration of Afghans 2007, 89.

94 In Iran, there were many highly educated women whose fathers were

religious scholars, often supporting girls’ secondary/tertiary education

(either secular or religious). Howzeha-ye ‘elmiyeh (religious seminaries)

in Iran provided various learning opportunities for both Afghan men and

women while offering material and nancial assistance.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

time, one Pashtun respondent in this study said

that he had at times experienced a sense of ethnic

solidarity with Pakistani Pashtuns in the face of

Urdu speakers. Perceptions and stereotypes are

heavily inuenced by changing political situations,

and in recent years, Afghans in Pakistan have also

been linked to terrorism (i.e. taken responsibility

for attacks, etc.). More positively, being Afghan was

reported to not be only associated with vulnerability

and helplessness, but also implied zealousness,

loyalty to customs and physical strength, sometimes

inspiring awe in Pakistanis.

Afghan refugees may take on an Iranian or

Pakistani identity to hide their Afghan-ness, either

occasionally or permanently:

Occasionally• in the short-term occurred

among all respondents regardless of their

degree of assimilation—related to fears and

the political context

Permanently• pretending to be Iranian/

Pakistani occurred more among respondents

who felt a sense of shame in relation to their

cultural context (and also to some extent

because of the political context)

However, the perceptions of Afghans in Iran (as

reported by respondents) tend to be more linked

to a cultural hierarchy, despite the fact that many

Afghans who left for Iran also shared religious

beliefs as Shia followers.

A sense of shame in

relation to being Afghan, more commonly observed

among refugees in Iran, is another reason cited

for refugees keeping a low prole in public.

Respondents universally became highly nervous

in reaction to the terms of abuse “Afghani” or

“Afghani kesafat”—literally meaning dirty Afghans

and implying that they have no culture, no manners,

no understanding, and that they are rural people

who are backward, barbarian and illiterate. Fitting

in with this, however, many respondents indeed saw

98 There are about 1,500 Afghan religious clerics in Iran; many

of them have married Iranian women. This is one of the examples

showing that Iran and Afghanistan is made up of a complex transborder

environment. Adelkhah and Olszewska, “The Iranian Afghans.”

difculties accessing opportunities in education

and work, and are liable to be deported.

The accelerating regulation and control by Iranian

authorities even causes some documented Afghan

refugees great anxiety about simply being Afghan

in Iranian society.

Some who were able to blend in

well physically among Iranians, with uent Iranian

Persian, denied their Afghan-ness in a range of

spaces and contexts, such as at school, in public

or in the local neighbourhood—which often caused

internal tension between their public and private

identities. In Pakistan, there were more diverse

opinions among respondents about how to deal

with the police: some declare they are Afghan and

pay bribes instead of disgracing their honourable

Afghan name with a lie,

while others pretend to

be Pakistani (but in some cases cannot share this

with elders at home for fear of their anger about

such denial of Afghan-ness).

3. Perception of self as Afghan within host

society

Bullying and social exclusion of refugees in all

cases of population displacement are common;

however, different connotations were observed in

the experiences of respondents between the two

neighbouring countries. In Pakistan some, if not all,

of the non-Pashtun respondents have experienced

political discrimination based on stereotypes held

by some Pakistanis (often Pashtun Pakistanis) of

Afghans from the northern regions. At the same

95 Due to a massive deportation campaign, about 720,000 people—

including men, women, and children—were deported from Iran during

2007 and 2008. “Afghanistan: Plight of Child Deportees from Iran,”

IRIN News, 22 March 2009, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/

db900sid/RMOI-7QDK23?OpenDocument&query=Iran%20Afghan%20

deport.

96 At the time of eldwork for this study in Pakistan, many

respondents were not aware of the introduction of Proof of Registration

cards, which shows their status as Afghan citizen temporally living

in Pakistan (in 2007). However, in general, many second-generation

Afghan refugees in Pakistan have had greater access to education and

work–regardless of legal status–while growing up.

97 The traumatic events experienced by young Eritrean refugees

in exile include harassment, insults or physical beatings by Sudanese

camp guards, police and the military. N. Farwell, “‘Onward through

Strength’: Coping and Psychological Support among Refugee Youth

Returning to Eritrea from Sudan,” Journal of Refugee Studies 14, no.

1 (2001):43–69.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

Photos 4 and 5: Afghans in Iran

A painting by an Afghan youth living in Iran

Afghans living in Iran like this man are restricted to

certain forms of labour, usually manual

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

positional difference among minorities in Pakistan

and Iran (see Table 2). The prevailing environment

of the host society is another factor inuencing

the formation of identity among second-generation

Afghans, as well as whether or not they are able to

create positive self-image.

4. Stereotypical characteristics of Afghan-ness

Despite their refugee or undocumented status

and uncertain future, second-generation refugees

generally appear to have a relatively robust sense

of self as Afghans. However, there are some notable

differences between respondents interviewed

in Pakistan and those in Iran in terms of what it

means to be Afghan. In Pakistan, both males and

females were able to describe what it meant to

them—as a second-generation refugee—to be

an Afghan man or woman, most commonly using

words associated with honour, such as: (for males)

zealous,

101

patriotic, honest, hard-working, kind

and sympathetic; and (for females) respectful (of

elders), decent, modest, educated, Islamic and

adhering to the Afghan dress code. Although internal

values may sometimes be seen to be contradictory

to those mentioned, most respondents considered

these characteristics to be at the core of “being

Afghan”—an ideal towards which they strived

in spite of facing great challenges over years of

growing up in Pakistan.

Dupree points out that Afghans in Pakistan “cling

tenaciously to their national identity, upholding

traditional values and customs that distinguish them

from their neighbour,” and this has certainly been

borne out by this study.

102

Centlivres and Centlivres-

Demont have also noted the generally positive

collective self-image that Afghans in Pakistan possess,

sometimes expressed as “the basic superiority of

being Afghan even in the absence, or at a distance,

from the territory of a nation state.”

103

101 The term baghairat was commonly used by males (and also some

females); it refers to bravery and the ability to defend one’s country,

land, property, women, etc.

102 N. Dupree, “Cultural Heritage and National Identity in

Afghanistan,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 977–89.

103 Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont, “The Afghan Refugee in

Pakistan.”

Iranians as more cultured, educated, mannered and

wealthier than Afghans—at the same time as they

held Afghan nationalist sentiments.

In terms of cultural linkages with Pakistan, some

tended to report that many of the customs and ways

of life of Pakistanis were largely similar to their

own; these respondents comprised those who were

highly assimilated (uent in Urdu, with Pakistani

education and Pakistani friends) and a small number

who were quite isolated from Pakistani society but

saw themselves as similar to the more conservative

elements of the Pakistani neighbours who live near

their residence. Overall, the presence of a strong

Pashtun population in Pakistan, especially in those

areas where Pashto is widely spoken as a local

language, has an impact on how different Afghans

may feel in Pakistan. Some non-Pashtun male

respondents commented on the relatively easier

access for Pashtun speakers compared to others,

often in Peshawar and Quetta.

In contrast to their peers in Pakistan, Afghans in

Iran—the majority of whom are Hazaras

—do not

necessarily appear to have created a positive

Afghan identity. This correlates with the situation

of the Khawari, an ethnic minority in Iran living

mostly around Mashhad that migrated from

Hazarajad a century ago and has tried to assimilate

into Iranian society. A few Afghans who grew up in

Mashhad pointed out that “Khawari” or “Barbaris”

often put forth extra effort to be seen as Iranians.

100

In general, according to the experiences of our

respondents, Pashtun-Pakistanis are often proud of

their roots, language and culture (superior self-

image, some autonomy from the centralised

control), while the situation of “Khawari” in

Mashhad shows the contrast—formed by contextual

99 Compared to Hazaras, those Afghans in Iran whose appearance

can easily blend in with Iranians and who speak Iranian-Persian are

perceived to be at an advantage because Iranians cannot distinguish

whether they are Afghans or Iranians.

100 A few Hazara Afghans who grew up in Iran mentioned that Hazara-

Afghans often feel more relaxed in Mashhad because of being able to

blend in with “Barbaris.” However, it was pointed out that, compared

to other Iranians, “Barbaris” sometimes discriminated against Afghans

more. (For example, Barbari neighbours tried to prevent their children

from going to Afghans’ houses in order not to acquire a Hazaragi

accent.)

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

“The word “Afghan” (), is made from the

letters of ve meaningful words:

 Eiman (Faith)

- Fa’aliat (Activity)

 Ghairat (Zeal)

 Adab (Politeness)

. Namus (Protecting female

dependents)

And if these ve characteristics are found in a

human being, he is a complete Afghan.”

— 20-year-old male high school student

from Kunduz who grew up in Karachi

In contrast, second-generation Afghan refugees

in Iran tend to view “other Afghans” as backward

or vulnerable, represented by their parents (the

rst generation of refugees) and to some extent

their peers growing up in Afghanistan, but not

themselves. In Iran, words used to describe Afghan-

ness were: (for males) hardworking, tolerant of

pain and hardship, resigned to their fate, illiterate,

long-suffering and zealous (baghairat); and (for

females) long-suffering, submissive, obedient,

hardworking and resilient, along with descriptions

of wearing the Afghan burqa. As many respondents

interviewed in Iran were well educated, they tended

to differentiate themselves as having grown up in

Iran as opposed to their “lower-status” peers who

had remained in Afghanistan, and many were not

necessarily referring to themselves when talking

about being Afghan but rather describing “the other

Afghans” (those of lower socioeconomic status).

This pattern is a general tendency observed more

among respondents in Iran compared to those in

Pakistan, albeit acknowledging some potential bias

in selected respondents and researcher’s views.

104

104 The role of arts and literary activities is reported to help young

educated Afghans in Iran be creative, thereby transforming their sense

of social exclusion into one of pride in having a shared heritage with

However, even for those refugees who were ercely

passionate about Afghanistan and harboured very

negative feelings towards their host country (often

due to experiencing social exclusion as a refugee),

returning to Afghanistan often meant facing

discrimination based on their “non-Afghan-ness”

(see Section 7.3). As the label “Iranigak” (meaning

“little Iran”) implies, Afghans who had remained in

Afghanistan tended not to be welcoming towards

some of their peers returning from Iran.

105

The

reaction towards returnees from Pakistan, however,

tended to be more diverse, depending on the

background and experience of each individual.

106

The political and cultural context of urban areas in

Iran—where minorities, either intentionally or not,

are often encouraged to assimilate into mainstream

populations—has been shown to hinder the formation

and maintenance of a strong positive Afghan identity,

compared to the relatively diverse situation of their

peers who grew up in Pakistan. This is exacerbated

when refugees try to mask their Afghan-ness and

status as mohajerin to blend in, thus producing a

conict between attempts to assimilate and the

ongoing feeling of “non-belonging.”

107

Ironically,

such an escalating environment has a reverse

impact on some respondents who strongly resist any

Iranians. Z. Olszewska, “‘A Desolate Voice’: Poetry and Identity among

Young Afghan Refugees in Iran,” Iranian Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 203-

24.

105 This is a signicant concern for many refugees in Iran in relation

to returning to Afghanistan: they believe that such changes in their

identity may result in social exclusion and discrimination by fellow

Afghans when they return home (this is also seen in the study conducted

by Chatty). See: Chatty and Crivello, Lessons Learned Report.

106 A few returnee respondents spoke of being called “Pakistani!”

by fellow Afghans in Afghanistan. However, no use of the term

“Pakistanigak” was reported.

107 For example, a returnee woman from Tehran who still felt that

Iran was her “homeland” said that her brother, who was also well

assimilated and educated at an Iranian state school, could not marry

the Iranian girl he had chosen. Her Iranian family had rejected the

proposal because they were Afghan. There have, however, been many

cases of mixed marriages between Afghans and members of the host

population. Zahedi reports that Iranian women marrying Afghan men

are often from low socioeconomic status, and marry for economic

reasons or for love. More than 40,000 Iranian women are estimated

to have married Afghans, with over 100,000 children without Iranian

birth certicates. A. Zahedi, “Transnational Marriages, Gendered

Citizenship, and the Dilemma of Iranian Women Married to Afghan

Men,” Iranian Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 225-39.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

eventual return and deny their links to Afghanistan,

which is itself subject to negative inuence from

tightening government policy and negative social

perceptions toward Afghans. For some others, the

pressures become too great to bear and they decide

to leave Iran. Second-generation refugees in this

situation have difculties forming clear perceptions

of Afghanistan, and this in turn makes reintegration

upon return a more complex process.

“Men from the previous generation wanted an

obedient wife who accepted without questioning,

for example, if he says “die!”, you should die.

Regarding my father, I saw the way he mistreated

my mother, for example, he used to ght and beat

her up. I wish not to be like that.”

— 29-year-old shopkeeper in Mashhad

with diploma-level education

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

Part 6: To Return or To Remain?

Table 5: Second-generation refugees’ intentions to return or remain

Taking action

to return to

Afghanistan (28)

Not taking action,

staying in Pakistan/Iran (110)

Planning to

go abroad (13)

Total

respondents

(151)

In decision-

making process

No intention

of returning

Pakistan 11 44 6 10 71

Iran 17 39 21 3 80

Total 28 83 27 13 151

This section discusses the issues facing second-

generation Afghan refugees leading up to their

repatriation to Afghanistan, focusing on personal

issues as well as household decision-making. The

data presented covers general attitudes toward

return among respondents living in Pakistan and

Iran. This is followed by an analysis of the range of

factors inuencing these attitudes, including those

issues that are less visible or non-material. Finally,

the dynamics of refugee households are explored,

focusing on issues of timing, household members’

participation in the decision to return, and practical

strategies for successful return.

6.1 Intentions to return or to

remain

Table 5 broadly categorises the attitudes towards

return among the 151 respondents in Iran and

Pakistan. The rst group (28 respondents) includes

those who are in the process of taking action to

return to Afghanistan. Some of these cases of

return do not reect the individual respondent’s

own desire but rather that of their household and

relatives.

The second and largest category (110 respondents)

includes those who were not taking any action

to return to Afghanistan at the time; this was

found to be for a wide range of reasons, making

it difcult to generalise about their current

inuences and motivations. Of this group, there

were 44 respondents in Pakistan and 39 in Iran who

were actively engaged in the process of deciding

whether to return; some expressed a strong desire

to go back to Afghanistan, while others were more

negative about returning at the time but hoped

to repatriate at some point in the future. The

common feature of this subgroup was their careful

monitoring of the situation in Afghanistan, waiting

for a time when the balance of factors—relevant

to their individual situations—would lead them to

a clear decision to go back. The second subgroup

in this category (six respondents in Pakistan, 21 in

Iran) had no intention of returning to Afghanistan.

Thirteen respondents (ten in Pakistan, three in

Iran) focused their attention on plans to go abroad

in either the short- or long-term.

6.2 Complex attitudes toward return

to Afghanistan

Table 6 shows the range of perceptions and

experiences of Pakistan and Afghanistan mentioned

by the 71 Afghan refugees interviewed in Pakistan

(male and female). It prioritises the relative

signicance of each factor—economic, political,

social, cultural and emotional—to respondents.

108

108 Some of these issues were addressed directly during the

formal interview process (such as questions about the opinions of

peers and where respondents wanted to raise their children), while

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

to access the best option (in relation to quality and

nancial availability) will have a strong pull factor.

Another prominent factor in their decision-making

that prevents some people, particularly in Pakistan,

from returning to Afghanistan (as mentioned by

respondents, see Table 6) has been the presence

of foreigners. Although many respondents spoke of

their support for the present Karzai government

in Afghanistan, others expressed serious cultural

concerns about the direction in which they see

their country going (in particular, the “non-Islamic

environment” which they feel contradicts their

national and religious identity). One unique pull

factor in Iran, particularly for Shiite Afghans, was

the proximity of the Shrine of Imam Reza as a place

of pilgrimage in Mashhad. This correlates with

some current anxieties about Afghanistan, where

religious and ethnic tensions are perceived to be

prevalent.

110

The decision to return is not an easy one to

make. But in particular for these young Afghans,

because they were brought up in foreign countries

as refugees, their attachment to Afghanistan is

full of contradictions, expectations and unseen

worries since they have roots—but less actual,

real experiences—in this place. As a result of this

complex relationship with two countries, refugees’

identication with Afghanistan and being Afghan

is constantly evolving. Whether they can accept

themselves as Afghans positively or try to deny their

Afghan roots adds great weight and complexity to

the decision-making processes that surround the

question of return. It is a continuous negotiation

between the balance of factors—how the host

communities perceive them and how they react and

perceive themselves—that determine how second-

generation refugees develop their perceptions of,

110 In general, the relationship between ethnicity and return among

the selected respondents is not strikingly patterned; rather, return

is a general concern throughout various ethnicities and is inuenced

by a set of complex factors. Among respondents interviewed in Iran,

relatively more Hazaras (10 out of 46) were taking actions for return,

in contrast to Tajik respondents (4 of 30). This is different from the

quantitative data of return (see footnote 67), but further examination

may be required given the limited number of respondents. In the case

of Pakistan, only four Hazara respondents were interviewed in Quetta

and Karachi, reecting both that 2.5 percent of Afghans in Pakistan

were Hazaras in the 2007 Registration data, as well as operational

constraints. See details in Saito and Hunte, To Return or To Remain.

Many experience internal conict between the

positive and negative factors in Afghanistan as well

as the country in which they had grown up; this mix

of emotions changes with time and in the face of

individuals’ experiences and the shifting external

environment of Afghans living as refugees. The

major difference between those who are taking

action to return to Afghanistan and those who are

not is the balance of these interweaving factors;

this does not imply that conict and contradiction

do not exist in those opting to return, but that

overall, either the positive features of return

outweigh all other factors (in the case of voluntary,

proactive returns) or push factors outweigh the

advantages of remaining as refugees (often among

more vulnerable groups).

A greater proportion of women respondents tended

to have negative perceptions of return compared

to their male counterparts in both countries.

109

The

main factors inuencing this gendered difference

were contextual, such as their limited exposure

to accurate information about returning to

Afghanistan, limited opportunities to visit there,

and perceptions of social norms regarding women

in Afghanistan. Reduced mobility and prevalent

gender norms, which had been often negatively

anticipated, were experienced by many returnee

respondents as required of “an honourable Afghan

woman” to t in the local context. It added greater

stresses and internal contradictions to some female

returnees (see Section 7.4).

One of the key factors that emerged from both

Pakistan and Iran was the importance of quality

education—not only formal schooling but also

Islamic learning and adult education, including

among those less-educated respondents who want

a better future for their children. For those seeking

higher education, the country in which they are able

others emerged during responses to more general questions. For a

comparative table of Iran and Afghanistan, see Abbasi-Shavazi et al.,

“Second-Generation Afghans in Iran,” 55.

109 Women are more reluctant than men to return, particularly

those living in Iran. See Monsutti, Afghan Transnational Networks;

Abbasi-Shavazi and Glazebrook, Continued Protection, Sustainable

Reintegration; and K.B. Harpviken, Networks in Transition: Wartime

Migration in Afghanistan (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute,

Oslo University, 2006), 251.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

Table 6: Push and pull factors in Pakistan and Afghanistan

Pakistan – PUSH Afghanistan – PULL

Not a citizen of Pakistan, not

“our” country

Hot weather

No knowledge of homeland, loss of

identity, patriotism, national language

Limited opportunities (education,

employment)

Far from kin

Police harassment, dislike by Pakistanis

Education fees, poor remain uneducated, students

drop out

Social pressures as refugees

Afghans have a bad reputation

Money problems, high cost of living

Fear of deportation, closure of camps

GOOD CLIMATE, BEAUTIFUL

COUNTRY

DREAM TO RAISE CHILDREN IN

OWN COUNTRY(among relatives—will know

culture, be healthier and stronger)

Chance to own land and house

Better peers

(knowledge of culture,

patriotic, physically strong, pure language)

Reconstruction happening (stable government, war

ended, work opportunities)

Hospitality, respect of others/elders

Freedom (more independence for women, right to

education and employment)

Better relatives (more educated, wealthy)

Conservative (pure) Islam

Desire to serve to country, help others

Pakistan – PULL Afghanistan – PUSH

EDUCATIONAL

OPPORTUNITIES

(quality, English

language, Islamic education, skills development,

access to information)

FACILITIES (electricity, gas, sanitation,

roads, entertainment)

Comfortable, no harassment, now

familiar with environment

Have work and place to live, can survive

Pakistanis are kind, do not discriminate

Positive characteristics of peers (better manners,

more sophisticated)

No tension, peaceful

Islamic environment

No ethnic discrimination

Lower cost of living

Rights of women, law, freedom

Lack of place to live

Lack of facilities

(electricity, gas,

sanitation)

Limited opportunities for education

Lack of work

Negative characteristics of peers (uneducated,

rough, no respect, do not know Islam, aggressive)

Insecurity (suicide attacks, kidnapping, ghting,

robberies)

High cost of living

Corruption, bribery

Ethnic/religious discrimination

Presence of foreign military/foreigners, NGOs’

(greed for money)

Non-Islamic (no prayer, sinful/free women, do not

know Islam, improper gender relations, alcohol/

drugs)

Social pressures, gender honour, restricted

environment

Enmity, family problems

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

have had the capacity to take on the risk of return

and deal successfully with potential problems

associated with reintegration who have tended to

return voluntarily. This corresponds well with the

data from those respondents in Pakistan and Iran

who are taking action to return.

Support from relatives and other networks in

Afghanistan is crucial for acquiring the information

needed to make the decision to return, as well

as for providing assistance on arrival. This broad

support includes telephone or letter communi-

cation prior to return, looking after property,

providing information about access to employment,

facilitating return visits and physical support on

return such as accom modation. For those who did

not make any arrangements at all before returning,

their savings were crucial for survival during the

initial stages of resettling. For respondents who were

from economically vulnerable returnee households,

networks with their own tribe made it possible to

access material assistance from organisations.

The adolescent and young adult Afghans interviewed

in this study participated to varying degrees in

their households’ decision-making: some had

considerable inuence over the decision to return,

others gave their opinions by offering comments to

other household members, while some were not

involved at all. The key decision-making power

in the household tended to be held by heads of

households or elder male family members (for

example, the eldest son if there was no father in

the household), and, in a small number of cases,

by women (often educated and from households

with better economic situations). A number of

less educated (along with a few educated) women

interviewed in Pakistan mentioned that they were

not even aware of discussions taking place in

their own households or among their tribe, and

only received information about such discussions

second-hand.

Not all second-generation refugee teenagers and

young adults whose households chose to return were

in agreement with that decision. Around a quarter

of respondents indicated that they had not been

happy with their household’s decision to go back

to Afghanistan. A few male respondents showed

and give meaning to, a “homeland” that they know

less about than the place in which they have grown

up as mohajerin.

Concerns over increasing forceful repatriation

policies and diminishing economic and social

opportunities were mentioned in both host

countries, but in particular in Iran. Nevertheless,

there were relatively more respondents in Iran

than Pakistan who had no intention of returning to

Afghanistan, although this may reect differences

in this study’s sampling in the two countries. What

is clear is that some Afghans choose the strategy

of invisibility and strongly resist returning because

of escalating deportation and associated negative

attitudes towards Afghans.

6.3 Household decision-making about

return

Among this study’s 48 returned refugee respondents

interviewed in Afghanistan, some patterns in the

conditions leading to return were identiable.

Among recent arrivals (2005–06), many were well

prepared for return: they made arrangements for

work in advance or returned with enough savings or

strong social networks to support themselves, and

some did both. The return of others in these recent

years occurred under more forced circumstances

related to strong push factors, particularly from

Iran. In contrast, earlier arrivals (2001–03) were

mostly those in the middle to lower economic

group who had made fewer plans for employment

or housing but returned in response to government

calls (the end of war and putting hope in the new

government), along with a few well-off households

who were responding to strong pull factors

(political links, government networks, strong social

and family networks) to Afghanistan. The level of

land ownership tended to be higher among many of

these “early” returnees, in contrast to the “recent”

group.

In general, it could be said that for those refugees

with fewer social networks, lower economic status

and lack of land remaining outside Afghanistan,

the prospect of voluntary return and successful

reintegration is low. In recent years, it is those who

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

households in Pakistan and returned alone to secure

employment, most frequently with the United

Nations, an NGO or a private business. From Iran, it

was more common that indi vidual males continued

to work in Iran to provide an income while their

family members returned to Afghanistan.

113

the time of interviewing in Afghanistan, more

than a quarter of the households had at least one

male family member working abroad who was

contributing or intending to contribute to the

remaining household’s income: in Iran (ten), the

Arabian peninsula (three), and Western countries

(two).

114

In another case, disagreement in relation

to return also resulted in the permanent split of one

household that used to share the same income.

The gradual return of household members has been

a common strategy adopted by families to reduce

the risks associated with returning, particularly in

recent years. In some cases, this has meant one or

more members returning rst in order to prepare the

way for the rest to arrive at a later point; in others,

some household members planned to remain in the

country of refuge over the medium- to longer-term

in order to diversify livelihoods. This has often

been used as a way of supporting economically

sustain able return, but it also happens for reasons

of security: in case the situation in Afghanistan

deteriorates again, connections would in place to

seek refuge again.

113 Harpviken also points out the different patterns of gradual

return among returnees from Pakistan and Iran (Networks in Transition,

290).

114 This is also because of the study’s high proportion of respondents

in Herat with male household members working in Iran. Of the ten

households with male family members working in Iran, eight were

respondents in Herat. In addition, a jobless male in a periphery of a

city in Baghlan, who was supposed to be a respondent for an interview,

turned out to have just left home for Kandahar with village men (or

if not available, to Karachi or Lahore) to join in poppy agricultural

work.

neutral or less emotional responses to household

decision-making on return, stating that they could

easily go back to Pakistan or Iran if they did not

like Afghanistan. Among those who disagreed with

the decision to return, most were women—many

educated, although a few less educated also felt

this way. Around half of these respondents reported

that they had argued against the decision and tried

to persuade the power-holders in the household to

change their minds. Some major factors leading

to strong negative return perceptions among

respondents were: the unfavourable timing of

return, particularly in relation to education,

111

and

the degree of attachment to the place where they

grew up compared to their “homeland”.

Complex household disagreement over whether to

return sometimes occurred between generations

(for example, parents of respondents were

unwilling to repatriate while second-generation

respondents wanted to, and vice versa) as well as

among siblings due to their dissimilar individual

experiences.

112

Household disagreement in relation

to return sometimes resulted in one individual going

back to Afghanistan alone to pursue opportunities

in higher education or work. There were cases of

both male and female educated returnees doing

this, with relatives in Afghanistan assisting them by

providing accommodation and information. Some

educated individuals (including women) left their

111 Concerns were raised that return to Afghanistan would end

up forcing them to drop out of school. It was a common wish among

school-going respondents that at least they would complete some upper

grades in neighbouring countries, then return later to Afghanistan.

112 For instance, a 23-year-old girl who studied in an Afghan school

in Peshawar was interested in going back to Afghanistan because of

her expectations of nding work as a young, English-speaking female.

However, her two brothers, who have been studying in Pakistani schools

and universities, were opposed to returning because they cannot read

and write Dari.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

During the process of reintegration after returning

to Afghanistan, many respondents reported having

to learn about a new kind of lifestyle and ways

to interact—getting by with fewer facilities and

coming to understand the “new” social rules, norms

and values of Afghans who remained in the country.

Some adjusted or adapted to the environ ment over

time without signicant stress, while others failed

to do so, instead questioning their future in their

homeland. These processes involve renegotiating

core values about society and people—comparing

different lifestyles and ideas in their homeland

to those they knew in Pakistan and Iran, and

developing new understandings of “home” and

their future within it. This nal section examines

how second-generation returnees have experienced

reintegration, as informed by interview data from

returnee respondents now living in Afghanistan.

watan: “homeland”

hamwatan: from the same watan, meaning

“compatriot”

The notion of watan relates primarily to a limited

geographical area in which individuals are well

known to each other. In the diaspora context,

however, this notion expands. Any Afghan may be

considered a hamwatan or belonging to the same

watan. Watan is to be treasured and seen as vulner-

able; it must be defended in ways similar to how

the women members of a family are protected.

A geographical and social area where I feel at

home, where I belong, where my family and my

relatives live, where I can rely on the people, and

where I feel security and social warmth.

Bernt Glatzer, 2001, “War and Boundaries in Afghanistan:

Signicance and Relativity of Local and Social Boundaries,”

Weld des Islams, 41(3):379–99.

For many second-generation refugees, with their

varying degrees of attachment to Pakistan or Iran,

the day of return is a major turning point in their

lives. Some respondents in the Afghanistan study

reported that they could remember the exact time

they crossed the border, along with many minor

events on the way. Some had staunchly resisted

return, while others had come back willingly and

harboured very negative feelings towards their

place of refuge. But for all of them, returning

to Afghanistan brought the pain and sadness, to

various degrees, of leaving the one place they knew

best—perhaps similar sentiments that their parents

had felt about leaving Afghanistan years earlier.

After arrival, many respondents found unexpected

differences in their new environment and in

people compared to life in refuge. But some found

Afghanistan more or less what they had been used

to; these were mostly males, especially those

who had maintained close contact with family

in Afghanistan while in exile or had moved to

returnee-concentrated areas. However, what other

native compatriots deemed as “common sense”

was not necessarily naturally understood by those

who previously had few or no opportunities to see

Afghanistan—even though they had lived in coun-

tries geographically nearby. This was the case

particularly among those who had left Afghanistan

at a very early age or who had been born in exile,

seeing the country for the rst time only upon their

“return.” Not surprisingly, for many refugees of

the second generation who were used to better

urban facilities in Pakistan or Iran, their home

life in less developed conditions left them feeling

deprived of what they had had in exile. Returning

refugees would usually notice: rst, changes in

material aspects of their new environment; second,

differences in social interactions; and later, less

visible differences in values discovered through

extended interaction with the society. All of these

factors, along with an individual’s corresponding

degree of adjustment, have impacted on subsequent

reintegration outcomes.

Part 7: From Mohajer to Hamwatan

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

community, and relatives) and nourishing the sense

of watan in relation to their own identity as a

coping mechanism.

Watan: a key “pull factor” in returning to

Afghanistan

One of the key motivations in the decision of many

refugees to go back to their homeland is the mental

and emotional satisfaction they expect to feel

there—despite being aware of the material hardships

they will experience.

117

The way in which they nd

personal meaning from living in their own country

is therefore crucial. A sense of freedom (azadi)

was repeatedly mentioned by the respondents in

Afghanistan when they spoke of their lives there,

regardless of socioeconomic status and particularly

in relation to eeing from their status as mohajer.

This personal fullment experienced in the watan

actually acts as a key force in motivating many

respondents to confront the hardships of their re-

integration process. Watan is also an important

“pull factor” keeping them in Afghanistan—fuelling

their inner strength in the face of the difculties

experienced in resettling. The sense of watan often

seems to ease the pain of material and emotional

hardship to some extent, as long as their actual

survival is not under threat.

Watan is also the place where returnees may

encounter unexpected social exclusion—

economically, socially and emotionally. Returning to

one’s homeland is often accompanied by the hope

of elevating one’s social status from subordinate

refugee (mohajer) to respected Afghan in a society

made up of Afghans and where one can work with his

or her own people to achieve a stable, prosperous

future. These hopes are a far greater pull for

second-generation Afghan refugees than actual

emotional or social connections in Afghanistan: for

them, unlike their parents, leaving Iran or Pakistan

usually means leaving their friends and the primary—

or only—“home” they have known (see 3.2). This

crucial pull factor for second-generation refugees—

to live in their homeland and to be freed from the

feeling of “non-belonging” and inferiority related

117 Ghanem, “When Forced Migrants Return ‘Home’,” 36. See also:

J. Bascom, “The Long, ‘Last Step’? Reintegration of Repatriates in

Eritrea,” Journal of Refugee Studies 18, no. 2 (2005):165-80.

7.1 The complex reintegration

process

Figure 2 shows the complex reintegration process

leading to varying degrees of success in return;

outcomes fall at different points along a continuum,

ranging from desires to settle permanently in

Afghanistan to wishes to leave again temporarily

or for the long term. This process has material,

social and personal dimensions, all of which are

inuenced by factors such as: individual personality

and prole, experiences prior to becoming a

refugee, particular circumstances of displacement,

experiences in exile, social networks, conditions

of return (domestic and political), and a refugee’s

own interpretations of “home” and “belonging.”

115

The long-term outcome of the process—eventual

adjustment,

116

adaptation (full reintegration) or

failure—is further inuenced by how individuals

respond to the conicting ideas they face upon

return.

Undoubtedly, basic material needs for survival

must be secured rst, but the returnee’s situation

is considerably affected by the degree of social

acceptance of returnees exhibited by those Afghans

who remained and by Afghan society more generally.

Furthermore, if the process is to lead to long-term

settlement, there must be an adequate sense of

personal fullment through which returnees feel at

ease and that they t in. A balance of these three

interlinked dimensions (with none signicantly

lacking) is crucial for successful reintegration

in the long term. This study found that re-entry

difculties can potentially be mitigated by more

effectively tapping into external support (both

material and emotional, from the government,

115 T. Ghanem, “When Forced Migrants Return ‘Home’: The

Psychosocial Difculties Returnees Encounter in the Reintegration

Process,” RSC Working Paper No. 16 (Oxford: University of Oxford,

2003) 24–5. See also: E.F. Kunz, “Exile and Resettlement: Refugee

Theory,” International Migration Review 15, no. 1/2 (1981): 42–51;

Altai Consulting, Integration of Returnees, 68.

116 In this case study, “adjustment” implies that respondents socially

or physically modied their appearance or behaviour in order to t in

with their new context—although they did not necessarily agree with

the values these changes expressed. It also has the sense of a short-

term, temporary measure. In contrast, “adaptation” connotes long-

term changed values and ideas.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

External support

Self resilience

Time &

space

Discrimination

Isolation

Full

resettlement

Thoughts of

moving again

Survival

crisis

Outcome of reintegration

Rejection

Adaptation

Returnee reintegration: the decision-making process

Material satisfaction...................

Social acceptance..............

Personal fullment.....................

Before eeing

family background•

ight condition•

memories•

Experience in Pakistan/Iran

living place (regulation, reception)•

opportunities•

social networks and Afghan community•

Return decision, conditions, timing

property ownership•

pre-arrangements (visits, work, information)•

social networks•

IMPRESSIONS ON ARRIVAL

REINTERGRATION PROCESS

Adaption

Rejection

Figure 2:

Returnee reintegration: the

decision-making process

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

well as the less conscious transformation of values

over time; these perceptions may be substantially

different to returnees’ initial impres sions. It is also

common that returnees’ emotional satisfaction

with being in their watan affords them greater

resilience to the challenges of material constraints.

This sense of living in their own country was shown

to provide some of the more vulnerable respondents

in this study with the inner strength to cope with

material difculties, particularly because of their

new-found freedom from their previous inferior

refugee status.

Lack of employment is a critical concern among

many respondents. Creation of work opportunities

for Afghans, especially for less skilled and

economically vulnerable groups, is an urgent

priority for the government and concerned agencies.

However, according to returnee respondents,

the acquired skills from Pakistan and Iran do not

always work benecially in Afghanistan and,

instead, are dependent on market needs, timing,

location,

118

possibility of acquiring materials or

118 An existing case study of villages around Herat reports that

many skilled returnees from Iran, many of which are young men, are

unemployed and seek daily work in Herat city, while some who can

afford the travel expenses go to Iran. UNHCR, Location of Returnees

(Herat: UNHCR, 2006), 6-9.

to their refugee status—continuously evolves in the

face of unexpected difculties experienced after

return (see Table 7).

The experience of feeling social exclusion again

in watan, echoing the exper ience of their refugee

status, hampers psychosocial reintegration, and for

those in the poorer socioeconomic categories, it is

particularly acute when combined with unfullled

material needs. Where that process fails and

the balance is tipped against remaining in the

watan, second-generation returnees are likely to

experience a strong desire to go back to the country

in which they grew up. Over a quarter of this study’s

respondents interviewed in Afghanistan, both the

poor and well-off, had hopes or expectations of

leaving again in either the short or long term.

7.2 Finding fullment in the watan

or failing to resettle

Many refugees face material constraints after

return, particularly compared to their lives in exile.

However, degrees of gradual adaptation to the new

environment of Afghanistan can be observed: as they

become familiar with the people and surroundings,

returnees learning and changing their ideas as

Table 7: Second-generation refugees’ expectations of life in watan

Mohajer in Pakistan/Iran Expected life in watan Actual life in watan

Legal rights and ofcial

status

no rights, limited

opportunities in education

(esp. higher education),

limited occupational choice

(Iran), unequal access to

services, lack of legal status

rights and legal status,

property ownership, access

to services to be improved

expected life achieved,

particularly emotional

state of feeling

“freedom,” internal

peace, comfort of living

in watan

but

continued ostracism

and discrimination (as

“returnee,” and on the

grounds of ethnicity,

religion, politics, gender,

economic status or lack

of wasita

), realisation of

differences to “others”

(other Afghans and Afghan

values)

Social position and identi

cation as Afghan

inferior, subordinate,

outcast, insulted (called a

“terrorist” or “criminal”)

but

all Afghans are the same

refugees

member of a nation where

all are Afghans, honour

associated with being

Afghan

Emotional state

weak, afraid, tired, worried,

uprooted, constant need

to defend honour, internal

complexity; although highly

assimilated, still cannot

avoid title and connotations

of “refugee”

end of fear, worries and

internal conict, freedom

from harass ment, abuse

and negative labels, own

country/territory, safety,

the place of their ancestors,

with own people

Material satisfaction...................

Social acceptance..............

Personal fullment.....................

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

particular concerns about drought and decreased

production), some households have no option

but to send men away for work, even though

it can be illegal and dangerous; it is a proactive

way of making adjustments that allow most of a

household’s members to remain in Afghanistan and

have their material needs fullled. However, those

who migrate for work must have at least enough

external support (credit, someone taking care of

remain ing family and networks or information to nd

employment) and money to cover travel expenses.

If these are not available and all coping strategies

have been exhausted while material needs of

family members in Afghanistan remain unmet, this

study showed that vulnerable returnees are likely

to reach a tipping point at which they give up trying

to adjust to life in the watan.

For instance, two of the lowest-income respondents’

households had left Afghanistan after initial

repatriation in 2002, then returned again in 2004

in the hope that better circumstances (such as land

allocation by the government or nancial support

from relatives) would allow for their successful

resettlement. Indeed, over half of this study’s

returnee respondents knew someone who had left

Afghanistan since the establishment of the new

government following their failure to reintegrate.

122

If returnees fail to reintegrate successfully and

decide to remigrate and experience a sense of

“betrayal” by their beloved watan, they are likely

to be much more critical of possibilities for future

return. It will require even greater pull factors for

them to return to Afghanistan a second time.

The psychological and emotional satisfaction of

returnees with life in watan warrants close attention

because it has the potential to impact heavily on

the decisions of others to return. A woman who has

no decision-making power in the household may

still tell negative stories to her children and other

relatives—inuencing their perceptions of return

prospects or desire to remain in Afghanistan. Even

among those who currently view their long-term

place of residence as Afghanistan, some still advise

122 Initially, this information was only recorded for those who

mentioned it; a question relating to this issue was then added to the

interview guide during the eld work.

equipment, availability of initial investment funds,

and connections. For example, in the case of

two skilled returnees from Iran, one got work as

an electrician through a television advertisement

when the need for electricians was high in Herat

for supplying power in the city, while a man who

was working in an Iranian factory as a tailor did not

nd his skills useful in Afghanistan (he was used to

sewing ready-made clothes, which are common in

the Iranian market, but he was not used to sewing

clothes tailored for individuals as is popular in

Afghanistan).

119

Feeling of marginalisation in rural Afghanistan:

“We are mountain people!”

“When I saw the neglect of Pakistanis and their

government toward us, I thought it was because

we were Afghans. But now in my country, our

government also neglects poor people, so how

should we feel?”

— 30-year-old housewife in a remote village in

Baghlan who returned from a tribal area in Pakistan

Working as a migrant labourer is often used as a

livelihood strategy

120

for returnee households

trying to adjust to living in their homeland. This

was shown to be particularly the case among the

average and below-average income respondents

in this study. There was a slightly higher number

of households with family members working

abroad from rural areas compared to urban areas.

121

Facing unemployment and having no means of

gaining livelihoods (in rural areas, people had

119 Skilled returnee women also have different opportunities in

Afghanistan. One in Kabul is connected to an organisation supplying

carpet materials and markets, while another in rural Baghlan did not

weave gilim any more because of the high cost of acquiring wool in

her village (caused by limited wool production due to drought), the

expensive cost of imported materials, and less time being available

for weaving gilim due to increased housework because of the fewer

facilities in rural Afghanistan.

120 Monsutti, Afghan Transnational Networks, 35-37.

121 Across Afghanistan generally, these statistics are: 19 percent

in rural area and 5 percent in urban areas. MRRD/CSO, National Risk

& Vulnerability Assessment 2005 (Kabul: Government of Afghanistan,

2007), 39.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

have abandoned their country, ed war and enjoyed

a prosperous life in exile. One of the reasons linked

to such experiences was fear related to competition

for resources. The second generation, who are likely

to be in a better socioeconomic position than those

who remained, are sometimes seen as undesirable

intruders by their country fellows whose “territory”

in education, work, property ownership and social

status is threatened by the large-scale return of

refugees. In addition, there seems to exist some

stereotypical perceptions toward girls and women

who came back to Afghanistan and were exposed

to other worlds as tending to be “freer” in the eyes

of some “remainees”. This is linked to the general

perceptions of Afghans towards Pakistani and

Iranian women. In the eyes of second-generation

Afghan refugees, Pakistani and Iranian women were

often seen as more “free”. This includes both in a

negative sense (e.g. shame related to less moral

behaviour) and positive sense (e.g. more access to

education and work). These young returnees who

grew up in the Pakistani and Iranian sphere were

seen in a similar way by those who remained.

“Before I was thinking that all people in Afghanistan

are one Afghan. ... when I arrived here, I saw

Hazara, Tajik, and Pashtun divides. I felt pity

and disappointed. I was telling myself that these

people were so ignorant.”

— 29-year-old male Hazara returnee in Herat

who completed religious study in Qom, Iran

Unequal treatment in the Afghan context

The status of “returnee” is only one of the

discouraging experiences faced by refugees returning

to Afghanistan. For second-generation refugees,

encountering discrimination based on various

sectarian lines (ethnic, religious and political) is

felt even more intensely than by rst-generation

refugees or Afghans who had prior experience in

Afghanistan and were more aware of this reality.

While growing up in Pakistan and Iran, some

respondents encountered ethnic discrimination

among Afghans by their Afghan teachers at schools;

some heard those stories from elders explaining the

cause of the war; some others were not fully aware

their relatives in neigh bouring countries not to

return, primarily due to the lack of employ ment

opportunities but also because of disappointment

with their current situation.

7.3 The external environment—social

acceptance or rejection

Social rejection by fellow Afghans who had remained

during the years of conict was another difcult

experience for some second-generation returnees.

This was because the motivation to return to

Afghanistan was in many cases related to negative

experiences being “outsiders” among the majority

populations of Pakistanis and Iranians. There are

two major reasons why second-generation refugees

experience this social exclusion on return to their

homeland: rstly, some returnees may be seen as

“intruders” into Afghan society and, secondly, it

may be the rst time that, as Afghans, they have

experienced profound differences among their

compatriots based on ethnic or tribal identity.

Social rejection of returnees

Around a quarter of returnee respondents, mostly

from Iran but some from Pakistan, spoke of their

experiences (or recounted those of their family

or friends) of being socially ostracised by fellow

Afghans on the basis of having returned from

other countries. The respondents who spoke of

these incidents were primarily single, educated

and female. Returnee women are relatively easily

identied by what they wear, and their appear ance

and behaviour can be at odds with local cultural

expectations and social codes. These returnees

are clearly “outsiders” and make easy targets for

harassment by their peers—both male and female.

In particular, where second-generation refugees

have been highly integrated into the Pakistani or

Iranian way of life, and cannot do, or do not know,

what is “normal” for Afghans, they may be per-

ceived with contempt as “spoiled,” “loafers” or

“not Afghan.”

By and large, there appears to be a general negative

attitude shown towards some returnees, who are

seen by some of those who remained in Afghanistan to

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

bribery and wasita (relations to powerful people)

associated with accessing education and work

opportunities was often raised as an issue by

respondents in this study. Corruption in the context

of school exams, university entrance exams and

scholarships was reported by educated respondents;

they said that only those who had power and money

could access more favourable opportunities. Given

that many refugees found it difcult to secure

satisfactory work during their time in Pakistan or

Iran, this apparently—and unexpectedly—unequal

situation in their homeland often left them feeling

despondent.

Some respondents, often males, said that they

experienced social acceptance and a welcoming

attitude at a relatively early stage of reintegration

among the receiving population—whether or not

they themselves felt that they tted in.

125

Some key

factors for this more immediate acceptance were:

pre-existing social relationships, strong ties that

had been maintained with relatives during exile,

and markers of status. If a returnee was a socially

respectable person in the community (e.g. in a

position of inuence, religiously devout, or able to

bring benet to others), he or she was less likely to

face harassment. This kind of inuence depended on

who occupied that shared space, who the returnee

was (e.g. not being an obvious target for harassment

or physically not tting in to the local context), and

who comprised the population that had remained

(such as those who are compassionate, patient and

understanding towards newcomers or see some

benet to be gleaned from the returnee).

Importance of external support

Regardless of the social status of returnees, crucial

external support has often been provided simply

through the generous understanding of others

because in some cases, if not most, the receiving

population have also experienced displacement

of some duration. The positive inuence of those

in positions of some authority over the receiving

communities adds to this, particularly in limited

social spaces (such as within a school or village). For

125 Not all respondents found themselves either “accepted” or

“unaccepted” – their experiences are not clear cut in this way, and

were sometimes expressed as more vague or neutral feelings.

of the diversity of the Afghan people.

123

While many

of them would have inherited certain perceptions

of these issues from their parents and relatives,

the more dominant feeling of “difference” was—

as refugees—the sense of having an inferior status

compared to the citizens of that country. As

refugees born or brought up in Pakistan and Iran,

the Afghan national identity tended to overshadow

ethnic, religious or political afliations.

124

“My brother learnt masonry in Iran and he built our

house himself. But in Herat, he says that there is

no work for him because it is dominated by groups

of construction companies. [...] It doesn’t matter

if you’re returned refugee or not, you just need

someone who knows you.”

— 19-year-old female ofce employee in Herat

working as a breadwinner of her household

For returned second-generation Afghan refugees

looking for employment, especially those unfamiliar

with the local environment, their lack of networks

in their new environment is a formidable obstacle.

Some familiarity with the job situation in the new

context is critical, even when returnees have had

the experience of self-employment or acquiring

skills dur ing exile. To be successfully self-employed,

some kind of guarantee, connections with a partner,

capital or a combination of these is needed,

particularly for economically vulnerable groups

with fewer connections. Notably, respondents who

were relatively wealthy and had strong extended

family networks did not mention serious concerns

about employ ment.

Similarly, a sense of marginalisation caused by

123 For example, an uneducated married male who had returned

from Peshawar discovered Uzbeks speaking their own language for the

rst time when he came to resettle in Kabul.

124 It has been claimed that a homogenous Afghan identity

rst emerged during the extended periods of exile and through

the experience of external threats to Afghanistan. See Dupree,

“Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan”; Centlivres

and Centlivres-Demont, “State, National Awareness and Levels of

Identity in Afghanistan from Monarchy to Islamic State,” Central Asian

Survey 19, no.3/4 (2000): 419-28; Schetter, “Ethnoscapes, National

Territorialisation, and the Afghan War.”

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

While this female respondent had adapted herself

through gradually interacting with villagers and

developing attachment to watan, her brother had

became more isolated—could not adapt himself in

these circumstances, no one understood him, and he

had no friend except the one who encouraged him

to leave for Iran through smugglers. The difference

that divided these siblings, who both had the same

quality education in Iran, was the degree of each

one’s social and personal reintegration within their

contexts. The brother remained in isolation, even

from family ties, and sought a safe place with a new

friend who took him out of Afghanistan by illegal

means. In contrast to his sister, who overcame her

initial hesitation to teach at an informal school, the

brother continued to not interact with others, and

his abilities were not utilised; instead, he became

de-motivated. Although personality and individual

resilience are important in this comparison between

sister and brother, the isolation and failure of social

and personal adjustment are also critical points to

note. These could be potentially mitigated through

external relationships and support, including the

opportunity to participate among others and share

internal struggles and experiences.

7.4 Personal fullment

While some returnees managed to live in

Afghanistan, some continue to see themselves as

not blending in with the environment—as having a

“different social self” to those around them. The

extent to which returnees come to feel a shared

identity with those around them and nd that

place socially and emotionally comfortable tends

to inuence their process of adaptation as well

as their long-term settlement outcomes. This is a

reverse process of what they used to experience:

many second-generation Afghan refugees grew up

among Pakistanis/Iranians and found familiarity with

the environment while continuously questioning

themselves as not belonging in a real sense in

contrast to other citizens. One notable feature

among the respondents in this study is that—with a

few exceptions—it is those who are better educated

(both males and females) who have tended to face

greater social and emotional contradictions during

their process of reintegration, which is possibly

Before eeing

family background•

ight condition•

memories•

Experience in Pakistan/Iran

living place (regulation, reception)•

opportunities•

social networks and Afghan community•

Return decision, conditions, timing

property ownership•

pre-arrangements (visits, work, information)•

social networks•

Impressions on arrival

example, if teachers introduce returnee students

positively to their classmates (“This student is

from Pakistan, don’t ght or make arguments”),

give equal punishment for misbehaviour and show

acceptance of diversity, respondents are more

likely to feel, and be, accepted. As the data

from this study shows, some returnees may be

excluded and disappointed due to their obviously

different appearance, but they may still end up

successfully reintegrating—the result of external

encouragement, self-resilience, the passage of

time and identication with watan.

“I don’t know where I feel at home. I always ask

myself this question but I haven’t got the answer

yet. Still in Afghanistan now I don’t feel relaxed, I

don’t know why. Maybe my real home is somewhere

else. I’m still looking for my real home. Maybe in

the future, I will nd somewhere.”

— 19-year-old female student in Kabul

who often thinks of Pakistan

On the other hand, lack of opportunity to nd one’s

own place in Afghanistan, isolation (from family,

society, school, workplace, etc.) and associated

depressions—combined with other material issues—

tend to cause the social exclusion of some returnees,

and to escalate remembering the positive aspects of

Pakistan and Iran as a better option. For example,

a story of a 17-year-old married teacher and her

brother highlights the comparative outcomes of

returnees’ reintegration. Both did not want to

leave Iran and upon return to their native village

in Hazarajad, they could not eat the local food or

communicate with the villagers, and wanted to go

back to Iran. While her maternal uncle encouraged

them to teach at an informal school, they didn’t want

to do this because of her difculties under standing

the local dialect. With repeated encouragement

from a liberal relative, even in the face of initial

community resistance against a female teacher, she

gradually became involved in community activities

and stopped thinking about Iran while her brother

could not make himself participate. She gradually

found herself useful in relation to others, but her

educated brother left for Iran.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

mechanisms. Some respondents in this study

described gradual change and adaptation of their

ideas with little resistance as time passed, while

others spoke of feeling compelled to adjust their

public image in response to social norms, while

clinging to their own personal values—creating a

degree of internal conict between their private

and public personas.

Hatred for watan: “Afghanistan doesn’t care

for me”

A 30-year-old single returnee woman from Iran, who

ed from two forced marriages and an attempt at

a third, does not even know her native province.

Through these experiences while in asylum she

formed intense feelings of hatred towards Afghans

and Afghanistan, believing instead that Iranian men

generally behaved respectfully towards women.

“Afghanistan has bad people. I would prefer to live

in an Iranian jail than here.”

Women reported more profound emotional

difculties on return to Afghanistan because of

the stricter social norms and expectations of

their behaviour there, an outcome similar to

other existing studies observed in the return

decision-making. The new situations they faced

were generally quite different from those they

experienced in Pakistan and Iran. Women’s reduced

mobility in Afghanistan—subject to issues of security,

social norms and availability of facilities (e.g.

unreliable public transportation)

126

—exemplies the

unfavourable environ ment for many women upon

return.

127

The behaviours that they had been used to

in the country of refuge were commonly perceived

as too “free” for women in Afghanistan, where

the reputation of the family is largely dependent

on the perception of its women as “honourable”

126 Limited infrastructure in Afghanistan except among selected

urban settlers reduced access to information, particularly internet

usage among some young women in their teens who used to have

relatively easy access for communicating with external society at

home in Pakistan/Iran.

127 A very small proportion of female respondents were allowed by

their families to maintain their relatively high mobility after returning

to Afghanistan.

linked to more exposure to “open-minded” ideas

in their previous lives. Among those who were less

educated and of a lower economic status, their

primary struggle was against material decit and

physical insecurity, which many of them had faced

in exile as well.

Returnee perceptions of Afghans who remained

in Afghanistan

Nearly all respondents—regard less of their

education, gender, extent of material difculties

and level of social accep tance or emotional

contentment—expressed generally negative, stereo-

typical perceptions of their Afghan counterparts

who had grown up in Afghanistan during the war

years. Words used to describe their compatriots

included: aggressive, rude, uneducated, ill-

mannered and physically dirty. While admitting

to some weaknesses such as confusion over their

self identity, many returnee respondents—both

educated and uneducated—saw themselves as

more open-minded than those who had remained

in Afghanistan, having experienced new people and

cultures in Pakistan or Iran. In particular, among

educated returnees, criticism of the “inferior”

material culture of Afghans who had remained was

common. Based on values formed while growing

up in Pakistan or Iran, returnees often feel in a

position to evaluate the situation in Afghanistan

from an outsider’s pers pective; as an example,

some women who had returned from Iran saw

many of their female peers in their homeland as

un-Islamic. As a result of these differences and

feelings of estrangement felt by many returnees

in comparison with those who had remained, being

socially accepted was not necessarily enough for

what could be considered “full” reintegration, in

particular for that sense of personal fullment and

being at ease in an Afghan context.

Conict with Afghan values and social norms

In order to address or combat feelings of difference,

many returnees end up adjusting their behaviour

and actions to t in with the new environment,

which occurs either naturally or more intentionally.

Personal maturity also inuences a returnee’s

values and may strengthen their internal coping

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

cur rent place, there is great variation in the detail

of that emotion. Some have strug gled enormously

just to manage to live in their current place and

advise their relatives in exile not to come back to

Afghanistan. Others, however, are highly satised

with their current situation (but this does include

some who also miss life in Pakistan or Iran, perhaps

indicating that they feel emotional ties to more

than one homeland).

Furthermore, not all respondents are xed in their

ideas and future intentions. Even while being

interviewed, some of their opinions and ideas

appeared to be contradictory—revealing their

ongoing internal struggles swinging between two

spaces at the same time, and lack of clarity about

the future. It is, therefore, difcult to classify

respondents in terms of their future intentions;

it can be said, however, that nearly half intend,

at present, to remain in their current place of

residence in Afghanistan. These second-generation

Afghan returnees tend to maintain strong ties with

the place where they grew up and, in terms of

their emotional attachment, do not make much of

a distinction between the two countries. They exist

simultaneously among multiple spaces, inuenced

by a range of values which dene their identities.

Regardless of permanent settlement or not, many

wish or have plans to visit Pakistan or Iran in the

near future, primarily to see relatives and friends

(Afghans, Pakistanis and Iranians), to see the place

of memories, for work purposes, or because they

are bored in Afghanistan.

129

For the eight respondents who intend to move to an

urban location, the primary reason for this is to have

better access to facilities and employment. Three

male respondents who were living in urban areas

had left their villages in order to pursue further

education; this is one of the primary reasons that

rural respondents (both educated and uneducated)

gave for their preference to settle in cities—to

have access to education for their children beyond

primary school. Over a quarter of respondents still

hope or expect to leave Afghanistan in the future,

129 Fourteen returnees out of 48, mostly men and from Pakistan,

visited Pakistan or Iran after returning to Afghanistan. Visiting Iran

includes using both legal and illegal means, due to a lack of legal

documentation.

and “Afghan.” Particularly in a changing society,

women are expected to transfer knowledge of their

culture to the next generation, so appearance and

attitudes that are perceived as “foreign” are often

cited as evidence of women having abandoned their

culture.

128

For those women who have lived in an Afghan

enclave in Pakistan or Iran, returning to Afghanistan

may not signicantly affect their mobility. Women’s

lives tend to be shaped by contextual factors—

not only the space in which they exist, the kind

of people and social norms that exist there, but

also family context and changes in their status

in relation to men (for example, getting married

or becoming widowed). Even so, for less mobile

women, the sense of living in their own watan often

gives them the strength to face material difculties

and personal frustrations—if they dene watan

positively in relation to themselves, and as long as

the balance of factors affecting resettlement does

not dramatically shift to the limit of basic needs.

The stresses and internal contradictions that

returnees face during the process of adjustment to

their homeland may, if they exist along with other

negative factors, reach a tipping point that will

lead them to wish to leave again. This is a critical

point to note: second-generation refugees may have

returned to Afghanistan for now, but they may not

necessarily be content there nor feel that they “t

in” to the place where they are sup posed to stay

for the long term—leaving the potential for future

movement to a place where they believe they will

be more at ease.

7.5 Reintegration prospects

Table 8 shows some general trends in the intentions

of the 48 second-generation Afghan returnees in

this study who live in Kabul, Herat and Baghlan

provinces. There is no clear-cut pattern to their

emotional responses to the reintegration process.

Even among those who share a desire to stay in their

128 See A. Rayaprol, “Being American, Learning to be Indian: Gender

and Generation in the Context of Transnational Migration,” in Women

and Migration in Asia, Volume 1, ed. M. Thapan, (New Delhi/Thousand

Oaks/London: Sage, 2005), 130-149.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

but with many varied reasons for wanting to do so

and for their preferred location. In summary, some

respondents changed their perceptions of life as a

returned refugee in the watan during reintegration,

in comparison to how they had thought they would

respond prior to return. Some who resisted returning

to Afghanistan have found a satisfactory life there,

primarily because they have been able to nd a

solution for their own particular problems or discover

a path to personal development. In contrast, three

of those who were originally willing to return to

Afghanistan are now thinking of leaving, mainly

because of disappointment related to corruption,

isolation and limited work opportunities.

Table 8: Future intentions of 48 returnee respondents

Intention: to stay in Afghanistan Intention: to leave Afghanistan

Remain in current

place

Urbanise, move to

another city

Labour migration

Return to Pakistan/

Iran (or move

elsewhere in

Afghanistan)

Transnational

marriage

26 (15 M, 11F) 8 (3 M, 5 F) 4 (4 M) 9 (2 M, 7 F) 1 (1 F)

Note: This study is based on data collected during just a few interviews over a short period: it is based on respondents’ ideas expressed in

a particular social environ ment at the time of the research–a snapshot of their feelings at that time, in that place.

It’s true that now I’m relaxed and free [in Herat].

Still, I don’t forget Iran and want to visit Iran

every year. Because my past life and memories are

in Iran. [...] I like Afghanistan very much as well.

But there is no memory in Afghanistan, because I

grew up in Iran. [...] I feel that I’m an Afghan but

in real, I feel sometimes that I’m a hybrid.

— 22-year-old female home-based

teacher, grew up in Tehran

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

Afghans living as refugees in Pakistan and Iran,

particularly those of the second generation,

commonly face situations in different contexts and

spaces in which they feel they need to adjust their

behaviour, either supercially or more profoundly.

In cases where refugees have tried to conceal their

Afghan-ness and status as mohajerin in order to

blend into the host society (more frequently in

Iran), they often feel conicted between these

attempts to assimilate and the ongoing feelings of

social exclusion, due to their legal impossibility of

belonging. For some, the energy it takes to blend

in are too demanding and they are more motivated

to return to Afghanistan. Others, however, strongly

resist returning to Afghanistan; as the deportation

campaign and negative perceptions toward Afghans

in Iran grow, some Afghans increasingly try to

choose a strategy of invisibility by denying their

links to Afghanistan.

Despite having grown up outside their homeland,

the majority of respondents in this study clung to

some kind of emotional tie to Afghanistan while

in exile. Learning about Afghanistan while living

outside was not a straightforward process; many

respondents had developed conicting perceptions

of their own country, holding both positive thoughts

and negative concerns about how life could be

there. The sense of “non-belonging” in Pakistani

and Iranian society impacted upon their attitudes

toward an idealised national homeland, regardless

of their degree of assimilation into the host society.

This was also accentuated when they felt that they

had been deprived of rights or socially excluded

for being “inferior” residents of the host country.

Second-generation refugees’ experiences in both

the private and public spheres, along with the

combination of other push and pull factors, deeply

affect their perceptions of future prospects in

Afghanistan, and, consequently, their intentions

related to return.

Based on data collected in this study, most second-

generation refugees living in Pakistan and Iran view

their lives in exile as non-permanent and accept

For second-generation Afghan refugees, returning to

their “homeland” as well as efforts at reintegration

are highly complex and uid processes. The

meaning of homeland in relation to self-identity

is constantly reconstructed through interactions

with different people and experiences as life

unfolds in their new environment: the majority of

second-generation refugees have had little or no

experience living in Afghanistan prior to “returning”

there. Understanding the characteristics, return

intentions and reintegration patterns of this

signicant population of young Afghans living

away from their country is of critical importance

to ensuring that both Afghanistan and the young

returnees themselves benet from the experience

of return, and that the remaining Afghan population

in neighbouring countries and ongoing cross-border

movements are managed in the best possible

ways.

The formation of identity for second-generation

Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran is heavily

inuenced by their surrounding environments, along

with individual personality, family background,

ties to relatives and communities, gender and

location. The nature of the host society is also

of key importance; this is not only related to the

refugees’ attitude toward it but also in terms of

the broader political and cultural issues at play.

For youth and young adult refugees in a country

that is not considered their own, the complexity

of establishing “who they are” is exacerbated by

their participation in two concurrent contexts—the

Afghan family sphere and the Pakistani or Iranian

social sphere—and also by being at the adolescent

stage of development. Their values and ideals,

shaped by the challenging situations they have faced

as refugees who do not have a strong connection

with their “home” country, are in many cases

markedly different to those of their parents and

of their peers who had remained in Afghanistan—

having found greater familiarity in living in Pakistan

and Iran and the way of life there (although also

having interpersonal contradictions at times).

Part 8: Conclusion

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

host population. They are also in a position to see

the situation in Afghanistan through the lens of an

“outsider” and to compare life there with that in

Pakistan and Iran. For those returnees who do not

resettle easily into life at “home” in Afghanistan,

the temptation to remember the positives about

life in Pakistan or Iran is great, and fuels further

questioning about where their future will be. This

is in a way similar to the decision-making process

around whether or not to repatriate.

This study found that the notion of being in one’s

own watan or “homeland” was a key pull factor

in encouraging Afghan refugees to return from

Pakistan and Iran as expectations that their rights

as a citizen would be ensured; this was true even for

those younger members of the second generation

who in many cases have stronger ties to the country

in which they have grown up. The sense of comfort

derived from being in their home country, along

with appropriate external support, has also been

shown to help them confront the difculties they

face in settling down—in often harsher conditions

than they had experienced in the country of exile.

In returning to their homeland, the expectation of

many second-generation Afghan refugees is that

they are coming to a place in which their rights

to equal treatment and opportunities as respected

citizens of the country are ensured, and where they

will have freedom of movement and residence, and

access to resources, livelihoods and property. This

expectation is not always fullled.

The degree of an individual’s relationship to, and

identication with, his or her “homeland” is a

critical point when considering the long-term fate of

second-generation returnees. Many returnees draw

upon the patience and resilience they developed

as refugees in their determination to adjust to life

in their homeland, and in return they achieve the

sense of “freedom” they had sought. However, this

coping mechanism for the sake of remaining in the

watan has a limit: if the balance of factors reaches

a tipping point, it can lead to disappointment in

the watan and re-migration. If this occurs, even

stronger pull factors are required to bring refugees

back again to Afghanistan.

the inevitability of return. This is in part because

of emotional ties to their homeland (despite little

actual experience in the country) and also because

of their unfavourable status as mohajerin as

long as they remain in the host country—a status

fundamentally rooted in a legal distinction. For

the majority of those remaining in Pakistan and

Iran however, a nal decision about whether or not

to return to Afghanistan has not yet been made

and the issue is open to further inuence by the

constantly evolving mix of factors. Many refugees

express great interest in going back at least once

to see and experience Afghanistan, but are open

to re-migrating if the return is not successful. This

optimistic attitude towards return and anticipated

continuous population movement across borders

are key points to note about second-generation

refugees since they exist alongside deep links and

emotional ties to the locations in which they grew

up.

The return of refugees to their homeland may in fact

bring about “the reverse condition of a refugee”

130

—

more so for those of the second generation. Upon

repatriation, a process of adaptation to the “new”

context must take place for returning refugees in

which the unease of being in a different environment

and adopting unfamiliar societal norms are again

the cause of varying degrees of emotional difculty.

For refugees who have lived most or all of their

lives outside their own country, the experience of

feeling foreign does not necessarily end as expected

in their homeland. These stresses combine with a

range of interplaying factors to present serious

challenges to successful reintegration—materially,

socially and emotionally.

The sense of attachment that second-generation

refugees feel to the locations they have experienced

living in comes from both familiarity with the

general environment as well as personal ties they

have developed with people there. They often

differentiate between Pakistan or Iran as a country

(the social structure, physical environment and

population in general) and the people who form

their daily networks, such as extended families

and friends—either Afghans or members of the

130 T. Ghanem, “When Forced Migrants Return ‘Home’,” 15.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

with their personal background and context. The

process of reintegration is not a simple movement

of population, nor is the group of returnees

homogeneous. These differences have to be

carefully examined for facilitating their more

permanent settlement in Afghanistan.

The situation for second-generation Afghan

refugees who have grown up in regional exile

cannot be generalised. They have experienced

a broad range of circumstances depending on

their particular place of residence inuenced by

political and social dynamics there, in combination

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

in Afghanistan to prepare appropriately for the

employment market they will face on return.

Priority access should be given to vulnerable

groups such as those in households headed

by women or children, those without formal

education, those with disabilities, and those

who are jobless in their country of refuge.

Local residents of Pakistan and Iran who are

economically vulnerable may also benet from

this training.

2. Facilitating realistic resettlement planning:

Information and visits

For those young refugees with fewer social •

networks and other assets to support themselves

after return, it is crucial that reliable sources

are used to provide accurate information on

support systems available in Afghanistan to

returnees (e.g. land allocation, employment

services and the National Skills Development

Programme) as well as local contacts in

Afghanistan in order to access employment

information in the location of resettlement. In

collaboration with the governments of Pakistan

and Iran, this information could be conveyed to

refugee youth through radio and other media.

Realistic resettlement planning is crucial •

prior to return as evidenced in the data of

recent returnees, particularly from Pakistan.

The Governments of Iran and Afghanistan are

encouraged to engage in further bilateral talks

to facilitate greater access to preparatory

visits by young refugees, many of whom have

overwhelmingly uneasy perceptions toward

Afghanistan because of having never seen or

experienced it in reality.

3. Education in transition: A key concern for

second-generation Afghan refugees

One key reason that second-generation Afghan •

refugees do not want to return is because their

education could possibly be discontinued.

Their fear of losing the opportunity to be

educated must be addressed; the Government

This study’s primary aim is to inform existing policy

and to contribute to programme development.

These nal recommendations, therefore, are

primarily aimed at the governments of Afghanistan,

Pakistan and Iran, along with donors, international

organisations and concerned stakeholders. They

draw out key points from the foregoing analysis

that could potentially shift the uctuating factors

affecting second-generation refugees in favour

of voluntary return and positive reintegration

experiences. It must be recognised that the

prevailing situation for refugees in Pakistan and

Iran, and for those who have recently returned to

Afghanistan, is in some ways not the same as it

was at the time of the research; in fact, being at

the intersection of a broad range of interplaying

factors, it is indeed always subject to change.

The lessons drawn from this study incorporate

suggestions made by senior representatives of the

Afghan government, donors, and the aid community,

following discussion and feedback received during

workshops conducted by the Afghanistan Research

and Evaluation Unit in Kabul, December 2007.

Voluntary return: reducing the risks of

reintegration failure

1. Improving work skills and access to employment

during transition: enhancing the capacity to take

risks related to return and reintegration

The Government of Afghanistan, in coordination •

with those of Pakistan and Iran, and the support

of donors, should engage in continuous efforts

to develop the skills of refugee youth, driven

by the demand and needs of the local labour

market in Afghanistan. Many of these youth

are expected to be the breadwinner of their

household.

Existing training centres and technical courses •

in cities and refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran

should be improved with facilities focused on

the needs of the Afghan market; this is aimed at

assisting refugee youth who lack job contacts

Part 9: Recommendations

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

international agencies, the Government of

Afghanistan should develop a comprehensive

communications strategy targeting young

refugees. Promotional campaigns, delivered via

a range of media and community outlets, should

highlight the importance of one’s homeland

to motivate young Afghans to return. While

acknowledging their diverse backgrounds,

the campaigns should also emphasise a sense

of unity among Afghans, encouraging them

to serve their own country. It is important to

create positive motivation for voluntary return

rather than from deportation pressure, which

leads to strong resistance to returning to

Afghanistan.

Complex reintegration: Inuencing the

balancing of factors

1. Promoting emotional security: Advocacy for

social inclusion and anti-discrimination policies

The process of returning “home” for many •

second-generation Afghan refugees is often

accompanied by great emotional stress

(particularly among women), signicantly

threatening successful long-term resettlement.

The Government of Afghanistan, together

with international agencies, should develop

media campaigns that advocate for social

acceptance and non-discriminatory treatment

of all Afghans (including returnees). These

campaigns should encourage such social

inclusion particularly in the public sphere

(e.g. schools). Such efforts could increase the

receiving communities’ understanding of the

transition faced by young returnees and help

them provide encouragement to returnees

adjusting to different values and adapting

to being “home”. Sustained government-led

advocacy to raise awareness of anti-corruption

policies could play a key role in promoting

solidarity among all Afghans.

Education programmes that promote the equal •

treatment of all people should be provided for

those in positions of authority in a community

(such as teachers, headmasters and mullahs).

Community-based mechanisms to regulate

discrimination against returnees could also be

of Afghanistan, with support from the

international community, should continue

to improve access to quality education in

Afghanistan (particularly beyond the primary

level in rural areas).

In coordination with the governments of the •

two host countries, the Afghan government

should actively facilitate securing legal status

for Afghan schools in Pakistan and Iran as places

where second-generation Afghan refugees can

prepare themselves with some qualications

for return. Through encouragement by Afghan

teachers, these young people may develop

a positive Afghan identity that could lead to

a desire to serve Afghanistan. Incentives to

draw talented students to the country may

be provided through vacation-time internship

opportunities, offered by the Afghan

government, private companies, or civil

society.

Clearer and more accessible procedures •

should be in place for the approval and

acceptance of certications from schools and

universities in the neighbouring countries,

particularly in the case of Pakistan where the

language of instruction may differ from that

of Afghanistan. Currently, standardised and

accessible information about these approval

procedures is lacking, and at the same

time there are many reports of procedures

affected by bribery, contributing to returnees’

negative perceptions of their homeland. The

Government of Afghanistan should establish a

“one-stop shop” in the Ministry of Education,

staffed by knowledgeable personnel who

can provide accurate information about

accrediting qualications and can process

certications efciently. This service should

be openly accessible to students seeking

consultations not only inside Afghanistan but

also at multiple locations in Pakistan and Iran;

this would help students avoid having to return

to the neighbouring countries to complete the

approval process.

4. Advocacy: Positive motivation for return

In collaboration with the governments of •

Pakistan and Iran and with the support of

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

involve actively employing returnees as

teachers, literacy trainers and health workers

in community organisations where their

exposure to new ideas while in exile could

positively affect local communities. In areas

of high concentration of returnees, their skills

should be specically identied and recorded

by the local government. This information

should be effectively mobilised to the benet

of the community as a whole; this may be

done in coordination with aid agencies through

strategised programming and implementation of

development projects. This programme should

include not only professional service providers

but also those in elds such as business and

trade, skilled workers, technicians and others.

Female members of vulnerable returnee •

families are often unable to work in Afghanistan

because of restrictive social norms. This may

reduce household responsiveness to survival

crises, prompting remigration. The Ministry

of Women’s Affairs, along with the Ministry

of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the

Disabled, and NGOs, should improve existing

efforts to provide more market-oriented,

culturally sensitive livelihood opportunities for

economically vulnerable women in rural and

urban areas.

3. Meeting material needs during reintegration

Second-generation Afghan returnees of a lower •

socioeconomic status and without skills and

basic education should be key beneciaries

of programmes providing material support.

These include opportunities for the provision

of labour-intensive work (such as through

water and sanitation programmes), skills

training that matches market needs (such

as through the National Skills Development

Programme), priority access to housing and

land allocation, and microcredit and business

development services (e.g. the Micronance

Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan

and the National Area-Based Development

Programme). In some cases, adjustments to

programme requirements could ensure that

returnees qualify for, for example, loans

through micronance institutions.

developed. Concerned government ministries

that work with youth (such as the Ministry of

Education) can work in close coordination to

develop such programmes.

It is important to reduce the risk of isolation •

and loneliness among second-generation

refugees returning to Afghanistan, particularly

for those who have few existing networks

there. This could be achieved by supporting

NGOs in the formation of community groups.

For example, youth jirgas could be established

for young female and male returnees to share

experiences in separate-sex groups and have

opportunities for self-development as they

also serve their community. These efforts

should include promoting support among family

members to ensure that girls and women are

permitted to participate in these groups.

As a part of more long-term social and economic •

programming, the reintegration process of

selected second-generation returnees should

be monitored not only at the time of initial

return but also over the medium and long

terms. The lessons accumulated from this

initiative could be applied to improve further

programming for permanent resettlement.

2. Enhancing opportunities for employment

The Afghan government, donors, civil society •

and the private sector must cooperate to

create access to jobs for vulnerable groups,

particularly those who do not have connections

or means to enter the job market in Afghanistan.

The outreach of existing employment service

centres should be extended to more districts

and rural areas; postings should be provided

in local languages and for a wider range of

positions (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled)

compared to limited postings targeting only the

skilled and educated. Local radio stations can

be used to disseminate information. Incen tives

should be provided to employers to post job

vacancies at newly established employment

centres.

Afrmative-action recruitment systems may •

be implemented by the local government

and development organisations. This could

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

The Ministry of Education’s initiative to approve

certicates issued by madrassas in Pakistan and

Iran should be better communicated to those

young refugees remaining in neighbouring

countries in order to ensure the availability of

quality instructors.

5. Understanding vulnerability: Providing

physical security

For those who seriously intend to remain in •

Afghanistan over the long term, security is

inextricably linked to potential economic

development. Concerns about less serious

crimes (such as robbery and theft) and

uneasiness over the unreliability of the police

(related to corruption) were also issues

commonly mentioned by respondents in this

study. To improve the performance and public

image of the police, the Ministry of Interior

Affairs and the international community should

increase the pace of police reform and enforce

penalties for proven corrupt behaviour.

A major frustration for many young female •

returnees is their reduced mobility, resulting

from prevailing social norms in Afghanistan, the

lack of appropriate facilities such as reliable

and secure public transportation, and fears of

kidnapping and harassment. Returnee women,

particularly from Iran, said that stronger

government-led social control, such as the

presence of policewomen in Iran, helped to

reduce harassment against women in public.

Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior Affairs and

the international com munity should strengthen

efforts to recruit female police ofcers and

increase the provision of effective and relevant

gender training for all police ofcers. New laws

should be adopted and existing laws enforced

to protect women’s safety; this will be required

to reduce the anxieties of returnee women.

6. Managing legal migration: Options for gradual

return

A focus on managing—rather than limiting or •

prohibiting labour migration—would better

support the successful resettlement of Afghan

households. Iran’s efforts to stem labour

migration, including making access to formal

The right to own property is one of the key pull •

factors drawing refugees back to Afghanistan.

This is true even for second-generation Afghan

refugees who have less of a connection to their

country based on real living experience but

who aspire to own land or a home. Although

challenging, the existing system of land

allocation should be made more efcient and

transparent. To contribute to improving service

provision, a system for feedback should be

established, incorporating third-party input,

including from randomly selected potential

beneciaries—both elders and youth.

Urban planning processes should take greater •

priority given the increase in urban populations

related to the inux of returnees and internal

migrants. At the same time, attention should

be paid to employment generation in both

urban and rural areas to reduce challenges

related to meeting material needs and to slow

the ow of migrants to urban locations.

4. Meeting the increasing need for quality

education

Donors and civil society must be strongly •

committed to longer-term investment in

post-primary education in urban and rural

areas, reecting the growing needs of young

returnees, both educated and uneducated,

and future generations. To attract highly

qualied students to rural areas, competitive

incentives to enhance access to continuous

education could be provided, for example,

secure transportation and accommodation.

Opportunities in higher education, which are •

not readily available to Afghans in Pakistan

and Iran, are strong pull factors in bringing

educated refugees back to Afghanistan. The

Afghan government should: ensure that equal,

corruption-free opportunities for higher

education in Afghanistan exist; invest in

scholarships for returnees; and improve the

governance of systems that allocate university

places, reducing the perception and reality of

corruption in university admissions processes.

Improving quality Islamic education in urban •

and rural Afghanistan similarly needs attention.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

by providing re-entry visas to those heading to

Afghanistan on reconnaissance visits and by

maintaining support to vulnerable households

that remain in the host country.

It is important to recognise that not all •

Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, rst- and second-

generation alike, will return to Afghanistan

voluntarily in the near future; among these

cases are those who have protection needs

and those who have married Pakistanis

or Iranians. Furthermore, the capacity of

Afghanistan to absorb the vast numbers of

refugees who remain in these neighbouring

countries requires continuous, realistic re-

examination and a consistent humanitarian

approach.

visas difcult and by deporting undocumented

Afghans, simply drive people to illegal migration.

The Afghan government should ensure Afghans

can easily obtain a passport. The Government

of Afghanistan and those of the host countries

should continue their bilateral dialogue to

develop laws and agreements that facilitate

a more manageable migration framework that

reduces illegal migration. This framework

should recognise that all three countries both

send and receive workers.

The gradual return of households is a common •

strategy used by Afghan families to mitigate

the risks associated with repatriation. The

Government of Iran, supported by international

aid agencies, should facilitate these strategies

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

Annex I: Study Sites in Three Countries

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

and industries. Mashhad, with its literal meaning

“the place of martyrdom,” is the second-largest

city in Iran. It is a famous place for Shia pilgrims,

having developed around the tomb of Imam Reza.

In contrast to the relatively high numbers of Afghan

households in Mashhad, there are fewer single

individuals residing there. Isfahan, in the south of

Tehran, hosts a large population of Afghans resident

in outlying or peri-urban areas of the city (e.g.

Dolatabad and Rahnan). It is a historic city that

ourished in the 16th century; a Persian proverb

says, “Isfahan is half of the world.”

Afghanistan

The population of Kabul city, as the country’s

capital, increased from 1.7 million in 2000 to around

three million in 2003—a result of high refugee

return numbers and rural-to-urban migration. The

government estimates about 6.4 million people

(30 percent of the population) live in cities, and

that this will double by 2015.

135

Herat, an ancient

city in western Afghanistan with much historic

architecture, has been the centre of trade to Iran

and beyond. The language spoken in the area is

called Herati, with accents inuenced from the

Persian of eastern Iran. Urban infrastructure has

been relatively well maintained compared to other

cities in Afghanistan. Pul-i-Khumri is the centre

of Baghlan province, and provides a picture of a

smaller provincial town with its peri-urban and

rural surrounding areas. It has a high concentration

of returnees and the unique situation of an active

textile industry in its centre, with ethnic diversity

and returnees from both Iran and Pakistan.

136

135 Government of Afghanistan and international agencies,

“Technical Annex: Urban Development,” in Securing Afghanistan’s

Future (Government of Afghanistan/Asian Development Bank/UNAMA/

UNDP/The World Bank Group, 2004), 2.

136 S. Schütte, Dwindling Industry, Growing Poverty: Urban

Livelihoods in Pul-e Khumri (Kabul: AREU, 2004), 3-4.

Annex II: Location Descriptions

Pakistan

Peshawar district has been the most important

centre for Afghan settlements in Pakistan, and

27.09 percent of all Afghans in Pakistan presently

reside there.

131

North West Frontier Province

(NWFP)—with Peshawar City as its capital—is

traditionally home to Pashto-speaking people and

has maintained many common social and economic

ties with Afghanistan. Quetta district hosts the

second-largest Afghan population in Pakistan (10.93

percent of the total). Baluchistan—with Quetta City

as its capital—is Pakistan’s largest province in land

size (44 percent of the national total) and is rich in

natural gas, but only seven percent of the country’s

population lives there. It is the least developed

province in Pakistan, with many environmental,

economic and human development challenges.

Karachi is the largest city in Pakistan, estimated to

have a population of more than 12 million. It is the

centre of nancial and industrial activities, having

better infrastructure in general, and therefore has

historically attracted migrants both from inside and

outside the country.

132

Iran

More than half of registered Afghans in Iran are

concentrated in three provinces: Tehran (31

percent), Khorasan—with Mashhad as its centre—

(15 percent), and Isfahan (12.6 percent).

133

Afghans

have mostly clustered in cities and towns in Iran.

Tehran is the largest city in Iran and the capital,

with over 12 million people in the province.

134

is the centre of the country’s transport network

131 Registration of Afghans in Pakistan 2007.

132 H. Gazdar, “Karachi, Pakistan: Between Regulation and

Regularization,” in International Migrants and the City, ed. M.Balbo,

151-185 (Venezia: UN-Habitat and dP dipartimento di Pianicazione,

Universita luav di Venezia, 2005).

133 Amayesh 2005. Abbasi-Shavazi, Second-Generation Afghans in

Iran.

134 IRNA, “Tehran Population Increased by 20 Percent Since Last

Statistics,” http://www.payvand.com/news/02/nov/1067.html

(accessed 7 July 2008).

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

Experiences Of Young Afghans Returning “Home” From Pakistan And Iran

Annex III: Key Characteristics of Respondents

137

137 Detailed descriptions and a comparison of respondents’ characteristics with existing quantitative data, as well as a focus on the relevance

and limitations of the respondent group as a representative sample, are explained in each country case study (published separately).

138 According to an existing household survey, illiteracy among the younger generation of Afghans in Iran is less than that of their elders (70

percent of children aged 6 to 16 go to school; 65 percent of girls and 74 percent of boys), while the illiteracy rate is higher among people over 40

years old (56.5 percent)–particularly among women. Overall, the literacy rate for Afghans in Iran is higher than for those in Pakistan (International

Labour Organization, Afghan Households and Workers in Iran (Geneva: ILO, 2006), 42-3.

139 Due to many respondents’ sensitivity about the issue, direct questions about legal status were not usually asked. Researchers gathered what

information they could about this characteristic, sometimes through an informed guess, in other cases it came up through general conversation,

and otherwise it remained unknown. It was clear, however, that the sample included both registered and non-registered refugees in Pakistan and

Iran. The legal status of individuals within households also varied. There were some cases where respondents themselves did not possess legal

documents, while other members of their household did.

Respondents’

Household Background

Timing and

circumstances

of asylum-

seeking

Among the 199 respondents’ households, roughly two-thirds (134) rst arrived in Pakistan or Iran in the 1980s

(between 1979 and 1990); the next largest waves took place in the early 1990s (38), before 1979 (24), and the

latter part of the 1990s (3). Not all households were motivated to move from their homeland because of war-related

issues; other factors included seeking medical treatment, poverty, loss of an income-earning household member,

marriage, protection-related reasons (family disputes or political conict) and higher education or religious study.

Location of

refuge

Given that fewer than 2.5 percent of Afghans settled in camps in Iran, respondents interviewed there were

overwhelmingly urban residents (with some peri-urban dwellers in Isfahan). In Pakistan, camp residents comprised

about a quarter of the sample, but these camps were within day-trip distance from Peshawar. In both countries,

little developed and border areas were not covered during eldwork due to security concerns and operational

feasibility, which was covered by information received from returnees inside Afghanistan.

Respondents’ Individual Characteristics

Age

The mean age of respondents across the three countries under study was 23 years (24 for males, 22 for

females). The mean age at which they got married was relatively higher among respondents in Iran (23 for

males, 19 for females) compared to those in Pakistan (21 for males, 17 for females); this was presumably

related to the higher proportion of educated respondents in Iran. However, data regarding returnees from

Iran (from interviews conducted in Afghanistan) indicated some notably early marriages, including a female

who had been married at 10 years old and a male at 13 years-old. More than one-third of respondents (71)

were born outside Afghanistan; most others left at an early age (under 10 years), and a small number left at

10 years or older.

Education and

occupation

Among respondents interviewed in Iran, those who were highly educated were over-represented—a quarter

had studied beyond 12th grade. This was because of the use of school and higher education networks to

identify respondents, and associated difculties nding second-generation Afghan refugees without any formal

schooling to take part in the study; single male labour migrants often did not meet the criteria of living

outside Afghanistan for more than half of their lives). There was also a higher proportion of teachers and ofce

clerks compared to labourers among respondents in Iran. Only four respondents without formal schooling were

interviewed in Iran, while this was a characteristic of nearly one-third of respondents interviewed in Pakistan.

Among returnees interviewed in Afghanistan, around half of these who did not have any formal secular education

belonged to households in the lowest wealth category in this study, but there was also one from the highest

wealth category. The household’s context (such as its socioeconomic situation and related values) was not the

only reason for respondents not attending school; this also depended on the country of refuge.

138

Across each of the three countries studied, roughly a quarter of male respondents were not engaged in paid

work at the time of interview (this includes students, unless they were also working as teachers or engaged in

another income-earning activity). More than half of female respondents did not work for an income. In terms

of mobility, girls and women—both in neighbouring countries and in Afghanistan—were often restricted to

spaces considered honourable and safe for females.

Legal status

139

Among respondents who had grown up in Iran, the majority had some legal documentation to justify their

presence in the country, although there were some who did not have any documentation at all.

There were a few cases of respondents in Iran who possessed Iranian national documents (citizenship), as well as

some cases of this in Pakistan. At the time of eldwork in Pakistan, Proof of Registration (PoR) cards had not yet

been introduced

and very few respondents were aware of the forthcoming registration process. PoR cards were

initially provided valid until the end of 2009, which was later extended until the end of 2012.

AREU Synthesis Paper Series

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